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2003 Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September
Bercuson, David J.
Oxford University Press
Bercuson, David J.. (2003). "Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September". In Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus, Carment, D., Hampson, F. O. & Hillmer, N. (eds). Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press: 121-134. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/44573 book part
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Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September
DAVID BERCUSON
If William Lyon Mackenzie King wer magicallo et y reappeae th n i r nation's capital today woule h , doubo dn shockee b textene th t a dt whico t armee hth d force f UniteCanade so th d daan States operate together and the extent to which Canada's defence has been so thor- oughly integrated into the larger context of US defence concerns. King woul e staggeredb e rang th numbed y an eb d f treaty-leveo r l agreements memorandumd an understandinf so Canadiage thath e tti n militarS U e Forceyth structureo t s e woulH . d disapprove th f o e Canadian navy's now standard practice of integrating a Canadian warship into every US carrier battle group that goes to the Arabian Gulf to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq. He would be mortified Canada'y b Augus9 s2 t 2002 announcemen pendina f o t g agreement alloo t troopS S wU U wit e s hth ont o Canadian soi responsn i l a o t e terrorist attack woule .H d undoubtedly rejec notioe th t n tha matn i t - ters of security and defence, the already close working relationship 2 CANAD12 A AMONG NATIONS 2003
between Canada and the US ought to be tightened even further, or that a Canadian government ought to think seriously of a significant expansio defencs it f no e budge orden i t sootho rt e risin concernS gU s about Canadian defence 'freeloading'. In general, it still remains that the Canada-US defence relationship is one of the closest of any two sovereign countries on the face of the earth. As of January 2002, there were close to 90 bilateral treaty-level agreements governing the Canada—US defence relationship, some dat- e earl r bacth fa ys ina k s nineteent ga h century. Sinc e terroristh e t attack Septembe1 1 f so r 2001, further close arrangements have been entered into, includin e establishmenth g e Canada-Uth f o t - SBi National Planning Group Groue Th . p will prepare 'contingency plans to ensure a cooperative and well coordinated response to national requests for military assistance' on land and at sea, essentially to supplement NORAD (DND, 2002). Outsid e purvieth f o e f strictlwo y defence matters, the two nations have moved very close together on sharing cross-border intelligence, providin r bordefo g r security, smoothing the flow of cross-border traffic, and generally in starting to shore up the continental perimeters to ward off attack. Offshore, active Canadian military co-operation with the US, as wel s wita l h Canada's other NATO allies, predate e event1 dth 1 f o s September, with the Canadian air force contributing to the bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis of 1999 and a Canadian ground contingent being sent to Kosovo for two rotations in 1999 and 2000 to help KFOR pacify that nominally Yugoslav province. Most notably, Canada sen larga t e naval contingen US-lee th d dai camo t - paign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, followed by a Canadian ground contingent sent to participate earle inshootina th yn i sprinr g wa f 2002 go . Close operationa- co l operation continues betwee r e Canadia navieai S nth U d d an s nan forces while Canadian defence contractors suppl ymyriaa f milido - tary equipment to the US armed forces. At one level, then, the Canada-US defence relationship continues s evolveha muc t i s dha sinc e firseth t post-Worl I affirmatioI r dWa n in February 1947 (Permanent Joint Boar Defencn do e Resolutio. nNo 36) that the close wartime continental defence relationship, initiated at Ogdensburg, New York, in August 1940, would continue into peacetime. And yet the post-11 September period saw an immediate upswin pressure—iS U n gi AmbassadoS nU publie th y cb Canado rt a and in private by a wide range of government officials, political Bercuson I CANADA-US DEFENCE RELATIONS POST-11 SEPTEMBER 123
