The West Papua Issue in a Regional Context
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Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-49128-0 — Democracy and Nationalism in Southeast Asia Jacques Bertrand Index More Information
Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-49128-0 — Democracy and Nationalism in Southeast Asia Jacques Bertrand Index More Information Index 1995 Mining Law, 191 Authoritarianism, 4, 11–13, 47, 64, 230–31, 1996 Agreement (with MNLF), 21, 155–56, 232, 239–40, 245 157–59, 160, 162, 165–66 Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, 142, 150, 153, 157, 158–61, 167–68 Abu Sayaff, 14, 163, 170 Autonomy, 4, 12, 25, 57, 240 Accelerated development unit for Papua and Aceh, 20, 72, 83, 95, 102–3, 107–9 West Papua provinces, 131 Cordillera, 21, 175, 182, 186, 197–98, 200 Accommodation. See Concessions federalism, 37 Aceh Peace Reintegration Agency, 99–100 fiscal resources, 37 Aceh Referendum Information Centre, 82, 84 fiscal resources, Aceh, 74, 85, 89, 95, 98, Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 101, 103, 105 Agency, 98 fiscal resources, Cordillera, 199 Act of Free Choice, 113, 117, 119–20, 137 fiscal resources, Mindanao, 150, 156, 160 Administrative Order Number 2 (Cordillera), fiscal resources, Papua, 111, 126, 128 189–90, See also Ancestral domain Indonesia, 88 Al Hamid, Thaha, 136 jurisdiction, 37 Al Qaeda, 14, 165, 171, 247 jurisdiction, Aceh, 101 Alua, Agus, 132, 134–36 jurisdiction, Cordillera, 186 Ancestral Domain, 166, 167–70, 182, 187, jurisdiction, Mindanao, 167, 169, 171 190, 201 jurisdiction, Papua, 126 Ancestral Land, 184–85, 189–94, 196 Malay-Muslims, 22, 203, 207, 219, 224 Aquino, Benigno Jr., 143, 162, 169, 172, Mindanao, 20, 146, 149, 151, 158, 166, 172 197, 199 Papua, 20, 122, 130 Aquino, Butz, 183 territorial, 27 Aquino, Corazon. See Aquino, Cory See also Self-determination Aquino, Cory, 17, 142–43, 148–51, 152, Azawad Popular Movement, Popular 180, 231 Liberation Front of Azawad (FPLA), 246 Armed Forces, 16–17, 49–50, 59, 67, 233, 236 Badan Reintegrasi Aceh. -
Heads of State Heads of Government Ministers For
UNITED NATIONS HEADS OF STATE Protocol and Liaison Service HEADS OF GOVERNMENT PUBLIC LIST MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNTRY HEAD OF STATE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFGHANISTAN His Excellency Same as Head of State His Excellency Mr. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Mr. Mohammad Haneef Atmar Full Title President of the Islamic Republic of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Afghanistan Republic of Afghanistan Date of Appointment 29-Sep-14 04-Apr-20 ALBANIA His Excellency His Excellency same as Prime Minister Mr. Ilir Meta Mr. Edi Rama Full Title President of the Republic of Albania Prime Minister and Minister for Europe and Foreign Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the Affairs of the Republic of Albania Republic of Albania Date of Appointment 24-Jul-17 15-Sep-13 21-Jan-19 ALGERIA Son Excellence Son Excellence Son Excellence Monsieur Abdelmadjid Tebboune Monsieur Abdelaziz Djerad Monsieur Sabri Boukadoum Full Title Président de la République algérienne Premier Ministre de la République algérienne Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République démocratique et populaire démocratique et populaire algérienne démocratique et populaire Date of Appointment 19-Dec-19 05-Jan-20 31-Mar-19 21/08/2020 Page 1 of 66 COUNTRY HEAD OF STATE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANDORRA Son Excellence Son Excellence Son Excellence Monseigneur Joan Enric Vives Sicília Monsieur Xavier Espot Zamora Madame Maria Ubach Font et Son Excellence Monsieur Emmanuel Macron Full Title Co-Princes de la Principauté d’Andorre Chef du Gouvernement de la Principauté d’Andorre Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Principauté d’Andorre Date of Appointment 16-May-12 21-May-19 17-Jul-17 ANGOLA His Excellency His Excellency Mr. -
West Papua Indonesia
JURISDICTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY PROFILE WEST PAPUA INDONESIA FOREST NO FOREST DEFORESTATION LOW-EMISSION RURAL (1990-2015) DEVELOPMENT (LED-R) AT A GLANCE MANOKWARI • Forests cover 90% of West Papua (WP) with lowest historical DRIVERS OF Illegal logging deforestation rates in Indonesia; WP commits to maintain at DEFORESTATION Legal logging least 70% as protected areas through Manokwari Declaration Large-scale agriculture (MD) & Special Regulation on Sustainable Development Infrastructure development (incl. for transportation) • Special Autonomy (SA) status allows provincial government Data sources: AVERAGE ANNUAL 7.08 Mt CO2 (2010-2015) Socio-economic: BPS regulation-making abilities, more decision-making authority EMISSIONS FROM Includes above-ground biomass Deforestation: Derived & peat decomposition from Ministry of considering local context & access to funding from central DEFORESTATION Environment and government through 2021 AREA 98,593 km2 Forestry data (2018) • ~13% provincial GDP growth from 2003-2012, due in part to POPULATION 937,500 HDI 62.99 (2017) growth in natural gas industry [BP Indonesia Tangguh liquid 57 GDP USD 4.38 billion 3 natural gas (LNG) project] & related sectors, & government (2016, base year 2010) 2 Deforestation spending following creation of province GINI 0.390 (2017) GDP TRILLIONS IDR FREL 40 • WP rural poverty rate (35%; 2017) is more than 2x the MAIN ECONOMIC 2 Manufacturing & national average & wealth is concentrated in urban areas; ACTIVITIES other industry Extraction of infrastructure development aims -
