Research Articles Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars • David Katz

Hydro-Political Hyperbole David Katz Research Articles Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars • David Katz

Introduction Reference to linkages between natural resource scarcity and the potential for violent conºict is now commonplace. Perhaps the most highlighted and most studied such linkage is that between freshwater scarcity and conºict. Predictions of looming water wars—such as former Egyptian Foreign Minister and later United Nations Secretary-General Boutrous Boutrous Ghali’s statement that “The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics,” or former World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin’s declaration that “the wars of the next century will be over water”1—have been cited extensively by a variety of sources over the past three decades. More recently, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed reports that water scarcity has created “a high risk of violent conºict.”2 Those who make claims regarding the possibility of future water wars range from people who present such a scenario as a possibility that can be avoided with cooperation and proper planning,3 to those who predict that such wars are likely,4 to those who conªdently assert that such outcomes are “certain”5 and only a matter of time.6 While the claim that increasing water scarcity will lead to increased out- breaks of wars—often dubbed the “water war hypothesis”—is widespread in public discourse, a growing body of literature has challenged both the empirical

1. Cited by Barbara Crossette, “Severe Water Crisis Ahead for Poorest Nations in Next 2 Decades,” New York Times, 10 August 1995. 2. Cited by Mark Clayton, “Is Water Becoming ‘The New Oil’?” The Christian Science Monitor, 29 May 2008. 3. Frey and Naff 1985; and Postel and Wolf 2001. 4. Cooley 1984; Naff and Matson 1984; Starr 1991; Bulloch and Darwish 1993; De Villiers 1999; and Ward 2002. 5. Myers 1993, 47. 6. Waslekar 2005.

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and theoretical foundations of such a hypothesis.7 Critics note, for instance, that proponents of the water war hypothesis often rely on a very limited number of case studies or statements from a handful of prominent ªgures,8 that relatively little systematic empirical evidence exists of past wars over water, and that there is scant evidence that violent conºict over water is becoming more frequent.9 Despite weak supporting evidence and numerous theoretical challenges to the water wars hypothesis, proclamations that water wars are imminent remain prevalent. Much of the academic literature on the topic has attempted to pro- mulgate, refute, or test the water war hypothesis. Little has attempted to explain why the predictions of water wars remain so popular despite questionable empirical support. This study addresses this gap. It outlines various incentives different types of key actors have to emphasize, and even exaggerate, the likelihood of water wars. Moreover, it demonstrates that relationships between several of these actors serve to mutually reinforce these incentives. This conºuence of incentives to stress such risks is likely to have contributed to the persistence of such warnings in public discourse at levels and proªles far beyond what appears justiªed by empirical evidence. While this article speciªcally addresses violent conºict over water, its premises and conclusions are likely relevant to much of the discourse in the ªeld of environmental security. The article proceeds as follows: The next section speciªes what is meant by water wars and violent conºict over water for the purposes of this discussion. It then lays out the main arguments for and against the water war hypothesis, and provides a review of some empirical studies. The subsequent section outlines incentives to stress the risks of war over water for ªve different actor types— political ofªcials, academics, the media, NGOs, and the private sector—and ex- plores interactions among each groups’ incentives. The ªnal section offers con- cluding thoughts and suggestions for further research.

The Water War Hypothesis: Examining the Evidence

Deªning Water-based Conºict and the Water Wars Hypothesis Perhaps because of its alliterative character, the expression “water wars” is often used to describe any level of conºict between parties involving water.10 Singer notes that most studies of war fail to distinguish between war, which is uncom- mon, and conºict, which is more common.11 Wolf and colleagues cite the lack of a clear use of the term “conºict” as a contributing cause for confusion and disagreement regarding the water wars hypothesis.12 This article focuses on the

7. Lonergan 2001; Dolatyar 2002; and Wolf 2007. 8. Dinar 2002. 9. Yoffe et al. 2003. 10. For example Annin 2006. 11. Singer 1981. 12. Wolf et al. 2003.

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potential for use of armed force or armed conºict13 between politically orga- nized groups over control over or access to freshwater resources, as this is a deªnition commonly used by both proponents and detractors of the water war hypothesis. The typical version of the water war hypothesis posits that countries will be willing to wage war in order to secure or preserve access to scarce water resources. A stronger version claims that countries experiencing acute water scarcity will be compelled by a “hydrological imperative” to obtain additional water supplies from neighboring countries, resorting to violent means if necessary.14 Other versions stress that water scarcity alone is unlikely to serve as a casus belli between nations, but rather, may aggravate existing international or domestic conºicts—for instance, by increasing competition over scarce arable land or causing displacement of rural populations and the creation of environmental refugees.15 Kahl identiªes four hypotheses to explain how resource scarcity could lead to violent conºict: simple scarcity, transboundary migration, depri- vation, and state failure.16 Homer-Dixon noted that resource scarcities could result from a decrease in supplies (e.g. drought), an increase in demand (e.g. increased consumption), or unequal distribution of a resource among a population.17

