REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION

-ontinuing role in reinforcing these themes. c challenges facing Lib importance of having a credible, To keep inflation in check, it eral and Liberal Democrat cam- effective communicator as leader called for a statutory wages paigns. A great deal had changed cannot be overstated; neither can and prices policy and a special with the advent of television the need for a distinctive, relevant surcharge on employers. The and the internet. The constant and clear campaign message. And manifesto also reprised familiar difficulties were the need to it seems to have been only in policies from the Grimond era, overcome the fatal ‘wasted vote’ very recent times that Lib Dem such as employee participation argument and the Liberals’ sheer campaigns have assembled all the in companies, to help smooth lack of resources compared pieces of this multi-dimensional over workplace disharmony. The to the funding, personnel and jigsaw and given the party its elite media, such as the Financial technology available to the Con- strongest voice. Times, praised the Liberal pro- servative and Labour parties. The gramme. As well as having an appealing theme, Thorpe and his party were able to pick up and run with a credible alternative programme. During the course The Fall of the Lloyd George Coalition of the campaign Liberal support trebled, reaching over 20 per cent Evening meeting (joint with the Conservative History in some polls. In addition to a certain Group), July 2003, with Margaret Macmillan, Andrew amount of luck, the Liberal Thorpe, John Barnes and Stuart Ball Party at last seemed to have its policy and its strategic houses in Report by Graham Lippiatt order. But Stockley concluded by pointing out two major iro- t is always fascinating to hear saw to it that he emerged as the nies. When Wilson called a new historians talk about history. only candidate who could keep election for October 1974, the Introducing the meeting, the the Coalition together, keep the Liberals largely re-used their I Conservative MP for Mid Nor- increasingly influential Labour February manifesto. With a folk, Keith Simpson, who is also Party on board and convince the strong showing in February and Chairman of the Conservative that he was the still achieving more than 20 per History Group, reminded us that man who could win the war. cent support in the polls, they is reputed to have If the influence of Andrew were now much more relevant said that ‘history does not repeat was crucial to the rise than at any time for a generation. itself, historians repeat each of Lloyd George, it was equally Yet the Liberal manifesto still other’. What we were about to central to his fall from office six offered no answer to the most hear, however, was four different years later. In the important question the party Far from interpretations of the reasons for Conservatives met at the Carl- would face: with whom and on the downfall of the last Liberal ton Club to decide whether the what terms would the party take offering prime minister. party should continue to sup- part in a coalition? (Or, on what became port the Coalition. With Bonar basis would it decide?) a radical prime minister in December Law’s backing they voted to pull Second, the Liberals had now 1916. There had been a Lib- out of the government. Lloyd succeeded in striking a popular departure, eral-Conservative coalition in George resigned three hours chord. They had some distinctive the Liber- office under Asquith since May after the vote, and, at the general policy ammunition with which 1915, but doubts over the pros- election that followed soon after, to fight their campaign. But they als were ecution of the First World War the Conservatives won a major- were really promising to main- produced dissatisfaction on both ity of over 100 seats. Bonar Law tain the economic status quo appealing Liberal and Unionist benches. became prime minister. Neither and preserve the post-war con- As A. J. P. Taylor pointed out, Lloyd George nor the Liberal sensus. Far from offering a radi- to ‘small-c ‘Bonar Law could destroy the Party were ever to return to cal departure, the Liberals were conserva- [Asquith] Coalition. What would office again. appealing to ‘small-c conserva- be its successor?’1 There was no As the chairman explained, it tism’ in an increasingly anxious tism’ in an longer enough support among had been hoped to hold this joint electorate. And, he asked, could the Tories to sustain an Asquith meeting at the itself anyone say that the policies they increas- government but nor was there but they were unable to make a offered to tackle inflation and sufficient support among Liberal room available. In any event, it right the economy, were really ingly rebels to put in an administra- would not have been the actual ‘liberal’? anxious tion led by building in which the famous The meeting provided a lively or Bonar Law. Lloyd George meeting took place, so what and interesting canvass of the electorate.

