INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY

JOURNAL

INDIANA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Volume 8 Number 2

May, 1983

F521 146 VOLS N02 - - - Indiana Military HistoryJournal is published by the Military History Section of the Indiana Historical Society, 315 West Ohio Street, Indianapolis 46202. Editorial offices for the Journal are at the Department of History, Purdue University, West Lafayette,Indiana 47907. Gunther E. Rothenberg is editor; Raymond·J. Frontain assistant editor. All contributions should be sent to this address. Manuscripts should be prepared in accordance with The University of Chicago A Manual of Style (13th edition). The Indiana Historical Society, the Military History Section, and the editor disclaim responsibility for statements of fact or opinions made by contributors.

The Indiana MilitaryHistory Journal serves as the organ of the Military History Section and carries news of the Section as well as articles, documents, pictures, and book reviews relating to Indiana's military past, the military history of the Old Northwest, and the activities of Hoosiers in the armed forces of the United States in war and peace. In addition, the Journalwill carry ar· tides on military history topics in general which impacted on the state or region. It is hoped that the Journalwill increase the reader's appreciation of the military heritage of the state and the nation.

Military History Section Board of Directors

Mr. Wayne Sanford, Chairman Mr. Thomas B. Williams III 8718 Old Town Lane Drive 3203 Dogwood Lane Indianapolis 46260 Carmel 46032

Col. Jerry L. Sargent (Ret.), Vice-Chairman Col. William Scott (Ret.) 334 Grovewood Place 6433 Hoover Rd., Apt. A Beech Grove, IN 46107 Indianapolis 46260

Dr. Gunther E. ROthenburg, editor Lt. Col. James R. H. Spears Department of History 4327 Kenmore Road Purdue University Indianapolis 46226 West Lafayette, IN 47906 Cpt. William J. Watt Dr. George W. Geib 2240 Rome Drive Apt. B 4737 Cornelius Avenue Indianapolis 46208 Indianapolis 46208

Mr. Ralph Dimmett 1306 Cruft St. Indianapolis 46203

The Journalis sent to members of the Indiana Historical Society who participate in the Military History Section. All the material in this Journal is copyrighted. Copyright, 1983, Indiana His· torical Society.

Cover: General Jefferson C. Davis, who spent the first part of the Civil War trying to live down his name and the last part of the Civil War trying to avoid the charge of murder for his slaying of General William Nelson in September 1862, played a critical role in the Union victory of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, in March 1862 (see article, "Battle in the Brush," this issuej. He ended the Civil War as a corps commander in Sherman's Army of the Tennessee. NOTE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

The up-coming Spring Work Shop to be held at Spring Mill State Park, on April 30, 1983, will feature two speakers. The first will be Bob Holden, historian for the George Rogers Clark Memorial. His topic will be "Indian Warfare on the Old Frontier." The second speaker will be Dr. Gunther Rothenberg of Purdue University who will present a paper about an Indiana militia unit during the Black Hawk War. Both programs promise to be entertaining as well as informative. An index of the oral histories gathered by the Military History Section is now available in the reading library of the Indiana Historical Society. It includes a brief narrative of the thirty-six interviews gathered over the last two years. Supplements will be added as future interviews are completed. It is our intention to add other pages as future manuscripts are included in the collection. We also anticipate publishing this same index in a future edition of the Military History Journal. Our membership continues to grow, thanks to the help of each and every one of you. Don't forget your friends in the weeks and months to come. If they aren't already members of the Society, now is a good time to make them a part. Remember, too, that your suggestions for improvement are always welcome. If you have such a suggestion, address it to me. Have a happy spring and summer! Wayne L. Sanford Chairman

George Rogers Clark National Historical Park and Vincennes University announce the first annual George Rogers Clark Trans-Appalachian Frontier History Conference Saturday, October 22, 1983, at Vincinnes University. The National Park Service and Vincennes University are seeking proposals for papers to be delivered on any aspect of frontier history from the Appalachians to the Mississippi, including: exploration, Indians, fur trade, military leaders, battles, weapons, early settlements, travel, transportation, religion, education, politics, medicine, architec­ ture, etc. Papers should be approximately 12 to 15 double-spaced pages in length and not exceed 20 minutes. This conference is intended to be informal; there will be no com­ mentaries on papers, but there will be a short period for general questions from the audience following each presentation. Interested individuals should submit a three hundred to four hundred word summary of their intended subject, along with a short resume to: Conference Committee George Rogers Clark National Historical Park 401 South Second Street Vincennes, Indiana 47591 Proposals must be received by May 31, 1983. Individuals will be notified by June 20, 1983.

3 MILITIA IN THE BLACK HAWK WAR, 1831-1832

By John K. Mahon*

Cecil D. Eby, the author who most recently wrote at book-length about the Black Hawk War, included in his title the phrase "That Disgraceful Affair." Perhaps not at the local, but certainly at the national level, history seems willing to forget this grim episode. In his biography of Andrew Jackson, Commander-in-Chief at the time, Marquis James devoted one paragraph to the war; Robert Remini, writing forty-four years after James, expanded this treatment to two paragraphs. Nevertheless, the Black Hawk War remains a good case study of how the American military system operated in the 1830's.1 The Sauk and Fox Indians earlier had been pressed out of Illinois and across the Mississippi River into what later became Iowa; but in 1831, drawn magnet-like to their ancestral land and in search of food, they recrossed the Great River and reentered their old hunting grounds along the Rock River in northwestern Illinois. Both John Reynolds, Governor of Illinois, and Edmund Pendleton Gaines, Brevet Major General commanding the United States Army in the western district, referred to the Indian movement as an invasion. First to mobilize to expel the Indians was Reynolds who, on 26 May 1831, without any requisition from the federal government, called on the militia for 700 mounted men. "This expedition thus far was on my own responsibility," he wrote, "and perhaps the General Government would not approve it."2 The cost of mili­ tary operations was, even then, too heavy for a state to bear, and states commonly looked to the federal government to assume most of the expense. Three days after Reynolds' call, General Gaines, at Jefferson Barracks near St. Louis - about 200 miles distant from the invaded area - wrote Reynolds that he was coming with six companies of regulars and would need no militia. Reynolds and the state of Illinois seemed to be facing financial jeopardy until, on 5 June, Gaines reasses­ sed his needs and asked Reynolds for a battalion of mounted men, which he authorized to draw from the arsenal at Rock Island rations, powder, lead, and com for the horses. Reynolds wrote that he was rejoiced by this letter, as it put his whole proceeding on a legal and constitutional footing and removed the responsibility of the war from him to the United States.' Enthusiasm for squelching Indians brought not 700, but 1,600 men to the rendez-vous on 10 June. For political reasons Reynolds did not dare send the surplus 900 home without pay or glory; instead, he swore in all 1,600. Later Major John Bliss gave federal sanction to the enlarged force by mustering all of them into United States service at Rockport. Forming one brigade, two regiments, and two specialized battalions, this was far and away the largest force that Illinois had assembled since statehood in 1818. The sole problem with the first Illinois army was to keep its mem­ bers from killing any Indians they met, friendly or hostile. • The federal show of force was impressive enough to bring Chief Black Hawk in to negotiate. On 30 June, he, Reynolds, and Gaines signed a treaty in which the Indians agreed never to return to Illinois, whereupon Reynolds supplied them with food, an action protested by the volunteers. 6 As a young man, Black Hawk had fought beside Tecumseh and had since re­ tained a strong resistance to white encroachment. Thus, early in 1832, when his people became truly hungry, he led his band of about 1,000, half of them warriors, back to the Rock River region. He induced a far larger reaction than he did the year before. On 16 April, Governor Reynolds sought by proclamation to inspire the citizen-soldiers of Illinois: "Your country requires your services. The Indians have assumed a hostile atti­ tude .... No citizen ought to remain inactive when his country is invaded, and the help­ less part of the community in danger."6 With that, the militia system in Illinois went into operation. The governor assigned quotas to colonels commanding in counties, whereupon the colonels called

