China Perspectives

2007/2 | 2007 Hong Kong. Ten Years Later

Alive and well but frustrated: Hong Kong's civil society

Christine Loh

Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/1653 DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.1653 ISSN : 1996-4617

Éditeur Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine

Édition imprimée Date de publication : 15 avril 2007 ISSN : 2070-3449

Référence électronique Christine Loh, « Alive and well but frustrated: Hong Kong's civil society », China Perspectives [En ligne], 2007/2 | 2007, mis en ligne le 08 avril 2008, consulté le 28 octobre 2019. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/1653 ; DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.1653

© All rights reserved Special feature s e

v Alive and Well but Frustrated: i a t c n i

e Hong Kong’s Civil Society h p s c r

e CHRISTINE LOH p

ong Kong’s civil society is alive and well. As social come together to further collective values, perhaps through awareness rises and citizen wealth grows, a greater dedicating time and money to benevolent causes, civic and Hnumber of residents give time to civil society activi - humanitarian need, religious and spiritual beliefs, or through ties and more private resources are put into community-build - new ideas for secular progress. Hong Kong is no different. ing endeavours –the philanthropy sector is therefore growing. The most authoritative study of Hong Kong’s civil society Yet, there is much frustration among civil society actors. The was commissioned by the HKSAR Government’s Central problem lies with the city’s politics. The unique nature of the Policy Unit in 2002 and published in 2004. The Study of political system where elections do not return a government the Third Sector Landscape in Hong Kong (Study) looked produces a very special kind of disarticulation and disconnec - at the history and organisation of non-profit, voluntary and tion between power-holders and other political actors and self-governing NGOs in their aims, structures and opera - non-governmental groups (NGOs). Moreover, the Chinese tions. The Study covered NGOs in many fields, including Community Party’s “united front” activities to support pre - arts and culture, economy, environment, education, health, ferred candidates at elections, as well as certain official posi - human rights, law, philanthropy, politics, sports and recre - tions, have the effect of distorting “public opinion” especially ation, religion and welfare, and identified over 16,660 in matters relating to constitutional development, where Bei - NGOs in Hong Kong as of 2002 ((1) . jing plays a highly interventionist role. Yet, there seems to be In its review of history of the Third Sector, the Study noted something irrepressible about the people of Hong Kong as a that over 85% of NGOs were formed after 1946?many be - whole, who have been willing to come out in very great num - tween 1986 and 1997 ((2) . Indeed, there was a new phase of bers when they feel their way of life is threatened. The politi - NGO evolution in the 1980s, as Hong Kong prepared for cisation of Hong Kong people and their NGOs continue as the transfer of sovereignty from British to Chinese rule, and the realisation grows that good governance requires active cit - as elections had to be introduced to fulfil the promise in the izenship and institutions within a political system that allows Sino-British Joint Declaration that the legislature would be for societal conflicts to be settled by means that have genuine elected. District Boards with a measure of election were in - public support. There is a tussle with Beijing over process, troduced in 1982 as a laboratory for democratisation, and a which ultimately determines whether the HKSAR’s power- number of legislators were elected by functional constituency holders have the legitimacy to govern. (special interest groups, including corporate voting) in 1985 This article will first provide an overview of Hong Kong’s and 1988. The 1989 Tiananmen crackdown marked a turn - NGOs before looking at how they function to fulfil their ing point in popular attitude towards political participation missions, and how they fit into the city’s politics and Bei - and a belief that democracy would be the best guarantee for jing’s role, before coming to concluding observations. the city’s liberal way of life. New NGOs to push for democ - racy were formed in response to the tumultuous events of the Hong Kong’s Third Sector 1980s. In 1991, when Hong Kong held its first ever direct elections to the Legislative Council, pro-democracy groups It is accepted in academic circles for NGOs to be cate - and new political parties won all the 18 seats up for grabs al - gorised as part of a distinct organisational sector that has a though the majority of the seats were still appointed by the unique identity and characteristic features. This sector is colonial administration. often referred to as the “Third Sector” to set it apart from the government and commercial sectors. Its vitality comes from shared values among the actors rather than a drive for 1. Central Policy Unit, The Study of the Third Sector Landscape in Hong Kong , August 24th 2004, http://www.cpu.gov.hk/english/research_reports.htm . Chapter 15 noted a total of direct political power or commercial gains, as is the case for 16,662 organisations formed the population of the study, p. 419. the other two sectors respectively. In many societies people 2. Ibid. , Chapter 15, Survey, p. 423.

