AGREEMENT WITHOUT IMPLEMENTATION

Military Bases and Alliance Tensions in

By Kerri . Ng

Department of International Relations Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs ANU College of Asia and the Pacific

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University.

Canberra

© Copyright by Kerri Jinzhi Ng 2020

Unless otherwise indicated, this is my own original work.

______

Kerri Jinzhi Ng October 2020

ii Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I must thank Dr. David Envall, my chief supervisor, for his time, patience and encouragement over the course of this undertaking. Over many long discussions, he has helped me articulate the ideas that I had and organize them in a logical way. I am also grateful for the opportunities he provided for me to share my research in class, which were also valuable exercises in summarizing and communicating my arguments. And if I one day find myself with more than one style guide in my office, I know exactly who to blame.

Similarly, I owe a debt of gratitude to the other supervisors on my panel. Professor William Tow was instrumental in getting me to as a visiting scholar in 2014, thus enabling me to conduct a large part of my fieldwork in Japan. But he was also a mentor whose door was always open when I needed advice and encouragement. I also thank Dr. Ian Hall for his suggestions in terms of background scholarship and how I should organize it, and to Dr. Amy Catalinac for her insights into the Japanese political system. The traces of their influence may not be as obvious in the finished work presented here, but it is most certainly there in my mind.

In the course of my fieldwork, I must especially thank Professor Chikako Kawakatsu-Ueki and Shino Hateruma, the former for sponsoring me for Waseda’s Visiting Scholar Program, and the latter for helping me reach out to many of the people I wished to interview. Dr. Noriaki Fumiaki and Dr. Akiko Yamamoto were also incredibly generous in sharing their time and contacts, especially in . I am immensely grateful to Professor Manabu Satō and Professor Kunitoshi Sakurai, and all the other former and current scholars and practitioners who agreed to speak with me, both on- and off-the-record. What I learned from all of you greatly enriched my research, and I hope that my findings and contributions to the field will be worth the time that you shared with me.

Many other individuals have been instrumental in this path I have wandered down. I will always credit Professor Rikki Kersten for sparking my interest in the complexities and contradictions of post-WW2 Japan, way back in the first half of 2011. Lauren Richardson has been incredibly inspirational, and I thank you in particular for being so generous with your time, both as I was setting out and also as I approached the end of the journey. I am grateful also to Dr. Amy King and Dr. Shiro Armstrong, who provided me with opportunities to

iii expand my horizons in the field of International Relations. And I must not forget Dr. Yoichi Funabashi, Yoichi Kato, and the rest of the staff at Asia Pacific Initiative, for allowing me to further explore the world of practitioners in international relations while I finished writing up this dissertation.

I would not have made it this far without my friends and family, both near and far. I am forever indebted to my Okinawan family for welcoming me into their lives even as some of the events covered herein played themselves out, and to my friends in , Japan and elsewhere, who were perhaps all too willing to distract me from time to time. Thank you to my housemates over the years—Rin, Hayley, Husnia, Priya and Cris in particular—for the many great dinners, movie and k-drama nights, and bouts of Settlers of Catan.

And to my comrades-in-arms from the Bell School at ANU, whose companionship on this journey has been much valued. Thank you to Wenti Sung, Caitlin Mollica and Jennifer Canfield for being great officemates, and also to Gail Ma, Ruji Auethavornpipat, Carly Gordyn, Richard Salmons, Tereza Kobelkova, Alana Moore, Naomi Atkins, Sophie Saydan, and Zohra Akhter for sharing laughter, tears and good cheer these past few years. I’ll never forget all those special resolutions that we adopted!

Finally, I am deeply grateful to my family for their unwavering love and support—in particular, Mum, Dad, Kevin, Paula, Jon, and Rupert and Joyce. Whether in Canberra, Singapore, Perth—and for three years, Ithaca, New York—you were always ready to offer a listening ear and encouragement, even when you couldn’t see where this project was going. Thank you for being patient with me as I wrestled with the biggest challenge in my life thus far. And I must not forget Jamie and Cameron, and Anka and Floyd—you were the best pals I could ever wish for when I needed to put everything aside, whether for an hour or a day.

I owe this to all of you.

iv

Abstract

Why are some international agreements implemented while others fail? Why do some pass easily whereas others progress only slowly or cause great turmoil? In 2006, and Washington signed an agreement to consolidate and realign US military facilities across Japan, with a major goal being to reduce alliance tensions in base-hosting communities in Japan. More than a decade later, efforts to implement this and related agreements have led to contrasting and, in some cases, quite unsatisfactory results. In , for example, tensions remain high and the agreement only partially implemented despite some successful land returns and unit transfers. By contrast, tensions rose briefly before falling again in Iwakuni City, , which has seen an increase in the number of fighter aircraft at the facility it hosts.

To explain such differing outcomes, this dissertation shifts attention away from the agreements in question—the focus of much of the scholarly literature—and instead examines how alliance managers undertook the task of carrying them out. It focuses especially on how sub-national actors and their preferences have shaped the dynamics of implementation and so might account for this variation in outcomes. Using as a framework the concept of “preference incorporation,” the core argument is that the manner in which alliance managers engage with sub-national actors and incorporate or otherwise address their preferences is crucial to understanding why and how tensions rise and fall. Furthermore, it identifies positive and negative feedback loops as the key mechanism through which this occurs. By making this case, the dissertation not only contributes to a better understanding of the turbulent history of basing politics in Japan but also broadens our knowledge of how sub-national actors shape not only agreements the states make but also how such agreements are then actually implemented.

v Table of Contents

Abbreviations ...... xiii Tables and Figures ...... ix Author’s Note ...... x

Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Okinawa: agreement without implementation ...... 2 1.2 Okinawa’s importance for Asia-Pacific security ...... 5 1.3 Okinawa’s importance for alliance theory ...... 8 1.4 Approach and argument: expanding the focus to implementation ...... 14 Chapter 2: Alliance Theory and Basing Politics ...... 19 2.1 Systemic level theories and implementation failure ...... 22 2.2 Neorealism and the US military realignment in Japan ...... 24 2.3 Institutions and norms in alliance theory ...... 29 2.4 The politics of basing 1: institutionalization at the domestic level of an alliance ...... 33 2.5 The politics of basing 2: socialization at the domestic level of an alliance ...... 40 2.6 Alliances from an implementation perspective ...... 45 2.7 Political will, capacity, and the US-Japan military realignment...... 48 2.8 Preference incorporation, internal alliance tensions, and implementation ...... 51 2.9 Methods ...... 60 Chapter 3: The History of Basing Politics in Japan and Okinawa ...... 66 3.1 The US-Japan Security Treaty and Okinawa’s separation from Japan ...... 67 3.2 Managing basing relations: compensation politics in Japan ...... 74 3.3 Okinawa under US administration ...... 82 3.4 The compensation framework comes to Okinawa ...... 87 3.5 The end of the Cold War and the expected “peace dividend” ...... 90 3.6 In summary ...... 95 Chapter 4: Basing Politics on the Mainland: the case of MCAS Iwakuni ..96 4.1 MCAS Iwakuni: a brief history ...... 98 4.2 The agreement to move the Iwakuni runway offshore ...... 99 4.3 The SACO Agreement and Iwakuni’s response ...... 102 4.4. The DPRI era: Iwakuni and the negotiation of the 2006 Roadmap ...... 104 4.5. Iwakuni and the 2006 Roadmap: Mayor Ihara’s resistance...... 111 4.6 The final referendum: the 2008 Iwakuni City Mayoral Election ...... 117 4.7 Implementing a compromise ...... 119 4.8 In summary ...... 123 Chapter 5: Negotiating the SACO Agreement ...... 125 5.1 The 1995 rape incident: an inadequate response? ...... 127 5.2 Escalation: Ōta and the land lease issue ...... 131 5.3 The SACO process and the “return” of MCAS Futenma ...... 138 5.4 Local reactions: the prefectural assembly elections and Japan’s first referendum ...... 144 5.5 The path to the floating heliport ...... 147 5.6 In summary ...... 155

vi Chapter 6: Implementing SACO: the rise and fall of the 2002 Basic Plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility ...... 156 6.1 Reactions to the SACO Final Report ...... 156 6.2 The tussle over troop reductions ...... 160 6.3 Local complications and the City referendum ...... 165 6.4 Governor Inamine and the influence of the pro- and anti-agreement factions ...... 170 6.5 Another failure of implementation: the problems with the 2002 plan ...... 179 6.6 In summary ...... 181 Chapter 7: Engulfed by the Defense Policy Review Initiative ...... 183 7.1 Towards a sustainable base presence in Okinawa? ...... 184 7.2 Local reactions to interim realignment agreement ...... 189 7.3 The tussle over the Environmental Impact Assessment ...... 192 7.4 In summary ...... 200 Chapter 8: The opening of Pandora's Box: Hatoyama and “the Futenma Problem” ...... 201 8.1 The fall of the LDP and the rise of the DPJ ...... 201 8.2 The DPJ coalition government and the realignment in Okinawa ...... 203 8.3 The return of the LDP and Governor Nakaima’s decision ...... 215 8.4 Attempted implementation and the backlash against Nakaima ...... 219 8.5 A drawn-out implementation process ...... 228 8.6 In summary ...... 231 Chapter 9: Tensions, Preferences and the Feedback Loop ...... 233 9.1 Summarizing the findings ...... 236 9.2 Preference incorporation and tensions in Iwakuni/Yamaguchi, 1992-2015 ...... 238 9.3 Preference incorporation and tensions in Nago/Okinawa 1, 1995-2004 ...... 245 9.4 Preference incorporation and tensions in Nago/Okinawa 2, 2004-2015 ...... 251 9.5 The feedback loop: reinforcing both higher and lower levels of preference incorporation ..... 257 9.6 Same feedback mechanism, different outcomes ...... 264 9.7 In summary ...... 267 Chapter 10: Conclusion ...... 269 10.1 Burden reduction and alliance tensions in the US-Japan alliance ...... 269 10.2 Looking further abroad: implications for alliance theory ...... 273 10.3 Implications for Asia-Pacific security and International Relations theory ...... 277 10.4 Final word: implications for Okinawa ...... 281

References ...... 286 Books and book chapters ...... 286 Government documents (including bilateral/multilateral documents) ...... 290 Interviews (cited in the dissertation) ...... 295 Journals, magazines, and newsletters ...... 295 News articles and press releases...... 300 Other ...... 331

vii Abbreviations

CATC Combined Arms Training Center CCS CVW-5 Carrier Air Wing Five DFAA Defense Facilities Administrative Agency DPJ Democratic Party of Japan DPRI Defense Policy Review Initiative FCLP field carrier landing practice FPA foreign policy analysis FRF Futenma replacement facility IR International Relations (the discipline/field of study) JDA Japan Defense Agency JCS () JSDF Japan Self-Defense Forces JASDF Japan Air Self-Defense Force JGSDF Japan Ground Self-Defense Force JMSDF Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force MCAS Marine Corps Air Station MEF Marine Expeditionary Force MOB mobile offshore base MOFA (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOU Memorandum of Understanding NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NFP New Frontier Party NIMBY not in my backyard ODA Okinawa Development Agency PNP People’s New Party QIP Quick Installation Platform method (for a “floating” facility) RAA Recreation and Amusement SACO Special Action Committee on Okinawa SBF sea-based facility SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers SCC Security Consultative Committee SDP Social Democratic Party SDF Self-Defense Forces SLOC sea lines of communication SOFA Status of Forces Agreement SPA Special Procurement Agency USAF United States Air Force USCAR United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands VTOL vertical take-off and landing

viii Tables and Figures

Figure 2.1: Calder’s Paradigms of Basing Politics ...... 35 Figure 2.2: Japanese Cabinet Budget Allocation for Okinawa (Fiscal Years 1989-2018) ...... 37 Table 2.1: The Agreement-Implementation Sequences Examined in this Dissertation ...... 64 Table 2.2: Indicators for Preference Incorporation and Tensions ...... 65

Figure 4.1 Diagram of the Plan for Relocating the MCAS Iwakuni Runway ...... 101 Table 4.1: Total Personnel and Unit Changes for MCAS Iwakuni (2006 Roadmap) ...... 110

Table 5.1: The Core Objectives listed in the SACO Interim Report ...... 142 Figure 5.1: Okinawa’s Strategic Location ...... 144

Table 6.1: Voting Results of the Nago City Referendum ...... 169 Figure 6.1: An Artist’s Rendition of What a Pontoon-type Facility Would Look Like ...... 177 Figure 6.2: An Artist’s Rendition of What a Pile-supported Facility Would Look Like ...... 178 Figure 6.3: The 2002 Basic Plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility ...... 179

Figure 7.1: Concept Plan for the L-shaped Facility ...... 187 Figure 7.2: Concept Plan for the Replacement Facility, with a V-shaped Runway ...... 192 Table 7.1: The Evolution of the US Military Realignment in Okinawa ...... 193

Table 8.1: The Results of the 2009 Japanese General Election (House of Representatives) ...... 207 Table 8.2: Breakdown of the House of Councillors, September 2009...... 208

Table 9.1 Indicators for Preference Incorporation and Tensions ...... 234 Table 9.2 Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture, 1990~2015 ...... 237 Table 9.3 Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture, 1990~2015 ...... 237 Table 9.4 Indicators of Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Iwakuni, 1990~2015 ...... 241 Figure 9.1 Chart showing Levels of Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture ...... 244 Table 9.5 Indicators of Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Okinawa, 1995~2015 ...... 247 Figure 9.2 Chart showing Levels of Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture ...... 256

ix

Author’s Note

All of the Japanese names that appear in this dissertation are in Western name order (first name, last name). Further, with the exception of well-known place names, such as “Tokyo,” long vowels are marked by macrons.

x ~Chapter 1~ Introduction

On August 14, 2014, a dozen Japanese Coast Guard vessels clashed with protestors off the coast of Okinawa, the main island of Japan’s southernmost prefecture.1 The clash occurred as the Japanese government began survey work needed to begin relocating a key US military facility on the island, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. At the heart of these altercations and the wider protests is a dispute over plans to relocate MCAS Futenma from its current location in Ginowan City to a more remote, coastal area near the city of Nago. On the one hand, protesters have been willing to risk injury in their efforts to prevent the construction of what they perceive to be a new American base in the prefecture. On the other hand, the Japanese national government has been adamant that the facility, which it regards as an important element of the ongoing US military realignment in Japan, will be built. The clashes continued through the remainder of 2014 and intensified the following January, after Okinawans elected a new governor opposed to the facility. Similar skirmishes also took place outside MCAS Futenma and the base to be expanded into its replacement facility, Camp Schwab.

Although officials on both sides of the Pacific assert that Japan’s subnational actors, including those protestors, do not have the capacity to change Japan’s security policy or reverse the steps already taken in the relocation process, the protests have clearly had an effect. Most obviously, they have contributed to the substantial delays in the US military realignment in Japan. The targeted completion date for relocating MCAS Futenma, for example, has been extended twice, from 2002 to 2014, and then to 2029 or beyond. At other times, these protests have raised questions about the viability of the continued presence of the US military in Okinawa. In particular, the CH-53D helicopter crash at Okinawa International University in August 2004 highlighted the potential consequences that an accident with local fatalities might have. As Yuki Tatsumi has pointed out, if the political deadlock in Okinawa extends the operation of MCAS Futenma for the foreseeable future, “(t)his means the US-Japan

1 Motoshi Sakata and Yujiro Okabe, “Japan in Depth / Coast guard blocks protesters at Henoko relocation site,” The Japan News by the , August 16, 2014.

1 alliance is ‘one accident away’ from irreparable damage.”2 Joseph Nye, who chaired the 1995 report recommending that the US maintain a force of 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific region, suggested that the allies should “think again” if they “don’t have the support of the Okinawan people” for the relocation.3 Although Nye’s primary concern is that the facilities on Okinawa are vulnerable to Chinese and North Korean ballistic missiles, he appears to recognize that Henoko is not a long-term solution for political reasons as well as strategic ones.4

1.1 Okinawa: agreement without implementation

Tokyo and Washington have now been attempting to realign the US military facilities in Okinawa prefecture for more than twenty years. The initial agreement to relocate MCAS Futenma was announced in 1996, following widespread protests in the wake of the rape of a 12-year-old girl by US military personnel in 1995. Subsequently, the United States and Japan have worked together to implement this objective, which is based on recommendations by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), finally settling on what is known as “the V- shaped runway plan” as part of the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (the Roadmap). After multiple protracted negotiations with local governments, a permit for land reclamation signed by Okinawa governor Hirokazu Nakaima in December 2013—as required by Japanese domestic law—effectively green-lighted the plan, which involves expanding Camp Schwab so that it can take over the core functions that MCAS Futenma has provided to date. Officials in Tokyo and Washington rejoiced that ground would finally be broken on the replacement facility, which is actually the expansion of an existing Marine Corps facility, Camp Schwab. However, less than one month later, reelected Nago mayor Susumu Inamine once again declared that he would seek to oppose and obstruct the construction, in accordance with the wishes of the majority of his constituency. Nakaima’s defeat in the November 2014

2 Yuki Tatsumi, “Future of the US Marines in Okinawa — long-term risks for short-term gain?,” PacNet Newsletter, no. 11, February 12 (2012). 3 Takashi Oshima, “Prominent U.S. scholar says Henoko relocation no long-term solution to Okinawa base problem,” , December 8, 2014. 4 Others have examined the “effect” of base politics and burden sharing in Okinawa on the US–Japan alliance in terms of alliance “efficiency.” See H. D. P. Envall and Kerri Ng, “The Okinawa “Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics,” Asian Security 11, no. 3 (2015).

2 gubernatorial elections then led to further tensions, as the new governor, Takeshi Onaga, also declared that he would do everything in his power to stop the construction.5

As in Okinawa, the US military has encountered waves of protest over the last decade or more in South Korea and . Various incidents have attracted controversy and significant media coverage in these countries, both domestically and internationally.6 Yet in Vicenza, Italy, an abandoned airport has been successfully turned into a new facility that will host units relocated from other bases in Europe. In South Korea, the relocation of Yongsan Garrison from to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, which was formally announced in 2004, has already seen the transfer of multiple units. Although the projected completion date has been revised numerous times, most of the transfers were on course to be completed by the end of 2019, and the US military has since started the formal process of returning Yongsan Garrison to Seoul.7 Even in Japan, the expansion of a facility on the Japanese mainland, MCAS Iwakuni, has proceeded relatively smoothly, and despite opposition from the local community, has successfully accommodated the transfer of additional units from other bases.

Although these other agreements have also encountered delays in implementation, their relative successes contrast with the developments in Okinawa. In fact, the problems confronting the relocation of MCAS Futenma echo the difficulty that the Japanese government has had in finding or constructing at least two other replacement facilities since the 1980s—a new port to take over the functions of Naval Port, also in Okinawa, and an airfield for Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) drills for the Seventh Fleet’s carrier strike group, which are currently held on Iwo Jima.8 The significant challenges that the Japanese government has encountered in relocating MCAS Futenma, therefore, present something of a puzzle for International Relations (IR) theory and, specifically, the study of alliance

5 “Gov’t crosses line with launch of landfill work for Okinawa base relocation,” The Mainichi, April 26, 2017. 6 Seungsook Moon, “Protesting the Expansion of US Military Bases in Pyeongtaek: A Local Movement in South Korea,” South Atlantic Quarterly 111, no. 4 (2012); The No Dal Molin Website, “No Dal Molin: The Antibase Movement in Vicenza,” 2013, accessed September 13, 2013, http://www.nodalmolin.it/No-Dal-Molin-The- Antibase-Movement; Andrew Yeo, “Anti-Base Movements in South Korea: Comparative Perspective on the Asia-Pacific,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 24-2-10 (2010); Toku Sakai, “The Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on the Japanese Mainland: A Case Study of the Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni,” Journal of International Development and Cooperation 17, no. 2 (2011). 7 Kim Gamel, “Yongsan Garrison is on its way to becoming a park for South Koreans. Here are the next steps,” Stars and Stripes, November 21, 2018; “U.S. forces in S. Korea open new HQ at biggest overseas base,” Kyodo News, June 29, 2018; Gamel, “US begins process of returning Yongsan Garrison to South Korea, but closure not imminent,” Stars and Stripes, December 11, 2019. 8 Eric Talmadge, “Despite safety fears, US Navy says jets will train on Iwo Jima until Japan finds better site,” The Associated Press, June 7, 2013.

3 management. Why are some alliance agreements carried out promptly while others fail or struggle to get implemented?

The Japanese experience shows that treating agreements as end points in alliance management can be problematic. Indeed, it highlights the importance of also examining how well (or not) agreements are implemented. Although documents such as the 1996 SACO agreement and the 2006 Roadmap are the end product of tricky negotiations, they also represent the beginning of what are sometimes significantly drawn-out implementation processes, where the difficult business of fulfilling the objectives of an agreement is carried out. This typically involves a range of actions, such as the creation and passing of domestic laws, adherence with bureaucratic and administrative processes and even negotiations with subnational actors. As scholars within the fields of policy administration and related fields have long pointed out, the nature of these laws, processes and intra-state bargaining processes differs depending on the problems or challenges being addressed by the policy, and on the capacity and will of local actors to comply or cooperate.9

This is not to say that the IR literature has entirely neglected implementation issues. Over the last two decades, a number of scholars have started examining implementation, particularly in reference to multilateral environmental and economic agreements as well as the application of sanctions.10 However, the subfield concerned with security and alliance politics continues to focus on the negotiation of agreements between states, with the implementation of such agreements simply assumed. When allies fail or struggle to implement agreements, therefore, the discipline often has little to say on why this might have occurred.

To fill this gap in the literature, this dissertation argues that preference incorporation is key to the successful implementation of agreements governing a foreign military presence in another sovereign state. To be specific, the timing and degree to which state elites include and/or address the preferences laid out by key subnational actors during the entire agreement cycle— from agenda setting through to implementation—are crucial. Where subnational actors are

9 Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, “Learning From Experience: Lessons From Policy Implementation,” Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 9, no. 2 (1987). 10 David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler, “Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge,” The World Economy 23, no. 4 (2000); Peter M. Haas, “Compliance with EU directives: insights from international relations and comparative politics,” Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 1 (1998); Michel Veuthey, “Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Non- International Armed Conflicts: The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross,” American University Law Review 33 (1983).

4 consulted right from the pre-agreement phase, and their concerns and preferences regarding the bases addressed from this early stage of the cycle onward, alliance managers are likely to have greater success in achieving their implementation goals. On the other hand, where subnational actors are only consulted later in the process, or their preferences left unaddressed, then the agreements are less likely to achieve those goals. The remainder of this introduction will outline the basis for this argument.

1.2 Okinawa’s importance for Asia-Pacific security

The study of basing politics is not new. Within the literature, the tensions observed in Okinawa are often considered part of the growing opposition to the US military around the world. The US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan has been subjected not only to attacks by insurgents, but also to growing antipathy from local communities.11 Anti-military and anti- base sentiments have increasingly been reported even in staunch American allies such as Italy, South Korea and Japan.12 These trends have prompted several recent efforts to systematically analyse the impact of domestic politics on international alliances, which Kent Calder has called the “policy science of basing.”13

However, many political elites and scholars working within the field of International Relations continue to regard basing politics as a domestic rather than international concern. The focus of comparative studies in basing politics is typically on the signing or abrogation of state-to-state agreements. In contrast, the process by which these agreements are carried out tends to be regarded as a formality and is rarely considered in depth. This oversight is reflected in the policymaking of the United States and its allies. Indeed, the response of Washington to these trends is inconsistent in terms of the importance placed on civil-military

11 Mark N. Katz, Leaving without losing : the War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012). 12 Caroline Spencer, “Meeting of the Dugongs and the Cooking Pots: Anti-military Base Citizens’ Groups on Okinawa,” Japanese Studies 23, no. 2 (2003); The No Dal Molin Website, “History of the No Dal Molin Movement in Vicenza,” 2009, accessed September 13, 2013, http://www.nodalmolin.it/History-of-the-No-Dal- Molin; Andrew Yeo, “Local-National Dynamics and Framing in South Korean Anti-Base Movements,” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 21, no. 2 (2006). 13 Sheila A. Smith, ed. Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia, East-West Center Special Reports (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2006); Kent E. Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Yuko Kawato, Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and its Limits (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).

5 relations and other issues that may affect agreement implementation. Although policies enacted in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan tend to be sensitive to political issues that may arise from the US military presence, local opposition in staunch allies such as Japan continues to be regarded as a “second-order issue” that should not be allowed to threaten the security relationship.14 In other words, the opposition to base realignments in Japan has been viewed as something that should not be important for managing the US–Japan alliance.

This is problematic because, as the developments surrounding MCAS Futenma since 1996 show, false starts and U-turns during the implementation process can easily destabilize an alliance. This in turn can create wider problems. The US alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific region, often referred to as the San Francisco system,15 is a major part of international politics because it provides the foundation for regional security. The network of forward basing locations and the improved interoperability between the various national forces arising from regular contact has enabled the United States and its allies to respond to a range of security challenges. Given the centrality of the alliance to the wider Asia-Pacific security architecture,16 having a comprehensive understanding of its politics becomes a small but crucial part of understanding the region’s wider security dynamics.

Indeed, the US–Japan alliance has proven central to managing both traditional and non- traditional security threats in the region. For example, the capabilities provided by the basing facilities and personnel in Japan are crucial in contingency plans for the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. Although questions were raised in the 1990s over whether the United States would be able to use its Japanese facilities in such a contingency, Japanese security policy has since evolved to enable such logistical support.17 More recently, the Abe administration has reaffirmed its commitment to increasing Japan’s ability to contribute to regional security by changing the interpretation of the country’s constitution to allow it to defend a close ally that

14 “Armitage: Futenma ‘Japan’s responsibility’,” , April 17, 2013; Joseph S. Nye, "An Alliance Larger Than One Issue " The New York Times, 2010. 15 Kent E. Calder, "Securing security through prosperity: the San Francisco System in comparative perspective," The Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (2004). 16 Michael J. Lostumbo et al., “Overseas Basing of US Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013); United States General Accounting Office, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting, GAO-02-525 (Washington, DC, 2002), accessed April 12, 2016, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-525. 17 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power (2013); Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, “The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993); Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 11, no. 3 (2002).

6 comes under attack.18 The operational effectiveness of the US basing network in addressing such contingencies is dependent on several factors, including the distribution of capabilities, the availability of space for training and hosting of personnel and equipment, as well as political and military cooperation with allies and strategic partners.19 On the non-traditional side, US forces based in Japan have made significant contributions in the aftermath of incidents such as the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, and the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster that confronted Japan in March 2011. Practiced cooperation cultivated through numerous joint exercises in the extended alliance structure also enabled other US allies such as Australia to provide prompt assistance in both contingencies.20

Tensions arising from the implementation of basing agreements in Japan, such as the clashes noted above, present a challenge for the operational effectiveness of US forces in managing these security threats. To be clear, the problem lies not in the direct impact of the failure to relocate existing facilities such as MCAS Futenma, but rather in increasing tensions between the US military and their host communities. The failure to relocate MCAS Futenma arguably presents more short-term problems to the local population than to the US military, whose operational capacity would be preserved by the logical outcome of implementation failure— the maintenance of the status quo. In the medium-to-longer term, however, this kind of failure may lead to increasingly negative consequences due to rises in local opposition to the environmental and quality-of-life pressures that the military and its training regimes impose. A famous example of such opposition involves City, whose legislative assembly in 1975 passed an ordinance barring the entry of nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships into Kobe Port. Due to the US policy of not confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons, this ordinance applies to many US military vessels and has been a sticking point in the alliance.21 More recently, court cases over the noise pollution generated by night-time FCLP drills have increased costs to the Japanese government in the form of payouts to plaintiffs and the transfer of drills to other sites. The distance and increased travel times also

18 Matthew Carney, “Japan’s cabinet approves changes to its pacifist constitution allowing for ‘collective self- defence’,” ABC News, July 1, 2014. 19 United States General Accounting Office, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting. 20 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Response, by Andrew Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery (2011); John Telford et al., Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report (, England: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, 2006); Bruce A. Elleman and Naval War College, Waves of Hope the U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007). 21 Purnendra Jain, Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Affairs (London, England; New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 149-50; Eric Johnston, “Kobe Declaration a thorn in the side of diplomacy,” The Japan Times, March 22, 2001.

7 make it more difficult for US personnel to complete necessary training, thus reducing their operational readiness.22

All of this highlights how strained relations between the military and their host communities, exacerbated by the contested process of carrying out basing agreements, can be detrimental to the US–Japan alliance and therefore also to wider regional stability. Rather than being a second-order issue, as the literature often assumes, the successful and timely implementation of basing agreements in Okinawa is highly relevant not only to the functioning of the bilateral alliance but also to broader stability in the Asia-Pacific.

1.3 Okinawa’s importance for alliance theory

Okinawa is also important for IR theory and, in particular, alliance theory. Alliance theory generally focuses on the formation and management of alliances, offering a range of explanations as to why and how these security relationships come to be, and once established, persist and evolve.23 Alliance formation is mostly attributed to states’ desire to aggregate their military capabilities in order to deter potential adversaries. Dominated by realist theory, this aspect of state behavior is often explained at a systemic level, with states forming security relationships in response to shifts in the balance of power or balance of threat in the international system, allying with others when they are unable to counter a common opponent alone.24

Yet states often do not balance against the dominant power in the system; nor do they perceive threats posed by other states in the same way. Indeed, as Duffield points out, a state’s threat perceptions may be more dependent on its internal characteristics rather than

22 United States General Accounting Office, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting, 16-17, 22. 23 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading: Addison-Wesley (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991); Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (1990); T. Sandler and K. Hartley, “Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action,” Journal of Economic Literature 39, no. 3 (2001). 24 For example, see John S. Duffield, “Alliances,” in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul Williams (London, England; New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 344-45.

8 external forces.25 Accordingly, some scholarship suggests that alliance formation may be shaped by the domestic structures of states, with those that share similar cultures, ideologies or institutions being more likely to form alliances. For instance, Walt points to the fact that the formation of alignments by similar states may enhance their domestic legitimacy. At the same time, however, he also suggests that ideological similarities may only be influential when external threats are low.26

A similar pattern emerges in the different explanations for alliance management. System-level theories explain alliance continuity, and consequently how these relationships are managed, in terms of the persistence of, or shifts in, the balance of power or the balance of threat. If a given alliance is directed at a particular threat, and that threat remains, then the relationship can also be expected to continue, even if there is some “buck-passing” (i.e. free-riding on the balancing efforts of an ally).27 Where changes occur in the balance of power or threat, then allies might be expected to enter a process of renegotiation over the terms of the alliance. As Snyder points out, such bargaining can be shaped by a range of factors, including how dependent each state is on the benefits provided by the alliance, how strongly they have committed to the relationship, and how important particular issues of contention are to the respective allies.28

However, such understandings of alliance management largely overlook domestic factors. Duffield, for instance, reviews the literature examining the roles played by institutionalization and socialization in alliance management. These act as drivers of alliance longevity by reshaping the outlooks of domestic political actors, especially the elites involved in managing these security relationships. Institutionalization refers to the development of inter- governmental organizations (bureaucracies) within an alliance intended to facilitate allies’ cooperation. Such bureaucracies can in turn seek to perpetuate the relationship regardless of external conditions. Similarly, socialization refers to the development of a shared identity or worldview amongst these political actors, as a result of regular interactions that result in such

25 Ibid., 345. 26 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 34-35, 216-17. 27 Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks”; Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security 29, no. 1 (2004). 28 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 166-72.

9 actors adopting pro-alliance policy positions within domestic debates. Through repetition, these may lead to the emergence of security communities.29

Okinawa is clearly an issue concerning alliance management rather than formation. Debates around the presence or relocation of foreign bases in the prefecture occur within a decades-old alliance. Yet, as noted above, Okinawa’s base politics creates problems for these established theories. In short, neither system-level nor state-level theory can readily explain variation within the US–Japan alliance at a particular time.

When system-level theories search for a driver of US–Japan alliance behavior, they focus on security in the Asia-Pacific. For balance of power and threat theories, this works well in terms of explaining alliance agreements in the US–Japan context. The emergence of a rising great power in Asia in the form of and an immediate security threat in the form of North Korea can be said to push the US and Japan to reinforce their alliance and so drive the signing of such agreements.30 Yet such theories cannot then account for why, even as such threats persist or grow worse, the United States and Japan then struggle to implement such agreements. Theories that focus on buck-passing have the opposite problem. Avoiding the implementation of potentially costly agreements makes sense, for instance, if Japan were aiming to avoid taking up a greater share of the alliance burden. But why, then, did it sign the agreements in the first instance?

Similarly, because state-level theories regard institutionalization and socialization in alliances as chiefly concerned with policy elites or “agenda setters” that work on the national stage, they tend not to consider how these phenomena affect or are affected by subnational actors. Institutionalization and socialization are thus viewed as complete when these agenda setters have reached a policy consensus, even if subnational actors remain outside this consensus. Yet, as the Okinawan case demonstrates, even where socialization or institutionalization have occurred or are occurring, this does not inevitably lead to implementation. The flaw in this

29 Duffield, “Alliances,” 347-48. See also Stephen M. Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (1997). On security communities, see Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, and Robert A. Kann, Political Community and the North American Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). 30 According to Waltz, structural realism does not make causal claims about foreign policy, but merely seeks to explain “why the range of outcomes falls within certain limits,” namely, that it tends towards a balance of power in the international system (Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 69, see also 16 and 121-22). However, other scholars have sought to apply variations and expansions of structural realism in an attempt explain the foreign policy of a number of states, including that of Japan. See, for example, Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 37-38. and Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy.” For a longer discussion, please see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

10 approach is apparent in the “policy science of basing” literature. This draws substantially from foreign policy analysis (FPA) ideas and especially those of two-level games theory developed by Robert Putnam and others.31 Making use of assumptions about how institutionalization and socialization works in alliances, it offers a number of explanations for alliance management outcomes in Okinawa. These might be broadly described as: (1) compensation politics, (2) regime-change theory, (3) the “security consensus,” and (4) norm alignment.32

The first two of these approaches—compensation politics and regime-change theory—focus on issues of institutionalization. Compensation politics refers to the use of side-payments by a national government in order to reduce anti-base attitudes in local communities. It suggests that alliance agreements and implementation in Japan should follow the promise and subsequent distribution of such side-payments, especially when host communities have become dependent on these benefits through the establishment of path-dependent institutions.33 Regime-change theory, on the other hand, argues that delayed democratization in Okinawa, compounded by the dynamics of its relationship with Tokyo, has resulted in a continued politicization and challenging of the alliance by national and local elites.34 This should lead to delays in agreement implementation.

But although these two approaches offer valuable insights into the process of Japan’s basing politics, both struggle to account for variations in the Japanese experience. Compensation politics cannot explain why certain agreement objectives have been implemented while others have not, despite all having been the focus of side-payment tactics. Furthermore, levels of compensation in a particular location across time do not correlate to ease of implementation. Regime-change theory, meanwhile, works at a broad level: while democratization in Japan since 1952 has led to the depoliticization of basing agreements, Okinawa’s delayed democratization relative to the rest of Japan has resulted in the US military presence lacking

31 R.D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,” International Organization 42, no. 03 (1988). 32 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 129-39; Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas; Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests; Kawato, Protests Against U.S. military Base Policy in Asia. 33 Kent E. Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 129-36; Brad Williams, “The YIMBY Phenomenon in Henoko, Okinawa: Compensation Politics and Grassroots Democracy in a Base Community,” Asian Survey 53, no. 5 (2013): 960. 34 Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas, 137-159.

11 “contractual legitimacy,” making it a prime target for politicization in local politics.35 This analysis, however, overlooks similar challenges to the alliance from other communities across Japan, some of which have resulted in significant delays and even led to changes to the associated agreements.36

The third and fourth approaches—the “security consensus” and norm alignment—follow the logic of socialization. The security consensus argument contends that disunity amongst the political elite over alliance issues (a weak consensus leading to weak socialization) may allow other actors to have greater influence over an alliance, thereby affecting agreements and implementation.37 Conversely, norm alignment suggests that subnational actors can influence elite preferences when they share norms and values with those elite (a strong consensus). Where the norms of the actors and the elite are aligned, this may open up opportunities for subnational actors to influence alliance policy and thus agreements and their implementation.38 Once again, however, these approaches do not satisfactorily deal with Japan’s internal variations. The Japanese political elite have, with one exception, maintained a relatively high consensus on the alliance in the face of strong opposition from subnational actors and quite divergent base realignment outcomes. Yet subnational actors have enjoyed success in delaying the implementation of agreements when they have held norms and values fundamentally opposed to those held by their elite counterparts. Further, often overlooked in terms of Okinawa is the fact that a number of influential subnational actors do not hold strongly anti-base values, subscribe to particular anti-base or anti-war norms, or see their identities as primarily shaped by basing issues.

In summary, the base issue in Okinawa reveals a significant oversight in alliance theory and the policy science of basing. Put simply, the literature does not fully account for the variations in the implementation of agreements within an alliance. There are two main reasons for this. First, the literature focuses excessively on the negotiation and formal ratification of alliance agreements by national elites and, as a result, does not give sufficient attention to the processes by which these agreements are subsequently translated into measurable outcomes. This is problematic because foreign policy decisions are arguably meaningless if they are not

35Ibid., 159. 36 Jain, Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Affairs, 157-58; Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2015 [White paper] (2015), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2015.html, 209. 37 Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests, 7-8. 38 Kawato, Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia, 4-5.

12 actually implemented.39 Second, the literature pays too much attention to the areas of alliance politics that has commanded the most media attention—issues that are of national importance or that relate primarily to the national political elite. Consequently, it marginalizes other elements of the alliance politics, particularly at the local level, that can have a substantial impact not on alliance agreements but on how those agreements are subsequently implemented. In short, it largely overlooks the important role of subnational actors.

These omissions help to explain why the four approaches have broad applicability but cannot adequately account for internal variation. In terms of the US–Japanese alliance, although some scholars discuss these differences in outcome, such as between MCAS Iwakuni and MCAS Futenma,40 they have as yet to satisfactorily incorporate such variation into alliance theory or the policy science of basing. In other IR subfields, there is a growing scholarship seeking to explain how international policy is implemented. In relation to multilateral environmental agreements for example, numerous studies have been conducted on issues of compliance by the signatories of those agreements.41 Scholars have also examined the challenges that developing states face in their efforts to comply with or implement international trade commitments.42 In the realm of international security, work has been carried out on the difficulty of implementing arms control agreements, ceasefire agreements and peace settlements.43 Within this literature, the main causal factors can be understood to be stem from some variation of a lack of material capacity or of political will. The implementation of alliance agreements, however, has yet to be subjected to such systematic analysis.

39 Peter Howard, “The Growing Role of States in U.S. Foreign Policy: the Case of the State Partnership Program,” International Studies Perspectives 5, no. 2 (2004): 189. 40 Sheila A. Smith, ed. Local Voices, National Issues: The Impact of Local Initiative in Japanese Policy-Making (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Japanese Studies, The University of Michigan, 2000); Jain, Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Affairs. 41 E.g. Steve Rayner, “A Cultural Perspective on the Structure and Implementation of Global Environmental Agreements,” Evaluation Review 15, no. 1 (1991); Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice; Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer, “Implementing multilateral environmental agreements: an analysis of EU directives,” Global Environmental Politics 7, no. 3 (2007). 42 E.g. Finger and Schuler, “Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge.” 43 Edwin M. Smith, “Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements,” Southern California Law Review 64(1990); Steven J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Karl DeRouen, Jr et al., “Civil war peace agreement implementation and state capacity,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010).

13 1.4 Approach and argument: expanding the focus to implementation

This dissertation has two main objectives. First, it aims to add to the current literature a more detailed empirical understanding of basing politics in the context of the US-Japan alliance. It does this by addressing not only the elements of the post-Cold War realignment in Okinawa but also examples of realignment from elsewhere in Japan. Two distinct and separate base hosting communities are examined; however, the dissertation does not examine them in isolation from each other but emphasises the importance of clarifying how developments in both communities interact. Second, based on this deeper empirical understanding of US– Japan base politics, it aims to contribute to IR theory, and especially alliance management and the policy science of basing, by explaining variations in the implementation of alliance agreements in terms of the extent to which alliance tensions are reduced.

Central to this latter objective is a basic question. Why is it that some alliance agreements are implemented quickly whereas others are implemented only slowly and at greater-than- expected cost, or not at all? This question is chiefly concerned with understanding alliance agreements in terms of their specific context, outcomes, and the mechanisms though which such outcomes might occur.44 All the theories identified in this introduction share features that prevent them from identifying these mechanisms. They assume that alliance management concludes when allies strike agreements and neglect or minimize the role played by subnational actors. For systemic theories, these omissions are the result of a deliberate decision to focus on a single level of analysis. For state-level approaches, by comparison, they are a side effect of the way in which the national policy process is characterized. The result, however, is that an obvious potential cause for this variation is not sufficiently examined. Instead, more attention should be paid to the role played by subnational actors in the implementation of alliance agreements.

To address this question, this dissertation focuses on explaining the variation in internal alliance tensions in relation to the agreements of the post-Cold War US military realignment in Japan. Using variation in these tensions as the object of analysis for examining implementation success or failure in this case is a valid approach because the underlying goal of the agreements being examined has been to reduce increase public support for the US basing presence in Japan while also maintaining capabilities. That is to say, in addition to

44 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 31.

14 material objectives such as relocation of military forces and training, the agreements were signed as part of an effort to reduce frictions between host communities and their foreign (US) military guests—these are the alliance tensions of concern in this dissertation. The extent to which this goal is achieved should be apparent in the level of tensions within particular host communities, whether these have increased or been reduced. Such shifts can be measured through such phenomena as the size and intensity of demonstrations, election campaigns or election results.

Of particular interest is the role of societal actors and the way their preferences interact with those at the level of the state and the system to produce international outcomes. The primacy of societal actors and their preferences in relations between states is a central pillar of liberal theories of International Relations.45 As with the theories outlined above, much of this literature continues to focus on state policy—and by extension, state-to-state agreements—as the outcome of interest. Fortunately, there is also a rich tradition in the field of FPA that has examined the role of veto players within the state in the post-agreement stage. However, this body of work typically defines veto players as national-level actors that are able to prevent the passage of legislation or the formal ratification of international agreements.46 In contrast, subnational actors are often active throughout the negotiation, ratification or implementation stages and can be instrumental in stalling or even blocking such agreements, particularly during the implementation stage.47 To preserve these distinctions, this dissertation instead refers to key subnational actors and the checkpoints at which their preferences come into play.

45 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997); Jeffry Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” in Strategic Choice and International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 46 Daniel W. Drezner, “Introduction: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions,” in Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions, ed. Daniel W. Drezner (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 6. See, for example, George Tsebelis, Veto players: how political institutions work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Thomas H. Hammond, “Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic Systems,” in Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy, ed. George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Markus M. L. Crepaz and Ann W. Moser, “The Impact of Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Public Expenditures in the Global Age,” Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 3 (2004); Edward D. Mansfield, Helen Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Vetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements,” British Journal of Political Science 37 (2007). 47 Marco Giugni, Social Protest and Policy Change: Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Francisco Aldecoa and Dr Michael Keating, Paradiplomacy in Action: the Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments (London, England; New York, NY: Taylor and Francis, 1999); Marta Lackowska-Madurowicz and Paweł Swianiewicz, “Structures, Procedures and Social Capital: The Implementation of EU Cohesion Policies by Subnational Governments in Poland,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 37, no. 4 (2013); OECD, “The interface

15 The argument presented here is that these subnational actors are crucial to the negotiation and implementation processes of alliance agreements and that the manner of their involvement holds foreseeable consequences for how effective those agreements are in achieving the implementation outcome of reducing alliance tensions. In this respect, the dissertation takes a similar approach to the norm alignment theory identified earlier in that it emphasises the importance of the strategic interaction between different groups of actors across the agreement-implementation sequence. However, rather than stressing the role of norm alignment, it argues that preference incorporation is crucial to explaining variation in alliance tensions as an outcome of implementing these agreements. Specifically, the extent to which alliance agreements are successful at ameliorating tensions arising from basing politics is likely to be a function of the timing and degree to which subnational actors’ preferences are incorporated into agreements.

This dissertation defines preferences as each actor’s ranking of the choices available to them in a particular situation.48 Preference incorporation, therefore, is concerned with the efforts made by state elites to include and/or address the preferences of these key subnational actors during the agreement-implementation sequence. Where consultation with subnational actors is embedded throughout the entire agreement-implementation sequence, a positive feedback loop is generated, allowing alliance managers to identify and address local preferences from an early stage. By ameliorating concerns and limiting the scope for a backlash, they are likely to have greater success at the overarching goal of reducing alliance tensions. On the other hand, where subnational actors are only consulted later in the process, or their preferences left unaddressed, a negative feedback loop starts to operate against further attempts at preference incorporation, leading to a spiral of increasing tensions. This occurs because subnational actors that are not engaged with or invested in the entire process may seek other strategies for achieving their preferred outcomes. As such, it is important to identify who the key subnational actors are, and how and why their preferences are crucial to shaping basing tensions. The most important actors are those figures or groups who have the power to impede or advance the implementation process at particular checkpoints. These key

between subnational and national levels of government,” in Better Regulation in Europe: United Kingdom 2010, Better Regulation in Europe (: OECD Publishing, 2010). 48 As preferences cannot be directly observed, they are derived for the purposes of this analysis from the actors’ fundamental interests, such as economic wellbeing or quality of life. This will be laid out in greater detail in chapter 2. (See Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 33-66; Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” 45.)

16 subnational actors will typically advance implementation at the checkpoints only if their preferences are addressed.

Accordingly, what might be expected of the base realignment process in the US–Japan alliance is for changes in the level of internal alliance tensions, and thus implementation, to be heavily influenced by shifts in preference incorporation over time. Specifically, when alliance managers deeply involve subnational actors such as governors, mayors, and influential local interest groups throughout the agreement-implementation sequences, levels of preference incorporation should increase over time, thus keeping tensions low and helping to facilitate implementation. Hence, where tensions associated with basing politics have decreased as basing agreements have been implemented, as in Iwakuni City in Yamaguchi Prefecture, we should observe increasing levels of preference incorporation as the negotiation and implementation processes proceed. Correspondingly, we should observe a higher proportion of agreement objectives being successfully carried out. Conversely, when alliance managers fail to involve subnational actors throughout the agreement-implementation sequences, levels of preference incorporation will stagnate or even regress to lower levels. Existing tensions are then likely to increase in intensity and negatively affect implementation. In short, where tensions associated with basing politics have increased as the Japanese government attempts to carry the agreements out, as in Okinawa Prefecture, we should observe decreasing levels of preference incorporation, and a lower proportion of agreement objectives being successfully achieved.

In making this argument, the dissertation is divided into eight chapters along with this introduction (Chapter 1) and a conclusion (Chapter 10). Chapter 2 outlines and expands on the basing politics literature and the conceptual framework introduced here. Chapter 3 provides the historical context to the Okinawan problem from the Second World War until the contemporary period. The next five chapters then systematically examine the range of implementation processes that have occurred in relation to three broad US–Japan alliance initiatives that constitute the alliance’s post–Cold War realignment process. These are: (Chapter 4) the agreement to expand the MCAS Iwakuni runway; (Chapter 5) the negotiations of the SACO agreement in 1996; (Chapter 6) the implementation of the SACO agreement and the implementation failure of the 2002 Basic Plan that resulted from it; (Chapter 7) the dynamics surrounding the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation agreement; and (Chapter 8) the Hatoyama government and its impact on the implementation of the Roadmap. Finally, before the conclusion, Chapter 9 brings together the empirical findings to show how

17 useful preference inclusion is in explaining the implementation outcomes in this realignment process.

Before moving into this discussion, however, it must be acknowledged that a number of other factors may influence a state’s decision to engage in preference incorporation. Over the course of the agreements, the need for Japan’s administration to respond to the global financial crisis beginning in 2008 and the 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster consumed government resources that might otherwise have been spent on the US-Japan military realignment. Flareups involving the history problems between South Korea and Japan over the last decade, for example, have negatively affected agreements that were intended to increase the efficacy of the US alliance system in Asia. This dissertation, however, is primarily interested in internal alliance management rather than on how states choose between competing national interests under the constraints of external factors. Such decisions, though an important facet of international relations, lie beyond the scope of this thesis.

18 ~Chapter 2~ Alliance Theory and Basing Politics

Scholars have long recognized the important role that alliances have played in US security policy since the end of the Second World War. The large and growing literature on the formation and management of such security pacts throughout history is rooted in the neorealist school of thought that was born from Kenneth Waltz’s balance-of-power theory. Other theorists have since elaborated on the conditions under which alliances persist or fail, and thus, how they might be better managed.1 Key theories and concepts from this literature can generate explanations for the difficulty that Washington and Tokyo have had in negotiating and signing agreements and otherwise carrying out alliance policy during the post-Cold War period. For example, balance-of-threat realism might associate the increasing challenges to alliance activity with the disappearance of the Soviet threat. The alliance security dilemma—that is, the conflicting fears of abandonment and entrapment—and the concepts of institutionalization and socialization from the neoliberal institutionalist and constructivist traditions add to the explanation by accounting for why the two states maintained their pact even though neither nor China seemed strong enough to challenge US power.2

This kind of theorization at the systemic level, however, cannot account for variation within states, which it tends to treat as singular actors. Having realized this, scholars started drawing on the field of foreign policy analysis, such as the two-level games framework, to examine how domestic political actors might influence alliance policy outcomes.3 A new subfield soon

1 James D. Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994); Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (1997); Carlo Masala, “Alliances,” in The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, ed. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2012). 2 John S. Duffield, “Alliances,” in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul Williams (London, England; New York, NY: Routledge, 2013); Celeste A Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000); Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s persistence after the cold war,” ibid. 50, no. 3 (1996). 3 Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkley and , CA: University of California Press, 1993), chapters 2-5; Woondo Choi, “Japanese bargaining behavior and U.S.-Japan relationship: FSX co-development project,” Global Economic Review 30, no. 1 (2001); Donald Putnam Henry, Keith Crane, and Katharine Watkins Webb, “The Philippine Bases: Background for Negotiations Executive Summary,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989).

19 emerged, with theorists led by Kent Calder using concepts such as “compensation politics,” “regime change,” “security consensus,” and “norm alignment” to explain how the domestic politics of military basing differs between and even within the countries that the US has allied with.4 Yet, applying the explanations that these studies offer to the ongoing military realignment in Japan suggests that they remain inadequate for explaining why some initiatives are more or less successful than others in terms of the overall goal of the agreements examined herein: reducing internal alliance tensions. This is due to the fact that studies of basing politics typically focus on the factors that influence the state of the relationship between the allies. But the internal alliance tensions that the agreements examined herein seek to reduce refer not to frictions between the allies or their national governments, but rather tensions between the hosted military forces and their host communities. Due to the nature of alliance relationships, whereby national governments are responsible for carrying out the agreements that alliance managers have negotiated, these tensions can also be characterized as existing between the host government at the national level and the host communities at the local level.

As such, a third area of research that may help bridge this gap is the study of policy implementation. One key aspect of the concepts and theories mentioned above is that they seem to be focused on state-to-state agreements as the primary outcomes of interest. As Steve Smith and Michael Clarke have pointed out, however, the factors that explain policy formation and successful negotiations do not necessarily explain real outcomes, for the latter ultimately depend on the actions of the actors involved in implementation.5 The scholarship on policy implementation can largely be divided between analyses of top-down or bottom-up approaches, but scholars like Michael Hill also point out the importance of the inter- relationship between issues of implementation and issues of policy-making.6 A similar spectrum of foci can also be found in the literature on the implementation of international agreements, particularly in relation to global environmental and economic governance, as

4 Kent E. Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Alexander Cooley, “Base Politics,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (2005); Yuko Kawato, Protests Against U.S. Military Base P olicy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015). 5 Steve Smith and Michael Clarke, “Foreign Policy Implementation and Foreign Policy Behaviour,” in Foreign Policy Implementation, ed. Steve Smith and Michael Clarke (London, England: G. Allen & Unwin, 1985). 6 Michael Hill, “Implementation Theory: Yesterday’s Issue?,” Policy & Politics 25, no. 4 (1997); Jill Schofield, “Time for a revival? Public policy implementation: a review of the literature and an agenda for future research,” International Journal of Management Reviews 3, no. 3 (2001).

20 well as civil and human rights.7 The challenges of enforcing international security agreements such as ceasefires have also been examined.8

However, the literature that has arisen out of the study of implementation at the international level is not as useful for examining how basing agreements are carried out. Due to the nature of environmental, economic and ceasefire agreements in particular, many studies of implementation in the field of International Relations have thus far been focused on compliance.9 The applicability of such findings from these studies to alliance relations is thus unclear. On the one hand, the implementation of agreements dealing with operational rules and regulations appear to lend themselves to similar kinds of analysis. On the other hand, the challenges of implementing agreements involving permanent and unmovable changes, such as the construction of basing facilities, have more in common with the construction of other “unwanted” facilities, such as nuclear power plants and dams.10 Work on the latter, however, obviously does not address the role played by the ally in the process. Hence, the literature on implementation in both the domestic and international arenas is insufficient for examining the

7 David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998); J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler, “Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge,” The World Economy 23, no. 4 (2000); Michel Veuthey, “Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts: The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross,” American University Law Review 33(1983); Krzysztof Drzewicki, “International Humanitarian Law and Domestic Legislation with Special Reference to Polish Law,” Military Law and Law of War Review 24 (1985); Jutta M. Joachim, Bob Reinalda, and Bertjan Verbeek, International Organizations and Implementation: Enforcers, Managers, Authorities? (London, England; New York, NY: Routledge/ECPR, 2008); Christiane Bourloyannis, “The Security Council of the and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 20, no. 2 (1992); Detlef F. Sprinz and Martin Weiß, “Domestic Politics and Global Climate Policy,” in International Relations and Global Climate Change, ed. U. Luterbacher and D. F. Sprinz (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001); Michael J. Kelly, “Overcoming Obstacles to the Effective Implementation of International Environmental Agreements,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 9 (1997); Joyce, Joseph. “Promises Made, Promises Broken: A Model of IMF Program Implementation.” Economics & Politics 18 (2006): 339-365. 8 Steven J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Karl DeRouen, Jr et al., “Civil war peace agreement implementation and state capacity,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010). 9 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization 47, no. 2 (1993); Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law, International Relations and Compliance,” in The Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London, England: Sage Publications, Ltd., 2002); Christer Jönsson and Jonas Tallberg, “Compliance and Post-Agreement Bargaining,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 4 (1998); Peter M. Haas, “Compliance with EU directives: insights from international relations and comparative politics,” Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 1 (1998); Arild Underdal, “Explaining Compliance and Defection: Three Models,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 1 (1998); Gerda Falkner et al., “Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?,” West European Politics 27, no. 3 (2004). 10 Daniel P. Aldrich, Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); S. Hayden Lesbirel, NIMBY Politics in Japan: Energy Siting and the Management of Environmental Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); S. Hayden Lesbirel and Daigee Shaw, Managing Conflict in Facility Siting: An International Comparison (Cheltenham, England; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005).

21 puzzle in question.

What is needed is an approach that addresses how international, national and local actors interact in alliance management. Specifically, in looking at the post-Cold War military realignment agreements in the US-Japan alliance, this dissertation draws from liberal theory on actors and actor preferences to propose the concept of preference incorporation as a way of understanding the interaction between these three groups of actors, as well as the impact that their interaction has upon internal alliance tensions, and thus, implementation outcomes. To present this argument, this chapter first addresses the three bodies of literature summarized in the introduction, showing where their key concepts and theories fall short of explaining the variation of implementation outcomes in the US--Cold War realignment. It begins with systemic theories of alliance formation and management, before shifting to the relatively new and developing subfield of basing politics, which draws from broader scholarship on foreign policy analysis (FPA) and social movements. It then addresses the literature on implementation in both the international and domestic arenas. The chapter then elaborates on the concept of preference incorporation, and how the presence and absence of this phenomenon advances or impedes the implementation of the military basing agreements being examined. Lastly, it outlines the methods used in this dissertation.

2.1 Systemic level theories and implementation failure

That the dissertation’s chief question is rarely examined in the field of International Relations can be attributed to the trajectory of the literature to date. The study of international relations—and thus, alliances—is dominated by systemic theories, which are built on the assumption that state behavior can be explained by factors relating to the structure of the international system and their own positions within it. Both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism postulate that states are the primary actors in the international system, and that they rationally seek ways to ensure their own survival; alliances are recognized as one of the instruments employed towards this end. Where the two schools diverge is in the reasoning behind a state’s desire to form and maintain an alliance, which then have different implications for state behavior within that relationship in particular international situations.

The groundwork for neorealist approaches to alliances between states has come largely from balance-of-power theory. In contrast to domestic political systems, whose parts “stand in

22 relations of super- and subordination,” the international political system is anarchic, meaning that the units that operate within it are essentially equal.11 As such, each unit has to ensure its own survival and defend its own interests, either by building internal resources and capabilities, or through cooperation with others. This kind of cooperation is difficult because states can never be certain of the intentions of others; however, two states may agree to cooperate militarily against a more powerful actor. Waltz argues that the self-help nature of the anarchical international system tends towards the creation of a balance of power, as states would balance against the strongest player or coalition rather than be a weaker member within a dominant coalition. Furthermore, the concentration of power in one state stimulates the rise of new powers to balance it. Hence, states form, maintain and terminate alliances with each other as part of this continuous process of balancing.

Balance-of-threat theory modifies this argument to postulate that states balance against threat instead of power alone. Although material power is an important element of whether a state can attack another, Walt argues that “the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.”12 States are more likely to fear powerful actors that are closer to them, that are focused on developing offensive rather than defensive capabilities, such as aircraft carriers and missile delivery systems, and whose rhetoric suggests enmity. As in the case of balance-of-power theory, then, states may ally with each other in order to balance against a third state that both regard as a threat to their survival. However, cooperation remains difficult because states can never be certain of the intentions of others, even those of their allies. As such, realist theory posits that these security relationships persist only so long as the threat exists.

Other scholars examined in greater detail how states manage these alliances. Key concepts and factors from this literature include the alliance security dilemma and the question of how asymmetries in allies’ power and interests influence the choices that states make within such relationships.13 For example, the alliance security dilemma occurs because states commit to helping each other despite not having completely identical interests. Because of these

11 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), 88. 12 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5. 13 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991); Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (1990); T. Sandler and K. Hartley, “Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action,” Journal of Economic Literature 39, no. 3 (2001).

23 differences, treaty obligations can lead to a state being entrapped in a conflict that it would prefer to avoid. However, if the state decides not to fulfil its commitment to come to its ally’s aid, then it risks being abandoned in its own time of need.

To date, this literature mostly overlooks the issue of implementation and thus misses the potential for implementation challenges to disrupt alliance management. Many of the studies on alliance politics focus on the negotiation stage, with signed agreements as the outcome of interest. Nevertheless, several factors that alliance scholars identify as having a significant influence on negotiation can be used to generate explanations for differences in implementation outcomes, as has occurred with the military basing agreements in Japan.

2.2 Neorealism and the US military realignment in Japan

Balance-of-power theory itself makes no predictions about state behavior—it only seeks to explain “why the range of outcomes falls within certain limits.”14 However, Waltz’s predictions about systemic outcomes have implications for state behavior within an alliance. Where a state needs to ally with another in order to balance a third, more powerful actor (be it one state or a group of allied states), it is more likely to cooperate and implement the agreements that it has signed, whether in terms of providing access to military facilities or providing support when its ally is attacked. Conversely, when a state’s position in the international system improves relative to other states or alliances, then it is less likely to implement any signed agreements. And if changes in relative power make it the second most powerful single actor in the system, the state is expected to break off the alliance and instead seek to balance the dominant power. Indeed, following the end of the Cold War, Waltz and other neorealists argued that Japan would itself emerge as a great power that would balance against the United States.15 Although this did not eventuate, adherents to balance-of-power theory may nevertheless have expected Japan to refrain from implementing basing agreements during the 1990s because it no longer needed to maintain its alliance with the United States to balance against another more powerful actor. Such behavior could be

14 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 69, see also 116 and 21-22. 15 Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 11, no. 3 (2002): 3-5. As Midford points out (p.7), neorealist arguments about Japan are challenged because the country “should have begun emerging as a significant military power long before the cold war’s end.” Nevertheless, balance-of-power theory can still help explain the foreign policy actions that Japan has taken, within the constraints Tokyo has applied to its security policy.

24 construed as an early indication of a desire to break off the alliance and form a balancing coalition of its own, checked only by the rapid emergence of China as another great power in the region.

Similarly, balance-of-threat theory allows neorealist explanations to account for Japan’s alliance behavior throughout the entire post-Cold War period. The more a state’s leaders perceive that another actor is capable of and intent on threatening its sovereignty, territorial integrity, or other interests, the more it will cooperate with its ally in negotiating and implementing alliance agreements that will help protect those interests. Conversely, when perceptions of such threats are reduced amongst the state’s leaders, levels of cooperation fall as the state dedicates its limited resources to other areas of policy. Hence, Japan’s failure to implement the basing agreements signed during the 1990s can arguably be attributed to greatly reduced threat perceptions amongst national and local leaders following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. On the other hand, the rapid rise of China, accompanied by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests during the 2000s, led to increasing perceptions of threat amongst the Japanese national and subnational elite. In this increased threat environment, the tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyu Islands and on the Korean Peninsula from 2010 onwards paved the way for the Abe administration’s success in obtaining Okinawan governor Hirokazu Nakaima’s consent for proceeding with the relocation of MCAS Futenma in December 2013.

However, theories that employ power and threat perceptions struggle to provide a satisfactory account of the variation in implementation outcomes in the US-Japan military basing agreements since the end of the Cold War. Even if correlation is established between levels of threat perception and the percentage of agreements implemented in different allies or across different time periods, it provides no basis for why the Japanese state in the 1990s would have chosen to carry out the expansion of MCAS Iwakuni while neglecting a similar project in the far more strategic location of Okinawa. Furthermore, it is puzzling for states to sign agreements that they do not intend to carry out. If reduced threat perceptions in Japan created disincentives for the implementation of these agreements, then the Japanese government should not have signed them, much less undertaken protracted administrative and legislative procedures, including lengthy environmental assessment procedures, in several attempts to carry them out. The failed implementation of several agreements to relocate MCAS Futenma during the 1990s and 2000s thus cannot be attributed to changes in the power balance or threat perceptions.

25 Alternatively, states may try to balance by relying on another state’s balancing efforts; this is known as “buck-passing.” States that employ this strategy recognise that there are threats in the anarchic international society that they have to balance against. However, due to the economic and political costs of maintaining a military and deploying it for regional or even global security purposes, they instead “try to ride free on other states’ balancing efforts” in order to “avoid unnecessary costs.”16 An important predictor of this strategy is the vulnerability of the ally to the threat.17 The more powerful the ally and/or the greater stake it has in countering the threat, the more likely a state is to pass the buck and rely on that ally for security. Indeed, many scholars and observers have argued that Japan has long been free riding on the US security guarantee, spending as little as possible on defense and avoiding wider alliance responsibilities by means of constitutional and self-imposed restrictions on its military capabilities.18

Accordingly, perceptions of US vulnerability provide an explanation for the problems encountered in the implementation of the agreements to relocate MCAS Futenma. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the perception of the United States as the sole superpower would have decreased Japan’s inclination to carry out costly base relocation agreements in the 1990s. Conversely, following the re-emergence of threats to the United States in the form of terrorism in the early 2000s, Japan moved to abandon its former strategy of buck-passing and recommitted itself to the alliance through the realignment. In other words, as Washington’s attention was increasingly focused on the Middle East in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, Tokyo pushed for the Futenma relocation to be included as part of the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation and attempted to carry it out. To further increase US perceptions of its commitment to the alliance, it also sought to find a permanent solution for the long- standing problem of Carrier Air Wing 5 (CVW-5)’s landing drills, which had been based at the distant and unsafe single airfield of Iwo Jima since the late 1980s. Although Japan continues to encounter local resistance to these basing changes, the progress that it has made since the early 2000s, particularly on MCAS Futenma, can be explained by Tokyo’s increased perception of the vulnerability of its ally.

16 Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks,” 141; Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security 29, no. 1 (2004): 103-04. 17 Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks,” 144-45. 18 Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy.”

26 However, the idea that Japan has been engaged in a strategy of buck-passing or free-riding leaves several puzzles about the implementation of the US-Japan military basing agreements. First, it does not account for why the Japanese government might have chosen to carry out the MCAS Iwakuni expansion while allowing the Futenma and Naha Port relocation projects and the construction of a new airfield for carrier aircraft training to languish. If the Japanese government were consistently passing the buck to its ally, then it should not have made significant progress in implementing the Iwakuni expansion during the 1990s and early 2000s, when the US was arguably at the peak of its power relative to all other players in the system. In fact, a closer look at interactions and negotiations between the alliance partners and also between Tokyo and local governments in Okinawa shows that significant efforts were undertaken towards relocating Futenma even during the 1990s. For example, following the original SACO agreement in 1996, the central, Okinawan and Nago governments worked together to develop the Basic Plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility by 2002, only for it to be scuttled as the relocation was absorbed into the Defense Posture Review Initiative (DPRI), the Japan-wide realignment negotiations that began around that time.

The logic of buck-passing also struggles to account for Japan’s alliance behavior in the face of changing Japanese perceptions of its ally’s strength and commitment. The above discussion shows that Japan had attempted to carry out the SACO agreement at a time when, under this strategy, it would have been expected to pass the buck to its powerful ally. Conversely, weakened by a protracted war in the Middle East as well as the global financial crisis beginning in 2008, the vulnerability of the United States was arguably at a high point in 2009. However, instead of carrying out the agreement as might be expected under the buck-passing theory, Japan, led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) under , attempted to review the MCAS Futenma part of the Roadmap. Although Hatoyama eventually returned to the agreement, the implementation of many of the realignment objectives in Okinawa remained stalled until the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) reclaimed power in December 2012.19 In other words, contrary to the expectations of the theory, indications of buck-passing seemed to increase at a time when the US became more vulnerable.

19 A major factor in this, of course, is the impact of the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster that began in March 2011 and led to the resignation of Prime Minister . Another issue that took high-level attention away from the realignment was the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyu Islands dispute, which escalated from 2010 to 2012 following the incident with the Chinese fishing boat captain. One overarching issue was that the DPJ’s lack of experience in government contributed to their poor response to all of these other issues (see, for example, Kushida, Kenji E., and Phillip Y. Lipscy, eds, Japan Under the DPJ: the Politics of Transition and Governance,

27 Alternatively, Japan may be engaging in selective buck-passing. Tokyo may be selectively implementing certain agreements in order to reduce its costs while still demonstrating a level of commitment that would forestall any abrogation of the alliance by the United States. Some commentators have also argued that the developments at MCAS Iwakuni comprise the most important element of the realignment in Japan, which would help explain why the changes at this facility have been prioritised over those in Okinawa. Indeed, one of the factors proposed in Snyder’s theory about alliance bargaining—the comparative interest of each state actor in the issue at stake20—might account for the variation if it can be shown that the Japanese government benefitted more from abandoning the projects in Okinawa than from carrying them out.

However, closer examination of Japanese foreign policy and the attitudes of Japanese elites towards the US-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War period suggest that Japan’s main foreign policy objective has been to strengthen the alliance due to concerns over the threats posed by China and North Korea.21 Okinawa is especially important due to its strategic position in relation to China, and its proximity to the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyu Islands that are a focal point of Sino-Japanese tensions. Hence, it appears unlikely that the Japanese government would deliberately avoid implementing the Futenma objectives in particular, especially given the intra-alliance strains that have stemmed from it over the years.22 Indeed, as outlined briefly above, empirical evidence shows that the Japanese government has made great efforts since at least the mid-2000s to relocate MCAS Futenma.

As the above discussion suggests, the main problem with neorealist theories as a framework for explaining alliance management is that, although they can explain variation between states or within any one state over time, they do not readily explain variation within a country at a particular time. This should be expected, for systemic theory is focused on long-term international outcomes; nothing is happening unless it affects these outcomes in a significant way. Under this perspective, whether states are able to implement military basing agreements

(Stanford, CA: The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, 2013)). It remains unclear, however, just how much of an impact these challenges had on the realignment in Okinawa. 20 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 170-72. 21 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power (Oxford, England; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 28-29; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, by Emma Chanlett-Avery, RL33740 (2011), 3-7; Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in Northeast Asia,” in Issues & Insights 8, no. 16 (Honolulu HI: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008). 22 Blaine Harden, “Future of Okinawa base strains U.S.-Japanese alliance; Change in ruling party has scuttled deal to move Marine air station from densely packed city to thinly populated area on island,” The Washington Post, January 24, 2010.

28 or not does not change the fact that actors in the anarchic international system engage in balancing behavior. As Waltz points out, balance-of-power and other systemic theories are theories of international politics, not theories of foreign policy. They explain why the international system exhibits certain long-term trends, not why a particular state will engage in a particular foreign policy behavior, be it a specific basing policy decision or another aspect of alliance management.

This is not to claim that international or systemic factors are unimportant in the development of alliance policy. Focusing on systemic factors allows scholars to observe broad, long-term trends that can be useful for developing grand strategies and other long-term goals, which then influence the specific security policies of the states in the system. However, states are not monolithic, and the interaction between strategic necessities and domestic political pressures often challenge their attempts to fulfil long-term goals. That is to say, domestic politics can significantly influence the short-term and mid-term objectives that are crucial to achieving those goals. When alliances are instrumental to achieving such objectives, the management of these security relationships then also becomes subject to the sway of subnational political actors, be they individuals or groups working within or outside of the international or state governing apparatus.

2.3 Institutions and norms in alliance theory

Indeed, the end of the Cold War brought about the expansion of alliance theory to the influence of domestic actors. The persistence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) following the breakup of the Soviet Union presented a puzzle for theories of alliance management. Based on the tenets of the balance-of-power and balance-of-threat theories, many scholars predicted that NATO would also break apart, since the threat that had facilitated its formation had passed. However, scholars such as Walt (1997), Wallander (2000) and Checkel (2005) later identified the processes of “alliance institutionalization” and “alliance socialization” as being instrumental in ensuring that NATO survived and even prospered.23 Institutionalization refers to the development of inter-governmental

23 Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse”; McCalla, “NATO’s persistence after the cold war”; Celeste A Wallander, “Institutional assets and adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization. 54, no. 4 (2000); Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” ibid. 59 (2005).

29 organizations (bureaucracies) intended to facilitate cooperation between alliance members. Elites within these bureaucracies can in turn seek to perpetuate the alliance for the sake of their own interests, regardless of external conditions. Similarly, socialization refers to the development amongst these political actors of a shared identity or worldview.24 Based on concepts and arguments that emerged from the fields of neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism, these two processes allow for the influence of domestic actors on alliance management.

Neoliberal institutionalism contends that, besides cooperation against another powerful or threatening actor, states obtain other mutual benefits from alliance relationships.25 One key benefit is that alliances reduce the uncertainty inherent in the anarchical system. In response to the pessimistic neorealist view that states are likely to cheat because they are concerned about relative gains in relation to their own allies, neoliberal institutionalists argue that the institutional framework of an alliance mitigates such fears because it facilitates the provision of credible information about each state’s own capabilities and intentions.26 Another benefit is that the capabilities that allies develop in response to the original threat are often adaptable to other security concerns.27 These benefits allow alliances to persist even when the actor or threat against which they were formed ceases to exist. The process of institutionalization is thus able to explain the empirical puzzle of the persistence of NATO despite the downfall of the Soviet Union. NATO’s member states perceived that the benefits derived from cooperation—not just in the security arena but also in terms of trade—outweighed the costs of reduced independence of action and the risk of being entrapped in an ally’s conflict with a third party. 28

Most importantly, the neoliberal institutionalist contribution to the literature on alliances identifies two major factors that impact alliance management and thus agreement implementation. The first of these is the process of institutionalization, which involves the development of intergovernmental organizations crucial to the day-to-day operation of the alliance. Although states negotiate and sign the broad terms of their security partnership— such as commitments to mutual defense and basing and visiting rights—during alliance

24 Duffield, “Security Studies,” 347-48. 25 Ibid.; Wallander, “Institutional assets and adaptability: NATO after the Cold War”; Masala, “Alliances,” 386- 87.) 26 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 45. 27 Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse.” 28 See, for example, Keohane and Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.”

30 formation, the implementation of those terms changes over time as both the strategic environment and the internal characteristics of both allied states evolve. Thus an alliance will typically develop and refine institutions for two broad types of alliance activities: the rules or processes that facilitate collective decision-making amongst the allies, and the organizations necessary to carry out joint tasks such as military planning, weapons procurement and crisis management. This creates a formal bureaucracy composed of individuals that have an interest in maintaining the alliance relationship because of their own career prospects. Peripheral actors, such as defense contractors, analysts and journalists, may also have a vested interest in prolonging the alliance. Furthermore, the longer it lasts, the larger this group of advocates will grow, simply through the sheer number of individuals that will have committed their lives to the relationship.29

Building on the above, the level of institutionalization of an alliance can have significant implications for alliance management. An undertaking such as the relocation of a major facility involves many intermediary steps, including design and assessing the feasibility of that design, budgeting and construction. The prior existence of organisations that can facilitate coordination between the allies for each of these steps can ensure that negotiation and implementation of such agreements is as efficient as possible. In the case of the ongoing US military realignment in Japan, the upgrading of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) to ministerial-level talks in the early 1990s facilitated the establishment of SACO, the DPRI talks in the early 2000s, and many other important developments in the alliance.30 However, the relationship between institutionalization and a successful outcome may not be linear, even if other factors such as budget are taken into account. In fact, having multiple intra-alliance organizations and rules can create challenges for alliance management because of the sheer

29 Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse,” 166-68. 30 Tokyo and Washington established the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in 1960 in order to facilitate regular high-level meetings. These meetings were originally conducted at the assistant secretary level on the US side, until US Secretary of State James Baker indicated to his Japanese counterparts in 1990 that the United States was willing to upgrade them to cabinet-level status. (Japan has always been represented by cabinet-level officials: the Foreign Minister and the Director-General of the JDA.) However, while it took until March 1994 for the allies to arrange the first official meeting in this new format—a meeting that also saw Undersecretary of Defense Frank Wisner in attendance instead of Secretary William Perry—officials were in the process of organizing the next meeting when the rape in Okinawa occurred. This fortuitous timing enabled the SCC to take up the issue and quickly facilitate the SACO process as a high-level response to the resulting protests. See U.S.- Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Announcement Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee,” December 2, 1996, accessed October 17, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/5.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Wakaru! Kokusai Jōsei: “2-plus-2” Kaigō ~ NichiBei Dōmei no “Tsugi no 50-nen” he,” September 13, 2011, accessed October 17, 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/pr/wakaru/topics/vol77/; “Christopher, Kono agree on 2-plus-2 talks in Sept.,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 16, 1995; Barbara Wanner, “Security Cooperation Emphasized Amid Trade Tensions,”JEI Report no.11 (Japan Economic Institute of America, 1994).

31 number of individuals and groups that might need to approve of or at least acquiesce to the objectives of any particular agreement.

This is where the second process, that of socialization, comes into play. At the international level, scholars typically refer to this as the process whereby allies come to “share common political values and objectives while remaining separate political entities.”31 Many alliances may begin with a solid foundation on this front, since state leaders will usually seek security partnerships with states that possess similar worldviews and values. In the case of multilateral alliances, founding members may restrict the addition of subsequent states by stipulating conditions that newcomers need to meet. Accession into NATO, for example, is guided by separate membership action plans specifying a curated list of criteria that a country must first satisfy.32 States may initially “role play” carrying out the norms and practices that signal fulfilment of these criteria. However, prolonged interaction within the shared community can lead to the internalization of these norms and practices as “the right thing to do.”33 Over time, the allies may even come to identify themselves as being part of a security community, defined by “a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, and mutual responsiveness.”34 In other words, they come to see the alliance as not being just about deterrence against a common enemy, but as part of a shared identity. This new political identity may lead allies to develop new objectives that will extend the lifetime of an alliance beyond the existence of the threat against which it was originally formed.

This alone does not help explain the variation in agreement outcomes in Japan. The US-Japan alliance is highly institutionalized, and alliance managers on both sides of the Pacific were clearly convinced of its continued importance after the end of the Cold War.35 However, as with the neorealist concepts examined above, theories that do not look into the black box of the state cannot be used to explain variation within states. But socialization and institutionalization are also relevant for national and subnational actors, from government bureaucracies to contractors, national and local politicians and even voters. Although an

31 Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse,” 168. 32 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Study on NATO Enlargement,” (2005); “Enlargement,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm. 33 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 34 Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, “Security communities in theoretical perspective,” in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7. 35 United States Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Department of Defense, 1995; Kotaro Higuchi, The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan – The Outlook for the 21st Century–, 1994.

32 alliance may be opposed by a number of these actors at its outset, regular debates about a state’s identity or world view over time, particularly in relation to tensions in the strategic environment that the state faces, may lead to them dropping their resistance and coming to support pro-alliance policy positions. Once this socialization has taken place, resistance to elements of alliance management such as military hosting or base access should fall. At the same time, the development of domestic bureaucratic institutions that support the alliance will create a number of actors that may have a vested interest in maintaining the alliance. Theoretically, the operation of these two processes within an alliance may thus enable smoother negotiation and implementation of alliance agreements

2.4 The politics of basing 1: institutionalization at the domestic level of an alliance

Indeed, the mid-level theories that have emerged in the growing literature on the policy science of basing involve processes of institutionalization or socialization at the domestic level. After the US military presence in the Middle East started encountering blowback in the mid-2000s, Calder drew attention to the practical importance of examining and theorizing about “how host nations deal with foreign military bases on their own soil.”36 Four concepts that have since emerged out of this literature can be used to generate explanations for alliance outcomes in the US-Japan case: (1) compensation politics and (2) regime-change theory, which can be characterized as involving institutionalization, and (3) the “security consensus” and (4) norm alignment, both of which utilize ideas consistent with socialization.37

Importantly, all of these concepts make use of two-level game theory, an approach born in the field of FPA for analyzing how diplomacy is linked to domestic politics.38 Most famously, Putnam postulated that agreements between states are best characterized by looking at negotiations at two distinct levels. Level I involves negotiations between states, whereby elites in the foreign policy decision-making process strike tentative agreements. Level II

36 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 73. 37 Ibid.; Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests; Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Kawato, Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia. 38 R.D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,” International Organization 42, no. 03 (1988); Jeffrey S. Lantis, Domestic Constraints and the Breakdown of International Agreements (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997); Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

33 refers to the negotiations between these elites and domestic actors such as bureaucratic agencies and particular interest groups, through which such agreements may be ratified or rejected. Various factors, such as the popularity and strength of elites in their domestic constituencies, condition the range of outcomes that are acceptable to important players. Although Putnam focused his original analysis on how elite expectations of what will happen at Level II affect how such elites negotiate at Level I, manipulation of these factors theoretically grants domestic actors a degree of influence over foreign policy decisions.

In breaking the ground on the policy science of basing, Calder presented a typology for categorising how state elites manage basing politics to achieve their international and domestic goals. He identified two key tactics that elites use in the hierarchical domestic setting: the provision of material benefits and the use of coercion. These tactics can, if they are combined in different ways, result in four paradigms of basing politics depending on which combination of these tactics they choose to employ (see Figure 2.1). Compensation politics involves the provision of benefits without coercion; bazaar politics the use of both; fiat politics the use of coercion without material benefits, and affective politics the absence of both. Putnam’s two levels come into play particularly in the bazaar politics paradigm, where the host nation government bargains with the basing nation in order to obtain greater benefits in return for basing access.39 However, even within the compensation politics paradigm, the inclusion of local and prefectural governments in this mix produces a dynamic of “complex multilevel bargaining, coordinated by politicians and specialized mediating institutions.”40 Although Calder cautions that these are all ideal types—“abstract models of policymaking not fully present in their entirety in any specific national context at any given point in time”—he uses Japan as the key example for illustrating the paradigm of compensation politics.41

Compensation politics involves the central government providing material benefits and refraining from using coercion in order to induce its domestic constituencies to accept or at least acquiesce to unwanted public facilities.42 Tokyo has always viewed the alliance as a necessary part of its strategy for national defense. Hence, although a number of domestic interest groups oppose the US military presence for ideological (anti-war or anti-military) and/or practical reasons, the Japanese state endeavours to maintain stability in basing politics

39 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 127-28. 40 Ibid., 130. 41 Ibid., 126-39. 42 See also Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

34 Figure 2.1: Calder’s Paradigms of Basing Politics43

Material Benefits

Yes No

Yes Bazaar Politics Fiat Politics Coercion No Compensation Politics Affective Politics

by providing significant levels of economic subsidies to local host governments. It also pays the leases for any local government or private land used for military purposes, and the remuneration for Japanese nationals that work on those facilities. Finally, monetary compensation is provided to citizens who incur damages or injury arising from the operations of the US military, and from issues such as noise pollution or accidents. These payments help ameliorate negative sentiments arising from these issues and are an important tool that the Japanese government has used in reducing alliance tensions.

