Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September
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University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Arts Arts Research & Publications 2003 Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September Bercuson, David J. Oxford University Press Bercuson, David J.. (2003). "Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September". In Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus, Carment, D., Hampson, F. O. & Hillmer, N. (eds). Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press: 121-134. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/44573 book part Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca 7 Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September DAVID BERCUSON If William Lyon Mackenzie King wer magicallo et y reappeae th n i r nation's capital today woule h , doubo dn shockee b textene th t a dt whico t armee hth d force f UniteCanade so th d daan States operate together and the extent to which Canada's defence has been so thor- oughly integrated into the larger context of US defence concerns. King woul e staggeredb e rang th numbed y an eb d f treaty-leveo r l agreements memorandumd an understandinf so Canadiage thath e tti n militarS U e Forceyth structureo t s e woulH . d disapprove th f o e Canadian navy's now standard practice of integrating a Canadian warship into every US carrier battle group that goes to the Arabian Gulf to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq. He would be mortified Canada'y b Augus9 s2 t 2002 announcemen pendina f o t g agreement alloo t troopS S wU U wit e s hth ont o Canadian soi responsn i l a o t e terrorist attack woule .H d undoubtedly rejec notioe th t n tha matn i t - ters of security and defence, the already close working relationship 2 CANAD12 A AMONG NATIONS 2003 between Canada and the US ought to be tightened even further, or that a Canadian government ought to think seriously of a significant expansio defencs it f no e budge orden i t sootho rt e risin concernS gU s about Canadian defence 'freeloading'. In general, it still remains that the Canada-US defence relationship is one of the closest of any two sovereign countries on the face of the earth. As of January 2002, there were close to 90 bilateral treaty-level agreements governing the Canada—US defence relationship, some dat- e earl r bacth fa ys ina k s nineteent ga h century. Sinc e terroristh e t attack Septembe1 1 f so r 2001, further close arrangements have been entered into, includin e establishmenth g e Canada-Uth f o t - SBi National Planning Group Groue Th . p will prepare 'contingency plans to ensure a cooperative and well coordinated response to national requests for military assistance' on land and at sea, essentially to supplement NORAD (DND, 2002). Outsid e purvieth f o e f strictlwo y defence matters, the two nations have moved very close together on sharing cross-border intelligence, providin r bordefo g r security, smoothing the flow of cross-border traffic, and generally in starting to shore up the continental perimeters to ward off attack. Offshore, active Canadian military co-operation with the US, as wel s wita l h Canada's other NATO allies, predate e event1 dth 1 f o s September, with the Canadian air force contributing to the bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis of 1999 and a Canadian ground contingent being sent to Kosovo for two rotations in 1999 and 2000 to help KFOR pacify that nominally Yugoslav province. Most notably, Canada sen larga t e naval contingen US-lee th d dai camo t - paign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, followed by a Canadian ground contingent sent to participate earle inshootina th yn i sprinr g wa f 2002 go . Close operationa- co l operation continues betwee r e Canadia navieai S nth U d d an s nan forces while Canadian defence contractors suppl ymyriaa f milido - tary equipment to the US armed forces. At one level, then, the Canada-US defence relationship continues s evolveha muc t i s dha sinc e firseth t post-Worl I affirmatioI r dWa n in February 1947 (Permanent Joint Boar Defencn do e Resolutio. nNo 36) that the close wartime continental defence relationship, initiated at Ogdensburg, New York, in August 1940, would continue into peacetime. And yet the post-11 September period saw an immediate upswin pressure—iS U n gi AmbassadoS nU publie th y cb Canado rt a and in private by a wide range of government