40 N o 2007/2 Hong Kong’s Civil Society s

With the encouragement of the mainland authorities, “pro- NGOs, civic and advocacy groups now in Hong Kong were e v i a

China” forces also began more overt activities to organise formed. Between 1987 and 1997, 83% of the political organ - t c n

and participate in elections to District Boards, the Munici - isations now in Hong Kong were formed. The earlier hesi - i e h pal Councils and Legislative Council, culminating in the tation among many NGOs to remain “non-political” began p s c birth of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of to ease as social actors determined which issue they pur - r Hong Kong (DAB) and the reinforcement of the Federa - sued –welfare, health or green –, and the city’s politics and e p tion of Trade Unions (FTU) to run for election. At the political institutions began to matter as civil society activists same time, Hong Kong’s business establishment became generally wanted change and reform of policies, priorities concerned that both the “pro-democracy” and “pro-China” and systems. forces articulated “grassroots” interests, and in response While the sector took on its importance between 1976 and formed the “pro-business” Liberal Party. Being pro-estab - 1985, in the period 1998 to 2002, 50% of philanthropic in - lishment in nature, the Liberal Party sided with the “pro- termediaries now found in Hong Kong were formed ((5) . China” forces on constitutional reform issues, and ran for election in the functional constituencies to promote the inter - Overview – Snapshot of ests of specific business sectors. Hong Kong’s NGOs At the same time that it had to face imminent political change, Hong Kong also emerged as a more cosmopolitan The population size of different types of NGOs varies society in the 1990s. More people concerned themselves tremendously. At one end of the scale are the more than ten with social issues, including welfare provision, quality educa - thousand district-based groups providing services in small lo - tion, pollution and a clean environment, animal rights and calities, while at the other end are a handful of NGOs work - welfare, equal opportunities, minority rights and freedom of ing in political areas. Over 70% of Hong Kong NGOs pri - the press. NGOs also began to work on the mainland, with marily serve their members, while the rest serve the public some serving needs across the border exclusively ((3) . More - at large. The Study found that around 52% of NGOs serve over, international NGOs also have a significant presence in neighbourhoods or districts within Hong Kong, while 44% Hong Kong for fundraising and regional outreach. Today, serve the whole of Hong Kong. many Hong Kong NGOs also hook into global discourse on As there is no legal form dedicated to NGOs in Hong Kong poverty alleviation, climate change, and HIV/AIDS. An equivalent to the économie sociale in France, most NGOs important trend since the late 1990s was the disappointment in Hong Kong are formed as societies, companies or trusts. with corporate behaviour –the Enron malaise –and workplace There is no government restriction on governance for most burnout, which resulted in younger professionals leaving cor - of the Third Sector in Hong Kong in terms of size or com - porate life to seek gratification in NGOs. Worldwide inter - position of its governing board. However, for those NGOs est in corporate social responsibility (CSR) has also resulted receiving substantial public funds for the provision of serv - in new NGOs doing local and regional promotion for corpo - ices, such as in welfare and health, provision is made for the rate governance, minority shareholder rights, workplace di - appointment of certain government representatives to over - versity and ethical-sustainable investment in Asia. see their management. The largest source of operating in - The Study acknowledged Hong Kong’s civil sector to be come for NGOs came from government funding (28%), and “highly dynamic, innovative and resourceful ((4) ”. Examining not surprisingly since so many NGOs provide basic services the date of establishment of the NGOs provides a good in - to the community. Other major sources of income were dication of the evolution of civil society in Hong Kong: membership fees (18%) and private donations and sponsor - Before 1841, NGOs were religious or welfare provision or - ship (15%). The Study made a conservative estimate that at ganisations. Between 1841-1911, numerous community bod - least 3.7 million people out of a population of about 6.8 mil - ies were formed, including some business associations and lion were members of NGOs, but numbers could in fact be trade unions. Between 1912 and 1975, 50% of religious bod - ies now found in Hong Kong were formed, and between 1946 and 1985, half the industry and business associations, 3. Ibid., Chapter 15, Survey, p. 427. The survey showed about 4.5% of NGOs in Hong Kong serve a province or an area within a province, 2.6% serve two or more provinces or educational and welfare bodies were formed. areas within provinces, and 8.2% serve the whole of China. Between 1986 and 1997, 62.5% of health organisations, al - 4. Ibid., Content and Overview, p. 15. most 50% of the environmental groups, international 5. Ibid., Chapter 15, pp. 424-425.

