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Hannah Blumhardt

Foxes Guarding the Hen House? Industry-led design of product schemes

n 2020 New Zealand began developing Abstract its first regulated product stewardship For the first time since the enactment of the Minimisation Act Ischemes in a drive to reverse our status 2008, New Zealand is applying regulated (or mandatory) product as one of the world’s most wasteful countries. Schemes will cover tyres, electronics, stewardship to several priority products. By making those who agrichemicals, farm plastics, refrigerants manufacture, sell and use products responsible for minimising the and plastic packaging. Whether this foray into regulated product stewardship waste those products cause, well-designed product stewardship triggers meaningful waste prevention or schemes can act as a critical tool in the transition to a circular economy. simply results in the proliferation of end- However, the New Zealand government has put its faith in industry of-pipe programmes will depend on robust, ambitious schemes reinforced to lead scheme design. Such an approach threatens to vitiate robust, by regulations. Success hinges on scheme ambitious schemes and foreground industry interests over those of design, especially who gets to set the product wider society and the natural environment. This article juxtaposes stewardship agenda, and government’s role in the process. Unfortunately, New the radical potential of product stewardship against the probable Zealand lacks a precedent for effective outcome of industry-led schemes, and recommends reforms that scheme design. The minimalism of the Act 2008 – home the minister for the environment should pursue in order to shift the to New Zealand’s product stewardship dial towards more inclusive design of product stewardship schemes. provisions – permits an outdated reliance Keywords product stewardship, , circular economy, on industry self-regulation, with only light-touch government intervention, and industry capture no guarantee of oversight in the public

Hannah Blumhardt is a senior associate at the Institute of Governance and Policy Studies, interest. The minister for the environment coordinator of the New Zealand Product Stewardship Council and co-founder of The Rubbish Trip. must ensure that the upcoming review of

Page 62 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 17, Issue 2 – May 2021 the Waste Minimisation Act addresses Figure 1: The , based on the approach in the Waste Minimisation Act these issues. Otherwise, New Zealand risks leaving the fox in charge of the hen house, Waste REDUCTION – lessening waste generation and validating weak schemes that hinder reduction true circularisation of our economy.

What is product stewardship and what is its purpose? – further using products in their existing form for their Product stewardship is about making those original purpose or similar purpose who manufacture, sell and use a product responsible for reducing that product’s environmental impact across its life cycle. Traditionally, product stewardship Waste RECYCLE – reprocessing waste materials to includes: diversion produce new products • product take-back services for reuse or recycling; • market-based measures to lift recovery RECOVERY – extraction of materials or rates (e.g. advanced disposal fees or energy from waste for further use or deposit/return systems); and processing, and includes, but not limited • modulating fees to cover costs of to, making materials into processing hard-to-recycle products. Product stewardship aims to internalise a product’s social and environmental costs, TREATMENT – subjecting waste to any physical, biological, or which is assumed to incentivise producers chemical process to change the to redesign products to be more volume or character of that waste Maximum conservation of resources environmentally friendly (Michaelis, 1995; so that it maybe disposed of with no, or reduced, significant adverse Andrews, 1998, p.188). This assumption effect on the environment has solidified product stewardship as Waste integral to the circular economy aspiration disposal to ‘design out waste’ (Jensen and Remmen, 2017; Crawford, 2021). DISPOSAL – final deposit of waste on land set However, to date, excessive focus on apart for the purpose managing ‘end-of-life’ products has shoehorned product stewardship schemes towards recycling, rather than upstream Source: Ministry for the Environment (2009), p.19 activities. Zero waste and circular economy These types of interventions focus on actors across the product life cycle (as experts continually remind policymakers changing how we design and use products opposed to ‘extended producer that product stewardship should consider to decelerate global demand for raw responsibility’, which places responsibility products’ full life cycles, and adopt materials and the pace of manufacture, a on producers solely).1 Accordingly, product interventions that disincentivise over- concept described as dematerialising