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A case of philosophical amnesia: Russell, Wittgenstein and a forgotten manuscript

Shosky, John Edwin, Ph.D.

The American University, 1992

Copyright ©1993 by Shosky, John Edwin. All rights reserved.

UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

A CASE OF PHILOSOPHICAL AMNESIA:

RUSSELL, WITTGENSTEIN AND A FORGOTTEN MANUSCRIPT

By John Edwin Shosky

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Philosophy

Signatures of Committee

Chair

jab=4_

Dêan .o|E t h e College

Date 1991

The American University

Washington, D.C. 20016 rra iiBEEiciK oiiTBfism im m DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of A.J. Ayer.

XI A CASE OF PHILOSOPHICAL AMNESIA: RUSSELL, WITTGENSTEIN AND A FORGOTTEN MANUSCRIPT BY John Shosky ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge, published in 1984 by George Allen and Unwin, Volume 7 in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. This manuscript by Russell is a major work by one of the most important figures in the history of philosophy, offering arguments on several topics that are crucial contributions to outstanding issues in epistemology and logic. It fills in several curious and large gaps in our understanding of the development of Russell's philosophical progress from 1912 through 1918. In addition, it provides an indispensable context for understanding the development of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The dissertation explores several related topics, including the development and later publication of Theory of Knowledge, the content of the book, the place of Russell's manuscript in the development of his thought, the influence of Theory

iii of Knowledge on Wittgenstein's Tractatus. the joint collaboration in 1913 between Russell and Wittgenstein, and the significance of the 1913 manuscript in the history of philosophy.

IV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my committee for bountiful assistance, encouragement and patience. The chairman, David Rodier, has been a mentor and friend. I can truthfully say that without his help and support I would not have received my Master of Arts degree nor would I have made it to this point in my Ph.D. work. Peter Simpson, Harold Durfee and Charles White have been extremely considerate and inspiring to me. I must include a special note of thanks to Antony Flew for agreeing to serve on my committee. I have long admired his work and learned much from him. It is a great honor and privilege to have him evaluate my scholarship.

I must also thank Michelle Ward, Paul Summers, Birgit

Summers, Elizabeth Stolpe, Bob Barnard, Cliff Henke, Brian Brooks and Michael Anderson for their constant concern, friendship and support.

V TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Preface ...... 1 Chapter One: "An Event of First-Rate Importance"..... 8 Chapter Two: "The Simplest and Most Pervading Aspect of Experience"...... 24 Chapter Three; Resurrecting Russell ...... 44 Chapter Four: The Missing Reference...... 76 Chapter Five: Russell's Tractatus? ...... 100 Chapter Six: Rewriting History ...... 110 Appendix: A Discussion of G o d e l ...... 114 Bibliography...... 127

VI PREFACE

Bertrand Russell was born in 1872, at the height of the Victorian period. In 1967, after 95 years of life and some 70 years of professional work that produced some of the most important discoveries in the history of philosophy, including the theory of descriptions and the theory of types, as well as the Principia Mathematics and a Nobel prize for literature, Russell's career was close to completion. So, pressed for funds to support his International War Crimes Tribunal, Russell offered his personal papers and letters for sale.

While cataloguing these papers for public auction, Kenneth Blackwell found a 208 page manuscript, numbered pages 143 to 350, dated 1913, and clearly written in Russell's hand. Russell's autobiography did not mention this document,^ nor did Alan Wood's biography of Russell,^

In fact, Russell's essay, "My Mental Development," in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. (1944) Volume 5 in the Librarv of Living Philosophers Series, jumps from the publication of the Principle Mathematica in 1910 to the beginning of World War I in 1914, virtually leaving out his association with Wittgenstein and never mentioning an unpublished manuscript. In addition, the first volume of the Autobioaraphv of Bertrand Russell 1872-1914 (1967) gives 2 nor was there a reference to it in any of Russell's published materials, significantly absent from his own encompassing summary in 1959 entitled Mv Philosophical

Development.^

Blackwell persuaded the literary agent in charge of the archives, Mr. Anton Felton, to write to Russell about the book. Russell did not answer the letter. Later in 1967, Blackwell asked Russell himself about the manuscript, which appeared to discuss topics in the theory of knowledge. Russell said that he could remember nothing about it, that a completely misleading picture. While not mentioning the manuscript, Russell argues that after the new year began in 1914, "I arranged for a shorthand typist to come next day, though I had not the vaguest idea what I should say to her when she came. As she entered the room, my ideas fell into place, and I dictated in a completely orderly sequence from that moment until the work was finished. What I dictated to her was subsequently published as a book with the titled Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophv. " (p. 210) Below an argument will be presented to place the date of the writing of the these lectures closer to the last months of 1913. However, Russell's passage indicates that he had not been working on epistemology, while in fact he had prepared the first two sections of a massive book, which biographer Ronald W. Clark (1975) called "(Russell's) first full-scale effort since Principia Mathematica." The Life of Bertrand Russell, p. 206. Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Skeptic. (1958) Until the publication of Ronald Clark's book in 1975, this was the definitive biography on Russell, and it is still a good source of sympathetic information.

Mv Philosophical Development. (1959) Although, in all fairness, he does claim in "My Own Philosophy," (1946) that "my professional attention has been devoted to [the foundations of empirical knowledge] ever since the publication of Principia Mathematica" (p. 10). 3 "it would take some time to think about a period so long past.The matter was not raised again and the manuscript was noted in the catalogue of the archives.^

This paper is about an excavation of vital importance to philosophy. Russell's Theorv of Knowledge, published in 1984 by George Allen and Unwin, in collaboration with the Bertrand Russell archives, is Volume 7 in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell.* This manuscript is significant for several reasons. First, it is a major work by one of the most important figures in the history of

Kenneth Blackwell and Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, "Russell's Unpublished Book on Theory of Knowledge," Russell, Autumn, 1975, p. 4.

This omission is nothing short of fantastic. Russell begins his chapter in Mv Philosophical Development on "Theory of Knowledge" by dating his interest in epistemology as arising after World War I — an interest that represented "a more or less permanent change in my philosophical interests." (p. 95). He dates his first major work in this field as The Analvsis on Mind in 1921, significantly ignoring the lasting impact of his "shilling shocker". The Problems of Philosophv. in 1912 and his Lowell Lectures delivered while at Harvard in 1914 and later published that same year as Our Knowledge of the External World. Also, it is worth nothing that he used virtually nothing from his unpublished Theorv of Knowledge manuscript in the Lowell Lectures, even though the lectures were written and delivered no more than 10 months after Russell started writing the work under examination in this paper. Bertrand Russell, Theorv of Knowledge, The 1913 Manuscript, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 7, edited by Elizabeth Ramsden Eames in collaboration with Kenneth Blackwell. Introduction by Elizabeth Ramsden Eames. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984. This volume will be referred to by the date of composition, 1913, rather than by the date of publication. 4 philosophy, offering arguments on several topics that are crucial contributions to outstanding issues in epistemology and logic. In short, the manuscript stands on its own merits. Second, it fills in several curious and large gaps in our understanding of the development of Russell's philosophical progress from 1912 through 1918. Third, it provides an indispensable context for understanding the development of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Loqico- Philosophicus. arguably one of the two or three most influential works of the last 100 years. Finally, it illuminates the collaborative efforts of both men, demonstrating the shocking influence of Wittgenstein's insights on Russell's thinking. Hence, Theorv of Knowledge is a valuable and compelling study, central to philosophy today. It is a "missing link," suddenly and unexpectedly found.

I will explore several related topics. Chapter One,

"An Event of First-Rate Importance," concerns the development and later publication of Theorv of Knowledge. Chapter Two, "The Simplest and Most Pervading Aspect of Experience," discusses the actual thesis of the book and the arguments presented by Russell. Chapter Three, "Resurrecting Russell," outlines the place of this manuscript in the development of Russell's thought. Chapter Four, "The Missing Reference," concerns the influence of 5 Theorv of Knowledge on Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Chapter Five, "Russell's Tractatus ?." examines their joint collaboration in 1913. Finally, Chapter Six, "Rewriting History," posits that the history of the development of philosophy in the early part of this century will have to be rewritten to acknowledge the impact of this manuscript.

Surprisingly little has been written about the importance of this manuscript. Since acquired by the Russell archives, the manuscript has been available for study, and several commentators have either noted its existence or offered short comments on it.^ This is not to

There have been several comments on this manuscript. See Brian McGuinness', "Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'Notes on Logic', Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Volume 26, 1972, pp. 444-60; McGuinness, 'The Grudgedanke of the Tractatus." in Godfrey Vesey's Understanding Wittgenstein. 1974; Kenneth Blackwell's "Wittgenstein's Impact on Russell's Theory of Belief," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, McMaster University, 1974; Blackwell and Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, "Russell's Unpublished Book on Theory of Knowledge," Russell, 1975, pp. 2-14, 18; Ronald Clark's The Life of Bertrand Russell, 1975; David Pears' Questions in the Philosophv of Mind. 1975; Eames "Philip E.B. Jourdain and the Open Court Papers," ICarbS, Volume 2, 1975, pp. 101-12; Pears, "The Relation between Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Propositions and Russell's Theories of Judgment," Philosophical Review. Volume 86, 1977, pp. 177-96; R.K. Perkins, Jr., "Russell's Unpublished Book on Theory of Knowledge," Russell. No. 35-36, 1979, pp. 37-40; Eames, "Response to Mr. Perkins," Russell, Number 35-6, 1979, pp. 37-38; Pears, "Wittgenstein's Picture Theory and Russell's Theorv of Knowledge," in H. Berghel, A. Hubner and E. Kohler's (editors) Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism: Proceedings of the Third International Wittgenstein Symposium, 1979; S.T. Sommerville, "Types, Categories and Significance," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, McMaster University, 1979; 6 say that the comments in print suffer from their brevity. Rather, aside from Douglas Lackey, Kenneth Blackwell, Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, Nicholas Griffin, and David Pears, no commentator has attempted a comprehensive assessment, choosing instead to focus on either the history of the

Sommerville, "Wittgenstein to Russell (July, 1913) 'I am Very Sorry to Hear...My Objection Paralyses You," in Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl's Language, Logic and Philosophv; Proceedings of the Fourth International Wittgenstein Symposium, 1980; Nicholas Griffin, "Russell on the Nature of Logic (1903-1913)," Svnthese, Volume 45, 1980, pp. 177-88; Blackwell, "The Early Wittgenstein and the Middle Russell," in Perspectives on the Philosophv of Wittgenstein, 1981, pp. 1-30; Pears, "The Logical Independence of Elementary Propositions," in Perspectives on the Philosophv of Wittgenstein. Edited by Irving Block, 1981, pp. 74-84; Pears, "The Function of Acquaintance in Russell's Philosophy," Svnthese, Volume 46, 1981, pp. 149-66; Douglas Lackey, "Russell's 1913 Map of the Mind," Midwest Studies in Philosophv, Volume VI, The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Edited by Peter French, Theodore Uehling, Jr., and Howard Wettstein, 1981, pp. 125-142; Griffin, "Russell's Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment," Unpublished paper read at Foundations of Logic Conference, University of Waterloo, 1982; Griffin, "Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of judgment," Russell; The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives New Series, Volume 5, Number 2, Winter 1985-86, pp. 132-145; Pears, The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophv, Volume One, 1987; McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life: Young Ludwig 1889-1921, 1988; Eames, "Introduction," to Theorv of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript: The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Volume 7, 1984, pp. xv-xlv; Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with his Contemporaries, 1989; Pears, "Russ'ell's 1913 Theorv of Knowledge Manuscript," in Rereading Russell: Essavs on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology. Edited by C. Wade Savage and C. Anthony Anderson, 1989, pp. 169-182; Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, 1990. Given the importance of this document, this listing may be considered to reflect a relative paucity of comment is strange, probably reflecting a general disinterest in Russell, who is currently viewed as unfashionable, a historic timepiece. 7 manuscript or on certain arguments in it, most notably Russell's theory of judgment. Of interest, aside from some perceptive comments and cross-references by Blackwell, Pears, Griffin, and Eames, no one has yet attempted a detailed assessment of this manuscript's influence on Wittgenstein's "Notes on Logic" in 1913 and the Tractatus. While this paper is an attempt to add to their work, it will borrow heavily from their groundbreaking efforts. This will be apparent throughout the manuscript.

