The Early Pythagorean Conception of Soul

It is commonly recognized that the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration must have exerted a significant influence on the development of the early Greek conception of the soul (see, e.g., Andre Laks [1999] “Soul, Sensation and Thought,” in The Cambridge

Companion to Early Greek Philosophy). Nevertheless, scholars have had great difficulty in determining with what conception of the soul Pythagoras and the early Pythagoreans were working, because of the scarcity of reliable sources for early Pythagoreanism; typically, more questions are raised than answers given, by those who have considered the issue (see, e.g., Walter Burkert [1972] Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, p. 133 ff.). Even in the case of Empedocles, who appears to have adopted the

Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration and where extensive fragments of his writings have been preserved, little is said about the nature of the soul (cuxÆ). The term for what transmigrates appears to be da€µvn rather than cuxÆ. In my paper, I argue that a consistent picture of the early Pythagorean conception of the soul (cuxÆ) can, in fact, be derived from four important sources: 1) the early testimonia for Pythagoras (e.g. those derived from Xenophanes, Herodotus and Ion), 2) the oral maxims known as acusmata, which may go back to Pythagoras and formed the basis for the Pythagorean way of life,

3) the fragments of Philolaus and 4) the Pythagorean Precepts of Aristoxenus, which describe a Pythagorean ethical system dating to the late fifth century. These four sources indicate that the soul was conceived of primarily as the seat of sensation and emotional life and was distinct from the intellect. Such a soul fits well with the doctrine of transmigration, since it is plausible that humans share such a soul with animals, so that this sort of soul could transmigrate between animals and human beings. Similarly, the identification of the human self with this seat of emotion and sensation is the foundation of the Pythagorean claim of a kinship between animals and men, which leads to the conclusion that human beings should not kill or eat any ensouled being. What passes from body to body is thus not the human intellect but a personality characterized by emotion and behavior, which is fashioned by human intellect, when born in a human body.