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Disclaimer Master’s Thesis The Inevitable Stalemate: A Two-Level Game Analysis of the Futenma Base Relocation in Okinawa 불가피한 교착상태: 오키나와현 후텐마 기지 이전에 대한 투 레벨 게임 분석 August 2017 Graduate School of Seoul National University International Cooperation Graduate School of International Studies Daniel Richard Michito Claxton Copyright © 2017 by Daniel Richard Michito Claxton All Rights Reserved Abstract The Inevitable Stalemate: A Two-Level Game Analysis of the Futenma Base Relocation in Okinawa Daniel Claxton International Cooperation Graduate School of International Studies Seoul National University Ever since the 1995 Okinawa rape incident, the relationship between Okinawa and Japan and the United States has soured. Hoping to amend local discontent, in 1996, both governments agreed on relocating Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Camp Schwab, Henoko bay within five to seven years. Interestingly, the two-decade old agreement to establish the Futenma Relocation Facility on Henoko bay has not occurred. Although the societal, environmental and security concerns regarding the Okinawa base problem are not completely ignored, existing literature fails to analyze and circumvent the reasons behind delay. This thesis contributes to debate by addressing why the Henoko relocation has stalled for the past twenty years. Loosely applying Putnam’s Two-Level Game Analysis, this thesis will present the argument that the United States of America and Japan, believing that security takes precedence over Okinawa interest, knowingly engaged in negotiations given the poor prospects in Okinawan consent. Negotiations were determined to be time consuming and difficult from the beginning due to the low win-set as revealed by initial Okinawan resistance. i Keyword: Okinawa, U.S.-Japan Alliance, Futenma, Henoko, Two-Level Game Analysis Student Number: 2016-23765 ii Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................ i List of Tables .............................................................................................................. v List of Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................. vi I. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 1. The Futenma Relocation Problem ............................................................................ 1 2. Puzzle and Importance of the Issue ......................................................................... 3 3. Structure of Thesis ....................................................................................................... 5 II. Theoretical Overview .......................................................................................... 7 1. Literature Review ........................................................................................................ 7 2. Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................ 11 3. Methodology ................................................................................................................ 14 III. Disrupted Promises and Delayed Implementation .................................. 15 1. Disguised Compromises: From the 1995 Rape to the 2006 Roadmap ............ 15 1.1 Background to Agreement of Futenma Base’s Relocation .................................. 15 1.2 The Level I Agreement Between the United States and Japan ........................... 17 1.3. The 2002 Blueprint: Taking Okinawa’s Demands into Consideration ........... 20 1.4 The 2006 Blueprint: Pushing for a Speedy Relocation ......................................... 23 1.5 Expanding Win-sets? ........................................................................................................ 27 2. Great Expectations: The DPJ and Hatoyama’s Failed Attempt ..................... 28 2.1 Hatoyama’s Challenge Against the Initial Level I Agreement ........................... 28 2.2 Okinawa’s Position that Remained Resilient ............................................................ 31 2.3 Reconfirming the Level I Agreement .......................................................................... 31 3. For the Brighter Future of Okinawa: The Second Abe Administration’s Initiatives .......................................................................................................................... 32 3.1 Unraveling Events under Two Governors ................................................................. 32 3.2 Unwavering Commitment to the Level I Agreement ............................................. 57 3.3 Careful Implementation Amidst Level II Resistance ............................................. 60 3.4 Analysis: Reconfirming the Level II Agreement ..................................................... 62 IV. Comparative Analysis of the Three Periods .............................................. 64 1. Changes of Okinawa’s Position? Questioning Okinawa’s Win-set ................. 64 1.1. The Environmental Argument: The Beautiful Sea and Dugongs ..................... 65 1.2 The Marginalization Argument: The “Spiritual Starvation” of Okinawa ....... 70 1.3 Statistical Data on Okinawan Concern ....................................................................... 76 1.4 Okinawan Gubernatorial, Nago City and Ginowan Elections ............................ 82 1.5 Marginalization, Opinion Polls and Election Results ............................................ 92 iii 2. Negative Reverberation? External Factors and Low Win-sets ........................ 94 2.1 Actions Falling Short: Implementation of the SACO Final Report .................. 94 2.2 American Military Accidents: Reminders of “Colonialism” ............................ 100 2.3 Japanese Language and Ambiguity: Shooting oneself in the foot .................. 108 3. Returning to Win-sets ............................................................................................ 113 3.1 Moments of Cooperation? Illusions of Overlapping Win-sets ........................ 113 3.2 Stagnant Win-sets ........................................................................................................... 114 4. The Future of Relocation ....................................................................................... 117 4.1. Changes in Security? Questioning the FRF’s Conditions ................................ 117 4.2. “Nokinawa”? Questioning Okinawa’s Low Win-set ......................................... 127 4.3 The Impossible Compromise ...................................................................................... 129 V. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 130 References .............................................................................................................. 132 Abstract (Korean) ............................................................................................... 163 iv List of Tables Table 1. Okinawa Gubernatorial Elections Table 2. Nago City Mayor Elections Table 3. Ginowan City Mayor Election Table 4. Comparison of Elections Table 5. Facilities returned to Okinawan jurisdiction Table 6. Facilities linked with the FRF Table 7. Comparison of FRF Positions v List of Acronyms and Abbreviations DOS Department of State, The United States of America DPJ Democratic Party of Japan FRF Futenma Relocation Facility GAO Government Accountability Office JDA Japan Defense Agency LDP Liberal Democratic Party of Japan MAFF The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery MCAS Marine Corps Air Station MCIPAC Marine Corps Installations Pacific MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit MLIT Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism MOB Mobile Offshore base NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation [Nihon Hodou Kyoukai] QIP Quick Installation Platform SACO Special Action Committee on Okinawa SBF Sea-based Facility SCC Security Consultative Committee, U.S. and Japan SOFA Status of Forces Agreement WWF World Wildlife Fund vi I. Introduction 1. The Futenma Relocation Problem When referring to the United States of America’s position in Asia, the alliance with Japan is indispensable for America. For Japan, the alliance with America symbolizes Japan’s commitment to the post-WWII system and therefore remains its strongest alliance to this day. According to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the alliance between the two countries is an “alliance of hope.”1 While the relationship between the two countries is strong and coherent, there remains a thorn that prickles both parties: the Okinawa base problem. The problem originates from the 1995