So, if successful, this paper will offer such a comprehensive assessment. It will show that this 1913 manuscript is necessary to a clear understanding of Russell in this period, that the Theorv of Knowledge shows the "Tractatus to be far more directed against Russell's philosophy than has been supposed," ® and that the Tractatus is really a "purified version of ideas that really originated with Russell."*

Kenneth Blackwell, "Early Wittgenstein and Middle Russell," Perspectives on the Philosophv of Wittgenstein. 1981, pp. 26-7.

*. Douglas Lackey, "Russell's 1913 Map of the Mind," Midwest Studies in Philosophv. 1981, p. 128. This thesis will be discussed below. However, it would not be surprising to discover that it is true. Russell was intimately involved in discussions with Wittgenstein from 1911 until 1914, formative years for the young student. However, it may be shocking for those who argue that Wittgenstein has long history of prior philosophical interests. However, Russell's work at that time and immediately prior to his contact with Wittgenstein provided the groundwork for their discussions. It was Russell's CHAPTER ONE:

"AN EVENT OF FIRST-RATE IMPORTANCE"

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna in 1889. His early life was full of education, music and privilege. In 1908 he came to England and enrolled at Manchester University. Following the advice of Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein left Manchester in 1912 to study with Russell at Cambridge, eventually for five terms through 1913, making history in a story by now familiar to most philosophers. While at Manchester, Russell's Principles of

Mathematics made a great impression upon Wittgenstein. He wanted to study with the author. However, in spite of a

constant support of Wittgenstein's early work that ignited Wittgenstein's original contributions. The German influences mentioned by Monk pale in comparison, as does the constant championship of Frege by Anscoitbe, Malcolm and others. If there was one dominant influence of the early Wittgenstein, it was Russell. If there was one dominant influence that Wittgenstein rebelled against in his later philosophical work, other than himself, it was Russell. The revisionism that attempts to marginalize Russell simply ignores the mountains of evidence, including correspondence, explicit and implicit reference, to the contrary. ■°. Two recent accounts of Wittgenstein in this period deserve careful reading: Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life, 1988, pp. 138-178 and Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1990, pp. 36-90. Also, Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir. 1958, offers important insights about Wittgenstein's student years at Cambridge.

8 9 limited background in philosophy, his work in mathematics offered sufficient preparation for the study of logic. Supposedly, after one term, Wittgenstein approached Russell and asked him to help him decide if he should be a philosopher. Russell quickly found him to be the

...most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating. He had a kind of purity which I have never known equalled expect by G.E. Moore.

His collaboration with the Cambridge don was a singularly important event in both of their lives, resulting in Wittgenstein's embrace of philosophy and his monumental writings and Russell's writings on logical atomism. It was also, in Blackwell's words, a relationship that was "one of the most fruitful in the history of philosophy.

The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell. 1914-1944, 1968, pp. 98-9. The story according to Russell is this: "At the end of his first term at Trinity, he came to me and said: 'Do you think I am an absolute idiot?' I said: 'Why do you want to know?' He replied: 'Because if I am I shall become an aeronaut, but if I am not I shall become a philosopher.' I said to him: 'My dear fellow, I don't know whether you are an absolute idiot or not, but if you will write me an essay during the vacation upon any philosophical topic that interests you, I will read it and tell you.' He did so, and brought it to me at the beginning of the next term. As soon as I read the first sentence, I became persuaded that he was a man of genius, and assured him on no account to become an aeronaut," Ibid. p. 99. "The Early Wittgenstein and the Middle Russell," Perspectives on the Philosophv of Wittgenstein. 1981, p. 1. 10 By the end of 1912 the relationship had progressed from that of pupil/teacher to collaborators. At one point Wittgenstein was even discussing with Frege a theory of symbolism developed jointly with Russell." Yet, by the end of 1913, this collaboration was seriously damaged, and Wittgenstein left Cambridge for Norway to work on logic.

Since the time of Wittgenstein's death in 1951 we have learned much about this period, discovering manuscripts that take us progressively farther back into the century. The revelation of Wittgenstein's "Notes on Logic" dictated to Russell in 1913, the "Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway" in 1914, and the publication of Wittgenstein's Notebooks 1914-1916 have demonstrated an early, profound period of work for Wittgenstein, which produced many of the central ideas of the Tractatus. " In fact, these manuscripts have not only illuminated the Tractatus, but they have indicated that much of it dates from the years 1913-14.

". Ibid. p. 11.

All three may be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Notebooks 1914-1916, 2nd Edition, 1979, edited by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. I have mentioned them roughly in their order of creation. See the "Origins of the Tractatus" in G.H. von Wright's Wittgenstein. 1981, pp. 63-109. von Wright argues that Wittgenstein drew much of the Tractatus from the Notebooks. work done much earlier than 1918. 11

Now, with these documents and other supporting evidence, it is possible to reconstruct the events of this time period through a careful examination of the extant documents, including letters written by Russell and Wittgenstein. We know, for example, that their first several months together produced mutual respect and admiration. Russell wrote to Ottoline Morrell that

(Wittgenstein) gives me such a delightful lazy feeling that I can leave a whole department of difficult thought to him, which used to depend on me alone. It makes it much easier to give up technical work."

Yet, after a period of intense excitement, by the spring of 1913 Russell clearly was worried about the effect of Wittgenstein on the fertility of his own work. He wrote in April that

When there are no clear arguments but only inconclusive considerations to be balanced, or unsatisfactory points of view to be set against each other, (Wittgenstein) is no good; and he treats infant theories with a ferocity which they can only endure when they are grown up.

16 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, March 15, 1912.

Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, April 23, 1913. 12

Having finished reading the galleys of Principia Mathematica. and bolstered by the success of his "shilling shocker," The Problems of Philosophv, by the summer of 1913 Russell was looking for a new project. He decided upon a major work on epistemology. Eames argues that this proposed project highlights Russell's intentions to bridge two approaches to philosophy. Generally, Russell seemed to stand with a "foot in two worlds, the old and the new. In her view

The old world of philosophy sought insight, synthesis, an over-arching human meaning which carried ethical enlightenment; the new world of scientific philosophy eschewed the comprehensive, the theologically orthodox, the schema intended to shore up ethical insights, and sought instead the scientific model of the piecemeal, the modest, the precise, with the method of logical analysis as the scientific method of philosophy." *

In other words, Russell used new methods in philosophy

— methods evident in the content of his proposed work — to tackle the grand, time-honored questions of philosophy, the old, unanswered questions asked by Thales, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume and others in the philosophical tradition. In fact, Eames and others have correctly

"Introduction", Theorv of Knowledge, 1984, pp. xx-xxi. Ibid, p. xxi. 13 juxtaposed this proposed project with the ambition of Principia Mathematica.

We know that Russell envisioned an ambitious work. Blackwell and Eames have reconstructed the proposed table of contents, offering a survey of Russell's intended project.They have pieced together several sources of information to provide the following picture of the project:

°. "Theory of knowledge thus provided a ground for technical work, and a bridge to allow the analysis of sense- data and the analysis of scientific concepts to meet. It was this project which became Russell's next major book, on a scale comparable in importance and extent to Principia..." Eames Ibid, p. xxii. . "Russell's Unpublished Book on Theory of Knowledge," pp. 2-14, 18. Also, see Eames's "Introduction" to Theorv of Knowledge and the Appendix A.3 of that manuscript, p. 185, Appendix A.5, p. 189, Appendix A.6, p. 191, and Appendix C, pp. 201-2. The material indicates the actual reconstruction of the table of contents. Appendix A.3 is an outline in Russell's hand of the entire proposed book, perhaps an early draft. Appendix A.5 is another outline, dealing only with the second and the third part of the analytic section of the book. Appendix A.6 is an outline headed "molecular Thought" and refers to the third part of the analytic section of the book. This part has not been found and may never have been written. Appendix 7 is a reconstructed table of contents listing the sources for the corresponding material in the book. For instance. Part I, Chapters I-VI were published in the Monist, January, 1914-April, 1915; Part I Chapters VII- IX and Part II Chapters I-VII were found in the Russell papers by Blackwell in 1967; Part III Chapters I-IX and Section B are listed as proposed or tentative. The Appendices also include other scraps of information that were used to help establish the order and content of the book, including Appendix A.7, which appears to be part of an outline for the seminar on the theory of knowledge offered by Russell at Harvard during the Spring Semester, 1914. 14

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Section A. Analysis Part I . Acquaintance Chapter I Preliminary Description of Experience Chapter II Neutral Monism Chapter III Analysis of Experience Chapter IV Definitions and Methodological Principles in Theories of Knowledge Chapter V Sensation and Imagination Chapter VI On the Experience of Time Chapter VII On the Acquaintance Involved in our Knowledge of Relations Chapter VII Acquaintance with Predicates Chapter IX Logical Data

Part II Atomic Prepositional Thought Chapter I The Understanding of Propositions Chapter II Analysis and Synthesis Chapter III Various Examples of Understanding Chapter IV Belief, Disbelief and Doubt Chapter V Truth and falsehood Chapter VI Self-Evidence Chapter VII Degrees of Certainty Part III. Molecular Prepositional Thought Chapter I Negation. Disjunction. Conjunction. Hypothetical Chapter II Inference — General Nature Of. Knowledge of Logical Principles Chapter III Inference — Valid and Invalid, Logical and Psychological Chapter IV Logical, Psychological, Epistemological Premisses Chapter V Logical and Epistemological Order - Certainty and Probability Chapter VI General Propositions Chapter VII Acquaintance and Description Chapter VII A Priori and Empirical Chapter IX Epistemological Order of sciences 15

Section B. Construction [Tentative] Part I. Knowledge of Logic Pure Form: Variables Only. Includes mathematics. A Priori Part II. Knowledge of Sense What can be discovered by mere analysis of data, without assuming principles by which existents not given can be inferred. Time. Space. Psychical data. Part III. Problem; To state (a) existence of certain sense- data (b) certain principles of inference, which must be self-evident, such that science will follow. Matter, causality. Induction. Principles of inference required: can they all belong to logic? Kant's query again.

Because of his concern about Wittgenstein's displeasure, Russell did not immediately tell him about beginning a new work on epistemology, which Russell started

on May 7th. Within approximately one month, until he stopped writing on June 6 or 7, Russell had completed 350 pages and was at the end of the first two portions of the first part of the book. On May 8 he had completed the chapter on "The Preliminary Description of Experience." A

series of letters outline his progress, which was substantial and rapid. He told Morrell that

The Roman numerals, substructure and comments are a faithful reproduction of Russell's own notes. 16

It all flows out. There will be an introductory chapter, which I shall probably leave to the last — the first substantial chapter, which I have already finished, is called "Preliminary description of experience"...If I go on the scale on which I have begun it will be quite a big book — 500 pages of print I should think. It is all in my head, ready to be written as fast as my pen will go. I feel as happy as a king.

By May 11, he had written 55 pages on the criticisms of William James and was working on a view of consciousness.