41 N o 2007/2 Special feature s

e Table 1. Areas served by Hong Kong’s NGOs (2002) v i a t c n i e h p s c r e p

very much greater ((6) . However, only 47% of NGOs have The Public Opinion Tussle tax exempt status ((7) . The Study found a total of between 150,000 and What do Hong Kong people think? The longstanding 372,000 people work in NGOs in Hong Kong, generat - stereotype has been a lack of interest in politics and an in - ing expenditures of HK$18.59 billion and HK$27.36 terest only in money. While the 1989 rallies in response to billion as of October 2002. That translated to 4.6% and the Tiananmen crackdown showed that the people of Hong 11.4% of total employment and 1.5% to 2.2% of GDP Kong had the capacity to react politically, it was not until in 2002. Thus, in terms of size, the NGO sector is com - 2003 that they came out in great numbers once more. parable to the manufacturing sector, construction indus - The most dramatic event of the past ten years was on July try or transport, storage and communications sector. 1st 2003 when more than 500,000 people took to the Contributions made by volunteer labour in the Third streets to protest against what was referred to as Article 23 Sector ranged from HK$52.9 to HK$83.3 million in of the national security legislation ((10) . The people who took 2002. Moreover, the Study estimated 550,000 to to the streets on the sixth anniversary of the handover were 710,000 Hong Kong residents participate in some sort mainly from middle class families (60%) and many were pro - of volunteer activity, which contributed greatly to Hong fessionals or semi-professionals. According to survey find - Kong’s overall quality of life and opportunities for per - sonal development. Even at the lower end of the esti - 6. Ibid., Chapter 15, p. 439. The estimated range was from 3.7 million to 8.3 million. mate, the number of volunteers equated to about 15.7% 7. Ibid., Chapter 15, pp. 425-426. NGOs have to apply separately to the Inland Revenue De - of the total workforce ((8) . The importance of the Third partment for tax exempt status after incorporation. Sector in Hong Kong can also be seen from the services 8. Ibid., Chapter 15, pp. 443-444. it provides to people. The Study estimated that each 9. Ibid., Chapter 15, p.442. 10. Article 23 of the Basic Law (Hong Kong’s post-1997 constitution) requires that Hong person living in the city received on average, 4.3 times Kong “shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, a year, some service from NGOs in areas where the subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit government and commercial sectors made no provi - foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with sion ((9) . foreign political organizations or bodies”.

42 N o 2007/2 Hong Kong’s Civil Society s ings, less than one in twenty of the marchers went to the NGOs realise they had underestimated public support for e v i a rally with NGOs that they belonged to, while only 34% re - reform. The protesters explicitly demanded rapid democrati - t c n

garded the mobilising power of social organisations as influ - sation?a sign that the public’s trust in the existing political i e h ential. Researchers concluded that the July 1st demonstra - order was weak. People had made an explicit link between p s ((11) c tion was mobilised by the people and not by associations . the lack of democracy and poor governance. Polls at the r These bands of citizens were considered to be not those time showed an overwhelming majority of respondents sup - e p who would normally participate in street protests. Their par - ported the direct election of the Chief Executive and the ticipation also served to wake the authorities and NGOs up Legislative Council (81% and 77% respectively) in princi - to the fact that the citizens they served had the capacity to ple, and large majorities (70% and 69% respectively) be highly motivated and politicised. wanted direct elections by 2007 and 2008 ((15) . There was The people felt strong enough to mobilise themselves to also a burst of activism aimed at asserting beliefs that peo - protest because they felt that their way of life was under ple felt the government did not share with them. The after - threat by Article 23. This was despite the government’s math of the protest saw the coming together of opinion-lead - claim that it had consulted the public and the legislation had ers and -shapers to call for the upholding of Hong Kong’s public support. The government packaged responses for its liberal “core values ((16) ”. convenience rather than to analyse the respondents’ views, At the same time, Tung Chee Hwa had to assuage public attitudes and suggestions. The responses showed the united anger. He said he would pay more attention to public opin - front machinery was hard at work. Scholars who subse - ion, specifically of the “middle class”. He said he would in - quently ploughed through the responses noted: crease funding for district and community activities and his administration would engage the public more in developing … we also found that amongst the about 1,000 submis - its policies ((17) . sions from organizations, a number of letters came The political fallout from Article 23 continued with the Dis - from organizations which differ greatly in nature and trict Council elections in November 2003, where DAB can - geographical location, yet shared very similar content didates did badly compared with the pro-democracy candi - or format, having no big difference from standard let - dates, even though united front efforts worked hard to help ters. Why did the government not doubt the independ - preferred candidates ((18) . Beijing became alarmed at the ence of these submissions from organizations then ((12) ? growing demands for democracy. In April 2004, the Standing