4 BLACK HAWK WAR 5

upon companies to volunteer intact. Some did - for example, the First Volunteer Rifles of Pike County, whose men received from their captain orders to arrive at the rendez­ vous "all with a good horse, and rifle, powder horn, one half pound of powder and three days provisions." The captain continued: "The Commanding Officer flatters himself that every man will be prompt [in] his duty." He took this notice to the local blacksmith, a member of the company, who without a moment's delay took off his leather apron, left the fire to die in the forge, and went on horseback to spread the word. The men respond­ ed with equal alacrity.7 In this case the system was working ideally. As in 1831, men felt boundless enthusiasm to kill Indians, one reason why the colonels had little difficulty meeting their quotas with individual volunteers who stepped forward from the militia ranks. Accordingly, Brevet Brigadier General Henry Atkinson, who had served with distinction in the War of 1812 and taken part in the military exploration of the far west, and who was now the regular army commander of the area in 1832, accepted into federal service on 8 May 1832 some 1,700 Illinois volun­ teers, 1,500 of them mounted.8 Men who either did not own a horse or did not want to risk their own came on borrowed mounts, duly noted on company rosters. The actual horse owners were protected by a certificate showing the loan or impressment of their animals. Such titles as "Mounted Volunteers," "40th Regiment," "4th Brigade," "First Division," and "Illinois Militia" suggested a much larger militia establishment than the young state actually had.9 Since this second Illinois army raised against Black Hawk was not enlisted for any specific term, Atkinson had to make early use of it or lose its services, a difficult thing to do since too many eager men appeared at the rendez-vous without arms, ammunition, or personal field gear, and unbacked by any state mechanism to supply them with food, tents, horse fodder, and other necessary camp equipage. Nevertheless, Atkinson gave orders to advance up the Rock River the day after muster, his ten companies of regulars to go by water and the mounted volunteers by land.10 Orville H. Browning recorded how campaigning felt at the enlisted level. "Had no tents," he wrote. "Could not sleep. Stood in ankle deep mud til day... much dissatisfaction and murmuring among the troops... provisions scarce. Hogs shot by soldiers... No guard placed at night."11 Starting under such conditions did not bode well for effective military results. More serious than the lack of supplies was the almost total absence of discip­ line. Each volunteer was eager to get himself an Indian; he would as soon shoot one as a wild cat or a raccoon. 12 At first the column had to be satisfied with burning an ancient village with no Indians in it. But to get close to the live "game," the men urged their officers to speed up and not bother with impedimenta. They persuaded General Samuel Whiteside, a veteran of the War of 1812 and an experienced Indian Fighter, to let them abandon all their stores except three or four days' worth of provisions, and plunge ahead. In a few days, having failed to contact the enemy, and being hungry and wet, they began to demand to go home. 13 Governor Reynolds had commissioned two veterans to raise battalions and operate independently of General Atkinson. Major Isaiah Stillman, commander of one of these, was a general officer in the peacetime militia from north of the Illinois River. He did not choose to cooperate with Atkinson, but moved far ahead of the main column. Three Indians came into his camp on 14 May carrying flags; some observers said they were red flags, others white, but, regardless of color, the volunteers wanted to kill the bearers. Stillman, by harangue, was able to prevent this murder, but when some Indians became visible on a ridge beyond the camp, he could no longer control his own men. Whooping like banshees, they rode tantivy into an ambush, losing 11 of 275 men. Most of the survivors deserted straightaway, while those that stayed spread terrifying reports of Indian hordes to everyone they saw. "Stillman's Run" foreclosed the chance of peaceful settlement. The Illinoisans began to favor not removal but extermination. General Atkinson took pains to notify the General-in-Chief in Washington, Alexander Macomb, that he did ·not hold himself answerable for this mis­ adventure since Stillman was never under his control.14 6 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

Zachary Taylor, a veteran recently promoted to colonel in the regular army, says of "Stillman's Run" that the volunteers "fled in the most shameful manner that every (sic) troops were known to do in this or any other country." His analysis was, of course, exaggerated, but it was true that the ardor of the second Illinois army in the Black Hawk War was gone. Since the men demanded to go home and the officers voted to give up pursuit, Governor Reynolds discharged most of the force on 27 and 28 May 1832.16 Two officers remained to become part of the third army: Samuel Whiteside and Abraham Lincoln, both of them this time as privates. Anticipating the short life of his second army, Reynolds had, on 15 May, issued a call for 2,000 fresh volunteers. As with the first two calls, it was oversub­ scribed, 3,000 men appearing and being accepted into United States service. The third Illinois army in the Black Hawk War contained three brigades: the First with 1,001 men; the Second, from eastern Illinois, 959 strong; and the Third with 1,232 men from the western part of the state. All three brigades had too many colonels and generals. Even the generals were elected, the citizenry considering that the election of officers strengthened the force. The regulars, however, felt that it precluded all attempts to establish discipline.16 Travelling with his troops, Governor Reynolds asked the War Department to accord himand his staff appropriate rank and pay. The secretary replied that he had no right to do this and that Reynolds had only one recourse, Congress. Likewise, he rejected a draft for $10,000 which Reynolds had drawn upon the department to meet expenses as they occurred, instructing Reynolds to go through channels with vouchers and proof of money spent. Discouraged by these rebuffs and by the failure to destroy Black Hawk, the governor left the field in July, with no rank except commander-in-chief of the Illinois militia.'7 Meanwhile, President Andrew Jackson, as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army and principal architect of the policy of Indian removal, became impatient with the lack of results in Illinois. Therefore, on 12 June 1832, Secretary of War Lewis Cass wrote a letter of criticism to Atkinson telling him to find and destroy the foe without delay. Convinced that higher rank was needed, Jackson sent Brevet Major General Win­ field Scott to take command. It did not matter to the president that he was ordering Scott to take charge of an area commanded by Scott's arch-rival, General Gaines, for­ although Jackson had scant use for Scott- he was at open odds with Gaines. Accord­ ingly, Scott started from Fortress Monroe on 28 June with nine companies of regulars; he never reached Illinois because cholera broke out among his men. Long after the con· flict was over, the president finally relented toward Atkinson and Cass wrote the general thanking him for what he had done.18 In June, the administration deemed it necessary to draw militiamen from a wider range. Consequently, the secretary directed the governors of Missouri, Indiana, and Michigan Territory to send troops. Michigan's quota was 400 men for three months service. Far removed from the combat zone, officers had to resort to a draft from the militia. Five hundred men were paraded and asked to volunteer and fill the quota. Only 100 stepped forward, so the balance were chosen by drawing lots.19 In the Gull Prairie Region, there was not enough of a militia organization to function according to formula. Someone, with or without authority, notified 20 men there of a rendez-vous; these men faithfully appeared, only to find no officer to explain why they had been called. Finally, one person who claimed to have been a sergeant in some other region, lined them up and put them through a few facings. In the end, since no one appeared to explain their mission, the men drifted back to their homes. Several times later the same thing happened. Once, the Gull Prairie men even joined a battalion and marched part way across Michigan; in the absence of orders, however, they marched back again. There­ after, they refused to turn out. 20 The secretary called upon Indiana for one company of Volunteer Mounted Rangers. Captain Orr, commander of the company, was at other times a major general in the Indiana militia. He informed General Scott that his men wanted action and were ready for it. They had, he said, supplies enough for two weeks, rare enough conditions BLACK HAWK WAR 7

for militia: tin cooking utensils, 13 cotton tents, 5 axes, 5 spades, and 3 trunks for clothing. What they lacked were camp kettles for all and better weapons for 15 or 20 men. Their armament included rifles, tomahawks, butcher knives, and 6 pairs of pistols. Scott received this message the same day that it was written, and at once replied that the United States would supply the camp kettles, but in the absence of rifles, would have to issue good muskets. The governor of Indiana wrote to Captain Orr that, as the state's militia had never been tested, in this its first trial serving with regulars, he wanted it to do well. Of course he asked the War Department for funds, only to be informed that it could not make advance payments, but could only pay when presented with detailed accounts, certified by officers of the regular army. 21 What brought volunteers into service in the Black Hawk War? Many of them, it is clear, were motivated by hatred of the Indians. Governor Reynolds stated that the redmen did not fear the regulars, but realized that the citizen soldiers would exterminate them if they could. To the volunteers, the Indians were subhuman. At the culminating battle of Bad Axe on 2 August 1832, when Black Hawk's band was finally cornered agains the river, one officer told his men to "kill the nits and you'll have no lice."22 Volunteers who arrived too late to shoot at warriors had to settle for shooting squaws burrowing in the dirt to conceal themselves and their children. All this seemed a holy mission, ridding the earth of hateful varmints.23 Billy Herndon claimed that Abraham Lincoln enlisted as a private, not for patriotic reasons, but because he had no home and no work. For poor frontiersmen the pay too was attractive, especially since, when it finally came, it was in specie worth more than its face value. The higher-ups were influenced by the flow of federal money which the war brought into the region, as well as by the chance to wipe out Indian title to local land. For additional motivation, there was the concept of glory, which could only be obtained by risking one's life in a patriotic cause; but if the aspirant survived, this intangible had solid value. Unmilitary though the United States was, there was power in the title of "captain" or above. The three men who succeeded Reynolds as governor of Illinois were all veterans of the Black Hawk War. Finally, as Governor Reynolds said, a martial spirit existed among the western folk. It was this spirit, working in one of the few young volunteers to be mortally wounded, which moved him to ask his commanding officer whether or not he had been a good soldier. Assured that he had been, he requested that his mother be so informed, and then died more easily!• Many militiamen signed up to escape the drudgery of the farm. They were, after all, committing themselves for only three months at most, during which an Indian hunt with friends would be a lark. Hard liquor flowed freely on the frontier, more of it during a military campaign than otherwise. 2• In the third Illinois army which stemmed from Reynolds' call of 15 May 1832, as in the first and second armies of the Black Hawk War, politics surrounding the election of officers stood in the way of officer-efficiency. When Henry Dodge entered an election to unseat Posey as general, the latter shamelessly implored the men not to dis­ grace him by electing him out. They did not, although Dodge was the better officer!6 Early in the conflict militiamen elected Abraham Lincoln captain as a joke, since at that time Lincoln seemed a buffoon. The fresh captain knew so little drill that, having marched his command to a fence, his order had to be "Halt! Break ranks for two minutes and form on the other side of the gate." During the advance of the second army, Lincoln's unit was left behind because most of the men were too drunk to take part. His punishment for this was being made to carry a wooden sword for two days, which further increased his reputation as a buffoon. 27 Eby claimed that the volunteers elected company officers "much as children chose sides for a tug of war."28 In a few cases, election resulted in a written contract: "We the undersigned agree to submit ourselves for the time being to (a list of the elected officers) as commanders of the militia ... until all apprehension of danger for the Indians may have subsided."29 Harangue was the standard method by which militia officers controlled their men because few of those men carried out orders without questioning. If harangue 8 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