Support for the Water War Hypothesis Support for the water war hypothesis rests on declarations of public ofªcials, theoretical models, and empirical evidence. In addition to the quotes already mentioned, other commonly cited ªgures warning of the risks of water wars include former heads of state such as former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the late King Hussein of Jordan, and former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.18 Much of the empirical evidence presented in support of the water war hypothesis consists of anecdotal evidence and case studies. Among the most popular are Israel’s bombing of Syrian attempts to divert the headwaters of the Jor- dan River, the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s attempt to blow up Israel’s National Water Carrier,19 and India’s decision to occupy the headwaters of the

13. For a detailed deªnition of the terms “armed force” and “armed conºict” as they are commonly used in the environmental security literature see Uppsala Universitat: http://www.pcr.uu.se/ research/ucdp/deªnitions/ Accessed on 12 October 2010. 14. Stauffer 1982; Stork 1983; Cooley 1984; and Lebanese government ofªcial Fadi Comair, cited in “Analysis: Shebaa farms key to Lebanese hydro-diplomacy,” IRIN humanitarian news and analysis, 10 September 2009. Available online at http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx ?ReportIdϭ86092, accessed 20 December 2009. 15. Gleick 1991; and Homer-Dixon 1994. 16. Kahl 2006. 17. Homer-Dixon 1994. 18. Sharon and Chanoff 1989; Starr 1991; and Amery 2002. 19. Naff and Matson 1984; Starr 1991; Gleick 1993; Lowi 1993; and Ward 2002.

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Indus in Kashmir.20 Some observers have also attributed more recent conºicts to water scarcity, such as those in Sri Lanka and the Darfur region of Sudan.21 Many early studies on water wars were guilty of what Singer noted as a ten- dency of many popular models to reduce war to single deterministic cause.22 Theories based on water scarcity as a single deterministic driver of conºict ig- nore other important variables such as historical relationships between parties, riparian position, military balance (or asymmetry) of power, governance, and decision-making structures. These factors have been identiªed as critical in both the literature on the determinants of war in general,23 and transboundary water conºict in particular.24 More recent empirical studies have attempted to address shortcomings of early studies by conducting large-sample statistical analysis that includes additional explanatory variables. Several have found per-capita water availability to be statistically correlated with the outbreak of either civil or international wars.25 Others have found that, holding other variables constant, neighboring countries that share a river are more likely to engage in violent conºict than those that do not.26 Still others have found correlations between changes in rainfall or high levels of variability in rainfall and the likelihood of violent conºict.27

Critiques of the Water War Hypothesis A number critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empirical evidence behind the water wars hypothesis. One critique of the environmental security literature, of which much of the published material on water wars is guilty, is that warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evidence.28 Statements from the 1980s that the next war in the Middle East will be over water have already proven false. Research has shown, however, that even the more general predictions of imminent water wars that are based on comments by ofªcials may be suspect. Leng, for instance, found no correlation between the frequency of threats of war and the onset of war.29 Examining conºict and cooperation over water resources, Yoffe and colleagues noted over 400 inci- dents of water-related verbal exchanges by political ªgures between 1948 and 1999 that were conºictual in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conºict of varying levels of intensity. Thirty of these were from the Middle East, none were

20. Mirza 2008. 21. Bajpaee 2006; Reddy 2006; and Ban Ki-moon, “A Climate Culprit in Darfur.” Washington Post, 16 June 2007. 22. Singer 1981, 2000. 23. Singer 1981; and Vasquez 2000. 24. Dinar 2009. 25. Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Gleditsch et al. 2006; and Hensel et al. 2006. 26. Toset et al. 2000; and Furlong et al. 2006. 27. Miguel et al. 2004; Levy et al. 2005; and Hendrix and Glaser 2007. 28. Gleditsch 1998, 381. 29. Leng 1980.

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more recent than 1970, none were all-out wars, and in none was water the cen- tral cause of conºict.30 Proponents of water war scenarios often premise their dire conclusions on the fact that water is essential for life and non-substitutable.31 Yet water for basic needs represents a small share of total water use, even in arid countries.32 Econo- mists and others point out that over 80 percent of world freshwater withdrawals are for the agricultural sector, a relatively low-value use and one in which large gains in efªciency could be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choice of crops. Thus, economic critiques of the water war hypothesis stress that the value of water that would be gained from military conºict is unlikely to out- weigh the economic costs of military preparation and battle, much less the loss of life.33 Some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusion that freshwater is increasingly scarce,34 an assumption on which the water war hypothesis relies. Such a “cornucopian” view claims that people adapt to scarcity through improvements in technology, pricing, and efªciency—rendering water less scarce, not more so. Perhaps the strongest case against the likelihood of water wars is the lack of empirical evidence of precedents. Wolf found only one documented case of war explicitly over water, and this took place over 4500 years ago.35 Moreover, he could document only seven cases of acute conºict over water. Yoffe and colleagues also ªnd that armed conºict over water resources has been uncom- mon.36 They found that cooperation was much more common than conºict, both globally and in all world regions except the Middle East/North Africa. This pattern may explain why only a limited number of case studies of water conºict are presented in the water wars literature. Analysts have criticized environmental security arguments that are based on case studies because such works tend to have no variation in the dependent variable.37 Many large sample statistical studies have attempted to address such shortcomings, however, in several cases these studies too have come under ªre. For instance, a number of large-sample statistical studies ªnd correlations between water-related variables and conºict, however, few, if any, provide convinc- ing support for causal relationships. Moreover, several studies found that water availability had no impact on the likelihood of either domestic or international conºict,38 including at least one study that attempted to replicate earlier studies

30. Yoffe et al. 2003. 31. For example Elhance 1999. 32. Gleick 1996. 33. Deudney 1999; Allan 2002; and Fisher and Huber-Lee 2005. 34. For example Lomborg 2001. 35. Wolf 1999. 36. Yoffe et al. 2003. 37. Levy 1995; and Gleditsch 1998. 38. Esty et al. 1999; Levy et al. 2005; and Stalley 2003.

