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NSSC 3 / CESN 3
SEMINAR 1 / SÉMINAIRE 1
DND’s RENEWAL: A POLITICAL OR A BUREAUCRATIC INITIATIVE
By /par Mr. René LaRose
This paper was written by a student attending La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour of the requirements of the Course of Studies. satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au contains facts and opinions which the author cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and correct for que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas policy or the opinion of any agency, including nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un the Government of Canada and the Canadian organisme quelconque, y compris le Department of National Defence. This paper gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la may not be released, quoted or copied except Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de with the express permission of the Canadian diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude Department of National Defence. sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale . ABSTRACT
This paper argues the need for the Department of National Defence’s bureaucracy to take
the lead for the resolution of the expectations-resources gap that has developed in
Canadian defence affairs. After having assessed the magnitude of this expectations-
resources gap, it is demonstrated that only a Cabinet level decision can resolve the issue.
However, an assessment of the environment shows no apparent stimulus that could
motivate Cabinet to take a decisive action to resolve this gap. After looking at the
options available to Cabinet, the status quo appears as the only viable approach for
Cabinet to take. This means that important decisions will only be made on a case by case basis and that the Department of National Defence (DND) will not get any significant
guidance for the hard choices to be made to resolve the issue. Hence, the need for
DND’s bureaucracy to take the lead and to propose capability options for debate in both
political and domestic forums. After having considered the nature and state of the
Canadian domestic political environment, this paper concludes that only a co-ordinated
bureaucratic initiative from DND’s senior leadership will lead to a debate at the
appropriate level and consequently, will lead Cabinet to resolve the issue. DND’s RENEWAL: A POLITICAL OR A BUREAUCRATIC INITIATIVE
Introduction
The world has changed. The highly predictable bipolar world experienced during
the Cold War period has been replaced by a world where regional stability concerns and
intrastate conflicts dominate the agenda. The very powerful nuclear threat, which once
ensured global stability, has been replaced by the more unpredictable asymmetric threats
at the top of the security priority list of Canadians. Thanks to advances in information
technologies, Canadians and their political masters can now observe and react to world
events as they happen in the comfort of their own living rooms. The globalisation trend
also modifies the global socio-economic map and poses new challenges to states in their
ability to exercise sovereignty.
However, something has yet to change. Despite all efforts made, so far, by the
Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) since the end of the Cold War, there
still remains a gap between the capabilities that DND tries to maintain and renew according to future expectations, and the resources available for doing so – the expectations-resources gap. Since government sets both, expectations through policy papers and decisions, and resources through budgets, the initiative to resolve the issue must reside within the government itself. Even after having gone through a relatively
good economical period and having turned deficits into surplus, the Canadian
government has yet to come up with a solution to resolve this gap.
1
DND is still struggling to maintain a minimum viable capability, stretched to the
limit by unending concurrent operational deployments, while looking at ways to deal
with the challenge posed by its renewal in the context of the Revolution in Military
Affairs and other interoperability issues. If DND wants to make progress and the
political executive is not in a position to initiate the first steps towards the required
decision, then DND’s bureaucracy must be prepared to take the lead. Political executive
decision will require either a perceived incentive or at least no major disincentive to do
so. First, the issue must be legitimate and brought to the attention of the right decision-
making level for action to take place. Then, the environment that influences the decision-
makers must be examined for any critical factors which could force the decision. Finally,
if there is no overriding imperative, government’s options will have to be looked at for
any comparative advantage as seen from the eyes of the decision-makers. It is only then,
after having assessed how government is going to handle the issue, that DND can decide
on a strategy based on whether or nor the process needs to be initiated from its own
bureaucracy.
Assessing whose initiative it is to resolve the current defence expectations- resources gap is the first step towards resolving it. This paper argues that, because of the
state of current defence policy-making environments, the Department of National
Defence’s bureaucracy has no other choice than to take the lead for the resolution of the
expectations-resources gap that has developed in Canadian defence affairs. Based on
lack of incentive and the current environmental situation, the Cabinet is most likely to
2 maintain status quo and leave DND with the challenge to make progress on a case by case basis. However, DND has means at its disposal to influence the nature of the debate in both political and domestic forums. A co-ordinated bureaucratic initiative from
DND’s senior leadership can lead to a debate at the appropriate level and consequently, can lead Cabinet to resolve the issue.
The Need for Government Action
The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the associated predictable bipolar world have created new challenges in the field of national security. The main perceived threats to the global world order have shifted from those requiring a powerful deterrent of nuclear weapons and a strong conventional force capability deployed forward, to a more unpredictable and volatile asymmetric threat. International crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and terrorism, to name but a few, have now become greater threats in the minds of Canadians than the direct threat to the territory.
National security is no longer restricted to defence and foreign policies. It has grown into a much more global issue involving new threats and more importantly, it has raised the level and criticality of the contribution of other departments. The Coast
Guard, Immigration, Solicitor General, Justice and others are now necessary partners with complementary missions and can claim a legitimate requirement for resources associated with national security.