failed, the firmer officers resorted to physical means. For example, General Samuel Whiteside promised to shoot the first man who attempted to break out of line. Faced with insubordination, Colonel Strode declared martial law and pricked men into line with a bayonet. Henry Dodge, lord of the lead mines, got command of the Iowa County (Michigan Territory) militia because of his reputation for being both fearless and hard. As soon as his men organized, he led them to the Winnebagoes and by show of force prevented that band from joining Black Hawk. He later received command of mounted troops in the United States Army.'" A number of regular officers involved against Black Hawk later became con­ spicuous in American military history: Philip St. George Cooke, Zachary Taylor, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Jefferson Davis, David Twiggs, and Robert Anderson. Most of these - and some of the other regulars - remained steadily skeptical of the military value of irregulars. So many militiamen swarmed into the service for short terms that they got in the way. With such numbers, Brevet Brigadier General Hugh Brady said "we will be able to shake every bush for many miles. "31 To Philip St. George Cooke, the camp of the Illinois militia was:

as active as a swarming hive; catching horses, electioneering, drawing rations, asking questions, shooting at marks, electing officers, mustering in, issuing orders, disobeying orders, galloping about cussing and discussing the war, and the rumors thereof ... (T)he General in his tent could not escape the intrusion of these raw fellows, who had no idea of the first principles of military respect and subordination.

Complaining of officer control, Cooke described the following scene:

A whole brigade was regularly paraded and firing in the air as regularly as they knew how, while their General, mounted on a tall stump, was endeavoring to argue them out of it ... (He) finally damned them to all posterity and resigned his commission in violent disgust.32

This view through St. George Cooke's eyes makes it clear why there was such a tension between regulfirS and irregulars, one that runs throughout American history. Considering the training of the West Pointers, one can understand why they were inclined to blame military failures on the militia. From the irregulars' point of view, however, the professionals were too stiff in their training to fight Indians effec­ tively. For example, Governor Reynolds faulted General Atkinson for unwillingness to move without cannon, a weapon of slight use against Indians, and one which made rapid marching impossible. The militiamen noticed, too, that Atkinson travelled with the regulars, feeling more comfortable when surrounded by their enforced respect; he was not, therefore, up front when needed.33 In some cases militiamen claimed that they were not legally obliged to obey regular officers' orders. One such case developed when Captain Gentry, United States Army, appeared to take command of a log fort manned by volunteers, and found the garrison determined to sally out before reinforcements arrived. When Gentry forbade their exit, they told him that his orders did not bind them, whereupon he stood in the door and barred their way at gunpoint."• Similarly, Major John Dement, Illinois Volun­ teers, force-marched his men to report to Colonel Zachary Taylor, United States Army. Without allowing them time to rest, Taylor ordered the weary men to swim the river and camp on the other side, sharply berating them all the while. Dement sprung for­ ward wasp-mad and denounced Taylor before the men, accusing him of habitually send­ ing green soldiers first into danger and holding the regulars comfortably in the rear. Then, ordering his men to follow him and to ignore Taylor, he rode his horse into the river and carried out the colonel's command. Taylor only laughed."5 The Black Hawk War was not the kind to produce white heroes, but James Daugherty Henry of the Illinois militia handled his citizen soldiers heroically. He was a man of near giant size (always an advantage in commanding irregulars), with a fierce temper and a thirst for glory. He had served as a lieutenant under Winfield Scott in the BLACKHAWK WAR 9

War of 1812, and in civil life was a storekeeper and sometimes sheriff. Henry began the war as an enlisted soldier, but showed such leadership that the captain of his unit offered to turn command over to him. Henry, however, preferred at that time to remain in the ranks, where he could talk to the men and steady them. Later, as an officer, he drilled the men all night to bound to their feet from where they lay and form two ranks automatically. In time, when the third Illinois army was formed for this war, he became brigadier general. Henry never flouted General Atkinson's orders, but preferred to operate as far away from him and his regulars as possible. Thus removed, his command -

dwindled from 1,000 to perhaps 600 - happened upon the clear trail of Black Hawk's band. Atkinson's orders did not permit him to pursue until the regulars came up, but Henry held a council of war, placing before it the question of disobeying orders and pursuing, or following orders and missing an important opportunity. Most of the officers stated in writing that they would not disobey orders; Henry ordered them arrested and charged with insubordination. The signers recanted and followed where he led. Coming upon Black Hawk's band on 21 July 1832, they wiped out sixty-eight Indians at a cost of only one man killed and eight wounded. Mortally crippled, Black Hawk's people managed with great skill to cross the Wisconsin River and escape complete annihilation, leaving Henry with nothing to do but wait for Atkinson to come up.3s General Atkinson placed Henry's brigade in the rear of the column to guard the baggage, then resumed pursuit. His motives for doing so have been in dispute ever since. Peter Parkinson, a contemporary, denied that Atkinson made this placement as punishment for disobeying orders, but Governor Reynolds said that he did. A later scholar, Reuben Gold Thwaites, insisted that Atkinson was jealous of the success of the citizen soldiers. The men of Henry's command considered their placement as punish­ ment for success: what else could one expect from regulars? In any case, bringing up the rear did not prevent Henry from being in on the kill. On 2 August, his scouts picked up the Indian trail again and, as before, without hesitation, Henry peeled off to follow it. Along the way his men observed the bodies of Indians who had died of starvation. Henry's unit caught up with the band before it could cross the Mississippi River. A gunboat interposed, the main column arrived, and thus began the grisly slaughter of the foe who had so long eluded them. Many of the Indians killed at the Battle of Bad Axe were wasted by famine, and of the 1,000 who had crossed into Illinois with Black Hawk in April, no more than 100 remained. Black Hawk himself ·escaped, but not for long. The Winnebagoes captured him and delivered him to the white men. By this time, the volunteers had gone home, so he was safe. 37 Eby says that 7,787 Illinois and Michigan men actually took part in the con­ flict. The cost in white lives, civilian and military, was about 250. Cost in money is customarily said to have been around two million dollars. Mounted volunteers cost much more than infantry, and volunteer foot more than regulars. In the midst of the bitter Florida War six years later, the War Department submitted to Congress an estimate of comparative costs. For three months service, a company of regular infantry cost $2,331.00; militia $3,674.58; and volunteers $4,973.83.38 Eby asserts that the same results could have been obtained in the Black Hawk War for $50,000 if the job of Indian removal had been given to private contractors, instead of being performed by the rickety combination of regulars and volunteers.39 Late in 1832, the Michigan militiamen who had reached the theater of combat learned that they were to be paid for twelve days only at about three dollars a man. This would scarcely buy a blanket or a pair of shoes, and - as spokesman pointed out - these volunteers had left their work, done without needed supplies, and endured hardship to answer a patriotic call. "Nothing less than a month's pay would be worth accepting." In time, the matter reached President Jackson, and he ruled that all men who served should be paid, but paid according to regulations. Secretary of War Cass asked the attorney general to rule on whether or not militiamen who had actually 10 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

turned out and been organized, but had not be mustered into federal service, should be paid In the end, all who could claim to have appeared in arms, whether in the presence of the enemy or not, were compensated. Later in 1850, active participants could apply for 40 acres of land, and in 1855 for 120 more. 40 It is difficult, if not impossible, to come to definite conclusions about the military system under which operations of the Black Hawk War were conducted. Eby may be wrong in his estimate of the cost of an alternative to a federal system of carry­ ing out military actions, but it is obvious that the system was not perfectly efficient. But then, no other aspect of the American way of life was. Our interest in the Black Hawk War is in its demonstration of the military system as it worked in most brief operations. In longer wars, such as the Civil War, men who began as raw militiamen became, through experience and practice, the equivalent of regulars, even while remaining products of the distinctive state/federal military relationship.