A notable feature of compensation politics in Japan is its high level of institutionalization. During the Occupation, the Japanese government established several organizations to deal with all of these issues—compensation for crimes and accidents, procurement of materials and land on which to construct additional facilities, and rents and remuneration. A separate organization was set up to take care of procurement for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). From the late 1940s to the 1960s, these institutions gradually evolved and were eventually merged into the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency (DFAA) within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). The facilities and host communities in Okinawa were incorporated into the system when it reverted to Japanese administration in 1972; however, a separate organization known as the Okinawa Development Agency was also set up at this time to help the prefecture catch up economically with the Japanese mainland.44 The development of this highly institutionalized framework of compensation has created interest groups that support the base presence for the economic benefits it brings, including construction companies, base-worker labor unions and landlords. Hence, although anti-base

43 Ibid., 128, Figure 6.1. 44 Embattled Garrisons, 130-35, 66-67. The institutions in question are discussed further in chapter 3, which reviews the history of basing politics in Japan and Okinawa.

35 activists will often organize demonstrations or pursue legal suits in relation to crimes or noise pollution, there is also a significant pro-base presence in many of these host communities.

Compensation politics appears to offer a strong explanation for the problems of implementation in Okinawa, both in terms of achieving concrete realignment objectives and the overall goal of reducing base tensions. In fact, the high level of institutionalization of the system for providing benefits forms the basis of the problem. Okinawan landowners and those who live around the bases benefit from stability of income from their rent or on-base work, giving them incentives to support the status quo and oppose relocation agreements. Hence, the Okinawa Federation of Landowners of Land Used for Military Purposes was on the side resisting change in the 1996 Okinawan referendum on base reduction.45 Furthermore, those who acquiesce to the base presence also have financial incentives to keep protesting the agreements, because the central government has and “will continue to compensate them for refraining from even more confrontational behavior.”46 For example, even LDP-affiliated governors such as Keiichi Inamine (1998-2006) regularly call for reductions in the base presence. These politicians and interest groups, Calder argues, played an important role in stalling the agreements to relocate not only MCAS Futenma, but also the Naha Port facility in Okinawa.47

However, while this approach offers a reasonable account of basing politics in Japan, particularly Okinawa, through to the early 2000s, it has difficultly explaining more recent developments. In particular, the variation in implementation outcomes in Yamaguchi and Okinawa since Calder conducted his study raises questions over why compensation politics works in some cases but not in others. For example, when Governor Nakaima approved the permit for offshore land reclamation in December 2013, he praised Prime Minister Abe’s promise that Tokyo would allocate 300 billion yen a year for Okinawa in its annual budget until 2021.48 However, although the budget allocation during Masahide Ōta’s two terms in office reached as high as 471 billion yen for fiscal year 1998, the late governor did not show

45 Robert D. Eldridge, “The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions: One Question, Several Answers,” Asian Survey 37, no. 10 (1997): 896; Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 173; Teresa Watanabe, “Landowners Lose With Return of Okinawa Base,” Los Angeles Times, April 22, 1996; “Okinawans mixed over future with fewer U.S. bases,” Japan Policy & Politics, September 30, 1996. 46 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 174. 47 Ibid., 167, 74. 48 Reiji Yoshida, “Nakaima cuts deal with Abe,” The Japan Times, December 26, 2013.

36 Figure 2.2: Japanese Cabinet Budget Allocation for Okinawa (Fiscal Years 1989-2018) (in billions of yen).49

Highlighted in red are FY1998, the last budget allocated during the governorship of Masahide Ōta, and FY2014, the budget allocated straight after Governor Hirokazu Nakaima extracted from Prime Minister Shinzō Abe the promise of an annual budget exceeding 300 billion until FY2021.

much inclination to cooperate.50 And as can be seen in Figure 2.2, Okinawa’s budget remained over 300 billion yen from then until FY2004, during which time new Okinawa governor Keiichi Inamine and Nago mayor Tateo Kishimoto cooperated with implementation, only for the Japanese government to abandon the 2002 Basic Plan and negotiate a new one. In other words, there has been a lack of correlation between levels of compensation and

49 Data obtained from the website of the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, https://www8.cao.go.jp/okinawa/3/33.html, accessed December 29, 2018; Okinawa General Bureau, “Part 1, Sanji ni wataru Okinawa Shinkō Kaihatsu Keikakuga no seika, Aratana Okinawa Shinkōkeikaku no Sakutei,” in Muribushi (2002); Ryūgin Sōgō Kenkyuushō, “Okinawa-ken no Shuyō Keizai Shiyou” (March 2002), accessed December 29, 2018, http://www.ryugin-ri.co.jp/tyousareport/2562.html; Okinawa-ken no Shuyō Keizai Shiyou” (February 2005), accessed December 29, 2018, http://www.ryugin-ri.co.jp/tyousareport/2646.html; “Okinawa- ken no Shuyō Keizai Shiyou” (September 2005), accessed December 29, 2018, http://www.ryugin- ri.co.jp/tyousareport/2668.html. 50 Interview with Masahide Ōta, conducted in Okinawa in November 2014. Jun Ōkubo, Gensō no Shima Okinawa (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha, 2009), 33.

37 implementation outcomes, suggesting that compensation politics, as laid out by Calder, does not provide a sufficient explanation for basing politics in Japan.

Alexander Cooley’s “regime change” concept also uses institutionalization to explain alliance management outcomes. Regime-change theory points to a relationship between domestic institutional change and “political attitudes toward honouring basing agreements and security contracts” as a means of explaining the occurrence and intensity of basing politics.51 Cooley argues that basing agreements signed with consolidated democracies are the most credible, due to “procedural legitimacy, institutional stability and delegation, and a consolidated party system,” which “make the implementation of (basing agreements) routine policy matters that are managed by technocrats, not political elites.”52 However, when states enter into alliance arrangements prior to democratic consolidation, a subsequent democratic transition process will see elites politicizing the alliance and its associated basing issues. Elites do this in order to consolidate their domestic power and obtain better concessions from their ally through new or renegotiated alliance agreements. Elites can then use the procedures institutionalized during this consolidation process to legitimize the alliance, after which new agreements are more easily negotiated and signed.53 If this argument is extended to cover implementation, then as a state’s democracy matures, it should also become easier to carry out these agreements, as elites have less of a need or desire to politicize them.

In his study, Cooley uses this argument to explain why basing politics in Okinawa remains highly contested, in contrast to the Japanese mainland. Although Japan might be regarded as a single actor under systemic theory, the US Occupation following the Second World War staggered the spread of democracy in the country. While the rest of Japan was able to elect their own national and local leaders from 1946 and regained full independence in 1952, the United States Civil Administration for the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) remained the authority in Okinawa (and the other occupied islands) until 1972. Furthermore, although USCAR created by proclamation the Government of the Ryukyus in 1952, allowing their citizens to elect their legislative representatives, it continued to appoint the Chief Executive until November 1968, when the prefecture was finally allowed to elect its own leader.54 Along with

51 Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas, 23. 52 Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas, 15-16. 53 Ibid., 18-28. 54 Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 99. United States Civil Administration for the Ryukyu Islands and “Executive Order 11010 of March 19, 1962, Executive Order 11010 of March 19, 1962, Amending Executive Order 10713, Relating to the Administration of the

38 Tokyo’s willingness to “sacrifice” Okinawa, first during the 1945 Battle of Okinawa and then in exchange for regaining sovereignty over the rest of Japan, these developments have led Okinawan reformers to regard the US basing presence as an illegitimate one.55 Hence, Cooley argues that while the consolidation of Japan’s democracy has led to the depoliticization of basing issues on the Japanese mainland, the Okinawa Prefectural Government, which has become a significant player through its own negotiations with the central government, continues to politicize the base presence in Okinawa in response to local political pressures.56 The long-delayed implementation of the agreements to relocate MCAS Futenma appears to fit this argument too. For example, Governor Nakaima made his December 2013 decision to approve the relocation plan contingent on conditions aimed at boosting Okinawa’s economy and easing the burden of base operations on host communities.

However, Cooley’s regime-change theory leaves unanswered questions about why implementation outcomes vary across Japan. If the key issue in Japan’s case is the perceived legitimacy of the US military presence, then Tokyo should have little difficulty negotiating and carrying out the Roadmap objectives on the Japanese mainland, where basing issues have long been depoliticized. Contrary to this expectation, the empirical record shows significant diversity in negotiation and implementation outcomes on the Japanese mainland.57 For example, the brief politicization of the 2006 Roadmap agreement in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, from 2006-2008 and its subsequent resolution is puzzling because the popularity of events such as Friendship Day point to the city’s long-term acquiescence to the legitimacy of the military presence.58 Cooley’s failure to consider this case can be attributed to timing: his study was conducted before Iwakuni mayor Katsusuke Ihara began politicizing the basing objectives involving his city. However, Tokyo has also failed to find a suitable location for a new airfield designed to host the landing drills for CVW-5, the aircraft unit assigned to the flagship carrier of the Seventh Fleet, which is home-ported at United States Fleet Activities Yokosuka. In fact, this particular issue has been on the bilateral agenda since the late 1980s,

Ryukyu Islands,” Code of Federal Regulations, Supplement to Title 3 (1962): 368-371. Chobyo Yara, a reformist, won this first election. 55 Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas, 159; Akiko Yamamoto, “1950 Nendai ni okeru Kaiheitai no Okinawa Iten,” in Okinawa to Kaiheitai: Chūryū no Rekishiteki Tenkai, ed. Tomohiro Yara, et al. (Tokyo: Junpōsha, 2016). 56 Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas, 172-174. 57 Purnendra Jain, Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Affairs (London, England; New York: Routledge, 2005): 153-158. 58 Sgt Antonio Rubio, “40th MCAS Iwakuni Friendship Day 2016 Air Show demonstrates U.S.-Japan alliance,” The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps, 2016; Sgt. Nicole Zurbrugg “MCAS Iwakuni Friendship Day Air Show earns award,” Stars and Stripes, December 23, 2016; Department of U.S. Marine Corps, “Annual Yuko Day Celebration Begins,” FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, 1998.

39 when the drills were first transferred to Iwo Jima. Although most scholars have refrained from considering less visible cases like these, examining why they have not progressed beyond the agenda stage is also necessary for a more complete understanding of basing politics.

2.5 The politics of basing 2: socialization at the domestic level of an alliance

The “security consensus” approach, which also draws on two-level games and the social movement literature, appears to offer a promising explanation for addressing some of the gaps left by Calder and Cooley. This approach can be rephrased as a form of socialization. Andrew Yeo argues that when national elites, who are involved in making or formally ratifying security policy, are relatively unified in support of a state’s alliance with the United States— or in other words, socialized into placing a high value on the alliance—anti-base activists are unable to influence alliance policy outcomes. Conversely, when socialization is incomplete and there is dissension amongst the elites, activists may be able to sway legislators towards rejection of alliance agreements, as occurred in the Philippines in 1989.59 In this case, the executive branch, led by President Corazon Aquino, favored the alliance, and thus negotiated an extension of the existing base lease at the international level of the game. However, a number of senators in the Philippines parliament did not place as much value on the alliance with the United States. Activists were able to identify and target these elites, and successfully convinced them to reject the agreement at the domestic level.

The same argument can be applied in the case of Japan. The landslide victory of the DPJ in 2009 and their formation of a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People’s New Party (PNP) arguably represent a weakening of Yeo’s security consensus. The DPJ, which was the largest party in the coalition, had for many years been arguing that Japan ought to form closer relationships with fellow Asian states, and to become more independent of the United States.60 The SDP, though a shadow of the former Social Party of Japan from whose remnants it had been formed, continued to oppose the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In other words, in terms of the domestic norm of recognizing the alliance with the US as being necessary for Japan’s security, both of these parties reflected an

59 Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests. 60 The Democratic Party of Japan, DPJ Manifesto 2005: Nihon wo Akiramenai, 2005, accessed July 6, 2017, http://archive.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2005/; DPJ Manifesto 2003, 2003, accessed July 6, 2017, http://archive.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/manifesto2003/.

40 incomplete socialization process. This weakening in the security consensus thus represented an opportunity for anti-base activists to influence policy outcomes and translated into Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s attempt to review the agreement to relocate MCAS Futenma. The result was that the implementation of the 2006 Roadmap agreement as it pertained to MCAS Futenma stalled while the DPJ was in government. After the LDP returned to power in the 2012 election, thus restoring the security consensus, the Japanese government restarted the implementation process, obtained the necessary land reclamation approval from the Okinawan governor, and began preparations for construction.

Yet questions remain over whether the security consensus approach fully explains the differences in implementation outcomes in the US-Japan military basing agreements. First, although the coalition with the SDP brought into the government a party that advocated that the Security Treaty be turned into a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the JSDF reduced in size,61 this remained a minority view. As several scholars have argued, the DPJ also put great value on the US-Japan alliance as being necessary for Japan’s security.62 In fact, DPJ leaders such as former Minister of Defense have indicated that they favor a strengthening of the alliance as part of their “commitment to long-term peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region.”63 The main difference between the LDP and the DPJ was not so much a question of “support for the alliance,” but rather what kind of alliance would be in Japan’s best interests. That Hatoyama chose to push for renegotiation of the agreement on Futenma suggests that the DPJ leadership believed that it would strengthen the alliance.

On the other hand, if the result of the 2009 election is indicative of a weakening consensus, the difference in implementation outcomes in Japan may be due to the varying efficacy of local activists. Even a cursory examination of basing politics in Japan shows that many communities continue to protest and bargain with the central government over the status of the US military.64 Hence, it might seem puzzling that the new government sought to revise the Futenma agreement without also reviewing other elements of the realignment that had also

61 The Social Democratic Party of Japan, SDP Manifesto 2009: Seikatsu Saiken 10 no Yakusoku, 2009, accessed July 6, 2017, http://www5.sdp.or.jp/policy/policy/election/images/manifesutopdf2.pdf. 62 Tomohito Shinoda, “Japan’s Parliamentary Confrontation on the Post-Cold War National Security Policies,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 10, no. 03 (2009); Michael J. Green, “The Democratic Party of Japan and the Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 37, no. 1 (2011). 63 Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests. p.168 see also Shinoda, “Japan’s Parliamentary Confrontation on the Post-Cold War National Security Policies,” 274. 64 Eric Slavin, “Navy jets train on Iwo Jima as Japan searches for better option,” Stars and Stripes, May 21, 2014; “21 of 55 affected local gov’ts stay opposed to U.S. base realignment,” Kyodo News, September 17 2006; “6,130 Japanese Sue State over Atsugi Base Noise Pollution,” Jiji Press English News Service, December 17, 2007.

41 encountered opposition from local activists. However, the greater intensity of the protests in Okinawa would be the defining factor under this expansion of the security consensus framework.65 In other words, while the activists in Okinawa successfully convinced Hatoyama to stop implementing the Futenma agreement and attempt to renegotiate it instead, the activists in other localities had not been able to influence policy makers to the same extent.

Still, a second counterargument for the applicability of Yeo’s security consensus framework to explaining implementation is that problems have occurred even during periods of strong LDP rule, when the consensus was unequivocally high. For example, implementation stalled in Iwakuni City from 2006–08, before the DPJ came to power. Furthermore, stops and starts in Okinawa have also occurred during LDP rule, and the construction of replacement facilities for Naha Port and the airfield for the FCLP drills for CVW-5 has not progressed throughout the course of the agreements. Even if anti-base or anti-alliance activism correlated with these periods of delay, if the security consensus is high, then no amount of activism should be able to affect the process. Thus, while Yeo’s framework arguably explains when activists are able to affect agreements, the security consensus alone is unable to fully explain the differences in the subsequent implementations of these agreements.

Finally, in the most recent addition to the basing politics literature, Yuko Kawato examines how the degree of norm alignment between policy makers and activists can influence basing politics. Even under the same security consensus, policy makers respond to the normative arguments that protestors make—based on “widely shared principles” about war, militarism, nuclear weapons, sovereignty, human rights and the environment—in different ways.66 Examining twelve protest cases in Okinawa, South Korea and the Philippines, Kawato argues that anti-base protests are effective only when the normative arguments that protestors make are in line with what policy makers already believe. Generally speaking, three possible

65 One reason for this is that the opposition to the realignment efforts involving MCAS Iwakuni are centered around a city of approximately 150,000 people (following the merger in 2006), located in a prefecture known to be an LDP stronghold and also reported to have a generally positive relationship with the military units stationed there. In contrast, Okinawa is a prefecture with a well-documented history of anti-military and anti-US military sentiment, with over 1 million individuals living on the main island where the US bases are concentrated. These differences make it easier for activists to organize gatherings numbering more than 10,000 people, with the largest protests seeing upwards of 50,000 individuals in attendance. In contrast, anti-base protest rallies in Iwakuni City are rarely reported, a fact that Toku Sakai argues is due to the local stigma against protesting the US military presence. Toku Sakai, “The Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on the Japanese Mainland: A Case Study of the Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni,” Journal of International Development and Cooperation 17, No. 2 (2011): 154. 66 Kawato, Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia, 4.

42 outcomes ensue. First, if the normative arguments do not contradict what policy makers believe, and the protestors themselves are credible, then protests can be an effective means for persuading those elites to change basing policy. Second, when persuasion does not work because elites do not share the beliefs of activists, successful protests can still “create incentives for policy makers to change policy” in order to placate protestors and thus ensure continuation of the alliance. The third outcome sees activists unable to effect policy change or generate incentives for compromise because they cannot persuade policy makers due to a lack of shared beliefs.67 Kawato’s principle of norm alignment can thus be seen as an argument about how the extent to which domestic elites have been socialized towards favoring the alliance is related to policy outcomes in the face of anti-base or anti-agreement protests.

This framework is helpful at explaining the inability of Okinawa’s anti-base movement to significantly change basing policy in the prefecture. In fact, Kawato’s argument about protestors successfully changing basing policy through persuasion or by encouraging compromise from policy makers is built on case studies that include two of the agreements under consideration here. Furthermore, the explanation can, to some extent, account for differences between outcomes in Yamaguchi and Okinawa. In the case of the former, the protest movement took place when the LDP was still in power, during 2006 to 2008. As such, no important national-level policy makers shared the normative beliefs of the anti-base activists. Furthermore, since Yamaguchi Prefecture has traditionally been an LDP stronghold, the smaller protest movement there was unable to generate enough incentives to force elites to compromise in order to retain sufficient local support for the bases. In contrast, Okinawa’s anti-base movement is much larger, and they were able to appeal to a government with high- level policy makers who shared their beliefs—Prime Minister Hatoyama and SDP-leader Fukushima. Hence, the protest movement centered around MCAS Iwakuni did not even come close to persuading policy makers, while the one centered around MCAS Futenma was able to persuade sympathetic elites to push for policy change. Even though the latter effort ultimately failed because the broader consensus in both the US and Japanese governments continues to be antithetical to the protestors’ goals, they were able to delay implementation and obtain further concessions.

Further examination of basing agreement implementation in Japan, however, shows that the process tends to be dominated by practical concerns rather than normative ones. For example,

67 Ibid., 4-7.

43 economic arguments for retaining existing bases and even allowing for construction of new ones still have remarkable influence in both Iwakuni City and Okinawa, although their effects differ because of variation in the local actors affected. This variation is caused and exacerbated by legacies in the systems of compensation set up by the Japanese government since the Second World War, wherein Okinawa is unique in having a high-level government bureau dedicated to planning and economic development in the prefecture. Furthermore, the implementation processes of many of these basing policies have also been dominated by practical considerations such as the cost and feasibility of planned facilities vis-à-vis the operational needs of the US military in Japan and Guam, in particular. Normative arguments may indeed be important considerations for policy makers, particularly when they’re negotiating international agreements or national-level policy; however, practical considerations such as cost and the nature of the base economy appear to have greater traction during implementation.

In short, the growing literature on “the politics of basing” offers several potential factors that might explain differences in implementation outcomes for US-Japan military basing agreements in the post-Cold War period. However, each leaves unanswered questions. The fact that the major objectives of the agreements have not changed much despite the high level of anti-base sentiment in Okinawa appears to support Yeo’s security consensus as a predictor of alliance policy outcomes, but it does not as reliably predict which of these agreements then get implemented. Similarly, Kawato’s argument about norm alignment between elites and protestors is more applicable to the negotiation and ratification of alliance agreements than their subsequent implementation. In short, these two potential explanations, which involve the degrees to which national and subnational elites are socialized into valuing the alliance with the US, can explain alliance variation across different states. But they are once again less successful at explaining variation within states, especially during the process of implementation.

Similarly, the two explanations that involve institutionalization do not effectively account for the variation in the implementation of the US military realignment within Japan. Cooley’s analysis of how domestic institutional change is linked to the politicization of basing issues leaves the puzzle of why politicization of agreement objectives on the Japanese mainland, which he coded as being a “consolidated democracy,” has resulted in significant delays to implementation. If highly institutionalized democratic processes translated into lower levels of politicization of basing issues, then the objectives concerning MCAS Iwakuni and the

44 airfield needed for CVW-5’s FCLP drills should have been easier to implement. Finally, Calder’s compensation politics paradigm offers the most promising framework for understanding how domestic interests get in the way of a smooth implementation process. However, it does not fully address how a state’s leaders can overcome such roadblocks. In short, the four explanations born out of the subfield of basing politics, which can be categorized as involving institutionalization or socialization of the alliances in question, cannot effectively explain the variation of implementation outcomes in the US military realignment in Japan.

2.6 Alliances from an implementation perspective

An important problem in the explanations outlined thus far is that they tend to focus on the process of agreement formation. To be more specific, they are all derived from theories or studies that focus on one or more of the stages of problem identification, information collection and decision-formulation, with the policy—or, in the case of relations between two or more states, the agreement—as the object of analysis. As the discussion above shows, factors and frameworks that successfully explain how agreements are negotiated and signed do not necessarily explain how such agreements are then implemented. This is because these different stages in the production of agreement outputs involve different kinds of actors, interests and procedures. In other words, “unlike the process of negotiating an international agreement…policy-making is concerned with the activities and attitudes of formal political leaders, institutions and definable groups, whereas…policy outputs [are] more concerned with the working of informal groupings, lower-level officials and half-understood procedures.”68 As Smith and Clarke noted when they first highlighted the lack of studies on implementation, “thinking about foreign policy behavior from an implementation perspective encourages us to ask slightly different types of question about how foreign policy emerges.”69

In contrast to these previous studies, this dissertation explicitly seeks to address implementation as the object of analysis. Hence, this section now turns to explanations that explicitly address how domestic policies and international agreements are affected by the efforts to carry them out. In fact, many studies of policy implementation have already been

68 Smith and Clarke, “Foreign Policy Implementation and Foreign Policy Behaviour,” 5. 69 Ibid., 2.

45 carried out in a wide variety of academic fields. According to Saetran, the first studies ever published on the topic were doctoral dissertations on international politics.70 But much of the first major wave of studies that followed was directed at realms of policy that are largely domestic in nature: educational, health, environmental, social, and economic issues.71 After peaking in the 1970s to 1980s, interest in implementation studies waned in the 1990s for a range of reasons, including questions over the benefits provided by such research and an increasing perception that implementation cannot “fruitfully be studied and understood as a discrete policy activity.”72 However, the early 2000s saw a resurgence of interest in this aspect of policy, largely due to scholars of comparative politics and International Relations, who were keen to explore “whether, when and how” international pacts matter.73

This second wave of implementation scholarship has again covered a broad spectrum of policy. Much of the literature has focused on compliance with multilateral environmental and trade accords,74 but there are also a number of studies regarding the effectiveness of international security pacts, such as peace settlements and arms control agreements.75 Top- down and bottom-up approaches are once again evident. These studies have produced arguments about how international actors such as international organizations, other state actors, or even global civil society, can effect change in target states through such

70 Harald Saetren, “Facts and Myths about Research on Public Policy Implementation: Out-of-Fashion, Allegedly Dead, But Still Very Much Alive and Relevant,” Policy Studies Journal 33, no. 4 (2005): 569. The two dissertations date from the 1930s and 1940s: J.C. Charlesworth’s The Implementation of the Pact of Paris, University of Pittsburgh 1933 and M.H.A. Laatsch’s The Implementation of the Monroe Doctrine, Princeton University 1942. 71 Ibid., 570. 72 Ibid., 572-73. 73 Joachim, Reinalda, and Verbeek, International Organizations and Implementation, 4. 74 Ibid.; Finger and Schuler, “Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge”; Haas, “Compliance with EU directives”; Underdal, “Explaining Compliance and Defection”; Steve Rayner, “A Cultural Perspective on the Structure and Implementation of Global Environmental Agreements,” Evaluation Review 15, no. 1 (1991); Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice; Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer, “Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives,” Global Environmental Politics 7, no. 3 (2007). A number of scholars are careful to specify that implementation differs from compliance. While the latter is about whether an actor conforms to the behavior prescribed, the former pays attention to concrete actions state actors take (or fail to take) to meet their international commitments, such as the passing of legislation. (See, for example, Raustiala and Slaughter, “International Law, International Relations and Compliance”; Joachim, Reinalda, and Verbeek, International Organizations and Implementation, 4.) However, the fact remains that compliance with and enforcement of international pacts is the focus of most scholarship on implementation at the supra-national level of government. This is arguably because the processes that state actors take to implement agreements domestically are considered to belong to the fields of domestic rather than international politics. 75 DeRouen et al., “Civil war peace agreement implementation and state capacity”; Edwin M. Smith, “Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements,” Southern California Law Review 64 (1990); Jönsson and Tallberg, “Compliance and Post-Agreement Bargaining”; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, eds, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements.

46 international regimes. Others focus on domestic-level factors that impede or enable that change, while yet others integrate analyses from both sides.76 Scholars have also pointed out that post-agreement bargaining is often observed in certain types of pacts: for example, Jönsson and Talberg analyze this phenomenon in peace settlements, while a much earlier study by Edwin Smith proposed the concept of dynamic international obligations to explain why and how the boundaries of arms control agreements are able to evolve in the post- agreement stage.77 Finally, there are also models and studies that look at the effects of normative ideas on implementation, such as reputation and culture.78

At first glance, the nature of many of the agreements suggests that this second wave of implementation studies should hold few insights for the puzzle within the basing politics literature. However, one key feature of multilateral regimes are supra-national organizations, such as the World Trade Organization or the European Union, which can take actions to monitor and then enforce or encourage compliance with the desired behaviors.79 In contrast, the organizational structures of alliances—both bilateral and multilateral—remain state- centered, with an emphasis on sovereign rights, especially with regard to agreements for hosting allied military facilities or assets in sovereign territory. For example, Japan maintains a policy of the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” of “not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons,” while the United States suspended its ANZUS treaty obligations to New Zealand from 1986 to 2010 after Wellington established a nuclear-free zone.80 Hence, there are questions over whether findings from this literature can be applied to the basing agreements in question.

But there are still a few models and concepts that appear useful for explaining the different outcomes observed in Japan. Within the compliance literature, “lack of capacity or resources” and “lack of political will” have often been identified as key factors that lead to

76 See, for example, Joachim, Reinalda, and Verbeek, International Organizations and Implementation, 4. 77 Jönsson and Tallberg, “Compliance and Post-Agreement Bargaining”; Smith, “Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements.” 78 Perkins and Neumayer, “Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives”; Rayner, “A Cultural Perspective on the Structure and Implementation of Global Environmental Agreements.” 79 Joachim, Reinalda, and Verbeek, International Organizations and Implementation; Haas, “Compliance with EU directives”; Perkins and Neumayer, “Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives.” 80 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/; Amy Catalinac, “Why New Zealand took itself out of ANZUS: Observing ‘Opposition for Autonomy’ in Asymmetric Alliances,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 3 (2010).

47 implementation failure.81 The former is quite easily defined. Simply put, it deals with the question of whether a state has the pecuniary resources, infrastructure and personnel required to implement a policy or agreement. The nature of domestic institutions may also be significant, as states will often need to develop and pass legislation in the process. On the other hand, “political will,” which was first introduced by Mintzberg (1983) in the field of management studies, remains a “fuzzy” concept.82 Scholars, commentators and even policy makers themselves have employed the concept when discussing political decision-making and follow through in both domestic and international arenas. However, as a number of scholars have also pointed out, exactly what “political will” comprises of has rarely been defined, and it is often used as a “catch-all” explanation for policies and agreements that have not been implemented.83 While it appears to refer to the “degree of commitment” that an actor has toward carrying out a particular policy or agreement, few scholars within the field have produced a systematic analysis of how political will and its effects can be measured.

2.7 Political will, capacity, and the US-Japan military realignment

Nevertheless, these two factors can be developed into models and applied to the US realignment in Japan in the post-Cold War period. Based on their calculations of costs and benefits, state leaders will implement an international agreement if the expected benefits of doing so outweigh the expected costs. Alternatively, the state may not have the economic or personnel capacity to carry them out. Applied to the agreements involving MCAS Futenma and MCAS Iwakuni, then, the argument is that Japanese government has either been making insufficient efforts to relocate MCAS Futenma or has lacked the economic or personnel capacity to do so. For example, Green ascribes the failure of implementation of the SACO agreement to “a lack of follow-through at senior levels” in both the US and Japanese administrations during the late 1990s.84 The development of facilities in Okinawa and Guam,

81Graham Bird and Thomas D. Willett, “IMF Conditionality, Implementation and the New Political Economy of Ownership,” Comparative Economic Studies 46, no. 3 (2004): 445. See also Chayes and Chayes, “On Compliance”; Haas, “Compliance with EU directives.” 82 Darren C. Treadway et al., “Political will, political skill, and political behavior,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 26, no. 3 (2005): 229-30. 83Graham Bird, “The effectiveness of conditionality and the political economy of policy reform: is it simply a matter of political will?,” The Journal of Policy Reform 2, no. 1 (1998): 91. See also Treadway et al., “Political will, political skill, and political behavior”; Lori Ann Post, Amber Raile, and Eric Raile, “Defining Political Will,” Politics & Policy vol. 38, no.4 (August 25, 2010). 84Michael J. Green, “Balance of Power,” in U.S.-Japan Relations in a Changing World, ed. Steven Kent Vogel (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 28.

48 which are important features of the 2006 Roadmap, has also been delayed partly as a result of budgetary pressures in the respective national governments.85 Moreover, these pressures may have been compounded by the rising cost of other elements of the realignment that were already underway, including the expansion of MCAS Iwakuni. This evidence seems to indicate that neither government is particularly keen on carrying out the return of MCAS Futenma; indeed, the status quo of leaving the base in its current location might be acceptable to both parties.

However, once again, this explanation does not fully account for the variation in implementation outcomes, especially in Okinawa. First, although a lack of resources can explain some of the delays, a closer look at US government reports suggests that, at least on the US side, the budget for the realignment has been reduced or rejected at various stages due to the lack of a comprehensive cost analysis for the planned facilities.86 US Senate documents also reveal that the lack of progress in the implementation process was a major factor in budget reductions.87 In other words, the lack of funding allocated by Congress to the relocation of MCAS Futenma arguably stems mostly from the absence of a clear implementation plan rather than from limited resources. On the Japanese side, although the global financial crisis beginning in 2008 could indeed be a factor in the cuts, Tokyo struggled to obtain the required permits for land reclamation for both the 2002 (failed) and 2006 (delayed until 2013) plans, which suggests that other factors are involved.

In one sense, the “lack of resources” explanation may actually be tantamount to a “lack of political will.” As Tatsumi has pointed out, for much of the early 2000s, the senior US leadership paid little attention to the realignment in Okinawa because their attention was focused on the Middle East. Similarly, in Japan, Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi was largely preoccupied with his own agenda of domestic reform, a significant turnaround from his immediate predecessors Keizō Obuchi and Ryūtarō Hashimoto.88 Conversely, the progress

85 Sung-ki Jung, “Yongsan Garrison to Be Relocated by 2014,” The Korea Times, January 5, 2011; “U.S. Senate OKs budget cut for Okinawa Marines relocation to Guam,” Kyodo News, December 15, 2011. 86 United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Management: Comprehensive Cost Information and Analysis of Alternatives Needed to Assess Military Posture in Asia, GAO-11-316 (Washington, DC, 2011), accessed October 17, 2013, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-316; Defense Planning: DOD Needs to Review the Costs and Benefits of Basing Alternatives for Army Forces in Europe, GAO-10-745R (Washington, DC, 2010), accessed October 24, 2013, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-745R. 87 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee On Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2011. S.Rep 112-026; “U.S. Senate OKs budget cut for Okinawa Marines relocation to Guam.” 88 Yuki Tatsumi, “The Defense Policy Review Initiative: a reflection,” PacNet Newsletter, no. 19, April 27 (2006), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0619.pdf.

49 achieved since December 2013, when Prime Minister Abe obtained Governor Nakaima’s cooperation in signing the permit for land reclamation at Henoko, can be attributed to the Japanese leadership’s renewed application towards fulfilling the agreement. Despite continued opposition from both civil society and the current governor, Tokyo has been forging ahead with construction.89 However, this explanation similarly leaves further questions about what exactly political will is, how it operates in relation to other factors such as state power and threats, and how exactly it is linked to the process of carrying out the agreements that have been signed. Hashimoto’s push for a sea-based facility, for example, appears to have contributed heavily to the delays in implementation on the Japanese side. In other words, greater political will from the head of state does not automatically lead to greater success in implementation.

One final avenue for investigation comes from studies of implementation in the domestic context. The physical impacts of military bases on their host communities, both positive and negative, are most similar to those of other unwanted facilities. Like military bases, facilities such as dams, waste disposal plants and nuclear power plants provide a “public good” to the broader public; at the same time, they concentrate their negative effects on the communities that host them. Hence, attempts to construct new facilities often lead to opposition from the community whose lives will be disrupted, often called the “not in my backyard” or NIMBY phenomenon, and has led to a rich literature examining how state and civil society interact as the former attempt to site these “public bads.”90 However, the nature and goal of siting— situating a new facility in a previously unaffected community—is significantly different from that of the post-Cold War US military realignment in Japan, which is to relocate and consolidate facilities so as to reduce tensions in basing communities while maintaining capabilities. Furthermore, these alliance agreements involve another state who must also approve of the arrangements before they can be implemented. Hence, the explanations found in the literature on siting cannot readily be applied to examining the pacts under consideration in this dissertation. Another explanation is needed for the differences in implementation outcomes in the US-Japan military realignment.

89 “Gov’t crosses line with launch of landfill work for Okinawa base relocation,” The Mainichi, April 26, 2017. 90 Aldrich, Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West, 3-6.

50 2.8 Preference incorporation, internal alliance tensions, and implementation

As can be seen from the discussion above, the three groups of explanations suffer from some combination of the following weaknesses. First, they are too focused on the negotiation of the agreements rather than the processes that follow their signing. In short, they do not examine the subsequent implementation of such agreements. Second, due to the focus on agreements, they prioritize the impact of international and national level factors on policy outcomes, for instance, by over-emphasising the role of national actors to the exclusion of subnational factors and subnational actors. Third, owing to these initial two weaknesses, they cannot readily account for variations in the degree to which agreement objectives are actually achieved by the implementing state(s). As outlined in the introduction, in order to explain the variations in the implementation of US-Japan military realignment agreements, this dissertation develops a new analytical framework better able to address these weaknesses. This framework extends analysis beyond the overall direction of alliance policy or alliance agreements to examine how key objectives of such agreements are actually implemented. In particular, it examines the role of societal actors and their preferences in the implementation process, by means of the concept of preference incorporation.

Preference incorporation refers to efforts made by state leaders to consider and address the interests and concerns of key subnational actors in the formation of policy. Focusing specifically on the specified agreements within the US-Japan alliance, the core argument of this dissertation is that the extent to which alliance managers—state leaders, negotiators and other bureaucrats involved in alliance policy-making—incorporate the preferences of those key subnational actors into the agreements, and the timing of their efforts to do so, are crucial for whether states are successful in implementing the objectives of military basing agreements. Early and successful efforts to incorporate local preferences generate a positive feedback loop that helps facilitate the successful implementation of the concrete agreement objectives. Conversely, where alliance managers are late in attempting to incorporate local preferences, or are unsuccessful in their attempts, this generates a negative feedback loop that impedes implementation of those objectives.

51 Preference incorporation has its basis in liberal theories of international relations, a key tent of which is the primacy of societal actors and their preferences.91 Moravcsik defines these actors as self-interested individuals and private groups that are “rational and risk-adverse,” and that pursue varied interests “under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence.”92 These constraints are important because individuals and groups have different desires, tastes, and positions in their societies. As such, even if their interests are similar, their preferences in a particular situation may differ (see further discussion below). States represent a subset of these actors, from which state preferences are derived. The “configuration of interdependent state preferences” in the international system then determines how each state behaves in relation to others.93 For the US-Japan alliance, trends in the third level of state behavior in the system can be discerned empirically: the allies have steadily increased joint exercises and worked toward better force integration, reflecting broad state preferences to maintain and even strengthen the relationship. However, the challenges encountered in implementing basing agreements point to the existence of mechanisms for interference by societal actors whose preferences are not reflected at this systemic level.

Hence, this dissertation seeks to specify which of these actors can interfere with implementation, and the process(es) that enable this. Because the implementation puzzle represents a “blocking” question—that is to say, it is focused on how alliance decision- making might be blocked or held up by particular actors—the dissertation focuses its search within societal actors on potential “veto” players. However, veto players are traditionally defined as actors, collective or individual, whose consent is required in order to change the status quo at particular veto points, typically the passing of legislation at the national level of government. Accordingly, the literature on veto players is predominantly concerned with how national-level actors are able to prevent the passage of legislation or the formal ratification of international agreements.94 This is true of Helen Milner’s 1997 model of two-level games,

91 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 516-17. 92 Ibid., 516. 93 Ibid., 518-21. 94 Daniel W. Drezner, “Introduction: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions,” in Locating the proper authorities the interaction of domestic and international institutions, ed. Daniel W. Drezner (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 6. See, for example, George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Thomas H. Hammond, “Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic Systems,” in Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy, ed. George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Markus M. L. Crepaz and Ann W. Moser, “The Impact of Collective and

52 where the role of individuals and private groups is relegated to providing information in order to persuade these national level actors to make the decision to ratify or not ratify an agreement in accordance with their own interests.95 But subnational actors are often active throughout the entire agreement-implementation sequence and can be instrumental in stalling or even blocking such agreements, particularly during the implementation stage. In other words, they have a different role to the interest groups identified and conceptualized by Milner, which are active primarily in trying to persuade national legislators to support their preferences. To preserve these distinctions, this dissertation instead refers to key subnational actors.

Preferences refer to a ranking of outcomes that actors would like to achieve in a particular policy situation. This ranking cannot be observed directly; instead, what is observed are the strategies that actors take in order to obtain their highest ranked outcome given the constraints they are operating under. However, it is possible to derive a particular actor’s preferences in a given situation from their fundamental interests, which remain unchanged. These interests may be practical (maintenance or improvement of one’s career and standard of living) or ideological (anti-military, anti-base, environmental).96 They are then translated into different preferences depending on how a particular actor is affected by the objectives of a basing agreement, such as a base return, a base expansion or the transfer of units. For example, many residents living close to a base would prefer not to accept a transfer or expansion because the additional noise pollution would decrease their standard of living. However, some residents may rank acceptance of these changes in exchange for economic benefits such as construction projects and subsidies as preferable to rejecting it. Conversely, those who stand to lose economically from a change in the status quo through the return of land or the loss of jobs may still prefer to reject it. Finally, interest groups acting according to ideological interests typically rank the complete withdrawal of the military above all other preferences. In this manner, local attitudes towards a particular status quo and any alliance initiatives to address it will always feature a mixture of different preferences based on the interests of the different subnational actors in each locality. According to liberal theory, these preferences are more or

Competitive Veto Points on Public Expenditures in the Global Age,” Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 3 (2004); Edward D. Mansfield, Helen Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Vetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements,” British Journal of Political Science (2007). 95 Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, 16–18, 60. 96 This conceptualisation of preferences and how to analyze them is based on Milner, who discusses how an actor’s policy preferences can be derived from their interests. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, 15 fn4. See also Jeffry Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” in Strategic Choice and International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

53 less reflected in the positions that their local political leaders take on the issues, just as state preferences reflect some mixture of the preferences of the societal actors within the state.97

This dissertation argues that the extent to which these preferences are incorporated and the timing at which such incorporation occurs has significant implications for implementation. The underlying framework of this argument is first, that subnational actors are crucial to the negotiation and implementation processes of alliance agreements and second, that the manner of their involvement holds foreseeable consequences for whether agreement objectives are successfully implemented. This is because Japan’s domestic laws grant key subnational actors such as governors and mayors the legal power to facilitate or impede implementation at administrative checkpoints, in the form of documented approvals they have to provide. Supportive actors cooperate at these checkpoints and refrain from using them to further politicize the agreements or the alliance. This cooperation allows alliance managers to achieve agreements objectives more quickly. Conversely, unsupportive actors are likely to refrain from cooperating with agreement implementation; they may even oppose the process outright and politicize the alliance or the agreement. Although the hierarchical nature of domestic politics means that central governments can initiate other legislative or administrative procedures to bypass or overcome instances of non-cooperation, such actions can increase local opposition to the agreement and the US military presence. These dynamics then further increase the time and cost needed for implementation. Hence, it is in the interests of the central government to seek cooperation through less coercive means. Some of these means, such as compensation or other trade-offs, regularly feature amongst the preferences ranked by subnational actors.

In fact, preference incorporation is already reflected in practice: the importance that national elites and bureaucrats in democratic states place on the influence of local political and societal leaders is evident in how consultation with such actors has long been part of political practice at the state and sub-state levels. The information that state elites glean about subnational preferences from these consultations enables them to incorporate the preferences of societal actors into policy, thus reducing or even eliminating political tensions associated with controversial policies, be they domestic or international. In reality, however, the extent to which the consultation process actually achieves this political goal can be mixed. Hence, this dissertation argues that two dimensions of consultation play a particularly significant role in

97 Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 516-17.

54 shaping the extent to which the goals that are set out in an international agreement are achieved as a result of the implementation process. These are (1) the extent to which these consultations are embedded through both negotiation and implementation of the agreement and (2) the breadth of subnational actors that are involved in the process.

Crucial to preference incorporation with regard to international pacts, such as alliance agreements, is a consultation process that begins during the pre-agreement stage and continues on throughout the rest of the agreement life cycle. Although the process of preference incorporation may begin anywhere from the negotiation stage right through implementation, the extent to which it is embedded in the former has important implications for how local actors will react to an agreement, and thus how cooperative they will be over the rest of the process. There are several reasons for this. First, early interactions with subnational actors allow alliance managers to directly or indirectly receive information about specific local concerns, and the kinds of trade-offs base-hosting communities are willing to accept as part of the package of acquiescing to an unwanted policy, be it the construction of a new facility or a unit transfer. The two allies can then work together to address these concerns. In other words, beginning interaction with subnational actors during the pre- agreement stage enables alliance managers to initiate measures to mitigate local concerns at an early juncture. Sustaining the consultation process then allows for further refinement of the agreements to ensure that sufficient preference incorporation is achieved, which helps secure local support and cooperation over the rest of the entire agreement-implementation process. Conversely, when the consultation process begins late, there is an increased chance that alliance managers will not have time to correctly identify the specific concerns of subnational actors or the trade-offs that they are willing to accept. Furthermore, failure to engage subnational actors at an early stage may alienate them and hinder later attempts on the part of alliance managers to establish and maintain an effective consultation process. Early failures to incorporate preferences can thus complicate subsequent attempts at redress.

It is also important to ascertain which subnational actors alliance managers need to engage in this process of preference incorporation. First and foremost are the actors that wield influence at the afore-mentioned checkpoints, which the dissertation defines as junctures where subnational actors are legally required to advance bureaucratic administrative procedures in relation to the agreements. Local political leaders such as governors and mayors are a logical starting point. For example, Japan’s Public Waters Reclamation Law (Law 57 of 1921)

55 requires Tokyo to obtain the approval of prefectural governors for land reclamation.98 Municipal leaders also have a level of control over the use of roads, ports and utility services within their jurisdictions. However, efforts at preference incorporation must also be extended to other societal actors that are affected by the agreements. This is because governors and mayors typically cater to the preferences of groups within their constituencies, who hold the power to extend their period in office or to remove them from power though the state’s electoral institutions. Hence, it is in the interest of the state to convince a majority of these groups to support the basing agreements as well, so as to ensure that their local leader is willing and able to cooperate at the checkpoints. In the case of host communities in Japan, the mixture of groups that can be persuaded to support the base presence and realignment efforts include the business community, residents, landowners and others who recognise the economic benefits that foreign military presence can bring. However, these groups will also be concerned about the disadvantages of being a host community, such as noise pollution and the potential for accidents and other incidents, for which recourse is often complicated by the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. Extending consultation down to these societal actors provides opportunities to espouse on benefits and develop solutions to mitigate concerns. Incorporating their preferences where possible and thus persuading them to support the agreements translates in turn into subnational political leaders being more willing to cooperate with the state and advance implementation at the relevant checkpoints.99 Conversely, if these societal actors do not feel that their preferences are being addressed, then they may appeal to their local leaders to oppose the agreements, or even to develop alternative solutions to their concerns that increase avenues for non-cooperation.

Linking preference incorporation to the outcome of implementation is the feedback loop. On the one hand, when alliance managers make successful efforts to incorporate local preferences, especially early in the entire agreement-implementation process, this generates a positive feedback loop that works to increase cooperation from the key subnational actors over time. The two dimensions outlined above—the embedding of consultation throughout

98 Public Waters Reclamation Law (Law 57 of 1921), September 11. 99 This conceptualization harkens back to Milner’s formal model for the dynamics of two-level games, which addresses how “the differences among the players’ policy preferences, the distribution of information domestically, and the nature of domestic political institutions” interact to influence policy options at the state level. That model simplified reality by focusing on the negotiation and formal ratification of agreements, with the actors consisting of an executive branch that was responsible for negotiating with their international counterparts, a legislature that would either endorse or reject the resulting agreement, and interest groups that provide information to one or both of the other groups to persuade them to produce a preferred outcome. This dissertation contends that key subnational actors such as governors and mayors take on a similar role to that of Milner’s legislature during the process of implementation.

56 the agreement and the breadth of actors involved—provide an early signal to subnational actors that the central government is committed to taking their interests into account. The signal is strengthened further when the preferences identified through the consultations are reflected in agreement objectives or subsequent steps taken to implement them, reducing backlash and encouraging support for the proposed changes amongst affected societal actors. When these actors form the majority of the constituency of key subnational actors, the latter are then more likely to cooperate and advance the agreement at administrative checkpoints during implementation. This cooperative stance then leads to more opportunities for interaction and consultation between the central government and subnational actors, which helps facilitate even higher levels of preference incorporation. This further reduces the impetus for both key subnational actors and societal actors to oppose the agreements, thus encouraging even greater cooperation with the implementation process.

On the other hand, when alliance managers are not successful in incorporating preferences at an early stage, this is likely to generate a negative feedback loop that works to decrease cooperation with implementation over time. When societal actors perceive that their interests are not being taken into account during the agreement-implementation process, then they are more likely to oppose the agreements and any efforts to carry them out. If such societal actors form the majority of a key subnational actor’s constituency, then the latter is likewise more likely to take a non-cooperative stance and refuse to advance implementation at any checkpoints where domestic law dictates that their approval is needed. Their non-cooperative stance also reduces opportunities for interactions for consultation and negotiation over trade- offs that the societal actors might be willing to accept in exchange for acquiescing to the agreements. Furthermore, if alliance managers continue to push their objectives onto the base- hosting community, this is likely to result in an even more oppositional stance from both key subnational actors and the societal actors that support them, thus decreasing cooperation with the implementation process.

Finally, it is also necessary select a dependant variable for measuring and analyzing the extent to which implementation has been successful achieved. As discussed in the introduction and at the start of this chapter, the dissertation uses the variation in internal alliance tensions as the object of analysis for examining implementation outcomes. These tensions are not the frictions between the allies at the systemic or state levels, bur rather those that may and often do exist between hosted military forces and their local host communities. Typically, they are associated with either the physical stresses imposed by the base presence—such as noise

57 pollution and accidents—or anti-war or anti-military sentiments, which have a more ideological basis. And since it is national governments that sign and carry out alliance agreements, including the military basing pacts under examination here, the host communities in question typically regard their national leaders as holding responsibility for base-related stresses. Hence, these tensions can also include frictions that may exist between the host government at the national level and the host communities at the local level.

This focus on internal alliance tensions is valid because the underlying goal pursued by US- Japan alliance managers from the 1990s onwards has been to ameliorate the frictions between US forces and their host communities, especially through a process of reducing the burden of hosting US forces. This concern is clear from the text of the SACO Reports in 1996, as well as the DPRI interim report from October 2005. These documents include statements such as “to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the US-Japan alliance,”100 and “both sides recognized the importance of enhancing Japanese and US public support for the security alliance, which contributes to sustainable presence of US forces at facilities and areas in Japan.”101 The aim of “reducing burdens on local communities” also appears in the 2006 Roadmap Agreement, while the 2009 Guam Agreement reiterates that this would provide “the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance.”102 Alliance managers have pursued this goal because they view a strong alliance as depending upon US forces in Japan being stationed in a sustainable way, which in turn depends upon public support. If the burden on particular communities is too great, this will stoke anti-alliance and anti-US sentiments in those communities, as well as local resentment of the national government. At worst, these sentiments can contribute to a lack of local cooperation with alliance objectives and requirements. In turn, this can lead to a weakening of the alliance, due to issues such as training restrictions that impact readiness, as well as uncertainty about the

100 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report,” April 15, 1996, signed by , Hideo Usui, William Perry, , accessed May 6, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n- america/us/security/seco.html; “The SACO Final Report,” signed by Yukihiko Ikeda, Hideo Usui, William Perry, Walter Mondale, accessed December 5, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n- america/us/security/96saco1.html. 101 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” October 29, 2005, signed by Condoleeza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, , Yoshinori Ohno, accessed November 5, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html. 102 “Agreement Between the Government of Japan and The Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam,” signed by and Hillary Rodham Clinton, February 17, 2009, accessed May 31, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/agree0902.pdf.

58 extent to which particular facilities can be used in, for example, regional contingencies.103 Hence, the extent to which this goal of reducing alliance tensions is achieved is a valid measure of how successfully the agreements have been implemented.

Furthermore, the indicators of internal alliance tensions are closely linked to how smoothly and to what extent the agreements’ physical objectives have been carried out. These tensions can be observed and measured through phenomena such as protest actions and rallies, elections and public referenda, as well as the extent to which subnational leaders cooperate with the implementation process. The size and frequency of protest actions indicate how widespread opposition is within host communities, while elections and referenda show how salient the base issue is compared to other concerns such as economic security. Both are also associated with the question of whether a local leader chooses to cooperate with the implementation process, because their political livelihoods rest upon them making decisions that satisfy their constituencies. Finally, the continued existence of these kinds of alliance tensions is, in itself, an indicator that the implementation process is not yet complete, because it demonstrates that actors within the host community still see opportunities to interfere with or otherwise prevent the allies from achieving the physical objectives of the agreements in question.

To connect preference incorporation with internal alliance tensions and the implementation of the US-Japan military basing agreements from the 1990s onwards, then, the following is what might be expected. Shifts in preference incorporation in the process of carrying out these agreements heavily influences changes in the levels of alliance tensions, thus impacting how successful implementation is. Specifically, when subnational actors such as governors, mayors and influential local interest groups are deeply involved throughout the agreement- implementation process, preference incorporation is likely to increase over time. This helps keep tensions low: fewer protest actions are observed and key subnational actors cooperate at the checkpoints. Feedback loops also reinforce these trends, leading to a further reduction in tensions and implementation of agreement objectives. Conversely, when alliance managers fail to engage subnational actors early in the process, or with sufficient continuity, preference incorporation is likely to stagnate or even regress. This leads to increases in tensions, in the

103 United States General Accounting Office, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting, GAO-02-525 (Washington, DC, 2002), accessed April 12, 2016, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-525. On page 2, the report notes that the “increase in restrictions facing US forces in many cases is the result of the growing commercial and residential development on or near previously established training areas and ranges.”

59 form of more protest actions at the local level, and non-cooperation from key subnational actors in the implementation of alliance objects. These dynamics are then further reinforced by feedback loops, thereby producing even higher levels of tensions, which can ultimately lead to failures in implementation.

2.9 Methods

In order to evaluate this core argument about the link between preference incorporation and implementation success, the dissertation here lays out the method for analysis. Within this dissertation, the specific context and outcomes, as well as mechanisms, occur across an instance of a single class of events, to use Bennett’s definition of “case.”104 That is, they occur within the framework of the post-Cold War realignment of the US–Japan alliance, and are focused, especially, on base realignment initiatives that involve subnational actors and that exhibit an agreement-implementation sequence with an identifiable beginning and end. Studying different examples of agreement-implementation sequences within the same country allows for a systematic comparison that should produce a range of implementation outcomes due to differences at the subnational level that may be more difficult to discern in broad, cross-country comparisons. In other words, keeping systemic and state factors constant allows for the identification of a set of “most similar” units of study that produce different outcomes, with the expectation that subnational variation has been an important factor.

This indicates that a within-case analysis centered around the method of process tracing is likely to provide the most appropriate means for drawing out the causes behind the variation in outcomes across these events.105 The aim of the analysis is to conceptualize the process by which the first part of the sequence (agreement) successfully leads, or alternatively fails to lead, to the second part of the sequence (implementation). To achieve this goal, the dissertation aims to trace the causal mechanisms linking particular subnational actors to the different agreement-implementation outcomes.106 It does so through an examination of

104 Andrew Bennett, “Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages,” in Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations, ed. Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 20-21. See also Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 59. 105 Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 179. 106 The “class of events” under examination is alliance realignment, being examined in order to expand the scholarship on alliance management. Hence, the case is the post-Cold War realignment in the US-Japan alliance, within which particular agreement-implementation sequences. Andrew Abbott, “Sequence Analysis: New

60 sources such as news articles, government documents and political memoirs, interviews with policy practitioners and other actors involved in basing politics, as well as research previously published.

As a single case, the post-Cold War US military realignment in Japan offers a number of agreement-implementation sequences that allow for systematic comparisons of the dynamics outlined above. Within it, the dissertation focuses on two “sub-cases” centered around Iwakuni City in Yamaguchi Prefecture and Nago City in Okinawa Prefecture, both of which include multiple agreement-implementation sequences as defined above. This choice was made in the interests of retaining as much similarity as possible, in line with the “most- similar” case selection technique.107 Both involve major Marine Corps facilities in Japan: MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture, and MCAS Futenma and Camp Schwab in Okinawa Prefecture. Furthermore, the changes to both facilities include seaward expansion that required or requires significant land reclamation as well as transfers of aircraft units and personnel. Finally, over the period of time under examination, Okinawa Prefecture and Yamaguchi Prefecture had similar populations of close to 1.5 million. These similarities help control for factors such as population density and procedural requirements on the sides of the US military and the Japanese governments.

Additionally, the multiple agreement-implementation sequences also allow for comparison within each sub-case. This is important because the history of the US military presence in Okinawa is considerably different to that on the Japanese mainland. As will be outlined in Chapter 3, the separation of the prefecture from the rest of Japan between 1952 and 1972 contributed to anti-military and anti-base sentiment due to contentious accidents and incidents, as well as fears of retaliation associated with the United States’ involvement in Vietnam. The incorporation of the compensation framework following Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 1972 helped ameliorate some of these tensions while tying the prefecture’s economy to the presence of the bases. Nevertheless, this separate history may be able to explain the differences in the levels of tensions between the two base-hosting locations examined in this dissertation. For example, Yamaguchi Prefecture has long been an LDP stronghold, and its strong ties to Tokyo can be contrasted with the shallower, compensation-

Methods for Old Ideas,” Annual Review of Sociology 21 (1995); Paul Pierson, “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development 14, no. 1 (2000); Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor‐Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 1, no. 1 (2005). 107 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 81.

61 based relationship that appears to have defined Okinawa’s relations with Japan’s various administrations. Hence, comparisons within each sub-case will provide further scope for examining the effect of preference incorporation on the changes in alliance tensions within each location while controlling for these differences. The two axes of comparison (between and within sub-cases) should provide a more complete picture of how subnational actors influence the process of implementing basing agreements, and thus alliance management.

Critics might argue that Okinawa is unique and thus cannot be compared to other base- hosting communities, whether in Japan or elsewhere around the world. However, its uniqueness is often overstated. For example, it is commonly reported that 70-75% of US military forces are hosted in the prefecture, but this actually refers to the percentage of land in Japan that is for the “exclusive” use of the US military in Japan.108 According to Robert Elderidge, who spent many years researching the issue before serving as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Government and External Affairs Marine Corps Installations Pacific/Marine Forces Japan, the figure drops to around 25% if all joint facilities across Japan are included.109 Furthermore, attitudes towards the military presence in Okinawa are mixed, just as they are elsewhere in Japan, with neutral and positive feelings being attributed mostly to the economic benefits they bring. Aside from subsidies provided by the central government, the US military directly generates a significant amount of economic activity not only in the hospitality sectors, but also by contracting services to local businesses. Finally, opposition to the US military presence is periodically a salient issue in other municipalities across Japan, especially those that are host to airfields, such as Naval Air Facility Atsugi () and MCAS Iwakuni. Preliminary research suggests that Atsugi and a number of other sub-cases in Japan can be examined if and when this research is further expanded, but for the limited aims of this dissertation, Iwakuni City in Yamaguchi Prefecture was chosen as an example for comparison because it is the most similar to the Okinawa/Nago sub-case.

The nine agreement-implementation sequences selected here come from the following three alliance agreements between the United States and Japan: • The 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on MCAS Iwakuni • The 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa Final Agreement

108 Okinawa Prefectural Government, “U.S. Military Base Issues in Okinawa,” 2016, accessed May 5, 2020, https://dc-office.org/basedata. Following several successful land returns as part of the realignment in Okinawa, the figure has now dropped to 70.6%. 109 Eldridge, “The Okinawa ‘Base Problem’ Today,” Nippon.com, February 3 (2012).

62 • The 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. and are laid out in Table 2.1. The sequences are presented here in chronological order. However, due to the linked nature of the objective pertaining to each facility and the process tracing methodology employed, they are examined in the following manner. Sequences (1), (3) and (6), which involve MCAS Iwakuni, are examined in chapter 4. Sequences (2) and (4) are examined in chapters 5-6, while (6), (7) and (8) can be found in chapters 7-8.

For each of these sequences, the dissertation first identifies the key subnational actors and the checkpoints at which they play an important role in implementation. Particular attention is also paid to statements and other commentary that point to what particular subnational actors were most concerned about. The dissertation then examines the variation in alliance tensions from 1990-2015 in both Iwakuni/Yamaguchi and Nago/Okinawa. For each agreement- implementation sequence, three indicators of preference incorporation were tracked. The number and frequency of consultations between national and subnational actors and the breadth of actors involved provide information as to the timing of consultations and the extent to which societal actors are involved. However, they are insufficient as an indicator for preference incorporation. There also needs to be evidence that local preferences identified through these consultations are incorporated into the agreements and/or their implementation. Government records as well as media coverage and first and second person accounts of these interactions should indicate that certain agreement objectives, changes and/or policy proposals made during implementation are linked to the interests of these local actors. Together, these three indicators provide evidence of the feedback loop that facilitates preference incorporation.

Tensions over the duration of each agreement-implementation sequences are also evaluated using three indicators: the number and size of protests rallies, the results of major public polls such as elections and referenda, and the cooperativeness of subnational leaders. The populations of the two prefectures were similar during the time period covered, but Iwakuni City had approximately twice the population of Nago City. Hence, the comparison is made by considering the size of protest rallies in relation to the population of the prefecture or municipality, and the number of localized versus “prefecture-wide” rallies. Since voting is not compulsory, the results of public polls are evaluated based not only on the result of the vote itself, but also on the turnout. This is important for referenda in particular, because a common

63 Table 2.1: The Agreement-Implementation Sequences Examined in this Dissertation

Sequence Timeframe Major objective Agreement Trigger Status

(1) Iwakuni 1992-1997 Shift MCAS Iwakuni MOU 1966 F4 Delayed, but MOU Iwakuni runway (1992) Phantom crash completed seaward

(2) Land 1996-1998 Renewal of land Administrative 1995 rape Implemented Leases Law leases in accordance Agreement incident and after legal (Okinawa) with Special Land under Art. III of other local process Leases Law the US-Japan discontent Security Treaty

(3) Iwakuni 1995-1997 Transfer KC-130 SACO 1995 rape Delayed; SACO squadron (12 (1996) incident and eventually aircraft) to MCAS land lease crisis completed Iwakuni in Okinawa (2014)

(4) Futenma 1996-2004 Relocate MCAS SACO (1996) 1995 rape Abandoned SACO Futenma to offshore incident and (2004) facility land lease crisis

(5) Futenma- 2005-2009 Relocate MCAS Roadmap (extension from Stalled Schwab Futenma to Camp (2006) SACO; 2004 Roadmap 1 Schwab expansion helicopter (implementation crash) attempt 1)

(6) Iwakuni 2005-2008 Transfer CVW-5 (59 Roadmap DPRI; noise Delayed; Roadmap 1 aircraft) from Naval (2006) pollution at completed Air Facility Atsugi Atsugi March 2018 to MCAS Iwakuni

(7) Futenma- 2009-2010 Review Roadmap Roadmap (Hatoyama/DPJ New Schwab agreement on (2006) campaign agreement Roadmap 2 MCAS Futenma (in promise) not reached; relation to Nago) returned to Roadmap.

(8) Iwakuni 2009-2010 Review Roadmap Roadmap (Hatoyama/DPJ New Roadmap 2 agreement on (2006) campaign agreement MCAS Futenma (in promise) not reached; relation to Iwakuni) returned to Roadmap.

(9) Futenma- 2010-2014 Relocate MCAS Roadmap (failure of Delayed, but Schwab Futenma to Camp (2006) Hatoyama’s underway. Roadmap 3 Schwab expansion attempt to Projected (implementation review and completion attempt 2) change 2022~29. agreement)

tactic is for one side to discourage voting in an effort to invalidate the result. Finally, the behavior of subnational leaders is evaluated based on statements made in response to agreements, how open they are to negotiations with the central government, and how quickly

64 they complete any required administrative functions. Overall, high levels of preference incorporation are expected in Iwakuni City/Yamaguchi Prefecture, where tensions have stayed relatively low, particularly in the earlier agreement-implementation sequences. On the other hand, low levels of preference incorporation are expected in Nago City/Okinawa Prefecture, especially during the early stage of the Futenma SACO sequence and all of the Futenma-Schwab Roadmap sequences examined.

Table 2.2: Indicators for Preference Incorporation and Tensions

Observation Preference Incorporation Tensions

Indicators No./frequency of consultations Size/intensity of protests Breadth of actors involved Results of elections/referenda Were requests incorporated? Subnational leader behavior

In gathering this information, a number of different sources are used. First, the dissertation refers to previous secondary accounts of the developments in both sub-cases. These findings are backed up by information obtained through interviews with a range of practitioners and observers—including government officials involved in negotiating and implementing the agreements, as well as academics and journalists that have observed and interacted with key actors within the Japanese state (at both the national and various subnational levels). Along with contemporary news articles, both in English and Japanese, political memoirs written by Japanese officials at both national and subnational levels are also used to triangulate the information gathered from these secondary sources and interviews. Before presenting the above information, however, this dissertation first turns to comparing the history of the US military presence in Okinawa and on the Japanese mainland.

65 ~Chapter 3~ The History of Basing Politics in Japan and Okinawa

National and subnational actors in alliance politics do not operate in a vacuum. This certainly applies to those seeking to implement or influence basing agreements in Japan. Indeed, these actors function in an historical context shaped by the presence of the US military forces in Japan, and especially Okinawa, since the Second World War. In order to properly understand how these actors act in relation to Japan’s contemporary basing politics, it is necessary to understand the legacies of this history. How did the administration of Okinawa by the United States until 1972 shape these actors’ perceptions of the alliance and US bases? How did the emergence of compensation politics in the context of military basing affect the interests and calculations of different subnational actors as well as the alliance management approaches of national actors? And how did the ending of the Cold War change the political perceptions in Okinawa toward both the Japanese and American governments? These questions are the subject of this chapter.

The US military presence in Japan was first established after the end of the Second World War, during the US Occupation of Japan. For the most part, the various branches of the US armed forces took over facilities that belonged to the imperial Japanese forces. Most of these bases had existed before the beginning of the war, and had been built on public land, set aside or purchased by the Japanese government for that purpose. As a result, besides the concerns of sovereignty that led to revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, opposition to the bases on the four main Japanese islands was primarily concerned with safety and how the US military presence otherwise affected the lives of local residents. To deal with these issues— accidents, crime, remuneration for work commissioned and the like—the Japanese government set up and institutionalized a strategy of compensation in order to placate host communities and develop local support for the US forces stationed in the country.

The origins of the US presence in Okinawa Prefecture were different in quite significant ways. The Battle of Okinawa in the closing days of the war was the only land battle fought on

66 Japanese soil. It spanned three months from April to June 1945, and historians estimate that it claimed the lives of more than one-quarter of the local population.1 During and after the battle, the US military took over the facilities used by the imperial armed forces, just as they would later do across the rest of Japan. However, a key difference is that while most of the latter facilities had been established many years prior to the war, the imperial forces had built a proportion of the Okinawan facilities on former farmland during the course of the war. This meant that, compared to the rest of Japan, a higher proportion of the land used for US facilities in Okinawa has been and remains privately owned. The subsequent separation of Okinawa from the rest of Japan until 1972 brought about further differences in the base- hosting situations of affected communities. In particular, differences in land ownership, the structure of compensation and the relationships between Tokyo and the prefectural and local governments would eventually become significant factors affecting alliance basing policy outcomes in Okinawa’s host communities versus their counterparts throughout the rest of Japan.

3.1 The US-Japan Security Treaty and Okinawa’s separation from Japan

The basis for the US military presence in Japan is the US-Japan security treaty.2 Originally signed at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference and amended in January 1960, the treaty states that the United States is able to maintain armed forces in Japan for the purpose of contributing to “the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East” and “the security of Japan.”3 However, the signing of the treaty merely codified a reality that was already in place at the time. The US Occupation of Japan in the wake of the latter’s defeat in the Second World War saw the various branches of the US armed forces take over facilities that had originally been built and used by the imperial Japanese forces. The naval port in

1 Kiyoshi Nakachi, Ryukyu-U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1972: The Reversion Movement, Political, Economic, and Strategical Issues (Abiva Pub. House, 1989), 26; John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (London, England: Penguin, 2000). 2 The full title is the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.” 3 The wording of the relevant article (Article 1 in the 1951 Treaty) was modified slightly when Washington and Tokyo updated the Treaty in 1960 (Article VI), but both of these phrases remain. “Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America,” signed September 8, 1951, entered into force April 28, 1952, published in “The World and Japan” Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, accessed November 25, 2016, http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19510908.T2E.html; “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan,” signed January 19, 1960, entered into force May 19, 1960, available on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed September 14, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.

67 Sasebo and the airbase at Iwakuni were just two of many imperial facilities built before or during the war that the United States used to establish and build its capacity for military operations in Northeast Asia. These bases, along with the facilities in Okinawa, became important staging grounds during the Chinese Civil War, which ended in 1949, and the early years of the Korean War (1950-1953). Recognising the strategic importance of Japan as “a bulwark against Communism,” the US military leadership was keen to preserve access to the basing facilities it was using. Hence, although the Department of State was opposed to the idea, the realities of the beginnings of the Cold War prompted Washington to pursue a security arrangement with Japan.4

On the Japanese side, key members of the leadership during the Occupation also recognized the importance of the US presence in Japan in the post-war period. These “pro-US elites” included (who served as prime minister from May 1946 to May 1947 and again from October 1948 until December 1954), Japanese Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, and Emperor Hirohito. They recognized that Japan’s “Peace Constitution,” which came into effect on May 3, 1947, would leave Japan unable to defend itself adequately. The issue lay with Article 9, which could be interpreted as a proclamation that Japan would never again possess a military:

(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.5

Furthermore, besides the increasingly apparent threat from the Soviet Union and China, the Japanese leadership was also wary of internal challenges to stability from communists and anarchists.6 Aware that key leaders on the US side were also looking at America’s strategic requirements in the region, the Japanese government prepared itself to negotiate the treaties that would mark Japan regaining its independence.

4 John W. Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays (New York, NY: New Press, 1993), 113-165; see also Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar US-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 (New York, NY: Garland, 2001). 5 (Promulgated November 3, 1946, came into effect May 3, 1947), art. 9, accessed June 15, 2016, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. 6 Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 135-53.

68 The status of the Ryukyu Islands, which comprise all of the islands of Okinawa Prefecture as well as some of the southern islands that now belong to , was a sticking point in the negotiation of the peace and security treaties that Japan would sign in 1951. Though under occupation, the Japanese government was aware from the Atlantic Charter (August 1941) and the Cairo Declaration (November 1943) that the Allied principles of “no territorial aggrandizement” and “self-determination” would ensure that Japan regained its sovereignty in due time.7 However, Japanese elites also knew that the conditions of such a development might not be in keeping with what they or the Japanese people desired. In particular, the Potsdam Declaration stated that Japanese national territory would be “limited to the islands of Honshu, , Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as (the allies) determine.”8 Hence, the main concern among Japanese leaders was what would happen to the Ryukyu Islands and other areas such as the Ogasawara and Kazan islands. Early on, the Foreign Ministry’s Political Affairs Bureau recognised that the United States would be keen to keep those islands, not only for of their strategic value, but also because many American lives had been lost in securing them during the war. In short, the Japanese government realized that those southern islands might be annexed or separated from Japan at the behest of the United States. Accordingly, they conducted studies in order to make the case for Japan retaining sovereignty and, if possible, administrative rights, in exchange for authorizing Washington to maintain a strong military presence both on those islands and across the rest of Japan.9

On the US side, military and civilian leaders took opposing stances on the issue of Okinawa and the other southern islands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) wanted the Ryukyu Islands to be permanently detached from Japan through the United Nation’s trusteeship system, with the United States as the administrative authority, because they regarded Okinawa’s strategic location as being vital to America’s post-war security posture.10 The JCS preferred a strategic trusteeship as opposed to an ordinary trusteeship. While more difficult to obtain—because it needed a Security Council vote, thus allowing the Soviet Union to veto the proposal—the former would allow the United States more freedom and control in its administration of the islands. In contrast, ordinary trusteeships were easier to obtain—being dependent merely on a vote by the UN General Assembly—but were also subject to oversight and regulation by the

7 Ibid., 113-15. 8 “Potsdam Declaration,” (Issued at Potsdam, July 26, 1945), accessed June 20, 2017, http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Hiroshima/Potsdam.shtml; see also Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 114. 9 Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 113-53. 10 Ibid., 83.

69 Trusteeship Council.11 On the other hand, the State Department favored a solution where Japan would retain sovereignty and administrative control over the Ryukyu Islands. Their reasoning was that this would be more acceptable domestically in Japan as well as internationally. Due to the aforementioned Atlantic Charter and Potsdam Declaration, they wanted to avoid annexing or otherwise separating the islands from Japan. A US strategic trusteeship of the Ryukyu Islands, where Washington would administrate and control the lives of its population, might be perceived as an act of imperialism.12 Hence, in relation to the disposition of Okinawa and the other southern islands in the aftermath of the Second World War, the US Department of State was effectively aligned with the Japanese leadership against the US Department of Defense.13

Ultimately, however, the contemporary security situation in Northeast Asia favored the position of the US military leadership. The Japanese government, under Prime Minister Yoshida, presented its reports to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, in an effort to convince the United States of Okinawa’s importance to the Japanese national consciousness. These initial overtures were continually rebuffed, but Emperor Hirohito followed the developments closely and soon sent a letter to SCAP to propose a compromise arrangement. The “Tenno Message,” as it is known, contained the emperor’s request that the United States retain administrative rights for Okinawa for its strategic requirements, thus maintaining control without annexation.14 On the US side, State Department officials continued to express concern that the Soviet Union and China would perceive US annexation of the islands as a provocative rather than a defensive act. Early in 1946, it issued “PR-35 Final (Revision B),” which recommended that, if the islands were determined to be necessary for security purposes, the United States should set up

11 Ibid., 84-85. 12 Ibid., 90-91. 13 This dissertation has used “US Department of Defense” here to avoid confusion, as there were great changes in the organizational structure of the US military establishment in the years immediately following the end of the Second World War. The US Department of Defense only took on its present name in 1949. Its precursor was the War Department, established in 1789; the Department of the Navy was founded as a separate organization in 1798. In 1947, the United States decided to unify all of the services under a single department; thus, the National Military Establishment replaced the War Department, which became known as the Department of the Army. The Department of the Air Force was also formed in 1947. The Army, Navy and Air Force were placed under direct control of the Secretary of Defense, and in 1949, an amendment to the National Security Act institutionalized the present structure. United States Department of Defense, “About the Department of Defense (DOD),” accessed November 20, 2018, https://archive.defense.gov/about/#history. 14 Okinawan narratives about “structural discrimination” from Japan present Hirohito’s letter as evidence of one of the four “disposals” demonstrating how the prefecture was sacrificed so that the rest of the country could regain its independence. However, the context in which this letter was sent suggests that the emperor and the Japanese political leadership had all been fighting to prevent an even worse outcome for Okinawa: permanent separation from Japan.

70 a trusteeship with minimal impact on the indigenous population.15 Given the increasingly tense relationship with the Soviet Union, however, the US military leadership remained adamant that unrestricted military access to Okinawa was necessary for America’s national security interests, especially if the communists won in China.16 In June 1950, when Soviet- backed North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into the areas being administered by the United States, thus beginning the Korean War, the strategic significance of Okinawa as a staging area became even more apparent.

Nevertheless, the efforts of the Japanese leadership and US State Department officials paved the way for a compromise. In particular, the tenacity of the Yoshida government in appealing for the southern islands to be returned to Japan emphasized the importance that Japan placed on this issue of sovereignty. Newspaper polls showed that the Japanese public held similar views. Worsening relations between the United States and the Soviet Union also abetted their position. Dr Ruth Bacon, a legal expert who was involved in preparations for the peace treaty with Japan, was commissioned to do a study and found that the Soviets would be likely to veto a strategic trusteeship. Bacon’s report also pointed out that the island’s economic recovery and development would be Washington’s responsibility, and that the Ryukyuan people favored a return to Japan. The combination of these factors enabled the Department of State, under Secretary John Foster Dulles, to resist the military’s push for annexation.17 Instead, the 1951 Peace Treaty saw Okinawa and the other southern islands placed under an arrangement whereby, until it lodged a formal proposal for a UN trusteeship, the United States would have “the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.”18 Under this arrangement, Okinawans retained their Japanese citizenship, but US administrative authorities governed all aspects of their lives, from economic activities to their ability to travel outside of the prefecture.

This formula of “residual sovereignty,” as it was called, generated several sources of tension in the US-Japan relationship. Despite the best efforts of the Yoshida government, along with Secretary Dulles and other State officials, the US military refused to give any timeframe for an official reversion of the islands to Japanese administration; instead, they asserted that “No

15 Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 70-72. 16 Ibid., 98-104. 17 Ibid., 328. 18 “Treaty of Peace with Japan (with two declarations),” signed September 8, 1951, Treaty Series: Treaties and International Agreements Registered of Filed and Recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations 136, no.1832 (1952), art. III.

71 change in US policy in regard to these islands should be contemplated until a condition of stability has been firmly established throughout the Far East.”19 Hence, even though the Amami and Tokara islands were reverted to Japan by December 1953, after the Japanese government contested their designation as part of “the Ryukyu Island chain,” Okinawa and the rest of the islands south of Amami remained under US control because of their strategic significance. This situation lasted until the 1960s, when social uprisings and student protests broke out across the world. In Japan, the use of military bases in Okinawa for staging the Vietnam War was a key target of protest actions, and the anti-base and anti-military movement in Okinawa increasingly clamored for reversion. This prompted Washington and Tokyo to negotiate a deal for Okinawa to revert back to Japanese administration. Given the ongoing war in Vietnam as well as the continuing potential for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Straits, the primary concern of the United States was to retain as much freedom as possible for the military operations it might need to conduct. Tokyo, which continued to value the protection offered by the US military, assented to the retention of most of the basing presence in Okinawa, and also secretly agreed to allow nuclear weapons to be brought into the prefecture without prior consultation in the case of an emergency.20 Hence, even though Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration in May 1972, the movement’s ultimate goal of the return of all Okinawan land to their owners was not achieved.

The evolution of the security arrangements between Japan and the United States also significantly contributed to “the Okinawa Problem.” The Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan (hereafter, the 1951 Security Treaty), signed in secret on the same day as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, saw Japan grant its new ally “the right…to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan” for:

“the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.”21

19 Joint Strategic Survey Command report, quoted in Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 367. 20 Yukinori Komine, “Okinawa Confidential, 1969: Exploring the Linkage between the Nuclear Issue and the Base Issue,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 4 (2013). 21 “Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America,” art. I.

72 In February 1952, the two governments signed the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the 1951 Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, which specified the practical arrangements that would provide for the deployment of the US forces in the country.22 But Japanese politicians and scholars soon began criticising these arrangements as unequal, primarily because they technically allowed the US to “interfere” in Japanese domestic politics without a clear-cut obligation to defend the country. This was especially problematic because, as mentioned above, the Constitution of Japan appeared to preclude the nation from developing sufficient military capabilities for self-defense.23

Hence, from 1959, the two governments entered into negotiations to revise these initial agreements, adding amendments that would make them more equal. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (hereafter the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty), signed in January 1960, removed the provision that allowed the United States to interfere in Japanese domestic affairs, and added articles specifying each country’s defense obligations. The allies were to build up their own as well as mutual defense capabilities, and act to support the other in the case of attack, subject to each nation’s own constitutional provisions.24 In effect, because of the restrictions in military rearmament encoded in the Constitution of Japan, the bargain was that Tokyo would provide Washington with land for the military facilities required to maintain security in the region, thus providing for Japan’s own security. Similarly, the administrative agreement governing the deployment of US forces in the country was updated into the Agreement regarding the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA). Left under US administration in 1951, Okinawa and the other southern islands were not subject to these agreements until they reverted to Japanese control in 1972.25 The implications of this development will be addressed in Section 3.3. The dissertation next turns to examining how alliance relations were managed on the mainland, looking in particular at their beginnings during the Occupation and their evolution during the early Cold War period.

22 “Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan,” signed February 28, 1952, entered into force April 28, 1952, available through “The World and Japan” Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, accessed November 26, 2018, http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19520228.T1E.html. 23 Tadashi Aruga, “The Problem of Security Treaty Revision in Japan’s Relations with the United States: 1951- 1960,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 13 (1985): 39. 24 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.” 25 “Handover of Okinawa to Japan was prickly issue,” The Japan Times, May 14, 2002.