leaders influentiad an , l private citizens—on Canade th beeo t ap u f Canadian military for both continental defence and offshore opera- tions. Dwight Mason's essay in this volume accurately reflects the growing frustratio feelS nU s tha e oveth t r Canada's shoddy treatment n armeow s doit f forces becaus e harth df o erealit y thae US'th t s longest border, and perhaps its most vulnerable, is with Canada. stils Iearlo i t to l knoo yt w whethe e forecastth l al r s thatere th t- rorist attacks would 'change the world' were correct. As with all such sweeping generalizations, no one will really know until many years have passedthine on certains t gi Bu . : those attacks revealed jusw ho t vulnerable the US is to acts of planned mass mayhem. Thus the defenc e continentath f o e l United State nows i s , once againe th t a , top of the US priority list, ahead of virtually every other American foreign policy concern. This has not been true since the end of the Cold War and not even since the era of the massive buildup of ICBMs whic, US he begath USSe inth d earnesRn an ni earle th yn i t 1960s. In many respects, then, Canada toda virtualln i s yi same yth e posi- tion it was during the 10 years immediately after World War II; due to geography alone, Canada is once again vital for the defence of the United States itself, whether Canadians are aware of that reality, whether they like it, or even whether they are prepared to pay for it. In that sense, 11 September returned Canada to a past that should forgottene b t no . Canadians remained wary neighbours of the US for more than six decades afte establishmene th r Canadf o t continuina 1867n ai s i t I . g sourc f amusemeneo Canadiao t t n military historians thae firsth t t interwar defence plan put together by Canada's tiny interwar military hears it t Canadiaa ta d ha n cavalry attac MidwestS k U ints e owa th t I . t untino l 1938, when roae Hitle welth s launchin o dt n rwa o l g World Wa , thae firsII r th t t very tentativ t tangiblbu e e steps towards Canada-US defence co-operation began after Frankli . RoosevelnD t told a Queen's University audience in 1938 that the US would not stan df Canad i idl y yb a were threatene hostila y db e power. King responded in kind a few days after (Thompson and Randall, 1994: 147)yearo Tw .s later Francs defeata n ,i y ela , Canada initiatee dth first military-to-military talks ever betwee countries—buo tw e nth n i t secret f courseo , . Canadian officers soon secrey begapa o tnt visits to Washington, always going in mufti, to begin exploring concrete step countrieo stw tha e tth s might tak growin e vien ei th f wo g threats overseas (Eayrs, 1965: 203). 4 CANAD12 A AMONG NATIONS 2003
Thu e fundamentath s l pattere Canada—Uth f o n S defence rela- t tionshifro e verse m th s y pwa beginnin f thago t relationshipe th : US initiates, Canada responds (because it usually must), but gener- ally reluctantl ofted yan n with great hesitation dynamic—ae .Th s true toda1938—in i s ya s rootes harbourerealite th ha n S di y U thae dth t global interests and ambitions since the late nineteenth century and Canad s notaha . Thus, wit exceptioe year0 h2 th e s th betwee f no n generalls ha S 191 1939d U 9e yan th ,understoo d that global interests must be protected by global power, manifest in its many forms but especially military power a minimumd tha t an a ,t , America's real security borders must be established far from its shores and its land boundaries with Canada and Mexico. Almost none of that is true for Canada. "When Canada's mandarins first awok e e importanc1930th th n o ei st f reachine o r inter fo t - gou national markets—particularly but not exclusively in the United States—their strategy rested primaril powee th e n reasof yo ro th d nan pul f economio l c eventualld self-interesan S U Canade ti e yth o t t o at the rest of the trading world (Granatstein, 1981: 66). Canada had eco- nomic interests in the Caribbean, for example, but no military capac- itforco y t people e eth thaf so biddings t it regio o d o n.t Besidese th , US was perfectly capable of policing that area and shouldering the full costs of maintaining marines and naval units at the ready there. e patterTh f Canada-Uno S defence relationships almost always involves ha d Canada respondin Americao gt n initiatives pattere th ; n of Canadian-American trade relationship almoss si t exactl oppoe yth - site. From the first days of Confederation, Canada