On May 13 Russell wrote on "the present time." On this day Wittgenstein was told of the project a week after it was started, and evidently disapproved. Russell reported that "...he thinks it will be like the shilling shocker, which he hates. He is a tyrant, if you like."

By May 14 he had finished 80 pagesand started work on sensation and experience.

Two. days later. May 16, Russell reported that he had written 110 pages and completed the work on sensation and imagination.

23 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, May 8, 1913.

Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, May 13, 1913. 17

On May 17 he was working on the analysis of our knowledge of time and had completed that section two days later.

On May 20th Wittgenstein offered an objection to the theory of judgment Russell was working on. Russell acknowledged the difficulty to Morrell.

He was right, but I think the correction required is not very serious. I shall have to make my mind within a week, as I shall soon reach judgment.

On the 20th Russell started work on the chapter entitled "On the Acquaintance Involved in our Knowledge of Relations."

By May 21 Russell reported that he had finished with particulars and was ready to start on acquaintance with universels. At this point, the completed portions consisted in the six manuscript chapters that later were printed in the Monist.

On the 24th Russell retained confidence. Even though

25 . Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, May 21, 1913. 18 Wittgenstein's objections loomed large, Russell forged ahead with his views on judgment:

I got a new way of dividing the subject — quite new and much more searching than the traditional divisions any number of really important ideas come to me.

By the 26th Russell had finished a crucial chapter entitled "On the understanding of propositions." Wittgenstein came to see him, and, predictably, there were problems.

We were both cross from the heat. I showed him a crucial part of what I had been writing. He said it was all wrong, not realizing the difficulties - - that he had tried my view and knew it wouldn't work. I couldn't understand his objection — in fact he was very inarticulate — but I feel in my bones he must be right, and that he has seen something I have missed. If I could see it too I shouldn't mind, but as it is, it is worrying, & yet I feel it is probably all wrong, & that Wittgenstein will think me a dishonest scoundrel for going on with it. Well, well — it is the younger generation knocking at the door — I must make room for him when I can, or I shall become an incubus. But at that moment I was rather cross.

Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, May 24, 1913.

Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, May 27, 1913. 19

The work came much slower now, and, by the end of the first week of June, Russell had stopped working.

In June, Wittgenstein wrote to Russell that

...I can now express my objection to your theory of judgment exactly: I believe it is obvious that, from the proposition "A judges that (say) a is in relation R to b", if correctly analyzed, the proposition "a R b.v.-a R b" must follow directly without the use of anv other premiss. This condition is not fulfilled by your theory.^®

We don't know how Russell responded. However, later in June, Wittgenstein wrote:

I am very sorry to hear that my objection to your theory of judgment paralyses you. I think it can only be removed by a correct theory of propositions

Russell's reaction revealed how deeply he felt Wittgenstein's objection, personally and philosophically.

Letter from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Bertrand Russell, June, 1913. This letter and the next are found in Appendix III of the Notebooks 1914-1916.

. Letter from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Bertrand Russell, July 22, 1913. 20

It was very difficult to be honest about [Wittgenstein's attack], as it makes a large part of the book I meant to write impossible for years to come probably. I tried to believe it wasn't as bad as that — then I felt I hadn't made enough effort over my work & must concentrate more severely — some instinct associated with this withdrawal from you. And the failure of honesty over my work — which was very slight and subtle, more an attitude than anything definite — spread poison in every direction. I am pure in heart again now, thanks to your divine gentleness & long-suffering. And so my heart goes out freely to you. I must be much sunk — it is the first time in my life that I have failed in honesty over work.®®

Years later, sometime in 1916, Russell revealed to Morrell that his confidence was crippled by Wittgenstein's criticisms :

Do you remember that at the time when you were seeing Vittoz [Ottoline's doctor] I wrote a lot of stuff about Theory of Knowledge, which Wittgenstein criticized with the greatest severity? His criticism, tho' I don't think you realized it at the time, was an event of first- rate importance in my life, and affected everything I have done since. I saw he was right, and I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy. My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to pieces against a breakwater. I became filled with utter despair...I had to produce lecture for America, but I took a metaphysical subject although I was and am convinced that all fundamental work in philosophy is logical. My reason was that Wittgenstein persuaded me that what wanted doing in logic was too difficult for me. So there was no real vital satisfaction of my philosophical

30 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, June 20, 1913. 21

impulse in that work, and philosophy lost its hold on me. That was due to Wittgenstein more than to the war.®^

Yet, the first six chapters did appear in print. Editorial investigation by Eames and Blackwell established that the missing 142 pages of the manuscript were published in a series of six articles in The Monist of 1914 and 1915.®^ Eames demonstrated that the six articles had to be the first six chapters of Theorv of Knowledge based on a summary of the first part of the book given in the manuscript;®® on the order of the topics in the articles and the summary; on the connected, book-like character of the articles; on comparing the number of words in the Monist articles with an estimate of the number in the missing 142

Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, 1916, reprinted in The Autobioaraphv of Bertrand Russell, Volume Two, 1968, p. 57.

®^. The six articles were "On the Nature of Acquaintance. Preliminary Description of Experience," Monist. Volume 24, January, 1914, pp. 1-16; "On the Nature of Acquaintance. II. Neutral Monism," Monist, Volume 24, April, 1914, pp. 161-87; "On the Nature of Acquaintance. III. Analysis of Experience," Monist. Volume 24, July, 1914, pp. 435-53; "Definitions and Methodological Principles in Theory of Knowledge," Monist. Volume 24, October, 1914, pp. 582-93; "Sensation and Imagination," Monist. Volume 25, January, 1915, pp. 28-44; and "On the Experience of Time," Monist, Volume 25, April, 1915, pp. 212-33. ®®. There has been some discussion about possible re-writes of these chapters/articles. See Perkins, Jr., "Russell's Unpublished Book on Theory of Knowledge," and Eames, "Response to Mr. Perkins," Russell, Autumn-Winter, 1979-80, pp. 37-40 and pp. 41-42. 22

pages of the manuscript and by eliminating the alternatives among Russell's writings of the same period.®* Surprisingly, at the time, and when the first three of these articles were reprinted in Robert Marsh's collection of Russell's logical writings, no one argued that the articles

were connected. ®®

In turn, other parts were used in Our Knowledge of the External World. the Lowell Lectures given in 1914. Russell taught a seminar on Theory of Knowledge at Harvard in the spring of 1914 where he may have used portions of the manuscript.®® Yet, Russell never referred to the project

Blackwell's reconstruction was offered in "Wittgenstein's Impact on Russell's Theory of Belief," unpublished M.A. thesis, McMaster University, 1974. Eames' interpretation has been offered in several places, including Blackwell and Eames, "Russell's Unpublished Book on Theory of Knowledge," Russell. 1975, pp. 2-14, 18. ®®. In fact. Marsh's introduction to these articles links them to prior arguments in The Problems of Philosophy (1912) and to current discussions by the American philosophers at Harvard and elsewhere. It is ironic that Marsh refers to them as "relatively unknown essays." See Logic and Knowledge. 1956, p. 126, ®®. T.S. Eliot's book of notes from this class are available for scholars to view at Harvard's Houghton Library. Victor Lenzen, another former student, has written a short article about his participation in this class. See "Bertrand Russell at Harvard, 1914," Russell. Autumn, 1971, pp. 4-6. There are two comments by Lenzen that deserve scrutiny. One concerns the connection between logic and epistemology: "Mr. Russell at the time was especially interested in applying the methods of mathematical logic to problems of philosophy, as scientific method in philosophy." Also, of particular interest for our inquiry, Lenzen reports that "As I look over my notes on the course in Theory of Knowledge, I find items that I have not seen published..." 23

in any of his books, or in any of his available private

correspondence.

The manuscript was never published. Perhaps the reason was that Russell believed the work inferior and/or Wittgenstein's objections unanswerable. In the next chapter we will examine the content of Theorv of Knowledge and begin the process of assessing its value in terms of the development of Russell's and Wittgenstein's philosophical thinking.

p. 5. Perhaps some of this information was part of the unpublished work under discussion here. Unfortunately, Lenzen did not know about the Theorv of Knowledge manuscript, and wrote without benefit of comparison to that manuscript.

Blackwell, in his duties as Russell's archivist, has uncovered other failed writing projects at this time. He has discovered that Russell wrote portions of a book-length manuscript on the philosophy of religion, entitled Prisons. There was also an autobiography, of which no trace remains. Russell also wrote an autobiographical novella, "The Perplexities of John Forstice," which was published posthumously. There was also a paper that Wittgenstein evidently read, "What is Logic?", of which only five pages survive. These five pages have been discussed in relation to Theorv of Knowledge because Russell excludes judgment from consideration as a part of logic. CHAPTER TWO; "THE SIMPLEST AND MOST PERVADING ASPECT OF EXPERIENCE"

The reconstructed manuscript, as prepared by the editors of Russell's Collected Works, now totals 178 pages, with appendices, notes and other reference materials. Only a minimum of textual changes have been made, none of major significance, allowing us to examine Russell's manuscript as it existed in 1913.

Russell begins the first chapter with these words; "The purpose of what follows is to advocate a certain analysis of the simplest and most pervading aspect of experience, namely what I call acquaintance." Clearly, the importance of knowledge by acquaintance is central to the entire book. Following the previous discussions in his 1910 article "On the Nature of Truth, "®® his 1911 lecture to the

Aristotelian Society, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,"®® and his chapters on

®®. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth," Philosophical Essays, 1910, pp. 147-159.

Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," Mvsticism and Logic, 1917, pp.152-167. This article originally appeared in the Proceedings of the

24 25

acquaintance one year later in the Problems of Philosophy,

Russell sought to expand and apply his theory in a more sophisticated, detailed discussion. In fact, the discussion in Theorv of Knowledge is by far his most extensive.

For example, in his 1911 lecture, Russell argued that to be acquainted with an object is to have "a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself."*® This is not a relationship that involves judgment. Rather, Russell categorizes it as a "presentation", that is to say, that an object is presented to the cognitive subject. This allows Russell to divorce subject and object, preserving a dualism that recognizes an

external world. The subject is acquainted with an object when it either has been before the mind, when it is now presently before the mind, or when it will be before the mind in the future. Examples of knowledge by acquaintance include sense-data, universais and perhaps the self. Russell rules out knowledge of physical objects or other minds.

In the Problems of Philosophy in 1912, Russell offers a similar, but broader, perspective — "we have acquaintance

Aristotelian Society, Volume 2, 1911, pp. 108-28. *°. Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," first given in 1911, reprinted in Mvsticism and Logic, 1917, p. 152. 26

with anything of which we are aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths."*^ We can know the sense data that make up the appearance of a table — its color, shape, hardness, etc. However, knowledge of the table as a physical object is not direct knowledge. That requires a cognitive function. But we do have knowledge of mental events, introspective knowledge, universels and, perhaps memory.

In each case the contrast is with knowledge by description, or definite descriptions of objects of which we do not have direct knowledge. Such a phrase would be of the form " a so-and-so", as in "the man with the iron mask"

Both knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by descriptions build on notions that Russell held since at least 1905, and play a central role in the Princioia Mathematica. So it is not surprising that Theorv of Knowledge begins with a discussion of this key contrast — knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by descriptions. But in the unpublished manuscript Russell extends his notion of acquaintance much farther. He argues that acquaintance is a "dual relation between a subject and an object" and does not require a "community of nature." In a situation of

Russell, Problems of Philosophy. 1912, p. 46.

Ibid, p. 52. 27 acquaintance, the subject is "mental". The object is not mental except in introspection. The object may be in the present, in the past, or not in time at all. It may be a sensible particular, or a universal, or an abstract logical fact.