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 29 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION

better location for our seminar than the Lloyd George Room at the National Liberal Club? Our first speaker was Marga- ret Macmillan, Professor of His- tory at the University of Toronto and author of the prize-win- ning book about the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Peacemak- ers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War. Professor Macmillan opened by making some remarks about the uses of history and its potential to act as a key to understanding the present and to raise interest- ing parallels and questions. The period at the end of the First World War, Professor Macmillan believed, was vital to understand if we are to make sense of the world today. Her intention was therefore to describe the interna- tional situation between the end of the war and October 1922 and so set the context for the fall of the Coalition. certain what was going to hap- From left: Andrew just cynicism or an effort by pen next. This made for a very Thorpe, and friends to Why did the Coalition fall? dangerous but also a very excit- Macmillan, Keith hold on to power. It was picking Simpson MP, But first, in asking why the Coa- ing period. There was also an Stuart Ball, John up on a more general attitude lition failed, the easy answer was optimism that the world could Barnes (Photo: – one that cut through all sec- that coalitions usually do. They be turning into a better place and Martin Ball) tions of society and from right to have been put together by people that the tremendous sacrifices of left across the political spectrum in disparate groupings for their the First World War must mean – that new structures and institu- own purposes and at a certain something. tions were needed to address the point they run out of steam. These pressures at first con- problems of the post-war world, Professor Macmillan identified solidated and sustained the economically, socially and in the various factors that made Lloyd George Coalition. Just as international affairs. the Coalition work in the first Woodrow Wilson was acclaimed There was also a very strong place and that then contributed in Europe for trying to build a feeling that David Lloyd George to its failure. The first thing was new type of international rela- was the man who could do it. themselves. It is dif- tions, domestically there was a He was the man who had won ficult from the perspective of feeling that perhaps a new type the war, something that was rec- the present day to imagine what of politics could be emerging. ognised and appreciated across it must have been like to live in This was based on more than a the whole of society. He was those days at the end of the Great fear of Bolshevism or revolution; perceived as someone who had War. It was a time when people it was based on a feeling that the introduced new ways of doing in Europe, in Britain and to a war had meant something and things, new styles of administra- lesser extent in North America that ‘something’ included the fact tion – he ran a great deal out felt that the very foundations of that the old ways of doing things of his own office, including key their world had been shaken. As did not work. Lloyd George and areas of foreign policy – and peo- Bolshevism spread from Russia some of those close to him in the ple believed he was going to use and appeared to be taking root Coalition sensed this themselves this new approach to be the man elsewhere, as empires fell and and there was some discussion to win the peace. It was both this political, economic and social about forming a new centre belief in the stature and personal- structures were turned upside party. Indeed, there was talk of ity of Lloyd George, and the fit -his down, there was a feeling that the t both before the coupon elec between his approach and style world was in a process of being tion of 1918 and again in 1921. and the needs of the times, which - on remade, cut adrift from its moor- Professor Macmillan thought w the Coalition the 1918 elec ings, and no one was entirely that this represented more than tion and sustained it through the

30 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION immediate aftermath of the war. Lloyd George was widely seen Thorpe quoted from the book In the longer run, however, the as the man who had encour- Mr Lloyd George and Liberalism by same factors would serve to pull aged the Greek policy of seek- J. M. Robertson, an Asquithian the Coalition apart and cause it ing a presence in what became Liberal, published in 1923: ‘Lib- and Lloyd George to fall. modern Turkey and when that eral leaders are to be chosen for As the Paris Peace Conference went wrong, in particular over right sagacity, for right judgment, failed to settle some of the major the Chanak crisis, he was blamed for self-control, for rectitude, problems in Europe and within for it. for political science and these international relations, there set He tried to bring Germany qualifications Mr George lacks. in a sense of disillusionment. The and Soviet Russia back into the To lack them, when all is said, is new ways of doing things were system of states, but his failure to lack the character needed in a not working either. Professor to make progress on this at the political leader. And in a compre- Macmillan’s view was that the Genoa Conference of Febru- hensive sense it may justly be said Conference and the resulting ary 1922 was seen by many as that there is an insurmountable attempted to evidence that the Coalition was objection to him as a leader, at shape a world which at that time not working. Lloyd George’s least for Liberals. With Conserva- simply could not be shaped. The personality was increasingly tives indeed, it is otherwise.’ international situation did not seen as autocratic rather than Many Liberals were delighted lend itself to the construction radical and he also seemed to be to see Lloyd George brought of a lasting peace. There were running out of steam, tired and down in October 1922, yet para- too many unresolved issues. The unwilling to appear in the House doxically the fall of the Coalition new states emerging in central of Commons. So, in conclusion, presented the Liberal Party with and eastern Europe, often in Professor Macmillan’s view was a huge and ultimately insuper- conflict with one another, were that the factors that had helped Many Lib- able problem. What Thorpe very difficult to accommodate in Lloyd George in the first place then suggested was that, in many the European system. The new – the idea that there was a new erals were ways, it might have been better Soviet Union showed very little world order and he was the man if fusion between the Coalition interest in participating in the to shape it – were by 1922 all delighted Liberals and the Conservative normal system of states. Ger- seen as working against him, and Party taken place, as some had many was highly resentful about caused the Coalition to fall apart. to see hoped would happen in 1920. the way in which it lost the war Lloyd This would have left the remain- and could not come to terms ing Liberals to plot their own with any peace settlement. In Impact on the Liberals George course, independent of the taint Professor Macmillan’s opinion, The next speaker was Andrew both of Lloyd George and of the Treaty of Versailles was not Thorpe, senior lecturer in his- brought coalitionism, which in reality as harsh as it has been painted tory at Exeter University and followed it after 1922. Thorpe – either later or as it was at the an authority on British politics down in argued that the fall of the Coali- time by J. M. Keynes. But that between the wars. Thorpe’s focus October tion has been seen as bringing was not reflected in contempo- was on the impact of the fall the Liberal Party real benefits. rary feeling, and what people of the Coalition on the Liberal 1922, yet These included a strengthen- feel, and what they think as a Party and its development over ing of personnel, stronger party result, is perhaps more important the following years. The Coali- paradoxi- organisation, better policy and politically than the truth. tion has been seen by many strategy. His own view, however, As the early 1920s wore on, Liberals, both at the time and cally the was that, on balance, the Liberal there continued to be problems since, as a rather dark period in fall of the Party did not benefit from reun- and Lloyd George did not seem the history of British liberalism, ion post-1922. to be able to deal with them. unable to be forgotten or, for Coalition As regards personnel, apart In a way he brought this on many, forgiven. The manner of from Lloyd George himself, most himself. He conducted a very the formation of the Coalition in presented of the Coalition Liberals who personal sort of diplomacy. He December 1916, the decision to came back to the party were loved going to conferences and fight a general election in 1918 as the Liberal fairly undistinguished. The other his personal success and failure a coalition, and the continuance Party with prominent Coalition Liberal was, was identified very much with of the Coalition through four of course, Churchill, but he lost the success or failure of these years of peacetime, during which a huge and his seat in Dundee in 1922, was international events. In particular, the split in the Liberal Party was out of Parliament for two years Lloyd George failed to settle the intensified and consolidated – all ultimately and then returned as a Conserva- reparations issue, the question of these factors created a situa- tive, being made Chancellor of of how much Germany should tion in which Liberals felt deeply insuper- the Exchequer by Baldwin. pay in compensation for the war. ill at ease and this discomfort able prob- Although he was a towering Also unresolved was the question took the form of disappoint- figure, Lloyd George himself was of Turkey and the Middle East. ment with Lloyd George himself. lem. such a controversial character

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 31 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION

that, even after he became leader Baldwin and the Tories to attack on to the legislative agenda in of the reunited Liberals in 1926, the Liberals as irresponsibly radi- 1930–31 and there was a return many leading personalities in cal, making promises to reduce to office as part of the National the party like Grey and Maclean, unemployment which could not Government when it was first mostly with an Asquithian back- be delivered. formed. But these achievements ground, hurried to support the Thorpe’s analysis of the Lib- were, to Thorpe, ephemeral. Liberal Council with the aim of eral position in the 1920s is of The return of the Lloyd George getting rid of him. a stance that was increasingly Liberals in 1922–23 forced the In terms of party organisa- misconceived. The Liberal Party Liberals to put off the day of tion, the return of Lloyd George was, from 1924, the third party reckoning and the need to come brought one huge benefit, the in British politics – but a third to terms with third-party status. hat Lloyd George Fund. This is the party which still very much pos- T thinking did not occur until bind that the Asquithians could sessed heartland areas. There is a a generation later, in the 1950s, not get out of. Asquith himself case for saying that the strategy and from that point onward the was desperate not to reunite of the party should have been to party effectively repositioned -tself with Lloyd George and many of consolidate those areas. Instead, it Echoing i to create a new type of poli his supporters were also deter- continued to believe itself to be Harold Wil- tics and a new way forward. mined to resist reunion, but the a potential party of government Thorpe ended by reminding party was very short of funds – an outlook that may not have son’s quo- us that the fall of the Coalition and had no obvious way of rais- been the best way forward for it had not been the responsibility ing extra money, so the Lloyd – and the return of Lloyd George tation that of the Liberal Party. It was the George Fund proved irresistible. contributed to that ministerial decision of the Conservatives to However the use of the fund mentality. the Labour end it. Yet it was the Liberals who soon became problematic. Firstly, The final problem the return Party was were at the mercy of the fall-out Lloyd George retained personal of Lloyd George represented for from it. control of the money and was the Liberals was one of image. a moral chary about dispensing funds. In Although, in Thorpe’s view, too addition, the existence of this vast much may often be made about crusade or The Carlton Club meeting treasure chest disinclined Liberals the importance of image in poli- It was then the turn of John on the ground from doing the tics, it was evidently the case that it was noth- Barnes, editor of the Conservative fundraising needed to develop by 1922 Lloyd George had an ing, Thorpe History Journal and co-author, the organisation and its electoral image problem. There was a clear with Keith Middlemas, of the capacity. This was in contrast sense that both the Lloyd George felt that 1969 biography of Stanley Bald- with the Labour and Conserva- Coalition and the prime minister win. Barnes also started with tive Parties at this time. had become sleazy and were not Liberals in a reference to historiography. When looking at policy there to be trusted. Echoing Harold According to Ambrose Bierce, is no doubt that Lloyd George Wilson’s quotation that the the 1920s God cannot change the past, brought dynamism to a party Labour Party was a moral crusade looked on which is why he connives at which desperately needed it, or it was nothing, Thorpe felt that the existence of historians. Like and one result was the various Liberals in the 1920s looked on their party Macmillan and Thorpe, Barnes ‘coloured books’ of the mid and their party in the same way as a sought to recreate a picture of late 1920s. But at the same time moral, uplifting movement. The in the same what was happening in politics there were other ideas around reputation of Lloyd George was in the 1920s, as people thought in the party which would have damaging to that portrayal, as he way as about the massive changes that developed without reunion, was unable to present himself as a moral, had happened in the world and and some of the policies which a credible leader of a party with a tried to canalise them into the were introduced under Lloyd moral purpose. uplifting normal channels of party politics. George’s influence may not have In Thorpe’s view, the collapse It was important to remember been as appropriate for the times of the Coalition brought benefits move- that everything was thought to as were thought. The forward- to the Liberal Party in the very be up for grabs: the Liberal Party looking policy on unemploy- short term: reunification, more ment. The was still recruiting new Young ment that formed the core of money, policy ferment and a reputation Liberals; the party may have been the Liberal platform in the 1929 more dynamic leadership. As a declining in a relative way, but in election was an exciting, proto- result there was some achieve- of Lloyd absolute terms there were more Keynesian initiative, but whether ment over the next ten years. Liberal voters in 1929 than there it brought much benefit to the Twice the Liberals held the bal- George was had been before the First World Liberals in terms of votes at that ance of power in Parliament, in War, or in the early 1920s. election, or the consolidation 1924 and 1929–31. They adopted damaging But it was right for the Con- of Liberal support is, according a daring and innovative eco- to that por- servatives and Liberals to be wor- to Thorpe, very much open to nomic policy at the end of the ried about the electoral role of question. It certainly enabled 1920s. They got electoral reform trayal. the working class, as there were