stewardship carries the ‘radical potential’ production and over-consumption and consumption (Cogoy, 2004; Petrides et al., to highlight the multiple opportunities for incentivise product redesign, reuse, 2018). Success in this endeavour will mean waste prevention across supply chains and maintenance and sharing, not only society generates less waste, but this is not a product’s life. This vista considers post- recycling (Hannon, 2020, p.4; Sanz et al., necessarily the end goal. Rather, waste consumption/end-of-life products, but 2015; Lane and Watson, 2012, pp.1256, reduction signifies our progress towards also how stuff circulates at the household 1260; National Recycling Coalition, 2020). mitigating climate change, respecting or community meso-scale, and the macro- Examples include: planetary boundaries, and replacing the scale processes that drive raw material • bans; current ‘take–make–throw’ linear economy extraction and decisions • binding reduction targets and import with a regenerative circular economy. (Lane and Watson, 2012; Hannon, 2020, levies for certain products, materials In the current era of ecological p.4). Some commentators argue that this and chemical additives; breakdown, environmental policies like diffused outlook creates confusion, • reuse quotas; and product stewardship must serve these allowing producers to deflect regulatory • design specifications and/or eco- critical bigger-picture goals. Fortunately, accountability, continue externalising modulating fees to increase product product stewardship is capable of doing so scheme costs, and implement ineffectual durability, reusability and repairability because it takes an expansive view, recycling initiatives (Nichol and Thompson, and decrease product toxicity. identifying roles and responsibilities for 2007; Lewis, 2009, p.21; Lane and Watson,

Policy Quarterly – Volume 17, Issue 2 – May 2021 – Page 63 Foxes Guarding the Hen House? Industry-led design of product stewardship schemes

2012, p.1258). However, good scheme Section 8 also foreshadows both stewardship process for the first time, design can mitigate these problems, and voluntary and mandatory product declaring the following ‘priority products’: ensure that product stewardship schemes stewardship. Under the voluntary approach, • tyres; are ambitious and incorporate robust anyone (usually an industry group) can • electrical and electronic products; regulatory measures that help to reduce design a scheme, then apply for its • agrichemicals and their containers; emissions, material consumption, accreditation, provided certain basic • refrigerants and other synthetic pollution and waste. criteria in section 14 of the Act are met. greenhouse gases; Until recently, successive New Zealand • farm plastics; and Product stewardship in New Zealand: lofty governments preferred the voluntary • plastic packaging. vision, shaky foundations approach to product stewardship, despite The minister also exercised her Product stewardship is enshrined in the mounting evidence that it was not discretion to issue section 12 guidelines.3 Waste Minimisation Act 2008. Section 8 delivering comprehensive waste reduction, Schemes are now in development for all defines product stewardship as a system to: nor cost redistribution outcomes listed products, with applications for (Blumhardt, 2018). accreditation due over the coming years. encourage (and, in certain The pathway for mandatory schemes The move towards mandatory product circumstances, require) the people and involves the relevant minister declaring a stewardship represents a turning point in organisations involved in the life of a product a ‘priority product’, which triggers New Zealand waste policy, prompting product to share responsibility for – the requirement that a product stewardship optimistic assessments about its potential to transform the economy and address various environmental ills (Crawford, Industry-led co-design allocates 2021). For example, the Climate Change power to those with a vested Commission has recommended that the government expand product stewardship interest in the status quo linear to more products to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Climate Change economy, while effectively Commission, 2021, p.125). This optimism reflects the growing influence of zero waste, marginalising other interest groups circular economy strategies, which perceive product stewardship’s potential to tackle and experts. climate change and resource depletion through upstream reductions in waste, toxicity and material consumption (Haigh et al., 2021; National Recycling Coalition, (a) ensuring there is effective reduction, scheme be developed and accredited. 