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that claimed to have found such correlations.39 Moreover, the results of several studies that do ªnd correlations between water and conºict are either not robust or are contrasted by other ªndings. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal ªnd that the statistical signiªcance of water scarcity variables is highly dependent on one or two observations, leading them to conclude that actual effects of water scarcity “are weak, negligible or insigniªcant.”40 Jensen and Gleditsch ªnd that the results of Miguel and colleagues are less robust when using a recoding of the origi- nal dataset.41 Gleditsch and colleagues found that shared basins do predict an increased propensity for conºict, but found no correlation between conºict and drought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream, leading them to state that “support for a scarcity theory of water conºict is some- what ambiguous.”42

Evidence and Perception In sum, despite some instances of violent conºict over water, there is little systematic evidence of war over water resources. Evidence for a deterministic relationship between water scarcity and the outbreak of armed conºict is particu- larly weak. Less ambitious claims that water shortages will contribute to insecurity, which can, in turn, lead to violent conºict, have more empirical support. Even here, however, the importance of water as a causal variable is questionable. Several studies have found that variables such as regime type and institutional capacity are much more important indicators of conºict potential,43 and may have mitigating effects on any water-conºict link. As a consequence of accumulated research, many scholars have concluded that risks of water wars are low,44 and others have toned down or qualiªed their statements about the likelihood of future water wars.45 Some governmental reports have limited their contentions to highlighting that water scarcity can aggravate conºicts and increase insecurity,46 and many studies now emphasize water as a tool for cooperation.47 Warnings and predictions of imminent water

39. Theisen 2008. 40. Raleigh and Urdal 2007, 674. 41. Jensen and Gleditsch 2009. 42. Gleditsch et al. 2006, 361. 43. Wolf et al. 2003; and Raleigh and Urdal 2009. 44. Beaumont 1994; and Dolatyar 2002. 45. Compare, for example, Homer-Dixon’s declaration that “the renewable resource most likely to stimulate interstate resource war is river water” (Homer-Dixon 1994, 19), with his later statement that “wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbors are likely only in a narrow set of circumstances...[and] there are, in fact, very few river basins around the world where all these conditions hold.” (Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Myth of Global Water Wars,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 9 November 1995; and Homer-Dixon 1999, 208). 46. UNDP 2006; and UN 2009. 47. Wolf 1998; Haddadin 2002; Asmal 2001; Sadoff and Grey 2002; Yoffe et al. 2003; Conca et al. 2005; Brochman and Hensel 2009; UN 2006a; and Wolf 2007.

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wars continue to be commonplace, however. In a review of published academic literature, Gupta and van der Zaag ªnd that articles on water conºict outnumber those on cooperation by nearly three to one, and are ªve times more likely to be cited.48 This article will now turn to offering possible explanations for the persistence and popularity of such declarations despite the bulk of expert opinion downplaying the risks of water wars.

Incentives to Stress a Water War Scenario

Incentives Presented in Existing Literature Observers have noted that various actors may have incentives to stress or even exaggerate the risks of water wars. Lonergan notes, for instance, that in “many cases, the comments are little more than media hype; in others, statements have been made for political reasons.”49 Beyond mere acknowledgement of the possibility of such incentives, however, little research has attempted to understand what these incentives are and how they may differ between actors. An understanding of the different motivations of various groups of actors to stress the possibility of imminent water wars can help explain the continued seemingly disproportionate popularity of such messages and help to evaluate such warnings more critically. Mueller offers a general explanation for a focus on violence in public discourse by postulating that, following the end of the Cold War, policy-makers, the press, and various analysts seek to ªll a “catastrophe quota.”50 According to this theory, various actors seek out new areas of potential violence to justify fears that had become commonplace during the Cold War period. Simon, while not speciªcally addressing environmental conºict, suggests four possible reasons for academic researchers to offer what he claimed were overly gloomy scenarios resulting from resource scarcity.51 The ªrst reason is that international funding organizations are eager to fund research dealing with crises, but not work that produces good news. The second is that bad news sells more newspapers and books. The third is a psychological predisposition to focus on bad news or worst-case scenarios. The fourth is a belief that sounding alarm bells can mobilize action to improve environmental issues. Haas offers two reasons why “exaggerated beliefs about resource scarcity and their possible threats to environmental security persist.” The ªrst is “the absence of any consensual mechanism for reconciling inter-discourse (or inter- paradigm) disputes.” This, Haas argues, allows for ideological disputes to con-