initiated contacts aimed at easing the cross-border trade flow, with the US responding. thren O e occasions—in 1910, 1947 1985—Canadd an , a initiated free trade discussions with the US, only to back away on the first two occasions and almost on the third. The explanation for this peculiar train of events is simple. In mat- ter f defenco s e Canadians have long believe needS dU thae s th t strong Canadian defence morr sfa e than Canada does,e whilon o en has to convince Canadians that in matters of trade, Canada badly need marketsS U s othen I . r words, when Canadians look south, they see jobs; when Americans look north, they see defence. This Canadian view of things is quite wrong, but most Canadians still seem to believe, as Senator Raoul Dandurand proclaimed at the League of Nations in 1924, that Canada lives in 'a fireproof house far from inflammable materials' and is thus unaffected by the onset of Bercuson I CANADA-U S DEFENCE RELATIONS POST-11 SEPTEMBE5 12 R
world crises and has no need to maintain a credible military between wars (Granatstein and Hillmer, 1994: 76). The historical evolution of the Canada-US defence partnership in s establishe wa post-Worlde a th er I I dr earlyWa 194n I .Militare 6th y Co-operation Committee (MCC) attempte convinco dt e both govern- ments thaair-atomie th t c threato s gravfroo s USSe d ms th ean R wa imminent that both countries ought to move quickly to establish vast networks of radar stations and fighter fields to counter the threat (Jockel, 1987: 6-29) factn .MCC'e I th , s view reflecte worst-case dth e scenario held by some high-ranking generals in the US Air Force far more than it did official thinking in either US military or diplomatic circles. The Canadian government was not at first aware of that and feared tha MCe openine th tth Ct reporcambu w gs ne stag -a wa t f eo paig pressuro nt e Canad fortifo at norths it y . William Lyon Mackenzie King's misgiving snewy werb d se fe leak s emanating from Washington relating that Canada was being pressed to establish some sort of aer- ial 'Maginot Line' in the Far North. Some historians took Canadian reticenc a sig s na e that Canada' se Sovie vieth f wo t threa than i t t perio mors dwa e moderate than coul foune db Washington di n (Page Muntond an , 1997) factn I . s closea , r examinatio f Departmenno f o t External Affair d Departmenan s f Nationao t l Defence documents have since revealed, Canadian policy-makers on the whole were of the same mindset as those in the US. The difference in outlook betweecountrieo tw e s thae Canadianth th wa st n defence budget muco s s h wa smaller that Canada's policy-makers were force subo dt - ordinate their mistrust spendine USSe th th f o Rt so g prioritiee th f so Department of Finance. That department, under Douglas Abbott, directle toocu s kit y fro Prime mth e determines Ministerwa o wh , o dt shrin e militarth k y budge d shifan t t financial prioritie o payint s g down Canada's massiv deb r initiatind ewa tan welfare gth e state mea- sures the government had promised in the June 1945 federal elec- tion. Not for the first time, Canada's defence planning was cut to fit the Finance Department's cloth (Bercuson, 1993a). Although the US also made massive cuts to its defence budget after 1945, those cuts still left enough money for the US military to be more expansive in its planning than was the case in Canada. s forginwa Besides S gU aheae th , d wit expansioe hth nucleas it f no r attack capabilitie e desigth d buildind intercontiw nan an sne f go - nental bomber developmene th se B-4 d sucth 7an s ha f air-to-aio t r refuelling, whichs believedwa t i , , would provid e ultimatth e e 126 CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2003
d wouls ultimatit an e S protectiodb U e e guarantoth r nfo r against attack from the USSR (Conant, 1962: 16). In almost ever ye lat casth e n i e1940s , CanadiaS U e n th tie o t s defence establishment developed out of US requests to Canada to map e Canadiath n Nort airy r establishb o , h LORA d weatheNan r stations, or allow cold-weather testing, or give access to US naval vessels and military personnel to practise joint land-sea exercises in the Arctic Archipelago. The US wanted the transcontinental radar station chains, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) lease of Goose Bay, the possible use of an emergency landing strip at Resolute, permission for its fighters croso