Implications of Marriage Institutions for Redistribution and Growth¤ Lena Edlundyand Nils-Petter Lagerl¨ofz First version September 2002 November 27, 2004 Abstract This paper argues that love – as opposed to arranged – marriage promotes growth. Men pay for marriage, but who receives and pays the bride-price differs between the two marriage institutions. Typi- cally, under love marriage the groom pays his bride, while under ar- ranged marriage the groom (or his father) pays the bride’s father. Clearly, love marriage directs resources from the father of the bride to the bride. Moreover, we argue that love marriage may redistribute resources from father to son. If young (v. old) and women (v. men) are more prone to save or invest in the human capital of children, then love marriage promotes physical or human capital accumulation. If so, the adoption and adherence to love marriage in Europe, starting in the 8th century at the instigation of the Catholic Church, may have been a factor in Europe’s economic ascent. ¤We thank Philippe Aghion, Tore Ellingsen, Jonathan Heathcote, Alessandro Lizzeri, Debraj Ray, Paul Schultz; seminar participants at Columbia, New York and Yale Univer- sity, Boston College, and University College London; and conference participants at the Population and Economic Growth Conference, Brown University, April 13 and 14, 2002. yColumbia University,
[email protected] zConcordia University,
[email protected] 1 Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law.