73 3.2 Managing basing relations: compensation politics in Japan

As outlined in Chapter 2, previous studies have shown that the Japanese government’s main strategy for managing basing politics in host communities is one of compensation. “Compensation politics” is a political strategy by which governments persuade local communities to host large, public facilities that may have negative consequences on groups and individuals in their vicinity.26 It is a strategy used across the world not only for military bases, but also for waste processing plants, power stations, factories and the like. These facilities provide a public good for the broader community, but often have negative effects such as noise or pollution that are concentrated in the communities that host them. Most states have powers of eminent domain, which allow them to forcefully acquire land deemed necessary for public purposes even when one or more private owners are opposed. However, reliance on coercive methods has political costs, especially over long periods of time. Hence, in democracies like Japan, public or private entities seeking to set up such facilities will usually offer ongoing material benefits to local governments and individuals in order to persuade host communities to acquiesce to the long-term presence of these relatively undesirable facilities.27

These benefits come in a range of modes. Some are provided directly through the establishment of the facility, which can bring other kinds of economic benefits for local residents. In the case of military bases in Japan, host community citizens are employed as part-time workers in a number of service roles, such as staffing on-base shops and supermarkets. Similarly, building construction and maintenance are often contracted to local companies. US military personnel deployed to the facilities will also spend parts of their salaries consuming goods and services in nearby districts.28 However, authorities will often provide further incentives in order to persuade host communities to acquiesce to a facility. These can be positive or negative: additional subsidies rewarding a welcoming stance towards the US military presence, versus sanctions for opposition and antagonism. For example, if the land to be built on is owned privately or by the local government, then the entity seeking the

26 Aurelia George Mulgan, “Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese Democracy,” Japanese Studies 20, no. 2 (2000): 166. 27 Daniel P. Aldrich, Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 14-15; George Mulgan, “Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese Democracy,” 166; Kent E. Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 166-169. See also Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 132. 28 Embattled Garrisons, 133.

74 right to use that land will offer to purchase or lease it. When owners resist selling or leasing such land, powers of eminent domain allow governments to forcefully appropriate it for public use. However, the provision of monetary payments or other kinds of compensation can help reduce opposition to the projects, thus lowering the political cost to the government and smoothing the way for the proposed developments.29

Tokyo also provides compensation for inconveniences experienced by host communities. Such inconveniences may be sporadic, such as accidents, or ongoing, such as noise or environmental pollution. In both cases, authorities ameliorate tensions by providing damages to affected residents, typically after residents have filed and won a suit through Japan’s judicial system. For example, a number of Japanese courts have, in recent years, ruled that Tokyo should compensate plaintiffs in a number of suits about noise levels around US military facilities.30 However, governments and private companies alike have also endeavored to address such concerns ahead of the fact, typically through urban planning and projects designed to lessen negative impacts such as noise, or by providing other kinds of community facilities at the behest of local governments. The Japanese Ministry of Defense has a department that deals solely with requests from local governments for the construction of noise reduction facilities and the construction of parks, sporting stadiums and other community-building initiatives.31 Compensation politics for the US military presence in Japan thus comprises three broad areas: base-related employment and business for local citizens, rents for the land on which the facilities are situated, and payments for inconveniences associated with the bases.

These structures of compensation politics evolved from policies that were set up in the early post-war period and the institutions that were created to implement them. Soon after US officials first arrived in Japan in 1945 to begin the Occupation, the high demand for fuel and other goods meant that such items were in short supply. The United States also needed additional land to set up more accommodation and other facilities and employed local labor to assist in construction. However, because there was no system for procuring these necessities,

29 George Mulgan, “Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese Democracy,” 166. 30 “Japan Court: Govt To Pay Damages For US Aircraft Noise,” Dow Jones International News, February 17, 2005; “Kadena Residents Win State Damage Payments,” Jiji Press English News Service, February 24, 1994; “Court orders state to pay damages for noise at Iwakuni base but does not ban flights,” The Japan Times, October 15, 2015. 31 An overview of how all of these compensatory functions were organized in both the JDA (prior to 2007) and the MOD (following 2007) can be found in Japan Ministry of Defense, Bōei Shisetsuchō Shi, 2007, 378-79, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/choushi/choushi.html.

75 problems arose between Occupation authorities and local communities. In order to ameliorate these problems, the Japanese government passed a 1947 law to set up the Special Procurement Agency (SPA) to provide for the needs of Occupation forces and their families. This agency institutionalized not only the process of procuring and maintaining facilities and materials on behalf of the US military, but also that of addressing the needs of the Japanese communities that hosted the bases.32

The role of the SPA evolved in the 1950s, following Japan’s return to independence. Its mandate was written into Article 1 of the 1951 Security Treaty, as outlined above, and all the functions that it carried out were to be continued under the auspices of the newly formed US- Japan alliance. However, this arrangement gave rise to problems amongst the Japanese communities hosting the bases. During the Occupation, US forces had requisitioned for their own use land and buildings from private citizens across the nation. Japanese citizens cooperated with the military and put up with a number of incidents and accidents, assuming that such problems would be resolved and their property returned once the Occupation ended. But the signing of the security treaty in 1951 and its administrative agreement a few months later dashed any such hopes, indicating to Japanese citizens that the foreign military presence would be a permanent intrusion into their lives. Hence, the treaty also marked the beginning of basing politics, or as it is known in Japan, “the problem of the bases (kichi mondai).”33

The rise of basing politics in Japan after the end of the Occupation prompted the Japanese government to formalize and structure its compensation strategies. The citizens made familiar complaints: the military’s use of land and water areas encroached upon the traditional livelihoods of various communities, noise generated by training exercises disrupted everyday life, and citizens felt threatened by the possibility of accidents and other incidents.34 In some areas, anti-base movements began to gather behind slogans such as “Opposed to bases! (kichi hantai)” and “The US military must withdraw immediately! (beigun sokuji tettai).”35 To ameliorate this opposition, Tokyo began in 1952 to provide compensation to the affected

32 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 134; Japan Ministry of Defense, “Bōei Shisetsuchō Shi,” 13-14. 33 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Bōei Shisetsuchō Shi,” 18-19. 34 Although accidents with civilian fatalities are relatively rare, serious military incidents such as the Tachikawa air disaster (1953, 129 passengers and crew killed) raised awareness of potential damage or loss of life and property and led to the closure of the base within a year. In Okinawa, survivors and relatives of the victims of the 1959 F-100 crash that killed 17 civilians, including 11 school children from Miyamori Elementary School, have long regarded the accident as a reminder of the danger of living alongside the bases. See Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 86; “Miyamori sho tsuiraku 55nen sengo no rifujin wasuremai,” Ryukyu Shimpo, July 1, 2014; “Record of Miyamori Elementary School accident published,” Ryukyu Shimpo, May 30, 2013.). 35 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Bōei Shisetsuchō Shi,” 20.

76 communities, both in monetary form and through policies to relocate residents or to construct facilities such as bigger fishing ports and roads so as to enable communities to improve their local industries. These measures went some way towards relieving the tensions surrounding the bases.36

In this growing anti-base atmosphere, one of the more important tasks institutionalized through the SPA involved procedures for obtaining and compensating owners for the land on which new or expanded US military facilities were constructed. At the end of World War II, the United States (and the other Occupation forces) set themselves up in old imperial bases. Since these were public facilities built on land already owned or leased by the national or local governments, Tokyo did not have to negotiate new leases with large groups of private citizens, as they might have done if the United States had required facilities constructed from the ground up. However, when some of these facilities needed to be expanded, the agency was tasked with procuring more land.37 During the Occupation, the SPA negotiated the purchase or lease of land from some private owners. Following the signing of the 1951 Security Treaty, the Japanese government passed the Act on Special Measures for US Forces Japan Land Release,38 which led to the standardization and institutionalization of these formerly ad hoc procedures.39 Further base realignment and consolidation plans in the early Cold War period then saw the agency set up a special task force to establish and oversee systemized procedures for consulting local governments and communities, and arranging appropriate forms of compensation.40

Another important facet of relations between the US military and host communities was that the SPA became involved with the hiring and compensation of on-base workers. During the Occupation, authorities on US facilities across Japan had hired workers to provide services such as laundry and labor for construction. However, due in part to difficulties in communication and thus problems in establishing sufficient levels of trust, Japanese citizens were sometimes paid in irregular ways, or even through food and other goods, like

36 Ibid., 20-24. 37 Ibid., 7-10. 38 The official title of this legislation is the “Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.” Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2017 [White paper] (2017), 284, accessed May 20, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2017.html. 39 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Bōei Shisetsuchō Shi,” 107 40 Ibid., 16-29.

77 chocolate.41 Formalizing and standardizing the rights and remuneration accorded to base- workers was one of the first tasks that the Japanese government took on after Japan’s return to independence in 1952. Tokyo passed a set of regulations that placed these workers under Japanese labor laws and negotiated contracts with the US military on their behalf. The withdrawal of US military units and the closure of their facilities also created the challenge of large numbers of workers being laid off simultaneously. Again, Tokyo legislated that special payments be made to such workers, and that they be assisted in finding subsequent work. In all of these cases, the SPA was the agency through which these methods of compensation were implemented.42

Finally, the Japanese government had to find ways to deal with accidents and incidents involving the US military and its dependents. Over the course of the Occupation, incidents and accidents involving US military assets, personnel, or associated citizens were recorded to have killed or injured over 9,000 people.43 The Japanese government had initially attempted to control some of the expected challenges, such as sexual assault, by pre-emptively establishing the Recreation and Amusement Association and setting up brothels to provide prostitution services for the foreign soldiers deployed to Japan. However, the spread of venereal diseases amongst these troops prompted Occupation authorities to ban prostitution; this was soon followed by a significant increase in the numbers of rape cases reported.44 Historians agree that many such incidents and other issues went unreported and unpunished, meaning that the actual number of cases could have been much higher.45 Japanese citizens were also unable to sue the Occupation authorities or—following the signing of the 1951 Security Treaty—the US military forces in Japan over damage, injury or death caused by military accidents.46

To deal with these problems, Tokyo worked to establish pathways for victims to claim compensation, largely through the SPA. In January 1947, the Japanese Cabinet passed a

41 Ibid., 5. 42 Ibid., 29-30. 43 Ibid., 32. 44 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 124-30, 579. 45 Yuki Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II (London, England: Routledge, 2001), 112; Dower, Embracing Defeat, 211; Terese Svoboda, “U.S. Courts-Martial in Occupation Japan: Rape, Race, and Censorship,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 21-1-09 (2009), http://apjjf.org/- Terese-Svoboda/3148/article.html. 46 The US-Japan SOFA provides that the US retains jurisdiction over incidents that arise in the performance of official duty. This is standard for US SOFAs with its allies. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?, by R. Chuck Mason, RL34531 (Washington, DC, 2012), 11, 4-5 fn 26.

78 resolution specifying four broad types of situations that would be covered: damages, death, destruction to furniture and destruction to the home.47 For the duration of the Occupation, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (which has since evolved into the present-day Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) was in charge of these reparations. After the peace treaty came into effect, the SPA took over the role. It would be another ten years before this compensation for damages and distress caused by the allied military forces was encoded into law, in Act 215 of the year 1961. Nevertheless, the role performed by the SPA helped the Japanese government maintain a sufficient level of acquiescence for the US military presence on the Japanese mainland.48

Since then, the organization has continued to carry out this role, even as its structure has evolved. Following its origins as an agency managing procurement for the Occupation forces in 1945, the SPA became attached to the Prime Minister’s Office in 1949 before becoming an external agency of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in 1958. In November 1962, the SPA was merged with the entity that handled construction for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). The new organization, renamed the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency (DFAA), was now formally under the umbrella of the JDA.49 However, as Calder has pointed out, its origins ensured that the DFAA was not only well connected and thus well-funded, but also accorded a degree of independence that allowed it to address the priorities for its core mission of ensuring the stability of the bases.50

That said, the structures of compensation outlined above did not always produce the desired outcome of ameliorating anti-base sentiment enough to allow for base expansion. In 1954, the United States requested that several facilities across Japan be enlarged, including those at Yokota and Tachikawa on the outskirts of Tokyo.51 In the case of Tachikawa, the US Air Force wanted to expand the runway in order to accommodate its largest aircraft. Upon examination, the SPA determined that it needed to obtain the properties of 140 families in the Sunagawa district. However, because they had expected the US military presence to be heavily reduced following the end of the Occupation, many residents were not in favor of the security treaty and its provisions for retaining US forces in the country. The community thus broke into two different factions, one that remained opposed to the enlargement of the

47 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Bōei Shisetsuchō Shi,” 32. 48 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 134. 49 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Bōei Shisetsuchō Shi,” 36-37. 50 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 134. 51 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Bōei Shisetsuchō Shi,” 24-29.

79 airfield’s runway, and another that was willing to acquiesce if certain conditions were met. The agency set up consultations with the latter, working with small groups of landowners at a time until they reached agreements to purchase the land outright. After more than a decade of negotiation with these landowners, the agency was still only able to procure around 90 percent of the land required. However, the two governments officially halted the Tachikawa project in 1968, after the United States deemed it no longer necessary given the maturation of the JSDF.52 Following a review in the early 1970s, Washington and Tokyo then agreed to consolidate US Air Force capabilities in the Kanto region into Yokota Airbase, which had successfully been expanded.53

It is important not to attribute the “failure” of the Japanese government to expand the Tachikawa runway entirely to the anti-base protests in Sunagawa. The rationale for halting the project and downsizing and consolidating the US Air Force assets into Yokota Air Base was at least threefold. Besides the domestic political problems caused by the visibility of the US military around Tokyo, the aging of the facilities and the combination of budget pressures back in the United States and costs of conducting operations from facilities spread out across the city had prompted alliance managers to develop and implement the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan. For example, Japan had constructed the Tachikawa Air Base facilities in the 1930s, and their deteriorated state saw the US spending around $4.5 million dollars on maintenance in 1972.54 The departure of the 347th Rescue Air Wing from Yokota Air Base early in 1971 was also significant because it opened up facility space for consolidation, pending the construction of residential and other support facilities for the increase in personnel.55 It remains clear, however, that the driving force for the consolidation was the US government’s desire to reduce unnecessary expenditure by streamlining and drawing down forces in Japan.56 Hence, although the protests in Sunagawa may have stalled and delayed planned changes at Tachikawa Air Base in the late 1950s, the eventual closure of this facility was arguably due primarily to the combination of factors that allowed for the consolidation of US Air Force assets at Yokota, a base just several kilometers to the West.

52 Ibid., 29; Dustin Wright, “‘Sunagawa Struggle’ ignited anti-U.S. base resistance across Japan,” The Japan Times, May 3, 2015. 53 John G. McKay, Jr., The Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan: A Case Study of Military Cost Reduction, (Air War College, Air University, 1975), accessed September 29, 2017, http://nautilus.org/wp- content/uploads/2012/01/Kanto_Plain_Consolidation_Plan.pdf. 54 Ibid., 8-10. 55 Ibid., 16. 56 Ibid., 6-10.

80 Finally, it is also interesting to note that, in contrast to countries like the Republic of Korea and the United States, the Japanese government has rarely resorted to more coercive means of persuasion. Like these other countries, Japanese law has provisions that allow governments and other entities to take private property for public use, provided that it compensates owners for the losses they would suffer. However, Article 3 of the 1951 Land Expropriation Law, which designates the types of projects that are covered, does not specify military facilities, whether for the US forces in Japan or for the JSDF.57 This is arguably a legacy of the Second World War and the US Occupation. SCAP disbanded both the national police forces and the imperial military in order to prevent the possibility of a relapse into the militarism that had led Japan to war, but then effectively reinstated them during the Korean War in the early 1950s. However, attempts to strengthen these forces were heavily opposed by both the Yoshida government and the Japan Socialist Party that formed the bulk of the opposition.58 Furthermore, even though the law provides a pathway for government authorities to obtain land for other kinds of public works, in practice, Tokyo has rarely taken such steps against uncooperative private owners in highly political cases.59 For example, as of 2018, the Narita International Airport remains incomplete because a handful of farmers have refused to sell their land to the government.60 Rather than forcing the issue, the Japanese government has largely chosen softer tools such as persuasion, or worked to reduce the footprint that such unwanted facilities have on local populations. This is arguably the approach they took with the US bases on the Japanese mainland not only during the early Cold War period, but also more recently with MCAS Iwakuni, as will be discussed in the next chapter.61 But first, the dissertation turns to examining how alliance relations are managed in Okinawa, comparing and contrasting it with the mainland experience.

57 Article 3 of the Land Expropriation Law, as quoted in Marissa L.L. Lum, “A Comparative Analysis: Legal and Cultural Aspects of Land Condemnation in the Practice of Eminent Domain in Japan and America,” Asian- Pacific Law & Policy Journal 8, no. 2 (2007): 462. 58 Thomas William French, National Police Reserve: The Origin of Japan's Self Defense Forces (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2014), 233-47; Calder, Crisis and Compensation, 166-169. 59 Aldrich, Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West, 12-15. 60 “Long-haul fight: Farmer wages decadeslong battle with Narita airport,” The Japan Times, June 3, 2018. 61 Sarah Kovner, “The Soundproofed Superpower: American Bases and Japanese Communities, 1945–1972,” The Journal of Asian Studies 75, no. 1 (2016).

81 3.3 Okinawa under US administration

Due in large part to its separation from Japan, the evolution of basing issues in Okinawa has differed from that of the rest of the country. As outlined above, the Tokara and Amami island groups were returned to Japan in 1952 and 1953 respectively, with Japan having emphasized that they belonged to the Satsunan chain rather than the Ryukyus.62 On the other hand, Okinawa Prefecture was left under US administration until 1972. But this was not the only significant difference between the origins of basing politics in the prefecture versus the rest of the country. Most importantly, unlike on the mainland, many of the facilities in Okinawa were set up on land that was owned either privately or collectively by local communities. As this section will show, this situation caused significant structural differences related to the military bases to emerge between Okinawa and the Japanese mainland, especially in political and economic terms.

The US basing presence in Okinawa was born in the closing days of the Second World War. During the Battle of Okinawa, which lasted from April through to June 1945, the US military took over the facilities of the imperial Japanese forces on the island, intending to use them to stage an invasion of the Japanese mainland. Japan’s official surrender on August 15 rendered such an operation unnecessary. However, as outlined in section 3.1, the JCS were well aware of the strategic location of the Ryukyu Islands, especially as “the Communist Threat” continued to spread on the Asian continent. The Department of the Navy was placed in charge of administering the islands, with the expectation that it would seek to use Okinawa as a base of operations. Following a survey of its surrounding waters, however, the Navy realized that Okinawa’s harbors were insufficient for its needs and turned instead to developing the naval facilities at Sasebo (Nagasaki) and Yokosuka (near Tokyo). As a result, it transferred administration of the Ryukyu Islands to the War Department in July 1945.63 In 1950, under a directive of the JCS, General MacArthur established the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR), operating under the Department of the Army (formerly the War

62 Robert D. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 16. 63 Arnold G. Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1988), 74-75. For a summary of USCAR records, see the US National Archives “Records of US Occupation Headquarters, World War II,” accessed May 10, 2017, https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/260.html#260.12.

82 Department).64 The US Army thus took over administration of the prefecture, its population, and the facilities that the US Air Force had started to construct on former Imperial Army airfields in the closing days of the war.

Unlike the facilities on the Japanese mainland, however, many of the airfields and other bases of operation that the imperial forces had established on Okinawa were not built on land owned by the Japanese state. Most had been set up during the course of the war; in fact, because the Imperial Army regarded Southeast Asia as the foremost point of defense, they originally constructed just a small number of airfields on the Miyako Islands southwest of Okinawa. It was only during 1944 that, anticipating an offensive from the US forces that were already fighting their way up through Southeast Asia, Japan’s leaders ordered more bases to be built to facilitate the defense of the Japanese mainland. In this manner, Okinawan citizens were ordered to turn their fields and village areas in the south and central parts of the island— which, being relatively flat, were best suited to the construction of the required facilities— into more airfields.65 As a result, the facilities that the US military took over in Okinawa had a much higher percentage of private ownership compared to the rest of Japan.

The interaction of this reality with the strategic value that the US military placed on the islands created significant challenges in Okinawa. Okinawans had expected their lands to be returned to them following the official end of the war; instead, the military government upgraded the facilities it had taken over and sought to provide compensation so as to legalize their use of the land. In April 1953, USCAR issued Ordinance Number 109 to establish the procedures for land that it might need to acquire during this process. If the land could not be acquired from its owners via negotiation, the directive specified that, should the commanding general of the Ryukyu Command deem the land to be “of urgent necessity,” the Deputy Governor would issue an order that the premises be vacated.66 Although it specified that “just

64 Ibid., 160-61. See fn. 13 in this chapter for a brief explanation of how the United States modified the organizational structure of the US military establishment in the years immediately following the end of the Second World War. 65 Nakachi, Ryukyu-U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1972, 24. 66 Ordinance 109 “Land Acquisition Procedure” states that “Whereas the United States has certain requirements concerning the use and possession of land in the Ryukyu Islands and whereas there are no provisions of Ryukyuan law whereby such requirements may be satisfied, it is deemed appropriate and necessary to establish procedures for the acquisition of and just compensation for such interests in land as the United States must have for the carrying out of its responsibility in the Ryukyu Islands.” The compensation for the land to be acquired was determined by the United States Land Acquisition Commission for the Ryukyu Islands, consisting of commissioners appointed by the Deputy Governor. The text of Ordinance 109 is available online at http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/caord109.html or http://heiwa.yomitan.jp/3/2446.html, accessed December 20, 2017.

83 compensation” would be provided in exchange for the land, this ordinance effectively meant that US authorities could force landowners off their property.

One of the most important developments that made use of this ordinance was the transfer of the 9th Marine Corps from Kyushu to Okinawa, which was announced in 1955. USCAR initially offered to buy any private property through a lump-sum payment, but Okinawan opposition produced a shift to an offer of land leases that would be renegotiated every few years. However, the low rents and the desire of many landowners to return to their former lives—coupled with a broader anti-war and anti-military ideology arising from their experiences during the Battle of Okinawa in particular—saw many oppose this development. As a result, US authorities began forcing landowners off the land using “bayonets and bulldozers.”67 The landowners continued their resistance by refusing to accept the compensation, building up to what is now known as the “Island-wide Struggle.”68 The resistance finally ended late in 1956, when the US military administration in Okinawa persuaded villagers in the northern village of Henoko to lease their lands for a new facility. Their decision precipitated acceptance of the offer for compensation in other communities, and the island-wide protest movement was broken.69 This marked the first occasion where Okinawans were persuaded by economic compensation to accept the presence of the US military presence.

However, the compensation that the US government provided to Okinawans for the use of their land was relatively low. The “Price Act” passed by Congress in 1953 established a ceiling of $6 million per year for economic aid to the prefecture, directed through USCAR.70 But in practice, the level of American aid did not reach this ceiling during the 1950s. Although several high level US officials concluded that it should be revised upwards in order to help “maintain the bases in Okinawa,” Congress raised the ceiling to just $12 million instead of the recommended $25 million when revising the Price Act in 1962, and only $6.9 million was provided the following year.71 The reluctance of US politicians to fund Okinawa’s economic development is understandable; many were unwilling to redirect

67 Masamichi S Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 42-43; Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 63. 68 Atsushi Toriyama and David Buist, “Okinawa’s ‘postwar’: some observations on the formation of American military bases in the aftermath of terrestrial warfare,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 4, no. 3 (2003): 407-08. 69 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 100-01. 70 Timothy Maga, John F. Kennedy and the New Pacific Community, 1961–63 (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1990), 101-02. 71 Toriyama and Buist, “Okinawa’s ‘postwar’,” 414-15.

84 taxpayer money that could be spent on their own constituents to a people that belonged to another nation, especially one with whom they had just fought a major war. However, this saw the prefecture’s economic development fall behind that of the Japanese mainland, which experienced a boom due to the Korean War and trade with the United States. The uneven distribution of compensation in the prefecture, most of which went to landowners and communities living around the bases, also contributed to growing inequality and dissatisfaction amongst Okinawans.72

A number of accidents and incidents involving US military assets and personnel compounded this situation. One of the most contentious incidents was the rape and murder of six-year-old Yumiko Nagayama in September 1955. The suspect, Sergeant Isaac J. Hurt, was court- martialled, convicted of rape and murder, and initially sentenced to death; however, he was later returned to the United States.73 Another controversial incident was the F-100 Super Sabre crash at Miyamori Elementary School in June 1959.74 Although the pilot ejected and survived the crash, which resulted from an engine fire, 18 Okinawans lost their lives, including 11 students, and over 100 people were injured.75 Such information was suppressed to varying degrees prior to reversion, but the Okinawa Prefectural Government has kept records of the number of incidents and accidents involving the US military in the prefecture since reversion in 1972.76

Compounding the incidents themselves, however, was the perception that there was little justice for the victims. In the case of the F-100 crash at Miyamori Elementary, compensation proceedings took around three years, and victims received just 10 percent of what they had asked ($4500 for victims who died and $2300-$4900 for those who were injured).77 It is

72 Masamichi S Inoue, “‘We Are Okinawans But of a Different Kind’ New/Old Social Movements and the U.S. Military in Okinawa,” Current Anthropology 45, no. 1 (2004): 90. 73 Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 71. 74 See, for example, Okinawa Peace Network of Los Angeles, “List of Main Crimes Committed and Incidents Concerning the U.S. Military on Okinawa – Excerpts,” http://www.uchinanchu.org/history/list_of_crimes.htm, accessed September 18, 2018, for a list of key incidents over the years. 75 “Ano higeki “keshite fūkasasenai” Beigunki tsuiraku 58nen Okinawa Miyamori-sho de giseisha 18nin wo tsuitō,” Okinawa Times, October 9, 2017. 76 Okinawa Prefectural Government Executive Office of the Governor, Military Base Affairs Division. “US Military Base Issues in Okinawa,” 2011, accessed October 23, 2013, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/us%20military%20base%20issues%20in%20okinaw a.pdf; Okinawa Prefectural Government, “Okinawa no Beigun oyobi Jieitai kichi (tōkeishiryōshū),” 2018, section IV.2, accessed June 15, 2016, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/syogai/toukeisiryosyu30.html. 77 Eiko Asato, “Beigunseika ni miru kodomo to jyosei no jinken -- ryōjoku sareru seimei,” People’s Plan Forum 3, no. No.4 (2000), with English translation available at “The Human Right of Children and Women Under the US Military Administration: Raped Lives,” accessed June 30, 2018, https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-human- right-of-children-and-women-under-the-us-military-administration-raped-lives. See also Glenn D. Hook, “The

85 instructive to compare these incidents with ones that took place on the Japanese mainland. In 1957, an American soldier by the name of William S. Girard shot and killed housewife Naka Sakai, who had entered an Army area to pick up rifle cartridges that she could then sell as scrap metal. The case caused tension between the US and Japanese governments: while the US side argued that Girard had acted while on active duty, and thus ought to be tried in a military court in accordance with the SOFA, the Japanese side argued for jurisdiction because he had shot Sakai during a rest break. Washington ultimately chose to turn Girard over, and he was given a suspended 3-year sentence,78 while Sakai’s husband and children received $1748.32 in compensation. This was arguably a worse outcome for the victims than in the Miyamori case, but an important element in the Girard case was that the Japanese government was perceived to have fought for justice on behalf of its citizens. In contrast, separation from Japan meant that Okinawans had to fight for change or compensation on their own.

Taken together, these issues translated into growing local opposition to USCAR and a desire for reversion to Japanese administration. Incidents and accidents like those described above erased the goodwill towards the Americans that many Okinawans had originally felt in the early days of the US administration. Discontent at the growing economic disparity with the rest of Japan through the 1950s and 1960s also enabled Okinawan progressives to make an economic argument for reversion. The Vietnam War only exacerbated these tensions: Okinawans feared the possibility of another Battle of Okinawa, and also protested the use of the island’s military facilities to inflict similar suffering on the Vietnamese people.79 On the Japanese mainland, protests coalesced around the US-Japan alliance through the focus on the anti-Anpo movement (“Anpo” being the shortened reference term for the security treaty), and later, opposition to the Vietnam War, amongst other things.80 The issue of Okinawa’s return to Japanese administration also became more salient, with Prime Minister Eisaku Satō pledging to achieve this goal during the 1964 election campaign. Concerned that this increasing volatility across Japan would constrain the use of its facilities, the US government agreed to negotiate.81

American eagle in Okinawa: the politics of contested memory and the unfinished war,” Japan Forum 27, no. 3 (2015): 310-13, for a detailed overview of the accident and its place in Okinawan collective memory. 78 LLC ANPO Movie, “Girard Case Summary,” (2011). 79 Yuko Kawato, Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 55. 80 Ellis S. Krauss, “The 1960s’ Japanese Student Movement in Retrospect,” in Japan and the World: Essays on Japanese History and Politics in Honour of Ishida Takeshi, ed. Gail Lee Bernstein and Haruhiro Fukui (London, England: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988). 81 Komine, “Okinawa Confidential, 1969,” 810; Daimon, “Handover of Okinawa to Japan was prickly issue.”

86 The outcome of these negotiations—an agreement to revert control of Okinawa to the Japanese government in the late 1960s—was quite remarkable considering the circumstances. With the ongoing conflict in Vietnam and the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union in the background, Washington was, understandably, keen to retain as many of its operational privileges as possible. It had already increased cooperation with the Japanese government in order for Tokyo to provide more funding for development and maintaining social stability in Okinawa.82 However, public suspicion that nuclear weapons were held in Okinawa gave rise to opposition on the Japanese mainland to reacquisition of the prefecture. To ameliorate this opposition, Prime Minister Sato introduced what became known as the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” in a parliamentary debate in 1967—that Japan would not produce, possess or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. However, as noted in Section 3.1, the two countries also negotiated a secret agreement that would allow the United States to reintroduce nuclear weapons to Okinawa in the case of an emergency.83 With these concessions from Tokyo, Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration on May 15, 1972.

3.4 The compensation framework comes to Okinawa

The reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control brought the prefecture under the structures of compensation that had earlier been set up across the rest of Japan. Post-reversion payments for land increased six-fold, which helped dampen the anti-base and anti-US sentiments that had been building in the prefecture.84 In preparation for reversion, Tokyo also set up policies to further the local economy, including the 1971 Okinawa Promotion and Development Special Measures Law, under which successive 10-year developmental plans have since been created and carried out.85 The Japanese government institutionalized these initiatives by setting up the Okinawa Development Agency (ODA) to oversee the implementation of these plans.86 It also established several DFAA branches in Okinawa and brought US military

82 Toriyama and Buist, “Okinawa’s ‘postwar’,” 416. 83 Mayumi Itoh, The Origin of Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Forgotten Architect of Sino-U.S. Rapprochement (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011), 194. 84 Steve Rabson, “‘Secret’ 1965 Memo Reveals Plans to Keep U.S. Bases and Nuclear Weapons Options in Okinawa After Reversion,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 5-1-10 (February 1, 2010). 85 George Mulgan, “Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese Democracy,” 167. 86 During the 2001 Central Government Reform, the Okinawa Development Agency was subsumed into the newly created Cabinet Office, under the new titles of the Okinawa General Bureau (Okinawa sōgō jimukyoku). Okinawa General Bureau, “Okinawa sōgō jimukyoku ni tsuite,” accessed August 20, 2018, http://www.ogb.go.jp/Soshiki/about.

87 facilities under the management of the compensation system. These changes enabled the allies to deal with local civilian grievances in a case-by-case manner.87

However, it would be several years before these measures began to show results. The use of Okinawa as a staging area for the Vietnam War, as well as for “rest and recreation” for the soldiers fighting in it, saw money flowing into the prefecture, but this was concentrated around base communities such as Koza Town in the center of the island and Henoko in the north.88 During that time, reformists dominated the political scene in Okinawa. Disappointed that reversion had not brought about a reduction in the basing presence, governors Chobyo Yara (1972-1976) and Koichi Taira (1976-1978) called for an end to the dominance of the central government and an increase in the level of local autonomy. However, even after two terms in power, the reformists were unable to find solutions for the economic stagnation in the prefecture. For example, the World Expo held in Okinawa from July 1975 until January 1976 had been expected to bring 4.5 million visitors to the prefecture, but actual numbers fell 1 million short of the target. Following on the heels of the 1973 oil shock, the lost return on investment in this project was one of the factors that contributed to the steep rise in unemployment in the prefecture, from 3.5% at reversion to 6.8% in 1977.89

These developments enabled more conservative Okinawan politicians to build support by focusing on economic development rather than anti-US or anti-government ideology. As mentioned above, Tokyo increased its funding to the prefecture in the latter half of the 1960s; however, the two decades of isolation from Tokyo meant that there was a lack of strong political links between Okinawan leaders and national politicians. As a result, the Japanese government at the time was unable to use “pork barrel politics” effectively to generate greater support for or, at least, acquiescence to the US military presence.90 This changed in 1978, when Okinawan voters elected Junji Nishime, who sought better access to central government funding as a means of reviving the economy. The overall aim was to catch up with the

87 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 139. 88 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 101-03; Jon Mitchell, “Boom times and bust on B.C. Street,” Japan Times, April 10, 2010. 89 Robert D. Eldridge, Post-reversion Okinawa and US-Japan Relations: A Preliminary Survey of Local Politics and the Bases, 1972-2002 (US-Japan Alliance Affairs Division, Center for International Security Studies and Policy, School of International Public Policy, University, 2004), 17. 90 The Japanese electoral system from 1955 until the early 1990s consisted of mixed-member districts coupled with proportional representation vote. This meant that the best way for a ruling party to remain in power was for its politicians to compete against each other, retaining the support of particular interest groups by channelling government funds to them through public works projects and other favorable policies. See, for example Frances McCall Rosenbluth and Michael F. Thies, Japan Transformed: Political Change and Economic Restructuring (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

88 mainland, which had continued to enjoy the boom.91 This conservative shift represented a backlash against the reformist agenda that had held sway in Okinawa in the early years post- reversion, as well as a growing acceptance of base-related compensation as a means for advancing the prefecture’s economy.

The establishment and consolidation of the structures of compensation politics following Nishime’s election were instrumental in increasing acquiescence to the bases and the US military presence. Over 12 years from 1978 to 1990, the governor sought an increase in base- related subsidies from the central government, initiated large-scale construction projects targeted at improving industry and development and built up both tourism and overseas cultural exchanges.92 Nishime was also able to use his links with the national LDP to push for Okinawan initiatives in the major ministries and government bodies, and sought “to turn Okinawa into a hub of international trade, exchange, and conventions in the Southeast Asian area.”93 These developments led to a marked change in the economic fortunes of the prefecture. For example, as early as 1979, there was a 21.4% year-on-year increase in the budget allocation for Okinawa.94 A significant proportion of this influx of cash went into the local construction industry, funding many large infrastructure projects such as the conversion of the 1975 World Expo site into the Churaumi Aquarium, now a well-known tourist attraction.95 These projects helped cultivate acquiescence to the US military presence.

The impact of the additional funds flowing into the prefecture can also be seen in the waning opposition amongst landowners. After Tokyo took over the payment of leases from Washington, the number of landowners who opposed the strategy of compensation dropped quickly from 2,850 in 1972 to 321 in 1977, and then to 153 out of approximately 25,000 in 1982. The remaining anti-military landowners, who opposed the US presence on ideological grounds, reacted by parcelling off small portions of their land to other like-minded people in Okinawa and also from the Japanese mainland, who became known as one-tsubo landowners.96 This strategy allowed them to increase their numbers to around 3,000 by the

91 Eldridge, Post-reversion Okinawa and US-Japan Relation, 19-27. 92 Ibid., 25. 93 Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 150. 94 Eldridge, Post-reversion Okinawa and US-Japan, 25-26. 95 Japan Cabinet Office, “Outline of Duties 2014,” (2014), 19-20. 96 The one-tsubo anti-military landowners association was established in December 1982, under the leadership of Moriteru Arasaki and other activists. A tsubo is a Japanese unit of measurement, amounting to approximately 3.3m2 (~35.5ft2). Arasaki’s idea was to enable individuals who did not own land to purchase a small piece of

89 late 1990s.97 However, by putting more money into the prefecture in the 1980s, the Japanese government managed to further increase support for the US presence.98 It is thus clear that the strategy of compensation was largely successful at quelling opposition to the base in Okinawa during the 1970s and 1980s.

3.5 The end of the Cold War and the expected “peace dividend”

However, with the end of the Cold War, the situation in Okinawa changed once again. Western scholars, policy-makers and commentators proclaimed the triumph of democracy and capitalism over the communist system.99 There were also flow-on effects for the regional security architecture. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the threat that the United States had used to justify their extensive military basing network in the region, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea, dissipated. Policy makers and commentators both in Washington and other capitals around the region began discussing how the regional security structure should evolve. In particular, the US-Japan alliance had been built up as a “bulwark to communism”; with the fall in power of the primary threat it was designed to contain, elites in both the United States and Japan started to debate what form the alliance should take in the new era of American hegemony, with the former also considering its overall force posture worldwide.100

In this changing regional security environment, reformists in Okinawa started pursuing, once again, a base-free future for the prefecture. Since the Soviet Union was no longer perceived to be a threat, they hoped that the “peace dividend” would also be granted to them through a

military land, worth 10,000 yen, so that they could formally join the movement. Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 36. 97 Eldridge, Post-reversion Okinawa and US-Japan Relations, 67. 98 Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas, 215. 99 Noboru Yamaguchi, “Redefining the Japan-US Alliance,” Nippon.com, no. May 11 (2012), http://www.nippon.com/en/features/c00204/. See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London, England: Penguin, 1992); United States Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Department of Defense, 1995; Kotaro Higuchi, The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan -The Outlook for the 21st Century-, 1994. 100 United States Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Department of Defense, 1998; Higuchi, “The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan -The Outlook for the 21st Century-.” See also Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999); Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994); Yamaguchi, “Redefining the Japan- US Alliance.”

90 reduction in the US military presence to mainland levels (known as hondo-nami).101 This would help free up land and reduce the long distances residents needed to travel around the facilities, and the resulting increase in productivity would raise local living standards to levels closer to that of the mainland.102 They also observed and studied the developments in the Philippines, where the anti-base movement played an important part in the removal of the Clark and Subic Bay facilities. Although the government of Philippine President Corazon Aquino had wanted to maintain the US military presence in the country, activists convinced on-the-fence senators to vote against an agreement that would renew the leases for another 25 years.103

This changing tide helped the reformists convince Masahide Ōta, then a professor at the University of the Ryukyus, to run as their candidate for the 1990 gubernatorial election.104 Ōta was an ideal candidate for the reformist cause. Having survived the Battle of Okinawa as a youth, he completed a degree in English at Waseda University and then worked as an academic in Tokyo before heading to the United States to complete a master’s degree in journalism. Upon returning to Okinawa, he observed up-close the protests and other developments leading up the prefecture’s reversion to Japanese administration in 1972.105 Ōta’s academic career took him back to the United States in 1973, to the East-West Center in and then later to Arizona State University, before he became employed at the University of the Ryukyus, specializing in Okinawan history and politics.106 As he learned more about Okinawa’s history and how it was affected by the war and the subsequent US administration, Ōta began to argue that the prefecture should seek a base-free future. His visibility on this subject led to numerous progressive groups approaching him to run for governor in 1986, a prospect that many people close to Ōta advised against because of how taxing it would be. Although he ultimately turned down that request in order to focus on his

101 Eldridge, Post-reversion Okinawa and US-Japan Relations, 35. 102 Gavan McCormack, “Okinawa and the Structure of Dependence,” in Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity, ed. Glen D. Hook and Richard Siddle (2003), 93-94. 103 Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 35-62 104 GRIPS, “Ōraru hisutorī Yoshimoto Masanori (Moto Okinawa-ken fuku-Chiji) [Oral History Yoshimoto Masanori (Former Vice Governor of Okinawa),” C.0.E. Ōraru Seisaku Kenkyū Purojekutto (Tokyo, Japan: Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies, 2005), 74. 105 GRIPS, “Ōraru hisutorī Ōta Masahide (Moto Okinawa-ken Chiji) [Oral History Ōta Masahide (Former Governor of Okinawa)].” C.0.E. Ōraru Seisaku Kenkyū Purojekutto (Tokyo: Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies, 2003), 63-65. 106 Satoko Norimatsu, “‘The World is beginning to know Okinawa’: Ota Masahide Reflects on his Life from the Battle of Okinawa to the Struggle for Okinawa.”

91 research, Ōta, concerned about the direction in which twelve years of conservative leadership had taken the prefecture, accepted the second request in 1990.107

International and domestic developments also helped turn the political wind within the prefecture in the reformists’ favor. The détente of the 1980s had seen Okinawans become accustomed to benefitting from the money flowing in from Tokyo, smoothing over concerns about negative consequences such as noise pollution, accidents and other incidents. However, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the Japanese government’s bill to send the JSDF to the Gulf War in 1990 reawakened fears that Okinawa and its citizens would again be entangled in a major conflict. Nishime’s endorsement of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill that would authorize the JSDF’s deployment also hurt his chances at being reelected, as the Kōmeitō Party decided to back his challenger instead.108 Furthermore, Ōta was able to obtain support from several traditionally conservative factions. His acquaintances and peers from his university days saw the Kokuba-Gumi Co. Ltd tentatively support him, and differences within the conservative camp meant that Keiichi Inamine—who would later succeed Ōta as governor—also ended up backing him.109 Together with the progressive faction and a coalition of women’s rights and other interest groups, this gave Ōta a broad base of support.

Another important factor in Ōta’s eventual election was that the twelve years of base-related subsidies and development had greatly improved the economy and living standards in Okinawa. Ōta’s objectives, which included removing the military bases, improving medical facilities and increasing international links, meshed with voters’ preferences for a higher quality of life.110 He sought a revision of the bill for Special Measures Relating to the Use of Former Military Land and the Conversion of Military Land in Okinawa, also known as the Guntenpo. The aim was to extend the period of lease payments for returned military land, because previous experience had shown the prefectural government and landowners that the land was often contaminated with petrol and other military-related chemicals. The need to decontaminate this land properly meant that redevelopment for other uses could take up to a decade or more, which many of the now-aging landowners could not afford to fund.111 These factors coalesced in the 1990 gubernatorial election to give Okinawa its first reformist-backed leader in 12 years, as Ōta defeated Nishime by a margin of 30,000 votes.

107 GRIPS, “Ōraru hisutorī Ōta Masahide,” 74-75. 108 Eldridge, Post-reversion Okinawa and US-Japan Relations, 36. 109 GRIPS, “Ōraru hisutorī Ōta Masahide,” 77. 110 Eldridge, Post-reversion Okinawa and US-Japan, 37. 111 Ibid., 45; Ota, “Ōraru hisutorī Ōta Masahide,” 89.

92 In his first term, however, Ōta was unable to carry out many of these pledges. One factor standing in his way was the fact that, when he started as governor, conservatives dominated the prefectural assembly. This affected the running of the prefectural government in two ways. First, conservative members of the assembly refused to back some of Ōta’s more progressive actions. For example, they refused to accept the appointment of a woman as one of his two vice governors, which would have been a countrywide first.112 Furthermore, although Ōta appointed Hirokazu Nakaima, who belonged to the prefectural LDP chapter, as one of his vice governors in order to bridge the divide with the conservatives in the assembly, this turned out to be ineffective. Assembly meetings extended late into the night, and Ōta suspected that the conservative faction was trying to force him to retire from the governorship.113 This resistance may have factored into Ōta’s decision to approve the renewal of the 5-year land-lease on behalf of the anti-base landowners during his first term.

Ōta’s efforts to change the prefectural economy during the first half of his governorship produced mixed results. On the one hand, he successfully established a range of programs aimed at setting Okinawa on the path towards a base-free future. First, he widened the prefecture’s political and trade relationships within the region by seeking the establishment of overseas offices in Fujian, Seoul, Hong Kong and Singapore, and pursuing links with other countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam.114 Then, he set up programs aimed at cultivating internationalist citizens, sending staff to the regional offices to develop interpretation skills, and groups of students to the United States for one-year educational exchanges.115 Finally, Ōta also made significant attempts to turn Okinawa into an information technology hub, although this initiative appears to have been less successful. In particular, efforts to encourage homegrown businesses did not always bear fruit, and buildings constructed with central

112 GRIPS, “Ōraru hisutorī Ōta Masahide,” 84. 113 Ibid., 81. 114 Ibid., 90. Okinawan’s first overseas prefectural office was established in Taiwan in May 1990, before Ōta was elected governor. However, offices were successfully established in Seoul and Hong Kong in January 1995, in Singapore in August 1998, and in Fujian in July 1998. Offices in and were established in subsequent years, during the administrations of Governor Keiichi Inamine and Governor Hirokazu Nakaima. The Singapore and Fujian offices were shut down in 2004 and 2011 respectively but have since been re- established (October 2017 and April 2014). See “Shingapo-ru ni Okinawa-ken jimusho 11-nen buri saisecchi,” Okinawa Times, October 9, 2017; “Ken sangyō kōsha, Chūgoku Fukushū ni chūzaisho kaisetu raigetsu, bussan tenjijō mo,” Ryukyu Shimpo, April 4 2014; Aomori Prefectural Government, 21-nendo Aomori-ken no Kokusai kōryu no gaiyō #24 Tōdōfuken ni yoru kaigaiz jimusho no secchi jōkyō External Relations Department [Yūkyaku kōryū ka], 2009; 25-nendo Aomori-ken no Kokusai kōryu no gaiyō #24 Tōdōfuken ni yoru kaigai jimusho no secchi jōkyō External Relations Department [Yūkyaku kōryū ka], 2013. 115 GRIPS, “Ōraru hisutorī Ōta Masahide,” 90.

93 government funds for this purpose often remained empty because of restrictions on how they could be used.116

International politics also worked against Okinawa’s hopes for the peace dividend. Despite the apparent loss of the Soviet threat, policy-makers and military planners in both the United States and Japan identified a need for a stable force posture in the Asia-Pacific region for potential contingencies involving Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. In 1993, Les Aspin’s “Report on the Bottom-Up Review” revealed a plan for the United States to maintain a presence of 100,000 troops each in the European and Asia-Pacific theatres. This amounted to a large reduction in Europe, which had hosted between 300,000 and 400,000 US troops during the Cold War, but a smaller reduction for the Asia-Pacific numbers of approximately 120,000 troops.117 Following this, the “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region” was released in February 1995. Also known as the Nye Initiative—so named because of its author, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph S. Nye, Jr.—this report outlined how the United States would seek to strengthen its bilateral alliances and maintain its forward deployed bases in East Asia.118

The Nye Report pointed to a continuation of the status quo in Okinawa. The document reiterated the importance of Japan as an ally and partner, particularly the strategic location of the facilities it provided, and stated that the United States would maintain the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa.119 However, it outlined no concrete measures for ensuring the political sustainability of the base presence. There were indications that alliance managers were responding to Okinawa complaints over particular aspects of the base presence. In February 1995, for instance, JDA Director General Tokuichirō Tamazawa presented Governor Ōta with a plan for a minor scale-back of US military facilities in the prefecture.120 Overall, however, the lack of concrete measures suggests that there were few concerns about the political sustainability of the US military presence in the alliance at this point.

116 Interview with Manabu Satō (Professor, Okinawa International University), conducted in Okinawa Prefecture, July 2016. 117 Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Department of Defense, 1993. 118 United States Department of Defense, “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region.” 119 Ibid., 25. 120 “Plan for U.S.-base cuts on Okinawa presented,” Japan Economic Newswire, February 18, 1995.

94 3.6 In summary

The history of the US military facilities in Okinawa, from the Second World War until the early post-Cold War period, differs from that of the facilities on the main Japanese islands. This was chiefly because the prefecture was cut off from the rest of the country from 1952 until 1972. As a result, alliance-supporting institutions from the Japanese side, such as base- related compensation from Tokyo, were introduced later than for host communities throughout the rest of Japan. The prefecture also fell behind economically because the United States was reluctant to increase Congressional spending on another state’s citizens. Tokyo’s policies towards Okinawa following reversion helped ameliorate anti-military and anti-base sentiment. However, those sentiments remained salient and led to the election of the progressive governor, Masahide Ōta, who would play an important role in the developments that followed. Before examining those events, however, the dissertation outlines in the next chapter the case of Iwakuni City in Yamaguchi Prefecture, and the agreements concerning MCAS Iwakuni. These serve as an important comparison for alliance management in Okinawa.

95 ~Chapter 4~ Basing Politics on the Mainland: the case of MCAS Iwakuni

Before addressing the realignment in Okinawa and how it has been implemented, it is important to look at the case of Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni (MCAS Iwakuni). This facility is one of the two Marine Corps facilities that can be found on the four main islands of Japan, the other being the Combined Arms Training Center Camp Fuji. It is important to this study for two reasons. First, MCAS Iwakuni remains relatively untouched in writings about the state of basing politics in Japan. Although much has been written about the US military facilities in Okinawa, far less attention in the literature has been devoted to examining what has happened in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture, whether in relation to the part it plays in the realignment and reduction of forces in Okinawa in the 1990s and across Japan in the 2000s, or in other alliance management efforts prior to the 1990s. Furthermore, most of this writing is in Japanese. For this reason, it is worth investigating and systematically comparing how the US, Japanese, and local governments went about negotiating and then cooperating to implement the agreed changes to MCAS Iwakuni.

The other reason MCAS Iwakuni was chosen is that the broad picture of the realignment of this facility shares some key similarities to the developments in Okinawa. By virtue of being the other major facility in Japan belonging to the US Marine Corps, MCAS Iwakuni is also involved in most of the agreements concerning the base reduction and realignment in Okinawa. Aircraft removed from MCAS Futenma as part of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement have been moved to Iwakuni, and the degree of local acquiescence to these transfers is linked to what has happened in Okinawa. Furthermore, like Futenma, the inclusion of the Iwakuni facility in the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (the Roadmap) agreement was just the next step in a long-line of US-Japan efforts to manage that facility. And like the replacement facility for MCAS Futenma being constructed at Camp Schwab, the expansion of MCAS Iwakuni in the early 1990s required extensive land reclamation into the sea adjacent to the facility. These similarities allow for the

96 examination of differences in alliance management approaches and processes that contributed to the various outcomes experienced across the two facilities.

Of course, there are also differences between the two cases that might be used to explain the difference in implementation outcomes. In particular, it may be that much lower levels of anti- base and anti-military opposition in Iwakuni City constitute the primary reason that the realignment objectives concerning MCAS Iwakuni from both the SACO and the 2006 Roadmap agreements have been more readily implemented than in Okinawa, thus resulting in or contributing to the lower levels of tension observed in Yamaguchi Prefecture and the immediate host community. But a closer look at the implementation of the Iwakuni-related objectives in these two agreements shows that the city did not readily accept the basing agreements negotiated and signed by the US and Japanese governments. Instead, each agreement-implementation sequence was a negotiated process between Tokyo and key subnational actors, which helped ensure that local preferences were incorporated into the agreement outcomes, or otherwise addressed. Furthermore, although the links between the realignment in Yamaguchi and Okinawa mean that the two cases cannot be treated as independent case studies in their entirety, the methods chosen nevertheless allow for the examination and analysis of processes that can explain the differences in implementation outcomes, which is the focus of this dissertation.

For this purpose, three base-management initiatives and their associated agreement- implementation sequences will be examined in relation to MCAS Iwakuni. The first is the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the US and Japanese governments, wherein the two governments agreed to expand the facility seaward in order to shift the runway further away from residential areas. The second is the 1996 SACO agreement, where a squadron of KC-130 transport aircraft was assigned to be transferred to MCAS Iwakuni from Okinawa. Finally, the inclusion of MCAS Iwakuni in the realignment of US forces across Japan in the mid-2000s, the objectives of which are outlined in the 2006 Roadmap, will also be examined. To begin, however, it is important to look at the history of the facility and its relations with the surrounding residents.

97 4.1 MCAS Iwakuni: a brief history

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, located in Yamaguchi Prefecture next to the Seto Inland Sea, was originally a facility that belonged to the Imperial Japanese Navy. Built on land that the Japanese government purchased in the 1930s, it was used for training imperial forces and the defense of the Japanese homeland during the Second World War. After the war ended, it was occupied by the allies, becoming a Royal Australian Air Force base in 1948. From 1950, the US Air Force used the facility to support its engagement in the Korean War, before officially taking it over in 1952 when Japan regained its independence.1 Following its transfer to the US Navy and official designation as MCAS Iwakuni in 1954, it became a joint US- Japanese facility in 1957, hosting a contingent of the newly formed Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). It also served as a joint civilian-military airfield from 1952 to 1964.

Compared to other host communities within Japan, such as Okinawa, the community hosting MCAS Iwakuni is quite tolerant of the US military presence. Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture have traditionally been strongholds for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—in fact, recently retired prime minister Shinzō Abe hails from the prefecture, where he was first elected to the Japanese Diet in 1993. The continuity of conservative leadership in both local and central governments for much of the post-war period enabled local elites to establish and maintain strong links to Tokyo, especially during Japan’s economic boom.2 Iwakuni has benefited from the largesse that these links have brought, particularly in relation to its base “burden”—former mayor Katsusuke Ihara noted that the city receives more base-related subsidies than most other local governments.3 Additionally, the city and its residents appear to have relatively good relations with the US military stationed at the facility—many have jobs associated with the base facility, and open day celebrations around May 5th every year bring crowds of visitors from local areas as well as tourists from outside of the city and prefecture.4 The MCAS Iwakuni runway is also further from residential areas than those of Naval Air Facility Atsugi and Yokota Air Base in the Tokyo metropolitan area, and Kadena Air Base and

1 The United States Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan,” accessed August 30, 2018, https://www.mcasiwakuni.marines.mil/About/; Japan Ministry of Defense, “Iwakuni Kōkū-kichi: Kichi no Enkaku,” accessed August 30, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/iwakuni/about/iwakuni_base/iwakuni_base.html. 2 Ihara Katsusuke interviewed by Jin Pil-su, “Former Iwakuni Mayor Ihara Reflects on the Problem of US Bases in Japan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 12-1-3 (2014). Also discussed in the author’s interview with Iwakuni City Government officials, July 2015. 3 Ibid. 4 Sgt Antonio Rubio, “40th MCAS Iwakuni Friendship Day 2016 Air Show demonstrates U.S.-Japan alliance,” The Official Website of Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, May 6, 2016.

98 MCAS Futenma in Okinawa. All of these factors appear to have contributed to a lower level of anti-base opposition in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture.5

However, this does not mean that alliance management issues involving MCAS Iwakuni are easy to resolve. The trigger for the original agreement to shift the facility’s runway seaward was, in fact, a 1968 F-4 Phantom accident at Kyushu University;6 the MOU was only signed in 1992, a full twenty-four years after the incident. The absence of significant levels of protest associated with its negotiation and subsequent implementation suggests that it is a worthwhile subject for further study.

4.2 The agreement to move the Iwakuni runway offshore

The original post-Cold War agreement on MCAS Iwakuni involved an effort to shift its runway further offshore. Driven by local political actors, the trigger was an accident in 1968, where an F4 Phantom caught fire and crashed into a building at Kyushu University in Fukuoka. This incident became a symbol for the student protest on campus, but the protests died down within a few months, along with the rest of the student movements during the 1960s. Nevertheless, the accident sparked concerns amongst base hosting communities around Japan over the danger of a similar accident occurring in a residential area. This was particularly true for the citizens of Iwakuni City, for although the aircraft involved in the accident belonged to another facility, F4s were one of the fighters deployed to MCAS Iwakuni during the 1960s. Responding to such concerns, the Iwakuni City government starting petitioning the Japanese central government to move the runway of the facility further offshore. As part of this process, the Iwakuni City Assembly regularly passed resolutions for proposing the offshore relocation and obtained similar resolutions from the Yamaguchi Prefectural Government. The city also petitioned Diet members as well as bureaucrats in the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA).7 Furthermore, six other local

5 Toku Sakai, “The Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on the Japanese Mainland: A Case Study of the Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni,” Journal of International Development and Cooperation 17, no. 2 (2011); Shintaro Ikeda, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Local Politics: A Case Study of the Iwakuni Base Problem,” Journal of International Studies 14 (2008). 6 Iwakuni Kichi Okiai Isetsu Sokushin Kiseidōmeikai, Iwakuni Kichi no Gaiyō oyobi Okiai Isetsu ni tsuite [in Japanese], 2010, 3; Japan Ministry of Defense, Bōei Shisetsuchō Shi, 2007, 263. Officials from both the Okinawa Prefectural Government (Regional Security Policy Department) and Iwakuni City Government also stressed this fact when interviewed by the author in November 2014 and July 2015 respectively. 7 Iwakuni Kichi Okiai Isetsu Sokushin Kiseidōmeikai, Iwakuni Kichi no Gaiyō oyobi Okiai Isetsu ni tsuite, 25- 42.

99 municipalities in close proximity to the base joined forces with Iwakuni to form the Alliance to Promote and Achieve the Seaward Relocation of the Iwakuni Air Station Runway.8

The Japanese government’s response was slow but steady. After a decade of petitions and discussions with the city’s leaders, the ruling LDP set up a new subcommittee in 1978 focused solely on addressing the proposal. This Subcommittee for the Offshore Relocation of the Iwakuni Air Base was established within the already existing Special Measures Committee for Military Basing Issues. It took another decade of meetings before Tokyo started setting aside funds for feasibility studies in Japan’s annual budget allocation. In response to a request from the subcommittee, the DFAA allocated 80 million yen in 1983 for this purpose, followed by 135 million yen in 1984 and 165 million yen in 1985. In 1986, the DFAA provided 220 million yen for the initial year of landfill feasibility studies, following up with another 830 million yen over the next two years. In 1988, the subcommittee requested and was granted 250 million yen in order to conduct further feasibility studies for two plans under consideration. In 1990, the Special Measures Committee released the “Report Concerning the Investigation for Relocating the Iwakuni Air Station Runway,” which expressed a preference for one of the plans. Throughout this process, Iwakuni City continued to petition numerous government ministers and groups, including the DFAA, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Cabinet, urging them to move forward on the proposal as soon as possible.9

Finally, following more than two decades of effort and negotiations between the United States and Japan as well as between Iwakuni City and Tokyo, the two national governments signed the aforementioned 1992 MOU. The overall goals were twofold: to reduce the noise pollution levels affecting the lives of the city’s residents, and also to improve flight safety.10 These goals were to be achieved by shifting the facility’s runway approximately 1000 meters (3280 feet) seaward, onto land reclaimed from the Seto Inland Sea (see Figure 4.1). This was one of the two plans mentioned in the previous paragraph. The MOU signalled that the US and Japanese governments were committed to the plan recommended by the DFAA; however, more steps were required for implementation. From 1994 to 1996, the DFAA conducted the environmental surveys required for the land reclamation process, applying for the permit in

8 Ibid., 26. 9 Ibid., 26-36. 10 Vincent R. Donnally, “Iwakuni Runway Relocation Project,” in 2005 Tri-Service Infrastructure Systems Conference: Re-Energizing Engineering Excellence (2005); Iwakuni Kichi Okiai Isetsu Sokushin Kiseidōmeikai, Iwakuni Kichi no Gaiyō oyobi Okiai Isetsu ni tsuite, 12.

100 Figure 4.1: Diagram of the Plan for Relocating the MCAS Iwakuni Runway11

May 1996. Construction Minister and Transport Minister Makoto Koga formally approved the project in November, paving the way for work to begin the following year.12 Since the project had been developed at the behest of the city and its residents, there was also little protest—Washington, Tokyo, Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City all cooperated to carry out the necessary steps. In short, the agreement to shift the MCAS Iwakuni runway represented the preferences of the city’s leaders and residences, and its implementation proceeded without issue in the immediate years following the signing of the MOU in 1992.

11 Iwakuni Kichi Okiai Isetsu Sokushin Kiseidōmeikai, Iwakuni Kichi no Gaiyō oyobi Okiai Isetsu ni tsuite, 19. 12 Iwakuni Kichi Okiai Isetsu Sokushin Kiseidōmeikai, Iwakuni Kichi no Gaiyō oyobi Okiai Isetsu ni tsuite, 17, 30-40; “Project approved to shift U.S. base runway offshore,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 26, 1996.

101 4.3 The SACO Agreement and Iwakuni’s response

These ongoing efforts to shift the runway of MCAS Iwakuni continued smoothly until September 1995, when the rape incident in Okinawa Prefecture introduced some changes to the plans for the facility. The incident in Okinawa generated large protests and led to an alliance crisis: Governor Masahide Ōta’s refusal to cooperate in the implementation of the Act on Special Measures for US Forces Japan Land Release, which authorized the use of privately-owned land for US basing facilities. In response, Washington and Tokyo set up the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in an effort to resolve the crisis and ameliorate anti-base sentiment by reducing the “burden” on the prefecture. The developments in Okinawa, which drove the content of the agreement, will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 5, but as the only other Marine Corps Air Station in Japan, MCAS Iwakuni naturally became part of the proposed solution.

The “Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report,” released on April 15, 1996, specified a unit transfer that had the potential to significantly affect the ongoing implementation of the MOU to relocate the MCAS Iwakuni runway. It declared that KC-130 tanker and transport aircraft would be transferred from the MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni as one of several measures taken to “reduce the burden” on Okinawa.13 This KC-130 squadron—the Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152)—consists of 12 aircraft. It had actually been relocated from Itami Air Force Base near Osaka to Iwakuni in 1954, before being transferred to Okinawa in 1965; its leader later suggested that this new move could be considered a “homecoming rather than a re-location.”14 Nevertheless, the SACO-designated transfer required the construction of additional support and housing facilities for the aircraft and 300 personnel. To help accommodate this, 20 AV-8 Harrier jump jets were to be transferred from Iwakuni to the US mainland.15 In fact, 14 of reassigned jets were moved by May 11, 1996, less than a month after the release of the interim report.16

13 Yukihiko Ikeda et al., “The SACO Final Report,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html. 14 Lance Cpl D.A. Walters, “More capabilities, more opportunities VMGR-152 arrives at MCAS Iwakuni,” The Official Website of Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, July 15, 2014. 15 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. “The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report,” April 15, 1996, signed by Yukihiko Ikeda, Hideo Usui, William Perry, and Walter Mondale, accessed May 6, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/seco.html; “The SACO Final Report.” December 2, 1996, signed by Yukihiko Ikeda, Hideo Usui, William Perry, and Walter Mondale, accessed December 5, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html. 16 “U.S. warplanes at Iwakuni reduced ahead of final accord,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 11, 1996.

102 The initial reaction to the transfer of the KC-130 squadron was mixed. In response to the interim report, the Iwakuni City Government stated its opposition to the plan, while the Yamaguchi Prefectural Government indicated that it would accept it “as long as the relocation does not reinforce the base.”17 Iwakuni mayor Yoshimitsu Kifune also expressed dissatisfaction at how Tokyo had included the transfers in the proposal without first discussing its possibility with the city and other affected local municipalities. However, after receiving an apology in person from Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto, Kifune agreed on May 2, 1996 to cooperate with the central and prefectural governments to set up a working group to discuss the feasibility of the plans, taking the same position as the prefectural government that the transfers would be accepted on the condition that it did not “strengthen” the functions of MCAS Iwakuni.18

Initially, Iwakuni citizens also gave a mixed reaction to the SACO interim report. On June 9, 1996, approximately 4,000 people gathered to protest the transfer of the KC-130 squadron. In July, Iwakuni City and the labor unions of Yamaguchi Prefecture conducted a survey as part of a vetting process in which 1,910 people responded to questions about the base and the planned transfers.19 Although 16% of respondents were willing to accept it in order to help reduce the burden on Okinawa, 62% opposed the transfer because they expected it to strengthen the functions of MCAS Iwakuni and increase the probability of dangerous accidents. Several citizens groups even started opposing the runway relocation project because of their concerns over this additional transfer.20 However, on February 10, 1997, the working group found that the transfer of the refuelling unit would not increase the burden on the residents around the facility, and the officials of Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, the nearby town of Yū formally accepted the transfer.21

Hence, despite the changes wrought by the SACO agreement, the implementation of the efforts to shift the MCAS Iwakuni runway proceeded smoothly for several more years. The reclamation work began promptly in June 1997, with the expectation that construction of the runway would be completed around 2005.22 Soil required for the landfill was to be taken from

17 “Iwakuni Mayor hints at accepting base shift,” Jiji Press English News Service, May 2, 1996; “Okinawa to cooperate on base shifts within prefecture,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 9, 1996; “Refueling planes’ shift to strengthen functions: group,” Japan Economic Newswire, April 22, 1996. 18 “Iwakuni Mayor hints at accepting base shift.” 19 “60% of Iwakuni residents opposed to U.S. base shift,” Japan Economic Newswire, July 12, 1996. 20 “Project approved to shift U.S. base runway offshore.” 21 “Iwakuni local gov’ts to accept U.S. unit from Okinawa,” Japan Economic Newswire, February 24, 1997. 22 “Project approved to shift U.S. base runway offshore”; “U.S. Marines Iwakuni base runway relocation work begins,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 1, 1997.

103 the nearby Atago Hills area, after which the prefectural and city governments would sponsor development of housing complexes for private sale at that site.23 Although rumors that Washington was willing to consider the relocation of more Futenma squadrons to Iwakuni raised alarms in the prefectural and municipal governments in December 1998, the US and Japanese governments were quick to deny the reports.24 Small protests continued to occur in relation to issues such as CVW-5’s field carrier landing practice (FCLP) drills, as MCAS Iwakuni was one of the designated alternative facilities when inclement weather prevented training at Iwo Jima.25 Nevertheless, these relatively minor issues were easily resolved between the Tokyo and Washington, and the relocation of the runway proceeded largely as planned during this initial period.

4.4. The DPRI era: Iwakuni and the negotiation of the 2006 Roadmap

However, the implementation of both of these earlier agreements became more complicated in the 2000s. Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and in September 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sought to update US military posture worldwide. As part of this effort, Washington and Tokyo launched the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) in 2002 in order to adapt the US-Japan alliance to the post-Cold War threat environment. The DPRI affected a number of facilities across Japan, including MCAS Futenma (see chapters 7 and 8) and MCAS Iwakuni. In the latter case, Washington and Tokyo agreed in 2005 to transfer Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni. The initiative—confirmed in the 2005 interim report, “US- Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” and finalized in the 2006 “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”—sparked several years of protest and resistance in Iwakuni City.

The transfer of CVW-5 to MCAS Iwakuni had its roots in a separate, ongoing alliance management effort by the US and Japanese governments. The unit is attached to the US Navy’s sole forward-deployed aircraft carrier, currently the USS Ronald Reagan, which is homeported at Yokosuka Naval Base, just south of Tokyo. When the carrier is in port, CVW-

23 Katsusuke Ihara, Iwakuni ni Fuita Kaze (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2009), 183. 24 “Japan Denies Relocation of Futenma Base to Iwakuni,” Jiji Press English News Service, December 3, 1998; “U.S. not considering shifting Futenma to Iwakuni,” Japan Economic Newswire, December 4, 1998. 25 “Local gov’ts call on U.S. to move night flights to Iwojima,” Kyodo News, January 29, 2001; “Yamaguchi Pref. says ‘no’ to U.S. Navy night flight exercises,” Kyodo News, October 11, 2002.

104 5 moves to a facility on land for safety and training purposes. From the 1970s onwards, the unit’s home base was Naval Air Facility Atsugi, where its training activities were originally conducted. However, after years of protests from residents living around the facility, who started suing the Japanese government for damages due to noise levels that often exceeded 80 decibels, Tokyo and Washington agreed in 1989 to shift the training to Iwo Jima, an island to the distant south of Tokyo, until a more permanent facility could be established elsewhere in Japan. Iwo Jima is primarily remembered as the site for a major battle during the final year of the Second World War, when the US Marines captured the island at enormous cost. It remained uninhabited, making it ideal as a training ground from a political perspective. An airfield was constructed there, and US forces began using it in 1991.26

This arrangement was never intended to be permanent. The drills in question, which take place over approximately 80 days in a calendar year, are a critical element of training for CVW-5, whose pilots need to obtain regular certification for the difficult task of taking off and landing on a carrier at sea. These FCLP drills consist largely of what are known as touch- and-go drills, where pilots simulate the procedure they need to follow for a failed landing on a carrier deck. Furthermore, because landings can take place around the clock when at sea, both day and night drills need to be scheduled. The noise generated by such intense training led to a number of court rulings that the Japanese government pay damages to residents.27 Hence, it might be argued that holding the training at Iwo Jima, which is a part of the Ogasawara (or Bonin) island group that lies approximately 1000 kilometers (620 miles) from Tokyo, is more politically expedient than holding it at airfields close to residential areas.

However, the remoteness of the JSDF facility on the island makes it challenging for the training on several fronts. Commercial access to the Ogasawara Islands is limited to ferries. As such, there is no civilian or military airfield close by to serve as a secondary runway, and pilots have to ditch into the sea if there is an emergency of any sort. While such an incident has yet to occur, it remains a risk that Washington, Tokyo and even the local governments recognize and hope to avoid.28 Second, the logistics of carrying out training at such a remote

26 Bryan Bender, “Navy wants new airstrip in Japan; Tokyo resists,” Defense Daily, October 23, 1996. 27 “Local gov’ts call on U.S. to move night flights to Iwojima”; Eric Talmadge, “Despite safety fears, US Navy says jets will train on Iwo Jima until Japan finds better site,” The Associated Press, June 7, 2013; “U.S. night landing drills to be moved to islet,” Daily Yomiuri, January 31, 2003; “Residents file 3rd suit over noise at U.S. Atsugi base,” Japan Economic Newswire, December 8, 1997; “6,130 Japanese Sue State over Atsugi Base Noise Pollution,” Jiji Press English News Service, December 17, 2007. 28 “Despite safety fears, US Navy says jets will train on Iwo Jima until Japan finds better site”; “Another battle brewing on Iwo Jima, but this time the Americans want off,” Associated Press Newswires, July 15, 2004.

105 facility translate into opportunity costs because the monetary and time resources could be used to improve other elements of the alliance. Furthermore, a relatively high frequency of inclement weather at Iwo Jima means that the drills often have to be carried out at several bases in Japan, including Atsugi and MCAS Iwakuni, which usually leads to local protests.29 The disadvantages of this temporary solution continue to be felt by both the central government and by residents. Due to these factors, the US and Japanese governments have continually tried to find another location on the Japanese mainland to host the drills. However, opposition from numerous domestic constituencies have made this a difficult task.

In 2004, the two governments started discussing the possibility of transferring CVW-5 from Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni as part of the DPRI.30 The relocation of the Iwakuni runway, which was well underway, was an important factor in their considerations. Although Iwakuni’s political leaders and citizens had requested that the facility’s functions not be further strengthened at the time of the SACO agreement, military planners reasoned that the new position of the runway would help ensure that there be no increase in the “burden.” Successful relocation would ensure that the noise from the take-offs and landings be largely directed over the waters of the Seto Inland Sea, rather than over residential areas. The original intention was for the Iwakuni runway to be used as a permanent FCLP facility; however, the city’s political leaders were resolutely opposed to any “enhancement” or “strengthening” of the base’s functions.31 Hence, the two governments settled on basing CVW-5 at MCAS Iwakuni, with a permanent, more remote facility for the FCLP drills to be identified at a subsequent date. The arrangements for training at Iwo Jima would continue until the new airfield was established. Nevertheless, in order to minimize the impact of this transfer on Iwakuni City, Tokyo also proposed that several JMSDF squadrons be transferred from MCAS Iwakuni to Atsugi, and that the KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma in Okinawa be transferred to JMSDF Kanoya Air Base instead.32 These changes were formally announced in the aforementioned DPRI interim agreement, which was released by the US-Japan Security Consultative

29 “Despite safety fears, US Navy says jets will train on Iwo Jima until Japan finds better site.” 30 “Zainichi Beigun saihen: Atsugi kichi, Iwakuni ni isetsuan Yakan hacchaku kunren mo iten--shigaichi ni sōon ni hairyo.” , July 16, 2004; Toshiyuki Ito, “U.S. proposes relocating Atsugi base,” Daily Yomiuri, July 18, 2004. 31 “Iwakuni dissatisfied over gov’t silence on U.S. base relocation plan,” Kyodo News, March 8, 2005. Also discussed in interview with Iwakuni City Government officials, July 2015. 32 “U.S. FORCES’ REALIGNMENT--Entering a new phase / Sharing burden hailed by some,” Daily Yomiuri, November 12, 2005.

106 Committee (SCC) in October 2005.33

Initially, both Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City reacted negatively to these developments. Iwakuni mayor Katsusuke Ihara was particularly opposed, and attempted to dissuade the central government from moving forward with the transfers both prior to and following this interim agreement.34 Yamaguchi governor Sekinari Nii criticized Tokyo for failing to notify both the prefectural government and the Iwakuni City Government ahead of time, and argued that this new agreement was merely “shifting the problem” from Atsugi to Iwakuni.35 At a meeting of prefectural governors on November 5, he joined others in expressing discontent with the “lack of consultation” during the negotiation process.36

However, it is important to note that the opposition from Iwakuni City was not just in relation to the expected increase in noise pollution and thus the burden on Iwakuni’s citizens. On November 16, Mayor Ihara specifically rejected the transfer of the JMSDF squadrons—which included more than 1000 residents when dependents were included—from MCAS Iwakuni to Atsugi, “citing an expected decline in tax revenues.”37 While this was understood to be a trade-off for the transfer of CVW-5, Ihara pointed out that the loss of 1000 residents would translate into an additional financial challenge for the city, because US personnel are not included in the Japanese taxation system. Furthermore, the JMSDF families were fully participating members of the city’s communities while the US families were expected to live and work predominantly within the base. From the perspective of the city, the exchange thus had several negative economic and social consequences on top of noise pollution. It was not simply a matter of the overall number of aircraft and personnel stationed at MCAS Iwakuni.38

Ihara also reiterated his opposition to the transfer of the carrier-based aircraft, claiming that it amounted to “shifting the entire Atsugi base to Iwakuni, thus doubling the size of the Iwakuni base.”39 Furthermore, the city and other surrounding municipalities continued to oppose the

33 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” October 29, 2005, signed by Condoleeza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Nobutaka Machimura, Yoshinori Ohno, accessed November 5, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html. 34 “Iwakuni mayor meets U.S. base commander, opposes realignment plan,” Kyodo News, July 5, 2005; “Yamaguchi, Iwakuni kichi: gunmin kyōyōka Nichibei Gōdōi de gōi,” Mainichi Shimbun, October 28, 2005; “Iwakuni mayor rejects gov’t explanation of relocation plan,” Kyodo News, November 16, 2005. 35 “Iwakuni mayor rejects gov’t explanation of relocation plan.” 36 “Government must heed locals on bases,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, November 21, 2005. 37 “Iwakuni mayor rejects gov’t explanation of relocation plan.” 38 Ihara, Iwakuni ni Fuita Kaze, 47; Iwakuni City Government, “Zainichi Beigun Saihen Mondai,” accessed June 15, 2018, https://www.city.iwakuni.lg.jp/site/kansaikimonsai/. Also discussed in the author’s interview with Iwakuni City Government officials, July 2015. 39 “Iwakuni mayor rejects gov’t explanation of relocation plan.”

107 transfer because of the proposal that a new airfield be constructed within the region to serve as a permanent host for carrier landing drills. As previously mentioned, in response to opposition from city officials, Tokyo and Washington compromised and agreed to transfer CVW-5 without designating MCAS Iwakuni as the permanent site for the FCLP drills, stating instead that they would establish the designated facility at a later date. However, many officials and citizens feared that if an appropriate facility could not be found or constructed within reasonable distance, Iwakuni would eventually be designated as the runway for the drills.40 Although CVW-5 would only be stationed at the base when the fleet carrier was in port—approximately 80 days annually—the city was resolutely opposed to anything that would increase the burden on its residents.

However, Mayor Ihara’s actions drew mixed views amongst Iwakuni’s citizens. On the one hand, most of the city’s residents seemed opposed to the transfers. Prior to the release of the interim report in October 2005, citizen activists had collected 60,000 signatures for a petition against any moves to “strengthen” MCAS Iwakuni. Responding to these views, in February 2006, Ihara announced a referendum where locals could show their support for or against the transfer of CVW-5.41 But on the other hand, the political and business elites were broadly in support of the agreement. The Iwakuni business community set up a counter-protest group, arguing that the cost of the referendum was not justified, especially given the proposed date of March 12. Iwakuni City was slated to merge with seven other municipalities just one week later, on March 20; of these seven, six were reported to agree with the proposed transfers. The pro-agreement group argued that this arrangement effectively invalidated the results of the referendum a priori, and thus amounted to little more than a political exercise for the mayor. Following discussions with central government ministers and bureaucrats, several members of the Iwakuni City Assembly also changed their minds and voiced support for the agreement in exchange for programs for economic development.42

The results of the referendum were not conclusive. On paper, it looked like a resounding victory for the anti-agreement lobby, with 43,433 votes against to 5,369 votes in favor of accepting the transfer. However, a low turnout during the referendum of 58.68% meant that

40 Ihara, Iwakuni ni Fuita Kaze, 58-29. 41 Linda Sieg, “Japan local politics clouds U.S. Marine base plan,” Reuters News, March 5, 2006. 42 Tatsuya Fukumoto and Masayuki Fuchinokami, “Iwakuni vote ‘not unexpected’ / Central govt unfazed by massive ‘no’ vote on base reorganization,” Daily Yomiuri, March 14, 2008; “Zainichi Beigun saihen: Iwakuni mondai ‘jūmin tōhyō wa kuni he no sensenfukoku’ shigikai, shūhenchōson ‘Nō’,” Mainichi Shimbun, February 4, 2006; “Futenma hikōjō henkan no jōken wo Beigawa ga Nihon ni dashin ‘daitai shisetsu wa motomezu’,” Mainichi Shimbun, February 13, 2004.

108 “no” votes represented only 51.3% of the city’s 85,000 eligible voters.43 Following the subsequent merger, the city’s population increased 1.4 fold, from approximately 107,000 to over 150,000 residents.44 Hence, this result meant that fewer than half of the newly formed city’s eligible voters had cast a vote against the agreement. Furthermore, the referendum was non-binding: the Iwakuni City ordinance stated only that the city’s mayor, legislative assembly and citizens “should respect the result.”45 Ultimately, the result had a limited impact on the negotiations. In response to the referendum, the Koizumi government maintained that Japan’s security policies were the mandate of the state and confirmed that no changes would be made to the plans to transfer CVW-5 from Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni.46

Opposition to the agreement amongst other groups also had implications for Iwakuni. In Kanoya City, Mayor Sakae Yamashita expressed opposition to the proposed transfer of the KC-130 squadron to the city’s JMSDF facility, instead of MCAS Iwakuni as originally slated in the SACO agreement. The Marine Corps also opposed to the change. Not only was there insufficient infrastructure at Kanoya, the Corps preferred that its assets be located at their own facilities.47 In further SCC talks from April 13-14, 2006, Tokyo and Washington agreed that the KC-130 squadron would be transferred to MCAS Iwakuni as per the original plan from the time of the SACO agreement. There were some minor concessions. Eight CH-53D helicopters—recently accepted as transfers from MCAS Futenma in Okinawa—would be transferred to Guam instead. The Japanese government then sent officials to Iwakuni to explain their decisions, before the SCC announced the revised agreement, the Roadmap, on May 1, 2006. In it, Tokyo and Washington reaffirmed their commitment to:

• Relocate Carrier Air Wing 5 (CVW-5), which consists of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, to MCAS Iwakuni, setting a target date of 2014. This would require the construction of hanger and maintenance facilities as well as housing for personnel, and the adjustment of training airspace in order to accommodate the additional aircraft.

43 Linda Sieg, “UPDATE 7-Japanese city rejects plan for more U.S. Marines,” Reuters, March 12, 2006; Eric Talmadge, “Japanese city rejects relocation of U.S. Navy air wing,” Associated Press Newswires, March 12, 2006. 44 Iwakuni City Government, “Iwakuni no jinkō 18-nen,” 2007, Iwakuni City Government Website, accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.city.iwakuni.lg.jp/site/toukeidata/4587.html. 45 “Zainichi Beigun saihen: Iwakuni-shi no jūmin tōhyō Shi-chō, raishū sōsō ni hotsugi / Yamaguchi,” Mainichi Shimbun, February 4, 2006. 46 Tatsuya Fukumoto and Masayuki Fuchinokami, “Iwakuni vote ‘not unexpected’ / Central govt unfazed by massive ‘no’ vote on base reorganization,” Daily Yomiuri, March 14, 2006. 47 “3 local gov’ts reject U.S. forces realignment plans,” Kyodo News, October 31, 2005; “U.S. wants to change base plan / Seeks to move KC-130 planes to Iwakuni,” Daily Yomiuri, January 30, 2006.

