Chapter 10: Military Service

Only 4,724 travelled ationwide,only about l, many repatriate and e were released after 'the government nor er the war. these the decline of embly and relocation ofthe few nonviolent three years of rising o expresstheir pain, mentsto the injustice il, evenso, to convey themfrom the camps. 10 MilitaryService Since their words would not have been believed, especially in wartime, Americans] communicated by action and be- "We[Japanese "We havior. are good Americans," they said. are good neigh- bors. We are useful and productive citizens. We love America " and are willing to die for her. These messageswere communicated by the industry of workers and businessmen and farmers, by their service to the communities in which they live, by their behavior as good citizens, and by the war record of the 442nd. lt u)as a form of cornmunication for ushich there is no aerbal or symbolic substitute. -S. 1. Hagakawar Following the attack on Pe:rl Harbor, the War Department stopped taking JapaneseArnericans into the military, and manv already in service were released. Almost from the beginning, two institutions were exempt: the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) and the 100th Battalion. By early 1943, when Nisei volunteers were again accepted, a new Nisei unit was formed, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Many Nisei also contributed in other capacitiesthroughout the war. Approximately 33,000 Nisei served in the military during World War II.2 Although many had come frorn the campswhere their families were still detained, Nisei service was extraordinarily heroic. At war's end, their valor and the public tributes heaped upon them did much to hasten the acceptanceof ethnic Japanesereleased from the camps: 253 254 pERsoNAL JUSTICE DENIED the question of loyalty had been most powerfully answered by a bat- Many of the linguis tlefteld record ofcourage and sacriftce uments at intelligence c example, were posted i assignments included br tercepted messagesand THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE could anticipate enemy LANGUAGE SCHOOL avoid surprise, and stril complishment was transl listed ImP In the spring of 1941, a few alert Army intelligence officers realized it completely names. and did the san that, if war came, the Army would need Japaneselanguage interpreters bases.la Among other a and translators. After much delay, Lieut, Col. John Weckerling and battle Capt. Kai Rasmussen won approval to start a small school for training Japanese naval 1 defending the island.rs persons with some background in Japanese. On November l, 1941, to rear-r the school opened at Crissy Field in San Francisco with four Nisei In addition part in combat, adding, instructors and 60 students, 58 of whom were Japanese Americans,s persuadinge The attack on Pearl Harbor con{irmed the value ofthe program. During oners and in actual the spring of L942, while evacuation was proceeding, the school was help the Allies tran enlarged and transferred to Camp Savage in Minnesota.a Meanwhile, ard Sakakida, who early the first group had completed training, and 35 of its graduates went landing on Bataan the in to the Pacific*-half to Guadalcanal and half to the Aleutian Islands.s up and ambush a combat zor The school, no\v renamed the Military Intelligence Service Lan- linguists in part every landir: guage School (MISLS) and officially part of the War Department, began took in New Guinea, the Marir its ftrst class at Camp Savage in June 1942 with 200 students,G By the cer end of 1942, more than 100 Nisei had left for the pacific.7 By Fall 1g44, ipated in surrender over 1,600 had graduated.sWhen the school closed in 1g46, after being with about 130 differenr moved once more to Fort Snelling, Minnesota, it had trained 6,000 and they were loaned I England and China.reI men. Of these, 3,700 served in combat areas before the Japanese surrender. Ironically, the often-mistrusted Kibei-Japanese Americans range of demands on tl joir who had received formal education in fapan-proved most quali{ied This unit later commando unit. T for the interpreter's task; most Nisei had too little facility with Japanese reinforcements mi to be useful.e As Mark Murakami pointed out: We served as in' the one hand the [On] Japanese Americans were condemned for captured documel having the linguistic and cultural knowledge of Japanese, and on teered for patrol d, the other hand the knowledge they had was capitalized on and and wounded sold used as a secret weapon by the Army and Naval Intelligence.ro After we comPlt At the beginning, MISLS graduates were poorly used in the pa- sent back to New cifie. A few ended up fighting rather than using their rare language Strategic Services terrogate talent. Others were sent to remote, inactive outposts or were ineffec- JaPanes, 11 tively employed by the Army. As the war went on, however, the Japan.20 situation improved