Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 12, ISSUE 2, WINTER 2010 Studies The Past as Prologue: Sustaining Canadian Capacity for Defence, Diplomacy and Development1 Colin Robertson Drive down Wellington Street, past the Parliament Buildings and, almost directly across from the Supreme Court are a pair of buildings buttressing both sides of Lyon Street. Built in the aftermath of World War II, the East and West Memorial Buildings once housed the Department of Veterans Affairs. Their architect had a sense of both history and the neighborhood. It is reflected in their chateau style, copper roofs and stone facing – not the usual cinder-block approach of later government buildings. Spanning the street and connecting the two buildings is an Arch. Chiseled into it, in both official languages on both the north and south side, is this inscription: ‘ALL THESE WERE HONOURED IN THEIR GENERATIONS AND WERE THE GLORY OF THEIR TIMES’ 1 My appreciation to Nancy Pearson Mackie who graciously provided me with a set of the previous Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures. The lecture I gave on January 14, 2010 at the Museum of the Regiments drew from previous lectures, especially those given by David Pratt, John English, Terry Copp and Jack Granatstein. As always I drew on the advice and published works of Jack Granatstein, David Bercuson, Terry Copp, Desmond Morton, Denis Stairs, Robert Bothwell, Norman Hillmer, John Holmes, Allan Gotlieb, Derek Burney and Michael Hart – all of whom furnish me with ideas, inspiration and knowledge. ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2010 ISSN : 1488-559X JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES Taken from Ecclesiasticus, it is a fit description of Ross Ellis and his Calgary Highlanders, ‘A battalion of heroes’, David Bercuson’s apt phrase, they fought for Canada and the Allied cause through Normandy, the Netherlands and into Germany. Having experienced three great Disruptions – Ellis was born during the First World War, he came of age during the Great Depression, and then he served with distinction in the Second Great War - Ellis and the rest of what we now call the ‘greatest generation’ of the 20th century were determined to build a better world, a better Canada, a better Alberta. Stability and security mattered. They’d learned at the sharp end that Canadians don’t live in a ‘fire-proof’ house. What counted were institutions that safeguarded individual liberty, permitted the development of a market economy and at the same time provided collective security. For Canadians, this was best achieved through a ‘community of shared values’ - cooperative security2 - under an umbrella that we now describe as Pearsonian internationalism. Ellis, the soldier-turned-citizen, went into business and served as town councilor, as mayor of High River and later as a coalition Liberal-Conservative member of the provincial legislature. Among his constituents was a future prime minister, Joe Clark. Clark’s father published the local newspaper. Ellis personified the civic-mindedness that characterized post-war Canadian international policy. The Roots of Canadian Internationalism: The St. Laurent Doctrine and Pearson Corollary The best enunciation of Canadian internationalism is still found in a speech given in Toronto by Louis St. Laurent, then our Secretary of State for External Affairs. The 2 David Haglund uses the phrase ‘cooperative security’ in his The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited- Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End (2000) and it builds on John Bartlet Brebner’s concept of the North Atlantic Triangle (1945) that argued Canada’s challenge was to maintain a comfortable but independent relationship with both the former and current hegemons, Britain and the United States. Played astutely, Canada could also be the Atlantic linchpin and leverage the relationships to advantage. 2 | P a g e VOLUME 12, ISSUE 2, WINTER 2010 remarks fit the occasion. It was the inaugural lecture to the memory of Duncan and John Gray, brothers who had died during the Second World War.3 The five principles put forward that January evening in 1947 continue to be the touchstone for the conduct of Canada’s international relations. They also set the dominant themes for our foreign policy and, for the most part, they endure. The first principle dealt with the continuing Canadian preoccupation with our ‘two solitudes’. St. Laurent proclaimed that ‚we are agreed that our external policies shall not destroy our unity.‛ He spoke not just of linguistic and cultural division but of sectionalism and the danger of extravagant regionalism, ‚no matter where they have their origin‛. St. Laurent warned that ‚a disunited Canada will be a powerless one.