Notes

•John K. Mahon, professor emeritus at the University of Florida, is the author of numerous works and articles on U.S. military history. 'Cecil D. Eby, "That Disgraceful Affair": The Black Hawk War (New York, 1973); Marquis James, Andrew Jackson: Portrait of a President (Indianapolis, 1937); Robert V. Rernini, Andl'llw Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822·1832(New York, 1981). 'John Reynolds, My Own Times (Chicago, 1879), pp. 210·12. 'Frank E. Stevens, The BlackHawk War (Chicago, 1903). p. 89; Reynolds, My Own Times, p. 211. •Stevens, Black Hawk War, p. 94; Reynolds, My Own Times. p. 214; Thomas Ford. History of Illinois (Chicago, 1864), p. 112. 'Stevens, BW.ck Hawk War, p. 94. •Ralph Henry Gabriel, ed., The Pageant of America, 15 vols. (Oxford, 1925·1929), III. pp. 152, 153; Eby, ThatDisgraceful Affair, p. 97. 'Stevens, Black Hawk War, pp. 117, 119, 120. •Atkinson to Brady, 8 May 1832. MS, National Archives (Black Hawk War, General and Special Orders, Correspondence, Reports). •Adjutant General of Illinois, Record of the Seroices of Illinois Soldiers in the Black Hawk War, 1831· 1892, and in the Mexican War, 1846-1848 (Springfield, 1902), p. 124; Governor of Indiana to Orr, 27 May 1832, MS, National Archives. ••Whiteside to Atkinson, 27 May 1832, MS, National Archives. "Quoted in Stevens,Black Hawk War, p. 118. "Eby, DisgracefulAffair, p. 100. "Stevens, Black Hawk War, p. 125. "Reynolds to SW, 4 June 1832, MS, National Archives; Stevens, BlackHawk War, p. 129; Reypolds, By Own Times, p. 231; Ford, History of Illinois, p. 118; Reuben Gold Thwaites, "Story of the Black Hawk War," Wisconsin Historical CoUections, 12 (1892), p. 235; Roger L. Nichols, General Henry Atkinson: A We stem Military Career (Norman, Ok., 1965), p. 163; and Atkinson to Macomb, 19 May 1832, MS, National Archives. '"Quoted in Eby, Disgraceful Affair, p. 140. Cf. Thwaites, "Story of the Black Hawk War," p. 241; Stevens, BW.ck Hawk War, pp. 15!HJ2; and John Wakefield, History of the War between the United States and the Sac and Fox Nations (Jacksonville, Ill, 1834), p. 202. "Stevens, Black Hawk War, p. 139; Reynolds, My Own Times, p. 245. "Stevens, Black Hawk War, p. 208; SW to Reynolds, 21 May 1832 and 6 July 1832, MSS, National Archives (War Office Letters Sent, vol 13, pp. 192 and 240). ••sw to Atkinson, 12 June 1832 and 24 October 1832, MSS, National Archives (War Office Letters Sent, Vol 13, pp. 221 and 284); Stevens, Black Hawk War, p. 242. "Scott to Governor of Michigan, 17 July 1832, MS, National Archives; C.M. Burton, ed., "Papers of Major General John R. Williams," Michigan Pioneer andHistorical CoUections, 31 (1902), p. 389. BLACK HAWK WAR 11

.,Henry Little, "History of the Black Hawk War," Michigan Pioneer and Historical CoUections, 6 (1882), pp. 162·163; Jeremiah D. Williams, "History of the Town of Webster," Michigan Pioneer and Historical CoUections, 13 (1908), p. 661. "Governor Noble to Orr, 26 June 1832 and 11 July 1832; Orr to Scott, 21 July 1832; Scott to Orr, 22 July 1832, MSS, National Archives. "Eby, DisgracefulAffair, pp. 160ff., 263; Reynolds, My Own Times, p. 211; Stevens, Black Hawk War, p. 139. " Eby, DisgracefulAffair, p. 264. 14Sylvan J. Muldoon, Alexander Hamilton's Pioneer Son (Harrisburg, Pa., 1930), p. 104; Reynolds, My Own Times, p. 209; William H. Herndon and Jesse W. Weik, Herndon's Life of Lincoln (Angle edition, 1930), p. 90. •Little, "History of the Black Hawk War," p. 166. •Stevens, BlackHawk War, p. 208. nHemdon and Weik, Life of Lincoln, p. 84; Ward Hill Lamon, Abraham Lincoln (Boston, 1872), p. 103; Eby,DisgracefulAffair, p. 107. •Lamon,Abraham Lincoln, p. 99. "Adjutant General, Record of the Services, p. 167 . .,Ford, History of Illinois, p. 124; Stevens, Black Hawk War, p. 139; Eby, DisgracefulAffair, pp. 163ff.; Louis Pelzer, HenryDodge (Iowa City, 1911), p. 66. "Brady to Scott, 26 June 1832, MS, National Archives; Atkinson to Scott, 11 July 1832, MS, National Archives. "Philip St. George Cooke, Scenes and Adventures in the Army (Philadelphia, 1869), pp. 166, 168; Nichols, General Henry Atkinson, pp. 167-68, 176. "Reynolds, My Own Times, p. 261. "Muldoon, Hamilton's Pioneer Son, p. 100. "Brainerd Dyer, Zachary Taylor (Baton Rouge, 1946), pp. 197·98; Stevens, Black Hawk War, p. 198. •Elijah lies, Sketches of Early Life and Times in Kentucky, Missouri, and Illinois (Springfield, Ill., 1883), pp. 46, 48-49; Wakefield, History of the War, p. 120; Stevens, Black Hawk War, pp. 208, 214-16; Henry to Atkinson, 19 July 1832, MS, National Archives. �hwaites, "Story of the Black Hawk War," pp. 266, 261; Eby, DisgracefulAffair, pp. 244, 267; Stevens, Black Hawk War, p. 221; and Geroge W. Harrison to M.J. Williams, 26 July 1832, reprinted in vol 12 of Clarence Carter's Territorial Papers of the United States (1946), p. 611. •Thwaites, "Story of the Black Hawk War," p. 261; Pelzer, Henry Dodge, p. 66; Eby, Disgraceful Affair, p. 264; Emory Upton, Military Policy of the United States (Washington, 1907), p. 192. "Eby, DisgracefulAffair, p. 100. ..Herndon, Life of Lincoln, p. 92; G. Mott Williams to SW, 8 December 1832, Michigan Territory ITP, vol 13), pp. 664·66; SW to Attorney General, 26 October 1832 and SW to Paymaster General, 29 October 1832, MSS, National Archives (War Office Letters Sent, vol. 13, pp. 286, 288). BATTI...E IN THE BRUSH: DAVIS' DIVISION AT PEA RIDGE, 7 MARCH 1862

By Earl J. Hess*

Jefferson C. Davis' division. which was composed of Indiana and Illinois units and led by a native Hoosier, played a key role in the Union victory at Pea Ridge, Arkansas. On 7 March 1862, Davis' command opposed the only major assult launched by the Confederates on the Union left flank in the Leetown sector of that battlefield. As a result of their competent performance, Davis' regiments averted the most serious threat to the Federal position at Leetown and perhaps saved the army. Although several accounts of Pea Ridge have been produced by historians, none contains a detailed, critical analysis of the Leetown fighting.1 In addition to exploring more fully the experiences of Davis' regiments, such a study would provide insight into the tactics employed by the Federals. The encounter at Pea Ridge resulted from the Federals' desire to secure their strategic position along the Missouri River, and thus support a major campaign down the Mississippi, which had been planned in the summer of 1861. Sterling Price's Missouri State Guard had attacked the river line and could do so again from its base at Springfield. To clear the state once and for all of organized resistance, Brigadier General Samuel Ryan Curtis assembled the Army of the Southwest at Lebanon. Missouri, in early February 1862, dividing it into four divisions with Davis in command of the Third Division.2 A native of Clark County, Indiana, Davis had been in service at Buena Vista during the Mexican War and as a regular army lieutenant at Fort Sumter during its bombardment. He had been commissioned colonel of the 22nd Indiana in August 1861, and had led a division in central Missouri before joining Curtis. Like their division leader, Davis' men had participated in previous Missouri campaigns. Colonel Thomas Pattison's 1st Brigade contained two Indianapolis regiments, the 8th and 18th Indiana, and a Madison unit, the 22nd Indiana. Pattison also had Martin Klauss' 1st Indiana Battery from Evansville. Colonel Julius White's 2nd Brigade consisted of the 37th Illinois, a Chicago regiment, and the 59th Illinois. The latter had been organized as the 9th Missouri at St. Louis by Illinoisans who could not find a place in their home' state's recruit quotas. A few weeks before Pea Ridge, they won War Department approval for calling themselves the 59th Illinois. Captain Peter Davidson's Battery A, 2nd Illinois Light Artillery, better known as the Peoria Battery, was added to White's command.4 Most of the infantry carried muzzle-loading rifled muskets, but two companies of the 37th Illinois and its noncommissioned officers were armed with Colt revolving rifles. A detachment of the 1st Missouri Cavalry also operated under White's command. a Davis' men performed creditably during the advance to Pea Ridge. Leaving Lebanon on 10 February, Curtis entered Springfield two days later without witnessing battle. He pursued Price into northwestern Arkansas, his advance guard skirmishing almost daily with the enemy's rearguard. After a short but bloody encounter at Sugar Creek on 17 February, Curtis dispersed his divisions within supporting distance of each other to gather forage and guard against a Confederate attempt to reenter Missouri.8 They did not wait long. Reinforced by Brigadier General Benjamin McCullouch's division of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas troops-and under the command of Major General Earl Van Dom-the combined force went on the offensive. The Army of the Southwest quickly concentrated on the north bank of Sugar Creek, three miles south of Pea Ridge, but Van Dom refused to attack its strong defensive position On the night of 6-7 March, he enveloped Curtis' right, marching Price's Missourians north of Pea Ridge and completely to the Federal rear. Price advanced southward, just to the east of the ridge, while McCulloch-whose division could not keep pace with the Missourians-advanced toward Curtis west of the ridge. Together, the two wings outnumbered Curtis, but their faulty dispositions nullified that advantage.7