48. Gupta and van der Zaag 2009. 49. Lonergan 2001. 50. Mueller 1994. 51. Simon 1980, 1431.

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tinue unresolved. “The second reason is the elective afªnity between environmental and security discourses on the one hand, and other dominant discourses in social discussions ...ontheother hand. Consequently self-interested political actors can borrow from discourses that are similar in their ontology and structure and that justify pre-existing political ambitions.”52 Trottier, addressing the risks of water wars speciªcally, suggests that certain private-sector actors in the water industry may stress the risks of water wars in order to promote water- related infrastructure.53 Mueller’s catastrophe quota does not distinguish among different types of actors, nor does it explain why speciªcally water-related or environmental crises would be the natural successor to Cold War worries. Straightforward explanations such as Simon’s claim that “blood sells” and Trottier’s economic argument may have some merit, but ultimately are unsatisfying; they are not relevant for several actors and they oversimplify a multifaceted picture by ignoring other possible motives. Such explanations also may give a mistaken impression that those offering such statements intentionally distort or mislead the public. Haas’s explanations, too, fail to distinguish between differing incentives for different actors. In sum, even taken collectively, these explanations provide only a partial picture of existing incentives. The following sections outline a range of incentives facing multiple stakeholders.

Multiple Incentives for Multiple Actors This study analyzes incentives of ªve different types of actors, each of whom has played a role in the promotion of the water war hypothesis. These include political leaders and policy-makers, academic scholars, the media, NGOs, and the private sector. Possible incentives to stress water war scenarios are offered for each type of actor. These are summarized in Table 1 below. Several incentives that are shared by more than one actor type are discussed ªrst, followed by a discussion of those incentives unique to a single type. While it is not possible in many cases to verify that these incentives have indeed played a role in the decision of a particular actor, several examples are given in which such a scenario seems credible.

Shared Incentives

Call Attention to Genuinely Felt Risk: Given past instances of conºict as well as declarations by policy-makers, many who stress the potential for war over water no doubt do so out of a belief that such risks are genuine. Such genuine warnings appear to be the case, for instance, for statements in the 1950s and 1960s

52. Haas 2002, 2. 53. Trottier 2003.

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Table 1 Incentives to Stress or Exaggerate Risk of Violent Conºict

Actor

Politicians & Private Incentive Policymakers Academics Media NGOs sector

Call attention to a genuinely X X X X X felt risk Raise the proªle of develop- XXXXX ment or environmental needs Raise the proªle of the author XX or organization Expand pools of available XXX funding Cite signiªcant statements by XX primary deªners Signal co-riparians that water is X high-level politics Signal domestic population that X water is a priority issue Signal to third party a desire for X intervention Serve as negotiating tactic X Provide a gripping headline X Shorten analysis into sound- X bite or article-length piece Give equal weight to opposing X views Focus on aspect of most interest X to target audience Serve as a null hypothesis in X research

by Israeli leaders that they would take military action against Arab forces should they interfere with Israeli water development projects, a threat upon which they later acted. Each actor, however, may have several other less straightforward incentives to stress the water war hypothesis.

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Raise the Proªle of Water-related Development or Environmental Needs: Several observers have noted that the process of securitization of issues is a strategic prac- tice done in a conscious way to achieve speciªc goals, which need not be security-related.54 Grifªths noted that “the rhetoric of security is used to attract attention to new concerns.”55 A desire to bring attention to aspects of water management that may otherwise be deemed as less deserving of attention or funding is an incentive common to all actors examined in this study. Raising the specter of war can draw attention to issues such as inequitable allocation, sanitation, pollution, or other environmental or development concerns that may not otherwise be on many people’s political agendas. By tying their primary cause to conºict over water, actors increase their visibility and offer those who sympathize with their mission an additional reason to offer support or take action. Of the actors discussed herein, NGOs, which often have public education and awareness-raising as goals, face perhaps the strongest incentive to emphasize the risks of water wars in order to raise the proªle of water-related development or environmental goals they are championing. On the ªrst page of a report on improving access to water in poor communities, for instance, the NGO CARE, an organization dedicated to “ªghting global poverty,”56 states in bold letters that “conºicts over water are predicted to contribute to most wars in the future.”57 The British-based NGO World Development Movement provocatively named its water campaign “Stop Water Wars,” though the primary goals of the campaign are advocacy in support of provision of basic water and sanitation ser- vices to the poor and opposition to privatization of the water industry.58 Other actors also may highlight the risks of water wars in order to bring attention to other environmental goals. Several books and articles have the phrase “water war” in the title, although actual discussion of violent conºict over water represents a relatively minor focus of the texts, with the bulk being dedicated to various water management issues.59 The intent of such works appears to be an effort to raise attention to some aspect of water management. Risk of violent conºict is used as a motivational device to highlight the potential dangers of failing to take action. Policy-makers, too, may attempt to “securitize” water in order to bring attention to water management issues. For instance, former US Senator Paul Si- mon warns of water wars in a book on water policy.60 British diplomat John

54. Balzacq 2005. 55. Grifªths 1997, 19. 56. CARE, “About CARE,” available at http://www.care.org/about/index.asp, accessed 10 January 2010. 57. CARE 2006. 58. The web site http://www.wdm.org.uk/stopwaterwars/ was closed following the completion of the campaign in 2008. 59. For example de Villiers 1999; Ward 2002; and Brahma Chellaney, “Averting Water Wars in Asia,” New York Times, 26 June 2007. 60. Simon 1998.