109 • Develop facilities at the Naval Air Facility Atsugi Air for the JMSDF EP-3/OP-3/UP-3 and U-36A aircraft to be transferred from MCAS Iwakuni. • Permanently base the KC-130 squadron (VMGR-152) at MCAS Iwakuni. However, this unit would periodically be deployed to Guam and the JMSDF Kanoya Air Base, in Kagoshima Prefecture, for training and operations.

In effect, these changes meant that MCAS Iwakuni would increase in size by 46 aircraft and approximately 1320 military personnel and 800 dependants.

Table 4.1: Total Personnel and Unit Changes for MCAS Iwakuni (2006 Roadmap)48

Unit Description ∆ Facility of ∆ Personnel ∆ Dependants Destination Aircraft(Iwa Origin (Iwakuni) (Iwakuni) Facility kuni) US Navy Carrier Air Wing Atsugi +59 aircraft 1900 1700 Iwakuni (CVW-5) US Marine Corps KC-130 squadron Futenma +12 aircraft 300 ?? Iwakuni (VMGR-152) US Marine Corps -8 Anderson Iwakuni -180 ?? CH-53D squadron helicopters (Guam) JMSDF E/O/UP-3 Iwakuni -17 aircraft -700 -900 Atsugi squadrons (Totals) 46 1320 800

Hence, Tokyo’s discussions and negotiations with Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture during this phrase of the DPRI facilitated fine-tuning of the transfers and realignment concerning MCAS Iwakuni. Not only were the SACO objectives enveloped into the DPRI process, the Japanese and US governments were able to agree to new objectives designed to solve several long-standing alliance problems by shifting CVW-5 to MCAS Iwakuni. Many of the city’s leaders and citizens balked at what they perceived to be a heavy increase in their “burden.” They also protested the transfer of several JMSDF squadrons out of their community due of the expected loss of tax revenue. Because of strategic requirements identified by the two national governments, as well as conflicting requests from different

48 Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, “Iwakuni Kichi Saihen-an ni kansuru hosoku kentō kekka,” http://www.pref.yamaguchi.lg.jp/cmsdata/2/b/c/2bc31c92889e7111a84306762caec6ec.pdf.

110 communities within Japan, neither of these objectives were changed in the final agreement.49 Nevertheless, one major local preference was reflected in the 2006 Roadmap. Since the two governments were unable to obtain local agreement for FCLP drills to be permanently transferred to MCAS Iwakuni, Washington and Tokyo settled for the status quo of keeping training at Iwo Jima until another facility could be found or constructed.

4.5. Iwakuni and the 2006 Roadmap: Mayor Ihara’s resistance

Once again, the initial reactions to the Roadmap agreement in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture were largely negative. Iwakuni City officials were amongst the first to directly convey their opposition to the central government. The day following the announcement, Iwakuni mayor Ihara met with JDA Administrative Vice-Minister Takemasa Moriya in Tokyo to convey his dissatisfaction with the agreement. The mayor emphasized that the city had expressed their opinion on the transfer of CVW-5 through the March referendum as well as his subsequent reelection.50 From Ihara’s perspective, his reelection following the merger indicated the city’s overall support for his non-cooperative stance. Yamaguchi governor Nii was also critical of the central government, criticising Tokyo for prioritising US requests over those of its own citizens.51

However, efforts by the central government contributed to the easing of opposition from a number of domestic actors. Tokyo responded to local concerns by sending officials from the Hiroshima branch of the JDA to Iwakuni on May 12, followed by the head of the DFAA, Iwao Kitahara, on May 17, to further explain the government’s position on why the transfers were necessary. These officials attempted to reassure prefectural representatives that Tokyo was no longer looking to making MCAS Iwakuni the permanent host of the FCLP drills.52 Governor Nii continued to have reservations about the transfers, but recognised Tokyo’s efforts to ease local concerns and advised the mayor that he should also be willing to

49 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” May 1, 2006, signed by , Donald Rumsfeld, Taro Aso and Fukushiro Nukuga, accessed May 17, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html. 50 “Beigun saihen no genba kara Atamagoshi saishū hōkoku ‘nani wo itte mo kawaranu’,” Mainichi Shimbun, May 2, 2006. 51 “Okinawa governor flexible on U.S. bases accord,” Kyodo News, May 2, 2006. 52 “Beigun saihen Saishū hōkoku he no rikai, Iwakuni shichō ni motomeru / Kitahara shisetuchō kanchō,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 17, 2006; “Iwakuni mondai Shi to ken ni gōi naiyō setsumei--Hiroshima bōeishisetsu kyokuchō / Yamaguchi,” Mainichi Shimbun, May 13, 2006.

111 negotiate.53 After the Japanese Cabinet approved the Roadmap agreement on May 30, Nii reiterated this position, showing a willingness to cooperate with the government to implement the transfer.54 The local chamber of commerce also indicated its acquiescence to the agreement, with its leader calling on Tokyo to set up legislation that would guarantee subsidies for economic development in return.55

On the other hand, Mayor Ihara remained opposed. In response to the Cabinet decision to approve the Roadmap, Ihara asserted that he would negotiate with the aim of having the decision to transfer CVW-5 retracted.56 The Iwakuni City Assembly was hesitant about backing Ihara: at an assembly meeting on June 2, several members questioned the mayor over how he intended to achieve a reversal of the decision, and on what he would do if the central government halted subsidies that the city needed for the ongoing construction of a new city hall.57 In fact, the funds for that financial year had yet to be released because the assembly had disagreed over the city budget; this was finally passed on June 28.58 On July 24, the DFAA released the funds, assuaging fears that the subsidies would be cut because of Ihara’s stance, at least for the 2006-2007 financial year.59 By this time, however, just over half of the assembly’s 110 members had indicated that they saw the transfer as something that could not be avoided.60

The Yamaguchi Prefectural Government also put pressure on Ihara to change to a more flexible stance. On August 2, it started pressuring the mayor on another project related to the changes at MCAS Iwakuni. As noted earlier, the soil used for the land reclamation work for shifting the runway had been taken from the Atago Hills area of Iwakuni City. During the original negotiations and early planning phases in the 1990s, the Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City governments had expected this arrangement to benefit their communities in two different ways. First, in addition to the contracts for construction work at MCAS Iwakuni,

53 “Bōei shisetsuchō kanchō ga raiken Chiji “jimoto fuan barai shoku wo” / Yamaguchi,” Mainichi Shimbun, May 16, 2006. 54 “Kakugi kettei Iwakuni shichō to ken chiji, rosen no chigai senmei ni / Yamaguchi,” Mainichi Shimbun, May 31, 2006. 55 “Okinawa, others unhappy with Japan’s approval of US military realignment plan,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, May 30, 2006. 56 “Kakugi kettei Iwakuni shichō to ken chiji, rosen no chigai senmei ni / Yamaguchi.” 57 “Iwakuni kichi no kansaiki inyū Shichō ni kibishii shitsumon Kyūchōsonbu shigira tettai jitsugensaku semaru = Yamaguchi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 3, 2006. 58 “Shisetsuchō, Yamaguchi, Iwakuni-shi ni hojyokin kōfu he Shigikai ga shichōsha kensetuhi kaketsu,” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 28, 2006. 59 “Iwakuni-shi no shinchōsha kensetsu Shisetsuchō, hojyokin 11oku-en wo kufu = Yamaguchi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 28, 2006. 60 “Iwakuni-shi gikai giin anke, ‘iten fukahi’ hansū kosu Shichō to no ondosa senmei,” Mainichi Shimbun, July 4, 2006.

112 local companies would profit from selling the soil to the Japanese government for the reclamation work. Furthermore, the prefectural and city governments intended to develop the Atago Hills area into housing complexes, which could then be sold for profit. This was a joint project, with the Yamaguchi Prefectural Government footing two thirds of the investment and the Iwakuni City Government the remaining one third.61

However, a combination of factors turned the project into a financial liability for both subnational governments. The construction companies that were to provide the soil for the land reclamation work initially estimated that each cubic meter of soil would cost between 1300 and 1700 yen to process and signed their contracts with the Hiroshima branch of the DFAA accordingly. However, since the soil turned out to be much harder than expected, costs jumped unexpectedly in 2002, to approximately 3000 yen per cubic meter, which meant that the companies were making a loss instead. The prefecture and the city were expected to cover the difference. By the time they were able to renegotiate the contracts in 2006 (to 2750 yen per cubic meter), the expected profits had largely been erased. On top of this issue, the economic downturn in Japan in the 1990s saw demand for apartments in the Atago Hills complex drop. By the early 2000s, the Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City governments had become worried that they would not be able to recoup their investment.62

Given this situation, the prefectural government proposed that the land should instead be sold to the central government. Rumors then started to circulate amongst citizens that the area would then be developed into a housing complex for the US personnel coming from Atsugi. As shown in Table 4.1 the US military in Iwakuni needed to accommodate an additional 2,200 people, including dependents, so the use of the Atago Hills development for this purpose provided a solution for both problems. Ihara, however, argued that such a move was an evasion of responsibility for mismanaging the development, and refused to authorize the sale.63 Finally, on August 2, 2006, the Yamaguchi vice governor presented the mayor with three choices. (1) After compensating the developer, the prefecture would sell its two-thirds share to the central government, leaving the city to decide what to do with the remaining one- third; (2) the developer would sell the entire area to the central government; or (3) Iwakuni

61 “Yamaguchi kenbunroku: Iwakuni-shi no Atagoyama kaihatsujigyō Bappon kaiketsu no tenbōmiezu / Yamaguchi,” Mainichi Shimbun, April 16, 2006; Ihara, Iwakuni ni Fuita Kaze, 183-84. 62 “Yamaguchi kenbunroku: Iwakuni-shi no Atagoyama kaihatsujigyō Bappon kaiketsu no tenbōmiezu / Yamaguchi.” 63 “Zainichi beigun saihen Iwakuni mondai Jūmin tōhyō ni shitsugi shūchū Shichō, sanka yobikae--setsumeikai / Yamaguchi,” Mainichi Shimbun, February 6, 2006.

113 City would purchase the entire area and take responsibility for it.64 Given the reduced demand for the planned housing complex, the second option seemed to be the most practical choice. However, Ihara perceived the proposal as a plan to force the city to accept the CVW-5 transfer from Atsugi. In 2009, the former mayor alleged that the proposal had actually come from Tokyo but had been framed as a solution to the problems that the two local governments had encountered in order to increase local acquiescence to the Roadmap agreement.65

Hence, Ihara continued to push Tokyo and even the US government for discussions in an attempt to find a solution that would not involve acceptance of the CVW-5 transfer. At a press conference in October, the mayor argued that the construction of the city hall—which the central government had promised Iwakuni during the negotiations surrounding the SACO agreement—and the joint civilian-military use of the MCAS Iwakuni runway should not be made dependant on this new agreement.66 Ihara visited the US Embassy in Tokyo and addressed a petition letter to US Ambassador to Japan Tom Schieffer and the commander of US Naval Forces Japan, Rear Admiral James D. Kelly, arguing against the transfer.67 However, since this was regarded as a domestic Japanese issue, the United States left all subnational negotiations to the Japanese government.

In response to Ihara’s move, the central government started using economic incentives and punishment to put pressure on the mayor. First, when tabling the budget for the upcoming financial year in February 2007, Tokyo removed Iwakuni from consideration for the subsidies promised to communities that accepted the changes that the Roadmap agreement brought to their hosted facilities.68 The Ministry of Defense (MOD; the JDA was formally upgraded to a Cabinet-level Ministry on January 9, 2007) also froze funding for the new Iwakuni city hall.69 The city administration had long desired the upgraded building, and as part of its acquiescence to the transfer of the KC-130 to Iwakuni by means of the 1996 SACO agreement, had negotiated with the central government for JDA funds to help with construction. Officials argued that the mayor’s refusal to accept the transfers from the 2006

64 “Iwakuni to get public housing offer,” Daily Yomiuri, January 5, 2007. 65 Ihara, Iwakuni ni Fuita Kaze, 188. 66 Iwakuni City Government, “Kishakaiken Shiryō” October 13, 2006, accessed December 28, 2016, https://www.city.iwakuni.lg.jp/uploaded/life/14067_30905_misc.pdf. 67 Iwakuni City Government, “Zainichi Beigun Saihen Mondai ni tsuite,” December 1, 2006, accessed December 28, 2016, https://www.city.iwakuni.lg.jp/uploaded/life/14067_30909_misc.pdf. 68 The Japanese financial year spans from April to the following March. “LEAD: Gov’t to shun Nago, Iwakuni in subsidies for realigning U.S. forces,” Kyodo News, February 9, 2007. 69 “Kurōzuappu 2008 - Beigun saihenhō, kyō seiritsu jichitai kujyū, kōfukin,” Mainichi Shimbun, May 23, 2007.

114 Roadmap effectively meant that the city was not fulfilling its side of the bargain; thus, the government was not obliged to provide the funds that it had promised.70

Another complicating factor for Ihara was that the Iwakuni City Assembly no longer supported his confrontational stance. Although the assembly had previously been relatively balanced between politicians for and against accepting the transfer, elections in October 2006 gave the conservatives supporting the transfers a majority.71 Following this development, the Japanese government regularly sent DFAA and MOD officials—from Tokyo as well as from the Hiroshima branch office of the MOD—to hold discussions with groups of residents and their local representatives.72 On March 23, 2007, the assembly passed a resolution indicating their conditional support for the transfers as outlined in the Roadmap.73 The resolution noted that the discussion sessions had increased understanding of the proposed transfers amongst the residents, but emphasized that Tokyo should clearly demonstrate that the carrier landing drills would continue to be held at Iwo Jima, and that MCAS Iwakuni would never be considered as an option for permanently hosting such training. Despite the erosion of his support, however, Ihara continued to hold his line against accepting the transfers under any conditions.

In response, the Japanese government hardened its stance even further. In May 2007, it reaffirmed its intention to exclude Iwakuni City and some 21 other local municipalities from the subsidies that were being legislated in relation to the realignment.74 Then, in a secret meeting with Ihara on July 4, 2007, Tokyo formally made acceptance of the realignment objectives a condition for opening MCAS Iwakuni to civilian flights.75 In effect, further resistance from Ihara would result in Tokyo cutting funds for construction of the civilian terminal, which the city and prefecture were planning to begin the following April. Ihara continued his resistance, consulting Yamaguchi governor Nii in a meeting on August 1 about ways to move forward on negotiating for the civilian-military airport. However, Nii informed Ihara that the latter was responsible for the truncated negotiations, due to his refusal to accept

70 Yoshifumi Sugita and Miki Masuda, “Will subsidies solve base issue? / Cash offers force Iwakuni residents to reassess stance on U.S. force realignment,” Daily Yomiuri, May 25, 2007. 71 Tsuneyo Muraoka, “Iwakuni a victim of politicking / Row over planned relocation of U.S. fighters paralyzes city government,” Daily Yomiuri, December 29, 2007. 72 Descriptions of and materials from these meetings can be found on the Iwakuni City website (Iwakuni City Government, “Zainichi Beigun Saihen Mondai,” accessed June 15, 2018, https://www.city.iwakuni.lg.jp/site/kansaikimonsai/). 73 “Iwakuni assembly OKs relocation of U.S. carrier-based aircraft,” Kyodo News, March 23, 2007. 74 “EDITORIAL / Realignment of U.S. forces should be sped up,” Daily Yomiuri, May 24, 2007. 75 Ihara, Iwakuni ni Fuita Kaze, 143-4, 77.

115 the CVW-5 transfer.76 Groups representing local business interests also formally petitioned Ihara to accede to Tokyo, so as to ensure that the reopening of the civilian airport would proceed.77

Despite this growing opposition to his stance, Ihara made two more separate attempts to achieve a breakthrough on his own terms. In November 2007, he made an overture to the central government, suggesting that he would approve the transfers “if he was assured of a convincing solution in connection with the review of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) so that Japan’s rights to investigate crimes committed by US troops stationed in Japan can be fully secured.”78 However, as the United States had never been keen on opening negotiations on the language of the SOFA, Ihara’s proposal was not positively received by the Japanese government. By this point, Tokyo was also likely to have been confident that Ihara would eventually be forced to concede, given the pressure being applied by the Yamaguchi Prefectural Government as well as various interest groups in Iwakuni City itself.

During the course of these negotiations, Ihara also attempted to solve Iwakuni’s financial problems internally. Since the most pressing issue was to finance the continued construction of the city hall, the mayor proposed a supplementary budget plan that involved issuing bonds to raise the required funds. However, the Iwakuni City Assembly refused to pass this budget, even after it was revised several times.79 The conservative members of the assembly, who were connected to and supported by Iwakuni’s business community, argued that Ihara’s proposal was irresponsible. Iwakuni City already had significant debt, partly because of the failed Atago Hills development plan, and they did not wish to increase the city’s financial liability by issuing even more bonds.80 Although several civilian groups and individuals conducted fundraising activities in support of Ihara, the amount they raised—over 6 million yen—fell far short of the 3.5 billion yen of funding that Tokyo had withdrawn.81 Without the support of the governor or the city assembly, Ihara was left without any political power to

76 Ibid., 174; “Minkū saikai, tonza no kanōsei Chiji kaidan de Ihara Iwakuni shichō ha jyūrai no kagae shūchō = Yamaguchi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 2, 2006. 77 “Beikūbo kansaiki ijchūmondai Minkū saikai jitsugen he yōnin motomeru Iwakuni-shichō ni yōbōsho = Yamaguchi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 28, 2006. 78 Muraoka, “Iwakuni a victim of politicking / Row over planned relocation of U.S. fighters paralyzes city government.” 79 “Iwakuni Mayor to Resign over U.S. Military Realignment,” Jiji Press English News Service, December 26, 2007. 80 Ihara, Iwakuni ni Fuita Kaze, 183-96. 81 “Iwakuni no Shimin dantai ga Shi ni 11-man 4008en Kifu Shinchōsha kensetsu bokin = Yamaguchi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 3, 2007.

116 solve the base and city hall issues in accordance with the stance that he had held since his reelection. The matter was even more pressing than it might otherwise have been because construction on the city hall had already begun, and any significant delays would damage the work that had already been completed.

4.6 The final referendum: the 2008 Iwakuni City Mayoral Election

This brought Ihara and Iwakuni City to another turning point. Unable to fund construction of the city hall or otherwise create a stronger position from which to negotiate with the central government over the basing issue, the mayor decided to ask his constituency once again to vote on the issue. Ihara resigned as mayor on December 26, 2007, calling an election for the following February and announcing that his platform for reelection would be based on opposing the transfer of CVW-5 to Iwakuni.82 Ihara later related that he would have preferred it had the city assembly called for his resignation. Such a move would have allowed him to dissolve the assembly in the hope of the subsequent election producing a city legislature that would back his budget proposal. The former mayor suggested that the conservatives in the assembly refrained from challenging him directly in order to force him to face election instead.83

The strategy of the pro-agreement local legislators and business leaders was to shift attention away from the transfers and the central government’s influence on local politics. They chose as their candidate Yoshihiko Fukuda, a relatively young politician who had served just two years as a member of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Assembly before being elected to the Japanese Diet in 2005, on the back of strong support from the prefectural division of the LDP. But for the Iwakuni City mayoral election, Fukuda ran as an independent in order to reduce any perception of heavy-handedness from Tokyo regarding the transfers. The central government also refrained from sending any high level leaders to the city, despite the LDP and its coalition partner, Kōmeitō, giving Fukuda their endorsement.84 Furthermore, although Fukuda represented himself as being against the current implementation plan, he framed it as

82 Kenji Yoshimura and Tsuneyo Muraoka, “Iwakuni voters face base relocation issue for 3rd time,” Daily Yomiuri, February 6, 2008. 83 Ihara, Iwakuni ni Fuita Kaze, 204-06; Yoshimura and Muraoka, “Iwakuni voters face base relocation issue for 3rd time”; “Yamaguchi Iwakuni Shichōsen Beiki ichū ni 3dome shinhan Fukuda, Ihara-shi gekitotsu,” Yomiuri Shimbun, February 5, 2008. 84 “LDP lawmaker Fukuda says to run for Iwakuni mayor over U.S. base row,” Kyodo News, January 5, 2008.

117 a question of the burden placed on residents and promised to negotiate for practical measures such as subsidies for sound-proofing and flight paths that would reduce noise pollution over the city. He also prioritised solving the city’s financial problems, criticizing Ihara’s administration for bringing the city to a 100 billion yen-debt, which was generating interest of 7 million yen per day.85

On the other hand, the anti-agreement faction led by the incumbent mayor attempted to make the Roadmap and the central government’s efforts to pressure the city the focus of the election. Although the major opposition parties—the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party—backed him, Ihara, like Fukuda, officially ran as an independent.86 However, he presented the vote as the city’s third and final referendum on “whether the base will get bigger,” and criticised the Japanese government for using “carrots and sticks” to pressure the city into accepting the transfer. Although Ihara stated that he would not push for the removal of the existing facility, he argued that “the state should not foist the bases on the people. It should negotiate with the US based on the views of the host community.”87

In the end, the pro-agreement faction came out on top. Fukuda narrowly defeated Ihara— 47,081 to 45,229 votes, with voter turnout relatively high at 76%.88 The new mayor promptly declared that he would “hold talks with the central and prefectural governments to obtain subsidies and other aid,” agreeing to the transfer plan as long as authorities took steps to lessen noise pollution and other potential burdens on the city’s residents.89 Within a few days, Tokyo began procedures for Iwakuni City to be allocated its share in the recently legislated subsidies in return for its acceptance of the transfer of CVW-5.90 Following visits to Tokyo and the Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Fukuda declared his support for the transfers in front of the city assembly, and set up a working group to investigate the effects of the realignment and identify measures that could be taken to reduce any burdens on residents.91

85 “Yamaguchi Iwakuni Shichōsen Beiki ichū ni 3dome shinhan Fukuda, Ihara-shi gekitotsu”; “Tokuhou Beigun kansaiki ichū tou Iwakuni shichōsen ‘3-dome no min’i’ dochira he Ihara-shi Kuni no ‘ame to muchi’ hihan Fukuda-shi Zaiseimen no kiki wo kyōchō,” , January 24, 2008. 86 “Mayoral candidate in favor of U.S. base move edges ahead in poll,” Kyodo News, February 5, 2008. 87 “Yamaguchi Iwakuni Shichōsen Beiki ichū ni 3dome shinhan Fukuda, Ihara-shi gekitotsu”; “Iwakuni voters face base relocation issue for 3rd time.” 88 “New mayor of Japan base town vows to ensure safety,” Agence France Presse, February 11, 2008; Eric Johnston, “Election of new Iwakuni mayor may speed U.S. realignment,” The Japan Times, February 13, 2008. 89 Kenji Yoshimura and Tsuneyo Muraoka, “Govt to speed jet move plan following vote,” Daily Yomiuri, February 13, 2008. 90 “Gov’t to lift subsidy freeze on Iwakuni now new mayor elected,” Kyodo News, February 14, 2008. 91 “Realignment of U.S. forces seen proceeding rapidly,” Daily Yomiuri, March 1, 2008.

118 On March 12, 2008, the new mayor formally informed Defense Minister that Iwakuni would accept the transfer of CVW-5.92

With this outcome, the tensions between Tokyo and Iwakuni City appeared to be over. The transfers stipulated in the Roadmap agreement necessitated large changes to MCAS Iwakuni—for example, the allies needed to construct support numerous facilities, not only those needed to store and maintain the incoming military assets but also housing and schools for the transferring personnel and their dependents. This was a large challenge for those involved in planning, coordinating and balancing the necessary construction against the missions, operations and training that the US and JSDF forces based at MCAS Iwakuni needed to carry out.93 The city and its mayor also continued to petition the Japanese government to allow the JMSDF squadrons to remain in Iwakuni, and to promise never to make the base the permanent facility for the FCLP drills.94 However, these demands did not appear to have much of an impact on implementation until the alliance came face-to-face with three other challenges, albeit relatively minor ones, to the Roadmap agreement.

4.7 Implementing a compromise

The first of these challenges came with advent of the DPJ’s coalition government. Led by Yukio Hatoyama, the party scored a landslide victory in the August 2009 general election, defeating an incumbent LDP government that had been plagued by scandal. The party appealed to the general public by pledging, in particular, to pursue “politics that sheds its dependence on the bureaucracy.”95 However, from 2008, Hatoyama had also signalled an intention to “review” the Roadmap agreement as it pertained to Okinawa and MCAS Futenma, stating that the DPJ would investigate the possibility of moving the facility “at least outside of Okinawa Prefecture.”96 When the Diet ratified the Guam Agreement in May 2009,

92 “Iwakuni Mayor Officially Accepts U.S. Aircraft Relocation,” Jiji Press English News Service, March 12, 2008. 93 Matthew M. Burke, “Marine base construction brings headaches to Iwakuni residents,” Stars and Stripes, August 8, 2012. 94 “Zainichi beigun saihen Kansaiki iten Iwakuni-shichō, kuni ni yōbōsho zōon, chiantaisaku nado motome / Yamaguchi,” Mainichi Shimbun, November 1, 2008; “Zainichi beigun saihen Kansaiki iten mondai FCLP shitei ni hantai Iwakuni-shigikai ga ikensho kaketu / Yamaguchi,” Mainichi Shimbun, June 27, 2008. 95 Yukio Hatoyama, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama “ ( and His Cabinet, 2009). See also Masami Ito, “DPJ’s promise to change the system failed,” The Japan Times, December 1, 2012. 96 “Senkyo - Okinawa-kengisen yotō kahansū ware Minshu, ‘Kichi iten’ taiō ga shikinseki ni,” Mainichi Shimbun, June 10, 2008. See chapter 7 for more detail on how Hatoyama’s promise affected Okinawa.

119 the DPJ, as the largest opposition party, also cited concerns “over a lack of transparency in the cost breakdown” for transferring 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam, and that this transfer was contingent on construction of MCAS Futenma’s replacement facility.97

This signalling was a cause for concern in Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, especially after the DPJ came to power. In December 2009, when the Yamaguchi Prefectural Government submitted its budgetary requests for the following fiscal year to Tokyo, it also asked for a formal promise that the FCLP drills would not be based at MCAS Iwakuni. More significantly, it withdrew the request that the Japanese government purchase the land in the Atago Hills area, even though, as discussed in section 4.5, the pro-agreement factions had used this proposed sale as leverage against former mayor Ihara. Governor Nii was concerned that the request would draw attention to MCAS Iwakuni as being a potential relocation site for the Marine Corps personnel being transferred from Okinawa.98 In response, Defense Minister reassured Iwakuni Mayor Fukuda and the city’s residents in February 2010 that no changes would be made to plans for Iwakuni, and that FCLP drills would not be permanently held there.99

Hatoyama was forced to backtrack on his promise and return to the Roadmap agreement in May 2010; however, his actions had by then aroused mistrust even in Iwakuni and Yamaguchi. The relocation of the MCAS Iwakuni runway was not, in itself, affected by Hatoyama’s efforts—it was completed and opened to flight operations following a commissioning ceremony on May 29. Iwakuni mayor Fukuda expressed appreciation at the completion of this phase of the project on behalf of his constituents, noting that the relocation of the runway had been the best way to address noise pollution and safety concerns while maintaining the facility’s operational capabilities.100 However, Yamaguchi governor Nii decided not to attend the ceremony, saying while he was grateful that the relocation of the runway would address the two afore-mentioned issues, Iwakuni had still been forced to accept

97 Sarah McDowall, “U.S. Welcomes Japan’s Ratification of Marine Transfer to Guam,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, May 15, 2009. 98 “Yamaguchi Pref. suspends request to central gov’t over U.S. base,” Kyodo News, December 19, 2009; “Atagoyama jigyō sekichi kaitori Ken, kuni he no yōbō miokuri = Yamaguchi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 19, 2002. 99 Maya Kaneko, “Kitazawa tells Iwakuni mayor no plan to change realignment,” Kyodo News, February 21, 2010. 100 “New runway open for use,” Department of Defense Documents, June 3, 2010; Lance Cpl Claudio A. Martinez, “American, Japanese officials commission new runway, open for use,” The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps, Japan, June 4, 2010.

120 the CVW-5 transfer.101 Furthermore, at this point, the city and prefecture remained unsuccessful in their request that the JMSDF remain in Iwakuni. In November 2010, Iwakuni mayor Fukuda once again presented a formal request to Tokyo for the transfer of the JMSDF squadrons to Atsugi to be halted.102

Two years later, developments in Guam caused these concerns to flare once again. Over the course of the US-Japan SCC meetings in February 2012, the Japanese news media reported that the US side had tabled a new proposal to move 1,500 Marines from Okinawa to MCAS Iwakuni.103 Feasibility studies in Guam had revealed that the island would not be able to support an increase of 8,000 Marines, which Washington and Tokyo had agreed to move from Okinawa as part of the Roadmap agreement. The studies found that Guam would only be able to accommodate 4,700 of those personnel and their dependants, so the two allies were exploring other possible arrangements for hosting or rotating the remaining 3,300 Marines in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese side denied this these reports, clarifying that the proposal was for MCAS Iwakuni to be one of the facilities through which the 1,500 Marines would be rotated.104 However, Yamaguchi governor Nii reacted by refusing to authorize the sale of the Atago Hills land until Tokyo promised that the Marines would not be transferred to MCAS Iwakuni.105 Only when the proposal was withdrawn the following month did Nii agree to authorize the sale.106

Finally, one other series of developments in the implementation process for realignment involving MCAS Iwakuni should be mentioned. In October 2013, the US-Japan SCC met again for another series of 2+2 meetings, following which they announced that “the location of a KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni would be accelerated and concluded as soon as possible,” and also that “the Maritime Self-Defense Force would

101 “Iwakuni kichi okiai kassōro no unyō kaishi ‘higan’ jitsugen, kage otosu kansaiki ichū.,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 30 2010; “U.S. military begins operation of new offshore runway at Iwakuni base,” Kyodo News, December 19, 2009. 102 “Beigun jyūtaku haichian asu, Iwakuni-shichō Bōeishō ni yōbō he = Yamaguchi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 23, 2010. 103 “Okinawa Kaiheitai Iwakuni ichūan Bei, 1500nin kibo Nihon ha kyohi hōshin,” Yomiuri Shimbun, February 7, 2012. 104 Ibid. 105 “Zainichi Beigun saihen - Yamaguchi chiji ‘Beigun jūtaku yōchi, uranu’ Kaiheitai ‘Iwakuni iten-nashi’ kakuyaku made,” Mainichi Shimbun, October 4, 2012. 106 “Yamaguchi Pref. Indicates Support for Land Sale to Defense Ministry,” Jiji Press English News Service, March 15, 2012.

121 continue to have a presence at MCAS Iwakuni.”107 Although the statement did not specify whether this meant that the squadrons scheduled to be transferred to Atsugi would remain— the 17 planes and 700 personnel comprised just under half of the JMSDF capabilities stationed at MCAS Iwakuni—the Japanese news media reported it to be the outcome that that city government had been seeking. Following a meeting with Takafumi Fujii, the head of the Chugoku-Shikoku Defense Bureau, Iwakuni mayor Fukuda told the press that he was incredibly pleased, because the city had for many years presented “a firm request for the JMSDF (squadrons) to remain (in Iwakuni).”108 Indeed, when interviewed less than two years later, Iwakuni City officials regarded this development as one of two important concessions that the city obtained from Tokyo.109

However, another item discussed during these SCC talks soon elicited a negative reaction from Iwakuni City. In the joint statement, the Ministers indicated that “the bilateral consultations on the relocation of the KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni would be accelerated and concluded as soon as possible.”110 Shortly after, on October 30, Vice Foreign Minister and Vice Minister of Defense Minoru Kihara visted Iwakuni to inform the city government that 15 aircraft would be relocated to Iwakuni between June and September 2014. Fukuda responded that he could not accept the relocation without first being assured that MCAS Futenma would also be successfully relocated within Okinawa. The stance of both the Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefectural governments had until then been that they would not acquiesce until it was clear that MCAS Futenma would be successfully relocated in Okinawa. The mayor also expressed discontent that the transfer included an additional three aircraft beyond the twelve that had been specified in the original 1996 SACO agreement. These additional aircraft had been deployed to Futenma in the intervening period, but Fukuda was not satisfied because the Japanese government had not explained these developments to the city beforehand.111

107 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Statement,” October 3, 2013, signed by , , John Kerry and Chuck Hagel, accessed October 10, 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215070.htm. 108 “Nichibei 2 purasu 2 - Kaijizanryū, Iwakuni-shi ga kangei Suterusu ki kokunai haibi, fuan no koe / Yamaguchi,” Mainichi Shimbun, October 4, 2013. 109 Interview with Iwakuni City Government officials, Policy Department, conducted in Iwakuni City, July 2015. 110 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Statement.” 111 “Beigun kyūyuki ichū ‘Okinawa shisatsu-go ni han dan’ Iwakuni-shichō, gikai ikō mo fumae = Yamaguchi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 31, 2013; “U.S. Refueling Planes to Move from Futenma to Iwakuni Next Year,” Jiji Press English News Service, October 31, 2013.

122 After visiting Okinawa, however, Fukuda showed a more flexible stance. On December 9, Fukuda informed the Iwakuni City Assembly that he had decided to accept the transfer even though there had been little progress on the relocation of MCAS Futenma. Instead, he focused on the importance of “reducing the burden” on Okinawa.112 A week later, the Yamaguchi Prefectural Government echoed the mayor’s stance, with Vice Governor Hidenori Fujibe stating that Yamaguchi would cooperate with Tokyo in order to lessen the burden on Okinawa.113 Fujibe also emphasized how important it was for the relocation in Okinawa to proceed: “If the relocation of the Futenma air base isn’t realized and the base continues to be used, it won’t make sense to relocate the KC-130s in the first place and it won’t lead to a reduction of the burden in Okinawa.”114 When the transfer of the squadron was completed in August 2014, Fukuda and Yamaguchi governor Tsugumasa Muraoka again asked for subsidies for the city, and also that the government ensure the successful relocation of MCAS Futenma in Okinawa.115

4.8 In summary

As this chapter shows, the post-Cold War realignment involving MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture were not straightforward or easy to negotiate and carry out. Instead, it involved extensive interactions between Tokyo and the political leaders of the prefecture and Iwakuni City that led to the increasing incorporation of local preferences. Following the trigger event—the F-4 Phantom incident at Kyushu University in 1968— actors petitioned the Japanese government for more than a decade before Tokyo and Washington finally agreed to conduct feasibility studies for shifting the facility’s runway seaward. Driven by Iwakuni City’s political leaders, the first agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 1992, reflected local preferences to a high degree and encountered little to no opposition. The second agreement, the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) effort aimed at “reducing the burden” on Okinawa, generated slightly more resistance because it involved the transfer of the KC-130 refuelling unit from MCAS Futenma. This transfer clashed with the Yamaguchi and Iwakuni preference that there be no increase in the burden on MCAS

112 “Beigun kyūyuki Iwakuni-shichō ukeire hyōmei,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 9, 2013. 113 “Bei kyūyuki ichū yōnin ‘Futenma henkan doryoku wo’ Fukuchiji, kanbōchōkan ni tsutaeru = Yamaguchi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 17, 2013. 114 “Yamaguchi officially accepts U.S. aircraft transfer from Okinawa,” Kyodo News, December 16, 2013. 115 “Kyūyuki ichū Bōeishō ga shai Bōeishō raiken Iwakuni-shichōra ni = Yamaguchi,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 30, 2014.

123 Iwakuni’s host community. But it was the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation that generated the highest level of tension in the host community, as the national and subnational governments negotiated the conditions under which the Iwakuni City would accept the additional transfer of Carrier Air Wing 5 (CVW-5) from Naval Air Station Atsugi. Local concerns about the increased burden imposed by the agreement sparked a confrontation between Mayor Katsusuke Ihara and Tokyo. However, with the support of pro-agreement subnational actors in Iwakuni, the US and Japanese governments were able to proceed with implementing the Roadmap agreement as it pertained to MCAS Iwakuni. Subsequently, tensions rose again when the administration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama attempted to review and change the agreement objectives relating to Okinawa. Nevertheless, the situation was resolved through continued interactions between Tokyo, Yamaguchi and Iwakuni, which also led to the incorporation of more local preferences.116

116 Following the end of the period examined in this dissertation, the transfer of CVW-5 from Atsugi to Iwakuni was completed successfully in March 2018. “U.S. Iwakuni air station expands with fighter jets from Atsugi,” The Asahi Shimbun, April 1, 2018.

124 ~Chapter 5~ Negotiating the SACO Agreement

Compared to Iwakuni City and the base that it hosts, the prefecture of Okinawa and the facility that sits at the center of its anti-base movement are more widely known both in Japan and overseas. Along with the Philippines and South Korea, Okinawa has one of the most widely reported and studied activist movements, in contrast with Iwakuni, which has attracted very little attention. As was shown in Chapter 3, a number of historical reasons appear to have contributed to an underlying difference in how the governments and citizens of both localities have interacted with the US military, as well as with the central Japanese government over base-related issues. Other scholars have attributed the relatively higher levels of base-related tensions in Okinawa to these historical reasons. However, close examination of the implementation of the post-Cold War realignment efforts in Okinawa Prefecture show that, just as it was in Iwakuni and Yamaguchi, each agreement-implementation sequence for Okinawa involved efforts by Tokyo and key subnational actors to incorporate local preferences into the agreements. The next four chapters of this dissertation examine how these efforts played out in relation to Okinawa, covering the processes and agreements associated with the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). In doing so, it links the levels of preference incorporation in the agreement-implementation processes to the levels of tension observed in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture over the timeframe of 1990 through to 2015.

The SACO process represents the first major effort of the US and Japanese governments to realign and consolidate the US military presence in Japan in the post-Cold War period. The resulting agreement, known as “The SACO Final Report,” was limited in the sense that it involved changes to a smaller number of facilities than the subsequent 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. Nevertheless, this was the initiative that earmarked the “return” of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma), the key objective that continues to be the focus for the DPRI as it pertains to the facilities in Okinawa. As in the case of MCAS Iwakuni, Tokyo attempted to work together with key subnational actors in Okinawa in order to incorporate local preferences into the agreement or otherwise address them. These efforts

125 were manifested both in the negotiation processes leading to realignment agreements as well as in the domestic policies and initiatives enacted during subsequent efforts at implementation. However, the strong influence of other actors, such as the US military and commercial business interests on the Japanese main islands, meant that local preferences were not successfully incorporated over the course of the SACO process. As a result, although the tensions that erupted in 1995 fell from 1998 through to 2002, as the negotiations involving Tokyo and Okinawan subnational actors led to the Basic Plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility in 2002, they only increased again subsequently as the SACO process entered into implementation.

This empirical chapter will cover the initial part of the SACO process, touching on two base- management initiatives and their associated agreement-implementation sequences. The first is the Act on Special Measures for US Forces Japan Land Release (hereafter, the Special Land Lease Law), an older piece of legislation that makes provisions for the lease of land being used by the US military forces in accordance with the US-Japan security treaty. Although the original post-Cold War realignment in Okinawa is often presented as having been triggered by the 1995 rape incident, the alliance crisis that led to SACO is actually associated with this law, the background of which was outlined in Chapter 3. The groundswell of protest following the rape incident encouraged Okinawa governor Masahide Ōta to take the opportunity to directly challenge the Japanese and US governments on the base presence by refusing to renew the leases. Alliance managers responded along two separate pathways: by pursuing implementation of the Special Land Lease Law through the judicial system, and also by setting up the second base-management initiative examined in this chapter—the SACO process. The core aim of this initiative was “to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the US-Japan alliance,” and the centerpiece of the resulting agreement was the return of MCAS Futenma following the relocation of its functions to more remote parts of the prefecture.1 The entire process began, however, with the tensions arising from the 1995 rape incident.

1 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report,” April 15, 1996, signed by Yukihiko Ikeda, Hideo Usui, William Perry, and Walter Mondale, accessed May 6, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/seco.html

126 5.1 The 1995 rape incident: an inadequate response?

On September 4, 1995, three US servicemen—two Marines and a sailor—serving at Camp Hansen in the north of Okinawa Prefecture, abducted and raped a 12-year-old schoolgirl. Outrage erupted over the heinous nature of the crime. The victim had also been beaten in an effort to subdue her and suffered “injuries that required two weeks of medical treatment.”2 The emerging details about the men’s decision to commit the crime further added to the outrage—they had initially discussed going to a brothel, but decided instead to rent a car and abduct someone because one of them did not have enough money. A fourth person in the discussion had backed out once he realised that the others were serious.3 Such details led to immense criticism based on the perceived attitudes of the US military towards women and women’s rights. A delegation of 71 Okinawa women was at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing when they heard about the rape. Upon returning home, Suzuyo Takazato, who was also a member of the Naha City Assembly, held a press conference calling for “the question of the bases” to be addressed from considerations of “the human rights of women.”4 In a resolution passed within the same month, the Okinawa City Assembly framed the rape incident as “a crime of extreme barbarism that fully expresses the occupation mentality”—the description indicating a belief that many US personnel behaved as if they were an occupying force instead of guests who were obliged to obey the laws of their host.5

The way that the investigation proceeded also fed into the public ire. The suspects were interrogated and arrested within a few days; however, they were kept in US custody, with Okinawan police given access to them as required for the investigation.6 This was entirely in accordance with the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which provides for the rights and privileges of US military personnel in Japan and outlines how Japanese domestic laws apply to the individuals covered. The relevant part of the SOFA in this case deals with the circumstances under which the host country is able to “exercise criminal jurisdiction over US personnel.”7 Where incidents occurred in the course of duty—which accidents often fall

2 Andrew Pollack, “One Pleads Guilty to Okinawa Rape; 2 Others Admit Role,” The New York Times, November 8, 1995. 3 Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 298. 4 As quoted in Yuko Kawato, Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 68. 5 As quoted in Mary Jordan, “Rape of 12-Year-Old Fans Okinawans’ Anger at U.S. Military Presence,” The Washington Post, September 20, 1995. 6 “GI rape case triggers fresh calls for review of US forces status,” Agence France Presse, September 20, 1995. 7 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?, by R. Chuck Mason. RL34531, 2012, 1.

127 under—suspects are to be investigated and prosecuted by the United States. If the individual covered by the agreement was off-duty, then primary jurisdiction lies with Japan. The US- Japan SOFA also specifies that under the latter circumstances, an accused individual covered under the agreement “shall, if he is in the hands of the United States, remain with the United States until he is charged by Japan.”8 This stipulation was intended to protect service members from interrogative and judicial procedures that do not satisfy the constitutional rights that they would be entitled to on US soil.9

However, past controversies associated with this arrangement contributed to the tensions surrounding the rape incident. The media, for example, referred to an incident two years prior, where a soldier under investigation for kidnapping and sexual assault returned to the United States; by the time he was brought back, the accuser had dropped the charges.10 Okinawan actors—including Governor Ōta—pressed the Japanese government to convince the United States to comply with a request from the local police that the suspects be turned over to their custody for investigation. In response, Foreign Minister Yōhei Kōno pointed out that the traditional arrangement was not impeding the investigation, as the suspects were being made available for questioning by local police. To Okinawans, Tokyo’s close adherence to the SOFA reinforced perceptions that the agreement placed US service members above local law.11 Although the three suspects were handed over promptly once Okinawan prosecutors indicted them on September 29, calls for revision of the SOFA continued.12

These tensions were compounded by the way the senior US authorities responded to the rape incident and the resulting protests. On the one hand, the civilian leadership recognized the grievousness of the crime and understood the importance of addressing it quickly and in an appropriate manner. Upon hearing of the rape, the first instinct of many senior US officials was to apologise to the Okinawan and Japanese people. The news reached the US Embassy in

8 Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, 1960. 9 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?, 2. 10 Andrew Pollack, “Rape Case in Japan Turns Harsh Light on U.S. Military,” The New York Times, September 20, 1995; “Girl’s rape fuels anti-U.S. sentiment in Okinawa,” Japan Economic Newswire, September 16, 1995; “Okinawa demands capture of U.S. soldier in rape case,” Agence France Presse, August 16, 1993. 11 “Rape Case in Japan Turns Harsh Light on U.S. Military.” 12 “Three Americans Are Charged In Okinawan Rape,” The Washington Post, September 29, 1995; Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan, “Americans Charged With Rape Turned Over to Police; Japanese Indictment of Three U.S. Servicemen in Okinawa Means Conviction Likely,” The Washington Post, September 30, 1995; “Nearly 200 local assemblies call for revised Japan-US defense accord,” Agence France Presse, October 7, 1995; Eugene Moosa, “Calls spread in Japan to revise U.S. forces pact,” Reuters News, October 2, 1995.

128 Japan on September 7, three days after the incident, and was immediately conveyed to Ambassador Walter Mondale in Minnesota, where he was on vacation.13 In Washington, DC, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell “called an emergency meeting to discuss the appropriate response.”14 The formal apologies began on September 11, with US Consul General in Okinawa Aloysius O’Neill meeting Governor Ōta at the Prefectural Offices. On September 13, Ambassador Mondale returned to Japan and immediately arranged to meet Foreign Minister Kōno on September 21. That day, he also apologised in person to Governor Ōta, who had come to Tokyo.15 Further supporting the sincere regret from the US civilian leadership was President Bill Clinton, through a radio address on the same day.16

On the other hand, the reaction from the military side was less conciliatory. In direct contrast to Consul General O’Neill, Major General Wayne Rollings, Commanding General of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), did not arrange to meet the governor to apologize directly. Instead, the apology was delivered in a letter from the press section of the Marine Corps.17 Furthermore, although Secretary of Defense William Perry announced following the September 27 meeting of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee that the Marine Corps in Okinawa would suspend training and exercises for a day of reflection, the force opposed the decision.18 Rust Deming, who was Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Tokyo at the time, would later relate that “there was a fear that they would be manipulated by political forces that were hostile to the alliance.”19

One of the major concerns was that the rape incident might lead to even stronger demands to modify the US-Japan SOFA. The growing calls for revision appeared to be a symbolic protest: initially, the protesters could not specify which parts of the agreement they wanted changed. Only after Japanese newspapers started comparing it with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOFA did the protesters become more familiar with the agreement that

13 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 297. 14 Ibid., 298. 15 “Mondale apologises over GIs accused in Japan rape,” Reuters News, September 19, 1995. 16 Alliance Adrift, 301. 17 Ibid., 302. 18 The US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meetings are a series of annual talks between ministerial or secretarial-level defense and foreign ministry officials from both governments. Established in the 1970s with the involvement of the deputy secretaries and vice-ministers, the United States had accepted a Japanese proposal to upgrade these talks to the ministerial/secretarial level in 1990. However, as a result of packed schedules as well as a number of crises, the first upgraded SCC meeting was held only in March 1994, and the first meeting attended by all (specified) officials—both US secretaries, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the JDA—took place only after the rape incident in Okinawa, on September 27, 1995. 19 quoted in Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 302.

129 they were seeking to change.20 Tokyo and Washington, however, were not keen to revise the agreement. First, even if the initial target was just the clause over custody of the accused, opening the door for revision would open up the text of the entire agreement for challenge. SOFAs are designed to ensure that the rights and privileges that US citizens enjoy at home apply to its citizens serving overseas. Efforts to revise the SOFA were thus expected to spark opposition from US domestic political actors, because of concerns that the rights of US citizens would be compromised as a result; personnel within the services themselves would also oppose such changes.21 This raised an additional concern for the Japanese government that, if pushed too hard on the SOFA, the United States would choose to remove their troops from Japan instead. For Foreign Minister Kōno, the American departure from Subic Bay in the Philippines suggested that the United States would also be willing to leave Japan if its leaders believed that US military personnel were not welcome.22

Given these potential complications, Washington and Tokyo hoped to address Okinawa’s discontent as quickly as possible, so as to reduce the chance of the protests escalating to expressions of wider discontent about the US-Japan alliance. There was a real fear amongst some officials that, in a worst-case scenario, this discontent could lead to widespread questioning of the alliance.23 If that were to happen, the negotiations and discussions about where the alliance should head in the post-Cold War era—whose results are manifested in the Higuchi Report and the Nye Initiative—would have been for naught. As Kōno observed “it would take at least one or two years to revise SOFA. What’s important is resolving this case to Okinawa’s satisfaction as quickly as possible.”24 For all of these reasons, the two governments sought to deal with this issue as a matter of refining the implementation of the SOFA rather than by seeking to modify the text of the agreement itself, and set up a study group for this purpose.25

20 Ibid., 300-01. 21 Ibid., 306; For discussion of the overarching purpose of SOFAs, see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?, 2-6. 22 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 304. 23 Ibid. 24 quoted in Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 303. 25 Miu Oikawa Dieter, “Accord on changes in implementing SOFA only one step,” Japan Economic Newswire, October 26, 1995.

130 5.2 Escalation: Governor Ōta and the land lease issue

Despite Kōno’s efforts, however, the situation escalated on September 29, as Governor Ōta elected not to cooperate in the implementation of the Special Land Lease Law. Ōta refused to renew a number of land leases that allowed the US military to legally maintain several Okinawa facilities.26 The governor’s resistance was made possible by the legal institutions that had been set up to facilitate the implementation of military basing policy in Japan. As discussed in Chapter 3, US military facilities in Japan are situated on a mixture of public and private land. Private land is leased by Tokyo on behalf of Washington, so that it can fulfil its alliance commitment of providing the basing facilities that the United States requires. This legislation provides for the land to be leased on five-year renewable contracts; however, if landowners do not agree to the contract, the municipal leader—the mayor of the village, town or city—is asked to make a public announcement that represents approval on their behalf.27 If the mayor also refuses to cooperate, it would fall to the prefectural governor to act as the landowners’ proxy. At the time of Ōta’s challenge, the law made provision for a proxy only as far as the governor.28

Ōta’s refusal to approve the leases was the first serious subnational challenge to the implementation of Japan’s alliance commitment to provide basing facilities for the US military. There were two main reasons for this. First, Okinawa is the only prefecture where a significant portion of US military facilities is situated on private land. 33% of the land being used by the US military is rented from private owners, with 35%, 3% and 29% belonging to the national, prefectural and municipal governments respectively. In contrast, over 87% of US bases on the Japanese main islands are located on public land, with less than 1% of the land leased from private citizens.29 These differences meant that Okinawa was home to far more

26 “Premier files suit against Okinawa gov. over land lease,” ibid., December 7, 1995; Nicholas D. Kristof, “Okinawan Ends Battle Over Leases On U.S. Bases,” The New York Times, September 14, 1996. 27 “Okinawa panel accepts land expropriation request,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 6, 1996. 28 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 340-45. The law has since been updated to allow the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (at the time, the Minister of Construction) to act as proxy if a governor refuses to cooperate. 29 This is largely because they were originally Japanese military facilities that the United States armed forces had taken over during the Occupation after the end of WWII—most of those facilities had been built on public land prior to the war. Conversely, the Japanese imperial forces did not originally have many bases on the Okinawa mainland, having regarded islands further south as being for more important for their military campaigns. Hence, when the Japanese military finally began constructing more airfields and other facilities on Okinawa during the early 1940s, privately owned farmland made up a significant proportion of the land that was used for this purpose. Furthermore, the United States took over and expanded these facilities both after the Battle of Okinawa and during the US administration of the prefecture. See Okinawa Prefectural Government, “U.S. Military Base

131 private landowners opposed to the military use of their land, and their collective refusal to renew lease contracts periodically gave the prefecture’s governor the power to affect the implementation of the Special Land Lease Law if he so chose.

But Ōta’s challenge was also a surprise because subnational political leaders in Japan usually cooperate with the central government in implementing national policy. As in other democracies, the power of governors, mayors and their legislative assemblies to influence, change or resist orders from Tokyo is limited by national legislation. Although these subnational actors can choose not to cooperate, typically by not approving routine administrative procedures to provide permits for construction or use of local infrastructure, Japan’s Supreme Court can overrule a decision deemed to go against “the public interest.”30 National legislatures can also modify legislation—through constitutionally determined parliamentary processes—to transfer important powers back to the central government. Because of these restrictions, the role of subnational leaders is usually to mediate with the central government on behalf of their local constituents, in order to obtain the best possible deal that they can get.

Ōta had two key reasons for going against this precedent of cooperation. First, following an academic career in which he had steadily called for Okinawa to seek a base-free future, he had been elected on platform calling for the reduction of the US military presence in the prefecture.31 However, when the issue of the land leases first came before him in 1992, the governor reluctantly elected to cooperate with Tokyo while requesting the return of land and facilities that were rarely being used. Some of these areas—such as the Naha Port facility— had long been marked for return, but the implementation of these initiatives had stalled.32 The

Issues in Okinawa,” on the Okinawa Prefectural Government Washington, DC office website, accessed July 15, 2018, http://dc-office.org/basedata. 30 Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Forced Leasing of Land for U.S. Bases in Okinawa Prefecture, 1996 (Gyo-Tsu) 90 Japan Supreme Court G. B. (1996). 31 Ian Rodger, “Okinawa, a battlefield still: On a day of remembrance, The key US power base in Asia,” Financial Times, August 11, 1990; “Japanese ruling party governor ousted in poll,” Financial Times, November 19, 1990. 32 For example, the two governments agreed to return Naha Port in the 15th SCC meeting in January 1974, on the condition that its functions were relocated. The SCC reaffirmed this in 1990 and 1992, but in relation to the latter, a prefectural government official pointed out that there was “nothing new,” as Ōta also alluded to his disappointment in the announcement. Furthermore, since it was announced just before the 30th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, some Okinawans criticized it as a symbolic gesture. Okinawa Prefectural Government, “FAC6064 Naha Kōwan Shisetsu,” accessed July 20, 2018, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/1228.html; “Mayor of Urasoe in Okinawa accepts U.S. military port,” Kyodo News, November 12, 2001.

132 lack of progress was a strong incentive for Ōta to refuse to cooperate on the leases in 1995, as a means of drawing Tokyo’s attention back to this issue.33

However, the main reason Ōta himself gave for his stance was the fear that the US bases would remain in Okinawa permanently. As was outlined in Chapter 3, the debate over the necessity of the alliance in the early 1990s ended with both Washington and Tokyo reaffirming its importance for regional security. The report known as the Nye Initiative, which was released in February 1995, recommended that the US should maintain a forward deployed presence numbering 100,000 troops in East Asia. Ōta feared that these developments would lead to a permanent US military presence on Okinawa, and this prompted him to withdraw his cooperation with Tokyo on the base leases.34 The anger and resentment arising from the rape incident helped create a groundswell of local support for Ōta to take this non-cooperative stance. On September 28, less than a month after the rape, the governor told the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly that he would not approve the base leases on behalf of the dissenting landowners.35

Ōta was determined for the issue to reach the highest levels of the Japanese judicial system. He refused to meet with Noboru Hōshuyama, the head of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA), who Prime Minister sent to Okinawa in an effort to negotiate over the issue. Murayama’s move may have reinforced Ōta’s position, for Hōshuyama had generated significant controversy the previous year when he expressed a desire for Okinawans to come around to a stance of “coexistence and symbiosis” with the military bases for the benefit of Japan.36 To make his point, Ōta ultimately refused to meet with representatives of the Japanese government until after the prefecture-wide protests scheduled for October 21.

This island-wide “People’s Rally” only reinforced Ōta’s oppositional stance. The protests drew a greater number of attendees than the 50,000 that the organizers had originally expected and planned for: the police estimate was 58,000, while organizers claimed that there

33 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 136-41, 312. 34 Ibid., 312; , The Mysterious Twists in the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma Relocation Plan (Tokyo: Kairyuusha, 2010), 29. Ōta also spoke of how the Nye Report influenced his decision during the author’s interview with the former governor, conducted in Naha, Okinawa Prefecture, in November 2014. 35 “Okinawa Gov. Ota refuses land contracts for U.S. forces,” Japan Economic Newswire, September 28, 1995. 36 “Murayama apologizes for official’s remarks on Okinawa,” Japan Policy & Politics, October 10, 1994; “ 9-gatsu 9-ka / Okinawa,” Ryukyu Shimpo, September 9, 2014; Okinawa Prefectural Government, Heisei 6-nen dai 6-kai Okinawa-ken Gikai (teireikai), 1994.

133 were approximately 85,000 participants.37 At that time, these numbers made this event the largest demonstration in Japan since the late 1960s and 1970s, the era of student-led activism that confronted both domestic issues and international developments such as the 1960 and 1970 renewals of the US-Japan security treaty, relations with The Republic of Korea and the Vietnam War.38 A 12,000-strong crowd of protesters was also reported in Tokyo, although it comprised mainly anti-war groups, namely “members of labour unions supporting the and peace activists, gathered to protest against the US Forces.”39 However, the rally in Okinawa represented almost all of the different political and interest groups in the prefecture, including the local chapters of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Social Democratic Party. The only group that did not send an official representative was the Okinawa Federation of Landowners of Land Used for Military Purposes. Federation officials noted that, although they “share the anger against the rape incident,” they could not support any call for a return of the bases, because many of the members depended on the rents for their livelihoods.40 Indeed, amongst other demands, the resolution adopted at the rally called for “the reduction and realignment of US military bases in Okinawa.”41

With these developments, alliance managers started to seriously consider removing at least some of the military facilities in Okinawa and returning the land on which they were situated. Japan Defense Agency (JDA) director-general Masahiro Akiyama had feared that an announcement of a SOFA implementation review in the lead-up to the rally would only make things worse, and he suggested to Joseph Nye—Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the person responsible for the Nye Report—the need to “set

37 “Massive rally in Okinawa against U.S. bases,” Japan Economic Newswire, October 21, 1995. These figures are even more impressive when one considers the relatively poor public transport facilities in Okinawa, where the majority of residents own their own vehicles. The author was living in Okinawa when another major protest rally was organized in May 2010. Organisers hired buses to ferry many of the people to and from the venue, while other attendees arranged to car and even bus pool to the venue, using local school or community buses. 38 Protests and related forms of political participation dropped off after the 1970s, for a number of reasons including the end of the Vietnam War and the 1973 oil shock. In particular, the slowing of the economy made it more difficult for university graduates to secure employment and prompted most students to recognize the potential negative consequences for their protest actions. See, for example Wilhelm Vosse, “The Emergence of a Civil Society in Japan,” Japanstudien 11, no. 1 (2000): 39; Patricia G. Steinhoff, “Student Protest in the 1960s,” Social Science Japan 15 (March 1999). Since the late 2000s, however, there have been increasing numbers of large-scale protests, not only concerning the basing issues in Okinawa, but also and especially in relation to nuclear power post-3/11 and the security reform legislation passed in 2015. 39 “Rallies held in Tokyo in support of Okinawa anti-US base protest,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, October 23, 1995. 40 “Massive rally in Okinawa against U.S. bases.” 41 “Okinawans adopt protest resolution at anti-US base rally,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, October 23, 1995; Mie Kawashima, “Okinawa landowner will celebrate when U.S. lease ends,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 5, 1995.

134 up some sort of joint commission on returning the bases.”42 Although US officials were initially hesitant, further discussions led to a proposal for an action committee on Okinawa, which was to come up with a plan of action to improve the base situation in the prefecture. To ensure that it would achieve something tangible, Defense Secretary Perry insisted on three points: that the committee would consist of civilian and military officials from both countries, that they would come up with a plan instead of a mere analysis, and that it have a deadline.43 On November 2, 1995, Prime Minister Murayama and Vice President Al Gore formally announced its establishment—with the tentative name of the “Ad-hoc Action Committee”— under the SCC or “2+2” framework. The broadly-stated aim was to develop a plan to realign and consolidate the bases in Okinawa.44

The two allies also proceeded with negotiations to modify how the US-Japan SOFA was implemented. In the study group set up to examine what could be changed and how, the Japanese side made three major requests: first, that the United States allow for suspects to be turned over prior to indictment; second, that there be more cooperation from the United States in investigations; and third, that US military authorities improve their handling of suspects in their custody. On October 25, just four days after the rally, the allies made a broad agreement that addressed the first of these requests, enabling the early transfer of custody of military personnel suspected of committing “heinous crimes.”45 To be precise, the United States “agreed to give sympathetic consideration to Japanese requests for transfer of custody of criminal suspects prior to indictment in specific cases of murder or rape,” although the exact details such as the timing of such transfers would be worked out in a proper agreement at a later date.46

Despite these overtures from Washington and Tokyo, however, Ōta remained uncooperative. On November 4, 1995, in his first meeting with Prime Minister Murayama following the establishment of the Ad-hoc Action Committee, Ōta criticised the lack of sincerity on the part of the Japanese government in relation to Okinawa’s complaints about the bases: “I signed as proxy five years ago (1990) on the condition that an improvement would be made on the

42 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 308. 43 Ibid., 308-09. 44 “US Defence Secretary Perry agrees to proposed forum for discussing okinawa bases,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, November 2, 1995. 45 Oikawa Dieter, “Accord on changes in implementing SOFA only one step.” 46 United States Department of State, 95/10/25 Testimony: Winston Lord on US-Japan Relations, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1995; “Japan says agrees military treaty changes with US,” Reuters News, October 25, 1995.

135 bases. Despite that, there has been virtually no progress on realignment or reduction.”47 In that same meeting, the governor presented Murayama with an “action programme” for the reduction and withdrawal of the bases in the prefecture.48 The proposal, developed by the Okinawa Prefectural Government under the leadership of Ōta and Vice Governor Masanori Yoshimoto, set out a three-phase timeframe for all of the military facilities to be returned by 2015.49 But from a military perspective, the withdrawal of the US presence in its entirety from Okinawa was foolhardy because of the power vacuum that would be left in such a strategic location. It was thus unsurprising that Tokyo and Washington were not receptive to Ōta’s demands, bar one, which was that “the American-Japanese committee on the bases pay greater attention to local opinions.”50

The Japanese government eventually resorted to using domestic institutions to overcome Ōta’s resistance. In late November, Murayama issued Ōta with an official warning, instructing him to approve the leases so as to ensure that there was no legal gap in the continued use of the land on which US military facilities were situated. When Ōta sent a letter refusing to follow that “recommendation,” the prime minister issued an official “order.”51 But the governor held firm; early in December, Ōta sent the prime minister a letter rejecting his instructions to approve the land leases. Murayama promptly initiated legal proceedings against Ōta, lodging the suit at the Naha branch of the Fukuoka High Court on December 7.52 The timing was incredibly tight because the first applicable lease, that of Shoichi Chibana’s property and part of the land upon which the Sobe Communications Site in was situated, was due to expire on April 1, 1996.53 Chibana was already planning to hold a party on his property, which he had inherited from his father the year before.54 If the Japanese government could not compel Ōta to approve the lease before the lease expired, then the US

47 Quoted in Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 312. 48 “Okinawa Gov. Ota unveils bases-free action program,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 5, 1995. 49 The Ryukyu-Okinawa History and Culture Website, “Archive: Base Return Action Programme (Proposal), Okinawa Prefectural Government, January 1996,” accessed February 26, 2019, http://ryukyu- okinawa.net/pages/archive/base96.html. 50 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Tokyo Fails To Resolve Bases Impasse,” The New York Times, November 5, 1995. 51 “Murayama orders Ota to sign military land deal,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 29, 1995. 52 “Premier files suit against Okinawa gov. over land lease.” 53 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 212. 54 Kawashima, “Okinawa landowner will celebrate when U.S. lease ends.” Chibana’s father had originally refused to sign the leases for four years from 1972, before he gave in to pressure from the community and signed a 20-year lease. Additionally, mayors of the Okinawan municipalities in which the facilities are situated often sign on behalf of their anti-base landowners, which provided another check on their ability to challenge the military use of their land. Hence, landowners like Chibana are only able to challenge the status quo if both their local mayor and the governor refuse to renew the leases on their behalf.

136 use of the land for the Sobe Communications Site would technically be illegal and subject to direct legal challenge from Chibana himself.

Indeed, this came to pass as Ōta fought the Japanese government all the way to the Supreme Court, where he was compelled in September to sign the leases. When April 1 arrived with the governor showing no signs of compromise, Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) Seiroku Kajiyama stated the government’s position that “it couldn’t immediately be called a violation,” and the Naha Bureau of the DFAA applied for a six-month emergency extension on the lease. However, the Okinawa Prefectural Committee on Expropriation rejected that application on May 11, on the grounds that the government had “failed to explain adequately the urgency and obstacles which would pertain if the site could not be used.”55 Chibana promptly sued for access to and return of his land, although he soon dropped the latter concern to focus on the former.56 Shortly afterwards, the Naha District Court provisionally ruled to allow Chibana access to his property, and accompanied by family and supporters, he entered the base and celebrated for two hours on May 14.57

These developments represented a small victory for Ōta and anti-base landowners like Chibana. However, it was to be short-lived. Despite the Naha court’s ruling, Chibana had to negotiate with the central government to access his plot of land; ultimately, he was allowed to enter just twice before the end of June, with a maximum of 30 people in total.58 Furthermore, Ōta’s challenge had highlighted the major flaw in the Special Land Lease Law. By the time the suit finished running its course, the Japanese government—now led by Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto from the LDP—had started drafting new legislation to ensure that subnational governments would never again be able to make a similar challenge. The modification to the Special Land Lease Law, approved in April 1997, saw the authority for final approval of lease renewals shift from prefectural governors to the central government.59 Although Ōta had again refused to comply with Hashimoto’s order to approve the next set of renewals, which were due to expire in May 1997, the change meant that the Minister of

55 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 312-13; “Okinawa village chief rejects expropriation of plot,” Japan Policy & Politics, May 20, 1996. 56 “Okinawa landowner enters U.S. base land with family,” Japan Policy & Politics, May 20, 1996. 57 Alliance Adrift, 312-13. 58 “Okinawa landowner enters U.S. base land with family.” 59 “Gov’t plans new legislation on U.S. base use in Okinawa,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 6, 1996; “Okinawa land bill enacted,” Japan Economic Newswire, April 17, 1997; “Okinawa forced land lease bill clears Diet,” Japan Economic Newswire, April 17, 1997.

137 Construction could simply approve the leases instead.60 In this manner, the means of resistance on the basis of the land leases was taken away, such that it could no longer be used to generate the same level of tensions as during Ōta’s challenge. Washington and Tokyo were thus able to weather the most serious crisis that the alliance had faced since the renewal of the security treaty in 1960.

5.3 The SACO process and the “return” of MCAS Futenma

As the land lease issue made its way through the courts, the action committee that Tokyo and Washington had set up to address the burden on Okinawa was facing its own set of challenges. This development was not universally welcomed in the Japanese government. In fact, Foreign Minister Kōno had been trying to avoid precisely this situation because he feared that it would bring the very structure of the alliance—cooperation enabled by the extensive stationing of US military forces across Japan—into question. The JDA was also wary because, depending on what the committee recommended about realignment, consolidation and reduction, “it was their job to actually go out there and convince the landowners.”61 Ostensibly, this would not be a problem if the process involved just returning facilities that were no longer required; but if relocation sites needed to be found, the process would be arduous. The relocations that took place as part of the consolidation around the Tokyo metropolitan area in the 1970s are a good example of the latter. However, the difficulties JDA officials would face were also exemplified in Okinawa itself. Before the rape incident, the agency had already been trying to return a number of different facilities, with little progress. Three of them—Onna Communications Site, the Range 21 training center at Camp Hansen, and part of the Northern Training Area—had been announced in 1992, but as noted above, the relocation and return of at least one other facility, Naha Port, had been in limbo since 1974.62

However, the drive to “solve the Okinawa affair” came from the top of the Japanese leadership, even as the so-called “revolving door” of the Japanese prime ministership claimed

60 “Okinawa Gov. Ota asked to take procedure over U.S. base,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 28, 1996; “Okinawa to continue to refuse cooperation with gov’t,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 6, 1996; “Okinawa reject’s premier’s request on U.S. base land,” Japan Economic Newswire, July 1, 1996; “Ota sends letter to reject Hashimoto’s request on base,” Japan Economic Newswire, July 10, 1996. 61 Alliance Adrift, 309. 62 “Quayle Announces Return of Okinawa Facilities to Japan,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 15, 1992.

138 another victim. Murayama stepped down as prime minister on January 11, 1996, leaving the following words to his successor, Hashimoto: “Okinawa is my greatest regret. It is the only thing I ask of you.”63 For his part, the new prime minister was also keen to “solve the Okinawa affair” as part of the legacy of his mentor, Eisaku Satō. Satō led Japan when its leaders negotiated for the return of Okinawa to Japanese administration in the late 1960s and had hoped to do more to reduce the US base presence in the prefecture. However, the ongoing Vietnam War had rendered such a goal unfeasible at the time. Hashimoto was resolved to be the leader that would fulfil Satō’s legacy by making progress on this issue.64

But Ōta’s apparent preferences with regard to the military bases in Okinawa also influenced Hashimoto’s position. As the court case played out over the land leases, the Okinawa Prefectural Government made a separate effort to steer the discussion towards a reduction in the US military facilities on Okinawa. As mentioned above, Ōta and Vice Governor Yoshimoto had earlier developed an action programme through which all bases would be returned by 2015.65 According to JDA Administrative Vice-Minister Takemasa Moriya, “the return of Futenma was regarded as the symbol of the whole scheme.”66 In response to this, Hashimoto had raised the question of MCAS Futenma with Defense Secretary Perry when they met in November 1995, even before he had succeeded Murayama.67 Following the release of the prefecture’s action programme proposal, a businessman by the name of Ken Moroi, who had links to both Ōta and Hashimoto, conveyed to the prime minister the message that the governor regarded “the return of Futenma Air Station” as the top priority. According to Moroi, knowing that Hashimoto had requested a meeting with President Bill Clinton in Santa Monica in February 1996, prior to the latter’s upcoming trip to Japan, Ōta wanted the prime minister to ask the US leader directly for the facility’s return.68 The governor later claimed that he had been positioned to present “the return of Futenma” as the top priority, expressing discontent at what he and other Okinawans subsequently perceived as manipulation from the central government.69 Regardless, when Clinton touched on the

63 As recalled by former Prime Minister Hashimoto and quoted in Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 29. 64 Ibid. 65 Takemasa Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru,” Chuo Koron, January 2010. A translation by Mike Meserve, US Army Pacific, was posted on NBR’S JAPAN FORUM, http://nbrforums.nbr.org/foraui/message.aspx?LID=5&MID=36658, accessed April 15, 2012. See also Okinawa Prefectural Government, “Base Return Action Programme (Proposal).” 66 Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru.” 67 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 23. 68 Ibid., 38. 69 Interview with Masahide Ōta, November 2014.

139 question of US bases in Japan, Hashimoto brought up the idea of returning MCAS Futenma as a means of quelling Okinawa’s discontent.

Perhaps surprisingly, high-level officials on both sides were soon behind the idea. The American officials in attendance at the Santa Monica meeting initially doubted what they had heard, as Hashimoto had expressed his view in a typically Japanese way:

To tell you the truth, I’m in an awkward position myself. Were I to pass on the demands of the Okinawan people, it would be for the complete return of Futenma. However, bearing in mind the importance of US-Japan security and maintaining the functionality of the US armed forces, I realize that that is extremely difficult.70

The question was whether Hashimoto had requested that the military actually “return” the base, instead of merely indicating his awareness of how difficult it would be to achieve this, and the Japanese side recalled that it took them a week to convince their counterparts on the US side that the prime minister wanted it to be taken seriously.71 But several high-level US government officials were also in favor of “returning” Futenma. Besides Perry, who had started seriously considering this possibility after his meeting with Hashimoto in November 1995, former Ambassador to Japan and former Assistant Security of Defense for International Security Affairs Richard Armitage had also called for Futenma’s return in the wake of the rape incident.72 Following this meeting, the action committee started examining options for relocating the functions of the MCAS Futenma in order to “do something about the bases that had a symbolic impact.”73

Hence, alliance managers identified what they thought was a key Okinawan preference and began looking at ways to carry it out. Having decided to return MCAS Futenma, the difficulty that the committee members now faced was working out the details, including where the personnel and functions of the facility would be moved. The JDA had already assessed that it would be a difficult task, because Futenma had other important functions above and beyond its primary use as an airfield for the Marine Corps. When the committee arranged to visit the facilities in Okinawa in early March 1996, the significance of Futenma’s secondary functions—especially in terms of logistical support during potential contingencies—was

70 As translated in Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 21. 71 Ibid., 22. 72 Ibid., 23; Mikio Haruna and Kohei Murayama, “Armitage urges return of Futenma base to Okinawa,” Japan Economic Newswire, December 1, 1995. 73 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 44.

140 echoed in the briefings of the local commanders.74 In fact, MCAS Futenma is one of the seven US military facilities in Japan that are designated as being available for use without prior notice to United Nations Command (UNC), the unified command for the multinational military forces that would support the Republic of Korea in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula.75 Hence, it was clear that Futenma’s functions would have to be relocated if the land on which the facility was situated was to be “returned.”

One of the earliest suggestions was to have these functions merged with the other key US military facility on the island: Kadena Air Base. Kadena was approximately four times the size of the MCAS Futenma, and having seen the Okinawan bases in person, a number of the committee’s members felt that many of the latter’s functions could easily be relocated to within the perimeters of the former. For the next two weeks, the American side worked out a proposal, incorporating feedback and requests from the Japanese side. On March 23, this proposal was presented to Hashimoto, who instructed Hitoshi Tanaka (a JDA bureaucrat who was a member of the committee) not to inform his superiors within the JDA so as to prevent leaks before the official announcements.76 From April 10, Japanese newspapers such as the Yomiuri Shimbun started breaking the news that the allies were planning to return some of the land being used by the US military in Okinawa.77 Then, on April 15, 1996, the SCC released the SACO interim report, which contained a series of preliminary proposals “on ways to consolidate, realign and reduce US facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of US forces in Okinawa.”78

74 Ibid., 47-50. 75 Won Gon Park, “The United Nations Command in Korea: past, present, and future,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21, no. 4 (2009): 491; Michael Bosack, “Relevance Despite Obscurity: Japan and UN Command,” Tokyo Review, February 1, 2018. UNC was originally established in Tokyo during the Korean War, in order “to provide command and control for the UN forces involved in the Korean War.” When Japan regained it sovereignty, provisions were made for this arrangement to continue, which led to the signing of the “Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan” (the UN-GOJ SOFA) in 1954. When UNC Headquarters was moved to Seoul in 1957, a small unit known as United Nations Command-Rear was left behind in order to maintain the UN-GOJ SOFA, because the agreement would be terminated if all UN Forces are withdrawn from Japan (Article 15). The other facilities in Japan that are listed under UNCR are Camp Zama, Yokota Air Base, Yokosuka Naval Base, Sasebo Naval Base, Kadena Air Base and White Beach (the latter two are also in Okinawa). “Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan,” (Conclusion date: February 19, 1954, United Kingdom Treaty Series No. 10 (1957)); United Nations Command-Rear, “United Nations Command-Rear Fact Sheet.” 76 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 57-58. 77 “U.S. To Return Some Land to Okinawa Owners, Report Says,” The Associated Press, April 10, 1996. 78 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report.”

141 The report outlined 26 different objectives across four core areas, as summarized in Table 5.1.79 They were, in effect, preliminary proposals that the committee would review, along with any other initiatives that the committee came up with, over the seven remaining months before the final SACO deadline. Many of these objectives were opposed by interest groups on both the US and Japanese sides. On the US side, the Marine Corps and the Air Force were particularly opposed to idea of sharing Kadena Air Base, not only because of inter-service rivalry, but also due to concerns about the potential loss of storage and repair facilities that would be required in times of contingency.80 Another issue was the length of the replacement runway, which at a maximum proposed length of 1,300 meters (4, 265 feet), would be less than half of the current 2,740 meter-long (8,990 feet) runway.81 These concerns were magnified by the fact that both Kadena and Futenma are part of the assets of UNC-rear, making the former also crucial in an potential regional contingency. On the Japanese side, one of the major opponents was the DFAA, which was concerned about the tentative timeframe of five to seven years that the interim report had stated as the target deadline for relocating and returning MCAS Futenma, which they felt to be impossible to achieve. The DFAA worried

Table 5.1: The Core Objectives listed in the SACO Interim Report

Core Areas Key objectives

(1) Return of Land • From 11 facilities, including the entirety of MCAS Futenma as well as Sobe Communications Site. • In order for these returns to be made, the functions of most of these facilities are to be relocated to other sites within Okinawa (or Japan).

(2) Adjustment of Training • Including the termination of live-firing exercises over and Operational Procedures Highway 104 and of parachute drop training.

(3) Noise Reduction • Implement previously announced noise reduction initiatives Initiatives around the Futenma and Kadena facilities. • Limit night training at Futenma. • Transfer a squadron of KC-130 Hercules aircraft to Iwakuni Air Station.

(4) Status of Forces • Establish new procedures for incidents. Agreement Procedures • Review the guidelines for access to US facilities.

79 Ibid. 80 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 64-65. 81 The Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network, “V-22 Osprey,” accessed July 20, https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/v-22.htm.

142

that they would have difficulty persuading non-base landowners to sell their land to the government, should it be needed for the construction of the replacement facility. But they were also concerned that they would face challenges negotiating with existing landowners whose incomes would be reduced when they got their land back.82

Furthermore, the Taiwan Straits crisis of from July 1995 to March 1996 influenced opposition to the proposals amongst government officials. For the US government—particularly the White House and the departments of State and Defense—this crisis was a timely reminder that there was another flashpoint in the region besides the Korean Peninsula. Okinawa’s strategic location places it roughly equidistant to both flashpoints, with Taiwan within the operational range of the V-22 Osprey being developed at the time.83 Key staff, including National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, felt that the announcement to return MCAS Futenma should be put off, arguing that it could be read by others in Asia as the United States distancing itself from the region. Although China had backed down this time, the danger of such a signal was not only that it might embolden the Chinese, but also that it would spark a regional arms race as other states lost faith in the US deterrent and increased their own defensive capabilities.84

However, the Taiwan Straits crisis also strengthened Perry’s position in the action committee. As Defense Secretary, Perry had decided to send the two carriers to the region. Not only did this help combat the perception that President Clinton was dovish on security—the Republicans had been attacking this facet of the administration’s policies in the leadup to the 1996 presidential election—the success of the tactic allowed Perry’s voice in favor of returning Futenma to carry greater weight. With Perry driving the issue on the US side, and Hashimoto on the Japanese side, they were also able to use their counterparts as leverage in overriding opposition from the military forces as well as concerns from their fellow government officials.85 The formal announcement on April 15 then became a point of no return. After the release of the SACO interim report, it would have been very difficult for the two governments to go back on the promise to “return” MCAS Futenma.

82 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 60-61. 83 The Osprey, which was still being tested at the time of SACO, can carry a payload of 24 troops to a combat range of 430 nautical miles. The distance from Okinawa to Taiwan falls just under that, at 395 nautical miles. The Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network, “V-22 Osprey”; Air Force Technology, “V- 22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft,” accessed July 20, 2018, https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/osprey/. 84 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 72-73. 85 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 67-73.

143 Figure 5.1: Okinawa’s Strategic Location

Source: 2016 Congressional Research Service Report by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, titled The US Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy.86

5.4 Local reactions: the prefectural assembly elections and Japan’s first referendum

In response to this turn of events, the Okinawan community was clearly divided. One of the first clear signs of this was the prefectural assembly elections in June 1996. Nominally, all of the candidates were in favor of a reduction in the US military presence in the prefecture.

86 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, by Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Ian E. Rinehart, R42645 (2016), 5.

144 However, they differed on the preferred extent and the way it should be achieved.87 For example, many in the business community recognized that Okinawa did not have well- developed industries that could replace the economic footprints of the US forces in the prefecture. They were also worried because the prefectural government’s plans for redevelopment of the returned land required a lot of funding from the central government, funding that Tokyo was not obliged to provide.88 However, the results of the election saw an increase in seats held by parties and individuals that backed Ōta, from 21 to 25.89 Japanese national leaders such as Prime Minister Hashimoto saw it as a “severe outcome,” one that would embolden the governor to maintain his stance of opposing the base presence.90 On the other hand, voter turnout was a mere 66%, almost 10 points less than the average.91 This suggests that some voters may have abstained from voting as a way of making a political statement about the stance that Ōta was taking.