2020). However, while the Waste reuse, recycling, or recovery of the Under section 12 the minister can also issue Minimisation Act’s expansive definition of product; and (b) managing any guidelines regarding the expected ‘contents product stewardship is fit for purpose, its environmental harm arising from the and effects’ of priority product schemes, silence regarding the scheme design process product when it becomes waste. with which schemes should be ‘consistent’ is not. As will be discussed, this silence risks to receive accreditation. Following undermining truly ambitious schemes by Subsection 8(a) guides product accreditation, the minister can make surrendering product stewardship to stewardship schemes to follow the waste scheme participation compulsory under vested interest capture. hierarchy, which prioritises preventing and section 22(1)(a), a discretionary power reducing waste, and fostering systems of only available for priority product schemes. Scheme design: who’s in charge and why reuse, before recycling, composting, energy Any additional regulatory measures to does it matter? recovery or disposal.2 The provision’s trigger activities up the waste hierarchy, Realising the radical potential of product wording encompasses a product’s end-of- such as fees, deposit/return systems, stewardship to stimulate circular life, but also upstream, activity, including binding targets or design specifications, are business models hinges on the presence product redesign geared towards achieving not guaranteed, and likely depend on and influence of bold, disruptive ideas reduction outcomes (e.g. selling liquid whether scheme designers recommend during scheme design. Under the Waste products as solid concentrates to eliminate them. This makes the scheme design Minimisation Act, scheme design loosely plastic packaging) or improving a product’s process critical. However, the Act is silent follows a ‘framework’ approach whereby reusability (e.g. designing durable, regarding who should design schemes and government sets general expectations for repairable electronics). Accordingly, how. scheme outcomes and leaves industry to subsection 8(a) envisages ambitious forms In July 2020 the then associate minister design schemes within these parameters of product stewardship that engage for the environment, Eugenie Sage, (Hickle, 2014; Lane and Watson, 2012, interventions across product life cycles. triggered the mandatory product p.1257). The minister’s section 12

Page 64 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 17, Issue 2 – May 2021 guidelines set the overarching ‘contents facilitation and oversight role is warranted, This predicament reveals the legacy of neo- and expected effects’ of schemes. However, given that ‘groups have unequal access to liberalism, which views government as when it comes to scheme design, the government policy-making processes’ clunky, bureaucratic, or even oppressive passive voice in key provisions – ‘a product (Lewis, 2009, p.82) and ‘the environment when upholding social and environmental stewardship scheme for the product must cannot sign a contract and has no way to goals vis-à-vis the efficiency of industry be developed’ (s10(a)) and ‘accreditation represent its interests’ (Rashbrooke, 2018, self-regulation (ibid.) – views that have led of the scheme must be obtained’ (s10(b)) p.130). Furthermore, inclusive processes New Zealand to excel at ‘privatizing its – elucidates neither a process nor who are needed to ensure fairness and scheme environmental regulatory system’ (Haufler, should take charge. durability: 2001, p.41). However, industry self- New Zealand policymakers have long regulation ‘is not … a viable substitute for assumed that industry would fill this gap. If everyone is in the room when effective governance regimes for Soon after the Waste Minimisation Act’s regulations are being drawn up – environmental protection’ (Andrews, 1998, enactment, the Ministry for the including the firms affected, but also p.193). One example of the consequences Environment released A Guide to Product their sharpest civil-society critics – and of this approach are the industry projects Stewardship, stating that ‘it is expected that the issues are fully canvassed, the that have lumped the New Zealand any business involved in the product life openness of the process raises the government with tracts of contaminated cycle will take the lead in designing and chance of producing rules that are well- land and to manage at public implementing schemes’ (Ministry for the Environment, 2009, p.2). The document explained that industry ‘know the most Research indicates that ‘companies about the product’ and ‘are best placed to tend to apply strategies that do not efficiently incorporate initiatives to manage end-of-life impacts into the design, challenge the concept of business as production and distribution of the product’ (p.2). A decade later the ministry called this usual, which in the long run does not approach ‘co-design’, adopting it for New Zealand’s first regulated product change companies’ relationship with stewardship schemes with similar justifications: ‘government intervention nature’ ... can be slow’, whereas business is ‘far more agile in leading innovation in areas of expertise’ (Ministry for the Environment, 2019, p.17). Furthermore, ‘[u]nlike the