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Ashton, the United Kingdom’s “Climate Ambassador,” reportedly said that global warming should be recast as a security issue to help mobilize support for cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions.61 While the previous comment addressed climate change in general rather than water shortages speciªcally, such a rationale seems reasonable in explaining declarations concerning water wars made by other ofªcials in government and at bodies such as UNDP and UNESCO, which are formally charged with development and educational issues, not conºict resolution, and which make such declarations in reports that primarily focus on other aspects of water or environmental management.62

Raise the Proªle of the Author or Organization: Similar to the desire to draw attention to a cause, framing water issues in a security context can be a means of raising the proªle of an organization or author. Again, this incentive is probably most dramatic for NGOs. Many observers have noted that NGOs and other “non-elites” can face serious challenges in attracting attention. Some have re- sorted to “exceptionally strange or violent acts as a substitute for their lack of status or resources” in order to attract the media’s eye.63 However, as some have noted, while “the beneªt of outlandish behavior is media attention, the price is that you get stuck in this role or caricaturization.”64 In order for their organization and message to be taken more seriously, many environmental organizations have moved away from such tactics.65 Increasing the severity of their message is one tactic to attract attention while toning down behavior. In the case of academics, connecting water to security also offers researchers a way to raise the proªle of their work, given the salience of security issues in high-level policy circles and with the general public. Doing so increases the potential to gain access to policy-makers and the media. There is some evidence that water research stressing conºict potential may be more likely to be published.66 Furthermore, combining environmental and security issues expands the number and types of journals in which academics can publish. Moreover, by gaining exposure to audiences outside their particular ªeld of expertise, researchers also expand possibilities for further research collaboration.

Expand Pools of Available Funding: Several actors face ªnancial incentives to reference the possibilities for water wars. Conºict can affect terms and levels of investment. There is some evidence to support Trottier’s claim that certain private industry actors may stress the risks of war in order to encourage policy-makers to invest in water infrastructure.67 A representative of a desalination facility un-

61. Alister Doyle, “Climate Change Called Security Issue Like Cold War,” Reuters News Service, 22 August 2007. 62. For example UN 2006b; and UNDP 2006. 63. Anderson 2003, 37. 64. Anderson 2003. 65. Cottle 2003, 37. 66. Gupta and van der Zaag 2009. 67. Trottier 2003.

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der construction in Israel commented, for instance, that “unfortunately water is one of the reasons that create war. If you compare the cost of one F-16, it is more or less the cost of this desalination plant. I believe at the end of the day it will be much cheaper to solve conºict based on this type of plant than through buying new F-16s.”68 The website of a developer of large bags that can be ªlled with water and towed quotes World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin’s statement that the next century’s wars will be over water and then claims that “Waterbag technology will have a direct impact on the Peace Process in the Mid- dle East.”69 Other types of actors also face ªnancial incentives to stress risks of water wars. Many NGOs are engaged in a constant search for funding, as are many academics. Both NGOs and academics with a focus on environmental, development, or security stand to beneªt by expanding their focus to include some aspect of environmental security, as adding additional ªelds increases the pools of funding available. This is especially true for those adding the security element to their core focus, given the large pools of funding frequently available for security issues. In addition, many NGOs use press coverage as evidence of their effec- tiveness in awareness-raising vis-à-vis current and future sources of funding. As already mentioned, stressing war can increase the likelihood of media exposure.

Cite Signiªcant Statements by ‘Primary Deªners’: The media and academic researchers may cite statements of policy-makers, regardless of their own personal beliefs as to the veracity of the claims, simply because they view statements by public ofªcials as legitimate subjects of study. Elites, including political elites, are considered inherently worthy of media coverage.70 Davis states that journalists are drawn to government and institutional sources in positions of power.71 Also, the media rely on these policy-makers to provide expert knowledge. Thus, Davis concludes that the media grant ofªcials “primary deªner” status.72 The prospect of imminent water wars was ªrst presented by authorities with such “primary deªner” status. Once the notion was established, it has re- mained a popular theme in the press, despite subsequent empirical studies. Fur- thermore, if political leaders continue to make reference to the possibilities of water wars, the media can be expected to continue to report such comments, regardless of the state of research supporting or refuting such claims. Academic researchers, too, may choose to focus on statements of leading ªgures. Furthermore, because of the multitude of possible methodological ap- proaches, the topic of water-based conºict invites numerous research studies.

68. “Water Factory’ Aims to Filter Tensions,” BBC News, 7 September, 2004. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3631964.stm, accessed 8 October 2007. 69. See the website of the company Waterbag, http://www.waterbag.com/,accessed 14 June 2008. 70. Cottle 2003; and Becker 1967. 71. Davis 2003. 72. Herman and Chomsky (1988) go even further, asserting that relations of economic dependency ensure that political leaders are given preferential access to and coverage by the media.

