Research Articles Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars • David Katz

Hydro-Political Hyperbole David Katz Research Articles Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars • David Katz Introduction Reference to linkages between natural resource scarcity and the potential for violent conºict is now commonplace. Perhaps the most highlighted and most studied such linkage is that between freshwater scarcity and conºict. Predictions of looming water wars—such as former Egyptian Foreign Minister and later United Nations Secretary-General Boutrous Boutrous Ghali’s statement that “The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics,” or former World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin’s declaration that “the wars of the next century will be over water”1—have been cited extensively by a variety of sources over the past three decades. More recently, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed reports that water scarcity has created “a high risk of violent conºict.”2 Those who make claims regarding the possibility of future water wars range from people who present such a scenario as a possibility that can be avoided with cooperation and proper planning,3 to those who predict that such wars are likely,4 to those who conªdently assert that such outcomes are “certain”5 and only a matter of time.6 While the claim that increasing water scarcity will lead to increased out- breaks of wars—often dubbed the “water war hypothesis”—is widespread in public discourse, a growing body of literature has challenged both the empirical 1. Cited by Barbara Crossette, “Severe Water Crisis Ahead for Poorest Nations in Next 2 Decades,” New York Times, 10 August 1995. 2. Cited by Mark Clayton, “Is Water Becoming ‘The New Oil’?” The Christian Science Monitor, 29 May 2008. 3. Frey and Naff 1985; and Postel and Wolf 2001. 4. Cooley 1984; Naff and Matson 1984; Starr 1991; Bulloch and Darwish 1993; De Villiers 1999; and Ward 2002. 5. Myers 1993, 47. 6. Waslekar 2005. Global Environmental Politics 11:1, February 2011 © 2011 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 12 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/GLEP_a_00041 by guest on 29 September 2021 David Katz • 13 and theoretical foundations of such a hypothesis.7 Critics note, for instance, that proponents of the water war hypothesis often rely on a very limited number of case studies or statements from a handful of prominent ªgures,8 that relatively little systematic empirical evidence exists of past wars over water, and that there is scant evidence that violent conºict over water is becoming more frequent.9 Despite weak supporting evidence and numerous theoretical challenges to the water wars hypothesis, proclamations that water wars are imminent remain prevalent. Much of the academic literature on the topic has attempted to pro- mulgate, refute, or test the water war hypothesis. Little has attempted to explain why the predictions of water wars remain so popular despite questionable empirical support. This study addresses this gap. It outlines various incentives different types of key actors have to emphasize, and even exaggerate, the likelihood of water wars. Moreover, it demonstrates that relationships between several of these actors serve to mutually reinforce these incentives. This conºuence of incentives to stress such risks is likely to have contributed to the persistence of such warnings in public discourse at levels and proªles far beyond what appears justiªed by empirical evidence. While this article speciªcally addresses violent conºict over water, its premises and conclusions are likely relevant to much of the discourse in the ªeld of environmental security. The article proceeds as follows: The next section speciªes what is meant by water wars and violent conºict over water for the purposes of this discussion. It then lays out the main arguments for and against the water war hypothesis, and provides a review of some empirical studies. The subsequent section outlines incentives to stress the risks of war over water for ªve different actor types— political ofªcials, academics, the media, NGOs, and the private sector—and ex- plores interactions among each groups’ incentives. The ªnal section offers con- cluding thoughts and suggestions for further research. The Water War Hypothesis: Examining the Evidence Deªning Water-based Conºict and the Water Wars Hypothesis Perhaps because of its alliterative character, the expression “water wars” is often used to describe any level of conºict between parties involving water.10 Singer notes that most studies of war fail to distinguish between war, which is uncom- mon, and conºict, which is more common.11 Wolf and colleagues cite the lack of a clear use of the term “conºict” as a contributing cause for confusion and disagreement regarding the water wars hypothesis.12 This article focuses on the 7. Lonergan 2001; Dolatyar 2002; and Wolf 2007. 8. Dinar 2002. 9. Yoffe et al. 2003. 10. For example Annin 2006. 11. Singer 1981. 12. Wolf et al. 2003. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/GLEP_a_00041 by guest on 29 September 2021 14 • Hydro-Political Hyperbole potential for use of armed force or armed conºict13 between politically orga- nized groups over control over or access to freshwater resources, as this is a deªnition commonly used by both proponents and detractors of the water war hypothesis. The typical version of the water war hypothesis posits that countries will be willing to wage war in order to secure or preserve access to scarce water resources. A stronger version claims that countries experiencing acute water scarcity will be compelled by a “hydrological imperative” to obtain additional water supplies from neighboring countries, resorting to violent means if necessary.14 Other versions stress that water scarcity alone is unlikely to serve as a casus belli between nations, but rather, may aggravate existing international or domestic conºicts—for instance, by increasing competition over scarce arable land or causing displacement of rural populations and the creation of environmental refugees.15 Kahl identiªes four hypotheses to explain how resource scarcity could lead to violent conºict: simple scarcity, transboundary migration, depri- vation, and state failure.16 Homer-Dixon noted that resource scarcities could result from a decrease in supplies (e.g. drought), an increase in demand (e.g. increased consumption), or unequal distribution of a resource among a popula- tion.17 Support for the Water War Hypothesis Support for the water war hypothesis rests on declarations of public ofªcials, theoretical models, and empirical evidence. In addition to the quotes already mentioned, other commonly cited ªgures warning of the risks of water wars include former heads of state such as former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the late King Hussein of Jordan, and former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.18 Much of the empirical evidence presented in support of the water war hypothesis consists of anecdotal evidence and case studies. Among the most popular are Israel’s bombing of Syrian attempts to divert the headwaters of the Jor- dan River, the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s attempt to blow up Israel’s National Water Carrier,19 and India’s decision to occupy the headwaters of the 13. For a detailed deªnition of the terms “armed force” and “armed conºict” as they are commonly used in the environmental security literature see Uppsala Universitat: http://www.pcr.uu.se/ research/ucdp/deªnitions/ Accessed on 12 October 2010. 14. Stauffer 1982; Stork 1983; Cooley 1984; and Lebanese government ofªcial Fadi Comair, cited in “Analysis: Shebaa farms key to Lebanese hydro-diplomacy,” IRIN humanitarian news and analysis, 10 September 2009. Available online at http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx ?ReportIdϭ86092, accessed 20 December 2009. 15. Gleick 1991; and Homer-Dixon 1994. 16. Kahl 2006. 17. Homer-Dixon 1994. 18. Sharon and Chanoff 1989; Starr 1991; and Amery 2002. 19. Naff and Matson 1984; Starr 1991; Gleick 1993; Lowi 1993; and Ward 2002. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/GLEP_a_00041 by guest on 29 September 2021 David Katz • 15 Indus in Kashmir.20 Some observers have also attributed more recent conºicts to water scarcity, such as those in Sri Lanka and the Darfur region of Sudan.21 Many early studies on water wars were guilty of what Singer noted as a ten- dency of many popular models to reduce war to single deterministic cause.22 Theories based on water scarcity as a single deterministic driver of conºict ig- nore other important variables such as historical relationships between parties, riparian position, military balance (or asymmetry) of power, governance, and decision-making structures. These factors have been identiªed as critical in both the literature on the determinants of war in general,23 and transboundary water conºict in particular.24 More recent empirical studies have attempted to address shortcomings of early studies by conducting large-sample statistical analysis that includes additional explanatory variables. Several have found per-capita water availability to be statistically correlated with the outbreak of either civil or international wars.25 Others have found that, holding other variables constant, neighboring countries that share a river are more likely to engage in violent conºict than those that do not.26 Still others have found correlations between changes in rainfall or high levels of variability in rainfall and the likelihood of violent conºict.27 Critiques of the Water War Hypothesis A number critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empirical evidence behind the water wars hypothesis. One critique of the environmental security literature, of which much of the published material on water wars is guilty, is that warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evidence.28 Statements from the 1980s that the next war in the Middle East will be over water have already proven false.

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