41 Fall of Lloyd George Coalition Report
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REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION -ontinuing role in reinforcing these themes. c challenges facing Lib importance of having a credible, To keep inflation in check, it eral and Liberal Democrat cam- effective communicator as leader called for a statutory wages paigns. A great deal had changed cannot be overstated; neither can and prices policy and a special with the advent of television the need for a distinctive, relevant surcharge on employers. The and the internet. The constant and clear campaign message. And manifesto also reprised familiar difficulties were the need to it seems to have been only in policies from the Grimond era, overcome the fatal ‘wasted vote’ very recent times that Lib Dem such as employee participation argument and the Liberals’ sheer campaigns have assembled all the in companies, to help smooth lack of resources compared pieces of this multi-dimensional over workplace disharmony. The to the funding, personnel and jigsaw and given the party its elite media, such as the Financial technology available to the Con- strongest voice. Times, praised the Liberal pro- servative and Labour parties. The gramme. As well as having an appealing theme, Thorpe and his party were able to pick up and run with a credible alternative programme. During the course The Fall of the Lloyd George Coalition of the campaign Liberal support trebled, reaching over 20 per cent Evening meeting (joint with the Conservative History in some polls. In addition to a certain Group), July 2003, with Margaret Macmillan, Andrew amount of luck, the Liberal Thorpe, John Barnes and Stuart Ball Party at last seemed to have its policy and its strategic houses in Report by Graham Lippiatt order. But Stockley concluded by pointing out two major iro- t is always fascinating to hear saw to it that he emerged as the nies. When Wilson called a new historians talk about history. only candidate who could keep election for October 1974, the Introducing the meeting, the the Coalition together, keep the Liberals largely re-used their I Conservative MP for Mid Nor- increasingly influential Labour February manifesto. With a folk, Keith Simpson, who is also Party on board and convince the strong showing in February and Chairman of the Conservative backbenchers that he was the still achieving more than 20 per History Group, reminded us that man who could win the war. cent support in the polls, they Arthur Balfour is reputed to have If the influence of Andrew were now much more relevant said that ‘history does not repeat Bonar Law was crucial to the rise than at any time for a generation. itself, historians repeat each of Lloyd George, it was equally Yet the Liberal manifesto still other’. What we were about to central to his fall from office six offered no answer to the most hear, however, was four different years later. In October 1922 the important question the party Far from interpretations of the reasons for Conservatives met at the Carl- would face: with whom and on the downfall of the last Liberal ton Club to decide whether the what terms would the party take offering prime minister. party should continue to sup- part in a coalition? (Or, on what David Lloyd George became port the Coalition. With Bonar basis would it decide?) a radical prime minister in December Law’s backing they voted to pull Second, the Liberals had now 1916. There had been a Lib- out of the government. Lloyd succeeded in striking a popular departure, eral-Conservative coalition in George resigned three hours chord. They had some distinctive the Liber- office under Asquith since May after the vote, and, at the general policy ammunition with which 1915, but doubts over the pros- election that followed soon after, to fight their campaign. But they als were ecution of the First World War the Conservatives won a major- were really promising to main- produced dissatisfaction on both ity of over 100 seats. Bonar Law tain the economic status quo appealing Liberal and Unionist benches. became prime minister. Neither and preserve the post-war con- As A. J. P. Taylor pointed out, Lloyd George nor the Liberal sensus. Far from offering a radi- to ‘small-c ‘Bonar Law could destroy the Party were ever to return to cal departure, the Liberals were conserva- [Asquith] Coalition. What would office again. appealing to ‘small-c conserva- be its successor?’1 There was no As the chairman explained, it tism’ in an increasingly anxious tism’ in an longer enough support among had been hoped to hold this joint electorate. And, he asked, could the Tories to sustain an Asquith meeting at the Carlton Club itself anyone say that the policies they increas- government but nor was there but they were unable to make a offered to tackle inflation and sufficient support among Liberal room available. In any event, it right the economy, were really ingly rebels to put in an administra- would not have been the actual ‘liberal’? anxious tion led by Austen Chamberlain building in which the famous The meeting provided a lively or Bonar Law. Lloyd George meeting took place, so what and interesting canvass of the electorate. Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 29 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION better location for our seminar than the Lloyd George Room at the National Liberal Club? Our first speaker was Marga- ret Macmillan, Professor of His- tory at the University of Toronto and author of the prize-win- ning book about the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Peacemak- ers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War. Professor Macmillan opened by making some remarks about the uses of history and its potential to act as a key to understanding the present and to raise interest- ing parallels and questions. The period at the end of the First World War, Professor Macmillan believed, was vital to understand if we are to make sense of the world today. Her intention was therefore to describe the interna- tional situation between the end of the war and October 1922 and so set the context for the fall of the Coalition. certain what was going to hap- From left: Andrew just cynicism or an effort by pen next. This made for a very Thorpe, Margaret Lloyd George and friends to Why did the Coalition fall? dangerous but also a very excit- Macmillan, Keith hold on to power. It was picking Simpson MP, But first, in asking why the Coa- ing period. There was also an Stuart Ball, John up on a more general attitude lition failed, the easy answer was optimism that the world could Barnes (Photo: – one that cut through all sec- that coalitions usually do. They be turning into a better place and Martin Ball) tions of society and from right to have been put together by people that the tremendous sacrifices of left across the political spectrum in disparate groupings for their the First World War must mean – that new structures and institu- own purposes and at a certain something. tions were needed to address the point they run out of steam. These pressures at first con- problems of the post-war world, Professor Macmillan identified solidated and sustained the economically, socially and in the various factors that made Lloyd George Coalition. Just as international affairs. the Coalition work in the first Woodrow Wilson was acclaimed There was also a very strong place and that then contributed in Europe for trying to build a feeling that David Lloyd George to its failure. The first thing was new type of international rela- was the man who could do it. the times themselves. It is dif- tions, domestically there was a He was the man who had won ficult from the perspective of feeling that perhaps a new type the war, something that was rec- the present day to imagine what of politics could be emerging. ognised and appreciated across it must have been like to live in This was based on more than a the whole of society. He was those days at the end of the Great fear of Bolshevism or revolution; perceived as someone who had War. It was a time when people it was based on a feeling that the introduced new ways of doing in Europe, in Britain and to a war had meant something and things, new styles of administra- lesser extent in North America that ‘something’ included the fact tion – he ran a great deal out felt that the very foundations of that the old ways of doing things of his own office, including key their world had been shaken. As did not work. Lloyd George and areas of foreign policy – and peo- Bolshevism spread from Russia some of those close to him in the ple believed he was going to use and appeared to be taking root Coalition sensed this themselves this new approach to be the man elsewhere, as empires fell and and there was some discussion to win the peace. It was both this political, economic and social about forming a new centre belief in the stature and personal- structures were turned upside party. Indeed, there was talk of ity of Lloyd George, and the fit -his down, there was a feeling that the t both before the coupon elec between his approach and style world was in a process of being tion of 1918 and again in 1921. and the needs of the times, which - on remade, cut adrift from its moor- Professor Macmillan thought w the Coalition the 1918 elec ings, and no one was entirely that this represented more than tion and sustained it through the 30 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION immediate aftermath of the war.