The importance of acquaintance is not to be underestimated because "all cognitive relations — attention, sensation, memory, imagination, believing, disbelieving, etc — presuppose acquaintance."*®

Acquaintance is tied to experience. Certainly, if we have an "experience", we have an acquaintance with something. Russell argues that "the things which a man is said to experience are the things given in sensation, his own thoughts and feelings...and perhaps...the facts which he comes to know by thinking."** That of which we are aware at any given moment are part of our experience, for example, sensations and beliefs. These are things we know by acquaintance. Naming is also tied to acquaintance. That which we can designate by a proper name is known by acquaintance, while that which we know by descriptive terms is not known in the same way. This is a new addition to his theory of acquaintance.

*®. Ibid.

**. Ibid. p. 7. 28 Part of what we know by acquaintance Russell calls "facts", the kind of thing we express by the phrase "that so and so is the case."*® A fact requires a belief expressed in a proposition. Some facts are "primitive", known to us by immediate insight as indubitable, in the same way we experience sense-data. Memory is one example because I am the only person who can have such the experience of my own recollections of the past.

Of course, there are many facts outside of the knowledge I have by acquaintance. But they are difficult because of our inability to verify the existence of physical objects or other minds. Such knowledge would be gained by induction and causality. Russell argues that we could accept the existence of these things as a working hypothesis and try to find a more rational justification as we go along. At the very least, there is no logical reason to presuppose that objects and other minds do not exist, that in the logical world there certainly are facts which we do not experience and that there are no arguments against it.

But Russell rejects neutral monism as an answer.*® The occurrence of ideas does not justify the conclusion that there is no difference between so-called mental and physical

*®. Ibid. p. 9. 46 See Theorv of Knowledge. 1913, pp. 15-32 29

events. Neutral monism cannot account for the fact that my experiences may be different from others. For instance, I may see a color one way or in one shade, and someone else sees it differently. This would be logically impossible if everything were made out of the same stuff. Also, for Russell, judgment is not part of the sensation or presentation of information, as James argued. Rather, judgment is a process after sensation. Russell raises other objections to the notion that a thought is not part in time, and to James' notion that immediate knowledge is not knowledge at all. Experiencing, on the other hand, does require a two-term relation: acquaintance and a subject. Following Hume and others, the subject has no knowledge of itself. However, we can self-designate through the term "I"; this helps to explain the rejection of neutral monism which is unable to explain the selectiveness of experience.

Yet, how do we know? For Russell, "the central problem of epistemology is the problem of distinguishing between true and false beliefs, and of finding, in as many regions as possible, criteria of true belief within those regions."*^ For Russell, this takes us through such diverse topics as the analysis of belief and its presuppositions, psychology and the enumeration of cognitive relations, and logic and the distinction between truth and falsehood.

Ibid. p. 46. 30 While the analysis of experience is regarded as mostly psychological, the distinction between truth and falsehood seems to belong to logic, although Russell conceded that this was open to some doubt. What is not open for doubt, however, is that judgment and the issues that surround this notion are almost entirely logical. In a note that acknowledges the influence of Wittgenstein (remember this was written in 1913), Russell posits that a judgment, and all thought whose expression involves propositions, must be a unique fact, different from subject predicate facts, dual relations and so on. If this is so, then Russell argues it becomes a matter of the form of the proposition, which enlarges the "inventory" of logical forms.

Russell also posits some methodological principles he believes be useful. First, Russell argues that the objects of acquaintance cannot be "illusionary" or "unreal". An object given in acquaintance has a relation to the subject, which would be meaningless if there were no object. Of course, we may have dreams or hallucinations, but proper analysis shows us that these objects are internal sensations or thoughts, and not simply nothing at all. Second, Russell claims that the possibility of error in any cognitive occurrence shows that occurrence is not a dual relation. Where error is involved, something other than acquaintance or attention or any other two term relation is involved. 31

which Russell maintains is a maxim of "purely logical origin."** Third, the epistemological order of deduction involves both logical and psychological considerations. Any set of deductions must involves the use of logic and its principles. But in epistemology our search for knowledge requires that we begin with a body of propositions that are "epistemologically self-contained, or a set of propositions that can be known otherwise than by inference. Such propositions may be those that are indubitable through acquaintance. Other propositions may be deduced from these. Finally, a knowledge of physics and physiology must not be assumed in a theory of knowledge. These belong to the external world, and will be obtained by our search for a

justification for our knowledge of the external world. They cannot be assumed prior to that search — after all, these laws are what we are looking for to begin with.

Russell also believes that we have acquaintance with "bare" relations and with certain predicates; relations through an understanding of the logic involved in complexes and with certain predicates through acquaintance with some universels as relations. We also have acquaintance with logical objects, but not because they are entities. Rather, we have this acquaintance through immediate knowledge other

*®. Ibid. p. 49. 32

than judgment.*® In fact, "every logical notion...is or involves a summum genus and results from a process of generalization which has been carried to its uppermost

limit."®® This is a "peculiarity of logic, and a touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others."®^ For Russell, a proposition that mentions any definite entity, whether universal or particular, is not logical. Logical constants are only concerned with "pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expression of which their names occur."®® We have acquaintance with that form.

In fact, we may have acquaintance with logical form even before we know anything about logic. This is a

"primitive constituent of our experience" and is "presupposed" in any understanding of a proposition "otherwise than by actual acquaintance with the complex whose existence it asserts."®®

This is consistent with his view in 1911, that acquaintance with a cognitive object is an awareness of a relation. But such a relation is not judgment. See page 152 of his lecture. ®°. Ibid. p. 97. ®\ Ibid.

®®. Ibid. p. 98.

®®. Ibid. 33 Elsewhere, he refers to this as "logical intuition." 54

The discussion of logic form is a crucial development for Russell. It is a new departure in his theory of knowledge by acquaintance, and probably reflects his conversations with Wittgenstein. It is almost impossible to overestimate this development. Pears has written that it is "a dramatic extension of the scope of acquaintance...."®® Lackey has argued that "These pages are, I believe, the first pages of twentieth century philosophy given over to the notion of 'logical form'..."®® Lackey finds them less confused than the "Notes on Logic" written by Wittgenstein months later and he claims that "we can only infer that Russell initiated the discussion of that topic and Wittgenstein merely picked it up and carried it forward... "®®

However, we must discuss this issue more extensively because now "the game is afoot." The discussion on

acquaintance with logical form occurs in Part I, Chapter IX — Logical Data. This chapter has received too little

®*. Ibid. p. 101.

®®. Pears, "Russell's 1913 Theorv of Knowledge." Rereading Russell. 1989, p. 174. ®®. Lackey, "Russell's 1913 Map of the Mind," Midwest Studies in Philosophv VI. 1981, p. 133. ®\ Ibid. 34 attention in previous commentaries. I believe this chapter may be the genesis of the Tractatus.

For Russell, logical objects cannot be regarded as "entities" . We know them through "logical experience", which is "a kind of immediate knowledge other than judgment. "®® This is an example of "logical intuition". This type of experience helps us to understand logical terms, such as particulars, universels, relations, dual complexes and predicates.

Logical propositions deal with the abstract, the "summum genus" of a logical notion. For example, the notion of a "dual class" does not belong to the class of dual classes; a correct analysis would place it in a class of which it is the only member. But, a proposition which mentions a definite entity, where particular or universal, is not logical. In fact, Russell explicitly rules this out.

Even " logical constants", which are only concerned with pure form, are not actual constituents of any logical proposition in the "verbal expression of which their names occur."®®

Of course, the notion of form is clear to any former

®®. Ibid. p. 97.

®®. Ibid. p. 98. Lackey argues that this passage shows Russell is sensitive to use/mention distinctions. 35 student of Introduction to Logic and so-called "argument by logical analogy." According to this view, every proposition has an underlying form, such as the quality/quantity/ subject/predicate relationship, and every argument has an underlying form, such as the form for modus ponens [If (p) implies (q), and (p), therefore (q)]. If we examine an argument like that old saw "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal," we discover this purely logical form at work; whatever (a) and (b) may be,

if (X) is an (a) and whatever a (a) is (b), then (x) is a (b). The form is not a "thing" nor is it a constituent along with the objects mentioned. In fact, if all the

constituents of a complex were enumerated, the form would not be included. Rather, the form is the way that the constituents are combined. This foian is what we have acquaintance with. It is not a part of the argument, it represents the way the argument is given. It is not an object. It shows how the objects themselves are related.

Russell claims that we may know logical form prior to an understanding of logic, that our primitive understanding of logic may come when we first understand a sentence.

Consider the complex "Socrates precedes Plato." How do we know what that means? This proposition does not give us acquaintance with the objects and relation described. But we do understand that the three terms are united in a complex 36

and that Socrates has the first place of subject and Plato has a certain relation to Socrates. So we do understand something other than the objects and the relation, and that something is the logical form.

For Russell, forms are logical objects, but there are also others. Certain terms like "or", "not", "all", and "some" involve logical notions. If we use these terms correctly, then we can become acquainted with the logical objects involved. But this is the limit of Russell's claim.

He is unsure of how to isolate logical objects and he does not know "what the logical objects involved really are." Because the "present chaotic state" of logic has not given him the insight to take this view further, for Russell "it is impossible to pursue this topic further."®^

Is this the seed, or one of the seeds, from which the Tractatus grew? This is the first mention of this topic, with these terms, recorded in this century. Wittgenstein's first work, the "Notes on Logic" came months later. But the time element is only one factor. The shocking event is that Russell is speaking this way at all. We know that there was virtually no mention of acquaintance or logical form in his 1914 Lowell lectures, actually written at the end of 1913,

®°. Ibid. p. 99. Ibid. 37

the same year as these writings. The Russell we have known did not write like this, and he certainly offered no comprehensive discussion elsewhere on such notions as logical form or logical objects, acquaintance with logical form or logical objects, or the isolation/separation of logical objects from the non-atomic complexes in which they may be found. We will discuss the similarity of this section with the Tractatus in another chapter. But I certainly agree with Lackey that this chapter is an event of first-rate importance, and shows an intimate link with the work of the Tractatus.

To this point we have been concerned mostly with his doctrine of acquaintance. Now we will turn to a discussion by Russell of understanding and judgment.

The second section of the book concerns atomic prepositional thought, developing the atomic view of logic and knowledge inherited from Princioia Mathematica. In a section entitled "The Understanding of Propositions" Russell again resurrects the notion of atomic and molecular propositions. An atomic proposition is one in which "no part is a proposition." In other words no portion of an atomic proposition is a complete sentence capable of expressing a statement. On the other hand, a molecular proposition is "one of which at least one part is a 38

proposition."®® The difference between knowledge by acquaintance and proposition formation is that the former is known simply through experience, whereas the latter requires linguistic conderations, and a consideration of truth or falsehood. An object of acquaintance is simply there. It is not true or false. A proposition has to be measured against a state of affairs. The proposition itself does not exist. In fact, a false proposition refers to nothing at all, "and it is not credible that anything further enters into the proposition."®® Yet, a true proposition has no existence either. They are "incomplete symbols."®*

Russell later offers an explication of belief, disbelief and doubt. Belief is synonymous with judgment. A judgment is defined as the fact "that such-and-such a proposition is believed."®® A judgment that "(a) succeeds

(b)" is the fact that there is a subject which believes that (a) succeeds (b). Judgment involves truth and falsehood, whereas mere belief is less suggestive of correct views.

Understanding and believing are also contrasted. The mental fact of understanding a proposition is different from

62 Ibid. p. 106. 63 Ibid. p. 110.

®*. Ibid. p. 108.