The next development that clearly demonstrated the division in the community was the first public referendum on the US military presence in Okinawa, which took place in September 1996. Once again, the anti-agreement faction appears on paper to have won, but the process and the close outcome are instructive. In the aftermath of the “People’s Rally” held in October 1995, Masahiro Toguchi, the president of the Okinawa Trade Union Confederation (Okinawa RENGO) was determined to hold a referendum so as to make clear what the prefecture wanted. RENGO collected the required signatures (1/50th of eligible voters) and followed the other necessary procedures to initiate the process of holding the referendum. The prefectural government, led by Ōta, was also in favor of holding the referendum, especially following the announcement on April 15 that the “return” of MCAS Futenma would require the transfer of its operational functions within the prefecture. With the help of the conservative New Frontier Party (NFP), Ōta’s backers in the prefectural assembly voted to pass the bill and budget that enabled the prefecture to hold the referendum. The Ōta government then set up a referendum promotion office in order to publicize the referendum and convince voters to show up at the polls. As the general consensus in the prefecture at the time was that most Okinawans agreed that the military presence should be reduced, the greatest concern of the pro-referendum

87 “Okinawa election to affect Gov. Ota’s posture on bases,” Japan Policy & Politics, June 3, 1996. See also Robert D. Eldridge, “The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions: One Question, Several Answers,” Asian Survey 37, no. 10 (1997): 887. 88 Nicholas D. Kristof, “U.S. Pullout Not Popular With Some In Okinawa,” The New York Times, June 2, 1996. 89 “Okinawa governor’s camp gets majority in assembly,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 10, 1999. 90 “Premier Comments on “Severe Outcome” of Okinawa Election,” BBC Monitoring Service: Asia Pacific, June 11, 1996. 91 “Okinawa governor’s camp gets majority in assembly.”

145 faction was a low-turnout and what that might signify to alliance managers. This concern was multiplied because this referendum was the first not only in Okinawa, but across the whole of Japan, so few eligible voters would have known what it involved or the significance it might have.92

The anti-referendum faction, led by the LDP prefectural chapter, focused on two issues: the questionable utility of the referendum, and the economic impact that removing the military presence would have. During prefectural assembly deliberations, the opposition LDP assembly members attacked the proposal but failed to prevent its passage, as its nominally ideological partner, NFP, voted in favor.93 So the anti-referendum faction instead turned its efforts to limiting the impact of the referendum. LDP officials argued that the vote undermined the central government’s efforts to find a feasible, practical solution to the issue, while Major General Hidenobu Murata, leader of the Ground SDF contingent in Okinawa, called it “meaningless.”94 Several other interest groups also came out against the referendum, citing more practical concerns. The Okinawa Federation of Landowners of Land Used for Military Purposes, the newly formed Okinawa Garrison Forces Labor Union, and the individuals and businesses that cater largely to American clientele all worried that a reduction in the military presence in the prefecture would be detrimental to their livelihoods.95

Ultimately, the outcome of the referendum showed the effects of these tensions. On the one hand, the result—with 89% of votes cast “agreement” (sansei) with the referendum’s sole question of “[How do you feel about] reviewing the Japan-United States Status of Forces Agreement and reducing the American bases in our prefecture?”—suggests that most of those who voted were anti-base. However, at just 59.5%, voter turnout was quite low, meaning that this figure of 89% actually represented just 53% of the eligible voters in the prefecture.96 Robert Eldridge has also shown that low voter turnout was most pronounced in several communities with a high percentage of residents whose livelihoods depended on the US military presence—landowners, people employed on the bases, and those working in hospitality and other industries whose business came in large part from the military or US personnel.97 In other words, the division in the prefecture was evident not so much in the

92 Eldridge, “The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions,” 883-84. 93 Eldridge argues that the votes fell this way because the two parties were then in opposition to each other at the national level. Ibid., 891. 94 Ibid., 894-95. 95 Ibid., 896-98. 96 Ibid., 879-80. 97 Ibid., 897-98.

146 percentage of votes cast for each option, but rather through the turnout: many of those who had the most to lose from a reduction in the US military presence registered their difference of opinion by abstaining from the vote.

5.5 The path to the floating heliport

But the negotiations within SACO proceeded almost without reference to the tensions surrounding these local interest groups and their preferences. Having arrived at the decision to relocate MCAS Futenma and return the land on which it was situated, the next step was for SACO to develop a concrete plan for the replacement facility. This involved considering not only the facility’s role in the day-to-day operations of the III MEF, but also its role in providing surge capacity for regional contingencies. Four major proposals were examined over the half-year period remaining before the final SACO deadline. These were: (i) the consolidation of Futenma’s functions into Kadena Air Base, (ii) the construction of new facilities at Camp Hansen and (iii) the expansion of Camp Schwab, both of which were in the north of the prefecture near the city of Nago, and (iv) the construction of a sea-based facility (SBF). Each approach had backers amongst the US and Japanese negotiators, both of whom played a large part in the seesawing negotiations. However, it is also important to recognize the effects that local and other domestic interests had on the eventual decision.

MCAS Futenma provides for three major functions that, according to military strategists, need to be transferred to new or existing facilities before the facility can be closed: (1) airlift, (2) aerial refuelling and (3) the helicopters to transport Marines into operational zones. The US offered to move the aerial refuelling capacity, which comprised twelve KC-130 aircraft (VMGR-152) at the time, to MCAS Iwakuni, with twenty AV-8 Harrier jets being transferred to the US mainland so as not to increase the burden on Iwakuni. However, they argued that the helicopter squadrons would have to remain in Okinawa in order to facilitate training with the rest of the III MEF.98 Hence, the SACO interim report noted that the return of MCAS

98 William L. Brooks, The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995- 1997, 2005-2006, Asia-Pacific Policy Papers Series (Washington, DC: Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, 2010), 13.

147 Futenma would “require construction of a heliport on other US facilities and areas in Okinawa [and] development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base.”99

The term “heliport,” which is normally used to refer to structures that are used for the landing and take-off of helicopters, is somewhat misleading. As mentioned above, MCAS Futenma is one of the three facilities in Okinawa designated by UNC as a support facility for a potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In order to ensure surge capacity in case of a crisis, the replacement facility needed to be able to accommodate “300 total aircraft: 70 in peacetime and 230 in times of contingency,” and provide “marine aviation logistics support; maintenance and repair of military aircraft.”100 Put simply, the Marine Corps required a relatively large-scale facility with a runway that could support a range of aircraft, rather than a smaller facility that would only take over the helicopter functions. Although they did not insist on obtaining a runway of the same length (2,740 meters/8,990 feet), it became clear in June and July 1996 that they were pushing for at least 5,100 feet (around 1,550 meters), which was required for the horizontal take-off of fully loaded helicopters.101 The units in question were the MV-22 Osprey VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) aircraft, which were still in testing stages prior to planned rollout in the Marine Corps as replacements for the CH- 53D helicopters.

The consolidation of MCAS Futenma’s functions into Kadena Air Base was one of the most thoroughly explored ideas. Vice Governor Yoshimoto was particularly in favor of this idea, arguing that it would be more palatable to Okinawan citizens as a whole because the prefecture had identified Kadena as “the last base,” and because it clearly showed “reduction,” as the replacement facilities would be built on land that was already under the control of the US military.102 According to former JDA Vice-Minister Moriya, because the idea originated from Yoshimoto, it had to be thoroughly examined so as not to give the impression that the national government was ignoring Okinawan preferences.103 As a result, although the military kept pushing back against it, several different plans to transfer MCAS

99 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report.” 100 From a brief delivered by Major General Wayne Rollings to SACO in March 1996, quoted in Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 49. 101 Ibid., 65, 67. See also “New heliport at Kadena base will be smaller than Futemma,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 25, 1996; U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence in Okinawa, by Reginald L. Furr, Brian J. Lepore, Colin L. Chambers, Nancy L. Ragsdale, Julio A. Luna, and Richard Seldin, GAO/NSIAD-98-66 (Washington, DC, 1998), 30, accessed May 25, 2014, https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-98-66. 102 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 175-76. 103 Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru.”

148 Futenma’s functions to Kadena were proposed and considered, though all were ultimately rejected.

The first of these plans involved the construction of the heliport in an unutilized part of the ammunition depot in the northern area of the base.104 This was actually the original plan that Tokyo had in mind at the time of the interim report. However, it was quickly criticised due to the detrimental effect it would have on surrounding communities. The unused area of the Kadena ammunition depot did not have enough flat land for a runway, so building Futenma’s replacement facility there would have required the partial levelling of a nearby mountain that local communities depended on for crop irrigation.105 In response to the Okinawa Prefectural Government’s concerns about this issue, Tokyo proposed three additional plans for consideration during the talks, including the proposals for Camp Schwab and Camp Hansen.

However, since it was clear that a sizeable replacement facility was required, these two proposals were rejected quite quickly because of stringent resistance from local residents. The resistance from the communities around Camp Hansen was particularly intense, with opposition from both citizens and local assemblies in the municipalities of Nago, Kin, Ginoza and Onna.106 The Marine Corps favoured the idea of expanding Camp Schwab if MCAS Futenma had to be closed and its functions transferred elsewhere. Although there were concerns that the civilian dependants of personnel deployed to Schwab would be less willing to live in such a remote part of the island—a 90-minute drive away from the more developed central areas of Okinawa—such resistance might be addressed if the base were enlarged, so that all necessary conveniences could be constructed within the base itself.107 However, local and prefectural opposition was registered not only for the noise pollution and danger that residents perceived due to the close proximity it would have to the host community, but also for environmental damage, because it involved a substantial amount of land reclamation in the coastal area next to Schwab.

The second major proposal for integration with Kadena was to construct replacement facilities for MCAS Futenma’s capabilities in a different part of the air base. Instead of the 1,500 meter (4,921 feet) runway that the Marine Corps had asked for, Washington was apparently willing

104 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 174. 105 Ibid; “Japan proposes 3 other sites for heliport,” Jiji Press English News Service, July 3, 1996. 106 Alliance Adrift, 174. See also “Angry Islanders Dig In For a Battle Over Bases,” The New York Times, May 25, 1996; “Prefecture opposes heliport’s relocation in Okinawa,” Kyodo News, July 16, 1996. 107 Alliance Adrift, 175.

149 to drop down to 1,000 meters (3,280 feet), while Tokyo argued that a shorter, 700 meter (2296 feet) runway would suffice. On the other hand, the Americans were not keen about the location that the Japanese side was pushing for—a piece of land that was being used as a golf course at the time. The proximity to the US Air Force’s runway facilities meant that the Kadena airspace would become even more crowded than it already was.108 Not only would this increase the mental burden on pilots and air traffic controllers, it would also raise the risk of accidents and thus opposition from local communities.109 Indeed, despite the prefectural government’s enthusiasm for the proposal, the communities around Kadena were stringently opposed. The towns of Chatan and Kadena joined with Okinawa City to lobby against the plan. The negotiations went back and forth until September, as the Japanese side kept developing different plans in an effort to persuade the United States to accept integration with Kadena Air Base in some form. 110

That so many plans for integration with Kadena were considered despite serious opposition from both the US side and local communities can arguably be attributed to the JDA, which heavily backed the idea. In particular, the JDA agreed with Vice Governor Yoshimoto that the other options would not be accepted because they involved the building of a “new” base, which Okinawans would interpret as pointing towards a permanent US military presence in Okinawa. The JDA thus set out to provide evidence that it was possible for the US Air Force jets and the Marine Corps helicopters to share Kadena’s airspace by documenting operations at Kaneohe Air Station in Hawaii, which had both F/A-18 Hornets and CH-53E Stallion transport helicopters.111 Studies conducted by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force had also found that it would be possible to have both slow moving helicopters and faster aircraft operating in the same area.112 By the middle of summer, the Prime Minister’s Office appeared to be convinced that this was the best option. CCS Kajiyama was also in favor, even as Prime Minister Hashimoto remained neutral.113

108 “Japan eyeing 700-meter heliport in Kadena Base,” Jiji Press English News Service, July 6, 1996. 109 Alliance Adrift, 177, 80; Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru.” 110 “Govt to push new plan on heliport relocation,” Jiji Press English News Service, September 10, 1996; “U.S. proposes heliport relocation site,” Jiji Press English News Service, August 26, 1996. 111 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 177-78. Helicopter units deployed at Kaneohe Air Station consist largely of the CH-53E Super Stallion transport helicopters, which were also deployed in Okinawa at the time of SACO. Just as in Okinawa, the older CH-53E is being replaced by the newer MV-22 Osprey, following construction of the necessary hangers and other support facilities, including housing for additional personnel. For more details, see Mark Abramson, “Kaneohe Marine base to get more than the MV-22 Osprey under new plan,” Pacific Business News Online, August 17, 2012. 112 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 182. 113 Ibid.176)

150 However, the push for integration with Kadena came up against even more stringent opposition from within the US military. The US Air Force and the Marine Corps remained heavily against the sharing of the base, and a senior White House official observed that “There’s nothing we can do about the egos and the rivalry in each of the services.”114 Furthermore, there was a risk that the anger directed at MCAS Futenma would pass on to Kadena Air Base, which had maintained comparatively good relations with its surrounding communities despite the immense noise pollution from its jets.115 This view was also supported by Yukio Okamoto, a private citizen who Prime Minister Hashimoto had asked “to handle Okinawan Affairs as a special advisor,” as recommended by Governor Ōta himself. He argued that integrating Futenma’s functions into Kadena would turn it into “the next focus of the antibase movement,” further jeopardizing the viability of the US military presence, the alliance, and thus the stability of the region.116 Protests that broke out in Okinawa City and the other towns and villages that border the air base supported these fears, and the Kadena option was discarded.117

By this time, attention within SACO was turning towards proposals for a sea-based facility (SBF), one that could be dismantled and removed when it was no longer necessary. In late August, Armitage suggested to Assistant Secretary of Defense Campbell that he look into the possibility of constructing the replacement facility as a mobile offshore base (MOB).118 This was far from a novel idea—the United States had employed temporary MOBs in previous conflicts, including the Vietnam War and the 1987 “Tanker Wars” in the Persian Gulf. Although the “mini-bases” in the latter conflict were relatively small platforms capable of housing just 177 and 132 personnel respectively, the mobile riverine base used in the Mekong River delta supported approximately 5,000 Army and Navy personnel. This floating base had been comprised of five barracks ships along with several other repair and supply ships. Each of the barracks ships—which themselves were converted from LSTs (landing ships, tanks)—

114 Quoted in ibid., 180. 115 Although Kadena Air Base is also the target of protest activities, open days like AmericaFest, which is held around the United States Independence Day of July 4th, and other community engagement activities help it maintain a good image within Okinawa. David Allen, “AmericaFest takes off July 4th on Kadena,” Stars and Stripes, June 13, 2007; Seth Robson, “July 4 fireworks, live concerts canceled at US bases in Japan,” ibid., June 22. The author herself has attended several of these activities, such as the Okinawan-American Shootout, a basketball tournament that involves the two U.S. high schools on Okinawa and a handful of the top local teams. 116 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 184-5. 117 Ibid., 174, 78; Brooks, The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995- 1997, 2005-2006, 18; Robert D. Eldridge, “Okinawa and the Nago heliport problem in the U.S.-Japan relationship,” Asia Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (2000): 141; “Residents Protest to Kadena Heliport Plan,” Jiji Press English News Service, 22 August, 1996. 118 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 186.

151 had been outfitted with helicopter decks and AMMI pontoons that served as operational platforms.119 Thus, although the mobile riverine base had been conceived and developed for temporary usage, it is not difficult to see why Armitage, who had served in the riverine forces in Vietnam, thought the concept worth exploring as a possible solution. Even though Campbell had not showed interest in the idea when it was raised by one of his staff members at an earlier date, now he began looking at it in earnest.120

But there was much resistance to the idea from both the US and Japanese sides. When Campbell gave a presentation about the MOB concept at the Pentagon, top civilian and military officials expressed strong opposition to the idea, largely because it was deemed unfeasible. The only voices that showed interest were Defense Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale, who suggested that it might enable Hashimoto and Ōta to persuade the Okinawans to accept the relocation. Having trained as an engineer, Perry, in particular, was willing to examine the idea to see if it was possible to develop the necessary technology.121 On the Japanese side, Hitoshi Tanaka and Masaki Orita—both from the North American Affairs Bureau in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)—were not only concerned that it was impossible on the technological front, but also that putting the idea of a removable, floating base on the table would prevent them from returning to any land-based options if it did prove unfeasible.122 As Orita pointed out, “Tabling something like that without even having done feasibility studies will just raise everyone’s hopes and stir things up.”123

However, Hashimoto was highly interested in the idea. The Prime Minister’s Office had, in fact, been looking into a similar idea since November 1995, when the previous Murayama administration commissioned preliminary feasibility study reports on using “floating construction methods” to build a possible replacement for Futenma offshore.124 The idea had originated from companies involved in the shipbuilding industry, which were trying to push floating construction methods after they had failed to secure a contract for the Kansai International Airport. Following that failure, they had created the Technological Research Association of the Mega-Float (TRAM) in April 1995 in order to test the feasibility of the

119 William B. Fulton, Major General, Riverine Operations 1966–1969 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1985). 120 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 186. 121 Ibid., 191-92. 122 Ibid., 189-90. 123 Quoted in ibid., 190. 124 Ibid., 205-07, 11.

152 technology for an offshore airport.125 A separate QIP (Quick Installation Platform method) group within the industry had been pushing for the replacement for Naha Port to be built using this technology, and also pitched for its use for the FRF by the end of 1995. At that time, Okinawan officials apparently also expressed interest in pursuing the feasibility of the idea.126

It is unclear why the Japanese side did not mention all of this interest in a sea-based floating facility before Campbell brought it up in discussion. As the former Minister of Transport (July 1986-November 1987) and also of Economy, Trade and Industry (July 1994-January 1996), Prime Minister Hashimoto is likely to have known of the industry’s push for involvement in constructing the FRF before he took office in January 1996. Furthermore, his political secretary had briefed both Hashimoto and CCS Kajiyama on the idea of a facility built using QIP methods in mid-August.127 At the latest, Hashimoto would have thus learned about the MOB idea before Campbell had started working on it. It was only after the US negotiators brought it up, however, that Prime Minister Hashimoto really expressed his enthusiasm for the idea. He argued that building a replacement facility that could be dismantled and removed in future would help diffuse opposition to what Okinawans feared would be a permanent new facility, thus aiding the implementation process.128 All things considered, an SBF—if technologically feasible—appeared to be the best political solution.

The switch of focus to the SBF proposal took the JDA by surprise, but they were ultimately unable to stop it. At this point, the agency was still pursuing integration with Kadena, and had just been sent to Hawaii to discuss its viability with the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet.129 When Campbell officially announced to a small group of SACO members the US side’s intention to table the MOB as an option for consideration, the JDA’s Masahiro

125 “U.S. suggests floating heliport to replace Okinawa base,” NIKKEI English News, September 17, 1996; Alliance Adrift, 206, 10-12. This test was apparently successful. TRAM published a report in 2001 concluding that construction of an airport with scale up to 4000m was technically feasible. However, this test had been conducted in the relatively sheltered confines of Tokyo Bay; Okinawa’s are more exposed, so a floating structure was likely to be exposed to higher waves than it would be in Tokyo, especially during the typhoon season. More tests would have been needed, so this technology actually arrived far too late for Okinawa, in any case. David Russell Schilling, “The World’s Largest Floating Airport, Tokyo Bay’s Megafloat,” Industry Tap, 2013; “Floating airport tested in Tokyo Bay,” The Japan Times, July 6, 2000; Japan Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, “A Stamp of Approval to Mega-Float Airport Feasibility,” http://www.mlit.go.jp/english/maritime/mega_float.html; Chiaki Sato and Ken-ichi Inoue, “Results of 6 years research project of Mega-float” (paper presented at the International Symposium on Ocean Space Utilization Technology, National Maritime Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan, January 28-31 2003). 126 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 211-12. 127 Ibid., 206. 128 Ibid., 204. 129 Ibid., 193-95.

153 Akiyama was stunned. As the two MOFA bureaucrats remained quiet, he sensed that this idea had already been discussed—in the absence of the JDA. Akiyama had doubts about the feasibility of the technology, which had been rejected for the Kansai International Airport project. The JDA was also critical of whether the PM’s Office and MOFA really understood the intensity of environmental activism in Okinawa, MCAS Futenma’s operational requirements, or the kind of bilateral alliance they wanted to have in the post-Cold War era.130 Nevertheless, although only a few weeks had passed since Campbell first began seriously considering the floating base option, it seemed to have become the most favoured option. On September 17, just a few days after Governor Ōta conceded on the base lease issue, Hashimoto himself went to Okinawa to make the announcement. Ōta declined to comment on the idea because the details of the proposal and the facility that might be built as a result were still unclear.131 The remaining two months before the SACO deadline were spent examining possible construction methods for the SBF

Of course, the details of these negotiations were only revealed several years later, with Yoichi Funabashi’s in-depth account based on interviews he’d collected with many of the key actors. At the time, few other details were revealed until the publication of “The SACO Final Report” on 2 December 1996, which confirmed the complete or partial return of all 11 facilities identified in the interim report. Regarding the replacement facility for MCAS Futenma, it stated that:

[T]he SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of US forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.132

However, this was far from finalized: the agreement specified that three construction methods would be examined in the development of a formal implementation plan, to be presented by the end of 1997.

This final report did not actually confirm where this SBF would be situated. Part of the reason for this may have been that plans for an SBF site continued to encounter intense local

130 Ibid., 194-97. 131 “Hashimoto vows to mull U.S. offshore heliport overture,” Japan Economic Newswire, September 17, 1996. 132 “The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report),” December 2, 1996, signed by Yukihiko Ikeda, Hideo Usui, William Perry, and Walter Mondale, asccessed 14 March, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco2.html.

154 resistance. When JDA Chief Fumio Kyuma told Okinawan reporters in November that the “open sea off Camp Schwab is a strong candidate,” immediate opposition from local fishermen and residents led to the Nago City Assembly’s second unanimous resolution against the construction of the heliport within the city’s jurisdiction.133 As a result, no locations were named in the SACO final report, and the Japanese government hoped to obtain cooperation from the prefecture and the local residents prior to making an official announcement.

5.6 In summary

On paper, the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) achieved something that few thought possible: a realignment agreement that included the “return” of MCAS Futenma, a military base in Okinawa, Japan, which had long been the focus on anti-base sentiment. As this chapter shows, the negotiation of the so-called SACO agreement was a complicated affair. Although observers often refer to the rape incident in September 1995 as the trigger that led to the realignment in Okinawa, the more important immediate concern for alliance managers was Okinawa governor Masahide Ōta’s refusal to cooperate in the implementation of an earlier base-management agreement: the Special Land Lease Law that provides the legal basis for use of private land by the US military. SACO represents the attempt made by US and Japanese alliance managers to address the tensions associated with these two developments in the mid-1990s, by “reducing the burden” that the US military presence places on Okinawa and its citizens. Driven by Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto’s strong investment in the issue, Tokyo and Washington agreed to “return” MCAS Futenma and several other facilities, so as to reduce the military footprint in the prefecture. These objectives were intended to reflect local preferences, but tensions in the prefecture continued once it was clarified that Futenma’s functions needed to be relocated within the prefecture. However, in searching for a solution, alliance managers soon became preoccupied with suggestions that originated from the major construction and shipbuilding industries in Japan, resulting in an agreement that reflected their interests and preferences more than those of Okinawa’s subnational actors.

133 Eldridge, “Okinawa and the Nago heliport problem in the U.S.-Japan relationship,” 142; Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 216.

155 ~Chapter 6~ Implementing SACO: the rise and fall of the 2002 Basic Plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility

“The SACO Final Report,” released on December 2, 1996 following more than a year of negotiations, specified the “return” of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) as the centerpiece of an agreement between Tokyo and Washington to reduce and consolidate the US military presence in Okinawa prefecture. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, agreements are not the end-point that negotiators seek; rather, they mark the start of what can be a drawn-out, contentious process of implementation. In fact, the first attempts to implement the objectives of this report ultimately ended in failure, after efforts to incorporate subnational preferences fell short. As a result, tensions that had started falling during the period where the central and local governments had some success working together started rising again towards the end of the SACO process.

This empirical chapter covers the two agreement-implementation sequences that comprise the second part of the base-management initiative that is the SACO process. It begins by examining the initial attempt to implement the SACO Final Report, particularly the efforts to convince Okinawa governor Masahide Ōta to cooperate in implementing the relocation of MCAS Futenma to a sea-based facility (SBF) off the northern coast of the prefecture. It then examines the Japanese government’s efforts to work with key subnational actors to develop and implement the 2002 Basic Plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).

6.1 Reactions to the SACO Final Report

Initial reactions to the SACO Final Report were largely negative. On the US side, the Marines questioned whether an SBF could meet the operational and safety requirements that MCAS Futenma’s replacement needed to fulfil. In particular, there were concerns that the limited size

156 of such a facility would not be able to contain all of the storage, repair and medical facilities required by US military guidelines. Furthermore, in contrast to the experimental facility that would be tested in the relatively sheltered confines of Tokyo Bay, Okinawa’s seas tend to be more exposed. If the facility was not robust enough to withstand Okinawa’s frequent typhoons, then the “floating” base could easily end up resting underwater as an incredibly expensive failure. To prevent that, the facility would have to be anchored to the seabed, and a massive sea wall built in order to reduce the severity of the swell; both of these measures would result in high levels of environmental damage.1

The operational costs of the replacement facility were another unknown factor at that point. Setting aside technology and engineering, even shifting closer to the sea increases maintenance costs because of the necessity to protect units and equipment against increased exposure to salt. As such, the proposal for an SBF was expected to exponentially increase these costs. For example, a 1998 report by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that the initial US estimate for maintenance costs of the SBF averaged out to over $200 million per year, more than seventy times the $2.8 million that was then being spent on maintaining MCAS Futenma.2 With all branches of the US armed forces facing the pressure of budget cuts at the time, this was easily a concern.3 US negotiators opened discussions with the Japanese side as to whether the latter would cover these costs.4

Finally, the Marine Corps also had concerns about the quality of life and the honor of the branch. As discussed in the previous chapter, there were fears that Camp Schwab’s location away from major population centers would make it less convenient for dependents, unless the facility could also be upgraded to provide the required amenities and services. However, a “floating” offshore facility would have to be limited in size, thus precluding the construction of buildings and facilities that were unnecessary for military operations. This would greatly reduce the quality of life for personnel and their dependents.5 As the 1998 GAO report pointed out, the DOD dependant schools were in the area near MCAS Futenma, which is

1 Robert V. Hamilton, “An idea that just won’t float,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1, 1997. 2 U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence in Okinawa, by Reginald L. Furr, Brian J. Lepore, Colin L. Chambers, Nancy L. Ragsdale, Julio A. Luna, and Richard Seldin, GAO/NSIAD-98-66 (Washington, DC, 1998), 37, accessed May 25, 2014, https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-98-66. 3 Thomas E. Ricks, “Armed Forces Prepare to Battle One Another Over Funds as Defense Spending Bottoms Out,” The Wall Street Journal, February 6, 1997; Susanne M. Schafer, “Navy chief says budget cuts won’t compromise force readiness,” Associated Press Newswires, January 28, 1997. 4 U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence in Okinawa, by Furr et al, 37. 5 Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 204.

157 more than 50 kilometers (31 miles) from Camp Schwab, where most personnel of the SBF facility were expected to be housed.6 Furthermore, relegation of US military personnel to an offshore base only reinforced the view that they were unwanted outsiders to be cloistered away until required in the case of an emergency.7 The Marine Corps thus had three major reasons to oppose the proposed SBF.

On the Japanese side, initial Okinawan reactions to the SACO Final Report were mixed. On the one hand, scholars, the local business community and the labor union of base workers welcomed the economic benefits that the relocation would bring to the less prosperous northern part of Okinawa. On the other hand, journalists and local political leaders were dissatisfied with the agreement. Since the “return” of MCAS Futenma and many of the other facilities named was attached to the condition that they be relocated within the prefecture, many regarded it as a betrayal of their expectations.8 Furthermore, although the proposed realignment did constitute a reduction in the land area for US military use in absolute terms, some communities felt that the burden was just being shifted around. For example, the partial return of the Northern Training Area was contingent on replacement helipads being built in other parts of the training area that were to be retained.9 Even the mayor of Ginowan City, from which Futenma was to be moved, commented that “[m]oving things from right to left inside the same cage isn’t going to change anything in Okinawa.”10

Several Okinawan actors also opposed SACO because of the proposed returns, primarily for economic reasons. Of the approximately 32,000 private landowners in the prefecture, more than 28,000 belong to the Okinawa Federation of Landowners of Land Used for Military

6 U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence in Okinawa, by Furr et al, 31-32. 7 Hamilton, “An idea that just won’t float.” 8 Eric Talmadge, “U.S. Defense Secretary Announces Okinawa Military Package,” The Associated Press, 2 December, 1996; “Okinawa Gov. Ota worried about offshore heliport,” Japan Economic Newswire, December 2, 1996; “Okinawa newspaper says Japanese-US committee failed to achieve real base reductions,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, December 4, 1996; “20,000 Okinawans stage protest against US base relocation plans,” Agence France-Presse, December 21, 1996. 9 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “The SACO Final Report.” December 2, 1996, signed by Yukihiko Ikeda, Hideo Usui, William Perry, and Walter Mondale, accessed December 5, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html. The replacement helipads have now been constructed close to the village of Takae, where activists opposed the implementation of the agreement, organizing a sit-in from 2007 and later trying to hinder construction by blocking roads leading to the site. Miya Tanaka, “FOCUS: Gov’t handling of Okinawa’s antibase fight remains open to question,” Kyodo News, January 31, 2017. 10 Eugene Moosa, “Okinawans sceptical about U.S.-Japan bases deal,” Reuters News, December 3, 1996.

158 Purposes.11 Many landowners relied on the income from the rents they received. Hence, local communities felt they should have been involved in discussions over which facilities would be returned because of the impact that lost rents would be expected to have, particularly given that increasing numbers of landowners were quite advanced in age.12 Similarly, local municipalities and self-governing bodies that leased land to the Japanese government for use by the US military were concerned that the loss of the rents would affect their own budgets.13 Others were keen to seek certain, small areas of land for return in order to improve issues such as access or flood control within their communities. All of these actors protested that they should have been consulted over the returns during the SACO process.14

Governor Ōta’s reaction reflected the mixed overall reactions in the prefecture. The governor initially took a neutral stance, suggesting that if the SACO objectives could be successfully carried out, “the prefecture’s demands for the first phrase of the bases reduction programme would have been met.”15 But although the committee presented the key changes as a response to the prefecture’s requests, the condition that many of these facilities be relocated within Futenma meant betraying the ultimate goal of “ridding Okinawa of all US bases” by 2015. Furthermore, while the key move of “returning Futenma” had indeed originated from Okinawa’s request, the developments in the second half of the year—where the SACO negotiators began considering a sea-based, floating facility as the replacement—were conducted in great secrecy. In other words, Tokyo and Washington had developed the proposed solution with little reference to other local interests like those of the landowners, which Governor Ōta and the prefectural government represented. Hence, dissatisfied with both the SACO Final Report and the process by which it had been negotiated, Ōta began to push for a reduction in the number of US military personnel deployed on Okinawa

11 Miwa Suzuki, “Okinawa landlords bitterly divided over US bases,” Agence France Presse, September 7, 1996. As mentioned in chapter 5, this interest group was the only one that did not have representatives at the October 1995 prefecture-wide rally, and also opposed the referendum the following September. 12 “Panel asks for 100 bil. yen for Okinawa economy,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 19, 1996. This was an ongoing issue. For example, towards the end of 1997, the association’s chairman, Shinei Nagahama, took a delegation of landowners to meet with the Defense Agency Director General Fumio Kyuma in Tokyo, in order to ask that their land continue to be used by the US military. “Landowners demand continued land use by US forces,” BBC Monitoring Service: Asia Pacific, December 10, 1997. 13 Jun Ōkubo, Gensō no Shima Okinawa (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha, 2009), 39-40. 14 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 215-16. 15 Moosa, “Okinawans sceptical about U.S.-Japan bases deal.”

159 6.2 The tussle over troop reductions

Ōta’s demand for troop reductions opened another phase in this alliance management process. Prime Minister Ryūtarõ Hashimoto travelled to Okinawa to discuss the agreement with the governor and promised to create a post within the Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) specifically for dealing with military basing issues in the prefecture. The Japanese leader also pledged 5 billion yen in a supplementary budget for Okinawa, and promised that implementation of the agreement would proceed in consultation with locals.16 However, just one week following the SACO announcement, Ōta announced at a news conference that he would seek not only a reduction in the number of facilities, but also in the number of military personnel stationed in the prefecture.17 US officials promptly signalled that they were not open to troop cuts, although they would consider any Okinawan proposals for further consolidation and reduction of the facilities within the prefecture.18

Ordinarily, the views of a mere governor are not expected to have a large impact on negotiations. However, others shared a similar perspective. US scholars Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki had also started questioning the role of the Marines in the region. Writing in the wake of the 1995 rape incident, they argued that while there was enough lift in Japan—in the form of units assigned to Sasebo Navel Port in —to transport approximately 2000 Marines to a regional contingency, the rest of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) would need to wait for additional transports to be dispatched from the continental United States. Given these restrictions, they did not consider the Marine Corps to be the appropriate response force for several important regional issues, including “possible Chinese threats to the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, or the sea lanes of the South China Sea.”19 They pointed out that the facilities in Okinawa were primarily for training and maintaining readiness, and thus could be shifted elsewhere. Furthermore, restrictions, especially during evening hours, were a hindrance to the readiness of units that might be expected to conduct night missions when deployed overseas.20 Hence, any further restrictions that might be applied in order to appease the local community were a concern, especially

16 “Hashimoto vows ‘Okinawa envoy’ to deal with U.S. bases,” Japan Economic Newswire, December 5, 1996. 17 “Okinawa governor seeks fewer US marines on island,” Reuters News, December 9, 1996. 18 “U.S. open for more Okinawa actions, but no troop cuts,” Japan Economic Newswire, January 19, 1996. 19 Mike Mochizuki and Michael O’Hanlon, “The Marines Should Come Home: Adapting the U.S.-Japan alliance to a new security era,” Brookings Newsletter Spring issue (1996), accessed March 17, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1996/03/spring-japan-ohanlon. 20 Eric Talmadge, “In Key Pacific Military Outpost, U.S. Troops Tone Down Their Act,” The Associated Press, July 22, 1996.

160 since other factors such as a recent attempt at restructuring the force had resulted in a loss of skilled personnel and training opportunities.21 There was thus an argument to be made for reducing the number of Marines in Okinawa instead, as a way of appeasing local discontent.

Responding to Ōta’s request and the arguments that supported it, officials on both sides of the Pacific began looking into the possibility of cuts. In the United States, Richard Armitage— long a respected voice in relation to security policy and security relations with Japan, and who had served as both Deputy Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs—was in favor of bringing some of the Marines to Guam. In Japan, Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) Seiroku Kajiyama told the Foreign Ministry to look into the possibility of the shift. The Social Democratic Party (SDP), then in a coalition government with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was also heavily in favor. Even if the United States was not keen to reduce actual numbers of Marines stationed in Okinawa, given that it was usually below the stated number of 18,000 due to overseas deployments and training, proponents of the move argued that the cut could be largely symbolic, merely matching the official number with the reality.22

The Marine Corps resisted these moves. They argued that III MEF was an important resource that could be used during other kinds of contingencies in the region, such as humanitarian assistance and evacuation in the case of natural disasters. Given their amphibious capabilities, they were also important in the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOC) through the South China Sea up to Japan. In the case of conflict, the 1994 Navy and Marine Corps White Paper, Forward…From the Sea, emphasized that Marines operating together with the Navy “can seize and defend advanced bases—ports and airfields—to enable the flow of land-based air and ground force.”23 Designed to be particularly effective in the early onset of hostilities, the forward deployment of the Marine Corps in the Asia-Pacific was thus argued to be a deterrent against conventional attacks from hostile powers.

21 U.S. Government General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Data and Trends for January 1990 to March 1995 (Washington, DC, 1996), 11, accessed April 11, 2017, https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-96- 111BR. 22 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 333. 23 United States Department of the Navy, Forward ... from the Sea (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 1994).

161 A number of scholars with high-level military experience supported the Marine Corps’ position, making arguments in favor of retaining the full III MEF contingent in Okinawa.24 First, they pointed out that pulling part of the force out would send a signal that the United States was not committed to the region, which might induce an arms race amongst concerned US allies. Furthermore, once removed, it was unlikely that Japan or Okinawa would allow their numbers to be increased again in the future. Reducing the numbers of Marines in Okinawa would also be detrimental operationally. For example, Noboru Yamaguchi argued that the proximity of Okinawa to the region’s potential hotspots was crucial. The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) based in Okinawa, supported by an amphibious squadron based at Sasesbo Naval Port, amounted to a “ready landing team” that could be deployed at incredibly short notice. Although other units would have to wait for lift from Guam or the continental United States, the MEU would be part of an immediate response force that could establish a beachhead in preparation for their arrival. In order to ensure sufficient training and readiness for this kind of operation, Yamaguchi argued that it was important that III MEF remain in Okinawa.25 In short, given Okinawa’s proximity not only to Taiwan but also to the Korean Peninsula and the SLOC in Southeast Asia, it made sense from a strategic and logistical perspective for the force to be based there even if there was not enough dedicated lift to transport the entire III MEF at once.

Ultimately, the United States backed away from committing to a reduction in troop numbers during the SACO process. But it was not just the strategic and operational arguments that influenced its decision: the position of the LDP’s coalition partner, the SDP, generated resistance from US officials. As outlined in Chapter 5, a bill for modifying the Special Land Lease Law had been proposed in response to Governor Ōta’s refusal to sign the base leases as proxy in 1995. In order to prevent a similar occurrence in the future, the government tabled an amendment to give Tokyo legal authority over land being used by US military forces until the prefectural expropriation committee grants the necessary lease approvals. If the committee refused to approve the leases, the Japanese government could then seek final approval from

24 Ralph A. Cossa, ed. Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Toward a More Equal Partnership (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997). See also Michael J. Green, “State Of The Field Report: Research On Japanese Security Policy,” NBR Publications: AccessAsia Review 2, no. 1 (1998). 25 Noboru Yamaguchi, “Why the U.S. Marines Should Remain in Okinawa: a Military Perspective,” in Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Toward a More Equal Partnership, ed. Ralph A. Cossa (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 103-06.

162 the Minister of Construction.26 But the SDP had gone so far as to push for troop reductions in exchange for supporting this bill, giving US officials the impression that the issue was being treated as another political chess piece on the domestic chessboard. In the end, the LDP joined forces with opposition parties, including political heavyweight Ichirō Ozawa’s New Frontier Party, to pass the amendment on April 17, 1997.27

This political tussle over the Marine Corps personnel numbers in Okinawa had negative implications for alliance management. MOFA and JDA officials wanted to continue developing a “true” alliance partnership, wherein leaders from both countries would discuss and make joint decisions over the necessary forces and capabilities as well as integration and interoperability between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the US military. But the suspicion that this issue was being used as a political football in Japan’s domestic politics generated tensions and distrust on the US side. This distrust, later exacerbated by the departures of Secretary of Defense William Perry and Ambassador Walter Mondale at the beginning of the second Clinton administration, hindered further efforts to improve cooperation between the allies. Despite the release of the updated Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation later that year (September 1997), there continued to be challenges achieving interoperability between the US military and the JSDF.28

The tension between the two sides at this elite level was a reflection of deeper problems within the alliance. Despite efforts to improve integration and cooperation over the years, starting with the 1979 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, aside from the US Navy and the Maritime SDF, the US forces and the JSDF did not have much practical

26 “SDP, Sakigake ask LDP for accord on U.S. base cuts,” Japan Economic Newswire, April 14, 1997. The Ministry of Construction would later be merged with the Ministry of Transport, becoming the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, as a result of the 2001 Central Government Reform. 27 “Okinawa forced land lease bill clears Diet,” Japan Economic Newswire, April 17, 1997. This amendment was passed just before over 3,000 leases had been due to expire on May 14. It removed the ability of those landowners to sue the Japanese government for access to their land as Shoichi Chibana had done the previous year. In other words, due to its timing, Ōta’s challenge had paradoxically enabled Tokyo to resolve the issue with far less damage than the allies might otherwise have been confronted with. 28 These challenges were exposed as the United States and Japan worked together to respond to the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011. Robert Eldridge, then a liaison officer for the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa, and Major General Jiro Hiroe noted in a discussion in July 2011 that the Japanese side “lacked full understanding of the capabilities of the U.S. forces,” which hindered and complicated the joint response. Another of the lessons learned from the operation was the importance of cross-service collaboration, e.g. the JGSDF conducting joint exercises with the US Navy would facilitate cooperation during an actual crisis. See Jiro Hiroe, Robert D. Eldridge, and Hidemichi Katsumata, “Behind the Scenes of Operation Tomodachi,” Discuss Japan — Japan Foreign Policy Forum 8 (2011), published electronically November 29, 2011, accessed April 28, 2019, https://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/archives/politics/pt20111129170122.html. See also Michael Bosack, “The Legacy of 3/11 and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Tokyo Review, March 9, 2018.

163 experience operating together.29 Alliance management largely consisted of negotiations about what each side wanted: issues like greater defense spending from Japan, host nation support, the reduction and consolidation of bases away from residential areas, noise reduction measures and even trade surpluses were often highlighted in the media. The Japanese side wanted to take the experience of SACO and turn the bargaining that had previously characterised US-Japan defense interaction into a more cooperative framework, one that enabled frank debate about security cooperation across the whole of Japan. By extension, they wanted to discuss questions of force structure and cooperation with reference to regional and global security, not just in relation to domestic politics in Okinawa.30

The US side, however, was “alarmed” by such moves from the Japanese side. Although many Japan experts in the departments of State and Defense were also keen for the alliance to be upgraded for the post-Cold War era, there were concerns because Japan did not seem to be sure what kind of alliance it wanted. This was partly due to the ongoing realignment in Japanese politics at the national level during the 1990s, which was not helped by the weak position that the JDA held in the bureaucracy. Japanese leaders at the time were trying to emphasise a greater role for their nation in regional and global affairs—including security— but there was disagreement over exactly what that role should be. The Hosokawa government, for example, had come into existence only by because it abandoned the Socialist Party’s pacifist, anti-alliance defence policy to form a coalition with the LDP. Ozawa called for expanding the JSDF’s role in peacekeeping, while others such as former Prime Minister wanted to focus on disarmament.31 Within this environment, the US side was understandably suspicious of their counterparts’ motives in bringing up force structure in relation not only to the international security environment but also to the domestic issues surrounding the bases. Without a common vision for the alliance and its role in regional and global security, the US side was unwilling to discuss such issues.32 The combination of these

29 The third Armitage-Nye report on the U.S. Japan alliance, released in 2012, notes that “[t]he U.S. Navy and [Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)] have demonstrated [interoperability] for decades. The U.S. Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) are making progress; but U.S. Army/Marine Corps cooperation with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) has been limited due to a contrast in focus.” The lessons learned from Operation Tomodachi, following the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear power plant disaster in Japan in March 2011, have also contributed to increased efforts for joint military exercises in a range of situations. Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2012), 11-12. 30 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 219. 31 Thomas U. Berger, “Alliance Politics and Japan’s Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism,” in The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 200-01. 32 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 219.

164 factors saw the cooperation achieved during the one-year SACO discussions dissipate, leaving the push for better integration and interoperability between the allies languishing until it was incorporated into the Defense Posture Review Initiative in the mid-2000s.33 The question about troop reductions in Okinawa was thus settled in favor of the Marine Corps, with the entirety of III MEF to remain in Okinawa.

6.3 Local complications and the Nago City referendum

Even as alliance managers wrestled over the question of Marine Corps troop numbers in Okinawa, the reaction of various groups in the prefectures contributed to the troubled process of implementing the SACO agreement. As mentioned in the previous section, initial Okinawan reactions to the SACO Final Report and the agreement to relocate MCAS Futenma within the prefecture were mixed. On the one hand, a group of citizens organised a 20,000- strong protest.34 Nago mayor Tetsuya Higa also voiced his frustration over how the drafters of the report did not “understand the feelings of Okinawans.”35 On the other hand, representatives of the business community and the labor union for Japanese workers employed on US military facilities expressed their support for the agreement because it preserved the economic structure on which their members depended. Later that month, however, the business community presented a proposal for building the heliport on land reclaimed form the sea, instead of employing the technologically advanced shipbuilding methods named in the agreement. This would allow for the participation of local companies that did not possess such high-level technologies. Additionally, they requested that the new facility be returned in its entirety to the community by 2015 so that it could be used as a civilian airport.36

Governor Ōta’s response, which shifted between neutral and opposed over the next few months, reflected the divisions in the prefecture. Taking the views of the business community into account, Ōta indicated in a December 1996 meeting with Prime Minister Hashimoto that he was willing to cooperate with the central government in implementing the agreement,

33 In fact, the allies would continue to make little progress on this issue until at least 2013. See Thomas Storch, “Putting “Meat on the Bones” of the U.S.-Japan Alliance Coordination Mechanism,” Sasakawa USA Forum Issue No. 2 (2016): 3-4. 34 “20,000 Okinawans stage protest against US base relocation plans.” 35 “Okinawa Governor expresses “concern” over proposed offshore heliport,” BBC Monitoring Service: Asia- Pacific, December 4, 1996. 36 “Okinawa Biz proposes heliport on landfill,” Jiji Press English News Service, December 26, 1996.

165 coordinating with local communities as necessary.37 When the Japanese government officially named the open sea off Camp Schwab as the best candidate for the SBF in January 1997, Ōta initially restated his opposition to relocation within the prefecture, but then retreated to a neutral position, saying that it was a matter “to be settled between the Japanese government and Nago.”38 As the scholar Masamichi Inoue observes, Ōta was trapped in the no-win situation of having to choose between rejecting the facility and thus the subsidy money from Tokyo or accepting the deal but betraying his own anti-base position.39 In passing off the responsibility to the Nago government, he may have been attempting avoid alienating both factions.

Nago mayor Higa’s reaction similarly reflected the conflicting interests of his constituency. Although backed by several groups that would benefit from the construction of the base, including the Northern Okinawa Construction Industry Association, Higa initially took a position against accepting the construction of MCAS Futenma’s replacement within the Nago area, and refused to approve the Japanese government’s request for a feasibility study.40 However, following consultation with local citizens and industry leaders, Higa reneged in April 1997 and accepted the study, although he maintained that “this does not mean that the new base will be built. It is just a preliminary survey.”41 In July, the Japanese government conducted a survey in the waters off Camp Schwab in Nago, with the approval of the prefectural government.42 By September, rumors were that the area near the village of Henoko was the prime candidate to be the location for the replacement facility.43

While these negotiations were being conducted between the central and local governments, the division within the prefecture crystallized as the Nago’s citizens mobilized into two groups lobbying for opposing interests. The pro-agreement faction, driven by the Construction Industry Association and the Henoko Women’s Association, advocated the

37 “Ota airs cooperation in new Okinawa heliport,” Jiji Press English News Service, December 5, 1996. 38 Quoted in Masamichi S. Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 129. See also Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, 215; Robert D. Eldridge, “Okinawa and the Nago heliport problem in the U.S.-Japan relationship,” Asia Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (2000): 143-44; “Nago rejects request for heliport site survey,” Jiji Press English News Service, January 21, 1997. 39 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 128-29. 40 “Nago rejects request for heliport site survey.”. 41 Ryukyu Shimpo April 1997, quoted in Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 132. See also “Nago mayor accepts gov’t study on heliport site,” Japan Economic Newswire, April 9, 1997. 42 “Okinawa to Approve Boring Survey for Heliport,” Jiji Press English News Service, July 31, 1997. 43 “Government denies Camp Schwab chosen as heliport site,” BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, September 9, 1997.

166 interests of the working class that had moved to the north to take advantage of Henoko’s boom during the Vietnam War (as outlined in Chapter 3). They decided early on to “actively invite the base” to Nago in the expectation that the accompanying development plans promised by Tokyo would revitalize the area’s flagging economy.44 At the same time, groups opposing the agreement mobilized around environmental and quality of life concerns such as noise pollution and the risk of accidents and crime. In Henoko, a group of 26 residents founded the Society for the Protection of Life in January 1997.45 The group protested Higa’s acceptance of the feasibility study by staging sit-ins outside his office and also set up the “struggle hut” near the Henoko beach as a symbol and focal point of their opposition. A number of other political, labor and social organizations in the surrounding districts also expressed their opposition to the base. Then in April 1997, worried that their concerns would be ignored by the central and local governments, which seemed to be proceeding with implementation processes, a group of 150 Nago residents became determined to put the question of accepting the agreement to a public referendum.46 By June, the city-wide Coalition for Realizing a Nago City Referendum about the heliport had been formed from more than twenty smaller political, labor and social organizations that were opposed to the agreement.47

The Nago City referendum clearly demonstrates how contested the debate over the agreement was at this point. The lead-up to the referendum represented a small victory for the anti- agreement groups. Higa and the Nago City Assembly were not in favor of a referendum, fearing it would reveal that a majority of residents were opposed to accepting the replacement facility in the city.48 The prefectural and city governments had already declared that they would not accept the relocation against the wishes of the local residents; as such, they anticipated that an anti-agreement result would introduce another hurdle to the implementation process. By August, however, the referendum coalition had collected more than 17,000 signatures, representing 46% of the Nago’s 38,000 eligible votes, which they presented to Higa, who then submitted a bill for the referendum to the city assembly. A

44 Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 131. 45 Caroline Spencer, “Meeting of the Dugongs and the Cooking Pots: Anti-military Base Citizens’ Groups on Okinawa,” Japanese Studies 23, no. 2 (2003): 126; Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 141. 46 “Nago residents eye holding vote on heliport,” Japan Economic Newswire, April 29, 1997. 47 Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 140. The group’s title in Japanese (romaji) was “Heripoto Kichi Kensetsu no Zehi o Tou Nago Shimin Tohyo Suishin Kyogikai” Eldridge, “Okinawa and the Nago heliport problem in the U.S.-Japan relationship,” 144-45. 48 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 139.

167 revised version of the bill was passed on a margin of 17 to 11.49 Whether they themselves were for or against the accepting MCAS Futenma’s replacement, the members of the city assembly could not ignore the overwhelming interest that the local community showed for democratically expressing their opinion. At the end of October, Higa announced that the referendum would be held before the end of the year, on December 21.50

However, the pro-agreement faction did not stay silent in the face of the opposition. Over the intervening months, pro-agreement actors worked to shift the nature of the debate about the bases, placing a greater emphasis on the economic benefits that they might bring. On September 2, the JDA created a task group that would work towards developing and implementing the construction plan for the FRF; they were also tasked with developing “measures to promote Okinawa’s economy and how the Futenma base site should be used after its return.”51 With their support and that of the local construction industry, the pro- agreement faction established a group, the Nago Citizen’s Organization for Revitalization and Stimulation.52 This group organised rallies and other gatherings in order to disseminate information about the benefits that the facility would bring to Okinawa’s north, which was lagging behind the more populous southern municipalities. They also worked with the Nago City Assembly to modify the referendum bill, adding two responses contingent on what voters expected they would receive in return for accepting the burden on the behalf of the rest of Okinawa and Japan (See Table 6.1 on the next page). Instead of a simple “yes”/”no” vote, the referendum allowed Nago’s citizens to signal their acceptance or rejection of the replacement facility in Nago based on whether they believe Tokyo could satisfactorily provide measures for economic stimulation and protection of the environment.53

The results of the referendum, which was held in December 1997, only complicated the issue further. Nago residents voted against the relocation plan by a margin of 53 to 45 percent. The anti-agreement faction viewed this result as a win for their cause, especially since the Japanese government had stated that it would not relocate the base against the will of the citizens.54 However, the 82 percent voter turnout meant that “no” votes did not encompass a

49 “Citizens in Okinawa city file referendum plea on heliport,” BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, September 17, 1997. 50 “Japan city to vote on floating heliport for U.S.,” Reuters News, October 30, 1997. 51 “Japan Sets Up Task Force for Futenma Base Return,” Jiji Press English News Service, September 2, 1997. 52 Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, 1st ed ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 167. 53 “Nago mayor wants referendum on heliport before yearend,” Japan Policy & Politics, June 3, 1996. 54 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 185; “Hashimoto Promises Full Consultation on Heliport Project,” Jiji Press English News Service, June 5, 1997; “Japan Seen Tolerant of Delay in Nago Heliport,” Jiji Press English News Service, October 3, 1997.This was in contrast to the

168 majority of eligible voters, and some of the pro-agreement lobby regarded the result as a “default victory” because the proportion of “yes” votes had exceeded their expectations.55 Although 16,254 voters rejected the replacement facility outright, 11,705 signalled their approval in exchange for measures to protect the environment and boost the economy in the north of the prefecture. If the vote had involved a simple black and white choice between approval and disapproval, it is likely that more than half of eligible voters would have chosen to reject the base, due to the overwhelming sentiment against the US military at the time. The introduction of these two contingent options thus pointed to the division within the community, and arguably turned the tide of the debate in favor of the pro-agreement faction.

Table 6.1: Voting Results of the Nago City Referendum

Option # Votes % of votes % of eligible cast voters 1. Disapproval 16,254 52.6 42.6 2. Disapproval because measures to protect 385 1.2 1.0 the environment and boost the economy cannot be expected 3. Approval because measures to protect the 11,705 37.9 30.7 environment and boost the economy can be expected 4. Approval 2562 8.3 6.7 Totals 30,908 100 81.0 (total # of eligible voters: 38,176)

The intensification and the increasing effectiveness of the pro-base economic argument were further reflected in the political aftermath of the referendum. On December 24, Higa pledged that the city would accept the relocation plan in exchange for subsidies, citing the Henoko administration’s conditional acceptance of the base. He then promptly resigned to take responsibility for the political division within the city.56 Higa’s on-the-fence stance was representative of the class split: Nago’s working class were more likely to welcome the relocation for the economic benefits it would bring, and felt that many anti-base protestors

prefecture-wide referendum held the previous year, where 53 percent of eligible voters had opposed the relocation of the base within Okinawa. 55 “Nago residents reject US heliport; reactions detailed,” BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, December 23, 1997. 56 Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 193; “Nago Mayor Higa Accepts Heliport, Offers to Resign,” Jiji Press English News Service, December 24, 1997.

169 forgot or ignored the fact that their ability to reject the economic development plans had been built on earlier base-related subsidies.57 The subsequent mayoral election in January underscored this issue, as Tateo Kishimoto was elected on a platform that emphasized economic issues but left the base issue to the prefectural governor. By this point, however, Ōta had abandoned his neutral position to oppose the relocation of Futenma anywhere within the prefecture, citing the results of the referendum; in response, the Japanese government cut its subsidies to Okinawa, and the joint talks between the prefecture and Tokyo on the relocation of MCAS Futenma stalled for the rest of Ōta’s governorship.58

6.4 Governor Inamine and the influence of the pro- and anti-agreement factions

This stalemate was broken with the 1998 gubernatorial election, when voter support shifted towards local politicians who represented the interests and preferences of the pro-agreement faction. On November 15, incumbent governor Masahide Ōta was defeated by the candidate backed by the central government, Keiichi Inamine, who offered conditional support for relocating MCAS Futenma within the prefecture. According to Ōta, the loss can be attributed largely to shifts in the domestic political alignments in Japan.59 In the 1990 and 1994 gubernatorial elections, the outgoing governor had been endorsed by the New Kōmeitō and five other parties on the progressive side of the political spectrum. However, during the political upheaval at the national level in the mid-1990s, the party split and then reformed along more conservative lines, subsequently joining with the LDP in a coalition government in 1998. This political realignment at the national level changed the calculus in the prefecture. While the Okinawa branch of the New Kōmeitō did not endorse Inamine outright, they did not endorse Ōta either, instead allowing supporters to vote for either candidate.60 This shift in voting preferences is the main factor to which Ōta attributes his 1998 loss.

Other observers, however, postulated that economic factors played a bigger part in Inamine’s win. After Tokyo cut its subsidies in response to Ōta’s refusal to cooperate, unemployment in

57 Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 194. 58 Chalmers Johnson, “The Heliport, Nago, and the end of the Ota Era,” in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 220-21. 59 Satoshi Morimoto, The Mysterious Twists in the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma Relocation Plan (Tokyo: Kairyuusha, 2010); interview with former governor Masahide Ota, conducted in Naha, Okinawa Prefecture, in November 2014. 60 “Ota, Inamine even in Okinawa governorship race: poll,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 9, 1998.

170 Okinawa spiked from approximately 6 percent to nearly 8 percent.61 Ōta nevertheless made his opposition to the continued US military presence in the prefecture the foundation of his reelection campaign, and insisted that MCAS Futenma be closed and its functions moved to another prefecture or overseas.62 In contrast, Inamine stated that he would conditionally approve the replacement facility while focusing his platform on the economy of the prefecture. He highlighted the positive benefits that the facility would bring to the prefecture and especially to Nago City and other municipalities in Okinawa’s north, pledging that he would push for a joint civilian-military facility that would improve the local business environment.63 The combination of these two factors—the loss of support from the New Kōmeitō for Ōta and the deteriorating Okinawan economy that Inamine promised to address—shifted local support towards the challenger’s more pragmatic stance, and he defeated his opponent by a margin of over 27,000 votes (374,833 to 337,369).64

Alliance managers regarded Inamine’s election to the governorship as a promising development in the tussle over the relocation of MCAS Futenma. The Japanese government was relieved that the so-called “pro-base” candidate had won and pledged to work with local political and industry leaders to develop a plan for construction that would bring greater benefits to the local economy. On November 24, Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi, who had taken over from Hashimoto in July of that year, met with the governor-elect at his residence in Tokyo, where the two agreed to resume the stalled talks on the relocation of MCAS Futenma.65 Inamine emphasised the Okinawan people’s desire for the “reorganization and reduction of military bases in the prefecture.” He also asked that Tokyo grant Okinawa the full budget it had requested for the following fiscal year and put forward the prefecture as a candidate for the 2000 summit that Japan was scheduled to host.66

However, Inamine’s election also meant a return to an earlier stage in the implementation process. The new governor’s preference that the replacement facility be built on reclaimed land far out from the Okinawan mainland required a new set of feasibility and impact studies due to the changed method of construction. Early in 1999, Governor Inamine established a

61 Nobuhiro Fujisawa, “The Okinawan Economy and Its Employment Issues,” Okinawa University Journal of Law & Economics 17 (2012): 62. 62 “Ota, Inamine even in Okinawa governorship race: poll.” 63 Jon Herskovitz, “Economy vies with U.S. bases in Okinawa election,” Reuters News, November 8, 1998; “Ota, Inamine even in Okinawa governorship race: poll.” 64 “Gov. Ota’s challenger claims victory in Okinawa gubernatorial elections,” Associated Press Newswires, October 29, 1998. 65 “Japan Govt to Resume Okinawa Policy Talks,” Jiji Press English News Service, November 24, 1998. 66 “Obuchi, Okinawa governor-elect agree to hold meeting,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 24, 1998.

171 private advisory panel to evaluate and make recommendations on siting the new facility, and their recommendation in August reaffirmed the sea off the coast of Camp Schwab in Nago’s Henoko district as the most appropriate candidate site.67 The Japanese government effectively had to take a step back and allow Okinawa to examine many of the options that had already been considered during the SACO process.68 In the meantime, the Obuchi administration took several measures to implement its promise to promote Okinawa’s economy. As part of administrative reform within the government, the prime minister created a post that was effectively “an administrative vice minister for Okinawa” within the newly established Cabinet Office.69 This institution, the top level of the bureaucracy sitting directly under the prime minister, was formed through the merger of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Economic Planning Agency, and the Okinawa Development Agency and Okinawa General Bureau.70 Working under the umbrella of the reformed Okinawa General Bureau, the newly appointed vice-minister would be responsible for coordinating between ministries to implement policies aimed at developing more advanced industries within the prefecture, as well as plans for utilizing the land to be returned by the US military.71

These moves were welcomed in Okinawa as a sign of the Japanese government’s commitment, and the preference for relocation within the prefecture in exchange for economic benefits began to gather traction. In April 1999, a group of residents from the Henoko district filed a request with the prefectural government to invite Tokyo to build the facility near Camp Schwab.72 In August, the municipal assembly of Ginowan City—where MCAS Futenma is located—also adopted a resolution expressing its acceptance of the transfer within Okinawa.73 However, the request that it be built completely offshore remained: on September 24, the Henoko Administrative Committee adopted a resolution opposing a construction plan involving both reclaimed land and land already set aside for the US

67 “Inamine’s panel says Nago best site for base relocation,” Japan Economic Newswire, September 1, 1999. 68 “Defence head scraps plan to form panel on future use of Okinawa bases,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, January 22, 1999; “Japan foreign minister urges USA to wait for Okinawa’s decision on base,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, September 4, 1999. See also “Okinawa frets over 2000 ‘deadline’ to solve base issue,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 29, 1999. 69 “Top post for Okinawa to be created in Cabinet Office,” Japan Economic Newswire, January 12, 1999. 70 Jon Choy, “Obuchi Government approves government reorganization plan,” in JEI Report (Japan Economic Institute of America, 1999); “Diet enacts administrative reform legislation.,” Japan Policy & Politics, July 12, 1999. As mentioned in chapter 3, the Okinawa Development Agency and the Okinawa General Bureau were institutions set up to facilitate the development and implementation of policies designed to help Okinawa catch up to the Japanese mainland economically and socially. 71 “Top post for Okinawa to be created in Cabinet Office.” 72 “Futenma chronology: Outrage sparked relocation,” The Japan Times, November 22, 1999. 73 “Ginowan assembly supports base transfer within Okinawa,” Japan Economic Newswire, August 21, 1999.

172 military.74 Then in November 1999, Governor Inamine formally accepted MCAS Futenma’s relocation within the prefecture,75 with Nago mayor Kishimoto also indicating his support the following month, despite continuing to express concern that the increased size of a joint facility would have an adverse effect on local residents.76 This growing swell of local support seemed to suggest that implementation of SACO’s recommendations would only be a matter of time.77

On the other hand, economic interests played a hand in fracturing the anti-agreement faction. One of the anti-base women’s groups, the Janu no Kai (“Group of the Dugongs”) had succeeded in turning the dugong, which was believed to be a resident of the proposed site, into an environmental and cultural symbol for resistance.78 However, the reliance on the dugong as a symbol for mobilization and a source of funding eventually drove a wedge between the Society for the Protection of Life and the citywide coalition.79 Environmental concerns were regarded as a middle-class preoccupation that disregarded the reality experienced by the working class in the north, who argued that “Our life is more important than the dugong’s. Without jobs [i.e. without the base, be it the existing facilities at Camp Schwab or the offshore base being developed at the time], we can’t live.” In response, the Henoko-based society tried unsuccessfully to bring the focus back to local issues in order to avoid alienating local residents.80 Due to this class-based division, the anti-agreement faction lost much of its influence even as the Japanese government and Nago City cooperated to develop plans for the joint-use facility.

However, Inamine’s two conditions for the replacement facility complicated the implementation of the agreement to return MCAS Futenma. Envisioning developments that would enable Nago to rival Naha—the capital of Okinawa Prefecture and its most populous city—as “a hub of business activity,” the governor continued to push for a joint commercial- military facility.81 But he also pushed for a time limit of 15 years on military use, which was

74 “Rikujyō, umetate ryōan ni hantai / Henoko-ku gyōsei ga kaketu / Futenma hikōjyō isetsu,” Ryukyu Shimpo, September 25, 1999. 75 “Futenma chronology: Outrage sparked relocation.” 76 “Dual use would increase heliport size, Nago mayor says,” Japan Policy & Politics, December 13, 1999. 77 “Japan foreign minister urges USA to wait for Okinawa’s decision on base.” 78 Spencer, “Meeting of the Dugongs and the Cooking Pots: Anti-military Base Citizens’ Groups on Okinawa,” 133. 79 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 190-92. 80 Ibid., 188. 81 Ibid., 202. The conservative commentator, Ryōnosuke Megumi, has argued that Inamine only added the 15- year limit one year after the election, thus suggesting that Okinawans had in fact been willing to accept a

173 intended to mollify resistance by reassuring the Okinawan people that the base would not be permanent. Inoue argues that it was the “magma” of anti-base opposition in Okinawa that led Inamine to demand these conditions in a show of partial resistance to Tokyo.82 The proposal, supported through resolutions passed by the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly (October 1999) and the Nago City Assembly (December 1999), constrained the Japanese government.83 On the one hand, the US side rejected the time limit outright; on the other hand, a refusal to accede to these demands risked offending Okinawa and wasting all the effort that had been put into the negotiations since 1995. Faced with this dilemma, the Japanese government downplayed US resistance to the time limit by reassuring Okinawans that they would raise the issue of the time limit in elite-level negotiations—despite not actually doing so—and agreed to use Inamine’s conditions as a basis for renegotiating the design of the replacement facility.84

The desire of the local construction industry for a project that they could have greater participation in also contributed to the changes in the trajectory of implementation at this point. The major problem with the “floating” facility that Hashimoto and Japan’s shipbuilding industry had been pushing for was that all of the suggested construction methods involved advanced technologies that Okinawa construction companies did not possess. Hence, although Okinawan workers might have been hired for labor if the facility were to be constructed according to one of those proposals, most of the profits and other major economic benefits would go to mainland companies rather than staying in the prefecture. This went against one of the arguments that Inamine and other local leaders were using to persuade residents to acquiesce to the construction of the replacement facility. Hence, in order to give local companies the opportunity for a greater share in construction-related economic benefits, the Okinawan and Nago business communities pushed for the replacement facility to be built on land reclaimed from the sea.85

permanent new offshore facility. However, news reports from the election year mention the 15-year limit (e.g. Patrick Smith, “Can Okinawa Live Without The U.S.?,” Time Magazine online, November 9, 1998.). 82 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 207. Though this is a “what if” situation for which the outcome can never be known, several Okinawan scholars that the author interviewed anonymously argue that he is unlikely to have been elected if he had not named these conditions. 83 Eldridge, “Okinawa and the Nago heliport problem in the U.S.-Japan relationship,” 137. 84 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 207. 85 Takemasa Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru,” Chuo Koron, January 2010. The decision of the Japanese government to abandon the original plan for the replacement facility would also have been based on factors such as the prohibitive cost of building and running a sea-based facility and serious doubts that such an ambitious project could actually be realized, as noted in the 1998 GAO report (U.S. General Accounting Office,

174 The combined effects of these local preferences played out in the meandering negotiations between the central and local governments and industry groups from 2000 to 2002. First, delays were introduced as Tokyo strove to ensure that Okinawan discontent would not affect the bilateral relationship with the United States. Following Inamine and Kishimoto’s formal acceptance of the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko in November and December 1999, the promptly approved a new development plan for Okinawa, pledging to spend 100 billion yen over the next 10 years on further stimulating the prefecture’s economy. Tokyo also established a joint panel of officials from the central, prefectural and municipal governments, and tasked them with developing a plan for construction that would satisfy all parties concerned. However, although CCS Mikio Aoki informed a press conference that Tokyo would discuss the time limit with its ally, Washington’s position that such a condition was not negotiable remained unchanged.86

Political manoeuvring continued to affect the planning for the replacement facility over the next year. Although originally scheduled for May 2000, the first meeting of the joint panel instead took place in August, because Tokyo postponed it until after the 2000 G-8 summit in Okinawa, where President Clinton would be in attendance.87 After meetings began, there were further signs that the central, prefectural and municipal governments remained divided over what the Okinawan side perceived to be a key aspect of the SACO agreement. The panel meetings appear to have progressively addressed issues such as measures to limit the impact on residents and on the environment.88 However, although Okinawan leaders continued to push Tokyo on the 15-year time limit, the central government seemed to be avoiding the issue as much as possible, stating only that they would “deal with the issue appropriately.”89 Outside of the panel meetings, officials from the Japanese and US governments both continued to state that it would be impossible to set such a limit because of uncertainty over

Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence in Okinawa, by Furr et al). 86 “Nago Accepts Relocation of U.S. Futenma Air Base,” Jiji Press English News Service, December 27, 1999; “Japan endorses plan for new U.S. military base on Okinawa,” Associated Press Newswires, December 28, 1999; “Tokyo promises aid in return for Okinawa’s US base relocation,” Agence France-Presse, December 28, 1999. The official name of the joint panel was Futenma Hikōjō Daitaishisetsu ni kansuru Kyōgikai (Council on the Futenma Replacement Facility). 87 “Securing time limit from U.S. impossible, says LDP lawmaker,” Kyodo News, October 2, 2000; “Japan delays study of U.S. military base transfer,” Reuters News, May 2, 2000. 88 “Okinawa calls for minimum impact from new airport+,” Japan Policy & Politics, December 4, 2000; “2ND LD - Gov’t opts for plan to build airport on Okinawa reef,” Kyodo News, December 27, 2001; “Gov’t, Okinawa to begin talks on new airport pact,” Kyodo News, October 3, 2001. 89 “Gov’t proposes eight of construction plans for heliport,” Kyodo News, June 8, 2001; “Okinawa calls for minimum impact from new airport+.”

175 the security of the region.90 JDA Vice-Minister Takemasa Moriya has also noted that Japan’s two national carriers expressed little interest in either a civilian or cargo airport in the north of Okinawa, since other airports in the region already served them well enough. The third possibility of using the airport for the maintenance of civilian or cargo aircraft for rejected for similar reasons.91 Despite these developments greatly reducing the likelihood that either of Inamine’s conditions would be fulfilled, however, discussions continued, and by June 2001, the central government was examining eight different construction plans for Futenma’s replacement facility.92

Over the next year, these eight plans were whittled down to three, with each supported by a distinct camp. Each plan utilized on a different core construction methodology—a “pontoon- type” floating facility, a “wharf harbour” built on piles (or beams), and large-scale land reclamation—pushed by large construction companies from the Japanese mainland or overseas; however, each was also backed by some combination of local government and industry. The “pontoon-type” facility was “essentially…a large platform that would float on water,” moored to the seabed to prevent it from floating away (See Figure 6.1).93 According to a 1998 United States GAO report on the SACO developments, it would be built just over 900 meters (3,000 feet) from shore, in water approximately 30 meters (100 feet) deep. Such a facility would also require the construction of a breakwater, in order to ensure that the sea around the pontoon remained relatively calm.94 This model was backed by several local steel companies, due to the large contracts they expected to receive for the manufactured steel needed for construction.95 However, in December 2001, this option was taken off the table

90 This was especially true in the wake of the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in . As the United States turned its attention to the Middle East, this condition seems to have been quietly dropped/shelved. “Okinawa Gov. to report choice of relocation site Thurs,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 24, 1999; “Cohen rejects limit on military use of Okinawa heliport,” Japan Economic Newswire, March 17, 2000; “U.S. forces’ commander negative on heliport time limit,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 6, 2000; “U.S. Navy secretary hesitant to accept Okinawa base request,” Japan Economic Newswire, April 5, 2000; “FOCUS - Tanaka softened stance on Okinawa disappoints Inamine,” Kyodo News, December 27, 2001; “Japan, U.S. in Stalemate over Okinawa Base Return,” Jiji Press English News Service, April 11, 2001. 91 Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru.” 92 “Gov’t proposes eight of construction plans for heliport.” 93 U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence in Okinawa, by Furr et al, 32. 94 Ibid., 33. 95 Abe Takahashi, “The Feud Behind the Scenes: Relocation of the US base on Okinawa,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 1-1-0 (2002).

176 Figure 6.1: An Artist’s Rendition of What a Pontoon-type Facility Would Look Like 96

when the Japanese government announced that they had chosen to build the replacement facility on a reef.97

The second proposal was a “wharf harbor” plan. Compared to the pontoon-type facility, this plan was for a facility closer to shore, in shallower water, supported by several thousand piles (or beams) driven into the seabed (see Figure 6.2).98 The core original backers for this proposal included Nago City and Mayor Kishimoto’s supporters from the Japanese mainland—major commercial entities such as Shimizu Construction and Shin-Nihon Steel. Following the government’s December announcement that the facility would be built on the reef, a compromise was proposed whereby the runway would be built on a landing wharf connected by bridge to reclaimed land off the coast of Henoko, thus attracting support from local companies involved in land reclamation. Many companies in the camp that had backed

96 U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence in Okinawa, by Furr et al, 33. 97 Ibid.; “Building of joint civilian, military airport on Okinawa reef approved,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, December 27, 2001; “2ND LD - Gov’t opts for plan to build airport on Okinawa reef.” 98 Ibid., 34.

177 Figure 6.2: An Artist’s Rendition of What a Pile-supported Facility Would Look Like 99

the abandoned pontoon proposal also switched to backing this hybrid plan, since steel was an essential material in the construction of the wharf.100

The Japanese government, however, ultimately chose to go with the third proposal, land reclamation, with the formal announcement coming in July 2002 following the ninth and final meeting of the joint panel.101 The 2002 Basic Plan for the FRF (hereafter “the (2002) Basic Plan”) involved reclaiming land over a reef for the construction of the runway. The facility was to be built entirely on an artificial island approximately one kilometer (~0.62 miles) from the Okinawan mainland, joined to the Henoko coast by several roads. The runway would run parallel to the coast approximately 2.2 kilometers (~1.7 miles) away from the main residential areas (see Figure 6.3). According to former Vice-Minister Moriya, the choice reflected local

99 U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence in Okinawa, by Furr et al, 35. 100 Takahashi, “The Feud Behind the Scenes: Relocation of the US base on Okinawa.” 101 Morimoto, The Mysterious Twists in the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma Relocation Plan 533; William L. Brooks, The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005-2006, Asia-Pacific Policy Papers Series (Washington, DC: Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, 2010), 35-36; Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru.”

178 Figure 6.3: The 2002 Basic Plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility102

demands; as noted above, local companies had been calling for land reclamation.103 However, the depth of the water at the chosen site necessitated the use of advanced land reclamation techniques, which these companies lacked the technology for.104 Hence, although alliance managers saw the successful development of the Basic Plan as an indication of progress in the resolution of the MCAS Futenma issue, Nago mayor Kishimoto and many others in the “wharf-harbor” camp were highly opposed to this proposal.105

6.5 Another failure of implementation: the problems with the 2002 plan

The growing distance between the central and local governments over the Basic Plan stymied the subsequent efforts to implement it. Once the plan for the facility was finalized, the next

102 Japan Defense Agency, “Daitai Shisetsu Kihon Keikaku Shuyō Jikō ni kakaru Toriatsukai” ni motodzuku Kentō Shiryō, 2002. 103 “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru.” 104 Takahashi, “The Feud Behind the Scenes: Relocation of the US base on Okinawa.” 105 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Statement,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html; U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence in Okinawa, by Furr et al, 35.

179 step was to carry out an environmental impact survey. Under Japan’s “Environmental Impact Assessment Law,” which was enacted in 1997 and came into effect in 1999, the Japanese government is obliged to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for Class-1 or large-scale projects.106 Since the amount of land to be reclaimed was clearly in excess of the 50ha minimum requirement, this applied to the 2002 Basic Plan. However, this step was delayed by 21 months because the central and prefectural governments could not agree on who was ultimately responsible for the project.107 The EIA Law specifies that a number of different parties, including the government, can submit the proposal for the EIA.108 In the case of the Basic Plan, prefectural government ordinances had stipulated that Okinawa Prefecture was the contracting party for the civilian part of the airport. However, because the lack of interest from Japan’s commercial carriers meant that the airport was likely to be used solely by the military, Okinawa insisted that the central government should submit the EIA proposal. In order to do that, Tokyo asked that the ordinance be modified to indicate that the central government had full responsibility for the project, but the prefectural government refused to do so; it also refused to take charge of the EIA. In the end, it was the central government that relented in December 2003, beginning EIA procedures in April 2004.109

The EIA also opened the project up to interference by civilian actors. On the one hand, actions by anti-agreement interest groups had had little impact on the development of the 2002 Basic Plan and the early days of its implementation. These groups continued to spread information about the bases, establishing links with worldwide movements and addressing issues such as the negative environmental impacts that military facilities bring to host communities.110 A group of Henoko residents even worked together with American environmental activists to file a court case in California, arguing that the US Department of Defense had neglected its obligation under the US National Historic Preservation Act to adequately evaluate the potential effects of the new facility on the dugong.111 However, these actions seem to have had little impact, possibly because many negative effects on nearby residents, such as crimes, pollution and military accidents, would nevertheless be minimized by the remoteness of the location on the reef.

106 Japan Ministry of the Environment, “Environmental Impact Assessment in Japan,” accessed March 30, 2016, https://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/assess/pamph.pdf. 107 Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru.” 108 Japan Ministry of the Environment, “Environmental Impact Assessment in Japan.” 109 Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru.” 110 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 205. 111 Lauren J. Schoenbaum, “The Okinawa Dugong and the Creative Application of US Extraterritorial Environmental Law,” International Law Journal 44 (2008): 458.

180 However, this changed when the implementation process entered its next stage. The Japanese government commissioned the Naha branch of the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency (DFAA) to conduct an environmental assessment, involving test drilling of the proposed site.112 In response, the Society for the Protection of Life mobilized to hinder the progress of the assessment. In April 2004, approximately 70 people organized a sit-in barricade to prevent dump trucks from passing through to Camp Schwab.113 When scaffolding was constructed on the reef in September, the Society and its supporters paddled out to the structures in canoes, clinging to them from 4am to 5pm daily in order to hinder the work.114 The following April, the DFAA started night drilling, but were countered by protestors clinging to the rigs in twelve-hour shifts. During that same period, other activists visited the DFAA office daily to ask that the drilling be halted, as the confrontation between workers and protestors was endangering both parties. Ultimately, the sustained protest was a success in the sense that the survey was never completed: the DFAA removed the scaffolding in September 2005 and the plan for the reef-based facility was officially withdrawn.115

6.6 In summary

In this manner, the first attempts to implement the realignment in Okinawa—specifically, the core SACO objectives of reducing the burden on the prefecture and thus ameliorating the tensions associated with the US military presence—ended in failure. But this failure was not the product of local opposition to the bases or the SACO report per se; rather, it came after a five-year period during which Okinawa Prefecture and Nago City cooperated with the Japanese government in an effort to develop a plan for implementation. As this chapter has shown, Okinawan responses to the report, particularly to the objective of relocating MCAS Futenma within the prefecture, were mixed. The campaigns, voter turnout and results of both the 1997 Nago referendum and the 1998 gubernatorial election showed that a significant number of Okinawans were willing to acquiesce to the relocation of Futenma within the prefecture for economic benefits. Subsequently, Tokyo, Okinawa and Nago developed the

112 Ibid. 113 Yumiko Kikuno and Satoko Norimatsu, “Henoko, Okinawa: Inside the Sit-In,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 8-1- 10 (2010). 114 Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, 205. 115 Kozue Akibayashi and Suzuyo Takazato, “Okinawa: Women’s Struggle for Demilitarization,” in The Bases of Empire: the Global Struggle against US Military Posts, ed. Catherine Lutz (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2009), 257; Kikuno and Norimatsu, “Henoko, Okinawa: Inside the Sit-In.”

181 2002 Basic Plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility. However, strong interference from mainland companies was reflected in this plan, and both Okinawa governor Keiichi Inamine and Nago mayor Tateo Kishimoto refused to cooperate fully as Tokyo attempted to carry it out. Anti-agreement activists also mobilized to impede the EIA, continuing their opposition until the Japanese government abandoned this attempt at implementation.

182 ~Chapter 7~ Engulfed by the Defense Policy Review Initiative

The abandonment of the 2002 Basic Plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility is sometimes seen as vindicating the movement against the relocation of MCAS Futenma within Okinawa. It might even be considered a mini-victory for the anti-base activists who disrupted the progress of the environmental impact assessment. However, Tokyo’s formal notice that it had abandoned the environmental assessment was promptly followed by the announcement of a new plan. In fact, as outlined in Chapter 4’s examination of the developments involving MCAS Iwakuni, this plan was born out of a US initiative that started building in the 1990s in response to the end of the Cold War. Following the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld set in motion an effort to update US defense posture around the world. As part of this effort, the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) was initiated in 2002 in order to adapt the US-Japan alliance to the post- Cold War threat environment. As had been the case with MCAS Iwakuni and its host city, although the changes in Okinawa had started as a separate initiative, it was formally brought into the DPRI in 2004. In other words, rather than abandoning the ongoing effort at consolidation and reduction of US military facilities in Okinawa, US and Japanese officials incorporated the agreed objectives that came out of the SACO process into a broader effort at realignment across Japan and the region.