3 In the absence of an overarching national security policy framework, DND
strategists have had to rely on the 1994 Defence White Paper1 to guide their strategic assessment and, to build their own vision of the needs and expectations of government.
Accordingly, the mission of the Canadian Forces as expressed in the Strategy 2020
document remains: “The Defence mission is to defend Canada and Canadians interests
and values while contributing to international peace and security”.2
Strategy 2020 recognizes the complexity of the geo-political, military, socio-
economic and organizational environment in which the defence policy needs to be
implemented. Where the whole plan fails the reality check is at the affordability level.
Although Strategy 2020 respects the expectations set in the Defence policy as updated by
day-to-day decisions, it also needs to reflect budget decisions to be appropriately carried
out.
The major lack of resources to implement the policy, as currently stated in the
1994 Defence White Paper, has been widely recognized by DND, Canadians, some
pressure groups and even by politicians themselves.3 Recent budgets have paid attention to such concern and budgets 1999 and 2000 have supported a slight increase in defence spending. However, Canadian government has still not been able to provide the necessary level of funding to DND to cope with the challenge. At a time where
1 Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper, (Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1994). 2 Canada, Department of National Defence, Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020, ( Ottawa 1999) p. 1. 3 LGen C. Belzile, Does Canada Need A New White Paper?, (The Political Studies Students’ Conference, University of Manitoba, Feb 2001) p. 2. [http://www.cda-cdai.ca/belzile_feb01.htm.]
4 Government tries to make ends meet by balancing the need for debt reduction, tax
reduction, education, health care and other issues, it is forced to make difficult choices in
areas that Canadians have close at heart. These choices have a strong and direct effect on
DND through the budget.
Although the rationale which led Cabinet to allocate roughly $10 billion a year to the DND budget is not documented, an additional $750 million per year was recently considered by the Auditor General to be more representative of what DND needs to renew its capability according to policy. 4
Conversely, there is even far less documentation addressing the level of capability that can be expected from DND based on the current budget statement. It would be
outside the scope of this essay to make any attempt at predicting such a capability level
considering the complexity of the issue. The mere fact that the various missions cannot
be segregated, that Canada is already committed in numerous treaties or agreements and
that Canadian Forces need to cope with the emerging Revolution in Military Affairs
suggests that such an issue is better left in the hands of the true experts.
In the absence of a clear expert appreciation on the overall issue of capability
reduction within current resources allocation, the views of an independent observer on a
sub element should be sufficient to evaluate the magnitude of the challenge and assess the
4 In his “Reflections on a decade of serving Parliament”, the Auditor General, Mr. Desautels, used $750M as the estimate provided by officials from DND. (Feb, 2001), [http://www.oag- bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/01cap_htm].
5 minimum level at which a decision is required. Joseph T. Jockel5 offers such an assessment while assessing the hard choices facing Canadian government in addressing
Canada’s capability to contribute to multilateral deployments. His analysis states that the hard decisions facing the Canadian government are not limited to an all-or-nothing combat capability, but they also include a possibility for reducing the requirement for the
Main Contingency Forces to the level of a “Vanguard” or that of single elements. He goes on to suggest that these choices are at such a level that their impacts could be significant. “Formally terminating the Sabre Brigade commitment and with it, in effect, the army’s combat responsibilities would mean openly recognizing the truth that no government could bring itself to deploy the brigade in the condition the army is in today.”
Other suggestions also include reducing or even ending the requirement for the main contingency force of CF-18s’ or reducing the size and commitment of our naval fleet.
The options explored even cover the possibility of transferring the responsibility of sovereignty protection to a better-equipped Coast Guard and RCMP. Considering the impact of such capability reduction on the ability of the government to project influence and act as a middle power, a decision of this magnitude has many consequences, which extend far beyond DND’s mission. It impacts directly on the Canadian government’s ability to ensure the security and well being of Canadians and could severely damage
Canada’s credibility in multilateral forums.
So far, DND and its three services have continued to support the need to maintain multi-purpose combat capable forces and the current contingency force. Budget cuts
5 Joseph T. Jockel, Hard Choices, Soft Power, (The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999), pp. 123- 126.
6 have forced DND to postpone some required initiatives adding to the increasing long- term burden. So, in view of this major challenge, DND has not yet been able to propose a ‘capability package’ which could resolve the existing expectations-resources gap.
Based on the magnitude of the expectations-resources gap that has developed the only level at which a decision can be made to resolve this issue is at the same governmental level as the level where defence policy and budget decisions are made.
The Government Decision Making Process
Having demonstrated that a decision is required at either the policy or the budget making level, we will look at the Canadian government decision-making process to locate the decision centre. More specifically, we will look at it from the defence policy- making process viewpoint.