®®. Ibid. p. 136. 39 believing a proposition, although both processes are mental and involve relations with the complex signified by the proposition. The objects of belief and understanding are the complexes that have logical form, joined with the subject in a multiple relation. No object of belief is a single particular. Belief and disbelief have degrees of certainty, from zero to absolute certainty. There can be an element of doubt that comes into play, because doubt reflects an element of uncertainty, as in "I think so, but I'm not sure."

Truth and falsehood are scrutinized next. They are properties of propositions. If a belief is true, then the objects are related as the belief asserts that they are. So, for Russell, "the belief is true when there is a certain complex which must be a definable function of the belief, and which we shall call the corresponding complex, or the corresponding fact."®® This is quite consistent with

Russell's notion of a correspondence theory of truth, faithfully maintained throughout his life.®®

®®. Ibid. p. 144.

In fact, Russell's theory of truth was extremely constant throughout his philosophical writings. There were many formulations in his various writings, but the remarkable thing is their consistency, not their divergence. In "On the Nature of Truth," found in his Philosophical Essays, 1910, Russell maintains that "Every judgment is a relation of a mind to several objects, one of which is a relation; the judgment is true when the relation which is one of the objects relates the other objects, otherwise it 40

is false." (p. 156). Truth or falsehood is solely dependent on the facts about which a subject judges, leaving truth or falsehood on objective ground. Judgment is a relation of the mind to several other terms. When these terms have a corresponding relation to the world, then the judgment is true, otherwise it is false. In the Problems of Philosophy. 1911, Russell fills this view out by claiming that "...a belief is true when it corresponds to a certain associated complex, and false when it does not." (p. 128). In this formulation Russell argues that a belief is separate from the proposition or the fact. "Thus," he concludes, "although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, yet they are in a sense extrinsic properties, for the condition of the truth of a belief is something not involving beliefs, or (in general) any mind at all, but only the objects of the beliefs. A mind, which believes, believes truly when there is a corresponding complex not involving the mind, but only its objects. This correspondence ensures truth, and its absence entails falsehood." (p. 129). In the Analysis of Mind in 1921, Russell sees truth as related to mental events. He maintains that "A belief is rendered true or false by relation to a fact, which may lie outside the experience of the person entertaining the belief. Truth and falsehood, except in the case of beliefs about our own minds, depend upon the relations of mental occurrences to outside things, and thus take us beyond the analysis of mental occurrences as they are in themselves." (p. 253). In An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. 1940, Russell becomes more of a positivists, stating that "(A theory of truth) is the correspondence theory of truth, according to which the truth of basic propositions depends upon their relation to some occurrence, and the truth of other propositions depends upon their syntactical relations to basic propositions. For my part, I adhere firmly to this last theory. It has, however, two forms, between which the decision is not easy In one form...propositions which cannot be suitably related to experience are neither true or false. In the other form, the basic propositions need not be related to experience, but only to "fact", though if they are not related to experience they cannot be known. Thus the two forms of the correspondence theory differ as to the relation of "truth" to "knowledge."(p. 289). Finally, in his Human Knowledge; Its Scope and Limits. 1948, Russell puts forth this view linking beliefs and truth closer together; "Truth is a property of beliefs, and derivatively of sentences which express beliefs. Truth consists in a certain relation between a belief and one or more facts other than the belief. When this relation is absent, the belief is false. A sentence may be called 'true' or 'false' even if no one believes it, provided that if it were believed, the belief 41

But there must be an incorrigible starting point, some lever from which a correspondence theory of truth can have the possibility of revealing truth about the external world. So Russell next examines the nature of self-evidence, which, although now unfashionable, has been a central theme throughout the history of philosophy. Russell notes that

"The endeavour to define self-evidence brings to a head the conflict between the objectivity of truth and the subjectivity of belief by which the skepticism of every age has been nourished."®®

He defines self evidence as "knowledge which we possess independently of inference."®® This is knowledge of propositions, not objects. Knowledge can only occur in prepositional thinking. This is equivalent to a requirement for some "logical resistance", some "subjective stability" would be true or false as the case may be." (p. 148.) In all of these theories, belief is not a sufficient condition for truth. Truth is a correspondence of a proposition or complex to the real world. Belief is a relation to the proposition. Beliefs are not true, per se. It is only in the last formulation that Russell argues that truth is a property of belief, and this is only with the caveat that a sentence may be true or false, regardless of the judgment. Also, his rejection of the coherence theory is a consistent stepping stone throughout his career. It is of interest that one of Russell's reasons for rejection of coherence theories is his rejection of the indubitability of self­ evidence in the Analvsis of Mind and later works. See especially the Analvsis of Mind, p. 263 and Human Knowledge, pp. 156-7. ®®. Ibid. p. 156.

®®. Ibid. 42

against doubt, which would rest in the "last resort" upon self-evidence.^® Yet, self-evidence cannot be defined by reference to a particular subject or a given set of psychological conditions. Actual self-evidence is relative to the subject at any given moment, so it does not belong to a proposition. It can belong to beliefs that shape a proposition and its constituents. Therefore, self-evidence must meet a criteria: it must have a psychologically "luminous obviousness", and it must be true. But, these are difficult conditions to meet and against the skeptic it is probably impossible to prove that they have been met.

Russell argues that the skeptic's position is merely a questioning attitude, a demand for justification. So perhaps the best approach is a more constructive attempt to examine the claim and accept facts at their face value. Of course, this could invite circular reasoning; we cannot prove that self-evident propositions are true by claiming that they are self-evident. That does not constitute a proof.

A correspondence theory of truth is more than a criterion; it is the "definition" of truth. A true proposition must correspond to some complex. When a judgment corresponds with a fact, it is true by definition.

Ibid. pp. 156-7. 43

So a self-evident judgment must possess some characteristic that makes the judgment true, which requires reference to

acquaintance with a fact. When we perceive this correspondence between belief and some complex, then we have established the truth of a judgment. And this gives us a clearer notion of self-evidence, says Russell, because self­ evidence is the property of judgments, consisting in the fact that, in the same experience with themselves, they are accompanied by acquaintance with their truth.

So Russell comes full circle: knowledge by acquaintance becomes self-evident, which enables us to use our judgments or beliefs to discover truths about the world. We do this through the use of an awareness of the forms of propositions of logic and what they imply, melded with atomic facts based on experience to provide the constituents that we use to replace the logical variables in propositions.

So far, I have merely presented his arguments in the manuscript, hermetically sealed from context or history. Now we must return to 1913 and consider how all of this fits into the development of Russell's thought. We will do this in the next chapter. CHAPTER THREE:

RESURRECTING RUSSELL

Eames has argued that "Pew in the English-speaking world would deny that Russell is a major figure in the philosophy of the twentieth century." Yet, this pre­ eminence has not generated the quantity of scholarship one would expect:

In spite of this, Russell's philosophical work suffers from neglect and misunderstanding. The neglect is evident in the few full-length studies of his work which have been undertaken, and in the cursory treatment which is given of his thought in historical surveys of our century.

One reason is often suggested for this neglect. Russell's productivity was often peppered with progressive changes, usually devastatingly identified by Russell himself, and invariably replaced by a new view. In fact, among most philosophers I have encountered, his reputation is one of constant change. One philosopher, in explaining

Eames, Bertrand Russell's Theorv of Knowledge. 1969, p.13.

44 45 to me his dislike of Russell, said, "How could one man always be so wrong, no matter which opinion he adopted?" C.D. Broad's famous remark about Russell comes to mind: "As we all know, Mr. Russell produces a different system of philosophy every few years....

There are other reasons for this neglect. The strange cult status of Wittgenstein, generated by his strong personality and remarkable story, has been detrimental to a clear and objective appreciation of Russell. Too often Russell is made out as Wittgenstein's foil, a man too old, feeble and wrong-headed to contribute anything of relevance to current debates. This is not just a current notion.

Wittgenstein and others have advanced it all along, even before Wittgenstein's disavowal of Russell's introduction to the Tractatus. Ramsey, for one, made this assessment of Russell in 1924:

I went to see Russell a few weeks ago, and am reading the manuscript of the new stuff he is putting into the Principia. You are quite right that it is of no importance; all it really amounts to is a clever proof of mathematical induction without using the axiom of reducibilitv. There are no fundamental changes, identity just as it used to be. I felt he was too old: he seemed to understand and sav 'ves' to each separate thing. but it made no impression so that three

72 C.D. Broad, Critical and Speculative Philosophy," Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series, Edited by J.H. Muirhead, 1924, p. 79. 46 minutes afterwards he talked on his old lines.

In addition, Russell did not want, nor inspire, discipleship among his admirers. In all fairness, Wittgenstein evidently did not want this either. But the difficulty in collecting, translating, interpreting and explaining Wittgenstein has led his followers to a vigorous defense of his work. In turn, many have made reputations because of their association with Wittgenstein, so much so that their own philosophical efforts paled in comparison, or were sacrificed completely. On the other hand, those philosophers powerfully influenced by Russell, such as Rudolf Carnap, A.J. Ayer, or Willard Van Orman Quine, and Wittgenstein himself, did not have the task of defense, because Russell's views were widely known and easier to understand. So it has been felt that there is little need to reiterate or reinterpret Russell.

As well, the rising estimation of Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida and other "deconstructionists" who believe that the great questions of philosophy should be ignored, because they can never be answered, and any attempt is pointless, has precluded many philosophers from the study

Letter from Frank Ramsey to Ludwig Wittgenstein, February 20, 1924, quoted in Eames, Russell's Dialogue with his Contemporaries. 1989, p. 165. 47

and appreciation of Russell. The influence of these philosophers has quickly expanded out of Europe and the literature departments of American campuses to become the rising tide of American philosophy. With this tide, so- called "analytic" philosophers like Russell are washed away from current, "cutting-edge" discussions.

Another reason is that, among analytic philosophers naturally sympathetic to Russell's methods, philosophy is rapidly moving on, with a philosopher whose body of work dating primarily from 1900-1921 regarded as "ancient history." Whereas the later Wittgenstein is viewed as "modern," i.e. after 1950, Russell is viewed as an anachronism.

Finally, many argue that there is no one masterpiece or classic text comparable to Descartes Discourse on Method or

Kant's first Critique. The Principia Mathematics is either too technical for many or consigned to mathematical logic, not mainstream philosophy. Russell's constant, steady stream of publications, each criticizing the last, and the entire body spread out from 1900-1948, and even beyond that, has made it difficult to identify that one "great" book, the one timeless text. Hence, rather than master several books, many philosophers either ignore the lot of them or place them on par with other analytical texts, none standing out 48

from the crowd.

However, despite this neglect, Russell's work does justify our scrutiny. His views are still relevant, often the starting point for discussions on issues of logic, language and epistemology.

Russell saw his work as philosophy in progress, viewing each book as a progressive improvement on the last, much as a scientist would refine a theory periodically to take into

account new data. However, even with this fluctuation, Russellian scholars often note a core of constant beliefs that provide a grounding for Russell's work. They particularly stress that his method was constant. Eames has argued that

As a matter of fact, most of the changes in Russell's thought have been on relatively less important aspects of his philosophy, and they have come about through the more rigorous application of a constant method.

Morris Weitz maintained that

Most of the changes in Russell's philosophy are minor ones and occur in his application of

74 Ibid, p. 19. 49 analysis to ontology....there is a basic unity in his work, and this unity revolves around his method.

Ayer has argued that, for Russell, the problems remained constant, and so did one of the tools — Ockham's razor, the principle that entities are not unnecessarily multiplied. Russell approached epistemology with caution, believing that, whenever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. In Ayer's view, (Russell) "uses analysis as a method of justification."^®

This methodology is evident in his three greatest achievements: the logic of Principia Mathematics. the

theory of types and the theory of descriptions. By examining his achievements, we will discover the value of this analytic use of logic and Ockham's razor. In this section I will argue that the three are intimately linked, where the use of analysis is intimately tied to the use of

logic to address philosophical problems. It is no accident that the theory of types and the theory of description are both given a prominent place in the logic of Principia Mathematics.