‛ This first principle should be read at the commencement of every federal-provincial meeting or international meetings at which the different levels of government participate. It would have served us at Copenhagen4 where certain members of the combined Canadian delegation of first ministers, ministers and mayors seemed more intent on scoring domestic political points than seeking to advance the Canadian interest on those areas where they shared consensus. The second principle is that of political liberty and collective security because ‚we are all conscious of the danger to our own political institutions when freedom is attacked in other parts of the world.‛ St. Laurent observed that ‚stability is lacking where consent is absent‛ and noted that ‚we have come as a people to distrust and dislike governments which rule by force and which suppress free comment on their activities‛. The third principle is respect for ‚the rule of law in national and international affairs‛ as ‚the necessary antecedent to self-government‛. This is what the international community now asks of President Karzai but with similar application elsewhere. The rule of law, continued St. Laurent, applies not just within states but with equal vigour between states. He had very much in mind the massive and unprecedented 3 For the text of this lecture, go to http://www.russilwvong.com/future/stlaurent.html. 4 Copenhagen talks on Climate Change, December 2009. 3 | P a g e JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES construction job in post-war architecture – the UN and its alphabet soup of agencies, work that continues today in the WTO and now, of course, on climate change. What distinguished the West from the rest, argued St. Laurent, was a commitment to the fourth principle - ‘human values’. In language that would fail contemporary infatuation with the politically correct, St. Laurent spoke of ‚the values of a Christian civilization…the conceptions of good and evil which emerged from Hebrew and Greek civilization and which have been transformed and transmitted through Christian traditions of the Western World.‛ Whatever the words, the intention was to underline a muscular approach to values linked to interests. In the wake of war, our foreign policy would put ‚emphasis on the importance of the individual, on the place of moral principles in the conduct of human relations (and) on the standards of judgment which transcend mere material well-being‛. Today, we’d call it ‘soft power’. In this commitment to values-based foreign policy are the roots of some of the most celebrated Canadian initiatives including the Treaty on Land Mines, the initiatives against child soldiers and blood diamonds, the concept of ‘right to protect’, the International Criminal Court and the initiatives on Africa as well as Prime Minister Harper’s initiative on improving maternal and child health. The fifth and final principle was our ‚willingness to accept our international responsibilities‛. St. Laurent underlined that ‚again and again on the major questions of participation in international organization, both in peace and war, we have taken our decision to be present‛. Being present mattered because, ‚if there is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organization.‛ A lawyer by profession, St. Laurent understood that rules-based systems leveled the playing field. Importantly, it gave a nimble ‘middle power’ the right to play alongside the great powers and, like a Canadian football field that is both longer and wider than its American counterpart, it gave scope and space for a foreign policy that thrived on initiative and doing diplomacy differently. A corollary to the willingness to accept our international obligations is the acknowledgement of having the capacity to meet those obligations. As Paul Martin Sr. remarked in 1964 when he was foreign minister, "Many nations had an appetite for 4 | P a g e VOLUME 12, ISSUE 2, WINTER 2010 power without teeth, but Canada [during the Cold War] had developed both the appetite and the teeth for a new international role." In 1964, we had a population of approximately 22 million and possessed a regular force of some 120,000 and a reserve force of some 45,000 strong. Doing diplomacy differently – quietly, yes, but with initiative and ideas - was another defining characteristic of Canadian postwar foreign policy. For St. Laurent, the practical application of these principles was displayed internationally in the construction of the post-war international architecture – the UN as a forum for international discussion and action, and in NATO for collective security and economic partnership and through the Commonwealth of Nations. The transition from Empire to Commonwealth owed much to Canadian creativity and diplomacy and St. Laurent allowed that it was an example of what, ‚we ourselves have fashioned for achieving the ends we desire in world affairs‛. Sadly, the Commonwealth is now mostly neglected as a forum for Canadian initiative. This is surprising, given that the Commonwealth’s history and the intersection within the organization between East and West, North and South means that it is a forum where we are seen as a leader and where we can act uninhibited by the shadow of the United States.