12 BA'ITLE IN THE BRUSH 13

The Federals reacted quickly on the morning of 7 March. Curtis sent 1st Division leader Peter J. Osterhaus northwestward toward Leetown to intercept McCulloch. Osterhaus took artillery, cavalry and infantry units, including Davis' 22nd Indiana. Curtis next sent Eugene Carr's 4th Division to oppose Price and ordered Davis to follow Carr. Before the Indianan could proceed very far, Osterhaus' cavalry met McCulloch. The Rebel cavalry attacked and drove it from the field. When the news reached Curtis' headquarters, he sent Davis to Osterhaus' aid.8 Leaving the 8th Indiana and Klauss' Battery at Sugar Creek, Davis found Osterhaus' infantry and artillery deployed a quarter-mile north of Leetown. They were placed on the south side of a large, cleared field to the left of the road leading from town. John A. Hendricks' 22nd Indiana stood on Osterhaus' right, its right flank on or near the road. Davis arrived at about 2 p.m. and ordered the 18th Indiana to deploy to Hendricks' right. Davidson's Peorians set up their guns in the southeast corner of the field, supported in their rear by the Indiana units. Davis ordered White's brigade to file right from the road to extend the line. As the 37th led the 59th Illinois, both regiments entered a rough terrain of dense underbrush and heavy timber. According to a lieutenant of the 59th, the brigade double-quicked a short distance up the road after reaching the open field and before filing into the woods. That would have placed its line slightly forward of the Indiana units. To lighten their passage through the woods, the Illinois soldiers who had not already done so dropped their knapsacks and other baggage. The 37th rested its left on or near the road, and the 59th placed itself on the right. White reported 950 men in his brigade; Pattison did not indicate his strength, but it probably was similar.9 While Davis positioned his men, the Confederates resumed their offensive. After dispersing the cavalry, McCulloch deployed his infantry in line and rode behind his skirmishers as they advanced toward Osterhaus' infantry. Federal skirmishers killed McCulloch before he formulated a battle plan. His successor, General James Mcintosh, decided to attack. Rather than direct his men from the rear, he personally led an advance by the 3rd Louisiana, and the 4th and 21st Arkansas Infantry. McCulloch's division line extended far beyond Osterhaus' right. When these three units set out, they moved through the woods east of the Leetown road. There is no indication that Mcintosh knew Davis had arrived on the field and was in position to his front. The strength of his three regiments is not precisely known, but according to reports filed on 1 January 1862, they totaled 2,104 men. Louis Hebert's 3rd Louisiana was the best infantry unit in McCulloch's division.'" White did not wait long for the Rebel advance. He estimated that when his brigade took position, it was about 150 yards from Mcintosh. He advanced almost immediately after his regiments deployed. They struggled through the brush for 60-70 yards, without firing and with no skirmishers to the front. When the opposing lines came within sight of each other, they were about 75 yards apart and both fired a volley. 11 The dense undergrowth reduced visibility and created confusion among White's men. Members of the 59th Illinois were not certain that they actually faced the enemy. (This unit had filed to the 37th's rear when it left the road to take position in the woods, and there was some question as to whether or not they had gone far enough to clear the other regiment.) Major Philip Sidney Post rode forward to find out. He was caught in the first Rebel volley and rode back with an ugly shoulder wound. Lieutenant Chesley Mosman remembered that at this point, by sitting on his calves, he could look through the brush and see Confederate soldiers 7 5 yards away. The 59th fired as many as two volleys before it withdrew with the 37th. The exact reason is unclear. Many men cited overwhelming numbers, but it is just as likely that, in their first fire, the Illinoisans became slightly unnerved by the suddenness with which the fighting erupted and by the enemy's close proximity.12 They fell back 200 feet, stopped, and reloaded. 13 Rather than witnessing a single confrontation and withdrawal, White's brigade engaged in three separate advances and retreats that day. The first has already been related. The second apparently gained more ground than the first. Lieutenant 14 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

George Currie of the 59th Illinois remembered that his regiment advanced, fired a volley and then descended into a ravine. This washout was not mentioned in accounts of the first advance. In it, Currie's men again exchanged fire with the enemy before the brigade fell back. If an order had been given to that effect, Currie noted, he did not receive it. The lieutenant kept his company in the ravine, assuming the brigade was still in line near him. When he realized that his men were alone, he ordered them to fire a last volley and retreat "like gophers" to regimenthe t.1' The brigade drove for a third time into the brush and again reached the ravine. Currie's company began to ascend the far slope and had climbed about half way up when the Rebels appeared on the crest and fired. The Yankee retreat that followed exceeded the intensity of the other two: "(H)urry! skurry! pell-mell! every man looking out for himself... ,'' Currie remembered. While running, he tripped on his sword and fell forward, but turned over in time to see and avoid a white horse ridden by the regi­ ment's adjutant that nearly ran over him. Currie's company retired to a small com field. Jumping the rail fence, the men "ran across the soft plowed ground without much military order, the rebels being within 150 feet of us, but so certain of capturing the entire command they did not stop to fire a shot."11 Although disorderly, the retreat of White's brigade was not a rout. Nevertheless, it posed a serious threat to Davis' position. The division leader had already made plans to stop the Rebel advance. Early in the encounter, probably soon after White's first clash with Mcintosh, Davis judged from the Rebels' "increasing and excessive fire" that they were being reinforced. He ordered Pattison's two regiments to outflank the Confederate left. To do so, the 18th and 22nd Indiana filed right through the woods behind White's brigade. Henry D. Washburn reported that this flanking movement began almost immediately after his 18th Indiana took position behind Davidson's guns. As he led his men on the double­ quick to the right, their line was broken by elements of the retreating 59th Illinois. George Currie's company made part of that retreat. When his men reached the opposite side of the plowed cornfield, they jumped the fence and collided with the 18th Indiana. Washburn's progress was stalled for "a few moments" until he could close up his line. At this point, Pattison stopped the brigade and wheeled to the left, his maneuver bringing the brigade's front into a position from which it could fire into the Rebel left.18 Pattison's flanking operation left Davidson's battery at least temporarily unsupported, and it tested his men's ability to act under pressure in difficult terrain. At least two alternatives were open to Davis. He could have tried to outflank the Rebel right by advancing Pattison up the Leetown road, thus covering Davidson but also exposing Pattison to fire from the Confederate troops in Osterhaus' front, positioned somewhere in the woods on the north of the open field that separated Osterhaus from the Rebels. Those gray units had done no more than skirmish all day, but they probably would not have sat idly while two Yankee regiments advanced toward their front and flank. The second alternative was to place Pattison behind White, a move that would take little time and would steady White's men. Currie remembered how reassuring it was to find friendly troops on the opposite side of the cornfield rather than more Rebels, and how his men formed another line just after passing through the Indianans' formation. 17 Because the maneuver worked beautifully, however, no one criticized Davis for it. To facilitate Pattison's move, the division leader ordered White's brigade to change "Front to rear on its right"; in short, to bend its right wing clear of Pattison's line of fire. When the Indiana units completed their left wheel, they fired a volley into the Rebel left. Because of the brush, Pattison's men found it difficult to shoot accurately, catching sight of their enemy only occassionally. This did not stop them, however. As an 18th Indianan observed, "We peppered them down as fast as we could see them." The fire of Pattison's brigade-"a tremendous volley of musketry," wrote a member of McNair's 4th Arkansas-surprised and confused the Rebels, throwing their "lines into perfect confusion-so much so that we were never able to form them again into their proper companies or regiments... . "The fragmented formations fused, so that BAITLE IN THE BRUSH 15

in the confusion men found themselves in strange companies and regiments, and those hybrid organizations found themselves separated from each other. '" Although fragmented, the Rebels were far from impotent. Chunks of men spun from the general line of advance as division leadership disintegrated. Mcintosh had been killed at the first volley by White's brigade.19 With their objective lying straight ahead, however, the regimental leaders managed to coordinate their assults effectively. The flank threat posed by Pattison demanded more than mere cooperation; it required firm control from above. Fortunately for Davis, that control did not exist. Louis Hebert, next in line of command probably could have done little to stop the rapid disintegration even if he had tried. Instead, he followed Mcintosh's example and personally led a group or perhaps all of the 3rd Louisiana (the sources are unclear) in an effort to take Davison's battery. To do so, he had to turn his men obliquely to the right and cover the approximately 200 yards that separated them from the guns. They were no doubt discomfited to receive fire in their rear from members of the two Arkansas units, who had become little more than a frightened mob, unresponsive to efforts by 3rd Louisiana officers to reform them and have them fire with more precision. 20 Davidson had not been idle that day. During White's seesaw fight with the Rebels, his gunners had sent shell into the woods ahead of the two Illinois regiments. A member of the 37th Illinois remembered that this fire "did not relieve our brigade," but a Louisianan stated that it nevertheless was "incessant. " William Watson remembered that as the 3rd Louisiana neared the corner of the field in which Davidson rested, the unit received a discharge of grape and canister that "for a moment staggered our men ..." Hebert's charge on the guns was a reflex action. Watson reported that "in a state of fury they rushed forward on the guns."'' White had drawn the 37th Illinois back to the field's corner after it withdrew from the Rebel front. The unit was surprised by Hebert's first volley and quickly fell further back. That volley also disabled enough horses and cannoneers to virtually immobilize two guns. With Hebert's men so close-a battery lieutenant reported that Davidson's right flank was "within two rod of the brush"-there was no time to replace the wounded beasts. The remaining artillerymen managed to pull four guns back some 300 yards. They redeployed them and began firing shell at the enemy.22 At about the same time, another fragment veered to the left of the Rebel line of advance. A group of men (probably Arkansanans who had managed to maintain some degree of cohesion) pressed the 22nd Indiana's left flank quite hard. According to Pattison, the Rebels actually broke the Indiana line, apparently because their approach was so sudden. Colonel Hendricks had dismounted to better observe his regiment in the brush. He sent an aide, Randolph V. Marshall, to ask Pattison for help and then ordered his men to withdraw. 23 But before he could direct the retreat, a musket ball penetrated his left side, passed through his torso, and exited near the right shoulder blade. Buckshot from a Rebel shotgun also traversed his face." His loss almost led to disaster for the 22nd. Temporarily without a leader, it "gave way in confusion, " according to Henry Washburn. The regiment's maj or, David W. Daily, had been with Pattison behind the 18th Indiana. He rode back to his own unit and, with the aid of his company leaders, reformed its lines and halted the withdrawal. 25 No more than 200 yards away, the 18th Indiana found itself seriously threatened by the 22nd's flight. When Marshall found Pattison, he was instructed to tell Hendricks to hold his position at all hazards, and to coordinate his regiment's moves with those of the 18th. That advice came too late, for other aides met Marshall on his return trip and told him of Hendricks' death and the confusion that followed. Before the 22nd could regain its lost ground, a group of Rebels-probably the same that had pushed Hendricks' unit back-passed Washburn's left flank and moved into his rear. As if that were not enough, some Louisianans turned their two captured guns on Washburn's position and began firing. Realizing that Davidson's gunners had mistaken them for the enemy, Washburn reacted quickly and efficiently. He faced his regiment to the rear flank, ordering it to lie on the ground and fire. When the Rebels left his rear 16 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