Morris Weitz, "The Unity of Russell's Philosophy," The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. 1944, pp. 57-121. Russell was reportedly in agreement with this assessment by Weitz.

^®. Ayer. Bertrand Russell. 1972, p. 35. 50

Theorv of Types In assessing the impact of this manuscript on Russell's philosophy, I will argue that the theory of types and the theory of descriptions must work within his logical framework to give us knowledge of both how logic properly functions and to give us a justification for proof of the external world. Three of the key concepts of Theorv of Knowledge are central to Russell in this endeavour — the theory of logical forms, the theory of judgments and knowledge by acquaintance.

First, let us examine the theory of types, which is designed to address and prevent logical paradoxes. John van Heijenoort has noted that, by definition, a logical paradox "consists of two contrary, or even contradictory, propositions to which we are led by apparently sound arguments. "

Yet, part of the problem is that the logic involved usually gives us this type of argument: (a) implies not (a), which can lead to [(a) implies not (a)] implies not (a), because the definition of material implication, and the rule of tautology, reduce the inside of the brackets to not (a). However, we also could have not (a) implies (a), which

van Heijenoort, "Logical Paradoxes," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Volume Five, 1967, p. 45. 51

establishes (a) through the same reasoning. Thus we would

be led to the conclusion that not (a) is materially equivalent to (a), which is false.

Of course, there is an assumption that (a) and not (a) are contraries or contradictories, if the (a) is uniformly substituted with the same meaning. However, in many of these paradoxes, there are subtleties that rob the paradox of such a clean substitution, particularly on the road to the final step where the paradox is triumphantly proclaimed.

In addition, Whitehead and Russell were correct — there is even more going on in a paradox; the common characteristic is "self-reference or reflexiveness. These are vicious-circle fallacies, defined by Whitehead and Russell to mean "supposing that a collection of objects may contain members which can only be defined by means of the collection as a whole."®®

Russell has shown particular attention to the following

^®. Ibid.

Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematics, 1910, p. 61.

®®. Ibid. p. 37. 52

paradoxes :

1) The Cretan. Epimenides the Cretan said that all Cretans were liars, and all other statements made by Cretans were certainly lies. 2) Class contradictions. Let w be the class of all those classes which are not members of themselves. Then, whatever class x may be, "x is a w" is equivalent to "x is not an x." Giving to X the value of w, "w is a w" is equivalent to "w is not a w. " ^ 3) Class relations. Let T be the relation which subsists between two relations R and S whenever R

These paradoxes are found in Russell's "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types, " American Journal of Mathematics. 1908, reprinted in Russell's Logic and Knowledge, Essavs 1901-1950. 1956, pp.59-102. They are also found in Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica, 1910. One outstanding analysis of these paradoxes is found in Charles Chihara, " Diagnosis of the Liar and Other Semantical Vicious-Circle Paradoxes," in Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume. 1979 pp. 52-80. Chihara has claimed that It was Bertrand Russell, more than anyone else, who focused the attention of the philosophical world on a whole cluster of paradoxes, which he called the 'vicious-circle paradoxes.'" p. 53. This paradox is known as "Russell's Paradox," supposedly discovered in 1902 while writing the Principles of Mathematics in 1903. Gregory Moore has argued that the paradox was discovered before that, certainly as early as May 1901, and perhaps even earlier than that, while working on unpublished paradoxes associated with Burali-Forte and Cantor. See "The Roots of Russell's Paradox," Russell, Volume 8, Numbers 1-2, Summer/Winter 1988, pp. 46-56. Also, this should be cross-referenced with the chapters "Logic" and "Relations" in Nicholas Griffin's Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship. 1991, pp. 270-369. According to Griffin, Russell was concerned in the late 1890s with neo-Hegelian paradoxes he called paradoxes of relativity and paradoxes of parts and whole. The latter concerns parts, when combined together, do not form a whole. Griffin claims that "It is not hard to see connections between these paradoxes and some of the paradoxes Russell was to make famous." p. 316. Griffin's comments on Russell's views of judgment are also of interest during this time period, and this would be a rich vein for further research. 53 does not have the relation R to S. Then, whatever relations R and S may be, "R has the relation T to S" is equivalent to "R does not have the relation R to S." So, giving the value T to both R and S , "T has the relation T to T" is equivalent to "T does not have the relation T to T." 4) The Burali-Forti's contradiction. It can be shown that every well-ordered series has an ordinal number, that the series of ordinals up to and including any given ordinal exceeds the given ordinal by one, and (on certain very natural assumptions) that the series of all ordinals (in order of magnitude) is well-ordered. It follows that the series of all ordinals has an ordinal number. But in that case the series of all ordinals including that one has the ordinal number of itself + 1, which must be greater than the number you started with. Hence, that number is not the ordinal number of all ordinals. 5) Berry's Contradiction. The number of syllables in the English names of finite integers tends to increase as the integers grow larger, and must gradually increase indefinitely, since only a finite number of names can be made with a given finite number of syllables. Hence the names of some integers must consist of at least nineteen syllables, and among these there must be a least. Hence, "the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables" must denote a definite integer; in fact, it denotes 111,777. But "the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables" is itself a name consisting of eighteen syllables; hence, the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables can be named in eighteen syllables, which is a contradiction.

6) Transfinite Ordinal Contradiction. Among transfinite ordinals some can be defined, while other cannot, for the total number of possible definitions is a given number, while the number of transfinite ordinals exceeds that number. Hence, there must be indefinable ordinals, and among these there must be a least. But this is defined as "the least indefinable ordinal," which is a contradiction. 7) Richard's Paradox. Consider all decimals that can be defined by means of a finite number of words ; let E be the class of such decimals. Then E has No terms; hence its members can be ordered 54 as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,... Let N be a number defined as follows: If the nth figure with the nth decimal is p, let the nth figure in N be p + 1 (or 0, if p=9). Then N is different from all the members of E, since whatever finite value n may have, the nth figure in N is different from the nth figure in the nth of the decimals composing E, and therefore N is different from the nth decimal. Nevertheless we have defined N in a finite number of words, and therefore N ought to be a member of E. Thus N both is and is not a member of E.

Resolution of these paradoxes requires a theory of types; Russell noted in 1903 that "it is the distinction of logical types that is the key to the whole mystery. Each paradox is self-referring in one way or another. The Cretan liar paradox includes the Cretan within its own scope. The class membership paradox applies the class membership to itself. The paradox concerning relations has the same self-referential problem. The Burali-Forte paradox is a more serious relational problem, but ultimately suffers from the same self-reflexiveness as the previous paradox. The remaining three paradoxes result from considering non- nameability and indefineability as elements in names and definitions.

The problem with self-reference is that type levels are confused, causing an mistake in grouping, what Whitehead and

The Principles of Mathematics. 1903, p. 105. 55

Russell term an "illegitimate totality." 84

The authors of Principia Mathematica were correct in claiming that "a proposition is not a single entity, but a relation of several..."®^ Hence, the theory of types is used to distinguish between the relationships involved, separating different relationships into a hierarchy of types, with each type level dictated by appropriate notions of truth and falsity. Simply, and crudely, put, the theory of types is a recognition that we must group objects with similar properties together, and exclude those that have

different predicates.

In fact, the standard is quite strict. A predicative

function presupposes as part of its meaning the totality of its values, or, in other words, the totality of its possible

arguments. A prepositional hierarchy would place only those propositions that concern similar objects and predicates on the same type level. Propositions that refer to other

functions in propositions would be on a second type level.

®^. Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica. 1910, p. 37.

®^. Ibid. p. 43. Also, it may be worth noting that Wittgenstein has a similar notion with generalized propositions, which he calls composite, the components of which stand in a "signifying relation" to the world. It could very well be that the picture theory is quite similar to what Whitehead and Russell argue for here. See Tractatus. 5.5261. 56 and so on.

As part of this discussion, a theory of judgment was postulated in the Principia Mathematica. Whitehead and Russell argued that "The universe consists of objects having various qualities and standing in various relations. Some of the objects which occur in the universe are complex,"®® such as (a)-in-the-relation-R-to-(b). These objects may be capable of being perceived. Judgment is linked to this perception, they labeJed it the "judgment of perception." This judgment is a relation of four terms, namely (a) and (b) and R and the percipient. In fact, when our perception of the relation is accurate, (a) must stand-in-the-relation-

R-to-(b). When we correctly judge this relation, this gives us a definition of truth:

...that is when we judge '(a) has the relation R to (b),' our judgment is aid to be true when there is a complex '(a)-in-the-relation-R-to-(b),' and is said to be false when this is not the case. This is a definition of truth and falsehood in relation to judgments of this kind.®

Ibid, p. 43. This comment is consistent with the realism intertwined elsewhere throughout the logical development of the book.

Ibid, p. 43. 57 Judgments help explain the nature of propositions. Given Whitehead and Russell's account, a judgment does not have the proposition has a single object. Rather, in a judgment, there were several interrelated objects. A judgment is a relation of the mind and the constituents of the proposition. For example, if we say "this is red," the judgment involves a relation of three terms — the mind, whatever "this" refers to and red. When we perceive "the redness of this," there is only a relation of two terms, namely the mind and the complex object. When a judgment is true there is a corresponding complex of the objects of the judgment alone. Falsehood consists in the absence of a corresponding complex composed of the objects alone. Thus,

...owing to the plurality of the objects of a single judgment, it follows that what we call a 'proposition' (in the sense in which this is distinguished from the phrase expressing it) is not a single entity at all.

However, the judgment itself makes "no verbal addition to the proposition."®® The proposition is an "incomplete symbol", requiring a supplement of some kind before it acquires a complete meaning, but "the meaning is completed

®®. Ibid, p. 44. ®®. Ibid. 58

by the act of judging."90

There are other kinds of judgments than "judgments of perceptions," such as "I met a man," "some men are Greeks," and so on. But without a theory of judgment, the theory of

types is incomplete.

Whitehead and Russell also postulated an axiom of reducibility to determine functional equivalence.®^ Two functions are formally equivalent when they are satisfied by the same set of arguments. In other words, the axiom of reducibility is an assumption that for any given function, there is a formally equivalent predictive function, and that any property of an object belongs to the same collection of objects as those that possess some predicate."®^. Of course, the axiom of reducibility is not self-evident, as

Whitehead and Russell concede.®® Rather, its usefulness as

®°. Ibid.

®^. Ibid, pp. 55-59. Whitehead and Russell argue that 'The axiom of reducibility is introduced in order to legitimate a great mass of reasoning, in which, prima facie, we are concerned with such notions as "all properties of (a) or all (a)-functions," and in which, nevertheless, it seems scarcely possible to suspect any substantial error." p. 56. ®®. Ibid, pp. 56-7. Of course, Wittgenstein makes much of this in the Tractatus. At 6.1232 he claims that propositions like the axiom of reducibility "are not logical propositions, and this explains our feeling that, even if they were true, their truth could only be the result of a fortunate accident." He continues at 6.1233 to argue that it is 59 a tool in cases like this provide an inductive justification. Whitehead and Russell make this claim:

The reason for accepting an axiom, as for accepting any other proposition, is always largely inductive, namely that many propositions which are nearly indubitable can be deduced from it, and that no equally plausible way is known by which these propositions could be true if the axiom were false, and nothing which is probably false can be deduced from it. If the axiom if apparently self- evident, that only means, practically, that it is nearly indubitable; for things have been thought to be self-evident and have yet turned out to be false....In formal logic, the element of doubt is less than in most sciences, but it is not absent, as appears from the fact that the paradoxes followed form premises which were not previously known to require limitations. In the case of the axiom of reducibility, the inductive evidence in its favor is very strong, since the reasoning which it permits and the results to which it leads are all such as appear valid. But although it seems very improbable that the axiom should turn out to be false, it is by no means improbable that it should be found to be deductible from some other more fundamental and more evident axiom. It is possible that the use of the vicious-circle principle, as embodied in the above hierarchy of types, is more drastic that it need be, and that by a less drastic use of the necessity for the axiom might be avoided. Such changes, however, would not render anything false which had been asserted on the basis of the principles explained above: they would merely provide easier proofs of the same theorems. There would seem, therefore, to be but the slenderest ground for fearing that the use of the axiom of reducibility may lead us into error.