officials, political Bercuson I CANADA-US DEFENCE RELATIONS POST-11 SEPTEMBER 123 leaders influentiad an , l private citizens—on Canade th beeo t ap u f Canadian military for both continental defence and offshore opera- tions. Dwight Mason's essay in this volume accurately reflects the growing frustratio feelS nU s tha e oveth t r Canada's shoddy treatment n armeow s doit f forces becaus e harth df o erealit y thae US'th t s longest border, and perhaps its most vulnerable, is with Canada. stils Iearlo i t to l knoo yt w whethe e forecastth l al r s thatere th t- rorist attacks would 'change the world' were correct. As with all such sweeping generalizations, no one will really know until many years have passedthine on certains t gi Bu . : those attacks revealed jusw ho t vulnerable the US is to acts of planned mass mayhem. Thus the defenc e continentath f o e l United State nows i s , once againe th t a , top of the US priority list, ahead of virtually every other American foreign policy concern. This has not been true since the end of the Cold War and not even since the era of the massive buildup of ICBMs whic, US he begath USSe inth d earnesRn an ni earle th yn i t 1960s. In many respects, then, Canada toda virtualln i s yi same yth e posi- tion it was during the 10 years immediately after World War II; due to geography alone, Canada is once again vital for the defence of the United States itself, whether Canadians are aware of that reality, whether they like it, or even whether they are prepared to pay for it. In that sense, 11 September returned Canada to a past that should forgottene b t no . Canadians remained wary neighbours of the US for more than six decades afte establishmene th r Canadf o t continuina 1867n ai s i t I . g sourc f amusemeneo Canadiao t t n military historians thae firsth t t interwar defence plan put together by Canada's tiny interwar military hears it t Canadiaa ta d ha n cavalry attac MidwestS k U ints e owa th t I . t untino l 1938, when roae Hitle welth s launchin o dt n rwa o l g World Wa , thae firsII r th t t very tentativ t tangiblbu e e steps towards Canada-US defence co-operation began after Frankli . RoosevelnD t told a Queen's University audience in 1938 that the US would not stan df Canad i idl y yb a were threatene hostila y db e power. King responded in kind a few days after (Thompson and Randall, 1994: 147)yearo Tw .s later Francs defeata n ,i y ela , Canada initiatee dth first military-to-military talks ever betwee countries—buo tw e nth n i t secret f courseo , . Canadian officers soon secrey begapa o tnt visits to Washington, always going in mufti, to begin exploring concrete step countrieo stw tha e tth s might tak growin e vien ei th f wo g threats overseas (Eayrs, 1965: 203). 4 CANAD12 A AMONG NATIONS 2003 Thu e fundamentath s l pattere Canada—Uth f o n S defence rela- t tionshifro e verse m th s y pwa beginnin f thago t relationshipe th : US initiates, Canada responds (because it usually must), but gener- ally reluctantl ofted yan n with great hesitation dynamic—ae .Th s true toda1938—in i s ya s rootes harbourerealite th ha n S di y U thae dth t global interests and ambitions since the late nineteenth century and Canad s notaha . Thus, wit exceptioe year0 h2 th e s th betwee f no n generalls ha S 191 1939d U 9e an y th ,understoo d that global interests must be protected by global power, manifest in its many forms but especially military power a minimumd tha t an a ,t , America's real security borders must be established far from its shores and its land boundaries with Canada and Mexico. Almost none of that is true for Canada. "When Canada's mandarins first awok e e importanc1930th th n o ei st f reachine o r inter fo t - gou national markets—particularly but not exclusively in the United States—their strategy rested primaril powee th e n reasof yo ro th d nan pul f economio l c eventualld self-interesan S U Canade ti e yth o t t o at the rest of the trading world (Granatstein, 1981: 66). Canada had eco- nomic interests in the Caribbean, for example, but no military capac- itforco y t people e eth thaf so biddings t it regio o d o n.t Besidese th , US was perfectly capable of policing that area and shouldering the full costs of maintaining marines and naval units at the ready there. e patterTh f Canada-Uno S defence relationships almost always involves ha d Canada respondin Americao gt n initiatives pattere th ; n of Canadian-American trade relationship almoss si t exactl oppoe yth - site.