32 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION

little-known event at the end of July, when most of the Coalition Liberals failed to vote in favour of a duty on fabric grants, the first great test of the Safeguard- ing of Industries Act, and the first test of the compromise that had been reached around the issue of tariff reform. But if the Coalition Liberals would not even vote for that measure, what did the protectionist Tories have to gain from remaining any longer in the Coalition? These four events taken together were fatal to the sur- vival of the Coalition. However, nothing happens by accident, and it must not be forgotten that the downfall of the govern- ment was engineered – and by the ‘second eleven’. These were men with their political futures few seats where the middle class Andrew Thorpe, social-reform, tariff-reform- still ahead of them who desper- amounted to more than a fifth Margaret ing caucus. However Barnes ately wanted to be rid of Lloyd of the electorate. Barnes saw Macmillan and re-emphasised that in the early Keith Simpson George. They believed that they two answers to this problem for MP (Photo: Martin summer of 1922, the Coalition would go down to defeat at the non-Labour politicians. On the Ball) appeared very secure. Even after next election, tarred by what one hand, there was the solution the failure at Genoa there was was seen as an autocratic and which Lloyd George had sought really very little sign of trouble. sleazy government. They were to cobble together in 1918: to Austen Chamberlain had routed fearful that Labour would make unite the more progressive face the diehards in two debates in headway and they needed a pro- of Toryism, the kind of people April and yet within months his gressive answer, a moral answer who made up the Unionist own leadership of the Conserva- and a challenging answer to Social Reform Group before tive Party was in question. the onset of socialism, and they 1914, with his own (supposedly) So what went wrong? Barnes thought that Lloyd George had progressive Liberals. In the early identified four factors. By far the become a hobble around their years of the Coalition, that recipe most important was the assassina- ankles, rather than the great had certain attractions. But the tion of Sir Henry Wilson and the saviour that he had seemed in first thing that went wrong was revival of violence and civil war 1918. This permeated to Cabinet an onset of panic at the eco- in Ireland. It was in the aftermath level and to the debate in the nomic slump, which led to a of the debate on that issue in July Tory party about whether there move away from social reform 1922 that Baldwin and Amery should be an immediate election. and towards retrenchment, epito- (neighbours in Eaton Square) got Curzon and Baldwin became mised by the Geddes committee together and decided to give the more important, along with less on national expenditure and the government some weeks to see well-remembered figures such ‘Geddes axe’. From that moment if it could get its act together on as Boscawen and Peel. Curzon is onward the progressive voices Ireland, and build on Church- reputed to have said, ‘When you and tariff reformers in the Con- ill’s brilliant summing up in the begin to hear the death watch servative Party began to suspect debate during which he said that beetle in the rafters, then the end that the Coalition was no longer if the Irish could not settle their of the house is nigh.’ It was. the answer to containing the ris- affairs then the British would Barnes identified Stanley ing tide of organised labour. It is help them to do so. Ireland is a Baldwin as the key figure, as he no accident that was very important theme in the his- was able to act as a link between one of the chief conspirators in tory of the Coalition. Second, the junior ministers and Cabinet bringing down the Lloyd George and following close afterwards, colleagues. Baldwin’s reaction was Coalition: he was probably the there was the honours scandal. both moral and constitutional. most thoughtful of the younger Next, the diehards linked their He had his policy concerns over tariff reformers, a man who fortunes to Lord Salisbury, prob- Ireland and was, Barnes main- hoped to enlist recruits from the ably the most prominent Union- tained, a tariff reformer. He was trade unions behind a broadly ist peer. Finally, there occurred a looking for a constructive answer