"possible to imagine a world in which the axiom of reducibility is not valid."

Ibid. pp. 59-60. 60

Of course, the acceptability of the axiom of reducibility is debateable. But, following this line of argumentation, the axiom of reducibility is clearly viewed as a useful grouping technique or principle of arrangement. A generous interpretation would allow that the analogy of its tool-like function in the text clearly argues for the conclusion that it must be part of a meta-language, and hence, at the very least, its truth or falsity would be decided on a different type level than the propositions its analyses.

This recalls an historically important debate along the same lines concerning the verification principle. Ayer defined the verification principle in this way: "...a statement is held to be literally meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable."®® As he noted at another point, empirical hypothesis may not be able to be conclusively verifiable, but some possible sense- experience should be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood. If a putative proposition fails to satisfy this principle, and is not a tautology, then he

holds that it is metaphysical, and that, being metaphysical, it is neither true nor false but literally senseless.

95 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic. Second Edition, 1946, p. 9. 61

One reason for the constant resurrection of the verification principle is the hope for some philosophers that it can be a useful, compelling, concept if we can find a way to avoid crashing on metaphysical rocks. To be sure, this is the key to any discussion of the verification principle fifty-some years after Language. Truth and Logic.

Of course, the target for Ayer was metaphysics itself. As he wrote in the first volume of his autobiography "(In Language, Truth and Logic) I began with a summary trial and execution of metaphysics, using the verification principle as an axe."®®

It is worth noting at the beginning that Ayer

understood that the principle itself stood in need of justification. And that has been the center of controversy over time. As Ayer himself has noted the verification principle, on which so much depended, was far too loosely formulated. Yet, for all of its faults, Ayer never abandoned it.

The attack has come from two fronts: by the metaphysicians themselves and by logical positivists. Both argued that the line could not be drawn. The paradox was that the principle itself could not be justified as either

96 Ayer, Part of Mv Life. 1977, p. 154-5. 62 analytical or empirical. Rather than removing the stain of metaphysics from philosophy, for these philosophers the verification principle actually allowed the stain to spread and saturate the entire endeavor.

I believe that the same arguments for the axiom of reducibility can be used to justify the verification principle without metaphysical trappings. Ayer himself suggests one avenue. He called the principle metaphorically an "axe." The verification principle would not be a proposition per se. Rather, the principle, following the metaphor, would be a utensil, a weapon or a surgical instrument. It is not on the same logical type status as an example used as a foil by Ayer, such as "The Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution or progress" or a personal favorite book title I recently observed. The Wisdom of Evolution.

This more than a trivial point. An axe is not a proposition, neither is a corkscrew, a refrigerator or a lightbulb.

Of course, a tool must be applicable for the task, and it must be used. Tools are conventional, and not prior to experience or language. Therefore, at best, the verification principle has no privileged status which can 63

protect it or philosophically sanctify it. But on this level it does have a usefulness and a purpose which justify its use. The theory of types surely is such a tool.

The theory of types allows for a proper notion of layering of functions, shuffling predictive functions into the proper type level. This becomes important in the solution of the historical paradoxes because it places self­ reference on a different type level than the object, number or class referred to.

Such a move can be used to illuminate virtually all paradoxes. Whitehead and Russell note

In all (paradoxes), the solution is of the same kind. In all of them, the appearance of contradiction is produced by the presence of some word which has systematic ambiguity of type, such as truth, falsehood, propertv. class, relation, cardinal, ordinal, name, definition. Any such word, if its typical ambiguity is overlooked, will apparently generate a totality containing members defined in terms of itself, and will thus give rise to vicious-circle fallacies. In most cases, the conclusions of arguments which involve vicious-circle fallacies will not be self­ contradictory, but wherever we have an illegitimate totality, a little ingenuity will enable us to construct a vicious-circle fallacy leading to a contradiction, which disappears as soon as the typically ambiguous words are rendered typically definite, ie are determined as belonging 64

to this or that type. 97

It is the formal recognition that all propositions are not operating in the same way that is the achievement of the theory of types. It offers an avenue for resolving paradoxes. It also explains many of the comments on self­ reference in the Tractatus. It also can be used to give a fresh reading to Kurt Godel's incompleteness theorem, a reading that would be very sympathetic to Whitehead and Russell.®®

Unlike Wittgenstein, Russell could make such postulations because he was a "logical realist." There is a long, and fascinating, passage from 1919 that reveals Russell's serious realist views in this time period. I

include it here to illustrate an underlying and strongly- held perspective that may not be readily apparent from our discussion thus far:

For want of the apparatus of prepositional

Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica, 1910, p. 64.

See Godel's "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I," 1931. Also, see the Appendix to this dissertation. 65 functions, many logicians have been driven to the conclusion that there are unreal objects. It is argued, e.g. by Meinong, that we can speak about "the golden mountain," "the round square," and so on; we can make true propositions of which these are the subjects; hence they must have some kind of logical being, since otherwise the propositions in which they occur would be meaningless. In such theories, it seems to me, there is a failure of that feeling for reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies. Logic, I should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features. To say that unicorns have an existence in heraldizy, or in literature, or in imagination, is a most pitiful and paltry evasion. What exists in heraldry is not an animal, made of flesh and blood, moving and breathing of its own initiative. What exists is a picture, or a description in words. Similarly, to maintain that Hamlet, for example, exists in his own words, namely, in the world of Shakespeare's imagination, just as truly as (say) Napoleon existed in the ordinary world, is to say something deliberately confusing, or else confused to a degree which is scarcely credible. There is only one world, the "real" world: Shakespeare's imagination is part of it, and the thoughts that he had in writing Hamlet are real. So are the thoughts that we have in reading the play. But it is of the very essence of fiction that only the thoughts, feelings, etc., in Shakespeare and his readers are real, and that there is not, in addition to them, an objective Hamlet. When you have taken account of all the feelings roused by Napoleon in writers and readers of history, you have not touched the actual man; but in the case of Hamlet you have come to the end of him. If no one thought about Hamlet, there would be nothing left of him; if no one had thought about Napoleon, he would have soon seen to it that some one did. The sense of reality is vital in logic, and whoever juggles with it by pretending that Hamlet has another kind of reality is doing a disservice to thought. A robust sense of reality is very necessary in framing a correct analysis of propositions about unicorns, golden mountains, round squares, and other such pseudo- 66

objects.99

The reaction of other logical "realists" reveals the astounding nature of this claim. For instance, Godel found this passage nothing short of stunning, and remarked on it at the beginning of his assessment of Russell's logical achievements. Godel even accused Russell of not only

changing his mind, but changing or deleting the passage in a later edition.

In addition to his realism, perhaps because of it, Russell was a "covert epistemologist." By this I mean that Russell wanted the logic of the Principia Mathematica to be used as a tool to justify our knowledge of the external world. He once remarked that logical concepts and propositions "represent the present frontier of knowledge, " and certainly that comment can be read to cut both ways — that logic is knowledge and that logic is an expandable frontier to help us discover knowledge about the world.

Bertrand Russell, An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. 1919, pp. 169-70. Kurt Godel, "Russell's Mathematical Philosophy, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. 1944, pp. 123-153.

Russell, An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. 1919, p. 195. 67

The axiomatic system of the Principia Mathematica is

designed to begin with atomic propositions, which are accepted as "datum," such as "this is red," "this is earlier than that," and other propositions that do not contain a quantity such as "all" or "some. " This atomic system, while not technically a part of logic, not only is instantiated into the logical system, but the system itself seems designed to use such propositions. For Whitehead and Russell, this is where logic and the world meet, and knowledge by acquaintance provides the "datum" for use in this system. In short, logic and epistemology are linked,

one dependent on the other, quickly intertwined, building up a logical system and providing a framework for knowledge about the world. This gives a two-sided view to a later

comment that "Given all true atomic propositions, together with the fact that they are all, every other true proposition can theoretically be deduced by logical

Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica. Introduction to the Second Edition, 1927, p. xv. Victor Lowe has argued that Russell wrote this introduction without Whitehead's input. See Lowe's Alfred North Whitehead; The Man and his Work. Volume II; 1910-1947. Edited by J.B. Schneewind, 1990, pp. 273-278. Also, it is worth noting that in 1988 Professor Lowe read this portion of his manuscript at The American University. On another matter, there are some who have claimed that this example is not a fair one, because it comes after Russell's detailed explication of logical atomism in 1918. Hence, Wittgenstein would not have been aware of it. However, in the body of the Principia Mathematica. in Section 1, "Primitive Ideas and Propositions," just five pages into Part 1, the same type of example of elementary propositions is given, such as "this is red". See page 91 of Principia Mathematica. 68

methods. "

Theory of Descriptions The theory of descriptions, or the demonstration that a phrase may contribute to the meaning of a proposition without having any meaning in isolation, is also included in Principia Mathematica. There it is used to explain the construction of classes.Whitehead and Russell argued that "by a 'description' we mean a phrase of the form "the so-and-so or of some equivalent form."^°® With the confined to the singular, a description offers a unique use. Prepositional notation can capture this uniqueness.

Ibid.

Norman Malcolm reports that Wittgenstein "believed that the Theory of Descriptions was Russell's most important production, and he once remarked that it must have been an enormously difficult undertaking for him." But he also reported that "in 1946 Wittgenstein had a poor opinion of Russell's contemporary philosophical writings. 'Russell isn't going to kill himself doing philosophy now,' he said with a smile. I noticed that on the infrequent occasions when both Russell and Wittgenstein were at the Moral Science Club, Wittgenstein was deferential to Russell in the discussion as I never knew him to be with anyone else." see Wittgenstein, A Memoir. 1958, p. 68. Of course, the theory is developed in greater clarity in Russell's "On Denoting" in 1905. There he explains that denoting phrases concern the things we have knowledge of by description, not knowledge by acquaintance. Wrong analysis of denoting phrases usually takes place because verbal expressions that contain denoting phrases are often confusing sense and reference. Only proper logical analysis will remove the confusion. "On Denoting," Essays in Logical Analysis. 1973, pp. 98-119.

Principia Mathematica. 1910, p. 30. 69 Unfortunately, there is a problem with descriptive phrases; their use can mislead us to treat them like proper names. Examples of such denoting phrases are a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of France the center of mass of the Solar System at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth around the sun, the revolution of the sun around the earth and so forth.