t s into Canadian airspac t pursuiho n eunknowf i o t n radar con- tacts abilite th , overflo yt y Canada -with bombers armed with nuclear weapons, and the right to use Goose Bay to launch atomic attacks by air against the USSR without Canadian permission. Being the larger power, with a greater military and a far more sweeping list of poten- tial threats s naturawa perpetuae woult S i , th lU thae e db th t l suppli- cant, Canad perpetuae ath l respondent s naturawa t i ld alsAn . o thaS U t defence requirements woul ofteo ds n distort Canadian budget priorities. In the first 15 years or so of the Cold War, Canadian policy vis-a- vis defence relations wit e Americanhth s evolved from initial great reluctance realistia o t , c appraisa f whao l t measures would havo et takee b accommodato nt requirementsS eU renewea o t , d reluctance perceivee b o t mera s da e cockboat S followinU e wake th th f n ego i man-of-war. From roughly 1945 through late 1949, the Canadian gov- ernment's main strategy for dealing with US requests for defence co- operation was deceit of the Canadian people and delay in agreeing to the requirements of the Americans. When Canada agreed to the constructio f LORAo n d weatheNan r Northr Fa r station e fo , th n i s example e publith , c never learne militare dth y nature buildth f eo - ing progra aircrafS U shipd d an mt an s detaile carro dt y construction supplies to the North were instructed to avoid Canadian population centres (Bercuson, 1993b: 158). To some degree the government's effort to mislead Canadians over the US presence in the Far North s rootefeae wa th r n d i thaAnglophile th t e Tory Official Opposition in Parliament would raise embarrassing questions over why Canada tyins wa g itself ever mordefencn i S e U closel e th matters o yt e Th . other main facto s King'wa r s reluctanc activiso seee to b s no a n et i t e USSRth lin S n U .eo Kin e o closth to g o et d offi an -e Colr th dWa cially retired from offic n lati es successor ehi 194 d 8an , Louit S s Laurent, was far less reticent to throw Canada's lot in with the US. Bercuson I CANADA-U S DEFENCE RELATIONS POST-11 SEPTEMBE7 12 R
In these early Cole yearth df s o War , Canada evolve dpolica y that amounte o defendint d n sovereigntow s it g y against possiblS U e incursions by ensuring that it be seen by Washington to be doing as muc tim s hCanada'd a ean s financial resources would allo regarwn i d to defending the continent (Bercuson, 1990). The greatest fear among Canadian policy-maker t suffiac s thao -t t allswa r ta o failur,t ac o t e ciently to give the US comfort, would prompt the US to shove Canadian sovereignty concerns aside and act in its own self-defence. There was an almost irrational fear, for example, that the US might challenge Canadian claim sovereignto st y ove Arctie rth c Archipelago, especially since Canada had no tangible presence on many of the Arctic island claimed san d sovereignt 'sectoe th n yo r principle', which t recognizno d di S eU (Smithe th , t 1966no s : 214)wa S U . Evee th f ni intereste formalln i d y challenging Canadian sovereignty ovey an r Canadian soile dangeth , r persisted that heav presencS yU y an n ei concentrated area of Canada would have the practical result of the US assumin e factgd o control over part f Canadao s , evee jurd f eni control was not sought. That had appeared to happen in large areas of British Columbia and the Yukon in the lands contiguous to the Alaska Highwa e Nortth d h yan Wes t Staging Router durinwa e gth and could not be allowed to happen again. f principleo Thut se workes sa Ottawn si wa t dou a thas subwa t- sequently applied to almost all Canada-US defence projects on Canadian soil, with the notable exception of the Goose Bay SAC base, which was governed by a special lease negotiated by both countries. Include f principleo tha n t di se t s were provisio t leasa r syma tn fo - bolic Canadian presence on all joint bases and projects, ultimate Canadian ownership of any facility built, and applicability of Canadian personneS U la wo t l (Bercuson, 1993b: 158). Canada's reluctanc o spent e d mone n defenco y e projects that appeared to be short-sighted and more beneficial to the US than to Canad montha4 1 melte o t 2 s 1 dbetwee e awath n yexplosioe i nth n firss e USSit th t f Ry o nucleab r weapo latn n i e initiae th 194 d l 9an spectacular successe Chinese th f so e Volunteers Koren i ' a beginning in November 1950. By the first months of 1951 Canada was as ready as the other Western powers (all affiliated to NATO) to spend mas- sively on defence. An atmosphere of panic pervaded Washington, London, Paris, Bonn d eve forcean ,N n U Koren Ottawi se th as a were pushed back from near the Korean border with China to south e thirty-eightoth f h parallel. Deep fear gripped these capitals thaa t 128 CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2003