The Past That Has Not Passed: Human Rights Violations in Papua Before and After Reformasi
International Center for Transitional Justice The Past That Has Not Passed: Human Rights Violations in Papua Before and After Reformasi June 2012 Cover: A Papuan victim shows diary entries from 1969, when he was detained and transported to Java before the Act of Free Choice. ICTJ International Center The Past That Has Not Passed: Human Rights Violations in Papua for Transitional Justice Before and After Reformasi The Past That Has Not Passed: Human Rights Violations in Papua Before and After Reformasi www.ictj.org iii International Center The Past That Has Not Passed: Human Rights Violations in Papua for Transitional Justice Before and After Reformasi Acknowledgements The International Center for Transitional Justice and (ICTJ) and the Institute of Human Rights Studies and Advocacy (ELSHAM) acknowledges the contributions of Matthew Easton, Zandra Mambrasar, Ferry Marisan, Joost Willem Mirino, Dominggas Nari, Daniel Radongkir, Aiesh Rumbekwan, Mathius Rumbrapuk, Sem Rumbrar, Andy Tagihuma, and Galuh Wandita in preparing this paper. Editorial support was also provided by Tony Francis, Atikah Nuraini, Nancy Sunarno, Dodi Yuniar, Dewi Yuri, and Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem. Research for this document were supported by Canada Fund. This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of ICTJ and ELSHAM and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union. About the International Center for Transitional Justice ICTJ works to assist societies in regaining humanity in the wake of massive human rights abuses. We provide expert technical advice, policy analysis, and comparative research on transitional justice approaches, including criminal prosecutions, reparations initiatives, truth seeking and memory, and institutional reform. -
INDO 84 0 1195498224 1 39.Pdf (756.2Kb)
Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh: M itigating or Fueling Secessionism? Marcus Mietzner1 Since the 1960s, scholars of separatism have debated the impact of regional autonomy policies and general democratization measures on the strength of secessionist movements in conflict-prone areas. In this heated academic discussion, supporters and critics of political decentralization advanced highly divergent arguments and case studies. On the one hand, numerous authors have identified regional autonomy and expanded democratic rights as effective instruments to settle differences between regions with secessionist tendencies and their central governments.2 In their view, regional autonomy has the potential to address and ultimately eliminate anti-centralist sentiments in local communities by involving them more deeply in political decision-making and economic resource distribution. They point to cases such as Quebec in Canada, where the support for the separatist Parti Quebecois dropped from almost 50 percent in 1981 to only 28.3 percent in the 2007 elections.3 Other examples of successful autonomy regimes frequently mentioned by pro-autonomy academics and policy-makers include Nagaland in India, the Miskito 1 The author would like to thank Edward Aspinall, Harold Crouch, Sidney Jones, Rodd McGibbon, and an anonymous reviewer for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 2 See for instance George Tsebelis, "Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Societies," Journal of Theoretical Politics 2,1 (1990): 5-29; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "Introduction: The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict," in The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, ed. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (London: Routledge, 1993); Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); and Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000). -
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West Papua Report July 2015 This is the 134th in a series of monthly reports that focus on developments affecting Papuans. This series is produced by the non-profit West Papua Advocacy Team (WPAT) drawing on media accounts, other NGO assessments, and analysis and reporting from sources within West Papua. This report is co-published by the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN). Back issues are posted online at http://www.etan.org/issues/wpapua/default.htm Questions regarding this report can be addressed to Edmund McWilliams at [email protected]. If you wish to receive the report directly via e-mail, write to [email protected]. Link to this issue: http://etan.org/issues/wpapua/2015/1507.htm. The Report leads with PERSPECTIVE, an analysis piece; followed by UPDATE, a summary of some recent news and developments; and then CHRONICLE which includes analyses, statements, new resources, appeals and action alerts related to West Papua. Anyone interested in contributing a PERSPECTIVE or responding to one should write to [email protected]. We also welcome suggestions of resources and analysis to for listing in the CHRONICLE section. The opinions expressed in Perspectives are the author's and not necessarily those of WPAT or ETAN. For ongoing news on West Papua subscribe to the reg.westpapua listserv or visit its archive; the list is also available on Twitter. CONTENTS This edition's PERSPECTIVE is an exclusive interview with Zely Airane of the #PapuaItuKita on creative ways they are raising issues involving West Papua in Indonesia. In UPDATE: This Issue highlights the recent Melanesian Spearhead Group summit in the Solomon Islands where the United Movement for the Liberation of West Papua (ULMWP) was given observer status. -