informed, necessary and likely to be expense: for example, the hazardous waste Government, business can bring to the obeyed. (ibid., p.77) stockpiled at the Tïwai Point aluminium design process a deep understanding of smelter, and in Northland by Sustainable supply chains, cost-effective logistics, Undoubtedly, industry stakeholders are Solvents Group (Pennington, 2021; product design, and stakeholder and essential. However, product stewardship Hancock, 2021). customer expectations’ (ibid.). accords responsibility to many actors who Producers may indeed know best how Industry-led co-design allocates power share a stake in scheme outcomes and a to redesign their products to reduce waste to those with a vested interest in the status right to influence them. Sometimes these most efficiently. However, this does not quo linear economy, while effectively interests will conflict with industry, given mean they can be relied upon to propose marginalising other interest groups and that many social and environmental costs necessary solutions that go against their experts. The ministry does state that co- of production are currently externalised. A vested interests. Ultimately, product design would ‘benefit from including wider neutral arbiter with policymaking stewardship exists to redress problems stakeholders’, including collectors, recyclers, competency is needed to oversee inclusive industry has been unable (or unwilling) to territorial authorities, and advocates for scheme design, balance competing interests solve independently. While producers may consumers and environmental and and power discrepancies between wish to control the rules that bind them, community health, and that Mäori must stakeholders, and act decisively for the government should not aspire to deliver be part of co-design as partners with the public good. In a democracy, these are roles this. And yet, those selected to lead New Crown (ibid., p.18). However, the Waste government can fulfil that ‘no other body Zealand’s first priority product schemes are Minimisation Act creates no framework to can’ (ibid., p.3). largely industry-led groupings and/or non- ensure wider stakeholder participation The government’s decision to derogate profit membership organisations (Mia, 2011, p.103). Although the ministry these roles likely stems from resourcing comprised of industry representatives. commits to ‘promote and monitor’ scheme constraints that prohibit the ministry from Warning signs are already emerging that design processes (Ministry for the leading scheme design when the Waste this approach could vitiate robust, Environment, 2019, p.18), an active Minimisation Act does not require this. ambitious product stewardship schemes.

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Warning signs: the pitfalls of industry-led stewardship a ‘recycling scheme’, only end-of-life focus restricts scheme incentives scheme design occasionally referenced reuse and redesign, to energy recovery (tyre-derived fuel and Small horizons – ‘If recycling is the answer, and made no mention of reduction pyrolysis) and various open-loop recycling we’re asking the wrong question’ (AgRecovery, 2020). A more inclusive options. Some of the proposed uses have Allowing the regulated community to scheme redesign process to introduce fresh, potential ecological and human health design the rules facilitates neutralisation external perspectives might help broaden hazards that Tyrewise underexplores, of robust, ambitious regulatory proposals. horizons. reinforcing the need for independent, Research indicates that ‘companies tend Similarly, in designing the proposed suitably qualified oversight of industry-led to apply strategies that do not challenge product stewardship scheme for tyres, the scheme proposals to assess environmental the concept of business as usual, which in industry-led Tyrewise group and social outcomes (Llompart et al., 2013). the long run does not change companies’ comprehensively weighed various options relationship with nature’ (Jensen and for managing rubber from end-of-life tyres Regulatory capture Remmen, 2017, pp.377–8). Industry- (ELTs) against the waste hierarchy, yet At times, the legitimacy the product led product stewardship schemes rarely excluded ‘reduce’ outcomes: stewardship process grants to industry- rise above recycling, as recycling fits designed schemes can be exploited to more comfortably within current linear Whilst reducing the waste generated decelerate advances towards effective business models than activities up the has the highest weighting within the and ambitious regulation. Overseas waste hierarchy (Lane and Watson, 2012, Waste Hierarchy it is unable to be commentators have noted that as regulators consider product stewardship, industries begin ‘co-opting public regulation’ to lock ... as regulators consider in ‘comfortable rather than demanding product stewardship, industries standards’ (Andrews, 1998, p.186). This can include ‘getting out in front of state begin ‘co-opting public