At the governmental level, we will look at the role played by the political executive and the civil service in decision-making. The latter will be considered under the governmental environment. The role played by the political level in the implementation of policy such as capital procurement or deployment decisions will not be covered, per se. The legislature will be considered under the governmental environment through the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
(SCONDVA). Legislature is not considered specifically since it only plays an indirect role in this policy-making process. Middlemiss and Sokolsky who support such an
7 approach indicate: “But in practical sense, Parliament has not made the decisions, or at
least been an active and influential participant in defence decisions.”6 This is not to say that Parliament should not be involved. But, considering the fact that Canada has experienced majority governments for most of its history and that party lines tend to carry the political executive influence to the Commons, the Parliament has not made decisions on its own but has supported the executive’s initiatives.
As an entity, the political executive comprising the Prime Minister and Cabinet plays the major role in the government decision-making process, being the ultimate judge on defence policy. “Questions about the overall purposes, objectives, and commitments of the armed forces are ultimately decided at this level of defence decision making.
Moreover, the executive wields the single most effective instrument of civilian control over the military – the budget”.7 The Cabinet not only approves the policy but, in some
instances, it becomes the leader of those changes. Some examples of the level of
leadership that is required to steer defence policy in a direction that expectations and
resources could become more coherent have already been shown in the past. Trudeau in
1971 with the decision to halve the troops in Europe and Hellyer in 1964 advocating
unification are examples of the level of decisions that are required if Canada is to reduce
expectations at the level of its commitment to invest in defence. On the other hand, the
Mulroney government with the 1987 policy showed that, in a period of increasing GDP,
the government could make the required decision to provide a defence budget aligned
with ‘adjusted’ commitments.
6 D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, (Harcourt Brace Jovanosvich Canada Inc. 1989), p. 91.
8
The other side of the challenge for government is to provide continued support to
ensure that the capability developed to meet expectations remains financially viable.
Although the 1987 Defence policy advocated the need to address the commitment-
capability gap, an analysis of the Canadian defence expenditures in constant dollars for
the last 50 years made by John Treddenick clearly indicates that the trend set in 1987 was
not supported for more than three years. It was in fact just an extension of the trend set in
the early 1980’s.8
It is also interesting to note that most of the significant initiatives where Cabinet
played a major role in leading the initiative occurred in the first mandate of a newly
elected government. This has been the case for Pearson (1964), Trudeau (1971),
Mulroney (1987) and Chretien (1994).9 This illustrates the fact that a newly elected
government is more likely to embark on politically challenging policy-making initiatives
than a government that has been in power for two or three mandates as it is currently the
case.
In sum the decision required to resolve the expectations-resources gap can only be
a Cabinet level decision since Cabinet is the ultimate judge on defence policy as well as
on budget matters.
7 Ibid., p.73. 8 John M. Treddenick, Distributing the Defence Budget: Choosing Between Capital and Manpower, (Defence Management) p. 66 9 The White Paper of 1971 was an expression of Trudeau’s statement made in 1969. The 1987 White Paper was issued in the third year of Mulroney’s first mandate. In the two other cases, they came 1 year after election.
9 The Environment
Although the decision required needs to be made at Cabinet, it can only be made
if the environment is permissive. According to Middlemiss and Sokolsky10, defence
policy-making takes place in three environments: governmental, domestic and external.
In consequence, we will look at each of those environments to assess their current state
and potential overriding impact. Figure 1 illustrates the link between those environments
and the Cabinet, and shows the direct and indirect links that DND can take advantage of
in advocating the need to resolve the issue. In this figure, the governmental environment
description is taken from the Privy Council Office’s representation of how issues are
moved through Cabinet.11
Domestic Public-Media-Influence Groups External Other levels of Government
Parliament Governmental Caucus SCONDVA
Cabinet Cabinet Committee
DND PCO/PMO/Finance/TBS OGD
The Policy-Making Environments Relationship Figure 1
10 Middlemiss and Sokolsky. P. 59. 11 Canada, Privy Council Office, Decision Making Process and Central Agencies in Canada, (Public Works and Government Services, Canada, 2000), Annex 1.
10
The Governmental Environment
From a government executive view point, the prime minister and Cabinet
members can count on the support of the various central agencies: the Prime Minister’s
Office (PMO), the Privy Council Office (PCO), Treasury Board and the Finance
Department. According to Donald Savoie12, it is the entire centre of government including the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the central agencies that has become the real centre of power. Amongst these central agencies, “the Privy Council Office plays a key role in the elaboration of government policy...[and] works closely with line departments, as well as with the Prime Minister in providing leadership and direction to the Government.”13 Besides this role, PCO is also responsible for “managing the flow of business to ensure that the decision-making process functions according to the standards set by the Prime Minister.”14
Cabinet ministers raise issues in the form of a memorandum to Cabinet and it is the responsibility of PCO to ensure co-ordination between all ministers. It is at this level that any proposal needs to take into account the various policies of other departments to gather their support at Cabinet. PCO as the co-ordinator then becomes the key player in the process and its partnership is required. For example, a proposal by DND to reduce its operational cost by unilaterally reducing its overall capability to globally deploy would
12 Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Center – The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1999), p. 3. 13 PCO p. 3. 14 Ibid.
