Asia Briefing, Nr. 31: Elections and Security in Afghanistan
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ASIA Briefing Kabul/Brussels, 30 March 2004 ELECTIONS AND SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN I. OVERVIEW meant to promote accountable, democratic government; Representatives of the Afghan government, the UN establish much more quickly the promised and the major donor countries and institutions will robust international security presence beyond assemble in Berlin on 31 March and 1 April for the Kabul, which is vital to the disarmament and first high-level diplomatic meeting on Afghanistan in reintegration (DR)2 of Afghanistan's militias and more than two years. The principal objective is to in turn to fostering an environment in which a secure substantial long-term aid commitments -- the culture of democratic politics can develop; and Afghan government seeks U.S.$27.6 billion over give greater attention to the legal and institutional seven years. In addition to meeting this global figure, infrastructure required for democratic politics. it will be important for donors to make multi-year pledges that provide a basis for predictability and to The international community's failure thus far to increase cash on hand for immediate projects over extend a strong security umbrella beyond Kabul is the coming year. All this is needed if Afghanistan's perpetuating, indeed deepening, the political and governance and security institutions are to be economic power of regional commanders. Even reconstructed, development goals met, and poverty Kabul, where militiamen from Panjshir and Shamali alleviated.1 remain concentrated more than two years after their entry into the capital, is not yet demilitarised. NATO Unless conference participants also set in train still lacks troop commitments from its member states discussion of the political framework within which to deploy additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams aid can be effectively utilised, however, they will (PRTs) across northern Afghanistan by September, only be doing part of their job. In particular, there as its already slow plan for gradually extending its is need to: presence in the countryside envisages. Nor has it obtained a commitment of troops for forward-basing discuss candidly the security failings and other rapid reaction forces as originally planned. internal obstacles that are seriously hindering implementation of the Bonn Agreement and The new Afghan National Army (ANA) has suffered endangering the success of the September 2004 setbacks that limit its ability to extend the authority presidential and parliamentary elections that are of the central government, facilitate DR, and provide security during the elections. Ministry of defence control of the recruitment process initially led to a disproportionate representation of Tajiks in the ANA, 1 The conference will be guided in part by a document, a situation that has prompted the U.S. to establish "Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and recruitment centres in Jalalabad, Kabul, Gardez and Strategic Pathway Forward", that revises cost estimates for Bamiyan in an effort to encourage a more diversified national reconstruction. It was prepared by the Afghanistan army. The desertion rate in the ANA reached 10 per Assistance Coordination Authority, headed by Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, and includes several technical annexes produced by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) that assess, often frankly, the 2 For greater simplicity and in the hope that the usage will degree of progress made in such key areas as disarmament, become more common, ICG employs in its reporting the demobilisation, and reintegration; police and national army abbreviation DR, to include, as appropriate to individual training; and judicial and civil service reforms. Available at situations, the concepts of disarmament, demobilisation, http://www.af. See also, Finance Ministry, "Press Release on repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration that are elsewhere Berlin Conference", 24 March 2004. often abbreviated as DDRRR or DDR. Elections and Security in Afghanistan ICG Asia Briefing, 30 March 2004 Page 2 cent during the summer of 2003. A number of to identify the target personnel. The program is measures have been taken to address the desertion intended to cover 100,000 militiamen over three years; problem but the present strength of approximately that figure is based on negotiations with the ministry 7,500 is still far short of the 40,000 projected by not on informed estimates of the actual number of Coalition officers.3 active-duty and reserve forces affiliated with the militias. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan DR programs to cut down the many militias around (UNAMA) estimates the maximum number of the country are going slowly. The proposed troops in the militias recognised by the ministry at establishment of new Special Forces-led militia units 45,000.4 ICG's own observations at militia corps and (Afghanistan Guard Forces, AGF) would cut across division bases, coupled with interviews with Afghan those programs, providing a disincentive to DR. professional officers, suggest that the number of There is, moreover, no publicly disclosed plan for active duty personnel is lower still. The elasticity of the eventual disarmament and demobilisation of the membership in militia units and the paucity of AGF. The hazards in the AGF concept include information about district level command structures increasing the authority and armament of militia make any projection of potential strength inherently commanders as well as potential command and speculative.5 control problems. With most militia commanders maintaining only a President Hamid Karzai has yet to issue either a draft relatively small number of combatants on active duty electoral law or a presidential decree on the provincial but retaining the capacity to mobilise many more and district boundaries that would form electoral through "team leaders" (sargroups) in each village, constituencies. The registration of political parties has the scope for abuse of the process is considerable. proceeded very slowly, in part due to a cumbersome Not surprisingly, the first ANBP pilot project in structure for registration that involves screening by Kunduz -- which collected arms from 1,008 former six different government departments or ministries, combatants, slightly above the target figure of 1,000 -- but also due to political pressure exerted by yielded a high proportion of effectively demobilised fundamentalist leaders. Only about 1.5 million voters combatants: small farmers who had not seen active out of an estimated potential electorate of 10 million combat since the intervention against the Taliban in have been registered, and those unevenly. Registration the northeast.6 Moreover, some troops ostensibly is markedly lower in the south and southeast in both demobilised during the subsequent pilot project in absolute numbers and the proportion of women. Mazar-i Sharif were later re-recruited by their commanders. There is inherent risk in downsizing, There is a real risk that elections under present rather than decommissioning militia units.7 conditions will merely confirm an undemocratic and unstable status quo. To avoid this, the international A major impasse developed in early 2004 over ANBP community needs to make serious efforts over the implementation in the central region, encompassing next few months to invigorate the disarmament and the provinces of Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Wardak, and reintegration process, guarantee the independence Logar, and including the key units directly accountable and impartiality of electoral institutions, and ensure to Vice President and Defence Minister Mohammad that Afghan authorities create opportunities for non- Qasim Fahim. The main phase of DR there was militarised political parties and independent candidates originally slated for February but was stalled by the to participate meaningfully in the electoral process. defence ministry. The Army Chief of Staff, General Bismillah Khan, insisted that all pilot projects should be completed before the main DR phase was launched II. DISARMAMENT AND REARMAMENT The salient feature of the UNDP-managed DR fund, known as Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), is that it is an essentially voluntary process, 4 Ibid. 5 with the ministry of defence having ultimate authority See ICG Asia Report N°65, Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, 30 September 2003. 6 Mark Sedra (BICC/UNAMA), "Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants", in 3 See Dr. Antonio Giustozzi and Mark Sedra, "National Army: "Securing Afghanistan's Future", op. cit. Technical Annex", in "Securing Afghanistan's Future", op. cit. 7 ICG interview with an ANBP official, 25 March 2004. Elections and Security in Afghanistan ICG Asia Briefing, 30 March 2004 Page 3 in Kabul.8 Subsequent developments led some Harakat-i Islami faction led by Agriculture Minister international observers to speculate that the ministry Sayyid Hussain Anwari; and Regiment 42, a Pashtun was attempting to stall those other pilot programs in unit. Of the units to be decommissioned, the most order to protect the militia presence in Kabul.9 significant politically would be Division 10, based in Getting the ministry to field its operational groups West Kabul, near Sayyaf's stronghold of Paghman; (the units assigned to the ANBP for registration, neither Rabbani nor Anwari wield much authority in collection, and storage of weapons, and other tasks) the capital.12 has been a persistent problem, as has been delivery of vehicles for the operational