Communist victory over the UN forces in Korea would prompt the Communists to launch World War III with either an atomic attack on North America or an attack into West Germany, or both. Canada's defence budget balloone earln di y 195 kepd 1an t climb- ing for the next half-decade; suddenly, Canada's hesitation over mat- ters of continental defence faded away. From the early winter of 1951, Canada-US military co-operation grew apace as the Cold War deepened. Agreements were concluded that solved a host of minor issues arising out of the American presence at the leased bases in Newfoundland renewabla , e 20-year leas s signe SAea wa r Cdfo base at Goose Bay, and provision was made for backup SAC facilities else- where. Canada undertook to build the Mid-Canada Line (or McGill Fence) and gave the US permission to build the DEW line. Canadian air defence resources expanded rapidly, -with major increases in fighter forces deployed, bases maintained d rada d grounan , an r d control stations operated serieA . f agreementso s deepened interop- e signinth o t f erabilitNORA go r d defencai le n 195Di n d i y an e7 (Jockel, 1987: 91-117) e samth t e.A tim Nortea h American defence production agreement was concluded in October 1956, while co- operatio researcn ni chemicaln ho , biological nuclead an , r weapons increased. By the time John Diefenbaker received his massive 208- seat majorit 195e th 8n yi election, Canad becomd aha willinea g part- ner not only in Canada-US continental defence matters but also in NATO, where the previous St Laurent government had been a leader in the nuclearization of the alliance. e CanadiaTh n defence effort d Canada'an , s commitmenn a o t t enthusiastic defence partnership wit Unitee hth d States, bega slio nt p during Diefenbaker's five year officen si . There were four main fac- tors underlying this renewed lac Canadiaf ko n enthusias defencr mfo e in genera defencd an l f Norteo h Americ particularn ai . rapie th ds firse slowinwa Th t g Canadiae dowth f no n economy in the first years of Diefenbaker's administration as the nation slid into its first serious post-war recession. Rising unemployment along- side Canada's first post-war devaluatio Canadiae th f no n dollar ush- ereperioa n di f severdo e federal restraint marked exampler fo , y b , the cancellation of the Avro CF-105, which was emerging as one of the most expensive defence undertakings in Canadian history. secone Th d facto Diefenbaker's wa r mindsen vies hi ow w s d an t that the Liberals had allowed Canada to slip much too far down the road of Americanization. Dief the Chief was determined to swim Bercuson I CANADA-US DEFENCE RELATIONS POST-11 SEPTEMBE9 12 R
agains inexorable th t e tid continentaf eo l economic histor thrusty yb - ing Canada back intmarketS U o d ensurinan s g that Canad- re a emphasiz s tieit e s wit he BritisBritaith d h an nCommonwealt f ho nations (Robinson, 1989: 10). Diefenbaker gave his approval, almost automatically, to the NORAD agreement not long after he was first elected with a minority government in 1957, but this lack of any resis- tance was almost certainly due to the wiles of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Charles Folukes, who presented it to the Prime Minister as a done deal and one that only capped a series of agreements that were already in place—which was partly true. As Diefenbaker grew more comfortable in his unexpected inter- regnum, he questioned Canada-US defence relations more closely until eventuall balkee yh d completely ove mattee rth nucleaf ro r war- newle headth r ysfo acquired BOMARC-SAGE ground-to-air anti-aircraft defence systems. Diefenbaker also refused to fulfill commitments made to NATO about acquiring tactical nuclear warheads for the Honest John short-range missiles thaCanadiae th t n arm opers ywa - atin CF-10e Europth n gi r 4fo r Starfightereo s thabeed ha t n acquired replaco t e agineth g RCAF Sabres. Diefenbaker was not only suspicious of the 