Philosophical Anthropology and Evangelium Vitae
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ACTA PHILOSOPHICA, vol. 12 (2003), fasc. 2 - PAGG. 311-322 Philosophical Anthropology and Evangelium Vitae WILLIAM E. MAY* ■ The purpose of this presentation is to articulate the philosophical anthropolo- gy underlying the teaching of Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium vitae and to contrast this understanding of the human person with the philosoph- ical anthropology underlying the “culture of death.” I will begin by considering the anthropology at the heart of the culture of death, continue by offering a critique of this utterly false and dualistic under- standing of the human person and setting forth the key elements central to the realistic and integral anthropology at the heart of the teaching found in Evangelium vitae. 1. The Anthropology Underlying the Culture of Death John Paul II explicitly and accurately identifies this anthropology in the first chapter of Evangelium vitae, a chapter entitled Present-Day Threats to Human Life. In identifying this anthropology he likewise sketches the authentic anthro- pology of his encyclical. The Pope goes to the root causes of these threats, declar- ing that the culture of death has its roots in «the mentality which carries the con- cept of subjectivity to an extreme and even distorts it, and recognizes as a subject of rights only the person who enjoys full or at least incipient autonomy and who emerges from a state of total dependence on others» (no. 19). It is a mentality «which tends to equate personal dignity with the capacity for verbal and explic- it, or at least perceptible, communication» (no. 19). It is likewise rooted in a «notion of freedom which exalts the individual in an absolute way, and gives no * Michael J. McGivney Professor of Moral Theology, John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family at The Catholic University of America 311 note e commenti place to solidarity, to openness to others and service of them» (no. 19), a misun- derstanding of freedom which «leads to a serious distortion of life in society» (no. 20). This mentality—and the philosophical anthropology on which it is based— «no longer considers life as a splendid gift from God, something ‘sacred,’ entrust- ed to man’s responsibility, and thus also to his loving care and ‘veneration’». (no. 22). Finally, on this mentality, this anthropology, «the body is no longer perceived as a properly personal reality, a sign and place of relations with others, with God, and with the world. It is reduced to pure materiality: it is simply a complex of organs, functions, and energies to be used according to the sole criteria of pleas- ure and efficiency. Consequently, sexuality too is depersonalized and exploited: from being the sign, place, and language of love, that is, of the gift of self and acceptance of another, in all the other’s richness as a person, it increasingly becomes the occa- sion and instrument for self-assertion and the selfish satisfaction of personal desires and instincts… Procreation then becomes the ‘enemy’, to be avoided in sexual activity; if it is welcomes, this is only because it expresses a desire, or intention, to have a child ‘at all costs’ and not because it signifies the complete acceptance of the other and therefore an openness to the richness of life which the child represents» (no. 23). The anthropology at the heart of the culture of death is dualistic inasmuch as it sharply distinguishes between the person, the consciously experiencing and autonomous subject, and the living human body. It is an anthropology clearly operative, as I will now briefly illustrate, in major arguments used to justify abor- tion, euthanasia, and contraception. 2. Abortion Many people who champion abortion readily grant that a human being, in the sense of a living member of the human species, is in existence from the time of conception/fertilization or at any rate very early thereafter. But they claim that membership in the human species is not a sufficient criterion for personhood because only some members of the human species acquire the property or set of properties necessary if an entity is to be regarded as a “person” and the bearer of rights. All members of the human species are obviously biologically alive, but they cannot be considered to be persons because membership in the human species has no moral significance. In fact, some advocates of this position, for instance the philosophers Michael Tooley and Peter Singer, frankly assert that those who believe that membership in the human species is of great moral signif- icance are guilty of a form of unjust discrimination, speciesism, a prejudice simi- lar to such immoral prejudices as racism and sexism. Singer, the champion of “animal rights,” contends that it is far more immoral to torture a kitten than to kill an unborn child or a young infant with a debilitating condition such as Down 312 William E. May Syndrome1, and in his new set of commandments, intended to replace those given to Moses at Sinai, we find the injunction, «Do Not Discriminate on the Basis of Species»2. Since those members of the human species who do not meet the crite- ria for personhood are obviously not persons, killing them is similar to killing other non-personal objects and is obviously justified if killing them enhances the dignity and well-being of those entities who are to be regarded as persons because they possess the appropriate autonomy and exercisable cognitive capacities3. 3. Euthanasia A common apologia given to justify voluntary euthanasia, that is, the mercy killing of those who freely choose and indeed demand to be killed, is based on the claim that the “dignity” of persons gives them the right to die and to choose to be killed if, in their judgment, continued biological life is no longer of any value to them. Champions of this view, for example, Marvin Kohl, contend that the most important dignity proper to persons, i.e., proper to autonomous agents conscious- ly aware of themselves and capable of relating to other selves, consists in their ability to control their own lives. If debilitating disease or other factors threaten persons with the loss of such control, if the continuation of merely biological exis- tence imperils this dignity, then persons can rightly demand to be killed4. As one writer puts it, «the most important aspect of having a right to life is that one can choose whether or not to invoke it. We value the protection given by the right to life only when we want to go on living. No-one can fear being killed at his or her own persistent and informed and autonomous request»5. With respect to nonvoluntary euthanasia, i.e., the mercy killing of individuals who are not capable of giving free and informed consent to being killed in this way, a common rationale used for its justification is that the individuals being killed are no longer persons; personal life has been extinguished in them because they no longer possess meaningful cognitive capacities, they are no longer con- scious subjects aware of themselves as selves and capable of relating to other selves. Their existence is merely biological; indeed, they can be regarded as liv- ing vegetables. Thus continued existence is no longer of any value to them, and ending it is not to do an injustice to a person but rather to bring an end to a life that no longer has any meaning. 1 P. S INGER, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) p. 173. 2 Ibidem, pp. 202-206. 3 See also M. TOOLEY, Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 4 M. KOHL, Voluntary Beneficent Euthanasia, in Beneficent Euthanasia (Buffalo: Prometheus Press, 1974). 5 P. S INGER, Rethinking Life and Death, pp. 218-219. 313 note e commenti 4. Contraception and Human Sexuality It is instructive to note that many champions of this anthropology, used to jus- tify abortion and euthanasia, explicitly compare the right of persons, i.e., con- sciously experiencing subjects, to control birth by the use of contraceptives with the right to choose death for themselves. Representative here is the following pas- sage from a leading advocate of abortion, euthanasia, and contraception, Daniel Maguire: «Birth control was for a very long time impeded by the physicalistic ethic that left mortal man at the mercy of his biology. He had no choice but to conform to the rhythms of his physical nature and to accept its determinations obediently. Only gradually did technological man discover that he was morally free to intervene cre- atively and to achieve birth control by choice. The question now arising is whether, in certain circumstances, we may intervene creatively to achieve death by choice or whether mortal man must in all cases await the good pleasure of biological and organic factors and allow them to determine the time and manner of his demise…. Could there be circumstances when it would be acutely reasonable (and therefore moral…) to terminate life through either positive action or calculated benign neg- lect rather than to await in awe the disposition of organic tissue?»6. The answer to this rhetorical question is, of course, «Yes, mortal man can indeed intervene creatively to achieve death by choice, i.e., to choose to be killed for reasons of dignity when mere biological life is no longer of any value to him». Even more illuminating is a text from Joseph Fletcher in which he justifies contraception, sterilization, artificial insemination, abortion, and euthanasia on the grounds that the human person, the consciously experiencing subject, has dominion over the merely biological and physical.