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3 December 2012 Speaker: Avraham Sela, A. Ephraim and Shirley Date: 3 December 2012 Speaker: Avraham Sela, A. Ephraim and Shirley Diamond Family Professor of International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Chair: Raffaella Del Sarto, Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute and Director of the BORDERLANDS Project (ERC), Florence, Italy; Adjunct Professor of Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, Italy “Deadlocked: The Palestinian Authority in Domestic and International Perspectives” Dr. Sela opened his remarks by noting that much had changed since he had first submitted the title of his lecture. The term “deadlock” had been used in reference to the gloomy domestic and international situation, political disunity and economic woes on the Palestinian side, and waning appetites for negotiations in Israel. The events of the last few weeks however, have led to a more dynamic picture: Israel decided to hold general elections and president Obama was reelected in the United States. An Israeli operation in Gaza also saw renewed clashes—and internationally sponsored cease-fire—with Hamas, followed by a United Nations resolution upgrading the status of Palestine’s membership to the status of “non-member observer state”. Dr. Sela focused his ensuring remarks on the domestic and international implications of these recent events. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been in dire economic straits since the global recession begun in 2008. Dependent on foreign aid, it ran short of liquidity when the U.S., EU and Arab countries cut back their aid due to the downturn. The PA struggled to pay salaries to its huge bureaucracy of 150,000 employees, which, since the summer of this year, resulted in strikes and demonstrations among a number of public sector workers. The Palestinian economy’s failure to establish a productive economic system is mainly due to its dependence on Israel. The Paris protocol of 1994 stipulates that the PA operates within the customs and currency of Israel’s economy, essentially handing Israel the levers. Though Israel has recently removed a number of roadblocks and checkpoints, the Palestinian economy is a far cry from self-sufficiency. Joblessness is an especially important problem when considering Palestinian population growth. Despite the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic deadlock and the security situation has seen a significant improvement.. Israel has in recent years reduced the number of checkpoints, released prisoners, and increased its cooperation with the PA. Since the beginning of 2009, 43 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli soldiers (and 20 Israelis killed by Palestinians), in contrast with the period between 2000 and 2008 in which 4789 Palestinians were killed, 1790 of them in the West Bank. During those years, 239 Israelis were killed in the West Bank and 492 others in Israel. This reduction in violence led many in Israel to believe that the situation had stabilized. While Likud climbed in the polls, the labor party, which has traditionally counterbalanced it, had little appetite to talk about the Palestinian situation. This political lethargy may have come to an end with the events of the last few weeks. Recent political maneuvering on the Palestinian side might be an unprecedented opportunity for Israel. Statements made by the leadership of Hamas and the PA suggest that the two organizations effectively agree on establishing a state along the 1967 borders. Mahmoud Abbas also hinted in a recent interview to Israeli media that he might be flexible on the Palestinian right of return. Dr. Sela argued that this political landscape offers opportunities for Israel, but was doubtful that the country’s leadership would use them. Events in the international arena might also break the deadlock. President Obama was reelected after a long campaign during which his hands were tied by Israel’s supporters in Congress. Though he has not sent any signals of renewing his efforts, he may still return from this hiatus, much like Secretary of State Henry Kissinger did in 1973. While Europe’s main players remain reluctant to use their clout in Middle East politics, the UN vote might mark a change in their direction as well. The events of the past few weeks have once again made the near future difficult to predict. While the effect of the UN vote remains uncertain, the upcoming elections in Israel might see a further shift to the right. On the Palestinian side, a combination of economic stress and political stalemate could lead to events we cannot yet see, including a third intifada. Whether the UN vote will bring the PA and Hamas closer remains to be seen. For the time being, the two factions remain in political competition. 2 .
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