'Americanization' of the Canadian defence effort, he was also suspicious of the new President e Uniteoth f d States, Joh . KennedynF e pooTh . r personal relations between Diefenbaker and Kennedy are well known and need not be detailed herelittle t b ther wern en bu , doubes ca me e a o ttw thae th t intens thein ei r dislik f eaceo h othe Lyndos a r n Johnso Lested nan r Pearso r Georgno e W. Bus Jead han n Chretien parn I . t that dislike was based on sheer age and personality differences. But Kennedy was also determined to conduct an active, vigorous, and, where neces- sary, armed US foreign policy where his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower seemed ha , relo dt y mor diplomacyn eo . Whenever there is great activit defencn yi foreigd ean n affair Washingtonn i s , Canadian governments find themselves challenge helo dt p lead followo t , r o , to get out of the way—a source of perpetual discomfort for most Canadian governments, which are by their nature hesitant and cau- tious, either for reasons of conviction or because of sheer politics. Thus 'when Kennedy announced the presence of Soviet intermediate- range ballistic missiles in Cuba in October 1962 and brought US mil- itary forces to the second highest state of readiness in anticipation of an invasion of Cuba and a war with the USSR, Diefenbaker refused to go along. As a consequence, the Canadian military itself took the 130 CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2003
unprecedented ste f followin pabsence o leath S U n dlawa i e f ego th - ful order fro Prime mth e Minister cleaa , r violatio e principlth f no f eo civilian contro militare th f o l y (Granatstein, 1986: 114-16). e finaTh l facto e Canadiarth thad le t n governmen o distanct t e itself fro Americane mth mattern i s f continentaso l e defencth s ewa growing realization that the threat of the manned bomber was pass- ing as the USSR and the US deployed increasing numbers of iCBMs e SLBth Mf o (submarine-launche e ag e th d an d ballistic missile) dawned. Since there was no effective defence against either of these two weapons systems, there was less need for Canada to continue devoting resource anti-aircrafo st t defence systems reliancS U . n eo detection for purposes of defence shifted to detection for purposes of -warning, with the first steps being towards the establishment of e BMEWth S (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 1959n i ) 196y B . 4 much of the continental radar warning system put in place after 1950 destines wa closee b dismantledd o dt dan . Canada would thenceforth have a much smaller part to play in continental defence than it had had during the manned bomber era; in the age of MAD (mutually assured destruction woulS U e d )th defen d itsel deterrencey b f rola , e in which Canada could play onl yperipheraa unimportand an l t part. In 1963 John Diefenbaker lost power in the first election since 1911 that had an important defence issue to be decided. His refusal to agree to acquire the nuclear warheads that were vital for the effec- tive operatio BOMARe th f no C missiles (an rockee dth t warheadd san tactical nukes designed for the Starfighters) gave Lester B. Pearson a •winning election issue. Previously, while Leader of the Opposition, Pearso d opposeha n d Canada's nuclearization t thad beeha Bu t. n mere politicsd beeha nwillina e h ; g proponen f NATo t O acquiring tactical nuke ss stil whelwa Secretare nh f Statyo Externar efo l Affairs. In a calculated move to distance themselves from the Tories, the Liberals switched sides and won the 1963 election by campaigning that Canada had made commitments to the US and NATO and must now fulfill those commitments. Once the Liberals were elected the nukes were acquired, but the government mad t cleai e r tha t wouli t d abandon Canada's nuclear rol soos ea possibles na . Pearson's main occupatio fivs hi e n nyeari s as a minority Prime Minister was the completion of the welfare state and the laying of foundations for national bilingualism. The war in Vietnam reached fever pitch as Canadians welcomed American draft dodger demonstrated san increasinn di g numbers agains 'wae n th t ro Bercuson I CANADA-US DEFENCE RELATIONS POST-11 SEPTEMBER 131