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 33 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION to socialism but he had a personal upshot of the meeting was that as that leader and thus that, if revulsion to the sleaze that was they wanted to go to the country Chamberlain and Birkenhead increasingly taking over the Coa- as an independent party and they would not cooperate, another lition and he had worries about wanted a Conservative as prime figure had to be identified. A matters of constitutional principle, minister. They acknowledged crucial part of the strategy was such as Lloyd George’s presiden- that coalition might be inevitable therefore to encourage Bonar tial style and the way he appeared but, if so, they wanted it on their Law, who was hesitant to come to be neglecting Parliament. After terms. back and show open disloyalty to the Chanak crisis, Baldwin came It was at this stage that Austen the leadership, out of retirement. back from holiday in France to a Chamberlain badly misplayed his A succession of emissaries was Cabinet meeting on 1 October hand. He took things personally, despatched to try to tempt him and to a government that did not felt it was a matter of honour to and he finally allowed himself know whether war was about to continue to support the govern- to be persuaded to come to the break out or not. Baldwin gained ment as he had pledged to do, Carlton Club for the meeting. the impression that he was enter- talked about betrayal and failed It is not clear whether he had ing an engineered international to take a strategic view of the made up his mind what to say, crisis, one that would allow the longer term interests of the Con- but for the rest the presence of an Coalition to go into a khaki elec- servative Party. He took what the alternative leader was sufficient. tion. At first, Baldwin thought that junior ministers and the back- In the end, Bonar Law made a he might resign and walk away benchers were saying very much rather confused speech. For the from it; but then the dissident as an ultimatum and felt that all whole of the first part of it no ministers begin to meet, Baldwin their criticisms of the govern- one knew which way he was was seized by a mood of resolu- ment and of Lloyd George were going to jump, but then he came tion and the junior ministerial actually attacks on him. In that down very firmly on Baldwin’s and Cabinet dissidents began to view he was egged on by his evil side. Baldwin’s own speech was coalesce around him. Baldwin sat genius Birkenhead, who took the ‘The Peacemaker’ described by Barnes as one of the down with Sir Samuel Hoare and view that he knew the electorate – David Low on most memorable eight minutes J. C. C. Davidson to go though better than the Tory dissenters the Coalition’s that have ever been delivered. As Vachers Parliamentary compan- and wanted them to do their Irish policy, The a hatchet job on Lloyd George ion, picking out the names of worst, feeling that they could Star, 1922. Lloyd it could not have been surpassed. George holds out eighty Conservative MPs, chosen never form or lead a government. symbols of peace, But the work that Baldwin had not for their views but for their Baldwin knew he could not but is backed up done before the event was even reputations. Those MPs were bring down the Coalition, even by the threat of more important. It was Bonar then brought together. Sources backed by the body of opinion armed force. Low Law’s presence and speech that conflict about how many actually in the party, without there being always portrayed swayed the day. In the view of the Coalition as a met: one indicates thirty-five but an alternative prime minister. two-headed ass the dissenters, if Bonar Law had Hoare himself (probably based on He also knew that he was not (here sitting on not come to the Carlton Club a diary) says seventy-four. But the prominent enough to be seen top of the tank). and made his speech, they would have lost, the Coalition would have endured and Lloyd George would have remained prime minister.

Role of the Conservative grassroots The last speaker was Stuart Ball, Reader in History at Leicester University and writer and com- mentator on the Conservative Party. Ball began by describing the fall of the Lloyd George Coalition as, without doubt, one of the most decisive events of modern British political history. It is one of the most dramatic and one of the most humanly enthralling as well. Ball drew attention to the work of a number of historians who have looked at the downfall of

34 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION the Coalition. In particular, he Baldwin’s were numbered and it is they meeting in October 1922, a large identified a pioneering study who worked to persuade the number (possibly a majority) of published in 1973 by Michael own speech leadership to catch up with that Conservative MPs had already Kinnear called The Fall of Lloyd opinion on the ground. The publicly or privately committed George. Yet despite this wealth of was one of decline in support for the Coali- themselves against the Coalition. historical assessment, there are tion in many areas, particularly The vote at the meeting can be still neglected aspects of the fall the most in safe seats in the Conservative anticipated as a foregone conclu- of the Coalition and it was on memorable heartlands in southern England