Integration and Conflict in Indonesia's Spice Islands
Volume 15 | Issue 11 | Number 4 | Article ID 5045 | Jun 01, 2017 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Integration and Conflict in Indonesia’s Spice Islands David Adam Stott Tucked away in a remote corner of eastern violence, in 1999 Maluku was divided into two Indonesia, between the much larger islands of provinces – Maluku and North Maluku - but this New Guinea and Sulawesi, lies Maluku, a small paper refers to both provinces combined as archipelago that over the last millennia has ‘Maluku’ unless stated otherwise. been disproportionately influential in world history. Largely unknown outside of Indonesia Given the scale of violence in Indonesia after today, Maluku is the modern name for the Suharto’s fall in May 1998, the country’s Moluccas, the fabled Spice Islands that were continuing viability as a nation state was the only place where nutmeg and cloves grew questioned. During this period, the spectre of in the fifteenth century. Christopher Columbus Balkanization was raised regularly in both had set out to find the Moluccas but mistakenly academic circles and mainstream media as the happened upon a hitherto unknown continent country struggled to cope with economic between Europe and Asia, and Moluccan spices reverse, terrorism, separatist campaigns and later became the raison d’etre for the European communal conflict in the post-Suharto presence in the Indonesian archipelago. The transition. With Yugoslavia’s violent breakup Dutch East India Company Company (VOC; fresh in memory, and not long after the demise Verenigde Oost-indische Compagnie) was of the Soviet Union, Indonesia was portrayed as established to control the lucrative spice trade, the next patchwork state that would implode. -
Pdf IWGIA Statement West Papua 2021
Civil Society Condemns Human Rights Violations against Indigenous Peoples in West Papua An ongoing armed conflict in West Papua between the Indonesian military and the separatist movement finds ordinary Indigenous Peoples caught in the middle, resulting in deaths and violations of their rights. Since 1963, when the Indonesian government formally took administrative control of West Papua1, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) have carried out security operations criticised for their violence and intimidation of Indigenous Peoples2 in West Papua. The TNI have stepped up their military operations3 in West Papua with the aim of ending the separatist movement4 (including but not limited to OPM). Recently, the Indonesian government created a new category called “KKB” (Armed Criminal Group). The group includes people or groups carrying out any confrontational activity in West Papua, but without clearly identifying who this group actually is. Therefore, anyone and any group can be labelled as terrorists. On April 29th 2021 the Indonesia state officially declared any criminal, armed group (KKB) a terrorist group.5 This declaration was announced following the murder of the Indonesian regional intelligence chief6, General I Gusti Putu Danny Karya Nugraha. In response, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo ordered the police and military "to chase and arrest"7 everyone involved in the ”KKB”, and 400 members of the elite Infantry Battalion 3158 were deployed to the easternmost region of West Papua. Over the past three years, the Indonesian state has sent 21,369 troops to the land of Papua9. On the 24th of April 2021, the chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), Bambang Soesatyo, added to these orders against the “KKB” in his statement to “destroy them first. -
AGENDA REV 5 1.Indd
DEWAN PERWAKILAN DAERAH REPUBLIK INDONESIA AGENDA KERJA DPD RI 2017 DATA PRIBADI Nama __________________________________________________________ No. Anggota ___________________________________________________ Alamat _________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________ Telepon/Fax ____________________________________________________ Nomor _________________________________________________________ KTP ____________________________________________________________ Paspor _________________________________________________________ Asuransi _______________________________________________________ Pajak Pendapatan ______________________________________________ SIM ____________________________________________________________ PBB ____________________________________________________________ Lain-lain _______________________________________________________ DATA BISNIS Kantor _________________________________________________________ Alamat _________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________ Telepon/Fax ____________________________________________________ Telex ___________________________________________________________ Lain-lain _______________________________________________________ NOMOR TELEPON PENTING Dokter/Dokter Gigi _____________________________________________ Biro Perjalanan _________________________________________________ Taksi ___________________________________________________________ Stasiun K.A -
Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999