Vietnam'. Pearson's attempt to give Lynclon Johnson advice about that war stoked Johnson's anger and the Canada-US defence rela- tionship cooled considerably t leasa , t officiaa t l levels (Martin, 1982: 223-30). Pearson's successor, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, publicly dis- tanced himself from closer defence ties with the US. He courted the Third e so-calle Worldleadea e starth s th f o tn wa i r, d North-South dialogue d evean , n trie o cultivatt d e Canada—USSR a vaitie n i ns attempt to make multilaterism actually -work for Canada. He also cut Canada's military presence in NATO. And although he eventually gave his blessing to the acquisition of new Leopard tanks and the CF-18 fighter jets, he left the navy and much of the rest of the military in a dilapidated state troe H . dfina e line whe permisS U e gav nh e eth - sion to test cruise missiles in the Canadian Arctic while launching his round-the-world peace missio e las th prims t n yeahi ni f eo r minis- tership (Granatstei Bothwelld nan , 1990: 377-83). If Trudeau's pirouette around traditional Canada-US defence ties d long-standinan g Canadian defence commitment NATo t s O e lefth t Americans unimpressed, Brian Mulroney trie o restordt e Canadian credibilit Washington yi pulliny nb g Canad tradn i S aeU closee th o rt majon o d r an foreign policy questions. Mulrone determines ywa o dt restor e credibiliteth y that Canad NATn i witoncd d d Oan ha ah eha Americanse th , participatin f 1990-o r Gule slightld th 1Wa fan n g i y increasin defence gth e budget governmens Hi . Halifax-clase th t se t s frigate construction progra mmotionn i , bega acquie th plao n t r n-fo sition of marine helicopters to replace the already-aging Sea Kings, and at one point even proposed that Canada acquire nuclear sub- marines and a Polar 8 icebreaker to guard Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. The subs died when Canada's growing budget deficit and debt crisis dictated new cuts in defence expenditures. There can be no doubt, however, that Canada-US defence relations reached a new high point during his administration (Davis, 1989: 215-38). Canada—US relations began to slide once again under Jean Chretien and, more particularly, his longest-serving Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy. Ax-worthy was determined to show the world that Canada was not simply a pale reflection of the United States and used the greater freedom that the end of the Cold War seemed to allow Canad encourago at e ties with Communis UNe th t , e Cubamulus o t -, tilateralism 'sofd an ,t power achievo t ' e Canadian pursu o goalt d san e goals—suc e anti-landmineth s ha s treaty—tha founS U de th tdiplo - matically embarrassing e mosth r t parFo .Clintoe th t n administration 2 13 CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2003
more than tolerated Axworthy's ingenuous spin on Canadian foreign relations, possibly because it projected the image that it was itself more t "withilikelac o yt multilaterana l framework tha Republicas nit n pre- decessors \vere. But when George W. Bush was elected in 2000, the Americae tonth f eo n administration quickly changed. The new President made it very clear that the US would rebuild s militaryit , tha t wouli t d unilaterally withdraw fro e Kyotmth o t trusAccordno td internationathad di t an ,i t l inspection regimes cov- ering chemica d biologicaan l l weapons. Ottaw s immediatelwa a y challenged to either get on side with the new administration or keep its distanc awaid ean t developments choice complicates .Th ewa y db the knowledge that President Bush had a long history of involvement Mexicaw witne h e closs Mexicth n wa o President et d oan , reformer Vicente Fox. One way to forestall a US-shift towards Mexico, several experts suggested rebuilo t s Canadiae dwa ,th n militar strengthed yan n e Canada-Uth S defence relationship s Britisa , h Prime Minister Tony Blair was strengthening UK-US defence ties. The Chretien govern- wonts it s ment, wa chos s a , e caution eved an , n appeare mako dt ea practic f denouncino e g allege unilateralismS U d , becoming once agai 'stere nth n daughte voice th f God'f eo o r Deas a , n Achesod nha once described Canadian foreign policy (Granatstein and Hillmer, 1991: 183). Almost immediately after the terror attacks of 11 September, Canada oncs wa e Washingtoagaie th n ni n spotligh countra s a t y sudthas wa t- denly very importan r continentafo t l e securitdefence th th d f yo an e United States. The closing of cross-border trade and the grounding of all air traffic in North America after the attacks grabbed