and continued their retreat, Washburn faced his men back to the front rank and prepared to deal with the remaining enemy!6 While Davis' division struggled with the still dangerous Rebels, Osterhaus' men came to its support. Osterhaus had done little fighting since the repulse of his cavalry earlier that day. Mci ntosh's preference to personally lead the left wing attack had left his right wing without orders, and it failed to keep Osterhaus from aiding Davis' hard-pressed units. Hebert's capture of Davidson's guns exposed Osterhaus' right, so, aided by the quick action of his company commanders, he double­ quicked the 12th Missouri into a change of front to its right, and the unit opened "a raging fire " on Hebert. Osterhaus also directed a battery commanded by Martin Welfley to open on the Rebels and brought the 36th Illinois into the open field. It formed a "close column" to the 12th Missouri's left in order to lend fire support to Davis and guard against a possible attack from the Rebels in Osterhaus' front.27 Meanwhile, Washburn's 18th Indiana cleared its rear and was ready to face the Louisianans who had become instant artillerists. Scattered Rebel infantry still occupied the intervening ground and Washburn began to advance toward them. When White saw this, he ordered his 37th Illinois-which had reformed-to advance.28 Disorganized and caught by fire from three directions, the Confederates lost all chance of regaining the initiative. Individual groups of men fought bravely; one such group of Louisianans decimated an ill-advised cavalry charge, probably conducted by the 1st Missouri battalion of Davis' division. Roving Federal patrols captured Hebert and W.H. Tunnard of the 3rd Louisiana, who was next in line of succession. Large scale, organized resistance broke, and squads of men-led by regimental commissioned and non-commis­ sioned officers-made their way northward out of Federal range, while White and Pattison closed the box they had built around the Rebels.29 The 22nd Indiana joined the 18th in its advance. It is entirely unclear which unit on the field retook Davidson's guns; the 22nd Indiana or the 37th Illinois were probably the captors. The 59th Illinois seems to have done little if anything after its final withdrawal. By dusk, the Leetown fighting had ended. 30 The next day 's action proved to be an anticlimax for Davis' men. They rested on the Leetown field until midnight, 7 March, and then joined the rest of Curtis' army as it concentrated on the right. Carr had heroically slowed Price's advance, although suffering heavily and giving up much ground. On 8 March, Davis and Carr supported the advance of Franz Sigel's wing of the army, which drove Price from the area. Davis' men provided fire support, but did not engage in hard fighting that day.3'

Davis' fight on 7 March offers the student a microcosm in which to study the good and bad about Civil War infantry leadership and tactics. Although new to pitched battle, the regiments did very well. Able leadership by line officers accounted for this to an important, if not decisive, degree. But there were exceptions to this rule. Major John Charles Black of the 37th Illinois, for example, castigated the regiment's color bearer for falling back during the seesaw fight that preceded the capture of Davidson's guns. The bearer, "an old British soldier" named Benjamin Manning, rashly tried to make up for his supposed lack of fortitude by exposing the color guard a couple of rods in front of the regiment. One of that unlucky guard remembered years later that Manning knelt on one knee, held the staff in one hand, and fired his revolver with the other. A ball took off Manning's left forefinger and another struck his chest; the latter, a spent proj ectile, merely knocked him unconscious. 32 The fate of one color guard was inconsequential, but Manning's story is an example of Civil War officers' sometimes ill-advised insistence on parade-ground display. There are many indications of the beneficial effect of such display on the battle­ field during the Civil War. But in the wooded terrain north of Leetown, probably few 37th Illinoisans saw the flag anyway, and the despairing effect on morale as the flag fled contact with the enemy was probably quite minimal. Manning's reaction illustrated the effectiveness of instilling elan (albeit rather rash elan) through criticism of soldiers' BA'ITLE IN THE BRUSH 17

courage. In this case, however, it was badly misplaced. There is no indication that such traditional martial displays had any effect on the fighting capacity of White's regiments. This lack of effect was due mainly to the rugged terrain and therefore limited visibility which they encountered. Many Civil War battles occurred on terrain as rugged, but few took place on ground that was worse. It became the central feature of Davis' fight. The brush enabled the opposing forces to meet at very short ranges; much closer than in most Civil War battles. A distance of 200-300 yards between infantry lines throughout the conflict was a fa ir average, yet White's brigade was only 7 5 yards from Mcintosh's men when the fighting started. It continued at ranges that likely approximated that distance. No one in Pattison's brigade appears to have estimated their distance after completing the left wheel that placed them on the Rebel flank. Because the Indiana regiments began their wheel immediately after clearing White's right, they were undoubtedly little more than 7 5 yards from the Rebel left when they opened fire. By reducing the range, the brush determined the nature of the Leetown fight. Surprise and suddenness, to a greater or lesser degree, characterized the meeting of opposing forces, leading to frenetic exchanges of gunfire that lasted relatively short periods of time, and that were often followed by precipitate withdrawa ls, usually by the less-experienced Federals. The brush also provided Union officers an opportunity to reform their men after pulling back short distances into cover, as White did three times and the 22nd Indiana did once. Of the Federal infantry, only the 18th Indiana engaged in fighting lasting more than a few minutes at one time. On the Confederate side, the brush probably was important in allowing isolated fragments of infantry to hold their ground, some of them for quite a while, as well as help them ma ke safe withdrawals. No infantry units on either side engaged in sustained fighting in the open fields, for wooded areas were always nearby to offer shelter, thus reducing casualties. The terrain also made artillery fire ineffective at Leetown, despite the counter-claims of participants on both sides. 33 There are accounts of individual shots finding their marks with disastrous results, but these were exceptions. Most of the generalizations about effective artillery fire can be discounted as post-battle exultation in victory, or as an expression of the real worth of Federal artillery. Trees were scarred, brush was battered, but no serious physical harm was done to Rebel troops. The moral support, however, was important for the hard-pressed Yankees, and some translated their euphoria at success into actual material support. In short, there is on good evidence that Davidson's guns or any other Federal artillery played a significant role in supporting the Union infantry at Leetown. The cavalry was even less effective. It could do little in the wooded areas, and the fields and roads were too small to allow it to deploy fully. When it did attack, the Rebels cut it to pieces at very close range. Armed with rifles, the 3rd Louisiana offered an early proof in the Civil War of how new military technology had made obsolete Napoleonic conceptions of the use of cavalry on the battlefield. The disadvantages of Leetown's rugged countryside were overcome by the generally efficient showing of Davis' regimental and brigade officers. Henry Washburn is a good example, with his quick reaction to the dangerous position in which his regiment found itself after the 22nd Indiana withdrew. Davis had not deployed his division in the woods by choice, but in order to extend the Federal line and prevent a Rebel flanking move on Osterhaus. He also wanted to maintain the Union position guarding Curtis' left near Leetown. The brush undoubtedly prevented his infantry lines from maintaining perfect formation. It is reasonable to assume that the regiments moved forward in more or less irregular deployments resembling lines, yet were strong enough to deliver concentrated fire on sudden notice. In such a situation, the work of both company and non-commissioned officers became even more important than usual. The stamina of individual privates cannot be overlooked either. Although they fell back several times, they rebounded effectively an.d pressed their advances until the Rebels gave up the field. 18 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