regulation’ legislatures’ by designing industry schemes for adoption, or mandatory EPR (extended to lock in ‘comfortable rather producer responsibility) laws being ‘absorbed by a pre-existing, voluntary than demanding standards’ industry consortium’ (Sarno and Hopkins, 2015, pp.13, 12). Industries may create or platform such consortia – typically non-profit associations with a veneer of separation and beneficence – that then p.1256). Can we really expect the plastic applied … This report identifies the act as blocking coalitions either within or packaging industry to impose binding alternative uses for ELTs and to do that outside the product stewardship system. reduction targets on their own product? it must be assumed that the waste has Sometimes, the very agencies established Or the electronics industry, which profits already been created. (3R Group Ltd, to manage product stewardship schemes from product upgrades and obsolescence, 2012, p.25) (producer responsibility organisations to recommend regulations that require or PROs) become lobbyists against longer-lasting, repairable products While pragmatic, framing analysis progressive legislation (Tangpuori et al., or increased sharing or service-based around ‘alternative uses for ELTs’ does not 2020, p.150). business models? uphold the spirit of section 8(a) of the The global packaging industry has A pro-recycling approach permeates Waste Minimisation Act. Of course, end- repeatedly demonstrated this behaviour, New Zealand’s proposed product of-life tyres will always exist. Nevertheless, creating multifarious industry-led non- stewardship schemes. For example, product stewardship presents an profit groupings and consistently pre- AgRecovery – the existing voluntary opportunity to reduce their total numbers, empting legislation by promoting product stewardship scheme for an opportunity that is missed when voluntary pacts that create the semblance agrichemicals – has been selected to lead removed from the equation. of activity while delaying real progress co-design of the agrichemical and farm Tyrewise also gives reuse pathways like (ibid., pp.13–17). In Europe, established plastics mandatory schemes. AgRecovery retreading short shrift, and averts any packaging PROs have opposed regulatory has pioneered efforts to reduce on-farm ability to influence tyre design to address efforts to lift packaging recovery rates and burying and burning of waste plastics, durability, toxicity or microplastic introduce design specifications and which is laudable. However, the scheme has pollution (3R Group Ltd, 2020, p.22). The binding plastic reduction targets (ibid., relied on open-loop recycling of collected scheme proposes that end-of-life tyre p.150; Wermter and Vanhoutte, 2021). New plastics.4 When the priority products were processors receive modulated payments to Zealand’s Glass Packaging Forum, an declared, AgRecovery’s early encourage preferred uses according to the accredited voluntary product stewardship communications called product waste hierarchy (ibid., p.132). However, the scheme, actively opposes a beverage

Page 66 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 17, Issue 2 – May 2021 deposit/return scheme applying to glass, scheme efficiency, but also continued cost encourage and at times prevent change that much like the glass industry overseas externalisation. For example, within we think will adversely affect our member (Tangpuori et al., 2020, p.109). Australia’s e-waste scheme, producer fees companies’ (Plastics NZ, n.d.). The , industry groupings are have dropped so far that some local Minimisation Fund is public money and moving (or have already moved) to absorb governments say they are ‘financially should uphold inclusive design processes, or pre-empt mandatory product underpinning the logistics of the Scheme’ and transparent feasibility investigations stewardship. For example, since plastic (Western Australia Local Government that lay the groundwork for robust schemes. packaging’s ‘priority product’ declaration, Association, 2018, p.14). Furthermore, the Current use of funds risks industry groups several packaging organisations have cost-driven approach has so depressed the being paid to control product stewardship begun positioning to influence scheme price for e-waste recycling that some policymaking and bolster future lobbying. design, including the Australian Packaging recyclers struggle to meet social and Covenant Organisation (APCO), currently environmental standards while Going forward promulgating its ANZPAC initiative across maintaining contracts. These recyclers As interest in product stewardship grows, Oceania. APCO already leads the industry have urged the Australian government to New Zealand’s approach needs updating component of Australia’s co-regulatory provide more oversight and ‘to stop to ensure that schemes achieve meaningful packaging product stewardship scheme. Despite this scheme’s failure to meet its ... New Zealand’s approach needs targets, APCO continues to push for voluntary