The draft bill was set to be passed in the Legislative Council 11. Robert Chung and Joseph Man Chan, A Revelation of 1 July: Internet Mobilization Gives on July 9th since the HKSAR Government had sufficient New Life to Democracy, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/columns/columns24.html . votes from the DAB, Liberal Party and their allies to get it 12. Jennifer So-Kuen Chan, Let Figures Speak For Themselves – Reanalysis on the Public through. Various pro-democracy, human rights and law NGOs Opinion Towards Article 23 Consultation Document, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/ came together to organise a march, the turnout for which sur - columns/columns19.html 13. The problems of Tung Chee Hwa and his administration have been well-documented by prised everyone. The rally caused the Liberal Party to break many scholars. See Lau Siu-kai (edited), The First Tung Chee-hwa Administration: The ranks from the government thus leading to Tung Chee Hwa First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region , Chinese University Press, Hong Kong (2002); and Joseph YS Cheng (edited), The July 1 Protest Rally: Inter - having to withdraw the bill as the government no longer had preting a Historic Event, City University of Hong Kong Press, Hong Kong, (2005). enough votes in the legislature to ensure its passage. 14. Ma Ngok, Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society , The rally was a resounding public rejection of Tung Chee Hong Kong University Press, 2007, 0.181. 15. Michael DeGolyer, Listening to the Wisdom of the Masses , Hong Kong: Hong Kong Tran - Hwa. It signalled a lack of confidence in his governance, a sition Project, HK Baptist University, January 2004. lack of trust in his administration, and a deep dissatisfaction 16. See www.hkcorevalues.net . with his performance. He had made a string of unpopular 17. Doing Justice to Public Opinion and Public Consultations: What to Do and What Not to and controversial decisions since taking office ((13) . Indeed, Do: A Case Study of the Government Consultation Exercise on its Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law , Public Opinion Programme, University of Hong Kong, many of the protesters saw the Tung administration as a http://hkupop.hku.hk/english.resources/bl23/bl23gp/report/index.html . threat to Hong Kong’s established way of life. Indeed, there 18. The united front machinery, co-ordinated in Hong Kong by Beijing’s Liaison Office in the HKSAR, has a long history of assisting pro-China and post-1997 pro-government forces in had been an average of six protests a day every year since winning elections. This included Tung Chee Hwa’s selection in 1996 and 2002, the Legisla - 1997 against government policies or policy demands ((14) . tive Council elections in 1998, 2000 and 2004, and Donald Tsang’s selection in 2005 and The legacy of the July 1st 2003 protest was to inject re - 2007. For an analysis of how the machinery works, see Lo Shiu-hing, ““Legitimising” the Se - lection of the Second HKSAR Chief Executive: From the Election Committee to the Chief Ex - newed energy into the democracy movement. It made ecutive Election Bill”, China Perspectives , Number 38, November-December 2001, pp.44-59.

43 N o 2007/2 In 2007, democrats have put forward various blueprints for universal suffrage

Committee of the National People’s Congress handed down a proach to that for Article 23. The way responses were cate - “decision” that Hong Kong would not be able to elect its chief gorised was not designed to seek meaningful understanding but executive in 2007 and legislature in 2008 by universal suffrage. merely to conclude that there was no consensus on how to pro - Hong Kong people were considered to not be ready and reform ceed and to exclude responses that fell outside the parameters had to be more gradual. Hong Kong people had not expected set by the Standing Committee ((20) . In October 2005, Tsang put such aggressive action from Beijing ((19) . forward a set of reform proposals that allowed a small measure Once the door was shut for 2007 and 2008, “consultations” of reform without altering the political structure that did not win were rolled out. In January 2005, Tung Chee Hwa announced the required two-thirds majority support in the Legislative Coun - the formation of the Constitutional Development Task Force to hold the line and remind people of Beijing’s ultimate power in determining the pace and direction of reform in Hong 19. The Interpretation by the SCNPC of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex III to the Kong. With Tung’s resignation in March 2005 and Donald Basic Law , adopted at the tenth NPC at its 8th Session, April 6th 2004, www.cab.gov.hk/cd/eng/basic/pdf/es22004080554.pdf . Tsang succeeding him, the first two years of the Tsang admin - 20. Constitutional Development Task Force’s Fourth Report noted that the government had re - istration was spent giving people a chance to make reform sug - ceived a total of 488 valid written submissions from individuals and organisations, relating gestions within the set restrictions. However, the government to the methods for selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and for forming the Legislative Council in 2008. Among them, 118 submissions were put forward by organisations. Its Fifth analysis of consultation responses had a not dissimilar ap - Report noted that 460 written submissions were received with 191 from organisations.

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