William Watson. a Scotsman serving in the 3rd Louisiana, offered an insight into the technical nature of White and Hebert's fight. Writing twenty-five years after the battle, he remembered that his officers ordered the men to "close in on them." They thought the Federal arms were better suited to long-range fire than their own. although that is questionable. As the Rebels pushed on. they used as a screen the smoke that

inevitably covered a Civil War battlefield. "Our men squatted down when loading, then advanced and squatted down again. and looking along under the smoke could take good aim; while the enemy, firing at random into the smoke, much of their shot passed over our heads." Later that day, when Watson retreated over the same ground to escape the final Union advance, he noticed that the trees were scarred high and low with bullet marks. He assumed that the marks which were higher than a man's head were mainly from the Federal guns, and those lower were from his own side's. Picking up discarded Union rifles as they passed on. Watson noted that the Belgian and Enfield guns had raised sights, all set at 200 yards.a.c Sources from the Federal side tend to support Watson's observations. Smoke was a serious problem, as Judson Tyler of the 18th Indiana noted. "It would be allmost (sic) impossible for any person in the situation that our Regt. was in to tell mutch (sic) how the battle was going. Our Brigade was in a thick woods ...with the whole Country beclouded with smoke .... " Edward E. Fielding of the 59th Illinois remembered that the undergrowth helped protect his brigade, for "the small trees and brush stopt (sic) a great many of the secesh bullets .... " White's men did not fare so well in the few open spaces they were forced to cross while retreating from Hebert's advance. Captain William P. Clack noted that his Company K, 37th Illinois, suffered its greatest loss while covering the regiment's final withdrawal. When the 37th retreated behind Davidson's guns to regroup, the rear of Black's company remained in the open field while the rest of the regiment was in the shelter of the woods. Hebert 's 3rd Louisianans came up, fired their volley, and inflicted heavy casualties on Black's company. 36• Watson and the Federals quoted above offer material with which to construct a plausible answer to a question that has bothered Pea Ridge historians for years. Although Union casualties are known with a high degree of certainty, Confederate losses are not. The deaths of McCulloch and Mcintosh. and the captures of Hebert and Tunnard. precluded a report from the perspective of division command. Of the seventeen Confederate regiments present at Leetown. reports exist for only three. None is so reliable that information on casualties can be extrapolated for the entire division. On 18 March. Earl Van Dom reported the loss of his army as 800 to 1,000 killed and wounded, but nine days later reduced his estimate to 600. Curtis' losses were 203 killed and 980 wounded, while Davis lost 48 and 285 respectively.38 A key to the discrepency in casualties is contained in Watson's observation. White's men were on the offensive during most of the fight with Hebert, and when they retreated, the Rebels took advantage of the smoke cover to pour in fire on their unprotected rear. That fire was most effective when the Federals retreated across open spaces. If Watson remembered correctly when he wrote that the Yankee rifle sights were set at 200 yards, that tactical mistake hampered Federal fire because most of the Leetown fighting occurred at shorter ranges. According to the estimate on armaments historical Jack Coggins, if sighted for a range of 200 yards, the proj ectile would rise about three feet above the line of sight. 37 That would have beenenough to send much of White's fire over the heads of Hebert's men. particularly if they squatted down to see below the smoke. Other factors probably affected the rate of casualties on both sides, and it is likely that an accurate estimate of Confederate losses at Leetown will never be known. But this perspective appears to be the only one that presently explains the apparently low Rebel losses. In summation, the Indiana and Illinois troops performed admirably in their first battle experience under conditions that were of more than ordinary difficulty. Their fighting was a major factor in the Union victory at Pea Ridge, and a study of it offers some insight into the tactical experience of Civil War infantry. BATTLE IN THE BRUSH 19

Notes

*Earl J. Hess is a graduate student in American Studies at Purdue University. 'Edwin C. Bearss has been the most prolific writer on Pea Ridge, with a five-part series entitled "The Battle of Pea Ridge" in Annals of Iowa, vols. 36 and 37 (1963-64), and in Arkansas Historical Q�U�.�Urly, vols. 17, 19 and 20 (1958, 1960, 1961). While Bearss has produced good outlines of the military movements, he avoids critical analyses of nearly all the battle's aspects, virtually ignoring unpublished sources and soldiers' letters that were printed in hometown newspapers. Other secondary accounts include Albert Castel, "A New View of the Battle of Pea Ridge," Missouri Historical Review, 57 (1968), 136-51; and Jay Monaghan, Civil War on the Western Border, 1854-1865 (New York: Bonanza Books, 1955), chap. 21. 'The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederute Armies, series 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883), 8:550, hereafter cited as OR (all volumes cited are in series 1). 'Ezra J. Warner, Generuls in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 115·16. 'Frederick H. Dyer, A Compendium of the Warof the Rebellion, vol 3 (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959), pp. 1062, 1073, 1111, 1120, and 1126-27. 'Edward A. Blodgett, "The Army of the Southwest and the Battle of Pea Ridge," in Milit4ry Essays and Reco/kctions: Papers Read Before the Commandery of the St4te of IUinois, Milit4ry Order of the Loyal Legion of the United St4tes, vol 2 (Chicago: A.C. McClung, 1894), p. 306. "OR. 8: 59, 61, 196. 'Van Dorn commanded about 16,000 men, while Curtis led 10,500. OR, 8: 196, 283. 'OR, 8: 199, 217. 'OR. 8: 246, 249·50; Chesley A. Mosman, diary, 7 March 1862, in George W. Herr, Nine Campaigns in Nine St4tes: The History of the Fifty-Nineth Regiment IUinois (San Francisco: Bancroft, 1890), p. 369. Sources documenting the discarding of unnecessary baggage including George Gordon, Diary, 7 March 1862, Gordon Papers, U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; and D.W. Henderson to ?, 10 March 1862, in Litchfield (IUinois) Journal, 26 March 1862. '00R. 8: 218, 728; William Kinney to ?, 16 March 1862, in W.H. Tunnard, A Southern Record: The History of the Third Regiment Louisiana Infantry (1866; reprinted Dayton: Morningside Bookshop, 1970), p. 138. "OR. 8: 253; anonymous letter from 37th Illinois, ChicagoDaily Tribune, 24 March 1862. "Mosman diary, 7 March 1862, in Herr, Nine Campaigns, pp. 369-70. White reported that Mcintosh's line overlapped his right, "notwithstanding I had deployed this conunand to an extent which

was of itself hazardous in the effort to prevent such a result .. . ," OR 8: 253. "Norman E. Clark, Sr., ed., Warefare along the Mississippi: The Letters of Lieutenant Colonel G. Currie (Mt. Pleasant, Mich.: Central Michigan Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 25-26. Currie apparently revised his wartime letters after the conflict to produce a narrative of his experience. Although some details appear erroneous, most of his account is accurate and valuable. "Clark, ed., Warfare along the Mississippi, p. 26. ••Clark, ed., Warfare along the Mississippi, p. 26. '"OR. 8: 246, 250; Washburn to Pattison, 8 March 1862, in Frank Moore, ed. The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events (New York: D. van Nostrand, n.d.), vol 4, p. 248. This document, Washburn's official report of Pea Ridge was not printed in OR. See also, Clark , ed., Warfare along the Mississippi, p. 27. 11Clark, ed., Warefare along the Mississippi, p. 27. "OR, 8: 246, 250. See also, E.E. Johnson, diary, 7 March 1862, in U.S. Works Progress Administra· tion Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; and R.K.G. to editor, 21 March 1862, Washington (A rkansas) Telegruph, 2 April 1862. "CaptainJames F. Harris to ?, no date, New Orleans CommercialBuUiten, 16 April 1862. '"Captain Jerome G. Gilmore to W.L. Gunnels, no date, in Tunnard, Southern Record, p. 140. Also, see Tunnard's own account on p. 135. Harris to?, no date, New Orleans CommercialBuUiten, 16 April 1862. "Anonymous letter from 37th Illinois, no date, Chicago Daily Tribune, 24 March 1862; Harris to ?, no date, New Orleans Commercial BuUiten, 16 April 1862; William Watson, Life in the Confederute Army, Being the Observations and Experiences of an Alien in the South during the American Civil War (New York: Scribner and Welford, 1888), p. 295. , "OR, 8: 253; J .C. Hansel to father, 11 March 1862, Peoria Daily Transcript, 31 March 1862. ''OR, 8: 247, 250; Randolph V. Marshall, An Historical Sketch of the Twenty-Second Regiment Indiana Volunteers (Madison: Courier, 1884), p. 1"1. 20 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

"Colonel Hendricks later died. A son of William Hendricks, former Indiana governor and U.S. sena­ tor during the days of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, John became one of the state's early war heroes. Ironically, Hendricks was killed on his thirty-ninth birthday while, at home, his wife and friends were celebrating his birthday by previous arrangement. See interview with Hendricks' brother, Cincinnati Daily GazettC', 20 March 1862: and Theo T. Scribner, Indiana 's Roll of Honor (Indianapolis: A.D. Streight, 1866), vol. 2, pp. 643, 647. "Washburn to Pattison, 8 March 1862, in Moore, ed., Rebellion Record, 4: 248; and Marshall, Twen ty­ Second Indiana, pp. 17-18. "Marshall, Twenty-Second Indiana, pp. 17-18: Washburn to Pattison, 8 March 1862, in Moore, ed., Rebellion Record, 4: 248, and E.E. Johnson, diary, 7 March 1862, U.S. Works Progress Administration Collection. Pattison reported in OR, 8: 250, that only the left wing of the 18th Indiana faced to the rear rank while the right wing continued to fire frontally at Rebels who retreated from the field the same way they had entered it. "OR, 8: 218: letter fragment attached to Henry Kircher to mother, 28 November 1862, Engelmann­ Kircher Collection, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield. "Washburn to Pattison, 8 March 1862, in Moore, ed., Rebellion Record. 4: 248; and OR, 8: 253. "Watson, Life in the Confederate Army, pp. 297-98; and Kinney to ?, 16 March 1862, in Tunnard, Sou them Record, p. 138. '00R, 8: 250, 253: and Washburn to Pattison, 8 March 1862, in Moore, ed., Rebellion Record, 4: 248. "OR, 8: 248. "Izora DeWolf, A.L. Swap in the Civil War (privately printed, n.d.), p. 11; and Faye) to editor, St. Louis Daily Mis souri Democrat, 22 March 1862. David Lathrop, a hospital steward in the 59th Illinois, wrote that "One or two subordinate officers failed to share the honors of battle, by being dilatory about going in, and a very few of the men." See his History of the Fifty-Ninth Regiment Illinois Volunteers (Indianapolis: Hall and Hutchinson, 1865), p. 93. "See OR, 8: 254; and J. Good to wife, ca. 11 March 1862, in Lester Newton Fitzhugh, ed., Cannon Smoke: The Letters of Cap tain John J. Good. Good-Douglas Texas Battery, CSA (Hillsboro, Tx.: Hill Junior College Press, 1971), p. 163. "Watson, Life in the Confedera te Army, pp. 294, 301. Although written 25 years after the battle, Watson's account appears quite accurate and warrants serious consideration. "Tyler to cousin, 4 April 1862, Stephen S. Harding Collection, Indiana Historical Society; Fielding to mother, 21 March 1862, Fielding Papers, Illinois State Historical Library; and Black to mother. 9 March 1862, John Charles Black Papers, Illinois State Historical Library. 360R, 8: 206, 282, 285. "Coggins, Arms and Equipment of the Civil Wa r (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), p. 32. BOOK REVIEWS