industry–government updating to ensure that schemes collaboration, claiming that further regulatory intervention would be ‘heavy- achieve meaningful waste reduction handed’ (Readfearn, 2021). Allowing APCO to lead co-design of New Zealand’s rather than simply rubber-stamping a scheme would likely produce similar outcomes. plethora of glorified recycling Meanwhile, the Australia and New Zealand Recycling Platform (ANZRP) has schemes. been selected to lead co-design of the scheme for electrical and electronic products through its flagship programme, TechCollect. ANZRP is a self-proclaimed considering that the producer organisations waste reduction rather than simply ‘industry-for-industry’ organisation whose are the best ones to run these rubber-stamping a plethora of glorified membership includes over 50 global schemes’ (Stephens, 2020). recycling schemes. The minister must electronics brands. It is transparent that its Industry dominance in product prioritise this in the government’s waste members are ‘our focus and our motivation’ stewardship scheme design casts a shadow work programme. The review of the Waste and that members’ ‘needs are second to over the allocation of public funds to these Minimisation Act (occurring throughout none’ (ANZRP, 2019, p.18). In 2019, before processes. The Ministry for the 2021) is a good opportunity; several the priority product declaration, ANZRP Environment administers the Waste reforms should be considered. described ‘actively lobbying the New Minimisation Fund, through which it has Zealand Government for a regulated allocated grants for industry-led co-design, Establish an independent product product stewardship scheme’ at its but also to industry-led associations before stewardship agency and comprehensive members’ request, and funding a pilot the priority product declarations compliance regime e- programme. The (presumably to ensure existing capacity to The updated Waste Minimisation Act organisation noted that ‘[o]ur efforts have design and run schemes). Since 2018, over should establish an independent central not gone unnoticed as we now find $1 million has been allocated to these ends government agency to oversee product ourselves in the ideal position to deliver (Ministry for the Environment, n.d.b). stewardship, with a legislated compliance such a scheme when the Government Additionally, in 2019, Plastics NZ was regime to ensure that scheme outcomes and launches its program’ (ibid., p. 9). awarded $1 million to investigate the targets are set, delivered and consistently ANZRP/TechCollect already run circular economy for plastics (Plastics NZ, improved upon. Given growing interest Australia’s largest co-regulatory scheme for 2020). One can reasonably assume that this in product stewardship and the circular e-waste, which faces allegations of excessive study will inform the future plastic economy, this agency must be properly competitiveness and ineffectual cost packaging scheme, for which co-design is resourced to work proactively across redistribution. When managing product still pending. This funding was awarded ministries and manage a growing work stewardship schemes, industry groups are despite Plastics NZ existing to advocate for programme. The Act should establish the motivated to reduce the scheme fees ‘plastics growth and the development of the agency’s mandate and key responsibilities, producers pay. This can drive improved plastics industry’, including working ‘to including:

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• advancing products for priority product and priority products, including: ambitious product pathways. status; • landfill bans; • leading and overseeing inclusive scheme • bans of products containing specified Conclusion design processes; materials; New Zealand is one of the world’s most • setting ambitious, measurable reduction • mandatory product take-back services wasteful countries per capita (OECD, n.d.; targets with regular, transparent for reuse, recycling, recovery, treatment Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata, 2012, p.82). In reporting requirements, and or safe disposal; the global economy’s current ‘take–make– monitoring and reviewing accredited • fees to cover product management costs throw’ setting, an outsized waste footprint schemes for compliance; (e.g. advanced recycling fees or clean- signifies entrenched overconsumption • advocating for the waste hierarchy and up costs); of Earth’s material resources, and the public interest in all schemes; and • deposit/return systems; and associated greenhouse gas emissions, • recommending new regulatory powers • compulsory labelling requirements. pollution, resource depletion and to achieve more ambitious waste Arguably, section 23 is the Act’s most biodiversity loss. High-income countries reduction outcomes. promising product stewardship provision like New Zealand must reduce waste by because it enables regulation without the reducing material consumption (Haigh Tighten requirements for expected