11 interfere with the implementation of the foreign policy and might not be acceptable at
Cabinet level depending on who has the stronger influence. In the end, it makes it very challenging for the minister of national defence to influence the agenda.
On the other hand, formulating the budget is a prerogative limited to central agencies and Cabinet. An increase in the defence budget has necessarily a negative effect on either the overall budget objectives or on the budget of other departments. Again, central agencies, including PCO, ensure co-ordination in order to be responsive to
Cabinet’s interests. In that sense, the central agencies actions are more influenced by
Cabinet interests than by specific department requests.
Overall, central agencies should end up having a neutral impact on the decision but they force departments to work in partnership to bring issues up and for decisions to be made. The minister of National Defence would need a very special and influential relationship with other Cabinet members to strongly influence on his own a decision of such importance.
In this analysis, the role and influence of the committees also merits consideration. In the current structure, DND cannot count on a specific Cabinet committee on defence because it simply does not exist. However, the House of
Commons has set up a Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
(SCONDVA) to discuss defence issues. The contribution of SCONDVA in the government decision to invest in quality of life improvements for members of the
12 Canadian Forces is a good example of support it can provide for advancing defence
issues. In his introductory address to the 16th annual seminar of the Conference of
Defence Association (CDA), Mr Pat O’Brien, MP, Chairman of SCONDVA, emphasised that the value of the committee does not reside only in its ability to table reports to
Parliament but also in the fact that its member go to the caucus and “the government caucus is the key.”15 Other committees such as the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s
Defence Policy have also played a role in policy making. However, since such
committees are established by Cabinet only after deciding to review an issue, they are of
no help to influence Cabinet to look at the issue in the first place.
Overall, the current government environment does not present any overwhelming reasons to believe that it could force a Cabinet decision. Central agencies, serving as
interface between Cabinet and DND, being responsible for co-ordination and being
responsive to Cabinet itself, are unlikely to challenge the status quo. SCONDVA, on the
other hand, could influence the decision by raising the general awareness level of the
challenge. It is however, unlikely to do so at this time because the issue is simply not
discussed. For the issue to be discussed, it needs to be properly documented (SCONDVA
does not have the research resources necessary to develop and analyse high level issues)
and needs a political incentive. Parliamentary standing committees are in majority
composed of elected members of the party forming the executive and party line might
discourage the members to challenge the executive’s agenda.
15 Pat O’Brien, Introductory Address to the 16th Annual CDA Seminar, (Jan 2000), [http://www.cda- cdai.ca/seminars/2000/obrien.htm]
13 The Domestic Environment
The individuals (public opinion), the interest groups, the other orders of
governments and the media characterise the domestic policy environment.16 To illustrate the importance of this environment in Defence policy making, Middlemiss and Sokolsky state that “No government can formulate defence policy with complete disregard for its public consequences. Thus, it is in this more specifically defined domestic environment that the important debates on defence policy take place, and it is here that the government and DND must promote their policy decisions to win the hearts and minds – and pocket books! - of the Canadians who must ultimately support and subsidize defence.”17
Having said that, Middlemiss and Sokolsky also support the fact that Canadians do not take great interest in defence policy issues.18 This has been the case for the policy itself. However, the government certainly gets the attention of Canadians where the budget is concerned. Until recently, Canadians had been willing to tolerate deficits as an acceptable way of managing government expenditures. This is no longer the case and issues such as deficit and tax reductions now form the centrepiece of budget. It is primarily on this aspect that Canadians are expected to influence government decisions although they will not get involved in the details per se.
16 This structure is borrowed from Middlemiss and Sokolsky in their study of the domestic policy-making environment. pp. 113-132. 17 Middlemiss, p. 115. 18 Ibid., pp. 113-114.
14 Rand Dyck in his textbook on Canadian politics notes on the topic of opinion
polls that “opinions are more specific, numerous, and changeable than values and
attitudes.”19 However, from the Cabinet’s viewpoint, polls constitute a vital source of
information and they are frequently used to gauge public opinion to the extent that “no
political party plans campaign strategy without them, no government is prepared to risk
major policy initiative without gauging public opinion.”20
In any case, opinion polls cannot be ignored because they represent a critical input
in the mind of the politicians themselves who will in the end have to make the decision.