This empirical chapter covers the first agreement-implementation sequence for MCAS Futenma and Okinawa within the framework of the DPRI. It begins by examining how Japan and the United States transitioned from the path laid out by the SACO process to incorporating the realignment in Okinawa into the new, region-wide initiative. Alliance managers retained the broad goals of the SACO agreement, but heavily modified the manner in which these goals would be achieved. The changes reflected a compromise between the many conflicting local preferences that had been revealed since 1995. Instead of a new joint civilian-military airport constructed as a sea-based facility off the northern coast of Okinawa prefecture, Tokyo and Washington settled on expanding Camp Schwab by reclaiming land in

183 Henoko Bay, with the runways being designed to minimize the impact of noise pollution on residents. Another major change saw the allies agreeing to move 8,000 Marine Corps personnel and their dependents to Guam, although this was only to take place once the major functions of MCAS Futenma had been successfully relocated. Finally, the two governments also reaffirmed most of the other SACO objectives that had yet to be implemented and earmarked several additional facilities for return.

7.1 Towards a sustainable base presence in Okinawa?

The first movement towards incorporating Okinawa into the DPRI took place in May 2003, when the two sides agreed to reexamine the issue of the US military presence on Okinawa.1 Following a visit to Japan, Okinawa and the Republic of Korea in November 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld signaled that the United States would, with its regional allies, pursue formal military realignment talks on the future of American force posture in the Asia-Pacific.2 Rumsfeld was later reported to have expressed concern over the delays in the relocation of MCAS Futenma, which saw him direct lower-level officials in the Pentagon to examine alternative options for relocating the facility.3 But it was only after the August 13, 2004 crash of a CH-53D helicopter on the campus of Okinawa International University that the allies began to consider changing the plan altogether. No Okinawans were hurt—largely because this crash occurred during the summer break when fewer students and staff were on campus— but the university’s functions were heavily disrupted. The local press and the Ginowan City Government also took umbrage at how the US military cordoned off the area, preventing local authorities from performing their own assessment, and called for changes to be made to the SOFA.4 Protests were sustained through to September, and served as a reminder to Tokyo and Washington that, while low in probability given the safety records of US units in both testing and service, a fatal accident could spark even more intense protests. Although the alliance had held in the face of large-scale or violent protests in the past, such as the 1960 demonstrations

1 “Nichibei shunou kaidan de “saihen” ketsuron dezu, Bēkã chūnichi beitaishi ga kaiken,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 31, 2003. 2 “U.S. to intensify military realignment talks with Japan, others,” Kyodo News, November 26, 2003. 3 “Japan, U.S. divided over plans to realign U.S. forces in Japan,” Japan Policy & Politics, March 15, 2004; “Futenma hikōjō henkan no jōken wo Beigawa ga Nihon ni dashin ‘daitai shisetsu wa motomezu’,” Mainichi Shimbun, February 13, 2004. 4 William L. Brooks, The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005-2006, Asia-Pacific Policy Papers Series (Washington, DC: Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, 2010); “Beigun heri tsuiraku jikō Futenma isetsu no saikō motome, kōgi ketsugi he / Ginowan-shi gikai,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 17, 2004.

184 against the renewal of the security treaty and the 1970 Koza riots in Okinawa City, officials on both sides clearly wanted to avoid such a scenario.5 Furthermore, the accident arguably played a part in the anti-base activism that saw elderly Okinawans risking their lives to disrupt Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures for the 2002 Basic Plan— outlined at the end of Chapter 6—which began early the following month.

All of these factors added to the long delays already experienced and prompted both the US and Japanese sides to seek another solution to the issue of relocating MCAS Futenma. In a September 21 summit at the sidelines of the 59th UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi and President George W. Bush discussed the need to “accelerate talks” on how to “strengthen the deterrence capability and effectiveness of the US military presence while addressing concerns and sensitivities of Japanese communities.”6 Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless visited Japan in December 2004 to set up three working groups to study the Okinawa bases and two other points of contention between the allies.7 But despite this high-level backing, the two sides—and various lower level interests groups within them—did not readily agree on a new course of action. On the one hand, Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Vice-Minister Takemasa Moriya had become convinced that Okinawan leaders were not really invested in implementing the existing plan because of the complex mixture of local interests outlined in the previous chapter, and strongly pushed for a new plan to construct the replacement facility on land in Camp Schwab. This would prevent environmental activists from disrupting both the EIA process and construction, and also remove the need to obtain formal approval from the governor for land reclamation, thus allowing Tokyo and Washington to move ahead with construction even if they were unable to get all local actors to accept the proposed replacement facility. But other officials involved in implementing the 2002 Basic Plan resisted, reluctant to abandon a plan for implementation that had been developed in conjunction with the prefectural and local municipal governments.8 It was only when Koizumi demanded in mid-February 2005 that something be done about the Futenma issue that officials from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

5 The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005-2006, 40-41; “2ND LD: Koizumi seeks coordination on U.S. military realignment,” Kyodo News, September 10, 2004. 6 “Bush, Japan’s Koizumi Agree to Speed U.S. Force Structure Review - Leaders affirm commitments on Iraq and N. Korea, discuss beef ban,” (United States Department of State, 2004). 7 The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005-2006, 43. The two other working groups were about exploring the joint-sharing of Yokota Airbase, as a joint civilian- military facility in accordance with Tokyo Governor Shintarō Ishihara’s preference or as a joint USAF-ASDF facility, which the US preferred. 8 Ibid.

185 and the JDA seriously began exploring alternative options.9

This kicked off another round of back-and-forth negotiations over the specifications for the Futenma replacement facility (FRF). Following Koizumi’s intervention, the Japanese side took up Vice-Minister Moriya’s land-based plan. However, the US side feared that this would lead to protests from local residents because it would bring flight paths well over residential areas.10 Furthermore, Moriya’s plan required the US military to shift live-fire training grounds and storage facilities elsewhere. Hence, US officials pushed instead for a “shoals” plan that had originally been drafted by the Northern Division of the Okinawa Prefecture Defense Cooperation Association.11 This proposal situated the runway on reclaimed land just off the coast of Camp Schwab, at a distance that would greatly lessen noise pollution in nearby residential areas. According to various news reports, the allies also revisited options that had been considered during the SACO process, such as integration with Kadena Air Base or relocation to Ie Jima, a small island just off the northwest coast of Okinawa.12 But the core arguments against these proposals had not changed: not only did residents around the proposed locations rise up in protest, the Marine Corps was also opposed because it would greatly compromise their training and thus readiness.

Another point of contention involved the size of the military presence in Okinawa. Right from the start, Prime Minister Koizumi pushed for a cutback in the number of Marines as a tangible measure of reducing the burden on the prefecture.13 The US side, however, had been arguing that the full III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) needed to stay in Okinawa in order to maintain deterrence. Subsequent developments in the prefecture added to the complexity of the negotiations. In response to ongoing protests, Okinawa governor Keiichi Inamine began pushing for a reduction in the Marine Corps presence in early 2005. As the two national governments struggled to find common ground on a new plan for the replacement facility, Tokyo once again took up the issue of personnel numbers, forcing Washington to commission a study. However, US alliance managers maintained a strong front against any reduction in

9 Ibid., 43-44. 10 Ibid., 46. Indeed, Nago mayor Kishimoto would later inform JDA Director General Ohno, in September 2005, that he was willing to acquiesce to a new plan only if it were built on reclaimed land to maximize distance from residential areas and minimize the impact of training on nearby residents. “U.S. FORCES’ REALIGNMENT-- Entering a new phase / Okinawa’s OK remains hurdle,” Daily Yomiuri, November 11, 2005. 11 The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005-2006, 46. 12 “Zainichi Beigun saihen, jimoto no futankeigen ni dōryoku, Nichibei shunōkaidan de Busshu Daitōryō ga hyoumei,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 31, 2004; “Futenma heri-butai wo Ie Jima ni Nichibei, bunsan iten an wo kentō,” The Chunichi Shimbun, April 3, 2005. 13 The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005-2006, 43.

186 forces in the interests of maintaining deterrence; increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula in May provided timely support for their stance.14

Nevertheless, the three sides eventually came to a compromise. In September and October, JDA Director General Yoshinori Ohno managed to find common ground with Washington and a number of pro-base Okinawan actors to develop a plan for construction on land and reclaimed land—the so-called L-shaped plan (see Figure 7.1).15 The runway was situated as close to the waterline as possible, so as to minimize the proportion of flight paths passing over residential areas. Additionally, the US side finally agreed to transfer 8,000 Marines to Guam, in exchange for the transformation of the US Army Japan’s command structure at Camp Zama in Kanazawa Prefecture.16 This new headquarters would facilitate better response capability for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, and also improved integration with

Figure 7.1: Concept Plan for the L-shaped Facility

14 William J. Kole, “North Korea may have enough plutonium to make six bombs, nuclear agency says,” The Associated Press, May 10, 2005. 15 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” October 29, 2005, signed by Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Nobutaka Machimura, Yoshinori Ohno, accessed November 5, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html. 16 Brooks, The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005- 2006, 67.

187 The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.17 The United States was thus willing to compromise on the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa in exchange for other changes that would help fulfill the overall goals of the broader DPRI.

The US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) announced these proposed changes on October 29, 2005, in a document known as the “US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” This agreement—effectively the interim agreement for the DPRI process—both reaffirmed and added to the SACO objectives that had yet to be completed. It emphasized that the core objectives of the earlier agreement would be maintained and implemented, but the details also reflected lessons learned from 1995 through to 2004. The SCC acknowledged requests from Okinawa’s residents that MCAS Futenma be returned as quickly as possible in order to reduce the danger to locals, as well as the preference for the replacement facility to be relocated outside of the prefecture. However, after careful consideration of the role of the Marine Corps in regional security, particularly its rapid response capability, the SCC emphasized that MCAS Futenma’s functions needed to remain in the prefecture so as to keep the required air, ground, logistics and command capabilities in close proximity. The new plan also represented a response to the difficulties from previous implementation efforts, aiming for a compromise between residents’ concerns about safety and noise pollution and environmental concerns about coral destruction in Oura Bay. On the one hand, alliance managers determined that some land reclamation was required in order to make sure flight paths were as far as possible from residential areas. On the other hand, they also greatly reduced the area that needed to be reclaimed in an effort to reduce the possibility for environmental activists to disrupt surveys and construction, as had occurred in the early 2000s.

The US and Japanese governments also made several concessions to Okinawa. Because the new L-shaped plan for the facility differed greatly from the offshore facility that the prefecture and Nago City had agreed to under Governor Inamine and Mayor Tateo Kishimoto, Tokyo knew that it would have to find a way to persuade these subnational governments and their leaders to accept the changes. Along with subsidies and other economic benefits, the core of this persuasive effort was the reduction in the number of Marine Corps personnel deployed to the prefecture, which had been discussed but ultimately rejected during the earlier SACO process. Furthermore, the transfer of 8,000 Marines outside of Okinawa was

17 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.”

188 accompanied by promises that the training of remaining units would, as far as possible, be carried out at other facilities on the Japanese mainland. Japan would foot the bill for any costs associated with these training relocations, but this was also a compromise on the US side because travel time and other logistical issues would present further challenges in terms of maintaining readiness.18

Most importantly, however, these developments incorporated the realignment in Okinawa into a much larger effort at alliance management. Whereas the return of MCAS Futenma had been the key objective of the SACO process, the entire effort to “lessen the burden” on Okinawa through consolidation and reduction of the facilities and personnel in the prefecture was now just one element of a broader realignment encompassing many US Forces and JSDF facilities across Japan. Furthermore, while troop reductions were highlighted in, for example, the State Department’s press release, the agreement itself foregrounded the overall objectives of the DPRI, which was “to develop options to adapt the alliance to the changing regional and global security environment.” It referred to the importance of Japan continuing to provide facilities and training areas to forward deployed US forces as part of the agreed “Roles, Missions and Capabilities.” However, the realignment of the US Marine Corps in the region was only the sixth item listed under “Recommendations for Realignment,” following initiatives with broader applicability such as the plans to collocate the command elements of the various branches of the US Armed Forces and JSDF at Camp Zama and Yokota Air Base, in order to improve interoperability.19

7.2 Local reactions to interim realignment agreement

Once again, the initial local reaction to the US-Japan SCC agreement in October 2005 was one of rejection. Okinawa governor Inamine called for MCAS Futenma to be moved outside of the prefecture, showing his dissatisfaction with how the new agreement went against his conditions that the replacement facility be a joint civilian-military airport with a 15-year time

18 United States General Accounting Office, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting, GAO-02-525 (Washington DC, 2002), accessed July 3, 2013, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-525. In the mid-1990s, the US armed forces were also facing challenges to readiness due to restructuring. For example, the loss of many skilled personnel during the early 1990s negatively impacted the training capacity of the Marine Corps. See also United States General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Data and Trends for January 1990 to March 1995, GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR (Washington, DC, 1996), 11, accessed April 11, 2017, https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-96-111BR. 19 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.”

189 limit on military use. Nago mayor Kishimoto also claimed that he would not be able to convince his constituency to accept the new plan, due to the higher level of noise pollution expected from moving the runway that much closer to residential areas. The prefectural and city governments also expressed their discontent. The Nago City Assembly passed a resolution on November 21 opposing the new plan;20 this was followed by the adoption of a similar resolution by the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly on December 16.21

However, Kishimoto was not completely opposed to the construction of MCAS Futenma’s replacement facility within the city of Nago. In his meeting with JDA Director General on November 9,22 he asked that Tokyo clarify why the facility had been expanded to 1,800 meters (approx. 5900 feet), even though SACO had called for a 1,500 meters (4920 feet) replacement facility with a runway 1,300 meters (4,265 feet) in length.23 While the Basic Plan had specified a 2,500 meters (8,202 feet) facility with a runway of 2,000 meters (6,560 feet) in length, that 2002 plan had been for a joint civilian-military facility.24 Given that MCAS Futenma’s replacement had been redesigned once again for sole use by the US military, residents would reasonably have expected a reduction in the length of the facility and runway. The mayor’s questioning of these elements suggested that he was open to negotiation, provided Tokyo reduce the length of the runways to be no longer than what had been specified in the SACO agreements. Nevertheless, Kishimoto’s new position was less flexible than the stance he had taken when Nukaga had approached him just two months earlier, prior to the announcement of the new plan.25 With the mayoral election approaching in January 2006 and the opposition from the governor, the mayor may have felt that it would be difficult for him to show too much positivity about the L-shaped plan. Although Kishimoto had decided not to run for reelection for health reasons, he seemed to want to avoid making the relocation of MCAS Futenma an election issue.26

Yet both sides remained flexible and were once again able to come to a compromise. On

20 “Nago Assembly Opposes Futenma Base Relocation Plan,” Jiji Press English News Service, November 21, 2005. 21 “Futenma hikōjō isetsu Shuwabu engan’an, hantai ikensho kaketu / Okinawaken gikai,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 16, 2005. 22 Nukaga replaced Ohno in this position on October 31, 2005 and remained in it until September 2006. 23 “Nago Mayor May Accept New Plan for U.S. Base Relocation,” Jiji Press English News Service, November 9, 2005. 24 Japan Defense Agency, “Daitai Shisetsu Kihon Keikaku Shuyō Jikō ni kakaru Toriatsukai” ni motodzuku Kentō Shiryō, 2002. 25 “U.S. FORCES’ REALIGNMENT--Entering a new phase / Okinawa’s OK remains hurdle”; Brooks, The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005-2006, 63. 26 “U.S. FORCES’ REALIGNMENT--Entering a new phase / Okinawa’s OK remains hurdle.”

190 January 23, 2006, the citizens of Nago elected Yoshikazu Shimabukuro as Kishimoto’s successor. Shimabukuro had expressed willingness to negotiate with Tokyo on the issue, while candidates that had taken a more hardline stance split the anti-agreement vote.27 Following consultations with the new mayor and other actors that were in favor of accepting the FRF, alliance managers modified the L-shaped plan so that it would have a V-shaped runway, which would theoretically allow most take-offs and landings to be directed over Oura Bay instead of over residential areas, and persuaded both Shimabukuro and Governor Inamine to acquiesce to it.28 The small increase in land reclamation represented another benefit, if small, to the construction industry that anticipated obtaining building contracts for the replacement facility.

This apparent flexibility allowed the United States and Japan to confirm the objectives of the DPRI as they pertained to Okinawa and MCAS Futenma in particular. On April 7, 2006, Nukuga signed a “basic agreement” with Nago Mayor Shimabukuro and the mayor of Ginoza, a village southwest of Camp Schwab, confirming the city’s acceptance of this plan for the FRF. Less than a month later, on May 1, the US-Japan SCC formally adopted this V-shaped runway plan as part of the Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (hereafter, “the Roadmap”).29 Nukuga had an “exchange of notes” with Okinawa Governor Inamine on May 11, supposedly confirming that the central government, the prefectural government, Nago and other affected local governments would work together to construct the replacement facility according to the V-shaped runway plan.30 It seemed as though that Tokyo and Okinawa had finally found a compromise solution to the thorny issue of relocating MCAS Futenma.

27 “New mayor in Okinawa willing to compromise on US troops,” Jiji Press English News Service, January 23, 2006. 28 “Futenma isetsu, bishūsei kassōro hōkaku nado seifu/yotō ga kentō jimoto mo ittei rikai,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 18, 2006; “Futenma isetsu Nago-shi, gutaiteki kōshō he hikō ru-to shusei ga jōken,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 25, 2006; “LEAD: Japan, U.S. OK Futemma plan but fail to close gap over Marines’ move,” Kyodo News, April 14, 2006. 29 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” May 1, 2006, signed by Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Taro Aso and Fukushiro Nukuga, accessed May 17, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html. 30 “ZaiOki Beigun Saihen ni kakaru Kihon Kakuninshō,” signed by Fukushiro Nukuga for the Government of Japan and Keiichi Inamine for the Okinawa Prefectural Government, May 11, 2006, accessed May 13, 2016, http://www8.cao.go.jp/okinawa/siryou/singikai/sinkousingikai/12/07_5.pdf; “Futenma Hikōjō Daitai Shisetsu no Kensetsu ni okeru Kihon Gōi,” signed by Fukushiro Nukuga for the Government of Japan and Yoshikazu Shimabukuro for the Nago City Government, April 7, 2006; accessed May 13, 2016, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/saihen/pdf/goui.pdf; Brooks, The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005-2006, 81-8; Ryukyu Shimpō Sha, Jyubaku no Yukue: Futenma isetsu to minshushugi (Okinawa: Ryukyu Shimpō Sha, 2012), 91-93.

191 Figure 7.2: Concept Plan for the Replacement Facility, with a V-shaped Runway31

7.3 The tussle over the Environmental Impact Assessment

Despite this apparent breakthrough, however, the Japanese government continued to run into roadblocks as it attempted to implement the agreement. Tokyo had taken the May 11 “exchange of notes” between JDA Director-General Nukuga and Governor Inamine to represent the Okinawa Prefectural Government’s approval of the plan, but both the governor and Nago Mayor Shimabukuro subsequently continued to signal their dissatisfaction with the plan. Inamine indicated his intention to push for the functions of MCAS Futenma to be moved to a smaller, temporary heliport within Camp Schwab within 3 years, until the replacement facility could be completed. In a May 4 meeting with Iwao Kitahara, the chief of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, he argued that this measure was intended to fulfil the “most important task” of removing the danger that MCAS Futenma posed to

31 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Concept Plan,” May 1, 2006, accessed May 17, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/g_aso/ubl_06/pdfs/2plus2_map_gai.pdf

192

Table 7.1: The Evolution of the US Military Realignment in Okinawa

Objective SACO Agreement (1996)32 Basic Plan for the FRF (2002)33 DPRI Interim Agreement (2005)34 Roadmap Agreement (2006)35 Relocate MCAS Build a sea-based facility off the Build a sea-based facility on an Expand Camp Schwab into the sea Expand Camp Schwab into the sea Futenma, incl. its (northern) coast of Okinawa, artificial island constructed using off Cape Henoko, using land off Cape Henoko, using land 2,740 m (8,990 ft) using shipbuilding technologies. landfill approx. 1 km (1.12 mi) off reclamation. reclamation. runway the coast at Henoko Bay. Length and 1,300 m (4,265 ft) 2,000 m (6,560 ft), two parallel One runway, less than 1,800 m Two runways, 1,800 m (5905 ft) position of the To be located off the east coast of runways. Runway length not stated, but length each replacement the main island of Okinawa. The shortest distance to residential of facility was to be 1,800 m (5905 Approx. 1 km (0.62 mi) from runway(s). Exact location not stated in areas stated to be approx. 2.2 km ft). Approx. 1 km (0.62 mi) from residential areas, but arranged in a report, but expected to be 2 km (1.38 mi) residential areas. V-shaped format to allow for (1.24 mi) from residential areas. aircraft flight paths that avoid residential areas. KC-130 squadron Transfer from MCAS Futenma to Transfer from MCAS Futenma to Transfer from MCAS Futenma, but Transfer from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni MCAS Iwakuni not to MCAS Iwakuni (JMSDF MCAS Iwakuni. Kanoya Base is the prime candidate at this point). Force reduction NA NA Relocate III MEF headquarters to Relocate III MEF headquarters to Guam; leaving a Marine Guam; leaving a Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Okinawa. Expeditionary Brigade in Okinawa. Approximately 7,000 personnel, Approximately 7,000 personnel, along with their dependents, would along with their dependents, would be transferred off Okinawa. be transferred off Okinawa.

32 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report,” December 2, 1996, signed by Yukihiko Ikeda, Hideo Usui, William Perry and Walter Mondale, accessed February 15, 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco2.html. 33 Japan Defense Agency, “Daitai Shisetsu Kihon Keikaku Shuyō Jikō ni kakaru Toriatsukai” ni motodzuku Kentō Shiryō. 34 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” 35 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.”

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local residents as soon as possible.36 On May 11, the governor also stated that he wished to continue discussions to move the runways slightly further offshore. This may have been influenced by the reaction of the Nago mayor to the formal announcement of the Roadmap and confirmation of the V-shaped runway plan on May 2. Shimabukuro had pointed out once again that the facility specified in the SACO final report had been no longer than 1,500 meters (~4,920 feet), echoing his predecessor in questioning the 1,800 meter-length of the facility in the new plan.37

These strains were reflected in the Cabinet meeting on May 30, where the Japanese government formally approved the Roadmap agreement. According to media reports, Nukaga argued heatedly with , the State Minister for Okinawa Affairs, over the policy. While the JDA director held that the “exchange of notes” indicated the agreement of the prefectural and relevant municipal governments in Okinawa, Koike argued that Okinawa and Nago’s position was that they had been unable to agree. As a result, the details of the V- shaped runway plan were deleted from the final Cabinet resolution, leaving numerous officials across different government ministries concerned as to the status of the agreement, and whether it could be completed by 2014 as stated. Nevertheless, the government moved to set up groups to oversee the construction of the facility, and also to map out steps to improve Okinawa’s economy.38

However, the Okinawan governor still refused to cooperate, claiming that these decisions went against the document that he signed with Nukuga. Inamine maintained that he had not accepted the V-shaped runway plan as presented—rather, he had accepted it as the basis for further negotiation. As such, the governor expressed dissatisfaction at the Cabinet resolution excluding a clause that the government’s plan would “continue to be discussed.”39 Inamine was also dissatisfied with Tokyo’s decision to abolish a 1999 Cabinet resolution that prescribed economic stimulus measures for Nago and the other northern districts of Okinawa. As a result, negotiations between the various levels of government over the details of

36 “Okinawa Gov Still Opposes Plan To Move US Marine Air Strip,” Dow Jones International News, May 4, 2006. 37 “Okinawa Nago-shichō, saishū hōkoku ni nanshoku Kassōro 1800 mētoru meiki ni fukaikan,” The Mainichi Newspaper, May 2, 2006. 38 Takashi Imai, Chikara Shima, and Shinya Yamada, “Govt tiptoed on Futenma relocation Tokyo keeps mum on where and when new base will be constructed,” Daily Yomiuri, June 1, 2006. 39 Ibid.

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agreement stalled once again.40 Inamine refused to come to the negotiating table unless Tokyo put these two items back on the agenda and continued to push the proposal for a temporary heliport to be constructed within Camp Schwab. But the Japanese and US governments were reluctant to negotiate on the latter because such a small facility would not be sufficient to carry out the necessary functions being transferred from MCAS Futenma. It was only in late August that the governor relented and agreed to return to the negotiating table, after Tokyo promised to reinstate economic stimulus measures. Ultimately, the first meeting of the Tokyo-Okinawa-Nago joint council set up to oversee the relocation took place only on August 29, a full three months after the Cabinet resolution that effectively ratified the Roadmap.41

Despite this development, changes at both the national and local levels of government meant that the implementation of the realignment in Okinawa continued to thread water. Prime Minister Koizumi stepped down as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in September 2006, with Shinzō Abe taking his place.42 However, various domestic challenges, including scandals involving members his Cabinet, prevented the new prime minister from focusing on the tense situation in Okinawa and contributed to his resignation in 2007, after just one year in office.43 Inamine, for his part, continued to present an uncompromising stance during the lead-up to the next gubernatorial election. While the governor did not intend to run for reelection at the end of his second term in November 2006, because of his 1998 pledge to develop a joint civilian-military airport with military use limited to 15 years, the prefecture’s conservative factions feared that wholesale acceptance of the new V-shaped runway plan would result in defeat for his successor.

This concern among Okinawa’s conservative factions was reflected in the campaign for the 2006 gubernatorial election. Although presented in much of the literature as a contest between the pro- and anti-agreement factions, in actual fact, both major candidates positioned themselves against the V-shaped runway plan presented in the 2006 Roadmap. Inamine’s successor, Hirokazu Nakaima, carried the election by a margin of close to 37,000 votes,

40 Chikara Shima and Shinya Yamada, “Govt-Okinawa Pref. talks on base relocation in limbo,” ibid., June 24, 2006. 41 Takashi Imai, “Uncertainty surrounds base relocation,” The Daily Yomiuri, 29 August, 2006. 42 “5TH LD: Abe becomes Japan's new premier, names Cabinet,” Kyodo News, September 26, 2006. 43 “Japan Govt Attempts To Deal With Scandals Ahead Of Elections,” Dow Jones International News, May 31, 2007; Chisaki Watanabe, “Japanese government scrambles to clean up scandals ahead of elections,” Associated Press Newswires, June 1, 2007; “LEAD: Nearly 50% think Abe should resign: Kyodo poll,” Kyodo News, July 31, 2007; Masami Ito, “Fukuda elected prime minister in Diet faceoff,” The Japan Times, September 26, 2007.

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registering almost 345,000 votes compared to Keiko Itokazu’s 308,000.44 While this was a far closer margin than that of the previous gubernatorial election—in 2002, Inamine had won by a margin of approximately 211,000 votes—Nakaima carried many of the municipalities where individuals, businesses and local governments alike derived significant benefits from hosting the bases, including Naha City, Ginowan City, Kadena Town and Nago City.45 In contrast, Itokazu was criticized for not doing enough to address local economic concerns, such as the prefecture’s high unemployment rate. Having given up her first-term seat in the House of Councillors, the upper house of the Japanese Diet, to run in this election, Itokazu took the standard progressive hard line on the US military presence and argued that Okinawa should work towards the removal of all of the bases.46

However, although his platform had focused on the economy, Nakaima also refrained from showing outright support for the 2006 Roadmap agreement and the V-shaped runway plan. Instead, he indicated that he would be flexible and willing to negotiate, and proposed in his victory speech that he would push for MCAS Futenma to be relocated within three years, so as to lessen the danger posed to the residential community around the base.47 In particular, while Nakaima was willing to accept relocation within Okinawa, he also felt that Inamine’s proposal for a temporary heliport was worth exploring.48 This suggests that sentiment against the base presence and new plan for MCAS Futenma’s replacement was more antagonistic than a simple pro-agreement/anti-agreement analysis might suggest.

The new governor’s stance thus meant a continuation of the tussle over the exact details of the realignment in Okinawa. When the third meeting of the joint council took place on January 17, 2007, newspapers reported that both Nakaima and Nago major Shimabukuro remained opposed to the V-shaped runway plan, asking that the runways be moved further offshore.49 To encourage cooperation, Tokyo designed policies for implementation of the promised economic subsidies in a way that linked them to subnational government

44 Eric Johnston, “Okinawa economic woes trump base ills for voters,” ibid., November 21, 2006; Takashi Oda, “POLITICAL PULSE / Voters failed to touch base,” Daily Yomiuri, November 23, 2006; Suvendrini Kakuchi, “Okinawa Poll Results Boost for US Military Ties,” ISI Emerging Markets Africawire, November 21, 2006. 45 Okinawa Prefectural Government, “Heisei 18-nen 11-gatsu 19-nichi shikkō Okinawa-ken Chiji senkyo (tōhyō kekka ni kansuru chō),” (2007). 46 Johnston, “Okinawa economic woes trump base ills for voters.” 47 “Senkyo - Okinawa-ken Chijisen Shin Chiji ni jikō Nakaima Hirokazu Shi, seifu, futenma shinten ni kitai,” The Mainichi, November 20, 2006. 48 Hidemichi Katsumata, “Futenma issue looms over Okinawa poll “ Daily Yomiuri, October 31, 2006. 49 “Central, local gov’ts remain apart over Futemma relocation plan,” Kyodo News, January 19, 2007.

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cooperation with the realignment. The bill that the Cabinet passed on February 9 specified that:50

The subsidies would be provided in four phases with their amount becoming greater in each phase -- the acceptance of the realignment plan, the launch of a pre-work environmental assessment, the start of facility construction, and the completion of the construction or the start of facility use.

However, Nakaima continued to refuse to give consent for the government to begin the three- year EIA survey, claiming that it would be interpreted as “acceptance of the proposal to build the V-shaped runway.”51 The Nago City Government also began demanding that the replacement facility be moved further out to sea.

Nakaima’s refusal to cooperate fully with Tokyo may have been influenced by the stance of senior officials within the Japanese and US governments. In early February, US Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless conveyed to the Japanese side the message that the United States would not accept any further changes to the agreement. In response, Defense Minister Fumio Kyūma reportedly said: “We have to heed the opinion of the Okinawa governor in implementing the plan. The Americans do not understand the necessity of consensus-building.”52 Kyūma continued to seek the possibility of fulfilling the conditions Nakaima had set for the relocation of MCAS Futenma within the prefecture. According to the Ryukyu Shimpo, he checked with a Ministry of the Environment bureaucrat involved in the EIA process how much leeway they had for moving the runway seaward: the answer given was around 150 meters.53 Subsequently, in a secret meeting on March 11, Kyūma sounded out Kevin Maher, then US Consul General in Okinawa, about the possibility of moving the replacement facility seaward. A few weeks later, at a press conference in Urasoe City on March 23, Maher signalled that he would work to confirm the 2006 plan while seeing what could be done about moving it seaward.54 The defense minister’s efforts suggest that he was keen to make things work with Okinawa.

However, other Japanese leaders soon put a halt to these efforts. On March 24, upon hearing of Kyūma’s accommodative stance, former prime minister Koizumi reprimanded the LDP

50 “Gov’t formalizes bills for realigning U.S. forces, facilities unit,” Kyodo News, February 9, 2007. 51 “Okinawa realignment still stuck,” Nikkei Weekly, March 19, 2007. 52 Keizo Nabeshima, “Gaffes dog Abe’s leadership,” The Japan Times, February 5, 2007. 53 Ryukyu Shimpō Sha, Jyubaku no Yukue: Futenma isetsu to minshushugi, 117. 54 Ibid., 116.

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leadership, pointing out that “the government cannot be indecisive,” and recommended that they stick to the V-shaped runway plan. The following day, Kyūma met with Nakaima and Shimabukuro to inform them that Tokyo would no longer be pushing for the runway to be moved seaward.55 The Japanese Diet continued its deliberation on the subsidies bill, with the House of Councillors voting it into effect on May 23, thus formalising this step in the implementation process. Finally, Vice-Minister of Defense Moriya convinced the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff to mobilize the Maritime SDF (JMSDF) forces to begin a preliminary survey on May 18, before the coral spawning season in June. This heavy-handedness surprised and irked local residents, and Nakaima, who had agreed to the preliminary survey the previous month, commented that he did not think it was “a situation that (warranted) participation by the MSDF.”56

Upheavals in Japan’s Ministry of Defense soon rendered the differing positions of the defense minister and his vice-minister moot. On July 3, 2007, Kyūma resigned following criticisms of his comment that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could not have been avoided.57 He was replaced as by Yuriko Koike, the former Minister for the Environment and for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs, a decision that Okinawa welcomed even as the LDP criticised it, claiming that she would lean too much towards the prefecture. Abe reportedly told Koike to focus on the implementation of the realignment in Okinawa, and the new defense minister soon reiterated the government position that it would continue to seek subnational acquiescence for the existing plan, which had already been thoroughly examined.58 However, Koike quickly became embroiled in a bureaucratic tussle for power when, in an effort to control leaks of information in the Ministry, she attempted to nominate a former national policy officer to replace Moriya as her deputy. Moriya and other ministry officials opposed this move, as the standard procedure was for such appointments to be decided “at a conference of chief and deputy chief Cabinet secretaries.”59 The tussle ended with both Moriya and Koike stepping down at the end of August. By then, however, their confrontation had turned into another newsworthy scandal that reflected poorly on the Abe administration, which was already struggling with the consequences of losing the LDP majority in the upper house of the Diet, during the election held at the end of July. Prime

55 Ibid., 118. 56 “Central gov’t begins preliminary survey for Futemma base relocation,” Kyodo News, May 18, 2007. 57 “‘Genbaku tōka shikataganai’ Kyuma Bōeishō kyū Soren no sansen soshi,” The Chunichi Shimbun, June 30, 2007; “Koike to succeed Kyuma, become 1st female Japanese defense minister,” Kyodo News, July 4, 2007. 58 “No Intention to Revise Futenma Relocation Plan: Koike,” Jiji Press English News Service, July 11, 2007. 59 “Koike’s vice defense minister plan canned despite resignation threat,” Kyodo News, August 13, 2007.

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Minister Abe himself stepped down a few weeks later, citing stress-related health issues, and was replaced by .60

Despite this upheaval at the national level, implementation in Okinawa continued moving forward following Kyūma’s departure. In August, the MOD began procedures for carrying out the EIA for the V-shaped runway plan. Although Nakaima maintained his position and refused to accept the plan submitted for the EIA, the relevant law makes provisions for the government to proceed even without the prefectural government’s approval.61 Tokyo was also able to put pressure on the local governments that did not acquiesce to the plan. On August 20, the Japanese Diet passed the Cabinet’s bill on special measures for the realignment, thus confirming the law to reward cooperative host communities with economic subsidies in the budget for the following financial year. In October, Tokyo eliminated Nago, Kin, Ginoza and Onna—and a number of other subnational governments around the nation— from the list of municipalities slated to receive subsidies. This economic pressure appeared to have an almost immediate effect. On November 13, Kin, Ginoza and Onna reversed their stances and agreed to the proposed joint use of US training facilities at Camp Hansen, saying “they (had) come to the fresh decision ‘after studying in a comprehensive manner’ the proposed joint use and government subsidies to be given to them.”62

However, it took several more months before the Okinawa governor accepted Tokyo’s proposed EIA plan. At the fifth meeting of the joint council, resuming in early November after a break of several months, Nakaima stated again that while he agreed on MCAS Futenma’s relocation to the north of the prefecture, he wanted the runways to be located “as far as possible” offshore from the Henoko coast off Camp Schwab, so as to reduce noise pollution and the risk of accidents.63 The Fukuda government initially indicated a degree of flexibility, and it was reported early in 2008 that Tokyo, Okinawa and Nago were close to agreeing to shift the runways a further 90 meters (approximately 300 feet) offshore.64 At the same time, the US government remained reluctant to consider any more changes to the V- shaped runway plan for construction. In the end, the governor accepted the EIA plan in exchange for Tokyo lifting the freeze on subsidies to the prefecture, while suggesting that he

60 Ito, “Fukuda elected prime minister in Diet faceoff.” 61 “Okinawa Refuses Environment Assessment Plan over Base Relocation,” Jiji Press English News Service, August 7, 2007. 62 “3 Okinawa municipalities OK Japan-U.S. joint use of Camp Hansen,” Kyodo News, November 13, 2007. 63 “Gov’t, Okinawa agree to early Futemma move, gap remains on details,” Kyodo News, November 7, 2007. 64 Shinya Yamada, “New Futenma plan may resolve impasse,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 3, 2008.

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would only agree to authorize subsequent steps in implementation depending on how Tokyo proceeded.65

7.4 In summary

When US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld launched the Global Posture Review in 2002, the US military realignment in Okinawa was still being pursued as a separate process, albeit one that was slowly coming to a standstill. However, an accident involving one of MCAS Futenma’s CH-53D helicopters in August 2004 highlighted the negative consequences that a fatal accident might have in Okinawa and pushed the US and Japanese governments to develop a new solution that was soon incorporated into the US-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative. Alliance managers carried over the core objectives of the SACO agreement to “reduce the burden” on Okinawa by consolidating facilities and returning land. This time, they tried to incorporate more local preferences regarding construction methods and the siting of replacement facilities, especially with regards to the most controversial objective: the relocation of MCAS Futenma. This ultimately resulted in the so-called V-shaped runway plan, which was approved as part of the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. The changes from the 2002 Basic Plan, which had been developed with Okinawan leaders, generated some tensions with Okinawa governor Keiichi Inamine and Nago mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro, and it took several more years for Tokyo to persuade Okinawa’s core leaders, including Inamine and his successor Nakaima, to acquiesce to the EIA, much less actually approve the design of the V-shaped runway plan. Nevertheless, the start of the EIA process in 2007 checked another box in the implementation process.

65 “Gov’t to begin survey of alternative site for Futemma in March,” Kyodo News, March 12, 2008; Kakumi Kobayashi and Masato Kurosaki, “FOCUS: Tough talks continue over Futemma base relocation in Okinawa,” ibid., March 14, 2008.

200 ~Chapter 8~ The opening of Pandora’s Box: Hatoyama and “the Futenma Problem”

Unfortunately for alliance managers, by 2007, a series of domestic political scandals had started to interfere with the ability of Japan’s leaders to govern. Within a few months of Shinzō Abe taking over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership and the prime ministership from Jun’ichirō Koizumi, the government’s approval ratings started a rapid fall. The public mood against the corruption within the LDP and high levels of the Japanese bureaucracy, whether real or perceived, subsequently opened the door for a landslide victory by Japan’s political opposition in the 2009 general election. This apparent mandate allowed the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), led by Yukio Hatoyama, to push for significant policy changes on a range of domestic and international issues, including the US military realignment in Okinawa. However, domestic and international political constraints forced Hatoyama to return to the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. As this chapter will show, the disjunct between the interests and preferences of the US government and those of the minor parties in the DPJ coalition government with regards to Okinawa prevented a compromise on the issue. These developments shifted the balance of public and elite opinion in Okinawa towards clear opposition to the agreement. The delicate political balance— between those vehemently opposed to the relocation of MCAS Futenma within the prefecture and those who were willing to accept it in return for economic subsidies—collapsed.

8.1 The fall of the LDP and the rise of the DPJ

The Ministry of Defense dispute involving Minister of Defense Yuriko Koike and Administrative Vice-Minister Takemasa Moriya was just one of several problems encountered by the first Abe administration. After taking over the LDP leadership and prime ministership from Koizumi, Abe was criticized first for the party’s moves to reinstate the eleven LDP lawmakers who had been ousted for not supporting his predecessor’s postal

201 service reform agenda.1 Following a separate scandal involving government officials posing as or paying members of the public to ask questions in “staged town meetings,” the administration was hit again in December 2006 by two separate incidents involving Chairman of the Tax Commission Masaaki Homma and Minister for Administrative Reform Genichirō Sata. Homma was criticised for letting his mistress live in a government-subsidised Tokyo apartment while his divorce from his wife was still being processed, and elected to resign from his post on December 21. Sata was accused of submitting false political records for his office from 1990 to 2000, despite the office not existing during this time period. He resigned on December 27.2 The following May saw the administration confronted by another pair of serious scandals. Agriculture Minister and his former mentor Shinichi Yamazaki committed suicide in separate incidents, just hours before they were each due to answer to a parliamentary committee probing accusations of bid-rigging and the misuse of public funds.3 At the same time, the government was confronted with widespread criticism due to the mishandling of over 50 million pension records.4

The public backlash to these scandals brought about a shift in the domestic political mood, which allowed opposition leaders to challenge US-Japan alliance policies pertaining to Okinawa. The Abe Cabinet’s approval rating fell with each new revelation of political misconduct, dropping from approximately 65% in Abe’s early days as prime minister to around 30% just prior to the House of Councillors elections on July 30.5 None were surprised when the LDP lost its upper house majority in those elections. Led by political heavyweight Ichirō Ozawa, the DPJ increased the number of seats it held from 81 to 109; in contrast, the LDP and its coalition partner, the New Kōmeitō, came away with 103 seats. Since the total number of councillors was 242, neither faction had enough seats for an outright majority. However, the DPJ was able to combine with three other opposition parties to form a majority.6 The resulting political deadlock, where the opposition parties used their control of the upper house of the Japanese Diet to block legislation, forced the administration of Yasuo

1 “Abe instructs LDP’s Nakagawa to study readmitting ‘postal rebels’,” Kyodo News, October 24, 2006; Takashi Oda, “POLITICAL PULSE / Return of rebels 1st test for Abe,” Daily Yomiuri, November 9, 2006. 2 “Abe Denies Responsibility For Having Appointed Tax Panel Chief,” Nikkei Report, December 22, 2006; Hiroki Tabuchi, “Japanese minister to step down over political fund scandal,” Associated Press Newswires, December 27, 1996. 3 “Ex-executive of J-Green predecessor ‘kills self’,” Daily Yomiuri, May 30, 2007; “Japan Govt Attempts To Deal With Scandals Ahead Of Elections,” Dow Jones International News, May 31, 2007. 4 Chisaki Watanabe, “Japanese government scrambles to clean up scandals ahead of elections,” Associated Press Newswires, June 1, 2007. 5 “CHRONOLOGY-Ten months of highs and lows for Japan PM Abe,” Reuters News, July 27, 2007. 6 “DPJ set to become top party in upper house,” Kyodo News, August 3, 2007.

202 Fukuda—who replaced Shinzō Abe as prime minister in September—to rely on the cooperation of minor parties in the lower house for the two-thirds majority needed to pass such bills. This tussle added to the ongoing impact of the scandals and precipitated the new prime minister’s resignation less than one year after he had taken over from Abe.7

Ultimately, this political turmoil led to a landslide victory for the DPJ in 2009 general election. Despite Ozawa becoming embroiled in his own funding scandal in May 2009, the damage to the LDP from the issues outlined above continued to have a strong effect on the administration of Fukuda’s successor, Tarō Asō. Ozawa gave up the leadership to DPJ Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama, though he worked from behind the scenes as the party’s election strategist.8 On August 30, Hatoyama led the party to an overwhelming victory in the election, having campaigned on a platform promising to “curtail bureaucratic authority, enact generous new programs such as a child allowance and elimination of highway tolls, reduce fiscal waste, and pursue a foreign policy that was more independent of the United States.”9

8.2 The DPJ coalition government and the realignment in Okinawa

The DPJ’s efforts to review the agreement on MCAS Futenma are symbolic of its push for a foreign policy “more independent of the United States.”10 In fact, the DPJ had started suggesting that it would to review the plans for the US military realignment Okinawa, especially in relation to MCAS Futenma, well before the 2009 election. In July 1999, just over a year after the party was originally established, the DPJ issued a formal statement about its “Okinawa policy.” The document referred to the sacrifice and burden that Okinawans bore from having US bases concentrated in their prefecture and stated that they would use SACO as the basis for further efforts to reduce this “base burden.” The DPJ also signaled that the party would address issues such as the income gap between Okinawa and the Japanese mainland, and the protection of the environment.11 The party later updated their policy in the 2002 “Okinawa Vision,” where they referred to the Prepositioning of Materiel Configured in

7 Tomohito Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese politics: institutional changes and power shifts (2013), 113-16. 8 “News Navigator: What kind of party in the DPJ?,” Mainichi Daily News, August 30, 2009. 9 Phillip Y. Lipscy and Ethan Scheiner, “Japan Under the DPJ: The Paradox of Political Change Without Policy Change,” Journal of East Asian Studies 12, no. 3 (2012), 312. 10 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Democratic Party of Japan: Its Foreign Policy Position and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Weston S. Konishi, R40758 (2009), 5. 11 The Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshutō Okinawa Seisaku,” July 8, 1999, accessed May 30, 2015, http://archive.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=10839.

203 Unit Sets (POMCUS) system—a system where the United States prepositioned large amounts of military equipment in West Germany during the Cold War—as a possibility for reducing the Marine Corps presence in the prefecture.12 Following its strong showing during the 2007 House of Councillors election, the DPJ updated its Okinawa policy once again. On May 24, 2008, Hatoyama visited Okinawa as Secretary General of the DPJ, and suggested that he would look into the possibility of relocating MCAS Futenma not only outside of the prefecture, but outside of Japan altogether, naming Guam as a possible relocation site.13 The next update of the Okinawa Vision, released in July, also reflected this stance.14

In response to these developments, the US and Japanese governments made efforts to ensure that the realignment in Okinawa would be implemented even if the LDP were to be voted out of office. In the second half of 2008, the two governments negotiated another agreement aimed at “(reducing) the risk that local politics in Okinawa or a change in government in Tokyo (would) result in the unravelling of the May 1, 2006 realignment package.”15 Negotiations from November through December 2008, produced what is known as the Guam International Agreement, which Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hirofumi Nakasone signed on February 17, 2009.16 At the request of the Japanese side, it represented a confirmation that the United States was committed to the relocation of part of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) to Guam and specified how funds pledged by Tokyo would be used to construct the necessary facilities. This included measures that would allow Japan to allocate funding for multi-year projects incrementally. In return, the agreement explicitly linked this Guam relocation to successful completion of the planned V- shaped runway replacement facility at Henoko and granted Washington some flexibility in the use of funding for construction in Guam.

One particular feature of the Guam Agreement was specifically designed to ensure that the Roadmap agreement would be carried out no matter what happened in Japan’s domestic political arena. In contrast with the US side, where the Guam pact was treated as an executive

12 The Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshutō Okinawa Bijon,” August 26, 2002, accessed May 30, 2015, http://www1.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=10686. 13 Reported in the Ryukyu Shimpo on May 25, 2008 (p.2). See also U.S. Embassy Tokyo, “Daily Summary of Japanese Press 05/27/08,” (Wikileaks Cable: 08TOKYO1447_a, 2008). 14 The Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshutō Okinawa Bijon (2008),” July 8, 1999, accessed May 30, 2015, http://archive.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=10839. 15 U.S. Embassy Tokyo, “U.S., Japan Reach Ad Ref Guam International Agreement,” (2008). 16 “Agreement Between the Government of Japan and The Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam,” signed by Hirofumi Nakasone and Hillary Rodham Clinton, February 17, 2009, accessed May 31, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/agree0902.pdf.

204 agreement and thus not subject to Senate approval, it was designated as a Treaty-level agreement on the Japanese side.17 In theory, once ratified by the Japanese Diet, the Guam Agreement would bind successive Japanese administrations to it. After several weeks of parliamentary debate, the LDP-Kōmeitō majority in the House of Representatives cleared the pact through to an upper house vote. Although the DPJ-controlled House of Councillors rejected it one month later, a provision in the Japanese constitution ensures that the decision of the lower house stands in such cases.18 Hence, the Japanese government formally endorsed the Guam Agreement on May 13, several months before it needed to call a general election. In the months that ensued, the United States steadily maintained the message that it regarded this agreement as binding, and thus not up for renegotiation or even adjustment.19

It is important to note, however, that the DPJ at this stage did not seriously intend to challenge the negotiated agreement over MCAS Futenma. The DPJ’s main issue with the Roadmap and Guam agreements was not specifically that MCAS Futenma would be relocated within Okinawa. Rather, the party “cited concerns over a lack of transparency in the cost breakdown” for the transfer of the 8,000 Marines and their dependants, and also over the linkage of this transfer with construction of the Futenma replacement facility (FRF).20 In fact, the guiding principle of the DPJ’s stance on these basing agreements was the afore-mentioned push for the US-Japan relationship to be a more “equal” partnership, as then leader Ozawa informed Clinton in February 2009 during a meeting requested by the Secretary of State.21 When senior DPJ member Seiji Maehara visited Washington in April, he reiterated that the party would aim to review the plans for MCAS Futenma’s relocation from the ground up, but did not specify any concrete alternative proposals.22 Furthermore, by the time the DPJ manifesto for the election was finally released in August, the party had toned down its rhetoric. Although it stated that the party would “propose” revisions to the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the manifesto reaffirmed the importance of the alliance and

17 “U.S., Japan Reach Ad Ref Guam International Agreement.” 18 “Japan Parliament OKs Pact on Relocation of U.S. Marines,” Jiji Press English News Service, May 13, 2009. 19 Linda Sieg, “U.S. forces chief in Japan: realignment should proceed,” Reuters News, July 23, 2009; Satoshi Ogawa and Toshimitsu Miyai, “ELECTION 2009--BATTLE FOR POWER / U.S. keeps close eye on DPJ manifesto,” Daily Yomiuri, August 11, 2009. 20 Sarah McDowall, “U.S. Welcomes Japan’s Ratification of Marine Transfer to Guam,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, May 15, 2009. 21 Given that this meeting took place just one day after Clinton signed the Guam Agreement, it is unsurprising that the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Okinawa realignment were amongst the topics that reporters would have focused on following their meeting. Yoko Kubota, “Japan opposition tells Clinton partnership equal,” Reuters News, February 18, 2009; Yuka Hayashi and Jay Solomon, “Japan, U.S. plan economic summit --- Aso struggles with financial and political crises; Clinton meets with opposition leader,” The Wall Street Journal (Asia Edition), February 18, 2009. 22 “[Seitō] Minshu no shiren (6) kienu ‘jieitai seiakusetu’ (rensai),” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 22, 2009.

205 refrained from mentioning the relocation of MCAS Futenma.23 Challenging the agreements on the realignment in Okinawa was arguably just one way in which the DPJ chose to express their intent to seek a more equal alliance partnership. Hence, despite Hatoyama’s pledge to review the agreement, the DPJ as a whole was not committed to relocating MCAS Futenma “at least outside Okinawa.”

However, the outcome of the 2009 House of Representatives election created a problem for the DPJ in relation to MCAS Futenma. Although the party had won the general election by a landslide, it did not have a majority in the House of Councillors. Out of 242 seats, the DPJ and the independents that cooperated with them—known as the Shin-Ryokufukai—held 111 seats, 11 short of an outright majority. With 308 seats in the House of Representatives, it also fell short of the two-thirds majority (320 out of 480 seats) needed to overrule an adverse upper house vote on most legislation (see Table 8.2).24 The DPJ thus entered into a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People’s New Party (PNP); along with the New Party Nippon’s sole member, this gave the government a slim majority of 122 in the House of Councillors, to which the DPJ was able to add two more seats through by-elections on October 25.25 This coalition was needed to ensure that the government would be able to pass legislation, thus avoiding the hung parliament or “twisted” Diet (nejire kokkai) that had characterized Japanese politics since the LDP ruling coalition’s poor showing in the July 2007 House of Councillors elections.

However, the DPJ and the SDP differed over several different key policy positions. First and foremost were their stances on the US military realignment in Okinawa, where the key point of contention was that the SDP was firmly against the relocation of MCAS Futenma within Okinawa prefecture. In fact, the SDP’s policy was to move the facility outside of Japan entirely. In negotiations to form the coalition government, the SDP leader was Mizuho Fukushima, whom Hatoyama appointed as Minister for Consumer Affairs and Food Safety, Social Affairs, and Gender Equality in his first Cabinet. Fukushima emphasized that the party’s cooperation in the Diet would be predicated on, amongst other things, Hatoyama

23 “In Strategic Shift, DPJ Stays Course On Foreign Policy,” Nikkei Report, July 28, 2009. 24 The two exceptions are legislation dealing with the annual budget and international treaties. In those cases, legislation that has passed the House of Representatives is automatically deemed to be the decision of the Diet after a period of 30 days. Hence, even if the two Houses are unable to agree on the legislation under consideration, as long as the bills have been passed by the lower house, they will become law once 30 days have lapsed. 25 Hajime Furukawa, Kenichi Aoyama, and Shuhei Kuromi, “By-election results give DPJ a shot in arm,” Daily Yomiuri, October 27, 2009.

206 Table 8.1: The Results of the 2009 Japanese General Election (House of Representatives)26

Party # Seats (before) # Seats (after) LDP 303 119 LDP-Kōmeitō coalition New Kōmeitō 31 21 Japan Renaissance Party 1 0 DPJ 112 308 Social Democratic Party 7 7 DPJ-SDP-PNP coalition People’s New Party 5 3 New Party Nippon - 1 New Party Daichi 1 1 Japanese Communist Party 9 9 - 5 Independents 9 6 Total 480

conducting a review of the 2006 V- shaped runway plan for the FRF.27 From the outset, this appeared to be an empty promise, for the Obama administration quickly reiterated that it would not accept any further changes to the agreement.28 Members of the Japanese bureaucracy, as well as some of the other ministers in the also showed an inclination to return to the existing pact.29 As early as October 2009, the Director-General of the MOD’s Defense Policy Bureau, Nobushige Takamizawa, indicated that Ozawa could be instrumental in persuading the SDP to come around on MCAS Futenma.30 The junior coalition partner, however, proved to be more fixated on keeping the “outside of Okinawa” promise than had been expected. Although Hatoyama had pledged to resolve the issue by the

26 “2ND LD: Table of party strength in House of Representatives,” Kyodo News, July 21, 2009. “Seats (before)” represents the number of seats each party held when the LDP dissolved the House of Representatives on July 21, 2009. 27 Mure Dickie, “Okinawa pledge paves the way for coalition deal,” Financial Times, September 10, 2009. 28 “US says won’t renegotiate Japan troop deal,” Agence France Presse, September 1, 2008. 29 U.S. Embassy Tokyo, “Ambassador Roos’s meeting with Minister Maehara,” (Wikileaks Cable: 09TOKYO2822, 2009); “EAP A/S Kurt Campbell Dicusses Futenma, POTUS Visit with MOFA DG Umemoto, MOD DG Takamizawa,” (Wikileaks Cable: 09TOKYO2614_a, 2008). 30 Ibid., “A/S Campbell, GOJ Officials Discuss the History of U.S. Force Realignment,” (Wikileaks Cable: 09TOKYO2378_a, 2009).

207 Table 8.2: Breakdown of the House of Councillors, September 200931

Party # Seats LDP 81 LDP-Kōmeitō New Kōmeitō 21 coalition Japan Renaissance Party 4 DPJ, Shin-Ryokufukai 111

DPJ-SDP-PNP Social Democratic Party 5 coalition People’s New Party 5 New Party Nippon 1 Japanese Communist Party 7 Independents 5 Vacancies 2 Total 242

end of the year, he was forced to postpone the decision on the relocation of the facility until the following May.32

However, the situation only became more muddled in early 2010. As discussed in Chapter 4, fearing that MCAS Iwakuni might be considered the logical destination if Tokyo and Washington were to push for more units to be transferred from MCAS Futenma, the Yamaguchi Prefectural Government set aside the request from Tokyo to purchase land required for constructing housing for the US personnel coming from Naval Air Facility Atsugi.33 Then, at the end of January, Nago citizens elected Susumu Inamine, who had

31 This is a breakdown of the House of Councillors following the formation of the DPJ-SDP-PNP coalition in September 2009. The breakdown was deduced from the information provided in the following news articles: Carolynne Wheeler, “Japan’s political earthquake; Voters fed up with the long-ruling LDP are turning to an opposition party with little governing experience,” The Globe and Mail, August 29, 2009; “ELECTION 2009-- BATTLE FOR POWER / DPJ’s Hirono set for upper house,” Daily Yomiuri, August 19, 2009; “New Party Nippon’s Hirayama certified as upper house member,” Kyodo News, August 30, 2009; “LEAD: Hirono, Arita certified as upper house members,” Kyodo News, August 27, 2009; “DPJ to form tripartite coalition government,” Mainichi Daily News, September 9, 2009. The Shin-Ryokufukai was a group of members of the House of Councillors that had no official affiliation, but which cooperated with the DPJ; all four officially joined the party on October 22, 2009. The Democratic Party of Japan, “Four Shinryokufukai Diet members apply to join DPJ,” accessed August 15, 2018, http://archive.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=17160. 32 “Japan puts off decision on US base issue with no deadline,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, December 15, 2009. 33 “Yamaguchi, Atagoyama happatsu jigyō--ken, kuni yosan yōbō ni kaitori morikomazu,” Mainichi Shimbun, December 19, 2009.

208 campaigned on a clear anti-base platform, as their new mayor.34 The incoming mayor, who proposed an economic vision for the city focused not on subsidies from the central government, but rather on agriculture, tourism and light industry, defeated the LDP-backed incumbent mayor, Yoshikazu Shimabukuro, by 17,950 to 16,363 votes.35 This marked a departure from the previous three campaigns, where the winning LDP-backed candidates focused on the economic benefits that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Nago would bring. However, the DPJ being in power and opposed to the existing agreement also made Inamine’s position more feasible—although he ran as an independent, he had support from the DPJ, the SDP and the PNP, along with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).36 Although the Hatoyama administration was, by then, struggling to find a solution to the Futenma relocation problem, the DPJ’s apparent stance vis-à-vis the 2006 Roadmap appears to have encouraged enough voters—including the widow of former pro-base mayor Tateo Kishimoto—to support a candidate that was clearly against the agreement.37

Thus under pressure from both Nago and Iwakuni, a committee set up by the DPJ government examined a range of different proposals in an attempt to satisfy their demands. These included previously floated suggestions to use the Katsuren Peninsula or the Kadena ammunition depot, both within Okinawa Prefecture. To the anti-agreement side in Okinawa, the most promising idea was to shift the facility to Tokunoshima, an island in Kagoshima Prefecture that is 200 kilometers north of the Okinawan main island. This proposal had actually been suggested by Hidetada Maeda, a former speaker of the assembly of Amagi Town on the island, who wanted to revitalize Tokunoshima’s economy by accepting the base. An elderly supporter suggested that if the LDP were pushing the plan, the island would accept, because the constituency supported the party’s Takeshi Tokuda.38 However, on April 18, 15,000 people gathered to protest how the DPJ government had secretly tried to make a deal with local leaders behind their backs.39 Hatoyama spent several weeks courting the support of

34 “Futenma relocation issue becomes more complicated following Nago election result,” Mainichi Daily News, January 25, 2010; “Base relocation now iffy,” The Japan Times, January 26, 2010; “Nago muddles base issue, but security should be priority,” Nikkei Weekly, February 1, 2010. 35 “Nago mayor vote a referendum on base,” The Japan Times, January 19, 2010; Alison Tudor and Yuka Hayashi, “World News: Japan mayoral vote rejects U.S. base,” The Wall Street Journal (Asia Edition), January 25, 2010. 36 “Futenma plan opponent wins Nago election / Result may put end to U.S. base deal,” Daily Yomiuri, January 25, 2010. 37 “Long Divided on U.S. Base, Nago Sees Hopes for Change,” Jiji Press English News Service, January 22, 2010. 38 Yoshifumi Sugita, “Tokunoshima averse to Futenma / Local mayors lead opposition to relocating U.S. air station to Kagoshima island,” Daily Yomiuri, April 14, 2010. 39 “Japan PM’s plight grows with rally, Obama remarks,” Reuters News, April 18, 2010.

209 Tokuda and the mayors of the three municipalities on the island, without success.40 Although they were willing to consider transferring some training to the island, US officials also voiced their opposition, citing operational requirements for Futenma’s replacement to be located no further than 120 kilometers from III MEF’s other facilities, which were to remain in Okinawa.41

In May 2010, Hatoyama returned to the existing agreement at great political cost at both the subnational and subnational levels. Public opinion in Okinawa had worsened as it became increasingly clear that Hatoyama would not be able to fulfill his pledge to move MCAS Futenma out of the prefecture. In April, 90,000 residents, including activists from both conservative and reformist groups, gathered to call for the relocation of Futenma outside of Okinawa. Also in attendance for the first time was Okinawa governor Hirokazu Nakaima, who told the crowd: “I believe that your power and fervor will influence the Japanese and US governments and that a solution acceptable to Okinawa citizens will be presented.”42 Following the prime minister’s official announcement that he was returning to the V-shaped runway plan for the FRF, the fifth human chain movement saw 17,000 protestors encircle MCAS Futenma.43 The decision also meant the end of the coalition government. On May 28, Hatoyama dismissed SDP leader Fukushima from the Cabinet because of her uncompromising stance on Futenma; on the same day, Tokyo and Washington reaffirmed the plans for the US military realignment in Okinawa, although the DPJ obtained a slight concession in the form of an increase in the amount of training to be moved to other locations.44 However, the SDP left the coalition government two days later, thus crippling the ability of the DPJ administration in its efforts to pass legislation. Hatoyama resigned as prime minister in order to take responsibility for the split in the government, and Naoto Kan took his

40 “Hatoyama Eyes Transfer of 1,000 U.S. Marines to Tokunoshima from Futenma,” Jiji Press English News Service, April 28, 2010; “Tokunoshima Says No to Hatoyama’s Base Request,” Jiji Press English News Service, May 7, 2010. 41 “U.S. May OK Relocation of Futenma Training to Tokunoshima,” Jiji Press English News Service, May 7, 2010; “U.S. Wants Relocated Futenma Units within Set Range,” Jiji Press English News Service, April 22, 2010; “U.S. Opposes Futenma Helicopter Unit Transfer to Tokunoshima,” Jiji Press English News Service, May 6, 2010. 42 Yoshifumi Sugita and Ryuhei Yoshimura, “Okinawa vents fury at govt over base,” Daily Yomiuri, April 27, 2010. 43 Linda Sieg, “Okinawans angry as Japan PM flipflops on U.S. base,” Reuters News, May 14, 2010; “About 17,000 Japanese encircle US Futenma base to protest relocation 16 May,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, May 17, 2010. 44 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” May 28, 2010, signed by Hillary Clinton, , , and Toshimi Kishida, accessed November 5, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint1005.html; “Japan PM fires coalition partner from cabinet,” Reuters News, May 28, 2000.

210 place as leader of the DPJ and Japan.45

By this time, however, Okinawan preferences were starting to show signs of change. As outlined above, the new Nago mayor, Susumu Inamine, had campaigned on a platform opposing the V-shaped plan outlined in the 2006 Roadmap.46 Discontent against incumbent mayor Yoshimizu Shimabukuro’s leadership had been building due to the failure of previous subsidies to benefit those in occupations unrelated to the construction industry.47 Furthermore, many of the resulting buildings and facilities had become public liabilities due to underuse and the cost of maintenance, which the municipalities had to pay for out of their ordinary budgets.48 For example, new sporting and recreational facilities in the villages of Kunigami and Ginoza, base-hosting communities in the north of the prefecture, were operating at a loss several years after they opened.49 Hence, Inamine attracted votes not only for his anti- agreement stance, but also by promoting a development vision founded on agriculture, environmental tourism and light industry instead of base-related subsidies. A Kyodo poll taken at several of the polling sites offered further indication that many voters no longer believed that the planned construction would improve the local economy.50

Developments across the rest of Okinawa highlighted other faults in the argument for the so- called base-economy. Areas such as Mihama American Village in the town of Chatan and Shintoshin in Naha City, developed on land returned in the 1980s and 1990s, had seen revenues increase between 10 and 200 times compared to those formerly obtained from based-related economic activity such as land rents, the remuneration of Japanese citizens employed on the bases, and patronage of local shops and restaurants by US personnel stationed at the former facilities.51 Furthermore, the income gap between the prefecture and the rest of Japan had remained at approximately 70% of the national average since the 1980s.

45 “Vice minister Tsujimoto to quit post as SDP leaves ruling coalition,” Kyodo News, May 30, 2010; “Japan prime minister resigns,” Al Jazeera English, June 2, 2010. 46 “55% of Nago voters expect new mayor to reject Futemma relocation,” Kyodo News, January 24, 2010; “U.S. Base Opponent Elected Mayor of Nago, Okinawa,” Jiji Press English News Service, January 25, 2010. 47 “Base relocation now iffy.” 48 Interviews with Kunitoshi Sakurai (Professor Emeritus, Okinawa University) and Manabu Satō (Professor, Okinawa International University), conducted in Okinawa Prefecture in November 2014. The reason so many of these buildings were underused is that significant number of projects had been developed not out of community necessity but rather out of a desire to use all the funds that Tokyo was throwing at Okinawa. See Jun Ōkubo, Gensō no Shima Okinawa (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha, 2009), 30-31 49 Takehiko Kambayashi, “Okinawa projects have high costs, but low returns; Japan continues to throw money into area to balance U.S. military presence,” The Washington Times, October 26, 2006. 50 “55% of Nago voters expect new mayor to reject Futemma relocation.” 51 Okinawa Prefectural Government, “US Bases and Okinawa’s Economy,” accessed June 15, 2016, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/panf-1.pdf.

211 The unemployment rate had also risen from 3% in 2003 to 8% in 2005.52 This was in spite of the government subsidies that had been poured into the prefecture in association with the Inamine and Nakaima administrations. In other words, the evidence suggested that the base- related subsidies were not having the desired effect of helping Okinawa reach economic parity with the Japanese mainland.

These developments changed the nature of the contest between the conservative and progressive factions in the Okinawan gubernatorial election of November 2010. Since the Futenma relocation issue arose in 1996, the contests had consistently pitted anti-agreement candidates against pro-agreement ones. While the former demanded that the facility either be moved outside of Okinawa or closed without replacement, the latter focused on improving the prefecture’s economy, typically through the base-related subsidies outlined in previous chapters. This time, however, pressured by the build-up of anti-agreement and anti-base sentiment in Okinawa, Governor Nakaima based his bid for re-election on a platform seeking relocation outside the prefecture. The governor’s opponent, former Ginowan mayor Yoichi Iha, demanded that the base be relocated outside Japan.53 Unlike previous elections, the political climate did not allow for any candidate to offer even conditional support—based on expectations of economic largesse—for the relocation of MCAS Futenma within Okinawa.

Nevertheless, Nakaima’s stance allowed for the possibility that the governor would cooperate in implementing the agreement. In contrast to his opponent, the governor remained in favor of the US-Japan alliance. His core argument was that Okinawa bore an excessive burden compared to the rest of Japan, and that this burden should be reduced by transferring military assets outside of the prefecture where possible. Earlier in the year, he had also noted that he would be willing to approve the required land reclamation permit as long as there was local agreement and that local businesses and contractors would obtain significant economic benefits.54 Hence, although the DPJ refrained from endorsing either candidate because of the reputation it had lost as a result of Hatoyama’s reversal, the local chapter of the LDP and the Kōmeitō supported Nakaima, who won with 335,708 (51.6%) of all votes cast, compared to Iha’s 297,082 votes (45.6%).55 Despite his anti-agreement stance at the time of the election,

52 Kunitoshi Sakurai, “US bases hurting Okinawa ecology, economy,” China Daily, June 12, 2007. 53 Chico Harlan, “Okinawa election likely to hinder U.S. base plans,” The Washington Post, November 21, 2010; Kakuchi Funatsuki and Atsushi Matsuura, “Tight 2-man race in Okinawa / Base relocation issue seen eroding support for incumbent governor,” Daily Yomiuri, 13 November, 2010; “Okinawa gubernatorial election candidates face off amid heightened security tensions,” Mainichi Daily News, November 24, 2010. 54 “Okinawa sticks with Nakaima,” The Japan Times, 29 November, 2010. 55 Yuka Hayashi, “Okinawa Governor Wins Re-Election,” Dow Jones News Service, November 28, 2010.

212 Nakaima’s successful re-election bid left the door open for implementation of the V-shaped runway plan.

The US and Japanese governments were relieved at this outcome, and efforts were made to restart the stalled relocation process. Officials on both sides of the Pacific resumed negotiations to explore and examine other ways to reduce the impact of the military presence on host communities across Japan, with the United States agreeing in January 2011 to transfer a portion of F-15 (Kadena), F-16 (Misawa) and F-18 (Iwakuni) training to Guam.56 In June 2011, Washington and Tokyo again confirmed the agreements concerning Okinawa at an SCC meeting, and in August, the Ministry of Defense set up four groups to spearhead various aspects of the US military realignment; one each for MCAS Futenma, the transfer of US Marines to Guam, and of field carrier landing practice (FCLP) from Atsugi to Mage island.57

By this time, the US government had also made progress on implementation in Guam. Senators Carl Levin, Jim Webb and John McCain first raised concerns in 2010 and 2011 about the unrealistic projected cost of the realignment and the challenging political realities on Guam and Okinawa, calling for the plans to be revised and that MCAS Futenma be relocated to Kadena, with some air force assets to be moved elsewhere in the region.58 The Senators’ concerns pushed the US Department of Defense to conduct feasibility studies and revise the plans for realignment. In the SCC joint statement in April 2012, the United States and Japan announced that the number of personnel moving to Guam had been reduced to 5,000, raising questions about whether the balance of 4,000 would then remain in Okinawa.59 Yet agreements with Australia and other US allies suggest that the Marine Corp units that did not go to Guam would be rotated though the region.60 The budget estimates were also updated: Japan would now contribute $3.1 billion out of $8.6 billion required for construction on Guam. Most importantly, in April 2012, the two governments agreed to delink the

56 “U.S. Agrees to Transfer Fighter Training in Okinawa to Guam,” Jiji Press English News Service, January 20, 2010. 57 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Progress on the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan,” June 21, 2011, signed by Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates, Tsuyoshi Matsumoto, Toshimi Kitazawa, accessed December 3, 2013, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_02.pdf. 58 Travis J. Tritten, “Congress wants military to study moving Futenma operations to Kadena,” Stars and Stripes, December 12, 2011. 59 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” April 27, 2012, signed by Hillary R. Clinton, Leon E. Panetta, Koichiro Genba, and Naoki Tanaka, accessed October 10, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/joint_120427_en.pdf. 60 One criticism that is often levelled at the number of Marine Corps personnel cited in the agreement is that, because of the ongoing wars in the Middle East, significant numbers of Marines have been redeployed away from Okinawa on active duty, meaning that actual personnel numbers in the prefecture have been below the official figure of 18,000.

213 relocation of the Marine Corp units from Okinawa to Guam and the return of lands south of Kadena Air Base from the relocation of MCAS Futenma, thus allowing for future progress on the former objectives even without significant progress on the latter.61

Practically, however, the DPJ’s time in government slowed implementation and contributed to rising tensions in Okinawa. For example, the LDP started procedures for the requisite Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the 2006 Roadmap in 2007.62 Although expected to take three years, Hatoyama’s attempt to change the agreement meant that the first EIA was delayed until December 2011, and the final Environmental Impact Statement was only submitted a year later.63 The construction of helipads in the Takae district of the Northern Training area, which began in July 2007, was also slowed due to persistent local opposition.64 The United States and Japan were able to return several other facilities, such as the Gimbaru training area in Kin Town, as stated in both SACO and the Roadmap.65 However, the major crises that the DPJ government faced from 2010 to 2012—the fishing boat captain incident in 2010, the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, and Tokyo Governor Shintarō Ishihara’s attempt to purchase the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyu Islands in 2012—also meant that the Kan and Noda governments remained unable to dedicate significant time or resources to negotiating with the subnational actors in Okinawa. Given the adverse Okinawan reaction to Hatoyama’s attempt to review the agreement on Futenma, implementation of this particular objective effectively remained at a standstill for the rest of the DPJ’s time in power.

61 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee”; “Okinawa land return progress marked by Japan Vice-Minister of Defense,” Department of Defense Documents, November 22, 2013. The original decision to link the other objectives to the successful relocation of MCAS Futenma was based on the assumption that Okinawa and Nago’s leaders strongly sought “burden reduction” and was intended as an incentive to encourage their cooperation. However, delinking them encourages cooperation via a different mechanism: pressure from other communities affected by the realignment. For example, as discussed in chapter 4, the Iwakuni City government has regularly stated its concern that failure to construct the replacement facility at Henoko would mean that the burden on Iwakuni was increased without any positive effect on the original objectives of the realignment in Okinawa. 62 “Gov’t formalizes bills for realigning U.S. forces, facilities unit,” Kyodo News, February 9, 2007; “Central gov’t begins preliminary survey for Futemma base relocation,” Kyodo News, May 18, 2007. 63 Okinawa Defense Bureau and Government of Japan Ministry of Defense, Futenma Replacement Facility Construction Project Final Environmental Impact Statement, 2012; Hideki Yoshikawa, “Memo: Five Points of Concern Regarding the Okinawa Defense Bureau’s Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Futenma Replacement Facility,” Appendix to Letter of Request to the Marine Mammal Commission, (2013); “Japan Finishes Base Report Submission to Okinawa,” Jiji Press English News Service, December 29, 2011. 64 Jon Mitchell, “Rumbles in the jungle,” The Japan Times, August 19, 2012; Shuhei Kuromi and Kentaro Nakajima, “Noda promises key Futenma report by year-end,” Daily Yomiuri, October 27, 2010. 65 “U.S. military returns Gimbaru Training Area to the locals,” Ryukyu Shimpo, August 1, 2011.

214 8.3 The return of the LDP and Governor Nakaima’s decision

The situation changed again once the LDP was re-elected to government in December 2012. Japan’s voters punished the DPJ for the failures during its term in government—including Hatoyama’s reversal over Okinawa, the poor response to the March 2011 triple disaster and the failure to manage the Senkaku dispute from 2010 through to 2012—by swinging back to give the LDP to a huge 294 to 57 seat margin in the House of Representatives. The LDP- Kōmeitō coalition gained a supermajority of 325 out of 475 seats in the lower house, and party leader Shinzō Abe started his second term as prime minister. Within three months of returning to government, on March 22, 2013, the Abe administration submitted to the Okinawa Prefectural Government an application for the permit for reclamation in public waters, as required by law.66 Although Governor Nakaima remained ambiguous on whether he would approve the permit, his prioritization of the early removal of the danger to the community around MCAS Futenma and apparent willingness to negotiate offered hope for resolving the impasse.67

Nevertheless, the battle over the realignment in Okinawa was far from over. As the Okinawa Prefectural Government reviewed the permit application over the following nine months, Nakaima faced pressure from both the pro- and anti-agreement sides. The fishing co-op that owned the fishing rights to the area off Henoko’s coast had already signalled their acquiescence to the landfill, since they were, in any case, “unable to fish freely in the planned landfill site.”68 A large proportion of the local business community, led by Yukikazu Kokuba, also voiced their support for the plan several times during the course of the year, pointing out that it was the only feasible solution for relocating MCAS Futenma. Kokuba is the head of one of Okinawa’s largest business groups, Kokuba-Gumi Co., Ltd, and thus one of the major political forces in the prefecture. He also had close ties to Nakaima, which suggests that the governor himself is likely to have held a similar opinion at this time.69 However, Okinawan public sentiment remained against the agreement, and at his first official meeting with Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera, Nakaima publicly maintained that finding another location outside of the prefecture would be the most

66 “Japan Govt Files Landfill Request for Futenma Base Transfer,” Jiji Press English News Service, March 22, 2013. 67 Michitaka Kaiya and Takashi Imai, “Focus turns to Nakaima over Futenma plan,” The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, December 1, 2013. 68 “Nago Fishing Co-op to Back Landfill for U.S. Base Transfer,” Jiji Press English News Service, February 13, 2013. 69 Mizuho Aoki, “Futenma question decisive factor for prefecture’s voters,” The Japan Times, July 12, 2013.

215 expedient way of removing the danger that MCAS Futenma posed to its surrounding residents.70

Hence, the Japanese government set about persuading the governor to give the required approval. Even as it prepared the application for the permit for landfill, the Abe government worked with the US government to update the plans for the realignment in Okinawa. In April 2013, the two governments released another update, titled the “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa.” This document reaffirmed the key objectives of the 1996 SACO and 2006 Roadmap agreements, and laid out clear plans for implementation through to the year 2029 and, if necessary, beyond.71 The level of detail contained in the document— specifying a sequence of procedures for each major area involved in the realignment—and the flexible timeframe that allowed for the possibility of further delays arguably signaled the Abe government’s intent to adhere to the Henoko plan. However, it also allowed Tokyo to show some flexibility, as several minor objectives were added or modified based on feedback from locals. For example, an additional 0.4 hectares around the Shirahi River were also to be returned in order to allow the local community “to develop better flood control measures.” Furthermore, this was accomplished before the next SCC meetings in October 2013.72 Officials announced several additional concessions, including the expansion of fishing waters into off-limits training areas and improved survey access to base land slated for return within 10-15 years, allowing for better development planning post-return.73 The following month, the Prime Minister’s Office also started examining whether it would be possible to revise the SOFA—which the United States has long resisted.74 Although the anti-base and anti- agreement faction criticized these concessions as being far too minor, the Abe government was clearly attempting to show that it was willing to be flexible with Okinawan demands, provided that they could be carried out within the constraints of the alliance.

The national LDP party also worked to change the stance of local LDP politicians in

70 Peter Ennis, “Showdown looming over planned US Marine base on Okinawa,” in Dispatch Japan, November 13, 2013, accessed March 25, 2014, http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2013/11/showdown-looming-over- planned-us-marine-base-on-okinawa.html; “Chiji, ryōdaijin ni kugi / Henoko-isetsu ‘mattaku rikai dekinai.’ Osupurei ‘chūshi wo fukumu minaoshi’,” Ryukyu Shimpo, September 9, 2014. 71 United States Department of Defense, “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa,” accessed May 15, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/Okinawa%20Consolidation%20Plan.pdf, (2013). 72 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” October 3, 2013, signed by Fumio Kishida, Itsunori Onodera, John Kerry and Chuck Hagel, accessed October 8, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215070.htm. 73 Travis J. Tritten and Chiyomi Sumida, “Okinawa rakes in concessions as Futenma decision looms,” Stars and Stripes, October 24, 2013. 74 Katsumi Takahashi and Atsushi Matsuura, “Japan in Depth / Govt moves to win Okinawa gov. approval of Henoko reclamation,” The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, November 4, 2013.

216 Okinawa. During the DPJ administration, the Okinawan chapter of the LDP had changed its policy to seek the relocation of MCAS Futenma outside of the prefecture. This meant that the Okinawan representatives in the Diet in 2013—the four members elected in the December 2012 House of Representatives election, and Aiko Shimajiri, who was elected in the July 2010 House of Councillors election—had all been voted in on a stance opposing the relocation to Camp Schwab.75 Shimajiri and one of the lower house Diet members, Kōsaburō Nishime—the son of Okinawa’s longest serving conservative governor, Junji Nishime (1978- 1990)—dropped their opposition to the plan in April 2013, following the LDP’s return to power at the national level, but the remaining three Diet members and the Okinawa chapter of the LDP were still officially opposed.

The issue became especially urgent towards the end of 2013, in the lead-up to the January 2014 Nago mayoral election. In October, conservative Okinawan politicians Bunshin Suematsu and Yoshikazu Shimabukuro expressed their intentions to run against incumbent mayor Inamine, who maintained his anti-agreement stance.76 Suematsu, then a member of the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, had previously supported the V-shaped runway plan for the FRF, though he did not initially commit to it this time around. Shimabukuro had supported it during his term as Nago mayor from 2006 to 2010. Expecting these two candidates to split the conservative vote and thus give Inamine an easy victory, the national LDP leadership endeavored to unite the local chapter behind a single candidate.77 In late November, LDP Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba met with the three Diet members from Okinawa who had remained opposed. Following discussions with their supporters, the three all announced that they would support the agreement because the V-shaped runway plan was the best way to ensure that the danger that MCAS Futenma posed to surrounding residents would be removed.78 A few days later, on December 1, the LDP’s prefectural chapter held a meeting in which the leadership explained the available options, resulting in the chapter adopting a resolution to accept the relocation to Camp Schwab in order to prevent MCAS Futenma from remaining where it was.79 While fourteen LDP members from the Naha City Assembly

75 “5 Okinawa LDP lawmakers back Henoko relocation,” ibid., November 26; “LDP’s Okinawa chapter decides to accept contentious U.S. base relocation plan,” The Mainichi, November 28, 2013; Mariko Yasumoto, “FOCUS: Hatoyama’s negative legacy on Futenma confounds Okinawa before poll,” Kyodo News, June 30, 2010; “LDP seen defeating SDP in Okinawa on split of antibase votes,” ibid., July 12, 2010. 76 “LDP Okinawa chapter to decide on U.S. base relocation by Dec. 5 ahead of local poll,” The Mainichi, November 14, 2013. 77 “Okinawans urged to toe LDP line,” The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, November 21, 2013. 78 “5 Okinawa LDP lawmakers back Henoko relocation.” 79 “LDP Okinawa chapter backs Futenma base relocation within Okinawa,” The Mainichi, December 2, 2013.