contents, entire priority product process. et al., 2021). This cannot be achieved effects, scheme design and accreditation Furthermore, its use is initiated by central by sporadically inventing new recycling The status of the minister’s section 12 government and must be preceded by programmes, but through transforming guidelines regarding the expected content public consultation, which equalises how we design and use products. and effects of priority product schemes is stakeholder input, with government Product stewardship is critical to this too precarious. The guidelines are issued stewarding the process and final decision. transformation, but requires far more in the New Zealand Gazette and could However, successive governments have activity at the ‘reduce’ and ‘reuse’ levels be revoked as ministers change. They underutilised this provision. Only of the waste hierarchy, at every stage of are not binding; they do not consider subsection 23(1)(b) – the provision a product’s life cycle. This ambitiousness scheme design; and issuing them at all is permitting product bans – has been used resides in the Waste Minimisation Act’s discretionary. The new Waste Minimisation (twice), to ban single-use plastic bags and definition of product stewardship, but not Act should build scheme expectations into plastic microbeads in janitorial products. in industry-led interpretations. Revamping its provisions, including adherence to the Governments should use section 23 how we understand, utilise and design waste hierarchy and a focus on full product more. Furthermore, the Waste product stewardship, and government’s life cycles rather than ‘end-of-life’ products Minimisation Act review should expand role in this process, will better equip us and ‘end-of-life’ costs. the regulatory powers in this provision to with the tools necessary to move towards a The Act must also establish the basic enable binding reduction targets for zero waste, circular society and reverse the elements of a robust priority product particular products, chemical additives and dramatic degradation of this one planet we scheme design process, including materials; reuse quotas; product design call home. articulating a leadership role for specifications, including mandatory 1 However, product stewardship still recognises that producers government. The design process for the recycled content; eco-modulating fees; and hold greatest influence in reducing products’ adverse proposed beverage container return tools to incentivise the service/sharing impacts, and should carry most responsibility within product stewardship schemes (Hickle, 2014, p.266; Lewis, 2009, scheme in 2020 provides a useful blueprint economy. The provision should also be p.22; Mia, 2011, pp.82, 124). 2 The waste hierarchy is ordered the way it is because regarding government oversight (Ministry amended to permit bans on single-use activities near the top are most effective at reducing waste for the Environment, n.d.a). The Act applications of specified products, and emissions, so this is where we should invest most time and resources. should also adopt a more stringent regardless of material composition. 3 The guidelines cover expectations such as circular resource accreditation process for priority products use, fully internalised end-of-life costs borne by producers, public accountability, and open and transparent appointment that better enables the government to Allocate waste levy revenue according to the of representative directors or governance boards. 4 Open-loop (as opposed to closed-loop) recycling occurs when evaluate proposed schemes, rather than waste hierarchy a product is not recycled back into the same type of product being obliged to accredit the first proposed As product stewardship scheme proposals with the same function. Consequently, there is material ‘leakage’ in the original product’s life cycle, meaning raw scheme that meets the guidelines. emerge, it is increasingly clear that New materials are required to continue manufacturing the product. Zealand lacks not only recycling capacity, Extend and utilise section 23 of the Waste but also infrastructure, systems and Acknowledgements Minimisation Act expertise to deliver outcomes higher I would like to thank Sue Coutts, Trisia Discussion about regulated product up the waste hierarchy – from reusable Farrelly, Liam Prince and Simon Chapple stewardship has focused on the priority packaging systems and repair and for providing invaluable feedback and product process. However, all of part 2 refurbishing apprenticeships, to research support on various versions of this article. of the Waste Minimisation Act relates to into product redesign to reduce waste and Any errors are my own. product stewardship , including the oft- toxicity. Waste levy revenue should be overlooked section 23. This section enables allocated towards building such capacity various regulations for both non-priority to enable scheme designers to recommend

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