Decisions of this nature have the potential to impact negatively on elected member’s
ability to remain in power. Such a critical importance of poll results was clearly in
evidence when Mr. David Pratt, M.P., Chairman of SCONDVA, was recently asked to
provide his views on the attitudes of Canadians towards the Canadian Forces. His
immediate reaction was to get from the minister’s office their most recent information on
this topic. The reply delivered was the most recent Pollara public opinion poll. In his
reading of the poll results, that will be considered as representative of the current
government executive’s perception, he underlines amongst other results that a strong
majority of Canadians believes that the Canadian Forces are doing a good job, that they
are an important and required institution, that they will be asked to do more and that their
budget should increase over the next decade. On the other hand, Canadians’ perception
of defence policy is not in accordance with the official policy (placing peacekeeping as
the primary role of the Canadian Forces) and DND is not perceived as managing its
19 Perry Rand Dyck, Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches, (International Thompson Publishing, 1996), p. 329.
15 budget very well. After analysing the data, his conclusion remained that although
important “when compared to other issues and concerns, it [Defence] takes a back
seat.”21
However, the current priority list and its general support could certainly change
and as Jockel puts it: “How Canadians and their government assess the Kosovo War itself
may turn decisive depending on the perception that human security has been restored at
an acceptable cost or not.” 22 This becomes even more applicable since most Canadians strongly support human security type operations although the support for operations where “robust intervention” is required comes slightly lower.
In sum, Canadians as a whole support DND and could support some budget increases. However, adjustments are required to the policy to address their real concerns and a special effort is needed to improve the perception of how resources are managed to
retain this support. It must also not be forgotten that Canadians do not perceive defence
matters as a top priority issue and tend to places a higher priority on socio-economic
issues when budget is the concern.
Another mean by which Canadians can influence government is through interest
groups. In most cases, the fact that they tend not to speak with a single voice limits their
ability to influence Government toward a decisive action. LGen (Ret’d) Belzile argues
20 Alan Frizzell et al., The Canadian General Election of 1988 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press), p. 69. 21 David Pratt, M.P., The attitude of the Canadian Public to the Canadian Forces, (17th Annual Seminar of CDA Institute, Feb 2001). 22 Jockel, p. 128.
16 that the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) and another pro-defence influence
group, the Committee of Thirteen, were successful in arguing the case for maintaining
combat capability against other activist groups, such as Canada 21, in the preparation of
the 1994 Defence White Paper. He stated that “in the end we won our case for combat
capability, but lost the battle for adequate defence funding to support it.”23 Although
commendable, such effort might have contributed to increasing the gap instead of
resolving it. It would certainly require a more integrated approach to bring a real
solution.
A similar contribution can be expected from groups supporting commercial
interests. It is certainly at this level that the economic impact of defence spending is
mainly felt. A $10 billion spending tends to affect the economy of some specific regions.
The local commercial groups benefiting from the location of physical infrastructures, the
various suppliers providing increased support due to the alternate service delivery
approach, and the specific suppliers for new equipment benefit from such spending.
Although, in the majority of the cases, they do not form a coherent group to influence the
development of a new policy or a change over budget proposals, they can certainly make
themselves heard if a change to the status quo is envisaged. Consequently, any major
change that would reduce the expected level of business of such group will be opposed
and will create an undesired effect as seen from Cabinet. Considering the relatively small
number of Canadian defence industries and the real difference it would makes on the
overall industry if there was a defence budget increase of $750M, this group also could carry some influence but certainly could not become a determining factor. For at least
23 Belzile, p. 4.
17 half of the respondents to a recent survey of Senators and Members of Parliaments, as
reported by Doug Bland, defence expenditure had no major impact on the economy of
their constituency24 nor should it be used to stimulate economy.
Other orders of governments may show more interest in the future for national
security issues. So far, their interest has been focussed on making sure they were getting
their fair share of regional benefits distribution. Due to the nature of the emerging threats
and the consequences of these on their own area of responsibilities such as health,
education or police, they are more likely to get involved if Canadian government opens
up discussions on national policy. Responding to their various interests would increase
the complexity of any governmental initiative aimed at reviewing the policy and could
prove unattractive to Cabinet.
Finally, the media also plays a critical role in influencing the agenda of policy-
making through their pivotal position. It “serves to inform and educate the general public
and other interest groups and to help establish the broad parameters with which the
political leadership and the bureaucracy must act.”25 On defence policy matters,
Middlemiss also supports that the Canadian government has been very reluctant to provide sufficient information for the media to fulfil its role properly. Consequently, the media have only developed limited capability and interest to address defence issues. The challenge for government is to sustain the interest by the media on defence matters for a sufficient period of time to get over the initial sensational aspect and discuss the
24 Douglas L. Bland, Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces, (The Claxton Papers, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, 1999), p. 35.