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Even if such studies do not promote the water war hypothesis, they keep the issue alive in public affairs and academic circles.

Incentives to Political Leaders and Policy-makers Political leaders and policy-makers have several other, unique, reasons to voice water war risks. Indeed, given that research has shown that public threats are more often met with deªance rather than compliance,73 other reasons may in fact be primary ones.

Signal Co-riparians that Water is Considered High-level Politics: Actors may use the language of securitization in order to elevate an issue from low to high politics.74 Issues of water management are often considered technical or bureau- cratic matters far from the realm of high politics, which traditionally has fo- cused on security and economic development. Warning of risks of war over water can be a signal to a co-riparian country that their actions are being taken seriously. This may be done, for instance, to convince a country to refrain from a planned action or to induce it to engage in negotiations. While Fearon shows that offering non-credible threats is a dominated strategy, he also notes that in reality, such policies are often pursued.75 For example, saber-rattling by Syria and Iraq towards militarily superior Turkey, including threats of war and mobi- lization of troops, were (unsuccessful) attempts to dissuade Turkey from developing dams upstream. Güner presents the use of threats of war over water as a signaling tactic by Turkey and Syria in a game-theoretic model.76 Such use of threats of war may be an important signaling device even if parties recognize the likelihood of the threat being realized as minor.

Signal Domestic Population: Political leaders may wish to signal not only to ri- val governments but to domestic constituencies as well. Putnam and others have noted that national political leaders are often engaged in two-level decision-making in which they must simultaneously attempt to balance domestic and international demands.77 Fearon notes that signaling threats of war is often done with both domestic and international audiences in mind, and that this may be responsible for “half-hearted” signals that are less likely to be acted upon.78 A public statement of willingness to ªght for water rights is likely to send a signal to domestic constituencies that water rights are being taken seriously by the national government, or it may be issued with the intent of per-

73. Leng 1980. 74. Waever 1995. 75. Fearon 1997. 76. Güner 1998. 77. Putnam 1988. 78. Fearon 1997.

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suading a domestic audience to favor or oppose a particular political party or policy. In analyzing the “bellicose statements, even at the highest levels” of the In- dian and Pakistani governments in the 1950s and 1960s, Alam suggests that

. . . though the statements made by key decisionmakers in public may suggest a move towards war, the statements are used to generate domestic support for a political position. As seen in the Indus basin the political rhetoric did not match the governments’ actions which sought to resolve an international water dispute through cooperation . . . The experience from the Indus basin, therefore, throws into question whether public statements made for a domestic audience are truly indicative of a country’s intent to go to war over shared waters.79

Many experts agree that accords over shared water resources between Israel and its neighbors are possible and need not be an obstacle to larger peace agreements.80 Political ofªcials and other parties opposed to territorial concessions, however, have often raised the risks of water wars among their reasons to maintain control of territory.81 Often this belligerent rhetoric is directed towards internal audiences. In so doing, policy-makers can develop a constituency block to make concessions more difªcult.

Signal Third Party: Third parties often play a role both in mediating international disputes and in ªnancing water development projects. Hensel and colleagues found that water scarcity was positively correlated with third-party assis- tance.82 Warnings of war may be meant to inºuence these third parties. Iraqi threats against Syria in the 1970s spurred intervention by the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, who helped negotiate a settlement. At the time that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon issued warnings that continued diversions of waters of the Wazzani stream could spur military conºict with Lebanon, the diversions presented a very minor threat to the Israeli economy.83 While Sharon may have been attempting to send a signal to Lebanese leadership, he may also have been attempting to engage a third party to mediate between Israel and Lebanon, with whom Israel has no direct diplomatic relations. Soon after the statements were made, US ofªcials became involved in the matter. They reportedly requested from the Israelis that messages should be transmitted through them and not through threats of military reprisals84 and proceeded to negotiate an agreement between the sides. Threats of war are also likely to undermine possible credit options for na-

79. Alam 2002, 349. 80. Asmal 2001; Allan 2002; and Haddadin 2002. 81. Sherman 2002. 82. Hensel et al. 2006. 83. Amery 2002. 84. “US Offers to Mediate Hasbani Problem,” Walla! Online News Service. Available online at http://news.walla.co.il/?wϭ//281451, accessed 18 September 2002 (in Hebrew).

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tions seeking to ªnance large-scale water projects. Thus, leaders may issue them in order to deter institutions from offering project ªnance or to inºuence the terms of projects being considered. Threats of violence were important in motivating World Bank efforts to help negotiate an agreement between India and Pa- kistan on the Indus River in the 1960s.85 Reputedly, the Bank not only refused to fund projects while the river was being disputed, but also convinced India not to take on projects unilaterally until an agreement was negotiated.86 Iraqi threats of military action against Turkey may have been intended not only to send a signal to Turkey, but also to the World Bank, which was contem- plating funding of Turkish dams.87 Risks of regional instability also may have been a factor dissuading international agencies and governments from ªnanc- ing dams in Ethiopia.88

Serve as Negotiating Tactic: Threats of war can be useful in extracting information that helps a state gauge the importance of an issue to a potential adversary or negotiating partner.89 Policy linkage is common in water negotiations,90 and threats of war may signiªcantly up the ante in terms of expected concessions on non-water-related issues. Güner explained how threats of military acts between Syria and Turkey, while ostensibly over shared water resources, were likely an attempt to inºuence issues such as territorial disputes and separatist move- ments.91 In 1993, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller sent a message to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad stating that there would be no solution to water disputes between the nations unless Syria prevented the Kurdish separatists from acting within its territory. Thus, despite the rhetoric, threats over water were an outcome of conºict over other issues, and likely used as an attempt to extract concessions on these other issues.