the attention Canadiae oth f n government almost immediately direce Th . t impacn o t the economy was devastating in its own right, but the ripples were felt right across Canada burgeonine On . g young airline close doors dit s per- manently e resth ;t required bailouts companien I . s larg d smallan e , retail, wholesale d manufacturingan , , plants shut down—or nearly did—for lac partf ko r lacs o accesf marketskS o U o st . Border security Canadiae th f o p nto leapegovernmene th o dt t agenda. From the very beginning of the war on terror, the Canadian gov- ernment was an active and willing partner with the US in tightening border controls and increasing border security. Tough new internal security measures were adopted and billions in new resources were directe o perimetedt nationad an r l securit e Decembeth n yi r 2001 budget. With $1.7 billion in daily cross-border trade at issue, it Bercuson I CANADA-US DEFENCE RELATIONS POST-11 SEPTEMBER 133
mattered muc Canad o honcs t wa eS aagai U tha e ntth very concerned abou northers it t n border. That firmness was missing, however, when it came to beefing up onle th y Canadian agency capabl patrollinf eo littorae gth l waterd san the air over Canada, or of making any significant contribution not terrorisn o attace r th wa terrorisn t homo mkt e a o onlt th ebu o y t m abroad. Canada's Operation Apollo, heavy on naval forces, extremely light on air assets, and with a battle group insertion only in late February 200 incapabld 2an toua f eo r longer tha monthsx nsi s wa , the best Ottawa could do with the nation's badly depleted military. No matter what pressur s placegovernmene th ewa n do variouy b t s domestic agencies, private and public, including the Senate Security Defencd an e Committee federae th , l Auditor General House th d ean , of Commons Standing Committe Nationan eo l Defenc Veteransd ean ' Affairs, the Prime Minister dug in his heels and refused to consider any significant increases in the national defence budget. It was then AmbassadoS U thae th t o Canadat r , Paul Celluci, bega o openlnt y disparage Canada's defence readines urged san d that Canada's mili- tary be bolstered (Gatehouse, 2002). Celluci's entreaties merely widene e rifdth t that Trudeau, Chretien Axworthd an , d alreadyha y worked har o createt d e polOn l. take mid-Decemben i n r 2002 showed that an astonishing 38 per cent of Canadians thought George Bush was more of a threat to world peace than Saddam Hussein.1 ironis Ii t c tha natioa t dependeno ns internationan o t l traded an , securelo s economyS U e y th tie o d,t should have emerged earln yi the twenty-first century as so cool to the US, so isolationist in its for- eign policy outlook self-deludeo s d an , believo t s da e tha mattert i t s much in world councils any longer. Tepid government leadership in foreign affairs e guttin e militaryth e fel, th th tf go need an ,f som do e Liberal ministers to cater to the illusions of the otherwise tattered Canadian left have produced a growing impasse with the United States. As in the early days of the Cold War, the US is looking to Canad r helpfo a ; unlike those days, Ottaw s spurnini a g Canada's only true neighbour and friend. If this policy trend is not reversed, the long-term implications for Canada will be devastating.
NOTE
See
REFERENCES
Bercuson, David. 1990. 'Continental Defenc d Arctian e c Sovereignty, 1945-1950: Solving the Canadian Dilemma', in K. Neilson and Ronald G. Haycock, eds, The d Defense. an York w Coldr Ne Wa : Praeger. ————. 1993a. 'A People so Ruthless as the Soviets: Canadian Images of the Cold War and the Soviet Union, 1946-1950', in David Davies, ed., Canada and the Soviet Experiment: Essays on Canadian Encounters with Russia and the Soviet Union, 1900-1991. Toronto and Waterloo: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, University of Waterloo, 89-103. ————. 1993b. True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960. Toronto: Universit f Torontyo o Press. Conant, Melvin. 1962. The Long Polar Watch: Canada and the Defense of North America. Yorkw Ne : Harper. Davis, Mathwi . 1989S n . 'Nuclear Submarine r Canadafo s TechnicaA : l Critique', n Davii . HaglunG d Joed an dl Sokolsky, eds e U.S.-Canada,Th Security Relationship. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Departmen f Nationao t l Defence (DND). 2002. 'Enhanced Canada-US Security Cooperation', Backgrounder Dec9 , . Availabl :