sion and the emphasis in some one of these – in Ball’s view the and the Midlands, brought con- studies on the influence of the most important of the under- eight min- siderable pressure to bear on speeches may be exaggerated. appreciated areas, the role of the Conservative MPs and prospec- MPs went into the meeting not Conservative grassroots – that utes that tive parliamentary candidates to just with their minds made up he chose to focus in his talk. By adjust their position. Under this but with commitments already grassroots Ball said he meant the have ever pressure, they sought to distance made to the people who mat- rank and file members in the been deliv- themselves from the Coalition tered in their constituencies and constituencies and the country – a coalition that was failing and to their chances of being re- – not the Parliamentary party, ered. As a in increasing trouble. elected. It was this pressure from or the backbenchers. The other The clearest method for doing the constituencies that opened up speakers had covered thoroughly hatchet job this was the promise, made some- cracks at the very base of the edi- the background issues to the fall times privately to constituency fice of the Coalition. The pressure of the government but the actual on Lloyd executive committees and some- was being applied even before the mechanism through which the George it times in public at constituency summer of 1922 and the cracks Coalition was ended was revolt meetings, that when the election widened and travelled upwards, within the Conservative Party, a could not came the MP or candidate would undermining the whole structure. revolt which not only swept away stand as a Conservative pure and Ball then went on to talk Lloyd George but, in an extraor- have been simple. This was a movement that about the causes of the hostility dinarily unprecedented manner, built up momentum throughout that the Conservative grassroots swept away the Conservative surpassed. 1922. J. C. C. Davidson (Bonar felt towards the Coalition and leadership as well. It was almost But the Law’s former Parliamentary Pri- to examine what motivated the as if the first intention of the dis- vate Secretary) was one example unusual degree of dissidence and senters was to remove Austen work that of this in his Hemel Hempstead rebellion among the normally Chamberlain, and it was simply seat. Like Bonar Law, Davidson docile and deferential Tory rank as a consequence of this that Baldwin was not an out-and-out oppo- and file. The first element he Lloyd George was also removed. nent of the Coalition in the identified was the importance of Lloyd George, of course, was had done months leading up to October what he described as ‘economy’. not present at the Carlton Club; before the 1922. But he was already under This was an issue linked to the it was Austen Chamberlain pressure in his constituency by economy and in particular to the who called the meeting, Austen event was January 1922. The minute book collapse of the post-war boom in Chamberlain who handled it and of one of the Ladies’ Organisa- 1920: the combination of rising Austen Chamberlain who lost it. even more tions shows that he was asked if prices and heavy taxation that All Lloyd George could do was he was prepared to stand as an seriously squeezed two impor- sit and wait until a white-faced important. independent Unionist at the next tant groups for the Conservative Sir Philip Sassoon rushed from election. At this stage Davidson Party: the middle classes, espe- the Carlton Club to Downing hedged but, after being urged cially the professional classes in Street to break the news that it to answer definitively at several the towns and suburbs, and those was all over. other meetings during the year, who owned land in agricul- Ball felt that it was essential at a gathering in September he tural areas. But what the word to look beyond the actions of informed his membership that ‘economy’ particularly meant the more visible players – the he would stand as an independ- in this period was the very high elite players at Cabinet, junior ent Conservative at the next levels of taxation – both Imperial ministerial or backbench level election – an announcement that taxation to the national excheq- – and to examine the role of was received with great applause. uer and local rates – which had the Conservative rank and file Davidson was just one of risen massively as a result of the and the immense influence he many under similar pressure and First World War and which were believed they had wielded both this is confirmed by Kinnear’s now affecting an increasingly over the parliamentary party analysis of the pronouncements large number of people. The and over Central Office and the of Conservative politicians in the ‘economy’ people were seeking machinery of the Conserva- press and by Stuart Ball’s exami- was a cutback in government tive Party in the country. It was nation of constituency associa- spending in order to reduce taxa- the rank and file who realised tion minute books. Well before tion in response to the depres- that the days of the Coalition the calling of the Carlton Club sion that was hitting the country.