Incentives to the Media and Popular Press

Provide Gripping Headlines: Simon’s claim that “bad news sells” more than good news92 seems to have ample empirical support. Cottle provides numerous examples in which the press focuses on exceptional or violent behavior,93 and New York Times reporter Max Frankel stated that among the news media “conºict is our favorite kind of news.”94 Disagreements over water allocations may be considered mundane, and

85. Ward 2002. 86. Mirza 2008. 87. Kibaroglu and Ünver 2000. 88. Ward 2002, 185–186. 89. Fearon 1994. 90. Fischhendler et al. 2004. 91. Güner 1998. 92. Simon 1980. 93. Cottle 2003. 94. Frankel, Max, “I Am Not a Camera,” New York Times, 16 October 1994.

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thus not newsworthy, while violence over such allocations is. The need for gripping headlines ensures that the media is predisposed to favor presenting the possibility of water wars over more moderate, less dramatic positions. For example, an article in the San Francisco Chronicle was titled “Future of War Will Go with the Flow” with the subtitle “Water Promises to be Flash Point;” this, despite the fact that experts quoted in the article actually stated that they felt water was unlikely to lead to violence and that such prognostications were “media hype.”95 Watkins and Berntell, development and water experts respectively, wrote an article provocatively headlined “A Global Problem: How to Avoid War Over Water.” However, while the article warned that water shortages can lead to conºict, the authors themselves surmised that “cooperation tends to attract less news than violent conºict. Perhaps that is why ‘water wars’ get such exaggerated coverage.”96

Shorten Analysis into Sound-bite or Article-length Segment: Because the media are increasingly structured around presenting brief sound-bites or catchy headlines,97 they frequently reduce complex issues into memorable catchphrases and simplistic storylines, at the expense of nuanced explanation and accuracy. Fur- thermore, Bird and Dardenne contend that the media often present what they feel the story should be, rather than what the facts actually depict.98 Aubin de- tails how pressures to provide pithy coverage of complex security issues have re- sulted in inaccurate media coverage and how, once established, this misinfor- mation has managed to persist in subsequent coverage.99 The connection between water and conºict is complex and context-dependent, with several in- tervening and mitigating variables. An explanation of this complex relationship, however, is not amenable to short press articles or brief news segments.

Give Equal Coverage to Opposing Views: The quest for “balanced coverage” itself may contribute to the amount of media exposure granted to the risk of water wars. When confronted with differing expert opinions regarding highly special- ized or technical issues, the merits of which the press is not competent to evaluate, journalists often attempt to provide equal coverage, regardless of how the weight of expert opinion is distributed.100 Dunwoody and Peters refer to such a strategy of balance as “a surrogate for validity checks.”101 This provision of equal coverage, ostensibly done in the spirit of fairness and balance, can result in disproportionate representation of minority viewpoints. One survey of scientists

95. Freid, Stephanie L. “Future of War Will Go with the Flow,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10 June 2007. 96. Watkins, Kevin and Anders Berntell, “A Global Problem: How to Avoid War Over Water,” Inter- national Herald Tribune, 23 August 2006. 97. Davis 2003. 98. Bird and Dardenne 1988, 337. 99. Aubin 1998. 100. Dearing 1995. 101. Dunwoody and Peters 1992, 210.

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found that 76 percent felt that news reports fail to distinguish between ªndings that are well-founded and those that are not.102 Press coverage of climate change is a well-documented example, in which the minority viewpoint among climate scientists that climate change is not occurring has been given disproportionately prominent media coverage.103 While no extensive content analysis of media coverage of conºict over war was undertaken for this study, numerous examples exist of articles that either present the potential for conºict or cooperation over water on equal footing or simply quote experts with a range of opinions.104

Focus on the Aspect of a Story of Greatest Interest to Target Audience: Not all bad news is the same in terms of newsworthiness. Singer and Endreny found a “lack of congruence between the size of the risk and the amount of media coverage it receives.”105 Combs and Slovic found that relative to actual objective risks, “disease appeared to be greatly underreported while violent, often catastrophic events...stood out as being overreported.”106 Moeller noted that “crises that threaten or even kill many but are not intrinsically horriªc...donotmake the newsroom cut.”107 Water-related illnesses kill several times the combined number of casual- ties from all the wars in the world each year, but they generally afºict the poorer classes in developing countries, not the media’s more afºuent target audiences. Thus, they are less likely to get prominent news coverage. In attempts to capture market share, major media outlets attempt to target their features to the pre- sumed tastes of their intended audiences.108 Wars over water, even if in developing countries, may have spillover effects that impact or interest the typical con- sumer of Western media in ways that more chronic humanitarian issues do not.