217 resigned from the chapter as a result, out of support for Naha mayor Takeshi Onaga who continued to oppose the plan,80 the changed stance of the political leadership in the prefecture represented a major shift in support for the relocation from subnational actors.

These changes paved the way for the Abe government to obtain the governor’s approval before the end of the year. Although the LDP in the prefecture was now united behind a single candidate for the Nago mayoral election in January, if the anti-agreement incumbent, Inamine, nevertheless retained his place, such a result would increase the pressure on Nakaima not to approve the land reclamation.81 This concern made it imperative for the governor to give his approval before the Nago election campaign got underway. From midway through December, aides arranged several meetings between Abe and the governor, who was in a Tokyo hospital receiving treatment for an ongoing ailment. On December 17, Nakaima made a number of demands of the Japanese government, including: (1) the suspension of operations at MCAS Futenma within five years; (2) the full return of Camp Kinser within seven years; (3) the revision of the US-Japan SOFA; (4) the deployment of at least half of the US Marine Corps’ Osprey contingent outside the prefecture immediately, and all units following the closure of MCAS Futenma.82 The governor also requested that Okinawa be granted the full amount of 340.8 billion yen that the prefectural government had requested for development in the budget for the following year.83

Tokyo’s response to these demands swiftly bore fruit. While the US side commented that it would not agree to any concessions before the governor signed the reclamation permit, Abe reportedly showed more flexibility in the private meetings with the governor. On December 24, the Japanese Cabinet raised the budget allocated to Okinawa to 346 billion yen, a 15% increase from the amount that the prefecture had requested.84 Finally, following a meeting with Abe on December 25 in which the prime minister promised a yearly budget in excess of 300 billion until 2021, Nakaima agreed to grant Tokyo the necessary permit, stating that he

80 “Futenma isetsu “kengai” de kessoku / jiminshigi 14nin gikai ga 6kaime ikensho / 7gatsu no senkyo kōyaku kenji,” Ryukyu Shimpo, December 3, 2013. 81 “Okinawans urged to toe LDP line.” 82 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, R42645 (2016), 11; “Futenma “5nen inai teishi wo” Okinawa Chiji yōkyū Shushō “jitsugen ni doryoku”,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 17, 2013; “Okinawa governor prepared to approve base relocation, but turmoil expected ahead,” The Mainichi, December 26, 2013; “Japan to Earmark Annual 300 B. Yen for Okinawa Development,” Jiji Press English News Service, December 24, 2013. 83 “Futenma ‘5nen inai teishi wo’ Okinawa Chiji yōkyū Shushō ‘jitsugen ni doryoku’.” 84 “Gov’t raises budget for Okinawa by 15% ahead of base-related decision,” Kyodo News, December 24, 2013; “Henoko shōnin kyou ni mo hyōmeu Okinawa Chiji futankeigen wo hyōka,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 26, 2013.

218 had “obtained assurances from the prime minister.”85 The governor and his supporters also cited the influence of recent tensions around the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyu islands in his decision.86 With this development, the consensus amongst observers and policy-makers alike was that the most important legal hurdle had been cleared, thus allowing Tokyo to proceed with construction.87 US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel welcomed Nakaima’s decision as “the most significant milestone achieved in (the) realignment efforts so far,” reaffirming again the commitment on the part of both national governments to continue with the realignments in Japan, Okinawa and Guam.88

8.4 Attempted implementation and the backlash against Nakaima

Following the governor’s decision, the Okinawan political establishment criticized Nakaima for his “betrayal,” though not unanimously. On January 6, the Naha City Assembly adopted a written protest against the governor’s approval of the land reclamation permit.89 The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly followed suit on January 10 with a written resolution calling for Nakaima’s resignation, criticizing his decision to sign the permit because of the environmental concerns the construction plans raised. Although LDP members of the assembly did not vote for it, the resolution passed with support from the local New Kōmeitō chapter, despite its national party being the LDP’s long-term coalition partner.90 This difference in the local political leadership was echoed in the rank and file of the party, with a JiJi Press survey on January 17 revealing that 42 percent of Kōmeitō supporters nationwide were against the relocation versus just 30 percent in favor, contrasting with 19.2 and 64.5 percent respectively for the LDP.91 A group of 194 citizens—including some residents from

85 “Okinawa governor says he can still hold his head high,” The Asahi Shimbun, December 28, 2013. 86 Yuka Hayashi, “U.S., Japan Move to Shore Up Military Base in Okinawa,” The Wall Street Journal Online, July 13, 2014. 87 Gavan McCormack, “Bitter Soup For Okinawans - The Governor’s Year-End Betrayal,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 12-1-2 (2014), published electronically January 6, 2014, accessed January 6, 2014, http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/4056; C. Douglas Lummis, “The Great Betrayal,” ibid., http://japanfocus.org/events/view/205; “Okinawa governor’s changed attitude disappoints local citizens,” The Mainichi, December 28, 2013; “Next up for US base relocation: drilling down to details,” Nikkei Report, December 28, 2006. 88 “Hagel Welcomes Approval of Futenma Landfill Permit,” Department of Defense Documents, December 27, 2013. 89 “Naha Assembly Protests Nakaima’s Landfill Permit,” Jiji Press English News Service, January 6, 2014. 90 “Assembly Wants Futenma Relocation in Okinawa Scrapped,” Jiji Press English News Service, January 10, 2014. 91 “43 Pct Back Futenma Relocation to Henoko: Jiji Survey,” Jiji Press English News Service, January 17, 2014.

219 Henoko—also filed a suit against the governor with the Naha District Court.92

However, none of these protest actions were legally binding. Having obtained the required land reclamation permit, the Japanese government started taking concrete steps towards implementing the V-shaped runway plan at Camp Schwab. In March, it began selecting the companies that would be involved in the work needed to carry out the landfill.93 Then, on May 22, Tokyo signed an agreement with the fishing co-op that owned the rights to fish in the area, agreeing to pay compensation of several billion yen.94 Prior to commencing the final drilling survey, the United States and Japan also agreed to expand the no-entry zone in Oura Bay in order to prevent interference by protestors.95 Having learned lessons from the failed attempt to implement the 2002 Basic Plan for the FRF, the Japanese government ordered that buoys be set up to keep protestors out of the zone.96 Finally, in April, the Japanese Diet approved the revised protocol specifying that Japan would bear one-third of the cost of construction—2.8 billion dollars—in Guam.97 This signaled not only to Washington but also to Okinawa that Tokyo was committed to the realignment in the prefecture.

At the same time, the Abe administration made an effort to respond to Nakaima’s demands. On January 15, at the inaugural meeting of a Ministry of Defense committee set up to discuss burden reduction in relation to the bases in Okinawa, the participants—which included the ministry’s parliamentary and administrative vice-ministers, the Chief of Staff of Japan’s Joint Staff, and the heads of the three JSDF branches—agreed to shift at least half of the Osprey training outside of the prefecture.98 Abe and his Cabinet then met with Okinawan officials on February 18 to hold the first talks on how to cease Futenma’s functions within five years.99 The government also took additional steps designed to boost the Okinawan economy. On March 28, Abe designated Okinawa as one of six special strategic zones—specifically, a “tourist Special Economic Zone”—that would allow for the encouragement of investment

92 “Okinawans File Suit to Block Landfill for Futenma Relocation,” Jiji Press English News Service, January 15, 2014. 93 “Japan invites tenders for seafloor drilling to relocate US base - Kyodo,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, March 27, 2014. 94 “Gov’t to pay several billions of yen to Nago fisheries group,” Kyodo News, May 22, 2014. 95 “Japan, U.S. Decide on Wider No-Entry Zone off Henoko,” Jiji Press English News Service, June 20, 2014. 96 “Gov’t installs buoys to declare Futenma replacement site off-limits,” Kyodo News, August 14, 2014; “Japan in Depth / Coast guard blocks protesters at Henoko relocation site,” The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, August 16, 2014. 97 “Japan Diet approves revised pact on U.S. Marines transfer to Guam,” Kyodo News, April 23, 2014. 98 “Okinawa futan keigeni, hassoku,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 26, 2014. 99 “Gov’t holds 1st meeting with Okinawa on U.S. base closure in 5 yrs,” Kyodo News, February 18, 2014.

220 through deregulation and tax breaks.100 Half a year later, the Cabinet announced that it planned to allocate 379.4 billion yen to Okinawa during the next financial year. Included in the budget was funding needed for constructing a second runway at Naha Airport, as well as expanding the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology. However, the prefecture would be able to use approximately half of the amount—186.9 billion yen—at its own discretion.101 These developments show that the government had listened to and responded to some of the feedback that Okinawan subnational actors had previously provided.

Despite maintaining that the relocation of MCAS Futenma was a domestic issue, the US side also made efforts to ameliorate the negativity that surrounded the US military presence in Okinawa. In February, MCAS Futenma hosted a visit by MOFA officials, who were later reported in a DOD press release to have been impressed by the efforts that base officials and personnel took to develop and maintain good relations with the surrounding communities.102 In fact, just as in Iwakuni and other base-hosting localities across Japan, US military communities across Okinawa have put into practice various opportunities for cultural exchange and the building of relationships, such as volunteering, language exchange classes and even basketball tournaments involving both on-base and local high schools.103 The visit of the US Ambassador to Japan, , to Okinawa in February 2014—which included a trip to the Peace Memorial Park that commemorates all civilians and soldiers who died in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945—was also intended to help establish better relations.104 Finally, in August, the US Department of Defense submitted to Congress a master plan for the relocation to Guam. While this step was required in order to lift the freeze on funding that Congress had imposed, it could also be construed as representing the US commitment to reducing the number of Marine Corps personnel on Okinawa.105 Around the same time, the long-delayed transfer of the KC-130s to MCAS Iwakuni was finally completed.106 These efforts signaled that the United States was also pushing forward on implementing the

100 “Okinawa, Tokyo designated as ‘strategic special zone’,” Kyodo News, March 28, 2014. 101 “Cabinet Office Eyes 380 B. Yen for Okinawa in FY 2015,” Jiji Press English News Service, August 27, 2014. 102 “Installation tours give perspective,” Department of Defense Documents, February 12, 2014. 103 (“U.S. Completes Air Tanker Transfer to Iwakuni from Okinawa,” Jiji Press English News Service, August 26, 2014; Lance Cpl. Adam B. Miller, “Tournament builds friendships,” The Official Website of the United States Marine Corps, January 31, 2013. The author herself was present at two of the annual cross-cultural basketball tournaments (2009-2010). 104 Alexander Martin, “Kennedy Invokes JFK Episode as She Seeks to Woo Okinawa,” Dow Jones Institutional News, February 12, 2014. 105 “Pentagon Submits Master Plan for Marine Transfer to Guam,” Jiji Press English News Service, August 16, 2014. 106 “U.S. Completes Air Tanker Transfer to Iwakuni from Okinawa.”

221 Okinawan objectives outlined in the Roadmap.

However, several of the concessions mentioned in the media coverage of the meetings between Abe and Nakaima proved especially contentious. Although the Japanese government was reported to have promised that it would halt MCAS Futenma’s operations by 2019, the US side insisted that this was not an achievable objective.107 The governor and the prefectural government argued that it would be possible if training were transferred outside of Okinawa until the FRF was completed.108 In accordance with the idea, Tokyo asked in July 2014 if it would accept temporary deployment of half the Ospreys, so that training at MCAS Futenma could be reduced while the replacement facility was being constructed.109 However, the US side vetoed the proposal, fearing that the anti-base and anti-agreement factions might use the arrangement to argue that the Ospreys do not need to be located close to the other units of III MEF.110 Although the US military could arguably relocate some of the Osprey squadron to Saga temporarily in order to ease the burden on the community around MCAS Futenma, logistically, it would be incredibly difficult for the Marine Corps to respond to contingencies in a timely manner if their transport helicopters were located in such a distant location (approximately 1000 kilometers / 635 miles). During Hatoyama’s attempt to review the agreement, even Tokunoshima Island, just 200 kilometers (approximately 125 miles) from the Okinawan mainland, had been considered too distant.111 By July, it was obvious that this particular demand was likely to remain unfulfilled, giving it the potential to further inflame anti-base and anti-agreement sentiments in the future.

By this time, however, the subnational backlash against Governor Nakaima had started to intensify. The first indication of the level of these tensions came in the Nago mayoral election of January 2014. Although the prefectural chapter of the LDP successfully united behind the conservative Bunshin Suematsu, Inamine won by an even larger margin than in the previous

107 “Japan Aims to End Futenma Base Operations in 2019,” Jiji Press English News Service, October 7, 2014; “U.S. opposed to Japan’s plan to end Futenma base operations by 2019,” Kyodo News, October 16, 2014. 108 “‘5-nennai teishi’ zero kaitō / Futenma futan keigen kaigi,” Ryukyu Shimpo, June 25, 2014. Interview with Okinawa Prefectural Government official (Regional Security Policy Division), conducted in Naha, Okinawa Prefecture, in November 2014. In this interview conducted in the lead-up to the 2014 gubernatorial election, the official explained to the author that Tokyo is aiming for an “effective cessation of functions,” that is, for the use of the runway to be reduced as much as possible by, for example, moving Osprey training drills outside of the prefecture. Data from surveys conducted by the Okinawa Defense Bureau indicate that the number of Osprey flights has seen an upward trend in the years since Nakaima’s decision in December 2013. External factors, such as Chinese activities around the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyu Islands, may be responsible for this trend. See Table A7 and Figure A1 in the Appendix 109 “Japan Govt Asks Saga Pref. to Accept Osprey Deployment,” Jiji Press English News Service, July 22, 2014. 110 “US refuses to move Ospreys outside Okinawa,” Nikkei Report, August 7, 2014. 111 “U.S. Opposes Futenma Helicopter Unit Transfer to Tokunoshima.”

222 election, with 19,839 votes to the 15,684 that had been cast for his opponent.112 The victory margin of 4,145 votes more than doubled the gap of 1,588 that had separated Inamine from Yoshikazu Shimabukuro in 2010.113 The caveat in this case is that Nago had 46,582 eligible voters at the time of the election, which means that less than half had voted for Inamine and the position he represented.114 Nevertheless, the anti-agreement factions in Okinawa celebrated the results as a resounding endorsement of their cause.115

Perhaps more importantly, the election also showed that influence of the economic argument for the base presence had weakened. During the campaign, LDP Secretary General Ishiba announced, at a rally for Suematsu in Nago, that the government would provide a 50-billion- yen stimulation fund to help the candidate achieve his policies. Although Suematsu’s conservative supporters reported positive feedback to this promise, Inamine immediately criticized it as an attempt to buy votes. The increased margin by which the incumbent mayor retained his seat suggests that his stance of opposing this traditional strand of money-based politics may have resonated more with voters than the government had realized.116

Following Nago’s mayoral vote, the opposition-dominated Okinawa Prefectural Assembly also took further action against Nakaima. In the middle of February, the assembly used Japan’s Local Autonomy Law to set up a special investigative committee to probe the circumstances of the governor’s decision on the land reclamation permit. The opposed assembly members were aware that the findings of the committee would not have a direct effect on base relocation procedures, but hoped to delay the passing of the prefectural budget in order to paint Nakaima in a negative light.117 Ultimately, the assembly passed the budget on March 28, before the end of the financial year, so the tactic did not have a lasting effect on the operations of the prefectural government.118 On the other hand, the investigation allowed

112 “Re-elected Nago mayor says he can stop move of U.S. base to his city,” The Asahi Shimbun, January 20, 2014. 113 “U.S. Base Opponent Elected Mayor of Nago, Okinawa.” 114 Nago City Election Administration Committee, “Nago Shichō Senkyo,” (2018). 115 “As I See It: Listen to message behind Nago mayoral incumbent’s landslide victory,” The Mainichi, January 29, 2014. 116 “Ishiba-shi ‘Nago ni kikin’ / 500-oku kibo shichōsen de genchi iri / ‘kadai kaiketsu he katsuyō’ Suematsu-shi / ‘kinken seiji’ to hihan Inamine-shi,” Ryukyu Shimpo, January 17, 2014; “Nago Inamine-san saisen Shimin futatabi ‘Henoko wa hantai’ Chiiki keizai ni fuan no koe mo,” Yomiuri Shimbun, January 20, 2014; “As I See It: Listen to message behind Nago mayoral incumbent’s landslide victory.” 117 “Okinawa Governor Defends Reclamation Approval,” Jiji Press English News Service, February 21, 2014; Michitaka Kaiya, “Okinawa Pref. assembly in battle over Henoko,” The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, February 16, 2013; Eric Johnston, “Okinawa assembly probes why Nakaima reversed base stance,” The Japan Times, February 26, 2014. 118 “‘Henoko’ Chiji tsuikyuu fuhatsu Okinawa-kengikai heikai yatō, senkyo de taiketsu,” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 28, 2014.

223 the opposition parties in the assembly to highlight how no detailed records remained from the final meetings between Nakaima and Abe in December 2013, before the governor announced his decision.119 Hence, although this investigation had no discernible effect on the Japanese government’s ongoing efforts to implement the agreement, it revealed information that may have influenced voters’ choices in the subsequent gubernatorial election.

Nago mayor Inamine also used his administrative power to stall the agreement’s implementation. On April 11, the Okinawa Defense Bureau made a request to the city to use the local port to transport and store building material, which would require some construction at the municipal facility. City officials waited until the last possible day before responding, eventually asking for corrections to the proposal on May 11.120 On May 23, media reports suggested the Japanese government was seeking to change the plan for implementation, since it could not be certain of Nago’s approval even if they corrected the proposal as requested.121 Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera promptly denied the report,122 showing the limits of what subnational governments can do if they are unable to influence agreements and policies themselves.

On the other hand, other actors and groups within Okinawa showed that the prefecture was far from monolithic even in the wake of Nakaima’s “betrayal.” In the Okinawa City mayoral election on April 27, the LDP-supported candidate, Sachio Kuwae, defeated the progressive- backed candidate who opposed MCAS Futenma’s relocation within the prefecture. Kuwae emphasized that the priority should be to remove the danger that the facility posed to surrounding residents, and also called for plans to develop the Okinawan economy in cooperation with the national and prefectural governments.123 The Nago City Assembly elections in September also saw the election of 11 individuals who supported the existing plans for relocation, even though the anti-agreement side won the other 16 seats for a clear majority.124 Besides the elections, groups of pro-base citizens showed their support for the central government and the US military through a variety of activities. For example, even

119 Gavan McCormack, “Okinawa’s Darkest Year,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 11-33-4 (2015). Published August 18, 2014, accessed December 5, 2014, http://apjjf.org/2015/13/10/Gavan-McCormack/4299.html. 120 “Japan Govt Seeks Nago’s Permission over Landfill Work in Okinawa,” Jiji Press English News Service, April 14, 2014; “Gov’t seeks approval to use port in Nago in transfer process,” Kyodo News, April 14, 2014. 121 “Zainichi beigun saihen Futenma isetsu Henoko kōji, ichibuhenkō sagyōba kensetsu, shi no kyoka orizu -- Bōeishō kentō,” Mainichi Shimbun, May 23, 2014. 122 “Futenma isetsu Shuwabu ni sagyōba / Bōeishō gyokō kara henkō kentō / Nago no shiyiōkyohi sōtei,” Ryukyu Shimpo, June 25, 2014. 123 “Base Relocation Supporter Kuwae Elected Okinawa Mayor,” Jiji Press English News Service, April 28, 2014. 124 “U.S. Base Opponents Win Majority in Okinawa’s Nago Assembly,” Kyodo News, September 8, 2014.

224 before the Nakaima’s decision in December the previous year, a citizens’ group led by business leader Shōhei Nakachi was reported to have collected 80,000 signatures in favor of the relocation plan.125 Other groups that showed their support throughout the year include local Osprey fan clubs that were able to arrange on-base tours to see the controversial aircraft. The pro-base faction also organized and conducted counter-protests against the anti-base protesters outside US military facilities.126 Despite the anti-agreement movement’s claim to the contrary, there is a clear indication of multiple views on the US military presence in Okinawa.

It is perhaps indicative of these divisions that the contest for the November 2014 gubernatorial election, which started shaping up in the middle of the year, involved the redrawing of lines amongst the political factions and their traditional support groups. Nakaima had intended to retire after his second term—aged 75 in 2014, he would have become the oldest governor Okinawa had ever seen if re-elected—but local LDP supporters convinced him to run again, as the best means of removing the danger posed by MCAS Futenma.127 In particular, the Kokuba-Gumi continued to stand behind Nakaima.128 However, the local branch of the Kōmeitō, the LDP’s national coalition partner, refused to endorse the incumbent governor because it did not agree with the relocation plan. Although Nakaima and his supporters asked for and obtained the endorsement of the LDP, Kōmeitō allowed its supporters to vote as they chose.129

The candidate that emerged for the anti-agreement side was, perhaps surprisingly, Naha mayor Onaga. Onaga had been a member of the LDP throughout most of his political career and had supported Nakaima in his two previous bids for governor. He had also worked for the interest groups—especially in the business and construction industries—that formed much of the LDP’s support base in the prefecture.130 As such, he might have been expected to follow Nakaima and the LDP Diet members, who had all switched to supporting the agreement. However, it was Onaga who had advised Nakaima in 2010 to take a position opposing the

125 Hayashi, “U.S., Japan Move to Shore Up Military Base in Okinawa.” 126 Koshin Shisui, “Backlash against anti-U.S. military activists on rise in Okinawa,” The Asahi Shimbun, May 11, 2014. See also Lance Cpl. John Gargano, “Local Osprey Fan Club tours Futenma facilities,” Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, July 21, 2013. 127 “Okinawa Gov. Nakaima says will seek 3rd term in Nov. election,” Japan Economic Newswire, July 18, 2014; “Okinawa governor announces candidacy for 3rd term,” Kyodo News, August 7, 2014. 128 “Ryūseki 11sha Nakaima-shi wo suisen / Chijisen,” Ryukyu Shimpo, September 2, 2014. 129 “Kōmei, Okinawa chijisen jishutōhyō Naha shichōsen ha Jimin to kyōryoku,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 21, 2014. 130 Eric Johnston, “Naha mayor, foe of Futenma plan, to run for governor,” The Japan Times, June 6, 2014.

225 plan to relocate MCAS Futenma within the prefecture. When 11 members of the Naha City Assembly asked him in June to run for governor on a platform opposing the relocation of MCAS Futenma within the prefecture, he agreed.131 Two other major players in Okinawa’s business community—the Kanehide Group and the Kariyushi Hotels Group—set up the “Association for Making Takeshi Onaga Governor,”132 while the prefecture’s reformist parties also came around to supporting him in late July.133 Onaga thus came to be the candidate for an unusual amalgamation of conservative and progressive groups that opposed the construction of the FRF at Camp Schwab in Henoko and instead pushed for MCAS Futenma’s relocation outside of the prefecture.

Two other candidates subsequently added themselves to the contest. Mikio Shimoji, a conservative like Onaga and Nakaima, threw his hat into the ring in August, favoring a referendum on the relocation.134 Finally, former Councillor Shōkichi Kina also joined the race on a platform opposing the relocation within Okinawa. This stance saw him kicked out of the DPJ, which had officially supported the 2006 Roadmap agreement on MCAS Futenma ever since Hatoyama’s ill-fated attempted to review it. It also left the party unable to endorse any of the candidates, which meant that DPJ supporters were free to vote as they chose.135 Hence, even though one reformist candidate was also in the running, the 2014 Okinawa gubernatorial election was effectively a two-way contest between two conservative candidates that were separated primarily on whether they supported the agreement to relocate MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab.

This does not mean that Onaga and his conservative supporters had turned their backs on past ideology. In fact, all three conservative candidates asked the construction industry association for support in the election. The association ultimately chose to back Nakaima while also recommending Shimoji, but the group’s chairman pointed out that members knew all three candidates had “done their best for the industry,” thus making the decision of whom to

131 “Naha Mayor Mulls Running for Okinawa Governor Election,” Jiji Press English News Service, June 19, 2014. 132 “Ken chiji-sen / keizaikai yuushi, Onaga-shi youritsu / Kanehide, Kariyushi sandō yobikake / 9-nichi kaigō ‘100 sha ijō aru’,” Ryukyu Shimpo, June 6, 2014. 133 “Okinawa election to diverge from traditional conservative vs. reformist battle,” The Mainichi, August 5, 2014. 134 Ibid. 135 “DPJ decides to expel Kina over Okinawa gubernatorial election,” Kyodo News, October 14, 2014; “Okinawa Governor Race Kicks Off with Futenma as Biggest Issue,” Jiji Press English News Service, October 30, 2014.

226 support a tricky one for all the companies concerned.136 Conversely, some of the reformists were unable to support Onaga, including former governor Masahide Ōta, who criticized his former supporters for siding with “a person who takes pride in the conservative mainstream.”137 Overseas observers who journeyed in Okinawa for the election also expressed their doubts over whether he would truly do everything in his power to oppose the relocation plan as he had promised.138 Indeed, the core difference between Onaga and Nakaima was that the former did not support the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab. Onaga remained a supporter of the US-Japan alliance, and wished to retain the US military presence in Okinawa.139 However, his official position was that there is a disproportional concentration of US-exclusive use facilities and practice areas in the prefecture, which ought to be rectified by the transfer of several facilities to other parts of Japan.

This centrist position allowed Onaga to win voters from across the spectrum of Okinawan voters. On November 16, Onaga collected 51.2% of votes cast, amounting to almost 100,000 votes more than Nakaima, who was his nearest rival. More significantly, polls suggest that approximately 35% of Kōmeitō supporters and 23% of LDP supporters backed him despite a lack of endorsement from their parties.140 The one caveat is that, with a voter turnout of 64.13%, Onaga had the support of just 33% of eligible voters in the prefecture. Nevertheless, the gap between the governor-elect and Nakaima, along with the 3.5-point increase in turnout from the previous election, points to a clear shift in voter preferences in Okinawa. This was also borne out in exit polls, which showed that approximately 60% of voters were opposed to the V-shaped runway plan for relocation within the prefecture, compared to just 25% for.141 Although polls cannot be used to prove cause and effect, the 2014 gubernatorial election campaign and outcome nevertheless signaled a shift away from the traditional conservative versus reformist divide in the prefecture.

136 “Nov. 16 Okinawa governor race to highlight split between conservatives over U.S. base,” The Mainichi, October 28, 2014. 137 Ibid. 138 Private conversations with foreign scholars and journalists covering the gubernatorial election in Okinawa in November 2014. 139 Gavan McCormack, “Japan’s Problematic Prefecture – Okinawa and the US-Japan Relationship,” The Asia- Pacific Journal 14-17-2 (2016), accessed November 15, 2018, https://apjjf.org/2016/17/McCormack.html. Also discussed in a second interview with Manabu Satō (Professor, Okinawan International University), conducted in Okinawa Prefecture in July 2016. 140 Eric Johnston, “Okinawa election a big win for opponents of Futenma relocation,” The Japan Times, November 17, 2014; Martin Fackler, “Okinawa Voters Replace Governor With Opponent of U.S. Base,” The New York Times, November 16, 2014. 141 “25 Pct of Voters Support Futenma Transfer to Henoko,” Jiji Press English News Service, November 17, 2014.

227

8.5 A drawn-out implementation process

Onaga’s win ensured that the implementation process would be drawn out for at least the next few years. The Japanese government downplayed the new governor’s ability to interfere with the agreement’s implementation while also attempting to persuade and force him to comply. Tokyo promptly reiterated that it remained committed to the military realignment in Okinawa, as did a US government spokesperson several days later.142 Shortly after, the Abe administration also announced that a snap general election would be held on December 14, fulfilling weeks-long speculation that the government would call an early election in order to extend its mandate while its popularity remained strong.143 Observers attributed this decision to Abe’s gradually declining poll numbers, which can be linked to the continued weak performance of the Japanese economy as well as the prime minister’s desire to undertake controversial security legislation.144 Winning the election would extend the term of the administration by four years, allowing Abe the chance to carry through on these reforms. The general election saw all LDP-backed candidates in Okinawa replaced by reformist ones, although the former were still elected via the proportional representation part of the vote.145 However, the timing of the election meant that any news and analysis about the Okinawa gubernatorial vote and how it affected the contest over the bases in the prefecture was buried under news about Japan’s general election.

Nakaima also took action to reduce as much as possible the incoming governor’s ability to affect the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab. As the rest of the country geared up for the national election, Nakaima used his last days in office to approve amendments to the plan for land reclamation, which the Okinawa Defense Bureau had submitted to the prefectural government in September. These changes were designed to enable the bureau to bypass Inamine’s authority as mayor of Nago by avoiding construction work in areas under his control.146 Through their questioning of the application, the opposition parties in the

142 “LDP to push for U.S. base relocation despite Okinawa election results,” Kyodo News, November 17, 2014; “U.S. committed to Futenma relocation plan: official,” The Japan Times, November 18, 2014. 143 “Japan’s Abe Announces Tax Hike Delay, General Election,” Jiji Press English News Service, November 18, 2014. 144 Reiji Yoshida, “Faltering GDP adds pressure to Abe to call off sales tax hike,” The Japan Times, November 18, 2014. 145 Anna Fifield, “Three reasons why the Japanese elections matter to the United States,” The Washington Post, December 15, 2014. 146 “Outgoing Okinawa Gov. takes action to promote U.S. base relocation,” Kyodo News, December 5, 2014.

228 prefectural assembly convinced the prefectural government to conduct a thorough examination of it, thus ensuring that the process took longer than “the regular 44-day processing period.”147 Nevertheless, the outgoing governor was able to complete the approval process for two of the three proposed changes on December 5. The third modification was left for approval by the incoming Onaga administration, and officials expressed confidence that it would succeed, because procedures were already in place. Nakaima’s actions were lambasted by anti-agreement proponents, as well as Inamine and the incoming governor.148 However, he was thus able to reduce the opportunities for Onaga to interfere with the relocation.

Onaga’s first actions as governor then saw reformist commentators starting to express doubts over the new governor’s allegiance. He appointed as his vice governors Mitsuo Ageda and Isho Urasaki, whom Gavan McCormack later pointed out had not shown strong views about the realignment plans.149 Furthermore, he also appointed Hideo Henzan to set up and run an overseas prefectural office in Washington, DC—Henzan was reasonably well-connected because he had worked for 30 years as an advisor to the US Consul General in Okinawa, serving US rather than Japanese or Okinawan interests.150 These appointments raised questions over how strongly the governor would be willing—or able—to contest Tokyo and Washington on the issue of relocating MCAS Futenma within Okinawa. Since Onaga had long been part of the LDP, critics suspected that he would be willing to compromise, as Nakaima had. McCormack also criticized how Onaga took until January 26 to set up the committee to investigate the process of decision-making undertaken by Nakaima before approving the landfill permit, pointing out that the earliest possible outcome of the inquiry— June of that year—would make it “too late to save Oura Bay.”151

Indeed, the actions that the new governor took in the first half of 2015 had little to no effect on the central government’s actions. Although Onaga instructed the defense bureau on February 17 to suspend installation of concrete blocks because of suspected damage to reefs in the bay, this move had minimal impact because “no further block installation [was]

147 “Outgoing Okinawa governor makes last-ditch push for Henoko relocation,” The Mainichi, December 6, 2014; “Ken shōnin, jiki ga shōten ni / chikaku bōeikyoku ni sai shitsumon,” Ryukyu Shimpo, November 18, 2014. 148 “Outgoing Okinawa governor makes last-ditch push for Henoko relocation.” 149 McCormack, “Okinawa’s Darkest Year”; “2-shi ga Fukuchiji shūnin,” Ryukyu Shimpo, December 17, 2014. 150 “Okinawa’s Darkest Year”; “Bei seifunai ni dokuji jinmyaku / Bei chūzai ni Henzan-shi Henoko soshi dakai he,” Okinawa Times, January 8, 2015. 151 “Okinawa’s Darkest Year.”

229 planned” at that point.152 On March 23, the governor ordered a halt to the seabed drilling needed to complete the preliminary survey, which the defense bureau had resumed on March 12. The bureau responded by filing a petition with Fisheries Minister to reject the order, and he suspended it just one week later, allowing the work to resume. While the deadline for the surveys was again extended, from the end of March until June (and later, on until September), inclement weather was cited as the main reason behind the delays.153 Furthermore, although Onaga met with Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) Suga on April 5, and then Prime Minister Abe himself on April 17, Tokyo also set up a panel group to speak directly with residents of the Henoko area, a number of whom remained keen to accept the relocation in return for economic benefits.154 Having cleared the final legal hurdle of the reclamation permit, Tokyo seemed able and willing to bypass the remaining local opposition, including that of the new governor.

Towards the second half of the year, however, the Abe administration was forced to confront Onaga more directly. On July 29, the Okinawa Prefectural Government rejected an embankment blueprint presented by Tokyo because it had been based on the incomplete drilling survey.155 Less than a week later, CCS Suga announced that work on the relocation would be suspended for a month so that Tokyo could conduct talks with Onaga and other Okinawan officials.156 On the one hand, newspaper accorded this backflip to the GOJ’s concerns about the administration’s falling ratings, which they postulated to be due to their effects to revise Japan’s security legislation.157 On the other hand, Onaga signaled that he was ready to revoke Nakaima’s approval of the reclamation permit; after the Japanese government restarted construction on September 12, 2015, the governor promptly announced that he would begin procedures to do so.158 This then segued into a court battle between the Tokyo and Okinawa, which again led to a temporary halt in the construction work in the first

152 “Onaga’s tactics up strife with govt / Abe expresses intention to keep to Futenma plan,” The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, February 19, 2015. The blocks would be used to anchor floating devices to support a temporary pier for the drilling survey, which the defense bureau needed to complete in order to present detailed plans for construction/reclamation work. 153 “Japan to conduct undersea research at base relocation site until June,” Kyodo News, March 31, 2015; “Gov’t to extend survey at U.S. base relocation site in Okinawa,” Kyodo News, June 30, 2015; “Okinawa Passes Ordinance to Block Landfill for U.S. Base,” Jiji Press English News Service, July 13, 2015. 154 Reiji Yoshida, “Abe, Onaga refuse to budge on base row in first allowed meeting,” The Japan Times, April 17, 2015; “Japan Govt, Okinawa Remain Apart over Base,” Jiji Press English News Service, April 5, 2015; “Gov’t to discuss economic issues with Okinawa base host city residents,” Kyodo News, May 7, 2015. 155 “Japan Govt Presents Henoko Embankment Blueprint to Okinawa,” Jiji Press English News Service, July 24, 2015; “Okinawa Wants Embankment Plan Withdrawn,” Jiji Press English News Service, July 29, 2015. 156 “Japan to halt work on U.S. base relocation in Okinawa for month,” Kyodo News, August 4, 2015. 157 “Still no solution in sight: Tokyo, Okinawa call tactical truce in Futenma battle,” Nikkei Report, August 5, 2015. 158 “Okinawa gov. says approval to be revoked for base relocation work,” Kyodo News, September 14, 2015.

230 half of 2016.159 The Japanese government won the case in September of that year, at which point Tokyo and Washington reiterated their commitment to the planned relocation of MCAS Futenma and the rest of the realignment in Okinawa.160

The efforts to implement the realignment in Okinawa have since followed a similar pattern. The Japanese government has persisted with its efforts to implement the realignment, with two key subnational actors—the Okinawa governor and Nago mayor—using their administrative powers to obstruct the process where possible. Most policy makers and observers expect that the realignment will be completed eventually, provided Washington and Tokyo remain committed, as procedures that exist under Japanese law enable the Japanese government to bypass or override these obstructions. When this comes to pass, the allies will ostensibly have been successful at achieving one of the two core objectives of the original SACO process: a real reduction in the burden on the prefecture. However, the other core objective of reducing tensions may be more elusive, as local leaders and citizens continue to oppose, protest and obstruct implementation.

8.6 In summary

As this chapter shows, the progress made towards implementing the US military realignment in Okinawa took a backwards step from 2008 to 2012, due to both national and local factors. At the national level, a shift in political power to the DPJ created a challenge for the agreement to relocate MCAS Futenma within the prefecture. Under pressure from an important coalition partner, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s attempt to review the agreement to relocate MCAS Futenma led to raised tensions in Okinawa. At the same time, the economic argument for the bases in Okinawa had started to lose its effect. These two factors induced a political shift in Okinawa, whereby even LDP leaders in the prefecture asserted that they were against the relocation. Following its return to power in 2012, the national LDP government under Shinzō Abe worked to convince Governor Hirokazu Nakaima to approve the permit for land reclamation, thus allowing the allies to proceed with implementation. However, the backlash to this move has seen anti-agreement Okinawan

159 “Japan Govt Takes Action against Okinawa over Landfill,” Jiji Press English News Service, October 14, 2015; “Legal battle over Okinawa base relocation comes to halt,” Kyodo News, March 4, 2016. 160 “No Change in Importance of Futenma Relocation: U.S. Official,” Jiji Press English News Service, September 17, 2016.

231 leaders such as Takeshi Onaga continue to use their administrative powers to obstruct implementation. Even if successfully completed, the US military realignment in Okinawa thus appears unlikely to achieve the core SACO objective of reducing tensions in the prefecture.

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~Chapter 9~ Tensions, Preferences and the Feedback Loop

This chapter outlines the findings drawn from the empirical sections of the dissertation. The aim of the dissertation was to find answers to the following questions. First, why are some alliance agreements carried out promptly while others struggle to get implemented? And second, what is the role that subnational actors play in the agreement-implementation process, and how much influence do they have over different parts of this process? In order to answer these questions, the dissertation has examined the US and Japanese governments’ efforts to negotiate and implement three US-Japan alliance agreements that involved significant changes to several Marine Corps facilities in Japan, namely MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture, and MCAS Futenma and Camp Schwab in Okinawa Prefecture.

In analyzing these agreements, the dissertation makes the central claim that the variation in implementation outcomes in the post-Cold War US military realignment in Japan can be explained by the level of preference incorporation. Specifically, the extent to which alliance managers incorporated local preferences into the agreement-implementation processes and the timing of their efforts to do so were crucial for success in achieving implementation. The dependent variable used for analysis was internal alliance tensions, chosen because a key underlying objective of the agreements in question is to “reduce the burden” on host communities. Furthermore, these tensions can particularly be observed at checkpoints during implementation, where those opposed to the agreements take steps to prevent or hinder the process. For these two reasons, a reduction in alliance tensions is a useful indicator of implementation success. Furthermore, it is possible to identify a mechanism—feedback loops—via which this relationship between preference incorporation and alliance tensions operates.

This research contributes to the alliance management and base politics literature in two key ways. First, it offers valuable new insights into the role that subnational actors play in the U.S.-Japan security alliance, which has potential implications not only for other alliances but

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also for other types of international agreements. Second, it explains the process of agreement implementation. In particular, it goes beyond analyzing the negotiation and formal ratification of alliance agreements, which have been the focus of the recently establish subfield of basing politics thus far. As argued in Chapter 2, such a focus means that the explanations of basing politics offered by existing studies do not adequately account for the variation in implementation outcomes across the post-Cold War realignment in Japan. The dissertation thus makes an important contribution to this literature by offering an explanation for this variation, specifically, in linking preference incorporation to internal alliance tensions—and thus implementation—through the mechanism of feedback loops.

In order to do this, the dissertation has tracked and analyzed levels of preference incorporation and internal alliance tensions in the two sub-cases of Yamaguchi Prefecture and Okinawa Prefecture. Nine different agreement-implementation sequences (four involving MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi and five involving the realignment in Okinawa) have been identified from the following three agreements: the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on MCAS Iwakuni; the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report; and the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (the Roadmap). For each sequence, the key subnational actors and the checkpoints at which they were instrumental in advancing or impeding implementation were identified. Measurements of the variation in preference incorporation and tensions across each sequence were then made. The indicators used are listed in Table 9.1 below, and tables of the data can be found in the Appendix.

Table 9.1 Indicators for Preference Incorporation and Tensions

Observation Preference Incorporation Tensions Indicators No./frequency of consultations Size/intensity of protests Breadth of actors involved Results of elections/referenda Were requests incorporated? Subnational leader behavior

The major finding of the dissertation is that the level of preference incorporation is indeed correlated with changes in the levels of alliance tensions in Okinawa Prefecture and Iwakuni City in Yamaguchi Prefecture. On the one hand, relatively higher levels of preference incorporation and lower levels of tensions, particularly at early junctures in the agreement- implementation sequences, were observed in Iwakuni City. On the other hand, lower levels of preference incorporation and higher levels of tensions, especially early in the agreement-

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implementation sequences, were observed in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture as a whole. Furthermore, a remarkable level of variation was also found within each sub-case. In Iwakuni City, two later sequences showed spikes in the levels of tensions that later fell, corresponding to increases in preference incorporation. In Nago City and Okinawa, several sequences showed noteworthy shifts in both preference incorporation and the levels of tensions. These variations help illustrate the mechanism that links the two variables: early outcomes from the implementation process, whether successful or not, were self-reinforcing because of the operation of feedback loops. High levels of preference incorporation at an early stage facilitated cordial relations between central and local actors, keeping tensions low and allowing for more preferences to be identified and incorporated later in the process. Conversely, low levels of preference incorporation complicated these central-local relations and inflamed tensions that hindered later efforts to incorporate preferences.

In laying out these findings, this chapter is divided into five parts. Section 9.1 summarizes the findings, showing that there are differences in the levels of tensions not only between Yamaguchi and Okinawa, but also within the two sub-cases over the periods examined. It also shows that there has been variation in the levels of preference incorporation across time. Sections 9.2 through 9.4 elaborate on these findings, outlining in detail how preference incorporation and tensions varied across each of the four sequences involving the realignment in Yamaguchi (MCAS Iwakuni) and the five sequences involving the realignment in Okinawa (MCAS Futenma and Camp Schwab). They demonstrate how higher levels of preference incorporation appear to be correlated with lower levels of tensions, and vice versa, when comparing both variables across the two sub-cases and also across the different sequences within each sub-case. More significantly, several of the sequences illustrate how shifts in preference incorporation over time translated into changes in the levels in tensions, with the differences in the two sub-cases showcasing the importance of early efforts to understand and address local preferences. The chapter’s final section then expands on how the mechanism of feedback loops produced these outcomes: positive feedback loops reinforced early successes in preference incorporation and reduced tensions, particularly in the Yamaguchi sub-case, while negative feedback loops amplified early failures to incorporate preferences and increased tensions instead, particularly in the Okinawa sub-case.

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9.1 Summarizing the findings

The theorized relationship between preference incorporation and alliance tensions generated a particular set of expectations for the two sub-cases involving MCAS Iwakuni and MCAS Futenma/Camp Schwab. Broadly speaking, it could be expected that levels of preference incorporation would be measurably higher in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture, corresponding with lower levels of tensions. Furthermore, successful incorporation of local preferences could be expected to have begun at an earlier stage of the agreement- implementation sequence, even prior to the signing of the formal agreements. Conversely, it could be expected for the MCAS Futenma/Camp Schwab sub-case that lower levels of preference incorporation would be observed in Nago City and across Okinawa Prefecture, corresponding with higher levels of tensions.

The findings of the dissertation indeed bear out this inverse correlation between preference incorporation and alliance tensions. At the simplest level of comparison, varying degrees of preference incorporation were observed in relation to the requests and demands from the two groups of subnational actors involved in the two sub-cases. On the whole, alliance managers addressed the preferences of subnational actors in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture earlier and to a greater extent than those of the subnational actors in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture. Although the Japanese government sought to address local preferences in both sub-cases, it was less successful in the latter, for reasons including more unrealistic expectations from both national and subnational actors and interference from external actors.

Different levels of tensions were also observed across the two sub-cases. The agreements involving MCAS Iwakuni generated tensions only within Iwakuni City and its immediate surrounding towns. Furthermore, with no more than a few thousand people attending protest rallies and just one mayor taking a non-cooperative stance, the levels of tensions generated by or associated with each incident were considerably lower than in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture. In the latter subcase, protest rallies attracted tens of thousands of people from across the prefecture, and several key subnational political actors, including mayors and governors, refused to cooperate for extended periods of time.

However, it is not the absolute levels but rather the shifts in preference incorporation in both sub-cases—and the corresponding shifts in levels of tensions—that tell a more interesting story. In the Iwakuni City/Yamaguchi Prefecture sub-case, falls in preference incorporation

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Table 9.2 Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture, 1992~2013

Preference Sequence Agreement and Major Objective Tensions Incorporation

Iwakuni MOU (1992): Iwakuni MOU Shift MCAS Iwakuni runway HIGH LOW seaward SACO (1996): Iwakuni SACO HIGH LOW Transfer of KC-130 squadron

Iwakuni Roadmap (2006): MODERATE MODERATE Roadmap 1 Transfer of CVW-5 => HIGH => LOW Roadmap (2006): Iwakuni MODERATE MODERATE DPJ’s attempted review of MCAS Roadmap 2 => HIGH => LOW Futenma relocation agreement

Table 9.3 Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture, 1990~2015

Preference Sequence Agreement and Major Objective Tensions Incorporation

Administrative Agreement under Art. III Land Leases LOW of the US-Japan Security Treaty LOW Law (Okinawa) Renewal of land leases => HIGH SACO (1996): HIGH LOW Futenma SACO Relocate MCAS Futenma to offshore => LOW => MODERATE facility (2002 Basic Plan) => MODERATE Roadmap (2006) Futenma- MODERATE Schwab Relocate MCAS Futenma to Camp LOW => HIGH Roadmap 1 Schwab expansion

Futenma- Roadmap (2006) Schwab DPJ’s attempted review of MCAS LOW HIGH Roadmap 2 Futenma relocation agreement Roadmap (2006) HIGH Futenma- LOW Schwab Relocate MCAS Futenma to Camp =>MODERATE => MODERATE Roadmap 3 Schwab expansion 2nd attempt =>HIGH

were observed in both the third and fourth agreement-implementation sequences, with corresponding rises in tensions. When preference incorporation increased again over the course of both sequences, tensions fell in response. In the Nago City/Okinawa sub-case,

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increases in preference incorporation were also observed, in the second and fifth sequences. But although tensions fell in the first halves of those sequences, they later rose again, especially in the fifth and final sequence examined. Tables 9.2 and 9.3 provide a summary of the findings from all nine sequences. A more detailed breakdown of these results is provided in the following sections.

9.2 Preference incorporation and tensions in Iwakuni/Yamaguchi, 1992- 2015

This section details the findings from examining the four agreement-implementation sequences involving MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture. These sequences involve three post-Cold War alliance management agreements: the 1992 MOU for expanding the facility onto reclaimed land in order to relocate the runway seaward, the 1996 SACO agreement that involved transferring the KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni, and the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation where Washington and Tokyo agreed to move Carrier Air Wing 5 (CVW-5) from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni. Table 9.4 provides a summary of the levels of preference incorporation and tensions of these sequences. Of particular interest are the third and fourth sequences (Iwakuni Roadmap 1 and 2), which exhibited several spikes in the levels of tensions. Significantly, they demonstrate how the feedback loop operates to reinforce early preference incorporation and thus bring tensions back down.

The first sequence in Table 9.4—the MOU for shifting the runway of MCAS Iwakuni seaward—was characterized by high levels of preference incorporation and extremely low levels of tension. The key subnational leaders (the Yamaguchi governor, the Iwakuni mayor, and their governments) welcomed the agreement and cooperated fully at the implementation checkpoints, and there was no record of civilian protests, election results or referenda that signified dissent from societal actors. Why was this the case? First, within Japan, this base hosting community is known to have one of the most positive attitudes towards the US military presence in their midst, with the annual Friendship Day on May 5—an MCAS Iwakuni open day with air shows and other attractions—being one of the city’s tourist attractions.

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But the second and more influential reason is that local preferences drove the negotiation of the agreement. The trigger that led to this MOU was the 1968 incident where an F-4 Phantom crashed into Kyushu University in . Following this accident, Iwakuni’s residents and leaders spent many years appealing to the Japanese government to address their safety concerns by expanding MCAS Iwakuni onto land to be reclaimed from the Seto Inland Sea, so as to shift the facility’s runway further away from residential areas. The central government eventually responded by engaging with these concerns, cooperating with local leaders and Washington to conduct feasibility studies and develop plans for construction prior to the official agreement in 1992. In other words, the heavy involvement of key subnational actors throughout the entire pre-agreement stage generated a feedback loop that ensured the agreement itself reflected a high level of preference incorporation.1 This meant that subnational actors had little to no cause for opposing the Iwakuni MOU, thus resulting in low levels of tensions and smooth progress in implementation over the course of this sequence.

Similarly, the second agreement-implementation sequence involving MCAS Iwakuni showed high levels of preference incorporation. As with the first sequence, the content of the agreement reflected local preferences. Based on the statements made by both the Yamaguchi governor and the Iwakuni mayor in the eight months leading up to their decisions to accept the transfer, it is clear that the main concern of subnational actors was to ensure that any changes to the US military footprint did not “increase the burden” on the city. Although the immediate responses of these actors to the SACO Interim Report in April 1996 suggest that they had not been consulted on the transfer, the agreement itself showed that the Japanese and US governments had already taken this main concern into account. At first glance, the transfer of the VMGR-152 KC-130 squadron—12 aircraft, along with 300 personal and their dependents—from MCAS Futenma appears to translate into an increase in the overall force presence at MCAS Iwakuni. However, this was balanced by the transfer of the 20-unit AV-8 Harrier squadron from Iwakuni back to the US mainland. In fact, the prompt transfer of the Harrier squadron—initiated within a month of the interim report—may have been intended to send a signal to Iwakuni’s subnational actors that their concerns about the overall “burden” had been taken into account. In short, even though few meetings appear to have taken place

1 See Section 4.2.

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during the year of SACO negotiations, the interim and final reports reflected high levels of preference incorporation for this second sequence involving MCAS Iwakuni,.2

The sequence is also characterized by relatively low levels of tensions. Unlike in the first sequence, there was one protest rally in response to the SACO Interim Report. However, it numbered just 4,000 people, less than 10% of the population of the city (and less than 0.5% of the prefecture’s population). No elections or referenda were held during this time period. Finally, the behavior of the key subnational actors shifted from neutral to cooperative over the course of this agreement-implementation sequence. The governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture and the mayors of Iwakuni City and the nearby town of Yū initially voiced their concerns that the transfer of the KC-130 squadron would “increase the burden” on the city’s residents. Following the release of working group findings that it would not, however, all three acquiesced to the transfer in February 1997, even though the Iwakuni City Assembly passed a unanimous but non-binding resolution against it. In other words, the key subnational actors made their decisions to accept the transfer and cooperate with implementation once the working group confirmed that local preferences had been incorporated into the agreement.

The third agreement-implementation sequence for Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture, concerning the 2006 Roadmap agreement born of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), showed for the first time significant variation in levels of both preference incorporation and levels of tensions. At first glance, the Japanese government appears to have addressed local preferences right from the start of the sequence. Although alliance managers did not engage in extensive consultations prior to the agreement, they based their early proposals on the condition that had been identified and adhered to in the previous sequences: any changes must not increase the burden on Iwakuni City. This is why the transfer of the CVW-5 carrier fighter unit from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni, as stipulated in the DPRI interim report (“US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” October 2005) was originally balanced by the transfer of several Iwakuni-based units to other facilities, including the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) squadrons to Atsugi. Furthermore, alliance managers indicated a willingness to examine the possibility of reopening the runway to civilian flights, which was another long-running request from subnational actors in Iwakuni.

2 See Section 4.3.

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Table 9.4 Indicators of Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Iwakuni, 1990~2015

Indicators of Preference Incorporation Indicators of Tensions Agreement and Major Sequence Objective Breadth of Leader Meetings Incorporation? Protests Public Votes Involvement Behavior

Iwakuni MOU (1992): Iwakuni MANY BROAD HIGH COOPERATION N/A N/A MOU Shift MCAS Iwakuni runway seaward

Iwakuni SACO (1996): FEW NARROW HIGH COOPERATION MINOR PRO SACO Transfer of KC-130 squadron

NONE N/A LOW OPPOSITION NEUTRAL Iwakuni Roadmap (2006): => => => => MODERATE => Roadmap 1 Transfer of CVW-5 MANY BROAD MODERATE COOPERATION PRO

Roadmap (2006): FEW MODERATE OPPOSITION Iwakuni DPJ’s attempted review of => NARROW => => MINOR PRO Roadmap 2 MCAS Futenma relocation MANY HIGH COOPERATION agreement

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However, the reality is that Tokyo’s efforts to incorporate local preferences overlooked a different kind of “burden.” As meetings between Iwakuni’s leaders and Tokyo soon revealed, the transfers increased the financial and social burden on the city, since the JMSDF were part of the community while the incoming US personnel and their dependents would not be. Key subnational actors also expressed their concern that accepting the CVW-5 transfer would increase the likelihood of MCAS Iwakuni being designated as the permanent host for the unit’s field carrier landing practice (FCLP) drills. Hence, the level of preference incorporation at the agreement stage remained unexpectedly low, unlike the two previous sequences. Nevertheless, this increased to a moderate level over the course of the third agreement- implementation sequence, as Tokyo used subsequent consultations with subnational actors to indicate its willingness to address two key preferences: the purchase of the Atago Hills project and the removal of MCAS Iwakuni from consideration as the permanent airfield for the FCLP drills. The former alleviated some of the financial pressures on the city, while the latter ensured that the physical burden on residents would be kept as low as possible despite the acceptance of the carrier aircraft unit. The third sequence for MCAS Iwakuni thus shows how a feedback loop that started early in the sequence helped Tokyo identify and incorporate certain local preferences into the agreement.

Not surprisingly, then, the levels of tensions during this sequence also showed a different pattern from the previous two. The beginning of this period, from 2005 to 2006, reflected the highest levels of tensions for the Iwakuni sub-case. The initial reaction from both Yamaguchi governor Sekinari Nii and Iwakuni mayor Katsusuke Ihara to the DPRI interim agreement was discontent at not having been consulted during the negotiation process. In fact, there was actually a contest between opposing views in Iwakuni City. Half of the voting public revealed their opposition during the referendum in March 2006, but the groups of societal actors that supported the agreement in exchange for economic benefits had advocated a boycott, in an attempt to render this public vote, already non-binding, invalid. Hence, the 83% of “No” votes combined with the low turnout of 58% percent suggests that the constituency was overall “neutral”—not decidedly pro- or anti-agreement—at that point in time. This was, however, the most strongly that the residents of Iwakuni City had registered opposition to the agreements, so Ihara remained opposed to the transfers and refused to cooperate with implementation. Furthermore, the mayor’s successful bid for re-election in April 2006, where he earned more than double the votes of the losing candidate who supported the agreement, suggests that a majority of his constituency favored his stance.

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However, the tensions over the 2006 Roadmap in Iwakuni City slowly decreased in intensity over the next few years, as evidenced by all indicators. First, other key subnational actors reversed their opposition, which reduced the impact of Ihara’s refusal to cooperate. Governor Nii took on a flexible stance in response to the announcement of the Roadmap in May 2006, recommending that Ihara do the same. In October, municipal elections then gave conservatives, who by-and-large supported the transfers in exchange for economic subsidies, a majority in the Iwakuni City Assembly. This result meant that although Ihara remained opposed to the agreement, the city assembly did not support his non-cooperative stance. Confident that it had the cooperation of subnational actors favoring cooperation, Tokyo then halted funding for the new Iwakuni City Hall, which was under construction at the time, forcing Ihara into a mayoral election in February 2008. The result of this vote, which saw the pro-agreement candidate, Yoshihiko Fukuda, defeat Ihara by the slim margin of just 1,782 votes (47,081 to 45,299), shows that opposition from societal actors had also dropped. Following this result, the new mayor and the city administration took on a flexible stance: the working group discussions subsequently set up between Tokyo, Yamaguchi and Iwakuni were premised on accepting the CVW-5 transfer, but only if certain local requests were met. Although small groups of residents initiated lawsuits against the central government over the approval of the landfill later in 2008, these actions did not lead to a significant increase in protests, nor did they influence local leaders to take a less cooperative stance. Thus, based on the three indicators of protest rallies, election results and opposition from key subnational actors, it is clear that tensions in Iwakuni fell over the course of this third agreement- implementation sequence.3

Analysis of the fourth agreement-implementation sequence involving MCAS Iwakuni showed a similar pattern of increasing preference incorporation and decreasing tensions. Furthermore, they demonstrated the link between the two. The DPJ’s 2009 pledge to review the agreement to relocate MCAS Futenma and question marks raised by feasibility studies in Guam gave rise to concerns that MCAS Iwakuni would receive some of the 8,000 Marines the Roadmap had earmarked for transfer out of Okinawa. Subnational actors became concerned that the core preference of “no increase in the burden” would not be adhered to. Former mayor Ihara helped organize a small protest rally (5,000 attendees; approximately 5% of the population of the city) in May 2010, and a group of Iwakuni residents filed a lawsuit over noise pollution that same year. More significantly, the key subnational actors—Mayor Fukuda and Governor

3 See Sections 4.4 to 4.6.

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Nii—also stepped back from full cooperation, reiterating that the city would not accept any further increase in its burden and, in early 2012, briefly halting the sale of the Atago Hills complex. In 2013, the mayor voiced his displeasure when Tokyo announced that the KC-130 squadron transfer would begin earlier than planned, concerned that Iwakuni City would be the only host community to suffer an overall increase in its burden should realignment efforts in Okinawa fail. Fukuda also protested the deployment, from 2012, of the controversial Osprey aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni.

Figure 9.1 Chart showing Levels of Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture

Figure 9.1 is a visual representation of levels of preference incorporation and tensions over time for the Yamaguchi Prefecture/MCAS Iwakuni sub-case. A scale with five values (lowest = 1; highest = 5) was used to represent the levels of the two variables.. The tables of data used to derive these values can be found in the Appendix.

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However, the situation became reversed from about 2013, when preference incorporation started to increase while tensions went in the opposite direction. After Tokyo confirmed several times that Iwakuni would not be considered for any more of the Marine Corps units that were to be transferred out of Okinawa (aside from the KC-130 squadron transfer to which the city had already acquiesced), both Governor Nii and Mayor Fukuda shifted back to cooperation by affirming the sale of the Atago Hills complex. Alliance managers then moved to incorporate another local preference uncovered during early rounds of feedback. In October of 2013, they finally agreed to allow the JMSDF units to remain at the base, pledging instead to move training to other areas so as not to increase the physical burden on the community. When interviewed in 2014, Iwakuni City officials in charge of base relations cited these preferences as being key concerns upon which the city’s support for the transfers continues to be predicated. Election results also suggest that the local community grew increasingly satisfied with the agreement as time went on: Fukuda’s winning margin in subsequent mayoral elections widened from 51% of valid votes cast in 2008 to 56% in 2012 and 72% in 2014. These last two agreement-implementation sequences thus show how the feedback loop operates to increase the level of preference incorporation over time.4

9.3 Preference incorporation and tensions in Nago/Okinawa 1, 1995-2004

Sections 9.3 and 9.4 detail the findings from examining the five agreement-implementation sequences involving MCAS Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture. These sequences are typically considered to center around two post-Cold War alliance management agreements: the 1996 SACO Report, whereby Tokyo and Washington agreed to relocate the operations of MCAS Futenma to an offshore facility; and the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, which stated that it would instead be relocated to Camp Schwab, another Marine Corps facility in the north of the prefecture. Table 9.5 provides a summary of the levels of preference incorporation and tensions across the sequences. Compared to Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture, levels of preference incorporation were generally lower while tensions were higher in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture. However, the changes in both of these variables within the latter subcase, especially from the second to fifth sequences, provide an interesting point of contrast. This time, they show how the feedback loop works to reinforce

4 See Section 4.7.

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an early lack of preference incorporation, thus leading to higher tensions and failures of implementation.

Levels of preference incorporation in the first sequence for Okinawa were low, while tensions were high. Close observation reveals the low levels of the former were associated not with the SACO agreement per se, but with the Act on Special Measures for US Forces Japan Land Release (the Special Land Lease Law). In campaigning for his first term, Governor Masahide Ōta had promised to work towards reducing the US military presence in the prefecture. However, despite public announcements about the planned return of five different facilities in May 1992 and February 1995, Tokyo made no further movement towards addressing the preference for base reductions—no meetings on how these returns would proceed appear to have been held with subnational actors. In fact, several of these sites had originally been earmarked for return during the 1980s. The subsequent lack of progress for more than a decade is an indication that, despite the announcements, little to no preference incorporation was actually taking place. The SACO initiative was the next high-level attempt to address this preference; however, as is discussed below, Ōta had by then decided that he would follow his chosen course of non-cooperation as far as the legal system allowed. As this sequence ended with the Japanese government passing amendments to the Special Land Lease Law in order to prevent a similar crisis in the future, and with Ōta and other subnational actors critical of how the “return” of MCAS Futenma required its relocation within the prefecture, preference incorporation clearly remained low throughout.

Conversely, internal alliance tensions in this sequence reached a much higher level. This is clear from the two indicators observed: a prefecture-wide protest rally attended by more than 50,000 people, and stringent non-cooperation from Governor Ōta and several local mayors. Both of these reactions were triggered by the rape incident of September 1995; however, what alliance managers regarded as the real crisis was Governor Masahide Ōta’s non-cooperation in the implementation of the Special Land Lease Law. During his first term as governor, Ōta had cooperated by approving the extension of land lease contracts on behalf of anti-base landowners, as designated by the law. Realizing that the rape incident had generated a large amount of anger amongst Okinawans, the governor declared that he would not approve the next leases that came up for renewal. In an attempt to ameliorate this anger and reduce tensions, alliance managers initiated the SACO process to “reduce the burden” on Okinawa. As the agreement was being negotiated, however, Ōta refused to cooperate on the land lease

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Table 9.5 Indicators of Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Okinawa, 1995~2015

Indicators of Preference Incorporation Indicators of Tensions Agreement and Major Sequence Objective Breadth of Leader Meetings Incorporation? Protests Public Votes Involvement Behavior

Administrative Agreement COOPERATION LOW Land Leases under Art. III of the US-Japan FEW NARROW LOW => => NEUTRAL Law (Okinawa) Security Treaty OPPOSITION HIGH Renewal of land leases

LOW OPPOSITION SACO (1996): FEW NARROW => => SEVERE NEUTRAL Futenma Relocate MCAS Futenma to => => MODERATE COOPERATION => => SACO offshore facility (2002 Basic MANY BROAD => => MODERATE PRO Plan) LOW NEUTRAL

Futenma- Roadmap (2006) NONE NARROW NEUTRAL MODERATE NEUTRAL Schwab Relocate MCAS Futenma to => => LOW => => => Roadmap 1 Camp Schwab expansion FEW MODERATE OPPOSITION SEVERE ANTI

Roadmap (2006) Futenma- DPJ’s attempted review of Schwab FEW/NONE N/A LOW OPPOSITION SEVERE ANTI MCAS Futenma relocation Roadmap 2 agreement

FEW NEUTRAL Roadmap (2006) => LOW => SEVERE Futenma- Relocate MCAS Futenma to Schwab MANY NARROW => COOPERATION => ANTI Camp Schwab expansion Roadmap 3 => MODERATE => MODERATE 2nd attempt FEW OPPOSITION

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issue, taking it through the legal system up to the Supreme Court and ultimately prompting the Japanese government to change the law to prevent a similar challenge in future. In short, indicators show that tensions started low, but rapidly increased after the rape incident triggered public protests across the island, prompting a key subnational actor’s decision to stop cooperating on alliance agreements. This first sequence involving the bases in Okinawa thus shows the expected correlation: low levels of preference incorporation precipitating high levels of internal alliance tensions.

The second agreement-implementation sequence, involving the SACO initiative itself, is particularly interesting because it showed a significant amount of variation in the levels of both preference incorporation and tensions over time. The early years, 1996 through to 1998, were marked by lows levels of preference incorporation. In seeking to “return” MCAS Futenma, Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto was responding to a local narrative that painted it as the symbol of the Okinawa problem. However, he made this decision without consulting either key subnational actors or societal actors who had a stake in the base presence, such as the business community and landowners. As a result, the preferences of many of these actors were not actually taken into account: many of the aging landowners, for example, were worried about the loss of income they would suffer from the return of the land. This only added to the broader discontentment, for the requirement that the operational functions of the facility be relocated within the prefecture meant that many Okinawans did not see it as a reduction in their overall burden. Furthermore, many of the other returns or changes to training had been announced previously, and the proposed review of the implementation of SOFA was also viewed as inadequate. Hence, local preferences were not really addressed during the early part of this sequence.

These early low levels of preference incorporation were correlated with high levels of tensions. The SACO Interim Report in April 1996, which announced that the allies would seek to relocate MCAS Futenma and several other facilities, was met with protests from the residents who lived near potential candidate sites. The governor and various municipal leaders also voiced their disapproval that the burden was merely being shifted to from one host community to another, and the municipal assemblies of towns hosting these sites promptly passed resolutions against accepting any transfers. The referendums in Okinawa (September 1996) and Nago City (December 1997), however, reflected a similar local dynamic as in Iwakuni City, revealing that a proportion of these constituencies were willing to acquiesce to

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the changes as long as they obtained significant economic benefits in exchange. This dynamic was also observed in the results of the February 1998 mayoral election for Nago and the November 1998 gubernatorial election, which saw candidates expressing this position of compromise voted into office. In other words, although tensions were relatively high, key subnational actors and their constituencies also used their protest actions to indicate to alliance managers ways in which the level of preference incorporation might be increased.

These dynamics contributed to a shift towards higher preference incorporation in the second part of this Futenma SACO sequence, after Keiichi Inamine replaced Ōta as governor. The increase can be observed in all three indicators. First, numerous consultations took place between central and local governments. Following Inamine’s election, Tokyo set up the joint panel on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), in which officials from Tokyo, Okinawa and Nago met to develop a plan for implementing this objective. Second, there is evidence that the consultations extended not only to key subnational actors, but also to societal actors with a stake in the issue. Representatives of local steel and construction companies had access to officials who brought their requests to the discussion. Finally, some of their preferences were clearly taken up by the working group. Inamine had promised his constituents that the new facility would be a joint civilian-military airport, and that military use would be limited to 15 years. The first of these conditions is clearly reflected in the July 2002 Basic Plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (the Basic Plan), which specified that a large, joint civilian-military airport would be built on a reef off the coast of the Henoko district in Nago City. This plan had been developed by the joint panel, which decided to situate the facility on top of the reef so as to reduce both danger and noise pollution for local residents, thus effectively reducing the overall burden on the host community. Alliance managers also expected that the large-scale requirements for land reclamation and steel, which local companies were expected to obtain contracts for, would satisfy the local preference for economic benefits in exchange for accepting the relocation.

However, preference incorporation fell again towards the end of the sequence as complications arose during the implementation process. On the surface, the two conditions outlined by Governor Inamine appeared to have been dropped. Although the central government maintained that it was willing to acquiesce to the two conditions, the statements Inamine made as he distanced himself from cooperating with the agreement point to the US government’s refusal to agree to the “15-year limit for military use” as the main deal breaker.

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But there were, in fact, two other underlying issues with the attempts at preference incorporation during this agreement-implementation sequence. First, mainland companies had inserted themselves into the negotiations, reducing the degree to which the local preferences were reflected in the reef plan that was chosen for the 2002 agreement. The smaller scale local industry did not possess the technology needed for land reclamation in the stipulated area of the reef, and alliance managers had put aside alternative potential plans that would have provided a greater number of contracts for steel production and land reclamation that local companies could participate in. Second, the buy-in from commercial airlines that would have been needed to turn the airport into a joint facility ultimately fell through. Japan’s two national airlines demonstrated little interest in the use of Nago City as a passenger or cargo hub, because Naha Airport at the southern end of already served that role adequately. Hence, although efforts were made to incorporate local preferences into the agreement during the middle part of this second agreement-implementation sequence, ultimately, the level of preference incorporation had fallen again by the time the Basic Plan was announced.

These downward shifts in preference incorporation were accompanied by a gradual rise in tensions as key subnational actors moved from a cooperative to a neutral stance. Although successful negotiation and signing of the Basic Plan signified apparent satisfaction with the plan on the part of key subnational actors, implementation stalled on the question of who should take charge for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process for the planned facility. As discussed in section 6.5, this complication ultimately arose because Inamine’s preference for a joint facility could not be met. The Okinawa Prefectural Government insisted that Tokyo should initiate the EIA process but refused to modify prefectural ordinances to specify that the central government was the sole contracting party for the facility. Nago mayor Tateo Kishimoto also took a neutral stance on this issue, stating that he would agree with the governor’s decision. Tokyo finally conceded and initiated the EIA process in December 2003, only for activists to interfere directly with survey procedures in the waters where the facility was to be situated. In short, the shifts in tensions during this sequence moved from high to low in the transition from Governor Ōta to his successor, Inamine, in conjunction with efforts to increase preference incorporation. However, tensions subsequently rose again to a middling

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level from 2002 to 2004 as it became apparent that key specified preferences would ultimately not be reflected if implementation proceeded as planned. These tensions5

9.4 Preference incorporation and tensions in Nago/Okinawa 2, 2004-2015

The third, fourth and fifth agreement-implementation sequences for Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture all involve the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, which the allies signed in May 2006. The negotiation of this new agreement was triggered by the August 2004 CH-53D helicopter crash, as it emphasized the tensions that could result should an even more serious incident occur. 6 While the resulting proposal for the facility was more feasible from a technical standpoint, this new agreement was a radical departure from the Basic Plan signed in 2002. Changes in preference incorporation and levels of tensions are particularly noteworthy across the fifth sequence, as it is here that they break from the reverse correlation that was observed in all previously examined sequences.

In the third sequence—labeled Futenma-Schwab Roadmap 1 in Table 9.5—the level of preference incorporation began low, rising to moderate levels towards the middle of the sequence. Alliance managers did not carry out prior consultation with key subnational actors as they negotiated the Roadmap, instead developing the L-shaped plan for the FRF solely at the international level. Furthermore, in abandoning the 2002 Basic Plan, flawed though it may have been, Tokyo and Washington put aside several local preferences that they had attempted to incorporate in the previous sequences, including Governor Inamine’s two conditions and concerns about the facility’s impact on communities. The changes meant, in effect, an increase in the burden on the residents around Camp Schwab, which would be expanded to accommodate the functions and units being relocated from MCAS Futenma. Following the October 2005 announcement of the DPRI interim agreement, preference incorporation rose slightly as the allies responded to feedback and modified the runway into the V-shaped plan

5 See Section 6.4. 6 This incident was a timely reminder to both alliance managers as well as local actors of the danger of leaving MCAS Futenma where it was. Individuals involved in policy-making who were interviewed for this dissertation often asserted that, in absolute terms, MCAS Futenma is not “the most dangerous base in the world,” which activists have often labelled it. They noted that there are other facilities similarly—or even more tightly— surrounded on all sides by their host communities, and that Air Force bases, which field multiple jet fighter units, are arguably more dangerous. The challenge that MCAS Futenma poses for the alliance, however, is that an accident with local fatalities may render it impossible for alliance managers to mitigate the current of opposition against the facility, and thus bring into question the political viability of the entire US military presence on Okinawa.

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included in the 2006 Roadmap agreement, so that aircraft flight paths could be directed away from residential areas. They also agreed to another longstanding request to reduce the force presence in the prefecture by transferring 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam once the FRF was operational. Hence, although the allies abandoned the 2002 Basic Plan—and the higher level of preference incorporation that it represented—alliance managers made some efforts to address local preferences as they finalized the details of the new agreement.

Given the lowered levels of preference incorporation, tensions unsurprisingly rose from moderate to high levels over this third sequence. This can be seen in the number and size of protests, in election campaigns and results, and in how subnational leaders initially opposed the new plan for the FRF. When the L-shaped plan was announced as part of the DPRI interim agreement in October 2005, individuals and groups from many levels of society reacted in protest. The Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture assemblies promptly passed resolutions against the new agreement, and civil society activists organized another protest rally the following March, with a reported 35,000 people attending. These tensions were also reflected in the stances taken by local leaders, who all moved from being cooperative to adopting neutral or anti-agreement stances for significant periods of time. Nago mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro remained willing to negotiate but opposed the agreement as it stood. Similarly, Governor Inamine positioned himself against the new proposal, demanding that the runway be moved further offshore, even after the allies had responded to feedback and modified the FRF’s runway as noted above. The 2006 gubernatorial election also echoed these dynamics, with voters electing Hirokazu Nakaima on a platform that inherited Inamine’s oppositional stance.

Subsequently, efforts to carry out preference incorporation became inconsistent. This can be seen in the seemingly contradictory actions of the Japanese government over the period from 2007 through to 2009. In March 2007, Defense Minister Fumio Kyūma halted his efforts to negotiate with Okinawa’s key subnational actors at the direction of former Prime Minister Jun’ichirõ Koizumi. In May, Tokyo followed this up by using the JMSDF to forcefully initiate environmental assessment procedures—without obtaining the acquiescence of any key subnational actors. But despite these coercive actions, the Japanese government also carried out its promise to provide economic subsidies to communities that acquiesced to the agreement, through a Cabinet special measures bill that the Diet passed in August 2007. At this point, a degree of flexibility crept back into Tokyo’s interactions with subnational actors

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in Okinawa, with the administration led by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda agreeing to investigate the possibility of moving the runways further offshore. This renewed effort to incorporate preferences appears to have had the desired effect in reducing tensions slightly. Governor Nakaima finally acquiesced to the updated plan in 2008, provided it was modified according to his conditions. He also indicated that the Japanese government would still have to convince him to cooperate at the key checkpoint in the future: the approval of the landfill permit.

But despite this apparent turnaround on the local level, efforts at preference incorporation once again ground to a halt in 2008–09 when a series of scandals captured the attention of the nation and the LDP government. Concerned about the increasing popularity of opposition leaders who indicated their intent to review the plans for MCAS Futenma, alliance managers negotiated and signed the 2009 Guam Agreement, which effectively committed both governments to carrying out the 2006 Roadmap. But although the United States treated the pact as an executive agreement that did not need to be passed by the US Senate, negotiators agreed that it would have a Treaty-level designation on the Japanese side, in order to “(reduce) the risk that local politics in Okinawa or a change in government in Tokyo (would) result in the unravelling of the May 1, 2006 realignment package.”7 Okinawa subnational actors regarded this agreement as a coercive measure used to force the prefecture to accept the relocation of MCAS Futenma. It can therefore be viewed as a drop in preference incorporation.

Levels of preference incorporation dropped even further during the fourth agreement- implementation sequence. This sequence began with the DPJ government’s attempt to review the 2006 agreement and potentially relocate MCAS Futenma outside of Okinawan Prefecture, in an effort to increase the level of preference incorporation. However, actual levels of incorporation remained low because of resistance from both local and national actors as well as the US Government. First, the focus on seeking alternative locations meant that there were fewer extensive consultations with Okinawans. The new government in Tokyo effectively alienated the subnational actors in Nago and Henoko who wanted to accept MCAS Futenma’s relocation for the economic benefits that it would bring, setting aside their interest in favor of the anti-agreement faction. Second, stringent resistance from Washington, the US military, the Japanese bureaucracy and other communities within Japan meant that the anti-agreement

7 U.S. Embassy Tokyo, “U.S., Japan Reach Ad Ref Guam International Agreement,” (2008). Wikileaks Cable: 08TOKYO3457_a

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preference of relocation outside of Okinawa simply could not be realized. In particular, while the Hatoyama administration responded to and consulted with key subnational actors that expressed interest in accepting transfers in exchange for the economic benefits, leaks and subsequent protests from their citizens suggest that such discussions were limited to just the local leaders. Finally, reports that the number of Marines to be transferred to Guam would be reduced from 8,000 to 4,700, coupled with the inability of the allies to confirm that the remaining 3,300 would be relocated elsewhere, meant the reduction in the burden for Okinawa might not be as large as had been promised in 2006. Hence, this fourth agreement- implementation sequence actually saw a decrease in preference incorporation across all communities concerned, including subnational actors in Nago and Okinawa.

Given the reduced levels of preference incorporation, as expected, the fourth sequence for Okinawa was marked by high levels of tension throughout. This can be seen through all three indicators, with the largest protest rallies seen since 1995, the election of candidates opposing the agreement, and statements from key subnational leaders expressing their discontent with developments in the sequence. As the DPJ government tried without success to find a host community that would accept a replacement facility, the Nago constituency voted for Susumu Inamine, who positioned himself completely against the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab, as their new mayor. April and May 2010 were marked by two major public protests in Okinawa, while a number of candidate communities elsewhere in Japan also rallied to oppose any transfers. By the time the DPJ returned to the Roadmap later that month, the heads of all of Okinawa’s 41 municipalities had stated that they were not in favor of the agreement. Then, in November 2010, Governor Nakaima was re-elected after he stated that he was “opposed” to the V-shaped runway plan. This sequence thus clearly demonstrates how a drop in preference incorporation led to an increase in tensions, despite apparent intentions to address local preferences. By alienating subnational actors that were willing to compromise, the DPJ government only strengthened the anti-agreement faction, resulting in all key subnational actors refusing to cooperate in implementation for the remainder of this fourth sequence.

All of these earlier developments had significant implications for the fifth and final agreement-implementation Nago/Okinawa sequence examined in this dissertation. Following the LDP’s return to power in the December 2012 Japanese general election, there was a clear effort to once again increase preference incorporation. The number and breadth of

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consultations with subnational actors increased, and many of their requests were taken up and included during the implementation process. High level officials in the Abe government and the bureaucracy were once again in contact with subnational actors in Okinawa, including prefectural government officials, the construction industry faction led by the Kokuba group and even local civic organizations that remained in favor of the agreement. In fact, Governor Nakaima’s acquiescence to the agreement in December 2013 came only after the Abe government agreed to four key concessions that Okinawans had long been asking for. The allies also completed KC-130 support facilities at MCAS Iwakuni, enabling the transfer of that squadron in August 2014 and thus completing one of the objectives in the original SACO agreement.

But this increase in preference incorporation was constrained because the boundaries between the anti-agreement and pro-agreement factions in Okinawa had changed. Naha mayor Takeshi Onaga, who had shifted from a pro- to an anti-agreement stance following Prime Minister Hatoyama’s failed attempt to review the agreement, ran against Nakaima in the 2014 gubernatorial election and won. A major part of the business industry, led by the Kanehide group, had also switched sides; together with Nago mayor Inamine, they promoted reducing Okinawa’s reliance on the base economy and building up tourism instead. For these actors, any agreement that saw MCAS Futenma relocated within the prefecture took a backseat to alternative ways of pursuing economic development. Thus, although, the level of preference incorporation appeared to increase over the course of 2013, prior to Nakaima’s decision at the most important checkpoint of the land reclamation permit, the shift in preferences within the prefecture meant that the actual level of preference incorporation ultimately remained at a moderate level during this fifth agreement-implementation sequence.

Changes in the levels of tensions also showed an interesting pattern during this final agreement-implementation sequence. While protests indicated severe opposition to the LDP’s renewed push for implementation, key subnational actors returned to a neutral position over the course of 2013. In December, the Abe government finally succeeded in persuading Nakaima to cooperate at the key checkpoint of approving the land reclamation permit. But while alliance managers regard this as the break-through point in implementation, the governor’s decision instead precipitated more opposition and thus tensions in the prefecture. The following month, Nago voters re-elected their anti-agreement mayor; a similar result followed in the gubernatorial election in November 2014 when Onaga defeated Nakaima.