Forward Into Battle: Fighting Tac tics From Wa terloo to Vietnam. By Paddy Griffith. (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982). Pp. 156, illus., index, biblio., maps. $20.00.

Paddy Griffith, a member of the faculty at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, has written a study sure to arouse controversy. Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson's recent Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tac tics and the Southern Heritage (reviewed vol. 7, no. 3) concluded that improvements in firearms-especially the general adoption of the rifled musket-made mass attacks prohibitively expensive. In that, McWhiney and Jamieson were conventional, the theory that fire and not shock dominated the battlefield since the days of Napoleon having become an almost axiomatic premise of military history. Griffith, however, sets out to challenge this view, arguing that not only was the bayonet a much underrated, if predominately psycholog· ical, weapon in the Napoleonic Wars, but that into the twentieth century-and indeed to this day-while "better firearms imposed looser formations and greater fire prepara· tions, it was still the will to charge home that won the victory" (p. 102). Griffith believes that the reason for the preponderance of the fire school is that tactical historians "appear to have developed a curious blind spot in relation to the whole problem of close combat. " This, in part, was in reaction to the late nineteenth century's excessive faith in the offensive, but it was also founded on the assumption that military problems could always be solved by the application of increased and higher technology. Yet, he concludes, from the "time of Wellington up to the war in Vietnam. technology has repeatedly failed to reven p t close combat as its apostles had hoped" (p. 143). This, then, is a fighting tract rather than a dispassionate historical account. To make his case, Griffith has used selective examples and has omitted, or only touched very lightly upon, cases where firepower prevailed. Thus, he has done nothing on the Civil War. Correspondence with Mr. Griffith elicited the response that he was not well acquainted with the literature, but more importantly, that he believed that neither officers nor men were adequately prepared to execute such tactics successfully. Civil War historians may well wish to take issue with this view. At the same time, however, Griffith does not analyze the Boer War in which highly disciplined British regulars repeatedly were defeated by long-range rifle fire. These are but two omissions; there are others. And yet, the book has much to recommend it. Its main theme is a challenge to the prevailing reliance on technology. As the author points out in his observations on Vietnam. the most profound tactical lesson was that "even the most advanced technology may fail to deliver everything that it seems to promise" (p. 135). American assumptions that firepower alone could destroy an enemy without the need for an infantry assault were often disappointed, and so contributed to the rising sense of frustration. To be sure, the bayonet is no longer the primary close combat weapon, having been replaced by the hand grenade, the assault rifle, and the submachine gun; but coming into close range may still decide the issue. A case in point is the recent Falklands campaign in which small bodies of highly disciplined British elite troops overran fortified positions held by superior numbers of disheartened Argentine conscripts armed with heavy and light automatic weapons. The message that the human spirit and not weaponry alone win victory is something that Americans might do well to ponder.. GER

21 22 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

The Making of a Soldier, By Anthony B. Herbert. (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982). Pp. 189, illustrations, maps, index. $14.95.

Anthony Herbert was too young to fight in World War II. But he joined the United States Anny at seventeen and, after basic training, went to Korea in the fall of 1950. By 1953 he was discharged as the anny's most highly decorated soldier and its youngest sergeant major. He attended college on the G I Bill, received a commission through the ROTC, and eventually became a colonel and battalion commander in Vietnam. There he created a maj or controversy by charging that war crimes committed by American troops were covered up by higher authority. In the end, he was relieved from command and resigned from the anny. This book, a personal account of his on&year combat experiences in Korea, is not only the chronicle of one soldier; it is also an account, as the author puts it, of the "last gasp of that love of justice and unity of purpose that shaped American life for such young men as I was." It is, then, a story of combat duty, as well as a story of motivation, sacrifice, and determination, told in astonishing detail after 30 years. And while the details of conversations, obscenities, wisecracks, and even hand-to-hand encounters may not be all that accurate, Herbert's record and valor are well established. It is essentially the tale of a loner, one of those rare soldiers who relished combat, took risks, and in doing so encouraged others to do likewise. But these qualities, which became less and less in demand after Korea as the U.S. Anny turned to technological rather than traditional military solutions to its problems, also explain why Herbert came into conflict with the bloated military bureaucracy in Vietnam. Already in Korea there was a disturbing tendency to substitute sheer mass for individual prowess, excepting on those occasions when necessity compelled American commanders to reconsider their ways and allow individuals like Herbert to emerge. In Vietnam, on the other hand, the combination of quantity with technological sophistication made it possible to avoid any kind of innovative and individualistic military thought, setting an individual like Herbert on a collision course with authority. It is, of course, true that this book was written 30 years after the events and that memory has been blurTed, while new ideas and impressions have been super­ imposed. Still, Herbert's story has the ring of truth. It is a fine account of an almost forgotten war, one for which we have few personal narratives, much less by fighting soldiers from the ranks. Herbert's account reminds us of the mud, snow, and ice, of long forgotten mountain ridges and brave Turks. As the anny struggles to find new ways to motivate its men towards combat, while the ranks of those who have actually experienced combat gets thinner, this book is not only good reading but a valuable contribution towards resolving the problem of combat motivation. It is highly recommended. GER

Juan Davis Bradburn: A Reappraisal of the Mexican Commander of Anahuac. By Margaret Swett Henson. (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1982.) Pp. 159, bibliog., index. $9.50.

Margaret Swett Henson looks behind popular legend to offer an informative reevaluation of Juan Davis Bradburn, controversial American-born commander of the Mexican garrison at Anahuac on Galveston Bay. Working closely from primary sources, Henson carefully constructs a vivid and detailed portrait that tempers the Texas tradition of Bradburn as a capricious and incompetent tyrant. She presents an BOOK REVIEWS 23

obj ective portrait of Bradburn as a career Mexican official rather than as an American arch-turncoat. In a brief but insightful historiographical review, Henson traces Bradburn's tarnished reputation to the personal resentment of Angl�Texans like Sf;ephen Austin who opposed the imposition of Mexican military authority along the nort;ijern frontier in 1830. The Angl�Texan and Federalist coup at Anahuac in 1832 made Bradburn a convenient scapegoat for the revolution that followed. But Henson's exhaustive research into a wide array of primary sources clearly uncovers enough new evidence to warrant reconsideration of that overhasty judgment. Henson reminds the reader that Bradburn's varied military experiences explain his insistence on unbending discipline and his strict observance of protocol. In addition, Bradburn faced many of the problems presented by any frontier assignment. He was indeed inflexible, but as a career officer in the Mexican Army he naturally followed orders and enforced Mexican law without question. Most importantly, Henson places Bradburn squarely in the center of an explosive conflict that had roots far deeper than an abrasive personality. The sudden intrusion of a new military post so far north of the Nueces ignited smouldering tensions that pitted Angl� Texan impresarios against Mexican authorities, Mexican Federalists against Mexican Centralists, civilian law against military discipline, and the state of Texas-Coahuila against the supreme government in Mexico City. Henson indicts the Angl�Texans at every turn for their misunderstanding of Bradburn's authority and of Mexican law in general, and she provides glimpses of a broader Texas independence movement for which Bradburn can bear little responsibility. In the face of Henson's analysis, the Mexican post at Anahuac seems ill-conceived at best and, at worst, doomed to failure. Henson's penetrating but judicious reconstruction of events at Anahuac from 1830 to 1832 makes her reassessment of Juan Davis Bradburn more than a biography. By sorting convincing evidence out from mere conjecture, Henson pieces together a persuasive portrait of Bradburn's background and motives from a large collection of fragmentary and sometimes suspect records. At the same time, she places Bradburn firmly within a broader context of people and events, justifying his actions as those of a military officer who accepted a difficult assignment. She therefore succeeds in separating fact from legend. A classified bibliography, an attractive format, and the inclusion of Bradburn's own defense in an appendix contribute greatly to the value of this interesting volume.

Kenneth J. Winkle Purdue University Indiana Historical Society Nonprofit Org. Indiana Military History Journal U.S. Postage 315 West Ohio Street PAID Indianapolis, IN 46202 Indianapolis, IN. Permit No. 3864