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 35 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION There was vocal criticism of the 1913 Act, the question of con- The Con- cleverly by ballooning of central govern- tracting in and contracting out, twice in 1930 in the two party ment and of bureaucracy, of the political levy – all bound up servative meetings he called in June and controls and wartime red tape, of with the issue of the political role October of that year. Chamber- the massive increase in the size of of the trade unions. Again the grassroots lain’s over-confidence led to his the civil service and the greater government had promised to do own downfall and then to the fall responsibilities that had been something about this and again it did mat- of the Coalition. But Chamber- handed out to local government. had let the Conservatives down. ter. If they lain also had a defensive reason This volatile mixture of eco- There was also the question of for calling the meeting and for nomic hard times and complaints Ireland, where the government had no calling it when he did. In a few about government restrictiveness had swung from ‘taking murder weeks’ time, the Conservative and interference was stirred up by the throat to shaking mur- influence, Party (National Union) annual by Lord Rothermere, the owner der by the hand’ in the phrase conference was due to meet. It of the Daily Mail. Rothermere used by Unionists in this period. why would was evident even to Chamberlain mounted his own campaign, the However, in Ball’s view, because Chamber- that the conference would either Anti-Waste League, and stood the position of Ulster had been overwhelmingly and publicly candidates in by-elections, win- safeguarded, with its own parlia- lain have reject the Coalition in a way ning two Conservative seats. ment, the issue of Ireland had lost that would make it impossible This sent a shiver through the resonance for many rank and file needed to for him to carry on leading the Conservative Party from top to Conservatives. party, or would shatter the party bottom. Combined with this was To sum up, Ball reiterated take the from top to bottom. The defen- the depression that agriculture, that, while the anti-coalition gamble of sive reason Chamberlain had for especially arable farming ,went pressure from the rank and file calling the Carlton Club meet- through in the 1920s. The Lloyd upon MPs and candidates varied the Carlton ing was to pre-empt and bounce George Coalition had brought in across the country, it was most the National Union conference. a major measure, the 1920 Agri- pressing in the Tory heartlands Club meet- Chamberlain wanted Conserva- culture Act, that looked as if it in the South, the Midlands and tive MPs to back the leadership, would greatly benefit the farm- the suburbs. It was strengthened ing as a back the Coalition and agree to ers, but the government then by the emerging role of women means to fight a quick general election as found that it was too expensive Conservative members as women Coalition MPs, with the result and it became one of the vic- gained the vote and began to prevent the that the National Union con- tims of the Geddes axe. So the play an increasing part in con- ference would have been post- Conservatives got some of the stituency political activity. The National poned. This move proved that ‘economy’ they were seeking but other critical element in the fall the Conservative grassroots did ironically at the expense of their of the Coalition was the role of Union con- matter. If they had no influence, own supporters, as subsidies for the National Union centrally, ference why would Chamberlain have farmers were axed. the representative institution of needed to take the gamble of the On top of this catalogue of the Conservative rank and file. It from taking Carlton Club meeting as a means discontent and of government was the National Union, under to prevent the National Union failure was heaped the rise of the chairmanship of Sir George place? conference from taking place? Labour, as evidenced in by-elec- Younger, which prevented the Overall, the meeting heard tions and local government Conservatives from pressing for a four different interpretations of elections. The growth of Labour general election in January 1922 the Carlton Club meeting, its led the Conservative rank and because the issue of House of impact and the reasons for the file to demand two things that Lords reform had not been set- fall of the Lloyd George Coali- the Lloyd George government tled. When Birkenhead attacked tion. In this joint event with the had promised but was manifestly Younger as the cabin boy trying Conservative History Group the o refusing to deliver. The first was t steer the ship, he made Younger emphasis was upon the role of House of Lords reform: revisiting the hero of the rank and file and Conservatives, and an important the 1911 Parliament Act, which the loss of support for the leader- element which was missing from had always been said to be only a ship in the National Union was the analysis and which should temporary measure, and restor- a critical factor in the eventual be addressed in a future meeting ing some powers to the House of downfall of the Coalition. or Journal article was the role of Lords. Conservatives wanted this In conclusion, Ball reminded Liberals in the fall of what turned desperately because they were us that it was well known that out to be the last Liberal prime frightened by the prospect of a the Carlton Club meeting was minister. Labour majority in the Com- called by Austen Chamberlain as mons with no constitutional an offensive move. He intended 1 ‘Politics in the First World War’ check upon it. The second, and to ambush his critics, to isolate (1959) reproduced in From the Boer War to the Cold War, Essays linked, issue for Tories was the and expose them. It was a tactic on 20th Century Europe (Penguin reform of trade union law: the used more effectively and more Books, 1996)

36 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003