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Both of these key subnational leaders subsequently maintained an oppositional stance and refused to cooperate on more minor checkpoints such as the use of local roads and ports for construction. They also attempted to retract or cancel the approval for the land reclamation permit. Finally, activists organized more protest rallies, with the largest gathering in May 2015 counting 35,000 attendees. Smaller scale protest actions also intensified, especially around Camp Schwab in Henoko, where construction was taking place.8 In short, increased

Figure 9.2 Chart showing Levels of Preference Incorporation and Tensions in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture

Figure 9.2 is a visual representation of the is of preference incorporation and tensions over time for the Okinawa Prefecture/MCAS Futenma sub-case. A scale with five values (lowest = 1; highest = 5) was used to represent the levels of the two variables. The tables of data used to derive these values can be found in the Appendix.

8 Matthew M. Burke and Chiyomi Sumida, “Okinawa protests intensify as Futenma relocation construction begins,” Stars and Stripes, April 4 2015.

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efforts at preference incorporation during this fifth sequence were far less effective at reducing tensions than earlier attempts. The fact that tensions remained high illustrates how feedback loops can also exacerbate the negative effects of earlier drops in preference incorporation. The following section will examine the precise mechanisms by which these feedback loops work, not only to help translate early preference incorporation into reduced tensions and implementation success, but also to reinforce early failures in preference incorporation so as to produce the opposite results.

9.5 The feedback loop: reinforcing both higher and lower levels of preference incorporation

Sections 9.2 to 9.4 show that that, for the most part, preference incorporation was inversely correlated with the level of internal alliance tensions in both Iwakuni City/Yamaguchi Prefecture and Nago City/Okinawa Prefecture (summarized visually in Figures 9.1 and 9.2). The exception was the fifth agreement-implementation sequence in Okinawa (Futenma- Schwab Roadmap 1), where an increase in preference incorporation was ultimately not matched by a drop in tensions. The dissertation now turns to the task of illustrating the mechanisms that explain these dynamics, and thus, how preference incorporation is ultimately linked with the extent to which these alliance agreements have been successfully implemented.

The expectation outlined in Chapter 2 was that feedback loops are the chief mechanism by which the successful incorporation of preferences leads to an eventual reduction in tensions and vice versa. When early preference incorporation is successful, a positive feedback loop reinforces this process by encouraging support for the proposed changes amongst societal actors and reducing tensions. This leads to cooperation from the key subnational actors at the key administrative checkpoints and increased opportunities for interaction between the central government and local actors, which then helps facilitate more preference incorporation in later agreement-implementation sequences, further reducing tensions. Conversely, when early preference incorporation is unsuccessful, a negative feedback loop works to maintain the status quo by generating opposition to the proposed changes, thereby increasing tensions. The resulting lack of cooperation from key subnational actors sours the relationship between the central government and local actors, decreasing opportunities for interaction and hindering the

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process of preference incorporation in later sequences, thus further increasing tensions. In other words, feedback loops work to reinforce the trend in central-local relations established early in the agreement life cycle, with the extent and degree of early preference incorporation greatly influencing whether and how quickly tensions increase or decrease over the course of implementation.

Indeed, both positive and negative feedback loops were observed in the sub-cases, albeit to different degrees. The Iwakuni City/Yamaguchi sub-case clearly showed the operation of positive feedback loops, with successful efforts to consult with subnational actors and incorporate their preferences facilitating further success at incorporation. Due to the fact that subnational actors drove the agenda of the first agreement-implementation sequence in this sub-case—the 1992 MOU to shift MCAS Iwakuni’s runway seaward—alliance managers were made well-aware of the core local preference of not increasing the physical burden associated with the base. This knowledge then influenced how Tokyo interacted with both key subnational actors and societal actors during the second agreement-implementation sequence involving the SACO agreement objectives that affected Iwakuni City. Alliance managers showed they were aware of and willing to address the concerns about the physical burden on nearby residents by negotiating to transfer units away from MCAS Iwakuni in exchange for the KC-130 squadron that would be reassigned from MCAS Futenma. In particular, the transfer of the AV-8 Harrier unit back to the US mainland within a month of the SACO Interim Report in mid-1996 demonstrated these efforts at preference incorporation. After a subnational government study found that this compromise ensured that the city would see no increase in its burden from the base, the Iwakuni City and the Yamaguchi Prefectural governments both acquiesced to the KC-130 transfer. In this manner, these first and second agreement-implementation sequences for the Iwakuni sub-case demonstrate how preference incorporation is self-reinforcing. Alliance managers who already had information about local preferences preemptively included them in agreement negotiations, thus ensuring high levels of preference incorporation in any new agreement-implementation sequences. By making sure that local actors would have fewer reasons to protest and reject cooperating at any administrative checkpoints, Tokyo and Washington effectively preempted any potential rise in the level of tensions, thus facilitating smooth progress in the implementation process.

The third agreement-implementation sequence again demonstrates how a positive feedback loop works to further increase preference incorporation and thus reduce tensions. This time,

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the tensions generated by the 2006 Roadmap were resolved because subnational actors who were invested in the US military presence—in part because of the successful earlier efforts at preference incorporation—played a crucial role in changing the city’s position from one of opposition to acquiescence. Despite Iwakuni mayor Ihara’s opposition, these actors, namely the Yamaguchi Prefectural Government and those representing commercial and industrial interests in Iwakuni, were willing to acquiesce to the CVW-5 transfer under certain specific conditions. The most important bargains that they sought were threefold: first, that the FCLP drills never be permanently designated to MCAS Iwakuni; second, that Tokyo purchase the Atago Hills project that was threatening to become a commercial liability for the city and prefecture; and third, that the JMSDF units remain in Iwakuni. Although the third request would not be granted until the fourth sequence, interactions between national and subnational actors saw Tokyo gradually respond more and more positively to the other two requests. Besides these economic carrots, Tokyo also held two economic sticks over Iwakuni City: government funding for the new city hall and the re-opening of the MCAS Iwakuni runway to commercial flights. Ihara tried to find other solutions, but a lack of support from Yamaguchi governor Nii and other subnational actors stymied his efforts and saw him replaced by the pro-agreement Fukuda in early 2008. In this manner, early and successful preference incorporation reinforced local support for the US military presence and facilitated further efforts at addressing local concerns. This ultimately worked to reduce tensions by the precipitating voter rejection of Mayor Ihara, the key subnational actor who had opposed the agreement. The new mayor then proceeded to cooperate with Tokyo, ensuring further progress in the implementation process.

The fourth sequence for the Iwakuni City/Yamaguchi subcase shows how the invested subnational actors then facilitated even higher levels of preference incorporation. Of particular interest, however, is the fact that this was a negative feedback loop that worked against changes in the direction of implementation. The DPJ’s attempted review of the Futenma agreement raised fears that MCAS Iwakuni would be considered a candidate location for relocating at least some of Okinawa’s Marines. But Yamaguchi governor Nii and Iwakuni mayor Fukuda both refused to approve the sale of the Atago Hills project until Tokyo removed the facility from the candidate list. Similarly, when the results of feasibility studies in Guam showed that the US territory would not be able to support all 8,000 Marines, Governor Nii once again froze the Atago Hills sale until Tokyo confirmed that an additional 1,300 Marines would not be deployed to MCAS Iwakuni. This sequence thus showed that

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both positive and negative feedback loops can work to facilitate the same outcome, albeit in different ways. In the case of MCAS Iwakuni, the positive loop applied pressure for change, while the negative loop applied counter-pressure to any subsequent changes that did not accord with local interests and preferences. This ultimately helped ensure that tensions in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture did not again rise to a level that would hinder the implementation of the objectives to which subnational actors had acquiesced.

In contrast to the Iwakuni City/Yamaguchi sub-case, the Nago City/Okinawa sub-case shows how feedback loops worked to limit preference incorporation and thus increase internal alliance tensions. The first agreement-implementation sequence, involving Governor Ōta and the land lease issue from 1995 to 1996, featured a negative feedback loop that hindered the Japanese government’s efforts at preference incorporation. This negative feedback loop was caused by two related issues. First, although the rape incident in 1995 triggered large protests from Okinawan citizens, the situation escalated to affect the renewal of the land lease contracts primarily because Ōta was dissatisfied with Tokyo’s long-standing but unfulfilled promises to return several facilities. The allies’ response of finally attempting to address Okinawan requests for “burden reduction” was arguably sound; however, Okinawans reacted negatively to the proposal to “return” MCAS Futenma because it required the construction of a replacement facility in the prefecture. These two issues gave Ōta little incentive to cooperate on either the land leases or the implementation of the SACO agreement. Had the Japanese government worked with the OPG and other relevant subnational actors to make significant progress on the earlier returns prior to the crisis triggered by the rape incident, Ōta would have had less of an incentive not to cooperate. Hence, the tensions that occurred during this first sequence were exacerbated by earlier failures at preference incorporation.

Similarly, the second and third agreement-implementation sequences highlight how negative feedback loops kept levels of preference incorporation low. Running against Ōta in the 1998 gubernatorial election, Keiichi Inamine presented himself as favoring cooperation as long as the prefecture and Nago City received substantial economic benefits in return. This explains the request for a joint-civilian military airport that would help boost the economy in the northern part of the prefecture. However, in an apparent response to the voices clamoring for a reduction in the base burden, Governor Inamine also pushed for military use of the facility to be restricted to 15 years. The other key subnational actor in this sequence, Nago mayor Tateo Kishimoto, was more concerned that local companies would benefit from contracts

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associated with construction. However, none of these three conditions were reflected in the 2002 Basic Plan. The US military, understandably, refused to agree to a time limit on military use, while Japanese commercial carriers did not see the need for a second cargo or passenger hub within Okinawa. Interference from mainland construction companies also led to alliance managers choosing a plan that required technology that local companies did not possess, thus reducing the benefits that they would gain. Together, these developments led to Inamine and Kishimoto taking a more neutral stance on the agreement and step back from full cooperation, even though the Japanese government had continued to provide economic subsidies through its renewal of the Okinawa Development Plan. As Vice-Minister of Defense Takemasa Moriya pointed out, the developments in this sequence gave Okinawa a reputation for engaging in various tactics to delay or postpone the Futenma relocation.9 In this manner, the failed attempt to incorporate preferences during the second and third agreement- implementation sequences contributed to a deterioration in relations between the central and subnational governments, thus increasing internal alliance tensions.

These tensions then complicated the fourth agreement-implementation sequence, giving rise to a negative feedback loop that obstructed further efforts at preference incorporation. As it became clear that the 2002 Basic Plan would not proceed, the 2004 helicopter crash gave impetus to alliance managers to initiate new agreement-implementation sequences without consulting the key subnational actors. The new design for the FRF was a huge departure from the 2002 Basic Plan: it not only removed any indications of Inamine’s two conditions, but also brought the runway much closer to residential areas. Although alliance managers had negotiated the new plan based on what they had learned from the failed second sequence, the changes and the lack of consultation further angered Inamine and Kishimoto. This new plan was later modified so as to accommodate the request that flight paths be directed away from residential areas, but the governor and mayor still refused to cooperate unless the runway was moved further out to sea. At this point, however, the Japanese government chose to avoid further compromise, on the advice of former prime minister Koizumi. In hindsight, Tokyo agreeing to this minor shift would arguably have been the most efficient way to advance implementation, since Defense Minister Kyūma had allegedly confirmed with officials in charge of the environmental survey procedures that there was a leeway of approximately 150

9 Takemasa Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru,” Chuo Koron, January 2010.

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metres.10 However, the previous failed efforts at preference incorporation meant that Tokyo became less willing to compromise during this third agreement-implementation sequence. The low levels of preference incorporation resulting from the failed second sequence thus fed back negatively into the implementation process and hindered subsequent attempts to better reflect local preferences in the 2006 Roadmap.

This situation in turn produced more negative feedback loops that limited preference incorporation and increased tensions even further during the fourth agreement- implementation sequence. Although the scandals that led Japanese voters to remove the LDP coalition from power had little to do with the stalemate in Okinawa, tensions in that prefecture clearly influenced the opposition to try to satisfy the demand for “burden reduction.” But after the 2009 general election, the Hatoyama administration’s attempt to relocate MCAS Futenma out of Okinawa ultimately led to greater non-cooperation from the key subnational actors. Since the central government had positioned itself against the agreement, many subnational actors in Okinawa followed suit in elections held during 2010. Among them was then Naha mayor Onaga and many of his backers in the local business community, who had previously acquiesced to or even welcomed relocation within Okinawa provided that it brought further economic benefits to the prefecture. In other words, the DPJ’s reversal on the agreement led to the unification of Okinawa conservatives and progressives against the agreement. Within this context, Hatoyama’s “betrayal” and return to the agreement in May 2010 meant that the Roadmap now reflected even lower levels of preference incorporation than it had prior to 2009, even though the stated objectives for Okinawa had not changed. Furthermore, the alienation of the Okinawan subnational actors who favored compromise and cooperation made it more difficult for Hatoyama’s successors to repair the damage, even before the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster struck. These developments greatly reduced the scope for cooperation for the rest of the DPJ government’s time in office.

The final agreement-implementation sequence examined in the Nago City \/Okinawa subcase exhibited a positive feedback loop that worked to increase preference incorporation. Following the general election in December 2012, the second Abe administration made implementation of the realignment one of its priorities. Cabinet ministers and other core government officials spent much of 2013 persuading key subnational actors to cooperate with the construction of the Futenma replacement facility in accordance with the 2006 Roadmap

10 Ryukyu Shimpō Sha, Jyubaku no Yukue: Futenma isetsu to minshushugi (Okinawa: Ryukyu Shimpō Sha, 2012), 117.

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agreement. Unlike the third agreement-implementation sequence, during which the LDP leadership halted efforts at compromise, Tokyo created opportunities for discussion with Okinawa’s political leaders, namely Governor Nakaima and the mayors and assembly members of the affected municipalities. Tokyo then made concessions to these subnational voices, culminating with the five promises made to Nakaima in December 2013. In exchange for these promises, the governor cooperated at the major checkpoint that had held up the Okinawa sub-case, finally authorizing the land reclamation necessary to advance the implementation process. This clearly indicates a pattern whereby an increase in levels of preference incorporation led to a decrease in the level of tensions as measured by the degree of cooperation from key subnational actors.

This time, however, the increase in preference incorporation had the opposite effect. In contrast to the Iwakuni City/Yamaguchi subcase, these efforts by the Abe administration to incorporate preferences in 2013 sent Nago City and Okinawa in the opposite direction, creating a unified anti-agreement front amongst most conservatives and progressives. Okinawan voters reacted to Nakaima’s decision to sign the permit for land reclamation by re- electing the anti-agreement Nago mayor, Susumu Inamine, in January 2014, and then replacing Nakaima with Onaga—now fully against the agreement—in the November 2014 gubernatorial election. These two key subnational actors subsequently sought ways to obstruct the implementation of the agreement, attempting to retract or cancel the land reclamation permit Nakaima had granted. They also sought to reduce Okinawa’s dependence on the base- related economy, focusing instead on tourism and other industries. Only more recently has the progress of implementation started swinging in the opposite direction, with the weakening of the unified front—the “All Okinawa” movement—through the election of pro-agreement or neutral politicians and renewed involvement from other actors in favor of compromise for economic benefits.11 Yet, although the turn towards cooperation indicates that tension levels have slowly been decreasing in the prefecture, substantial opposition towards the agreement remains. These tensions provide the impetus for key subnational actors to maintain their non- cooperative stances, thus hindering the implementation process.

11 Another recent example of this was in the Nago City mayoral election in February 2018, where the anti- agreement incumbent Inamine lost to Taketoyo Toguchi, a former assemblyman backed by the LDP and Kōmeitō coalition. Although the prefectural chapter of Kōmeitō was officially opposed to the agreement, Toguchi’s win represented another loss for the “All Okinawa” front, following the election of other LDP-backed officials such as Kosaburo Nishime in the October 2017 general election. Eric Johnston, “Incumbent Nago Mayor Susumu Inamine falls in closely watched Okinawa election,” The Japan Times, February 5 2018; “‘All Okinawa’ camp opposing base relocation fails to score clean election sweep,” The Mainichi, October 24 2017.

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9.6 Same feedback mechanisms, different outcomes

At first glance, the contrast between how the agreement-implementation sequences proceeded in the two sub-cases is puzzling, especially considering the reactions in both host communities in the wake of the 2006 Roadmap. In both cases, elections were held around the time that the Roadmap agreement was finalized—early in 2006 for the Nago City and Iwakuni City mayoral elections, with the Okinawa gubernatorial election in November 2006 taking place six months after the official SCC statement. Of the three, the result in Iwakuni City arguably showed the greatest amount of opposition to the agreement: the candidate that came second to Ihara was also against the transfers, while the candidate supported by the central LDP government came a distant third. In contrast, the candidates who won in Nago City and Okinawa were both willing to negotiate, and had been backed by Tokyo against opponents that held an even stronger stance against the new agreement. Despite these developments, tensions in Iwakuni City have since been dispersed, with voters electing to replace their anti-agreement mayor with a pro-agreement politician in 2008, while Nago and Okinawa elected candidates that refused to negotiate in their 2010 and 2014 elections respectively.

In fact, this contrast demonstrates the difference that early preference incorporation made. In the sub-case involving MCAS Iwakuni, the successful early efforts to incorporate preferences generated a baseline of underlying support and trust in the central government that then shaped later negotiations. The fact that local actors were deeply involved in both setting and driving the agenda to relocate the MCAS Iwakuni runway helped ensure that concrete construction plans had already been created by the time Washington and Tokyo signed the 1992 MOU. The Japanese government and Iwakuni City also cooperated to conduct extensive feasibility studies on those plans throughout the 1980s. In other words, crucial steps for carrying out the agreement had been conducted by the time Washington and Tokyo actually signed it. This ensured that not only the local political elite but also societal actors, including residents living near the facility and the local business community, were generally supportive of the plan. This underlying support contributed to the flexible way in which the Yamaguchi governor and Iwakuni mayor reacted to the SACO reports from 1995-1996. More importantly, it facilitated a relatively prompt turnaround from rejection of the CVW-5 transfer to conditional acceptance from 2006-2008. Although the anti-agreement Mayor Ihara refused

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to cooperate, other key subnational actors like Governor Nii remained willing to negotiate with Tokyo and put pressure on the mayor to persuade local voters to replace him after less than two years of resistance. In short, the early success of preference incorporation in the Iwakuni City/Yamaguchi sub-case created local stakeholders who helped facilitate even greater incorporation of local preferences into later agreements, thus ameliorating the tensions surrounding the agreements. As a result, key subnational actors have largely cooperated with the implementation process—the implementation of the objectives pertaining to MCAS Iwakuni have essentially been completed.

On the other hand, the unsuccessful early efforts at preference incorporation in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture, both prior to SACO and as part of SACO, meant that there was a very low baseline of underlying support by the time of the Roadmap agreement. As discussed in section 9.3, Ōta elected to challenge the US-Japan alliance on the land leases issue precisely because he was frustrated at the lack of earlier preference incorporation. The SACO pledge to “return” MCAS Futenma was similarly problematic, because it merely reflected what then Prime Minister Hashimoto thought subnational actors preferred. Subsequently, the 2002 Basic Plan ultimately reflected the preferences of mainland construction companies. These failures of incorporation were arguably born from the lack of interaction and serious negotiation with key subnational actors; uncertainty about the preferences of subnational actors thus contributed to the SACO negotiations straying ever further from local preferences. Hence, although conservative “pro-base” subnational leaders held the offices of both Okinawa governor and Nago mayor over the second sequence, they became less inclined to cooperate in implementation over time.

This negative feedback loop continued to operate in a similar fashion throughout the third and fourth agreement-implementation sequences for the Nago City/Okinawa sub-case. On the surface, the fact that these key subnational actors had both been willing to acquiesce to the relocation of MCAS Futenma within Okinawa—provided that the replacement facility satisfied their interests—should have facilitated attempts at preference incorporation. However, the earlier failures meant that negotiations between Tokyo and Okinawa did not proceed smoothly. Although the 2002 Basic Plan had proven unfeasible, the October 2005 L- shaped plan’s departure from that plan meant that both Governor Inamine and Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro (elected Jan 2006) were forced to adopt public positions strongly against the new agreement. Even after the shape of the runway was modified to reduce flight

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paths over residential areas, both key actors continued to push for the FRF to be moved just 70-100 metres further offshore. As previously discussed, however, Tokyo also refused to compromise, having grown tired of what was seen as Okinawan back-paddling.12 This then led to the fourth agreement-implementation sequence that began with Prime Minister Hatoyama’s pledge to review the Roadmap agreement pertaining to MCAS Futenma. In this manner, the low level of preference incorporation prior to and during the first few agreement- implementation sequences in Okinawa generated a negative feedback loop that contributed to failures to incorporate preferences during later sequences, eventually leading to the national opposition’s effective rejection of the agreement.

Prime Minister Hatoyama’s attempt to change the terms of the agreement was also characterised by several negative feedback loops. Of particular interest is the fact that negative feedback loops were operating both to resist deviation from the status quo and to promote a different departure from it. The communities elsewhere in Japan that Hatoyama approached as potential candidate sites for the FRF all opposed accepting even a portion of Okinawa’s burden. Separately, the US government and military as well as the national Japanese bureaucracy also refused to seriously consider Hatoyama’s proposals. This resistance gradually cemented the status quo of MCAS Futenma remaining in Okinawa. By comparison, the negative feedback loop in Okinawa was starting to push for change in a different direction. As discussed in Chapter 8, the two decades-long stalemate allowed subnational actors to see the mixed impact of policies designed to fulfil local preferences. In particular, ill-managed construction projects had created underused buildings whose maintenance costs often exceeded the anticipated benefits. This led a number of anti- agreement actors, including Susumu Inamine, who was elected as Nago mayor in January 2010, to seek and promote alternative options for rejuvenating the local economy, such as tourism. Significantly, they were also joined by conservative interest groups normally regarded as pro-base, such as the Kanehide group involved in construction and tourism. Hence, by the time Hatoyama returned to the agreement in May 2010, Okinawan preferences had shifted significantly.

This shift in Okinawan preferences greatly affected the fifth agreement-implementation sequence. As discussed above, the Abe government re-started the preference incorporation process upon returning to power in December 2012, and made great efforts to persuade the

12 Moriya, “Okinawa Mondai no Shinsou wo Kataru.”

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LDP politicians in the prefecture to acquiesce to the Roadmap agreement. These efforts culminated in Governor Nakaima agreeing to cooperate to advance implementation by signing the land reclamation permit, in exchange for a set of conditions aimed at satisfying preferences about economic benefits and reducing the danger posed by MCAS Futenma to its host community. However, the shift in preferences meant that many conservatives, including then Naha mayor Onaga, opposed the governor’s decision to acquiesce to the base in exchange for these conditions. The broad Okinawan reaction was to replace Nakaima with Onaga at the gubernatorial election the following year. This created a united front between the new governor and the Nago City mayor, which translated into a lack of cooperation from both key subnational actors. In fact, close observation of the Okinawa sub-case in the fifth agreement-implementation sequence shows that Tokyo was only able to proceed with implementation by completely cordoning off the construction site and forcing construction through, which only generated more opposition from local actors. In this manner, the earlier low levels of preference incorporation actually led subnational actors to reject later efforts by Tokyo to incorporate local preferences. Thus, feedback loops in the Nago City/Okinawa sub- case worked to create a self-reinforcing spiral of low preference incorporation and high tensions, which has and continues to hinder the implementation process.

9.7 In summary

This chapter has demonstrated that preference incorporation and tensions in the two sub-cases are indeed correlated as was theorized in Chapter 2. Generally speaking, higher levels of preference incorporation (as measured by the indicators of size/intensity of protests, the results of elections/referenda, and whether key subnational actors cooperated or not in implementation) corresponded to lower levels of tensions (as measured by the number and frequency of consultations, the breadth of the actors involved, and whether requests were successfully incorporated into the agreements and carried out). Furthermore, shifts in preference incorporation were linked to shifts in tensions in both sub-cases, though with opposing results. These contrasting outcomes demonstrated that early success in preference incorporation was important, and close analysis of the developments show that this occurred due to the operation of feedback loops. In the sub-case involving MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture, the early incorporation of preferences was reinforced by positive feedback loops that facilitated further increases throughout all agreement-implementation

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sequences. Additionally, a negative feedback loop was instrumental in resisting a reversal in these developments over 2006-2008, when a key subnational actor attempted to oppose the agreements. The ever-increasing level of preference incorporation in this sub-case reduced internal alliance tensions and helped facilitate successful implementation of agreement objectives pertaining to MCAS Iwakuni. On the other hand, the sub-case involving MCAS Futenma and Camp Schwab in Okinawa Prefecture started with low levels of preference incorporation, which were then kept low by negative feedback loops despite sincere efforts from several Japanese governments to increase them. These low levels of preference incorporation generated and sustained levels of tensions that have thus far prevented successful implementation of the agreements in question.

268 ~Chapter 10~ Conclusion

On August 8, 2018, Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga passed away following a brief fight with cancer.1 Two years had passed since the Okinawa Prefectural Government lost the court battle over the governor’s October 2015 decision to revoke the land reclamation permit that his predecessor had granted, and Onaga had exhausted almost all of his legal avenues for challenging the relocation of MCAS Futenma within the prefecture. As his final act of resistance, the governor announced on July 27 his intention to retract the permit. Observers believe that this decision was timed so that it would impact municipal assembly elections for the two cities most greatly affected by the relocation—Ginowan City, which hosts MCAS Futenma, and Nago City, where the Futenma replacement facility (FRF) is being constructed. The timing also coincided with the beginning of the next phases of reclamation work from August 17. Following Onaga’s death, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe offered to postpone the resumption of work until after the election for the next governor, provided that the prefectural government not go through with the revocation of the permit; the prefectural government, however, chose to proceed.2 The gubernatorial election for Onaga’s successor was won by the anti-agreement candidate, , who pledged to continue the opposition of his predecessor.

10.1 Burden reduction and alliance tensions in the US-Japan alliance

The new Okinawan governor is unlikely to be able to prevent the construction of the FRF. At the end of October, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Keiichi Ishii suspended Okinawan’s retraction of the permit, paving the way for the Defense Bureau in Okinawa to recommence reclamation work in the prefecture. Although Governor Tamaki criticized the

1 Eric Johnston, “Okinawa Gov. Takeshi Onaga, long a voice for those opposed to U.S. bases in the prefecture, dies at 67,” The Japan Times, August 8, 2018. 2 “Political calculus over Henoko base intensifies as Okinawa election nears,” The Mainichi, September 1, 2018.

269 decision, construction has since resumed.3 Following in the footsteps of his predecessors, the governor travelled to Washington, DC and New York in November 2018 in an effort to convince US lawmakers to reconsider the relocation plans for MCAS Futenma, but was only able to speak with low-level bureaucrats from the departments of State and Defense.4 Another prefecture-wide referendum held early in 2019 saw 72% of voters reject Futenma’s relocation within the prefecture, although once again, low voter turnout means that these “no” votes only represented 38% of all eligible voters in the prefecture.5 At Tamaki’s request, the Japanese government agreed to hold talks with the prefectural government on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab. However, the Abe administration refused to suspend the land reclamation work while the talks were being carried out.6 Although they acknowledge the possibility of further delays, the US and Japanese governments have, since the advent of the second Abe administration in December 2012, made it clear that they are committed to the US military realignment in Okinawa. At most, Okinawa’s subnational actors will only be able to delay its completion further.

Despite these developments, the United States and Japan have not come any closer to reducing alliance tensions in Okinawa. As discussed in the introduction, there are two related goals in the realignment agreements examined in this dissertation: (1) to reduce the physical burdens placed on those communities and (2) to reduce the internal alliance tensions associated with those burdens. Practically speaking, the physical burdens have been reduced: land has periodically been returned (e.g. approximately half of the Northern Training Area), unit transfers have been implemented (e.g. the KC-130 squadron), and the promised relocation of MCAS Futenma to a more remote area is now underway. However, internal alliance tensions—defined as frictions between host communities and their foreign (US) military guests, as well as with the Japanese government that is ultimately responsible for their presence—remain high. These tensions, should they continue, are likely to further delay implementation of the physical objectives of the

3 “Land minister suspends Okinawa’s retraction of landfill permission for US base relocation,” The Mainichi, October 30, 2018; “New governor urges government to move U.S. base out of Okinawa,” Kyodo News, October 10, 2018; “Japan picks up landfill work at controversial site for U.S. base relocation,” The Washington Post, October 6, 2018. 4 Ryuichi Yamashita, “Anti-U.S. bases governor runs into realities of politics in D.C.,” The Asahi Shimbun, November 17, 2018. 5 “Over 70% of voters reject US base transfer in Okinawa referendum,” The Mainichi, February 25, 2019. 6 “EDITORIAL: Time to suspend Henoko work while both sides sit down to talk,” The Asahi Shimbun, November 14, 2018.

270 realignment. Alliance managers seem to have accepted this reality: instead of listing deadlines as with the earlier agreements, the April 2013 Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa used the phrase “FY (~~) or later” to give Tokyo and Washington some leeway for such delays.

In contrast, the realignment objectives in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, are more or less complete, with internal alliance tensions remaining relatively low. Some in Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City may consider the transfer of Carrier Air Wing 5 (CVW-5) an increase in the burden that more-or-less erases the reduction that the seaward shift of the runway was meant to have. Former governor Sekinari Nii indicated as much when he chose not to attend the ceremony marking the opening of the new runway in 2010.7 However, after the pro- agreement faction overcame the anti-agreement side led by Mayor Katsusuke Ihara from 2006- 2008, relations between the US military and the host community have remained robust, led by subnational leaders that are positive about the base presence. This seems unlikely to change, so long as alliance managers do not attempt to designate MCAS Iwakuni as the permanent host for the Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) drills. However, given that multiple other communities have also protested such moves, the United States and Japan may find that the current arrangement, whereby the drills are held at Iwo Jima or spread out among several different US and SDF military facilities in the case of inclement weather, will need to be continued indefinitely.

As this dissertation has argued, a comparison between the realignment efforts in these two host communities is instructive. In terms of burden reduction, the case of Iwakuni City in Yamaguchi Prefecture shows mixed results. The offshore relocation of the MCAS Iwakuni runway reduced noise pollution and arguably increased safety to local residents by redirecting aircraft flight paths over water. Local actors, however, regard subsequent agreements as having increased the burden on the local community, particularly with the transfer of CVW-5 from Naval Air Facility Atsugi. On the other hand, the planned and in-progress realignment efforts in Okinawa arguably represent a clear reduction in the burden on local communities overall. Land has been successfully returned, and the relocation of MCAS Futenma to the expanded facility at Camp

7 “Iwakuni kichi okiai kassōro no unyō kaishi “higan” jitsugen, kage otosu kansaiki ichū.,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 30, 2010; “U.S. military begins operation of new offshore runway at Iwakuni base,” Kyodo News, December 19, 2009.

271 Schwab will ensure that the noise and safety impacts of Marine Corps activities in the prefecture will affect far fewer residents.

In contrast, on the issue of reducing internal alliance tensions, the trajectory of such tensions, as measured through several indicators of local opposition to the realignment efforts, points to greater success on this objective in Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture than in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture. In Iwakuni, tensions remained low throughout the first two agreement- implementation sequences, namely those involving the original 1992 MOU to relocate the MCAS Iwakuni runway and the 1996 SACO Final Report. Tensions peaked at moderate levels as alliance managers negotiated and started to implement the 2006 Roadmap, during which time Iwakuni mayor Katsusuke Ihara and his supporters resisted the transfer of CVW-5. However, these tensions only lasted for two years before Iwakuni’s citizens replaced Ihara with a pro- agreement leader, and subsequent flare-ups in the level of tensions were also resolved relatively quickly. In contrast, although tensions in Okinawa subsided following the 1996 SACO Final Report, after voters elected a governor that was willing to cooperate in implementation, opposition to the realignment has grown substantially since 2002. Key subnational actors in the prefecture have refused to cooperate to implement agreements that would further reduce the overall level of the burden on host communities.

Why was this the case? As the dissertation has shown, this variation in implementation outcomes can be put down to preference incorporation. Specifically, the timing and degree to which state elites included or addressed the preferences laid out by key subnational actors during the agreement life cycles for each of these two sub-cases were crucial. Furthermore, the mechanism that facilitated the link between preference incorporation, internal alliance tensions and implementation was the feedback loop. Where preference incorporation at an early stage was successful—that is, subnational actors like governors, mayors and certain interest groups were consulted right from the pre-agreement phase, and their concerns and preferences regarding the bases addressed from this early stage of the cycle onward—internal alliance tensions stayed relatively low. Key subnational actors cooperated with alliance managers as long as certain conditions continued to be met, and these cooperative interactions helped alliance managers identify even more avenues to further increase preference incorporation. Even where tensions spiked in response to new agreement objectives, Tokyo was able to return them to lower levels

272 by working to incorporate additional local preferences. These feedback dynamics helped facilitate the implementation of realignment objectives in Iwakuni City in Yamaguchi Prefecture.

Conversely, where preference incorporation was unsuccessful early on—namely when subnational actors were only consulted later in the process, or their preferences left unaddressed—alliance managers found it difficult to manage the resulting moderate to high levels of internal alliance tensions. Key subnational actors such as governors and mayors refused to cooperate at various administrative checkpoints in the implementation process, such as the approval of permits for land reclamation or the use of municipal roads and ports. Furthermore, efforts to redress early failures in preference incorporation were hindered because those same failures also reduced the numbers of interactions between alliance managers and subnational actors. Although the Japanese government has been able to use administrative and legal procedures to override non-cooperation and forcefully carry out agreement objectives, in this case, this only increases the levels of internal alliance tensions. These feedback dynamics continue to hinder implementation of agreement objectives in Nago City in Okinawa Prefecture.

Of course, a number of other factors may influence a state’s decision to engage in preference incorporation. Over the timeframe spanned by the agreements examined in this dissertation, the Japanese government has had to devote its resources to numerous other national and international emergencies—the 1997 Asian and 2008 global financial crises, the 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster, and numerous North Korean missile crises, just to name a few. Flareups involving the history problems between South Korea and Japan over the last decade have also derailed agreements that were intended to increase the efficacy of the US alliance system in Asia. This dissertation, however, is primarily interested in internal alliance management rather than on how states choose between competing national interests under the constraints of external factors. Though an important facet of international relations, such decisions lie beyond the scope of this thesis.

10.2 Looking further abroad: implications for alliance theory

What then, do the findings of this dissertation, particularly in relation to the importance attached

273 to preference incorporation, mean for alliance theory? The answer lies in two different but related areas. First, these findings attest to the importance of examining and analyzing the implementation process, both on its own and especially in the context of the entire agreement cycle. There is no question that national governments and leaders have the biggest impact on international agreements; this is true even in relation to the basing realignments studied in this dissertation. However, it is important to study implementation more systematically, especially in relation to agreements involving international security, which has traditionally been regarded as the domain most isolated from domestic effects. Second, in order to facilitate this, there needs to an increased focus on the influence of subnational actors such as local political leaders and their constituencies on international security agreements.

Perhaps most importantly, however, the findings show that the concept of preference incorporation offers an especially useful means of accomplishing this. The concept has relevance for both the institutionalization and socialization of alliances and security partnerships, particularly within the basing politics literature. It does not replace other approaches to understanding base politics. Instead, it complements past approaches while also filling in theoretical and conceptual gaps. For example, Kent Calder’s paradigm of compensation politics is still highly relevant for the US-Japan alliance, as the Japanese government continues to use economic subsidies to cultivate and maintain vested interests in the US military presence.8 This was clear from both the sub-cases examined in this dissertation. However, preference incorporation helps refine this paradigm by providing an answer for when compensation is most effective. The core issue is that, even if alliance managers assume or deduce that a host community has an interest in obtaining economic subsidies in exchange for acquiescing to an unwanted US military presence, different interest groups within that host community will have different preferences about the form in which those benefits are delivered. Furthermore, these preferences may evolve over time, as economic realities change, or as the effects of earlier subsidies or other elements of the basing presence become known.

This was evident in both sub-cases. With regards to the sub-case involving Iwakuni City and Yamaguchi Prefecture, the Japanese government was able to identify and make use of local

8 Kent E. Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2007), 127-28.

274 preferences for economic assistance with the Atago Hill and City Hall projects, which facilitated the replacement of a non-cooperative key subnational actor with a more cooperative one. On the other hand, during the SACO process, Tokyo was less successful at identifying and addressing preferences for the type of facility that would most benefit local construction companies in Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture, which was an important factor in the disinclination of two key subnational actors to cooperate with implementing the 2002 Basic Plan.

Similarly, preference incorporation adds value to Cooley’s argument concerning the differences between basing politics in Okinawa Prefecture and the Japanese mainland.9 The core contention is that Okinawa continues to politicize the US military presence because it regards it as illegitimate. Some scholars and activists who push for further reductions in the US military footprint in Okinawa do indeed argue that the US presence in the prefecture is illegitimate. Hence, Cooley’s argument that this illegitimacy is an important factor in the politicization of the post-Cold War realignment and base management efforts may well be true for Okinawa. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, there are also cases of politicization involving military facilities elsewhere in Japan, including the sub-case involving MCAS Iwakuni that this dissertation analyzed. Preference incorporation can explain the instances of politicization in these other communities, and also helps elucidate how politicization varies over time in Okinawa. Preference incorporation thus helps refine these two other concepts that have been used to characterize the institutionalization of alliances.

Preference incorporation also adds value to the literature on the socialization of alliance, in that the concept represents a process through which such socialization occurs. The other two major works in the basing politics literature both specifically address the question of whether social movement activists can affect alliance policy. In the context of the agreements examined in here, the question becomes “to what extent and under what circumstances can activists influence military realignment agreements?” Essentially, both Yeo and Kawato argued that because the norms that alliance managers subscribed to were very different from those of the activists, the latter were unable to persuade the former to change (in the case of alliance policy-makers) or reject (in the case of legislatures responsible for ratifying international pacts) controversial

9 Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

275 policies and agreements. In contrast, this dissertation has focused on explaining implementation outcomes, specifically, whether the outcome of a “reduction in alliance tensions” is achieved. In this respect, it is focused on the actions that alliance managers can take to facilitate this goal, the argument being that looking for ways to incorporate the preferences of subnational actors helps induce cooperation in implementation, ultimately reducing tensions. By approaching the question from a different angle, the dissertation complements the work of Yeo and Kawato regarding such socialization.10

Lastly, preference incorporation offers a framework for examining other cases of base realignments and similar alliance management issues. The current US military realignment in Okinawa is still ongoing, which means that alliance managers may eventually be successful in achieving the second goal of reducing alliance tensions. If this does happen, understanding how it took place could be reliably done through preference incorporation. It may instructive to look at other cases, both past and present, to examine the likelihood of such outcomes. For example, another sub-case from the ongoing realignment that may provide a relevant point of comparison for those examined in this dissertation would be Zushi City in Kanagawa Prefecture. In 2004, the US and Japanese governments agreed to construct an additional 800 units of housing in the US Navy’s Ikego Housing Area, in exchange for returning land. The city’s residents and leaders objected, arguing that the Ikego forest area was a natural area requiring preservation. In contrast to Okinawa and Yamaguchi, the new agreement was never implemented.11 Cases such as the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan, which this dissertation briefly discussed in Chapter 3, as well as the US military realignment in the Republic of Korea, could also be the target of further research. Looking beyond military basing agreements, it may also be helpful to expand analysis to the implementation of the rotational deployments through various countries in the region, such as Australia.

10 Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Yuko Kawato, Protests against U.S. military base policy in Asia: persuasion and its limits (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015). 11 Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2015 [White paper], 2015, accessed May 20, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2015.html.; “Beigun Negishi Jūtaku no henkan he, Nichibei kyōgi Ikego no jūtakuk kensetsu chuushi,” Nippon Keizai Shimbun, November 14, 2018.

276 10.3 Implications for Asia-Pacific security and International Relations theory

More broadly, what do the findings mean for Asia-Pacific security and International Relations theory? As noted in the Introduction, problematic relations between military units deployed in a foreign country and their hosts can negatively affect alliance stability. This is particularly likely to be the case when the allies are open democratic societies that allow their citizens considerable access to governmental processes, even at the level of national security. All this certainly applies to the US-Japan alliance. The case studies show how such problematic relations led to strategic incoherence, whereby the assets of the alliance were not “used effectively and in a coordinated fashion” to achieve the allies’ security objectives.12 This has occurred largely through political pluralization, whereby different groups increasingly disagree and compete over the objectives a state should be pursuing. Tokyo and Washington were, at the time, seeking to update the alliance for a changing security environment, one in which the rise of China, North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, and the terrorist threat were emerging as core security challenges. The two governments upgraded the bilateral Security Consultative Committee to ministerial level and revised alliance guidelines focused on improving intra- alliance cooperation.13 However, the crisis triggered by the 1995 rape incident in Okinawa forced alliance managers to devote precious time and resources towards addressing and mitigating basing tensions, taking their attention away from that core task of updating the alliance. Furthermore, growing suspicion on the US side that their Japanese counterparts were using the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa as a “domestic political football” hindered efforts to increase interoperability.14

The incorporation of the SACO process into the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) subsequently led to further strategic incoherence. This time, political pluralization manifested at the very highest levels of government. The long-running opposition to the relocation of MCAS Futenma within Okinawa influenced the policies of the Democratic Party of Japan and Social Democratic Party, with the latter insisting that the facility be relocated outside of the prefecture

12 H. D. P. Envall and Kerri Ng, “The Okinawa “Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics,” Asian Security 11, no. 3 (2015): 227. 13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation,” (1997); Japan Ministry of Defense, “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond,” (2010). 14 See Section 6.2.

277 instead. Hence, when these two parties joined with others to form a coalition government following the 2009 Japanese general election, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama sought to renegotiate the 2006 Roadmap agreement. Once again, time and resources were redirected towards addressing basing tensions instead of carrying out strategic objectives. More significantly, this period pointed to the possibility of strategic incoherence resulting not only from political pluralization but also goal displacement, whereby organizational goals replace strategic ones.15 The US side consistently maintained its perspective on the strategic importance of the base presence in Okinawa, but some on the Japanese side began to question the necessity of basing the Marine Corps in Okinawa.16 Fortunately for the allies, this shift towards debating the alliance’s strategic objectives was arrested and has since been reversed by the Abe government, which has proactively sought to improve Japan’s ability to contribute to regional and global security. However, this agreement-implementation sequence demonstrated how supposedly “minor” issues in an alliance can turn into “major” issues if they are not addressed early enough.

The key implication from this is that alliance management is not a second-order issue for the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific, especially that part that has the US-Japan alliance at its core. There is a constant risk that the next crisis associated with basing tensions could damage the US-Japan alliance fundamentally and thus undermine the role it plays in the regional security order. The developments triggered by the 1995 rape incident echoed the case of the 1970s Koza riots, in that the reason both incidents escalated was the preceding build-up of tensions in relation to other incidents, crimes, and failures to address local preferences with respect to the US military presence.17 The CH-53D helicopter crash at Okinawa International University, which triggered the current renewed efforts by Tokyo and Washington to execute the realignment, was a stark reminder of the potential for unresolved tensions in Okinawa to boil over in this manner. Given the rise of China and North Korea’s growing nuclear and ballistic arsenal, Japan in particular may be “more willing to bear the political costs of Okinawa.”18 However, if such a crisis were to occur when there is a contingency on the Korean Peninsula or any other regional flashpoints, this could

15 Envall and Ng, “The Okinawa “Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics,” 226. 16 Ibid., 236. 17 See Chapter 5 of this dissertation and Masamichi S Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 53-55. 18 Envall and Ng, “The Okinawa “Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics,” 236.

278 delay or hinder a prompt response from US Forces based in Japan, especially Okinawa.

In more practical terms, the main impact of the basing tensions and the inefficiencies they cause manifests in reduced levels of readiness and lost opportunities for improving broader regional security cooperation.19 The need to move units and personnel from their home facilities to more isolated areas for training consumes time and defense funding that could otherwise be used more productively. Moreover, restrictions placed on units training near residential areas can mean that personnel practice procedures different from those that they would use in a real combat situation. If prolonged, these issues could have severe consequences in the event of a contingency, especially if reduced training for the individual force units has a snowballing effect on joint training exercises involving not just the US armed forces and the JSDF, but also the military forces of other regional allies and partners such as the Republic of Korea and Australia. It is possible that these challenges might lead to positive outcomes, as the United States and its allies and security partners continue exploring options for distributing US capabilities around the region. However, this raises the risk of goal displacement, whereby policy makers pursue the organizational goal of maintaining force levels in the region by compromising on strategic imperatives, such as ensuring adequate force levels in key strategic locations like Okinawa. For these reasons, successful alliance management is crucial for ensuring regional security, and identifying and addressing tensions arising from basing politics play an important role in this process.

On the second issue of International Relations theory, the dissertation has argued that the implementation of international agreements is in need of more systematic theorization and analysis. There is a large and growing literature on compliance; however, the focus once again remains on national actors and international regimes.20 Foreign policy analysis has also provided

19 United States General Accounting Office, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting, GAO-02-525 (Washington, DC, 2002), accessed April 12, 2016, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-525; United States Government Accountability Office, Marine Corps Asia Pacific Realignment: DOD Should Resolve Capability Deficiencies and Infrastructure Risks and Revise Cost Estimates, GAO-17-415 (Washington, DC, 2017), accessed December 24, 2018, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-415. 20 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization 47, no. 2 (1993); Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law, International Relations and Compliance,” in The Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London, England: Sage Publications, Ltd., 2002); Christer Jönsson and Jonas Tallberg, “Compliance and Post-Agreement Bargaining,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 4 (1998); Peter M. Haas, “Compliance with EU directives:

279 one of the more important frameworks for studying implementation: the two-level games theory that numerous scholars have greatly advanced since it was first introduced in 1988. Still, many studies and models have focused on the more formal “ratification” procedures that involve national-level actors (legislatures). Yet this dissertation demonstrates that ratification is but one part of the post-agreement stages of an agreement’s life cycle, and it is not unusual for international pacts to evolve as signatory states attempt to carry them out.

International Relations theory would therefore benefit from a greater focus on the roles of those subnational actors that are involved in post-ratification stages of implementation, on “the working of informal groupings, lower-level officials and half-understood procedures” that are the characteristic features of the business of carrying out policy.21 These are central characteristics of policy. Again, preference incorporation provides a strong conceptual framework for achieving this because the interests and preferences of subnational actors matter when they have the ability to advance or impede the implementation of international agreements at particular checkpoints. These checkpoints, and the extent of influence that these actors have, can usually be identified by analyzing relevant domestic legislation, such as Japan’s Special Land Leases and Public Waters Reclamation laws (in the Nago City/Okinawa sub-case). In this manner, the concept of preference incorporation provides the basis for a more structured exploration of implementation and the important roles that subnational actors play in this process.

Such theorization should not, however, stop with preference incorporation. There may be another interesting and relevant way to characterize the developments in Yamaguchi Prefecture and Okinawa Prefecture that has significant theoretical implications. In both sub-cases, we can see similar milestones. First, there is a trigger, where an accident or other incident triggers protests, then there is problem identification and agenda setting. Plans of action typically follow, with governments allocating budgets aimed at alliance problem solving. These are in turn followed by relocation plans, which are analyzed and tested for feasibility, and formal administrative procedures for implementation. Differences in time between triggers and agreements and the

insights from international relations and comparative politics,” Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 1 (1998); Arild Underdal, “Explaining Compliance and Defection: Three Models,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 1 (1998); Gerda Falkner et al., “Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?,” West European Politics 27, no. 3 (2004). 21 Steve Smith and Michael Clarke, “Foreign Policy Implementation and Foreign Policy Behaviour,” in Foreign Policy Implementation, ed. Steve Smith and Michael Clarke (London, England: G. Allen & Unwin, 1985), 5.

280 scope this allows for preference incorporation may well be worth further research. There were significant differences in the time that elapsed between these two stages in the Yamaguchi and Okinawa sub-cases. The impact of this difference warrants further investigation.

10.4 Final word: implications for Okinawa

Finally, it is important to remember that analysis of the bases in Japan, and especially in Okinawa, touches on issues that affect peoples’ lives in quite direct and at times damaging ways. The clashes between the Japanese Coast Guard and protesters since August 2014, for instance, have seen both sides accusing the other of violent and confrontational actions leading to relatively serious injuries.22 In 2017, Okinawan activist and civic group leader Hiroji Yamashiro spoke before the United Nations Human Rights Council, accusing the government of Japan of committing human rights violations and demanding that it “respect the Okinawan people’s will against the construction of the new US and Japanese military bases.”23 The Naha District Court ruled in 2017 that Yamashiro was guilty of “forcible obstruction of a business and assault” and sentenced him to a suspended sentence of two years, which the activist appealed.24

These developments point to a divide between Tokyo and Okinawa over the US military presence and the ongoing realignment in the prefecture. The judicial system is fully on the side of the national government; in December 2018, the Naha branch of the Fukuoka High Court upheld the lower court’s ruling and rejected Yamashiro’s appeal against his conviction.25 News media reporting on the issue also reflects this division. Progressive outlets such as the Asahi Shimbun predominantly focus on the Okinawan perspective, with editorials criticizing Tokyo for ignoring the “popular will” in the prefecture and for taking what progressives perceive to be heavy-handed

22 Jon Mitchell, “Thousands march on Henoko base site,” The Japan Times, August 23, 2014; “Injuries to Okinawa anti-base protesters ‘laughable,’ says U.S. military spokesman,” ibid., February 15, 2015; “Readers split over issue of U.S. military presence in Okinawa,” ibid., February 16, 2016. 23 Philip Brasor, “Okinawa’s story told differently in Tokyo,” ibid., March 7, 2015; “Okinawa base activist describes five months of alleged Japanese oppression to U.N. rights council,” ibid., June 16, 2017. 24 “Okinawan anti-base protest leader pleads not guilty to obstruction and assault charges,” ibid., March 17, 2017. 25 “High court upholds suspended sentence for Okinawa activist Hiroji Yamashiro for offenses during anti-U.S. base protests,” The Japan Times, December 13, 2018.

281 actions to forcefully implement Futenma’s relocation.26 On the other hand, the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun presents the central government’s perspective, regularly calling for Okinawan leaders to cease their opposition and cooperate to implement the agreements.27 The divide appears to be an intractable battle between the pro-base and anti-base factions.

However, a deeper look into the two sub-cases examined within this dissertation makes it clear that both opposition and acquiescence to the ongoing realignment are based on a complex mix of concerns. On an individual level, the issues include job and livelihood security as well as personal safety; at a broader level, they also involve questions of economic development, urban planning, regional-central relations, and societal and commercial interests. Facilitated by the institutionalization of the US military presence, these concerns have produced a range of preferences in relation to the realignment agreements, depending on the fundamental interests of each actor. The reasons for opposition vary widely, and include both normative and practical concerns, but overall, actors that benefit financially from the base presence—such as landlords and those involved in the construction industry—tend to support the agreements. However, some landlords may be against a particular agreement objective because it would entail a loss of revenue if their land was slated to be returned, while otherwise anti-base actors may support an agreement to relocate a facility because it reduces overall safety risks.28

Key political figures, at both national and subnational levels, have spent considerable time and effort seeking ways to address these interests and concerns while ensuring national and regional security. Prime ministers Murayama and Hashimoto were both motivated by the desire to further reduce the US military presence in Okinawa, in part to fulfil the legacy of one of their mentors, Eisaku Satō. However, the influence of the shipbuilding industry on Hashimoto led SACO towards considering advanced technologies that were difficult to reconcile with the interests and needs of both the local construction industry and the US military forces in the prefecture. At the subnational level, conservative politicians like Governor Keiichi Inamine and Nago mayor Tateo

26 “EDITORIAL: Abe putting U.S. before Okinawa in starting base work off Henoko,” The Asahi Shimbun, February 7, 2017; “EDITORIAL: Time to suspend Henoko work while both sides sit down to talk.”; “Henoko row back in court,” The Japan Times, August 15, 2016. 27 “EDITORIAL / Seize the change of govt to push relocation issue,” Daily Yomiuri, December 25, 2012; “EDITORIAL / Step up efforts to pave way for Futenma base relocation plan,” The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, November 30, 2013; “EDITORIAL / Suits to block Henoko base project definitively shown to be quixotic,” ibid., March 15, 2018. 28 “Citizens rail against Onaga’s decision to block base relocation,” Kyodo News, October 20, 2015.

282 Kishimoto focused on the local construction industry’s interests and preferences, but also attempted to mollify the anti-base and anti-agreement factions of their constituencies in ways that Washington could not agree to. Similarly, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Okinawa governor Hirokazu Nakaima and Nago mayor Susume Inamine all attempted without success to find a path forward. Nevertheless, Nakaima’s decision to approve the land reclamation permit appears to have given the Japanese government the mandate it needs to forge ahead on construction at Camp Schwab in Nago City, despite a lack of cooperation from subsequent subnational leaders.

At the same time, tensions in the wider region are now arguably greater than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The first half of 2018 brought the promise of détente on the Korean Peninsula, when South Korean President Moon Jae-In and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un held three summits and agreed to work towards ending the Korean war and denuclearization.29 The two states have since moved towards reconnecting railway lines, although sanctions and the need to upgrade North Korea’s rail networks will slow further progress.30 However, much uncertainty remains over whether denuclearization talks will bear fruit or only lead to more tensions, with both US and North Korean negotiators unwilling to be the first to compromise.31 The United States and China have also embarked on a trade war, after President Trump followed through on threats to place tariffs on Chinese exports unless it addressed accusations of unfair trade practices.32 The potential for both issues to escalate into physical conflict has increased the perceived importance of the US-Japan alliance and the US military presence in Okinawa. As regional tensions have fluctuated over the past few years, the Abe government has made it increasingly clear that the lack of cooperation from the Okinawan governor and other subnational actors will not prevent it from carrying out the realignment in the prefecture.33

29 Andrew Salmon, “North Korea risks rising, South Korean growth slowing,” Asia Times, December 30, 2018. 30 “North and South Korea hold ceremony to link railways, but sanctions block way,” The Washington Post, December 26, 2018. 31 Nicole Gaouette, Michelle Kosinski, and Barbara Starr, “North Korea ‘really angry’ at US as tensions rise,” CNN News, November 8, 2018. 32 Michael Hirtzer and Tom Polansek, “Trade wars cost U.S., China billions of dollars each in 2018,” Reuters News, December 29, 2018. 33 “Japan picks up landfill work at controversial site for U.S. base relocation”; “Land minister suspends Okinawa’s retraction of landfill permission for US base relocation.”

283 But even if the objectives of the realignment are fully implemented, it appears that alliance tensions arising from the US military presence in Okinawa are likely to remain for some time. Although the SACO and DPRI agreements state that the reduction in the burden on host communities is aimed at “strengthen(ing) the Japan-US alliance,” it has become increasingly clear that the achieving such reductions does not automatically lead to a stronger alliance. The way in which the agreements are carried out is also important, and the key is to manage and mitigate tensions associated with the basing presence. This dissertation argues that the process of preference incorporation—discussing interests and preferences with subnational actors and incorporating or addressing them in the agreements—is crucial for such an endeavour.

Alliance managers certainly could look to more successful realignment agreements and see how they were achieved, such as the sub-case of Iwakuni City/Yamaguchi Prefecture. One of the important trade-offs was that the city would only accept the transfer of CVW-5 if they were assured that MCAS Iwakuni would never be designated as the permanent training location for the FCLP drills. Another significant change that reflects local preferences was that the JMSDF units would remain at the facility, even though this meant that the physical burden on the city would increase. An important lesson derived from these developments is that the “burdens” on a community are not necessarily what alliance managers think they are. Host communities may have a different idea of what the burdens are, and thus what compromises they might accept. Furthermore, Iwakuni City is a good example of the importance of developing and maintaining good civil-military relations.

Without doubt, such efforts are particularly difficult when the majority of a host community is prejudiced against the military presence. In Okinawa’s case, the Hatoyama government’s failed attempt to renegotiate the Futenma agreement from 2009 to 2010 was particularly damaging because it upset the fine balance between the anti-base and pro-base factions. The resulting shift saw conservatives in the prefecture join with progressives to oppose the realignment objectives. The central government now appears resigned about the possibility of persuading Okinawa’s subnational actors to acquiesce to the realignment, particularly the controversial efforts to relocate MCAS Futenma. Furthermore, the progressive media outlets in the prefecture seldom, if ever, cover the base presence in a positive light. But this only makes efforts at preference

284 incorporation more important. As this dissertation has shown, only by keeping communication channels between Tokyo and Okinawa open can paths towards cooperation be found.

285 References

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Interviews (cited in the dissertation)

Ōta, Masahide. Former Governor of Okinawa Prefecture (1990-1998). Conducted in Naha, Okinawa Prefecture, November 2014. Sakurai, Kunitoshi. Professor Emeritus, Okinawa University. Conducted in Okinawa Prefecture, November 2014. Satō, Manabu. Professor, Okinawa International University. Interview conducted in Okinawa Prefecture, November 2014. ———. Interview conducted in Okinawa Prefecture, July 2016.

Anonymous interviews

An official from the Regional Security Policy Division [Chiiki Anzen Seisaku Ka], Okinawa Prefectural Government. Conducted in Naha, Okinawa Prefecture, in November 2014. Two officials from the Policy Department [Sōgō Seisaku Bu], Iwakuni City Government. Conducted in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in July 2015.

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News articles and press releases

“2-shi ga Fukuchiji shūnin.” Ryukyu Shimpo, December 17, 2014. Accessed February 24, 2015, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=RYUKYU0020141217each0000u. “2ND LD - Gov’t opts for plan to build airport on Okinawa reef.” Kyodo News, December 27, 2001. Accessed March 31, 2015, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=kyodo00020011227dxcr0038v. “2ND LD: Koizumi seeks coordination on U.S. military realignment.” Kyodo News, September 10, 2004. Accessed March 20, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020040910e09a004s9. “2ND LD: Table of party strength in House of Representatives.” Kyodo News, July 21, 2009. Accessed July 31, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020090721e57l000ul. “3 local gov’ts reject U.S. forces realignment plans.” Kyodo News, October 31, 2005. Accessed May 24, 2013, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020051031e1av0050m. “3 Okinawa municipalities OK Japan-U.S. joint use of Camp Hansen.” Kyodo News, November 13, 2007. Accessed March 20, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020071113e3bd006bt. “5 Okinawa LDP lawmakers back Henoko relocation.” The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, November 26, 2013. Accessed August 1, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020131125e9bq0000g. “‘5-nennai teishi’ zero kaitō / Futenma futan keigen kaigi.” Ryukyu Shimpo, June 25, 2014. Accessed February 24, 2015, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=RYUKYU0020140625ea6p00009. “5TH LD: Abe becomes Japan's new premier, names Cabinet.” Kyodo News, September 26, 2006. Accessed July 30, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020060926e29q004ee. “21 of 55 affected local gov’ts stay opposed to U.S. base realignment.” Kyodo News, September 17, 2006. Accessed February 5, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020050705e175007vd.

300 “25 Pct of Voters Support Futenma Transfer to Henoko.” Jiji Press English News Service, November 17, 2014. Accessed August 3, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=JIJI000020141116eabg000dx. “43 Pct Back Futenma Relocation to Henoko: Jiji Survey.” Jiji Press English News Service, January 17, 2014. Accessed August 3, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=JIJI000020140117ea1h0005s. “55% of Nago voters expect new mayor to reject Futemma relocation.” Kyodo News, January 24, 2010. Accessed March 20, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020100124e61o002e5. “60% of Iwakuni residents opposed to U.S. base shift.” Japan Economic Newswire, July 12, 1996. Accessed October 10, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=kyodo00020011014ds7c00jrn. “6,130 Japanese Sue State over Atsugi Base Noise Pollution.” Jiji Press English News Service, December 17, 2007. Accessed October 10, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=JIJI000020071217e3ch000b5. “20,000 Okinawans stage protest against US base relocation plans.” Agence France-Presse, December 21, 1996. Accessed April 25, 2012, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=afpr000020011012dscl04qti. “Abe Denies Responsibility For Having Appointed Tax Panel Chief.” Nikkei Report, December 22, 2006. Accessed June 10, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=NKRP000020061222e2cm0000g. “Abe instructs LDP’s Nakagawa to study readmitting ‘postal rebels’.” Kyodo News, October 24, 2006. Accessed July 30, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020061024e2ao0038p. “About 17,000 Japanese encircle US Futenma base to protest relocation 16 May.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, May 17, 2010. Accessed May 5, 2012, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=BBCAPP0020100517e65h000ry. Abramson, Mark. “Kaneohe Marine base to get more than the MV-22 Osprey under new plan.” Pacific Business News Online, August 17, 2012. Accessed http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=PACBNO0020120817e88h00003. “‘All Okinawa’ camp opposing base relocation fails to score clean election sweep,” The Mainichi, October 24, 2017, accessed February 18, 2018, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20171024/p2a/00m/0na/005000c. Allen, David. “AmericaFest takes off July 4th on Kadena.” Stars and Stripes, June 13, 2007. Accessed July 20, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/news/americafest-takes-off-july-4th- on-kadena-1.79975. “Angry Islanders Dig In For a Battle Over Bases.” The New York Times, May 25, 1996. Accessed March 31, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=nytf000020011014ds5p00r1c. “Ano higeki “keshite fūkasasenai” Beigunki tsuiraku 58nen Okinawa Miyamori-sho de giseisha 18nin wo tsuitō.” Okinawa Times, October 9, 2017. Accessed December 15, http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/107039. Aoki, Mizuho. “Futenma question decisive factor for prefecture’s voters.” The Japan Times, July 12, 2013. Accessed March 5, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=JTIM000020130711e97c0000b. “Armitage: Futenma ‘Japan’s responsibility’.” The Japan Times, April 17, 2013. Accessed May 1, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/17/national/armitage- futenma--responsibility/.

301 “As I See It: Listen to message behind Nago mayoral incumbent’s landslide victory.” The Mainichi, January 29, 2014. Accessed March 5, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=AIWMDM0020140129ea1t000dx. “Assembly Wants Futenma Relocation in Okinawa Scrapped.” Jiji Press English News Service, January 10, 2014. Accessed August 3, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=JIJI000020140110ea1a000ba. “Atagoyama jigyō sekichi kaitori Ken, kuni he no yōbō miokuri = Yamaguchi.” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 19, 2002. Accessed October 5, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020091219e5cj000ad. “Base relocation now iffy.” The Japan Times, January 26, 2010. Accessed May 5, 2012, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=JTIM000020100127e61q00005. “Base Relocation Supporter Kuwae Elected Okinawa Mayor.” Jiji Press English News Service, April 28, 2014. Accessed August 3, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=JIJI000020140427ea4r000dy. “Bei kyūyuki ichū yōnin ‘Futenma henkan doryoku wo’ Fukuchiji, kanbōchōkan ni tsutaeru = Yamaguchi.” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 17, 2013. Accessed October 5, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020131217e9ch0008z. “Bei seifunai ni dokuji jinmyaku / Bei chūzai ni Henzan-shi Henoko soshi dakai he.” Okinawa Times, January 8, 2015. Accessed September 5, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=OKNAWA0020150212eb1800c5h. “Beigun heri tsuiraku jikō Futenma isetsu no saikō motome, kōgi ketsugi he / Ginowan-shi gikai.” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 17, 2004. Accessed March 21, 2015, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020040818e08h0009b. “Beigun jyūtaku haichian asu, Iwakuni-shichō Bōeishō ni yōbō he = Yamaguchi.” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 23, 2010. Accessed March 5, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020101123e6bn0008g. “Beigun kyūyuki ichū ‘Okinawa shisatsu-go ni han dan’ Iwakuni-shichō, gikai ikō mo fumae = Yamaguchi.” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 31, 2013. Accessed October 5, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020131031e9av0009j. “Beigun kyūyuki Iwakuni-shichō ukeire hyōmei.” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 9, 2013. Accessed October 5, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020131209e9c9000js. “Beigun Negishi Jūtaku no henkan he, Nichibei kyōgi Ikego no jūtakuk kensetsu chuushi.” Nippon Keizai Shimbun, November 14, 2018. Accessed November 28, 2018, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO37752620U8A111C1L82000/. “Beigun saihen no genba kara Atamagoshi saishū hōkoku ‘nani wo itte mo kawaranu’.” Mainichi Shimbun, May 2, 2006. Accessed March 5, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=MAIMEP0020060502e2520003i. “Beigun saihen Saishū hōkoku he no rikai, Iwakuni shichō ni motomeru / Kitahara shisetuchō kanchō.” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 17, 2006. Accessed March 5, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020060517e25h0008l. “Beikūbo kansaiki ijchūmondai Minkū saikai jitsugen he yōnin motomeru Iwakuni-shichō ni yōbōsho = Yamaguchi.” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 28, 2006. Accessed December 20, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020070728e37s0008p. Bender, Bryan. “Navy wants new airstrip in Japan; Tokyo resists.” Defense Daily, October 23, 1996. Accessed March 21, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=defd000020011013dsan001u0. “Bōei shisetsuchō kanchō ga raiken Chiji “jimoto fuan barai shoku wo” / Yamaguchi.” Mainichi Shimbun, May 16, 2006. Accessed March 5, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=MAINLO0020060516e25g000es.

302 Bosack, Michael. “The Legacy of 3/11 and the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” Tokyo Review, March 9, 2018. Accessed April 28, 2019, https://www.tokyoreview.net/2018/03/the-legacy-of- 3-11-and-the-u-s-japan-alliance/. ———. “Relevance Despite Obscurity: Japan and UN Command.” Tokyo Review, February 1, 2018. Accessed October 12, 2018, http://www.tokyoreview.net/2018/02/relevance- despite-obscurity-japan-un-command/. Brasor, Philip. “Okinawa’s story told differently in Tokyo.” The Japan Times, March 7, 2015. Accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/07/national/media-national/okinawas- story-told-differently-tokyo/. Burke, Matthew M. “Marine base construction brings headaches to Iwakuni residents.” Stars and Stripes, August 8, 2012. Accessed November 19, 2015, http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/japan/marine-base-construction-brings- headaches-to-iwakuni-residents-1.185103. Burke, Matthew M., and Chiyomi Sumida, “Okinawa protests intensify as Futenma relocation construction begins,” Stars and Stripes, April 4, 2015, accessed February 24, 2017, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/okinawa-protests-intensify-as-futenma- relocation-construction-begins-1.338251. “Bush, Japan’s Koizumi Agree to Speed U.S. Force Structure Review - Leaders affirm commitments on Iraq and N. Korea, discuss beef ban.” United States Department of State, September 22, 2004. Accessed September 30, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=STDP000020040923e09m0000a. “Cabinet Office Eyes 380 B. Yen for Okinawa in FY 2015.” Jiji Press English News Service, August 27, 2014. Accessed August 3, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=JIJI000020140827ea8r000e4. Carney, Matthew. “Japan’s cabinet approves changes to its pacifist constitution allowing for ‘collective self-defence’.” ABC News, July 1, 2014. Accessed February 23, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-01/an-japan-constitution/5564098. “Central gov’t begins preliminary survey for Futemma base relocation.” Kyodo News, May 18, 2007. Accessed August 3, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020070518e35i007pt. “Central, local gov’ts remain apart over Futemma relocation plan.” Kyodo News, January 19, 2007. Accessed July 30, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020070119e31j0018h. “Chiji, ryōdaijin ni kugi / Henoko-isetsu ‘mattaku rikai dekinai.’ Osupurei ‘chūshi wo fukumu minaoshi’,” Ryukyu Shimpo, September 9, 2014. Accessed July 30, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=RYUKYU0020131009e9a900056. “CHRONOLOGY-Ten months of highs and lows for Japan PM Abe.” Reuters News, July 27, 2007. Accessed March 31, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=LBA0000020070727e37r0029q. “Citizens in Okinawa city file referendum plea on heliport.” BBC Monitoring Service: Asia- Pacific, September 17, 1997. Accessed March 21, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=bbcfe00020010929dt9h00683. “Citizens rail against Onaga’s decision to block base relocation.” Kyodo News, October 20, 2015. Accessed August 10, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020151020ebak001xh. “Cohen rejects limit on military use of Okinawa heliport.” Japan Economic Newswire, March 17, 2000. Accessed July 20, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=kyodo00020010807dw3h00l34.

303 “Court orders state to pay damages for noise at Iwakuni base but does not ban flights.” The Japan Times, October 15, 2015. Accessed 17 November, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/15/national/crime-legal/court-orders-state- pay-damages-noise-iwakuni-base-flights-not-banned/. “Christopher, Kono agree on 2-plus-2 talks in Sept.” Japan Economic Newswire, June 16, 1995. Accessed October 17, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=kyodo00020011025dr6f00khq. Daimon, Sayuri. “Handover of Okinawa to Japan was prickly issue.” The Japan Times, May 14, 2002. Accessed March 20, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2002/05/14/national/handover-of-okinawa-to- japan-was-prickly-issue/. “Defence head scraps plan to form panel on future use of Okinawa bases.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, January 22, 1999. Accessed March 21, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=bbcapp0020010901dv1m005xu. “Defence head scraps plan to form panel on future use of Okinawa bases.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, January 22, 1999. Accessed March 21, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=bbcapp0020010901dv1m005xu. Department of U.S. Marine Corps. “Annual Yuko Day Celebration Begins.” FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, 1998. Accessed August 11, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=fdchri0020010923du5k0075o. Dickie, Mure. “Okinawa pledge paves the way for coalition deal.” Financial Times, September 10, 2009. Accessed http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=FTFT000020090910e59a00003. “Diet enacts administrative reform legislation.” Japan Policy & Politics, July 12, 1999. Accessed February 5, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=jppo000020010828dv7c001dc. “DPJ decides to expel Kina over Okinawa gubernatorial election.” Kyodo News, October 14, 2014. Accessed August 10, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020141014eaae00439. “DPJ set to become top party in upper house.” Kyodo News, August 3, 2007. Accessed July 30, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=KYODO00020070803e3830040h. “DPJ to form tripartite coalition government.” Mainichi Daily News, September 9, 2009. Accessed July 31, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=Aiwmdm0020090909e599000ul. “Dual use would increase heliport size, Nago mayor says.” Japan Policy & Politics, December 13, 1999. Accessed March 31, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=jppo000020010828dvck000rs. “EDITORIAL / Realignment of U.S. forces should be sped up.” Daily Yomiuri, May 24, 2007. Accessed February 5, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020051110e1bb0000b. “EDITORIAL / Seize the change of govt to push relocation issue.” The Daily Yomiuri, December 25, 2012. Accessed September 20, 2013, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020121224e8cp00006. “EDITORIAL / Step up efforts to pave way for Futenma base relocation plan.” The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, November 30, 2013. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020131129e9bu00004. “EDITORIAL / Suits to block Henoko base project definitively shown to be quixotic.” The Japan News by the Yoimiuri Shimbun, March 15, 2018. Accessed December 24, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020180314ee3f00009.

304 “EDITORIAL: Abe putting U.S. before Okinawa in starting base work off Henoko.” The Asahi Shimbun, February 7, 2017. Accessed April 14, 2017, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201702070024.html. “EDITORIAL: Time to suspend Henoko work while both sides sit down to talk.” The Asahi Shimbun, November 14, 2018. Accessed November 30, 2018, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201804270047.html. “ELECTION 2009--BATTLE FOR POWER / DPJ’s Hirono set for upper house.” Daily Yomiuri, August 19, 2009. Accessed July 31, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020090818e58j00008. Ennis, Peter. “Showdown looming over planned US Marine base on Okinawa.” In Dispatch Japan, November 18, 2013. Accessed March 25, 2014, http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2013/11/showdown-looming-over-planned-us- marine-base-on-okinawa.html. “Ex-executive of J-Green predecessor ‘kills self’.” Daily Yomiuri, May 30, 2007. Accessed March 5, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020070529e35u00003. Fackler, Martin. “Okinawa Voters Replace Governor With Opponent of U.S. Base.” The New York Times, November 16, 2014. Accessed Fifield, Anna. “Three reasons why the Japanese elections matter to the United States.” The Washington Post, December 15, 2014. Accessed 13 May 2013, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=WPCOM00020141215eacf0043e. “FOCUS - Tanaka softened stance on Okinawa disappoints Inamine.” Kyodo News, December 27, 2001. Accessed March 31, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=kyodo00020011229dxct0025t. Fukumoto, Tatsuya, and Masayuki Fuchinokami. “Iwakuni vote ‘not unexpected’ / Central govt unfazed by massive ‘no’ vote on base reorganization.” Daily Yomiuri, March 14, 2008. Accessed March 21, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020060313e23e0000j. Funatsuki, Kakuchi, and Atsushi Matsuura. “Tight 2-man race in Okinawa / Base relocation issue seen eroding support for incumbent governor.” Daily Yomiuri, 13 November, 2010. Accessed May 5, 2012, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020101112e6bd00005. Furukawa, Hajime, Kenichi Aoyama, and Shuhei Kuromi. “By-election results give DPJ a shot in arm.” Daily Yomiuri, October 27, 2009. Accessed March 5, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020091026e5ar0000b. “Futenma ‘5nen inai teishi wo’ Okinawa Chiji yōkyū Shushō ‘jitsugen ni doryoku’.” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 17, 2013. Accessed July 19, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020131217e9ch000c1. “Futenma chronology: Outrage sparked relocation.” The Japan Times, November 22, 1999. Accessed July 8, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/1999/11/22/national/futenma-chronology-outrage- sparked-relocation/. “Futenma heri-butai wo Ie Jima ni Nichibei, bunsan iten an wo kentō.” The Chunichi Shimbun, April 3, 2005. Accessed March 5, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=CHUSHI0020050405e14300003. “Futenma hikōjō henkan no jōken wo Beigawa ga Nihon ni dashin ‘daitai shisetsu wa motomezu’.” Mainichi Shimbun, February 13, 2004. Accessed March 5, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=MAINHQ0020040213e02d000e5. “Futenma hikōjō isetsu Shuwabu engan’an, hantai ikensho kaketu / Okinawaken gikai.” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 16, 2005. Accessed July 30, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020051219e1cg0009j.

305 “Futenma isetsu “kengai” de kessoku / jiminshigi 14nin gikai ga 6kaime ikensho / 7gatsu no senkyo kōyaku kenji.” Ryukyu Shimpo, December 3, 2013. Accessed October 8, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=RYUKYU0020131203e9c30004p. “Futenma isetsu Nago-shi, gutaiteki kōshō he hikō ru-to shusei ga jōken.” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 25, 2006. Accessed July 19, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020060325e23p000fl. “Futenma isetsu, bishūsei kassōro hōkaku nado seifu/yotō ga kentō jimoto mo ittei rikai.” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 18, 2006. Accessed July 19, 2018, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOSHIN0020060318e23i000ge. “Futenma isetsu Shuwabu ni sagyōba / Bōeishō gyokō kara henkō kentō / Nago no shiyiōkyohi sōtei.” Ryukyu Shimpo, June 25, 2014. Accessed February 24, 2015, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=RYUKYU0020140526ea5o00009. “Futenma plan opponent wins Nago election / Result may put end to U.S. base deal.” Daily Yomiuri, January 25, 2010. Accessed March 5, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=YOMSHI0020100124e61p00002. “Futenma relocation issue becomes more complicated following Nago election result.” Mainichi Daily News, January 25, 2010. Accessed May 5, 2012, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=Aiwmdm0020100125e61p000jh. Gamel, Kim. “Yongsan Garrison is on its way to becoming a park for South Koreans. Here are the next steps.” Stars and Stripes, November 21, 2018. Accessed March 1, 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/yongsan-garrison-is-on-its-way-to-becoming-a-park- for-south-koreans-here-are-the-next-steps-1.557506. ———. “US begins process of returning Yongsan Garrison to South Korea, but closure not imminent.” Stars and Stripes, December 19, 2019. Accessed September 5, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/us-begins-process-of-returning-yongsan- garrison-to-south-korea-but-closure-not-imminent-1.610654. Gaouette, Nicole, Michelle Kosinski, and Barbara Starr. “North Korea ‘really angry’ at US as tensions rise.” CNN News, November 8, 2018. Accessed December 28, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/07/politics/north-korea-trump-pompeo- tensions/index.html. Gargano, Lance Cpl. John. “Local Osprey Fan Club tours Futenma facilities.” Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, 21 July, 2013. Accessed July 29, 2013, http://www.dvidshub.net/news/110570/local-osprey-fan-club-tours-futenma-facilities. “‘Genbaku tōka shikataganai’ Kyuma Bōeishō kyū Soren no sansen soshi.” The Chunichi Shimbun, June 30, 2007. Accessed March 5, 2016, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=CHUSHI0020070702e36u000ax. “GI rape case triggers fresh calls for review of US forces status.” Agence France Presse, September 20, 1995. Accessed October 30, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=afpr000020011028dr9k00lcq. “Ginowan assembly supports base transfer within Okinawa.” Japan Economic Newswire, August 21, 1999. Accessed http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=kyodo00020010828dv8l00ryz. “Girl’s rape fuels anti-U.S. sentiment in Okinawa.” Japan Economic Newswire, September 16, 1995. Accessed October 10, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=kyodo00020011025dr9g00uxn. “Gov. Ota’s challenger claims victory in Okinawa gubernatorial elections.” Associated Press Newswires, October 29, 1998. Accessed April 30, 2014, http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=APRS000020051029e1at002p5.

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331 ———. “Minshutō Okinawa Seisaku.” July 8, 1999. Accessed May 30, 2015, http://archive.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=10839. Donnally, Vincent R. “Iwakuni Runway Relocation Project.” Paper presented at the 2005 Tri- Service Infrastructure Systems Conference: Re-Energizing Engineering Excellence, August 2-5, 2005. Accessed October 2, 2014, https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2005/triservice/track5/donnally.pdf. The Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network. “V-22 Osprey.” Accessed July 20, https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/v-22.htm. Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Forced Leasing of Land for U.S. Bases in Okinawa Prefecture, Case No. 1996 (Gyo-Tsu) 90 (Japan Supreme Court G. B. 1996). Accessed July 20, 2018, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=268. The No Dal Molin Website. “History of the No Dal Molin Movement in Vicenza.” April 9, 2009. Accessed September 13, 2013, http://www.nodalmolin.it/History-of-the-No- Dal-Molin. ———. “No Dal Molin: The Antibase Movement in Vicenza.” April 23, 2013. Accessed September 13, 2013, http://www.nodalmolin.it/No-Dal-Molin-The-Antibase- Movement. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Enlargement.” Accessed September 22, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm. ———. “Study on NATO Enlargement.” September, 2005. Accessed September 22, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm. Okinawa Peace Network of Los Angeles. “List of Main Crimes Committed and Incidents Concerning the U.S. Military on Okinawa – Excerpts.” Accessed September 18, 2018, http://www.uchinanchu.org/history/list_of_crimes.htm. Ryūgin Sōgō Kenkyuushō. “Okinawa-ken no Shuyō Keizai Shihyou.” March 2002. Accessed December 29, 2018, http://www.ryugin-ri.co.jp/tyousareport/2562.html. ———. “Okinawa-ken no Shuyō Keizai Shihyou.” February 2005. Accessed December 29, 2018, http://www.ryugin-ri.co.jp/tyousareport/2646.html. ———. “Okinawa-ken no Shuyō Keizai Shihyou.” September 2005. Accessed December 29, 2018, http://www.ryugin-ri.co.jp/tyousareport/2668.html. The Ryukyu-Okinawa History and Culture Website. “Archive: Base Return Action Programme (Proposal), Okinawa Prefectural Government. January, 1996.” Accessed February 26, 2019, http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/base96.html. Sato, Chiaki, and Ken-ichi Inoue. “Results of 6 years research project of Mega-float.” Paper presented at the International Symposium on Ocean Space Utilization Technology, National Maritime Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan, January 28-31, 2003. The Social Democratic Party of Japan. SDP Manifesto 2009: Seikatsu Saiken 10 no Yakusoku. 2009. Accessed July 6, 2017, http://www5.sdp.or.jp/policy/policy/election/images/manifesutopdf2.pdf. Yoshikawa, Hideki. “Memo: Five Points of Concern Regarding the Okinawa Defense Bureau’s Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Futenma Replacement Facility.” Appendix to Letter of Request to the Marine Mammal Commission. 2013. Accessed http://img03.ti-da.net/usr/o/k/i/okinawabd/pointssofsconcernFinal.pdf.

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