Academic Scholars

Serve as Null Hypothesis of Research into Water and Conºict: Studies that address the water war hypothesis, even if they do so in a critical light or present war as a worst-case scenario, still serve to keep the issue alive in the public consciousness and in political and academic debates. Moreover, these studies (including this one) implicitly give the water wars hypothesis some credibility by deeming it worthy of study and/or useful as a working hypothesis in empirical studies. Be- cause empirical studies in this ªeld are still few, and theories remain speculative,

102. The Pew Research Center 2009. 103. Boykoff and Boykoff 2004. 104. For example “Streams of Blood or Streams of Peace,” The Economist, 1 May 2008; and Stepha- nie L. Freid, “Future of War will Go with the Flow,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10 June 2007. 105. Singer and Endreny 1987. 106. Combs and Slovic 1979, 841. 107. Moeller 1999, 317. 108. Bae 2000.

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publications both supporting and refuting the risks of conºict invite further work, keeping the subject in public debate.

Interaction among Incentives Several of the incentives discussed above may be mutually reinforcing. For instance, statements by policy-makers are not only covered by the media and academics; policy-makers also react to these actors’ reports and use them as sources of information.109 Similarly, NGOs and academics may covet media coverage in order to publicize their ªndings or may seek to inºuence policy-makers directly or via the media, and they, themselves, may be sought out by the media and policy-makers as credible sources of information. Statements by policy-makers directed at domestic populations may appear via the press and result in NGOs taking action on the issue. This mutually reinforcing web of interactions between actors may well be serving to maintain or even elevate the issue of water wars in public discourse.

Conclusion It is not the aim of this article to claim, as others have, that the prospect of war over water is without merit.110 Water has been and continues to be a source of political conºict, at times even violent conºict, a prospect which may worsen as populations grow, economies develop, and climatic conditions change. More- over, there are many possible rebuttals to critiques of the water war hypothesis: the dearth of historical precedent may not be indicative of future trends; conºict and cooperation over water are not mutually exclusive outcomes;111 although wars over water may make little economic sense, many economically irrational wars occur nevertheless;11 2 and the absence of past conºict over water may be explained by variables such as power asymmetries11 3 which, should they change, could allow water issues to come to a boil. Still, the frequency with which water wars are mentioned and the credibility given to that prospect do seem to be markedly overrepresented in public discourse. The efªcacy of such rhetorical strategies remains unclear. Overstating risks of water wars or oversimplifying causal links may be detrimental to intended objectives. For instance, raising the specter of war to raise attention to, or mobilize action on, related environmental or development issues may ultimately result in redirecting resources away from development and towards conºict pre-

109. For example Simon 1998. 110. Beaumont 1994; and Dolatyar 2002. 111. Zeitoun 2007. 112. Fearon (1995) discusses reasons for the outbreak of wars that are poorly explained by a ratio- nal actor model. The Economist expressed the counter-argument more succinctly, stating “wars are usually fought for much stupider reasons than water.” See “As Thick as Blood: Water Sup- ply in the Middle East,” The Economist 337 (7946): 53–56, 1995. 113. Zeitoun and Warner 2006.

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vention. Moreover, there is a risk that policy-makers and other decision-makers may feel that as long as violent conºict is avoided, they have been successful. Al- ternatively, by focusing on water as a cause of violent conºict, attention may be drawn away from more important or proximate causes of such conºict. It is not the intent of this study to imply that actors acting on these various incentives intend to mislead or manipulate public opinion. It is legitimate to highlight worst-case scenarios and to promote measures to avoid them. Rather, this study suggests that numerous and varied incentives facing several actors to stress or even exaggerate the possibility of such conºict may help to explain the signiªcant exposure and tractability that such threats and warnings have re- ceived to date. This study was meant to be suggestive rather than conclusive. It did not attempt to estimate the actual inºuence of the various incentives laid out above in motivating the behavior of the set of actors discussed. Nor did it suggest meth- ods for identifying when such incentives are in fact responsible for actions by a given party. Some of the incentives, such as raising the exposure of other environmental issues, use of signaling by politicians, and need for catchy headlines, appear to have much empirical support, while others have less. Because this analysis relies on plausible hypotheses backed up with anecdotal evidence, it is subject to many of the same critiques leveled against much of the early environmental security literature. Veriªcation of the relative importance of the various incentives laid out in this study is left to future research. Fu- ture research may also evaluate possible incentives actors may face to underesti- mate such risks—for instance, in order to encourage investment or inºuence negotiations. Such incentives no doubt exist, but were not addressed herein. Such limitations noted, this study does provide analysts with a framework with which to start evaluating various claims regarding the prospects of violent conºict over water and other natural resources. Analysts have long acknowledged “that one cannot dismiss the political motives of those who wished to elevate—or prevent the elevation—of environmental concerns to the same status as military ones.”11 4 The intent of this study was to provide a clearer picture of these motives, with the hope that this will as- sist analysts in evaluating the credibility of the many diverse pronouncements on this subject. While the speciªc topic of this study was conºict over water, much of the analysis is relevant to discussions of conºict over other natural resources and to broader discussions of environmental security.

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