U.S. Department of State, April 2000 Introduction The US Government continues its commitment to use all tools necessary—including international diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence collection and sharing, and military force—to counter current terrorist threats and hold terrorists accountable for past actions. Terrorists seek refuge in “swamps” where government control is weak or governments are sympathetic. We seek to drain these swamps. Through international and domestic legislation and strengthened law enforcement, the United States seeks to limit the room in which terrorists can move, plan, raise funds, and operate. Our goal is to eliminate terrorist safehavens, dry up their sources of revenue, break up their cells, disrupt their movements, and criminalize their behavior. We work closely with other countries to increase international political will to limit all aspects of terrorists’ efforts. US counterterrorist policies are tailored to combat what we believe to be the shifting trends in terrorism. One trend is the shift from well-organized, localized groups supported by state sponsors to loosely organized, international networks of terrorists. Such a network supported the failed attempt to smuggle explosives material and detonating devices into Seattle in December. With the decrease of state funding, these loosely networked individuals and groups have turned increasingly to other sources of funding, including private sponsorship, narcotrafficking, crime, and illegal trade. This shift parallels a change from primarily politically motivated terrorism to terrorism that is more religiously or ideologically motivated. Another trend is the shift eastward of the locus of terrorism from the Middle East to South Asia, specifically Afghanistan. As most Middle Eastern governments have strengthened their counterterrorist response, terrorists and their organizations have sought safehaven in areas where they can operate with impunity. -
24 June 2016 Excellency, I Refer to the Convention on Cluster
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 24 June 2016 Excellency, I refer to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which entered into force on 1 August 2010. The Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits the use, development, production, stockpiling, retaining and transfer of cluster munitions, establishes deadlines for the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions and clearance of unexploded sub-munitions and contains robust provisions on assistance to cluster munition survivors. I welcome the fact that 100 States have become parties to the Convention since its adoption in 2008. I support all efforts aimed at achieving universal adherence to and full implementation of the provisions of the Convention. A widely supported and strictly implemented Convention would benefit the victims of cluster munitions and affected communities, save lives and prevent enormous human suffering. I would therefore like to encourage your country to consider, without delay, becoming a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. By joining the Convention, your country would contribute significantly to the strengthening of international humanitarian law in the interests of promoting international security and preserving human life. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. BAN Ki-moon His Excellency Mr. José Eduardo dos Santos President of the Republic of Angola President of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) Luanda THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 24 June 2016 Excellency, I refer to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which entered into force on 1 August 2010. The Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits the use, development, production, stockpiling, retaining and transfer of cluster munitions, establishes deadlines for the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions and clearance of unexploded sub-munitions and contains robust provisions on assistance to cluster munition survivors. -
Political Reviews
Political Reviews The Region in Review: International Issues and Events, 2017 nic maclellan Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2017 volker boege, mathias chauchat, alumita durutalo, joseph daniel foukona, budi hernawan, michael leach, james stiefvater The Contemporary Pacic, Volume 30, Number 2, 461–547 © 2018 by University of Hawai‘i Press 461 political reviews • melanesia 531 ville. 6 April. https://www.economist.com/ early in the year, revealing that the news/asia/21720327-first-pacific-island country was experiencing cash flow -may-choose-stay-part-france-second problems due to financial mismanage- -could-split-papua [accessed 6 Feb 2018] ment (Aatai 2017a). It was alleged by The National. 2017a. Micah Vows to former Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Cancel apec. 31 May. https://www Lilo that the government’s reserve .thenational.com.pg/micah-vows-cancel had been reduced within two years -apec/ [accessed 6 Feb 2018] from si$1.5 billion to si$150 million ———. 2017b Polye Pledges to Help (si$100 = us$12.63). As a result, the B’ville Gain Independence. 19 May. government had to borrow to pay its https://www.thenational.com.pg/polye bills and settle other financial com- -pledges-help-bville-gain-independence/ mitments (sibc 2017b). Minister of [accessed 6 Feb 2018] Finance Snyder Rini assured the gen- Tlozek, Erik. 2017. Papua New Guinea eral public that government finances Loses UN Vote over Unpaid Annual Con- were stable and under control. This tributions. abc News (Australia), 23 Feb. was contrary to the government’s http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-24/ actual financial performance through- papua-new-guinea-loses-un-vote-over out the year because the government -unpaid-contributions/8298486 continued to delay the payment of [accessed 13 Feb 2018] bills and meeting its financial com- Vari, Mathew.