18 important aspects. An other challenge for government is to provide coherent information
on a very complex issue when this information originates simultaneously from various
internal sources (from the soldier to the minister). Statements by the defence minister
such as: “The Canadian Forces is in a better, healthier state now than it was a number of
years ago, to be able to meet Canada’s interests at home and abroad. We have
established and are establishing a healthy foundation for the 21st century.”26 will certainly challenge the readers of David Pugliese of the Ottawa Citizen who at the same time writes, based on inputs from a senior officer, “Numerous reports by army officers in the past two years have warned about the organisation’s severe financial problems and how it
is affecting combat capability.”27 Although it is clear that the media influences the way
Canadians think about defence, there is certainly not a specific trend observable at this time in the media that could significantly influence Cabinet to take action.
This brief overview of the domestic political environment shows no major issues that could force Cabinet to energetically act to resolve the expectations-resources gap to the detriment of any other current priorities.
The External Environment
Canadian defence does not exist in a vacuum. As stated in the white paper, protection of Canada, defence cooperation with the US and contribution to international
25 Middlemiss, p. 130. 26 Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, Opening Address to the 17th Annual CDA Seminar, (Feb2001), [http://www.cda-cdai.ca/seminars/2001/MDN.htm] 27 David Puglieese, Fighting a losing battle, Ottawa Citizen, 27 Jan 2001.
19 security are all part of the defence mission. We have already observed that in their own views, Canadians do not perceive a direct threat to the territory as a concern and have adopted the general perception that peacekeeping has now become the primary role of the
CF. Looking back at history, one must recognise that issues such as participation in
NORAD and a reduction in the contribution to NATO have drawn significant attention and expose the government of the time to some degree of scrutiny.
However, at this time, the US is promoting its National Missile Defence (NMD) initiative and has sought support from Canada. There has not been, so far, any indication that this would require in any significant additional investment or that the US would try to influence Canada in such a way. The way NMD goes could have an impact on
NORAD and the approach to defend North America but would not displace the priority given to this aspect of the policy.
NATO is also readjusting following the Cold War and is putting a high priority on the European ability to defend Europe. Through the EU, Europe is also considering to domestically reinforce its own defence and it is most unlikely that Europe would try to significantly influence Canada to invest more in defence or to increase its commitment towards Europe.
Finally, Canada is already committed to the UN and brings a contribution level generally well accepted by Canadians and other nations. It is also unlikely that the UN would strongly influence Canada to review either the defence policy or the budget.
20
Although it is outside the scope of this paper to predict what could be the outcome of these specific issues, there is no indication at this time that any influence from the external environment could overcome the strong domestic influence to restrain reactions.
The Government Options
Having assessed the environment and not discovered any major impetus to force the issue one way or the other, Cabinet is left with various options to consider on their own merit. For the benefit of this study, three options will be retained as potential choices:
- maintain expectations and increase resources
- reduce expectations and maintain resources
- maintain status quo and deal with important issues on a case by case basis.
These options will be examined in light of the environments that could influence the
Cabinet to act considering the various incentives and the need for re-election.
Maintain Capability
The first option considered is to increase the budget in order to match current expectations. This option offers some advantages to a country like Canada, which sees itself as a middle power involved in international affairs. It represents a critical and credible capability to complement the political, diplomatic and economic tools that
21 Canadian government possesses to contribute to the global and stable world required for
Canada to prosper. NATO and the UN have sought after Canada’s participation in peace support operations and, there is a general belief that there could even be more requests in the future. The emergence of new threats and the recent announcement by the Prime
Minister of the creation of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency
Preparedness is a good example of the need to adapt to this new reality and could lead to the justification of the higher resource level.
However, increasing the Canadian defence budget by $750 million or more is a risky undertaking for Cabinet at this time. It is not in harmony with any of the three policy-making environments. First, the political agenda of the current Cabinet puts the emphasis on debt ant tax reductions. With a fragile economy, the predicted variations in the limited growth could easily cancel any margin the Cabinet has. Finance Minister Paul
Martin recently stated in the Commons that “the Canadian government has been prudent and that will help us weather the storm”28. Since defence issues take a “back seat”, it is not in the current Cabinet interest to risk missing its primary objective because of a decision to increase defence budget unless there are strong pressures coming from either the domestic or external environments. Looking back at history, Canada has gone through only two periods of defence budget increase over the last 50 years. Treddenick explains the budget increase of the first period 1950-1953 by “the rearmament needs of the Korean War and NATO obligations in Europe” and for the 1973-1990 by “Canada’s
28 Sandra Cordon, IMF prises Canada’s tax cuts, low inflation as economy slows, (Canadian Press, Feb 1, 2001.
22 adhesion to the NATO undertaking to increase real expenditures by 3 percent per year” 29.
Having looked at the international environment, there does not appear to be any
predictable influence of the sort that could bring Cabinet to modify its agenda at this
time. Finally, Canadians themselves, although acknowledging the need for a better
equipped Armed Forces, appear as not being convinced that DND is well enough
managed nor that the current policy corresponds sufficiently to their perceived needs to
support such an orientation. They would certainly be wary of any defence budget
increase that could contribute to a potential deficit or to limit their taste for tax reductions
in the absence of clear indications of the benefits. In sum, from a Cabinet standpoint,
there is no clear incentive to proceed with such an increase while running the risk of not
being supported by the Canadians. One must remember that the next election is always
only a few years away.