as the Army learned how to use this valuable spe- After the surrendr cialized resource. uates helped to occuP MILITARY SERVICE 255 ly answered by a bat- Many of the linguists worked in teams, translating captured documents at intelligence centers around the Pacific. Large groups, for example, were posted in Australia, New Delhi and Hawaii.rz Their assignments included battle plans, defense maps, tactical orders, in- tercepted messagesand diaries. From these, American commanders could anticipate enemy action, evaluate strengths and weaknesses, avoid surprise, and strike unexpectedly.13The Nisei's first major ac- complishment was translation of a document picked up on Guadalcanal; ence officers realized it completely listed Imperial Navy ships with their call signs and code languageinterpreters names, and did the same for the JapaneseNavy's air squadrons and ra [ohn Weckerling and bases. Am<ing other accomplishments was translation of the entire all school for training Japanese naval battle plan {br the Philippines as well as plans for rs r November 1, Ig4l, defending the island. ciscowith four Nisei In addition to rear-echelon duties, languageschool graduatestook apaneseAmericans.3 part in combat, adding to their other duties interrogating enemy pris- 'theprogram. During oners and persuading enemy soldiers to surrender. The first Nisei to ding, the school was help the Allies in actual combat through his languageability was Rich- rnesota.aMeanwhile, ard Sakakida, who translated a captured set of Japaneseplans for a :f its graduateswent landing on Bataan early in the war; American tanks were able to move e AleutianIslands.5 up and ambush the invaders as they arrived,l6 One early group of ligenceService Lan- linguists in a combat zone went to the Aleutian Islands.lTThe linguists r Department, began tocik part in every landing in the bitter island-hopping campaign through 100students.6 By the New Guinea, the Marianas, the Philippines and Okinawa, and partic- 'acific.7 By Fall 1944, ipated in surrender ceremoniesin Tokyo Buy.tt Nisei linguistsserved d in 1940,a{ter being with about 130 different Army and Navy units, r.viththe Marine Corps, it had trained 6,000 and they were loaned to combat forces from Australia, New Zealand, before the Japanese England and China.le Arthur Morimitsu's experiences make clear the -JapaneseAmericans range of demands on the linguists: :oved most qualified This unit later joined other units to form the Mars Task Force, a hcility with Japanese commando unit. The missionwas to cut offthe enemy supply and reinforcements miles behind enemy lines along the Burma Road. We served as interpreters, questioned prisoners, translated the ,verecondemned for captured documents. We also worked as mule skinners, volun- ofJapanese,and on teered for patrol duty with advancedunits and brought down dead s capitalizedon and and wounded soldiers from the battlefields. aval Intelligence.lo After we completed our duties w-ith the Mars Task Force, I was 'orly used in the pa- sent back to New Delhi, India, assignedto the OSS, Office of their rare language Strategic Services,as head of a detachment of Nisei MIS to in- ostsor were ineffec- terrogate Japanese prisoners in preparation for the invasion of rt on, however, the Japan.20 sethis valuable spe- After the surrender, NIISLS shifted to civil matters, and its graduates helped to occupy and reconstmct Japan. They interpreted for 256 PERSoNAL JUSTICE DENIED military government teams, located and repatriated imprisoned Amer- THE 442ND REGIN icans, and interpreted at the war crimes trials.2r Despite their impor- Bat tance-General Willoughby, MacArthur's chief of intelligence, has said While the 100th T' that the work of the Nisei MIS shortened the Pacific war by two Regimental Combat years22-these accomplishments got little publicity; most were classi- Composed of volunte' from rt fied information during the war. Instead, the highly-publicized exploits came directlY 194 of the l00th Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team in Europe 1943 to FebruarY june first helped to show where Nisei loyalty clearly lay. the l00th. On mediately to the beac had already Pushed t June 15, the two car THE IOOTH BATTALION of the 442nd's1 The 442nd foug) The 100th Battalion began as part of the Hawaii National Guard. As ing the first half of evacuation plans were formulated on the mainland, the War Depart- July. On lulY 27, Li ment also debated the best way to handle ethnic Japanesein Hawaii.23 Fifth ArmY, awarde< On February L, 1942, Hawaiian Commander Lieut. General Delos mended the other u Emmons learned to his dismay that the War Department wanted to ing:32 release the Nisei from active duty. He needed the manpower and had You are alwaYs com been impressed with the desire of many Hawaiian Nisei to prove their have never have written a loyalty.

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