Maintain resources level
The second option offered to Cabinet is to reduce expectations so defence capabilities can be reduced to a manageable level within the currently set level of resources.
At first sight this proposal might appears as the easiest solution for a Cabinet who would want to solve the dilemma at once. The priority, which has been given to social and economic policy for the past decade, is now paying dividends. In its last report, the
29 John M. Treddenick, Distributing the Defence Budget: Choosing Between Capital and Manpower, (Issues in Defence Management), p. 66.
23 International Monetary Fund is praising Canada for having reinforced its economy:
“Sizeable tax cuts, low inflation policies and some of Canada’s social spending have
helped brace the economy against almost any economic storm blowing in from the
United States”.30
However, reducing the capabilities of the Canadian Forces to the level comparable to what Jockel proposes would mean a significant decrease in Canada’s influence in his global multilateral relations. On this aspect, Doug Bland’s survey shows that most parliamentarians (>80%) perceive Canadian military contribution in both
NATO and the United Nations as giving Canada influence in those organisations. Would they be prepared to accept a lesser contribution from the CF to allow for the rebuilding of a future capability more in tune with the current resources level? Would they accept to do it at a time when there is an increase demand for military intervention? The answer is probably no, or not before they can be convinced that this cannot be achieved within the current level of resources.
Statements such as the one made by the Minister of National Defence in his address to attendees in Toronto gathered to celebrate the 50th anniversary of NATO are
more indicative of a desire to maintain the current expectations. “Canada...remains ready
to assist any ally in the unlikely event of war. We would immediately make available the
contingency forces we maintain for all multilateral operations. This includes a brigade
30 Sandra Gordon, “IMF praises Canada’s tax cuts, low inflation as economy slows”, Canadian Press, Feb 1, 2001.
24 group and an infantry battalion for service with NATO’s Immediate Reaction Force, a
naval task group, a wing of fighter aircraft and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft.31
Results obtained by Bland are also indicative of the Cabinet’s interest. Although
parliamentarians “suggest that the question of missions should be revisited more
precisely”, they also indicate that “politicians want an armed force that can function in a
variety of situations without resort to high levels of violence.”32 In the end, it is most
likely that Cabinet will require a clear way ahead from DND in terms of capabilities
before accepting to limit its freedom of action. Unfortunately, at this stage, it appears
that most suggestions for an “adapted” defence capability originate from interest groups
or from independent experts33. Such an option would only be applicable if “options
packages” to choose from were offered by the experts which in this case is DND.
An other variation of this option would be to initiate a defence policy review such
as been done four times since WWII. With the appreciation that defence is an integral
part of national security, the Cabinet would be hard pressed not to open the debate at the
higher level. In turn, this would mean involving all the other partners in security and
most likely, would significantly increase the risk for Cabinet not to meet its high priority
socio-economic objectives. In the previous cases where defence policy was seriously
reviewed, it happened in the first mandate of a newly elected government. This is clearly
31 Jockel, p. 126. 32 Douglas L. Bland, p. 8. 33 Canada 21 Council, Canada21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century, (Centre for International Studies, Toronto, 1994), and CDA, A Strategic Assessment, [http://www.cda-cdai.ca]. Both documents contain general proposals of the potential nature of the future Canadian force capability.
25 not the case at this point. Again, current Cabinet has no incentive to proceed with this
option.
Maintain status quo
Finally, the third option is the status quo. Since the two other options did not lead
to a proposal which could be really attractive to Canadians, nor that it puts any external pressure on Cabinet to get involved in a debate which could be conflicting with its own socio-economic priorities, this option becomes more attractive.
Current Cabinet is more likely to pursue with a “wait and see” attitude and consider the issues on a case by case basis. The primary advantage for Cabinet is to retain freedom to decide on a course of action in synch with the economical performance of the country. In good years, it distributes some amount of the surplus such as was done this year and manages the more sensitive requests on an opportunistic basis. Subjects such as base closures, personnel reductions and capability reductions need to be worked out with other departments through PCO before being proposed. Such a posture would allow
Cabinet to control the agenda and maximises its ability to meet its primary objectives. As long as there is no perceived direct threat to Canada and Canadians, and that Canada appears to contribute to a reasonable level in multilateral operations, it is unlikely that
Cabinet would see a strong impetus to do otherwise.
The Challenge for DND’s Bureaucracy
26 In the end, the current environments, either political, domestic or external, will not lead Cabinet to decide on a course of actions aimed at resolving the expectations- resources gap which has developed. Therefore, DND will be left with the challenge of finding an alternate approach to bring the issue up for decision. Faced with the challenge that it is Cabinet that sets both expectations and resources, DND’s bureaucracy will have to exploit all means at its disposal to stimulate the debate and raise the interest for reaching a viable solution.
Being in the middle of the expectations-capability-resources chain, DND could choose to develop “capability options” packages and offer them for debate on the various forums already in existence. This could very well focus the debate at the heart of the real issue: what is the level of capabilities that Canada wants and how much is Canada prepared to invest in its defence?
At this time, neither Cabinet nor Canadians have a clear enough image of the expectations-capability gap that will exist in any given future to be engaged in a constructive debate. The level of resources that would be required in the future to achieve current expectations is also unclear. In such conditions, how can DND expect an informed decision? To resolve this issue, DND must take the lead and stimulate the debate on what “capability package” is required to close the expectations-resources gap.
The auditor General summarized this idea very well by his last comment on DND in his reflections. “The government is falling short of telling Parliament what it needs to perform its oversight role. We found continuing problems in readiness, internal
27 efficiency, and program affordability during the 1990s. These problems cannot be solved
without changes that have political effects. It is therefore essential that Parliament be
provided with the information it needs to carry out its role in setting things right.”34
Such statement opens up the door to DND’s senior leaders, and more particularly to the
Chief of Defence Staff to develop a global approach to ensure that Parliament is well aware of the challenges while respecting the political masters who have to make those decisions having political effects. Such a task is certainly not easy. DND works with a long-term agenda while Parliamentarians are subject to short-term imperatives. The bureaucracy has a support role to the minister and the minister is the ‘official’ representative, and in a democratic system, the military is under the civilian authority and has to behave accordingly.
But on the other hand, it is the duty of DND to ensure that Parliament has all the necessary information to support Cabinet’s decisions. Such information must include public expectations towards defence issues. It is then the role of DND’s senior leadership to create the environment that will lead to such awareness. By developing a clear vision of the future forces, by sharing this vision within the defence team, and by promoting this vision in an appropriate “language” for sharing it with the general public, the scholars and the Parliamentarians, DND can influence the outcome. Assuming that such a clear vision exists, DND can promote a coherent approach by building on the already existing means. The Auditor General notes that, so far, “The annual Performance
Report to Parliament has been a disappointing collection of “good news” anecdotes rather
34 Auditor General, p.45.
28 than a source of genuine information on performance.”35 Pat O’Brien, in his remarks,
states that the military should not take the public or political support for granted and co-
ordinated messages and initiatives are required to reach out the Parliament, the media and
the public. 36 David Pratt also reminds all members of the defence community of their
“responsibility to ensure that this debate takes place, and that the debate is informed,
direct and ... enlightened.”37 While it is the duty of Parliament to defend Canada, its is
the duty of the Canadian Forces and their leadership to ensure that appropriate
information is available to Canadians and Parliamentarians to make the necessary
decisions.
Conclusion
An expectation-resources gap has developed in Canadian defence and it is
currently perceived to have reached an estimated $750 million per year. When looking at
the political environment and decision-making process, it becomes clear that a decision at the highest governmental level (Cabinet) is required to reconcile the dilemma. However, there is no apparent stimulus, neither in the domestic nor in the external environment to motivate Cabinet to lead such an initiative. In those conditions, Cabinet has no incentive to change its way of conducting business and will continue to consider the defence issues on a case by case basis not being in a position to provide the necessary guidance for the hard choices that are required.
35 Ibid., p.45. 36 O’Brien, p.4.
29 An option for DND’s bureaucracy is to co-ordinate its efforts to develop
“capability packages” options and to offer them for debate in both political and domestic forums. A “capability package” approach stands the potential of breaking the expectation-resources dilemma and allows DND to influence the discussion and hopefully influence the required Cabinet decision towards a realistic outcome. Failing to provide adequate inputs in the debate can only prevent an acceptable resolution of this issue and prevent DND from fulfilling its mission.
In the end, because of the nature of the Canadian domestic political environment,
DND’s renewal will have to come from a bureaucratic initiative. The door has already been opened by the Auditor General, SCONDVA and others for DND to raise the fundamental issues to Parliament. However, it is fully recognized that any attempt to resolve these issues will have a political impact and will stand the change of being in conflict with the political agenda. Although recognizing and respecting the civilian authority over the military, DND’s senior leadership must ensure that the debate takes place on the fundamental issues. A clear vision, well-defined capability options, and a co-ordinated strategy for promoting the debate will go a long way to influence Cabinet to adopt a coherent approach and will limit the possibility of generating other expectations- resources gaps in the future.
37 Pratt, p. 4.
30
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Treddenick, John M. Distributing the Defence Budget: Choosing Between Capital and Manpower. Defence Management Issue, 1997.
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Canada. Department of National Defence. Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A S trategy for 2020. Ottawa, 1999.
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Cordon, Sandra. IMF prises Canada’s tax cuts, low inflation as economy slows. Canadian Press. Feb 1, 2001.
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