It is easy to see how such phrases can be mislead in isolation. For example, the phrase "Scott is the author of Waverly" seems to assert that "Scott" and "the author of WaverIv" are two names for the same object. But the authors of Principia Mathematica posit that this is a mistaken view,

for it means that Scott must be called "the author of WaverIv" in order to be Scott. However, if someone else wrote the book in question, then such an assertion would be false. The two phrases are not necessarily names for the same thing. Scott may have been, and in fact was, the author of Waverlv before people knew that fact. In addition, if someone else wrote that book, then to assert Scott was the author would be mistaken. Thus, the two phrases do not act as proper names — only "Scott" is a proper name. The phrase "the author of Waverlv" does not designate in the same way. The lesson here is that we must

These examples are used in "On Denoting," 1905, p. 103. 70 concentrate on the use of the denoting phrase in order to determine its meaning. A denoting phrase is only part of a proposition — it does not have meaning in isolation. The proper analysis of the phrase "the author of Waverlv" is that one and only one entity wrote Waverlv. and Scott was that person.

The proper use of descriptions, as Russell observed in his earlier effort, is "of very great importance not only in logic and mathematics, but also in theory of knowledge."^”® Denoting involves knowledge by description, which is knowledge of things we do not have "presentations" of, that we do not know by acquaintance. But, the constituents of a descriptive phrase must be composed of elements that we are immediately acquainted with. Knowledge by description must be constructed out of knowledge by acquaintance; hence, descriptive phrases must somehow be linked back to our immediate knowledge. In part, this linkage may be done by virtue of the logical form of denoting phrases, as Whitehead and Russell were keenly aware. Language is another component, because denoting phrases never have meaning in themselves, only as part of the propositions in which they occur. In fact, all thinking, whether through understanding of logical form or through the use of language, has to start from acquaintance in order to arrive at information about

Ibid. 71 things which we do not have acquaintance with. Therefore, it is only through knowledge by acquaintance that we can "know" denoting phrases. Denoting phrases only make sense in terms of self-evidence.

After considering the theory of types and the theory of descriptions, with an appreciation for Russell's belief that logic and epistemology can work hand in hand and are co­ dependent, we are in a position to appreciate why Theorv of Knowledge was the proper next step in the development of Russell's thought. Armed with the logical tools of the Principia Mathematica. Russell now could examine the world, using incorrigible knowledge by acquaintance as the constituents of an elementary proposition, to construct not only an understanding of the nature of the external world, but to prove its existence. And two key components are central to the manuscript — the theory of judgment, given

in his theory of types, and knowledge by acquaintance, given importance in the theory of descriptions. The importance of these concepts working together now reveals the purpose behind his proposes table of contents, because acquaintance and logic must work together.

The fact that the Principia Mathematica offers important new tools to tackle problems outside of logic has been noted by many commentators, notably Weitz: "(Both Whitehead and Russell) recognized in the techniques of (Principia Mathematica) a powerful instrument for the solution of many of the traditional problems of scientific philosophy: time, space, mind and matter." See "The Unity 72 Of course, Russell's arguments on logical form add credibility to this view. Through an acquaintance with logical forms, Russell's logical realism was intimately tied to his epistemology. In addition, because a true judgment is tied to self-evidence, the correspondence theory of truth makes knowledge by acquaintance central to anv knowledge about the world. Pears has correctly noticed that "the whole edifice of Theorv of Knowledge is founded on Russell's doctrine of acquaintance...."^°

So it is curious that Russell virtually abandons his theory of judgment and his theory about knowledge by acquaintance after the summer of 1913. Perhaps this is because Wittgenstein had powerful objections, which I will consider in the next chapter. These objections, and their impact of Russell, may explain why the theory of judgment and the doctrine of knowledge by acquaintance, and minimized and begin to recede from view after the writing of this manuscript. In Our Knowledge of the External World, the of Russell's Philosophy," The Philosophv of Bertrand Russell. 1944, pp. 100-101.

Pears, "Russell's 1913 'Theory of Knowledge, ' Rereading Russell. 1989, p. 170. 73 Lowell Lectures written at the end of 1913, published in 1914, a search for discussion of these central comments yields an amazing finding. The concept of judgment is briefly mentioned at the end of the lecture entitled "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy." Here Russell reiterates that judgment is an important component in the question of truth. Yet, judgment is not a sufficient condition for truth — one could judge falsely. If one judges falsely, there is no objective fact that lines up with the false proposition; just the opposite is the case. Russell concludes that

It is therefore necessary, in analyzing a belief, to look for some other logical form than a two- term relation. Failure to realize this necessity has, in my opinion, vitiated almost everything 74

that has hitherto been written on the theory of knowledge, making the problem of error insoluble and the difference between belief and perception in explicable.“

One can't help but wonder if this dense passage doesn't refer to his problem in correctly formulating a theory of judgment a few months earlier in Theorv of Knowledge. Certainly, the paucity of discussion here is stunning, given the central feature judgment plays in the Principia Matnematxca ana in the unpublished manuscript. . Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, 1914, p. 68. IftiÊdgaiwa. s5Au6tion is discovered in his discussion in t^e Lbfafedl gqacth5rbs2of knowledge by acquaintance. There are two passages that mention acquaintance. The first, related to the views of Bergson, briefly posits that knowledge by acquaintance can be "unique and new". But it is only given in sensation. The second passage mentions acquaintance in relation to the interpretation of sense data and the formation of propositions."^ Russell argues that sense data is raw, and cannot be divided. Acquaintance does not have degrees. Indubitable propositions cannot be formed 75 out of sense data alone. This surely is a decisive turn from Theorv of Knowledge, where knowledge by acquaintance is the bedrock of his logical atomism, the starting point for his logical system and its covert epistemology. Now, sense data are onlj given, but the construction of propositions gives rise to the possibility of error.

In this chapter I have argued that Theorv of Knowledge helps us to understand the development of Russell's philosophy in a period that is curiously under-reported in his own published work. Now I will turn to the work of Wittgenstein and demonstrate that this manuscript is a "missing reference", much discussed but not publicly acknowledged. CHAPTER FOUR;

THE HISSING REFERENCE

Nicholas Griffin has argued that "It turns out that much of Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell in his Notebooks, especially the criticism in the 'Notes on Logic' and the 'Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore', was directed at Russell's position in his unpublished book.McGuinness agrees that this is a missing reference: "...in Wittgenstein's own writings over the next years many of the theses discussed — many of the positions contested — were taken from the Theorv of Knowledge manuscript.""^

McGuinness argues that this manuscript was certainly on Wittgenstein's mind in through the end of 1913 and the next year spent in Norway, where the entries in the Notebooks reveal many of the central concepts of the Tractatus. It is worth remembering that Wittgenstein's "Notes on Logic" were dictated to Russell in September of 1913, only three months after Russell stopped work on Theorv of Knowledge. Also,

Nicholas Griffin, "Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Judgment," Russell, 1985-86, p. 133. McGuinness, Wittgenstein, A Life, 1988, p. 175.

76 77

Russell's manuscript was the last of his writings available to Wittgenstein until after the war, and prior to the writing of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein was not aware of Russell's later efforts from 1914-1918, which significantly includes the Lowell Lectures and the lectures on logical atomism.

The Tractatus itself is an enigmatic work. Like Wittgenstein's other efforts, notably the Philosophical Investigations, themes are woven together so tightly that separation and extraction become impossible. Like a symphony, the parts only make sense in their complementary relationship to the whole. Each theme — thoughts, names, objects, propositions, and so on — criss-cross and touch each other throughout the manuscript.

In addition, the abstract nature of the work, without benefit of clear explanations or examples, leave it open to many interpretations. Wittgenstein's method of argumentation is extremely dense and difficult to follow. One of his students has remarked

Wittgenstein's argument consists largely, it is regrettable to say, in the putting across of a set of ungrounded atomistic prepossessions by a vivid series of insinuations, persuasive pictures and leading questions, when a thoroughgoing search for unifying concepts, covering all alternatives and consequences, would better deserve consideration 78

and acceptance. 117

Also, some of his former students have set themselves

up as "official" interpreters of Wittgenstein, forming a party line that has stifled new interpretations, especially those based on earlier manuscripts. The philosophical presumption now rests with G.E.M. Anscombe, Peter Geach, Rush Rees, Norman Malcolm, and Georg Henry von Wright. Yet, with the passing of Wittgenstein's disciples from the scene, new critical accounts have offered less "orthodox", often varied accounts."*

There is no denying the importance, or the brilliance,

of the Tractatus. Yet, it is but the tip of the iceberg, with much of its argumentation and inspiration found in earlier works, such as the "Notes on Logic", written in 1913, "Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway" in 1914, the

J.N. Findlay, Wittgenstein ; A Critique, 1984, p. 6. ^^*. For a new look, see Ayer, Wittgenstein. 1985; J.N. Findlay, Wittgenstein; A Critique, 1984; Pears, The False Prison. Volume 1, 1987; and A.C. Grayling, Wittgenstein, 1988. None of these reviewers are part of the clique of students who have protected Wittgenstein's memory. Rather, their objective analysis breathes new life into the subject of his work, leaving it with less shine but also less distance. The Tractatus has always been intimidating, and understanding it recalls attempts to understand holy scripture. Certainly, this was the very problem with a pandering philosophical public that Wittgenstein loathed, and feared for his own work. 79 Notebooks 1914-1916 and evidently several notebooks that were destroyed or remain lost, the many letters to Russell and others, and, the published and unpublished works for Russell and other philosophers.

Let us examine the Tractatus and then search for points of commonality or interest concerning Theorv of Knowledge. There are seven major propositions in the Tractatus, all but the last substantiated by a series of numbered sub­ propositions .

1. The world is all that is the case. 2. What is the case — a fact — is the existence of states of affairs. 3- A logical picture of facts is

a thought. 4. A thought is a proposition with a sense.

5. A proposition is a truth- function of elementary propositions. 6. The general form of a truth- function is [p,E,N(E)]. 7. What we cannot speak about we

must pass over in silence. 80

It would be obvious to begin at the beginning in our examination with the first proposition. But I propose a different route. I believe the ordering contributes to the confusion surrounding the Tractatus, which means that confusion is inherent if the order is followed. After all, a discussion of the world seems to imply that we are actually going to say something about it, when we really aren't. As well, the discussion of logical atomism misled Russell and many others into thinking that Wittgenstein meant the same thing as Russell and other analysts in their use of the hallowed terms "elementary propositions", "objects", "names", and even "logic". Wittgenstein declared that his project was different, and we should take him at his word. However, I am convinced that he saw his problems to be the same as Russell's, which explains his reference to "our problems" in several letters to the senior philosopher.

There have been two traditional ways of approaching the Tractatus. either by proceeding through the propositions in

order 1-7 or by attempting to isolate major themes."* This is not say that every commentator took one of these two routes. Some simply attempted a free-for-all, grab-bag, global strategy, which only seems to suffice for superficial

The former approach has been followed by Max Black in his Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1964. The latter approach was the guide for Anthony Kenney's Wittgenstein. 1973. The Kenney choice has been more commonly followed by critics. 81 explanations. In my analysis of the Tractatus I wish to start far from the beginning of that work. As I noted above, part of the interpretive problem may very well be an attempt to follow the propositions in the order given by Wittgenstein. Rather, I wish to start with the method of analysis, the actual role of logic, as Wittgenstein himself did in the "Notes on Logic" and the Notebooks. If this is the real beginning, then we can uncover more than logic as method; we may actually penetrate to the core of the work.

There is an overwhelming reason to carefully consider the "Notes on Logic", the "Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore" and the Notebooks 1914-1916; these writings are either early drafts of notions in the Tractatus or else the actual texts used for particular propositions. G.H. von Wright has traced back the origin of the Tractatus to these manuscripts, demonstrating that an early version of the Tractatus. labeled the "Prototractatus", was composed in

1918 out of several notebooks, three of which he believes are the documents now known as Notebooks 1914-1916. If this is so, many of the concepts from the notebook covering 1914 were written soon after his discussions with Russell, including his discussions on logical form, judgment, experience, self evidence and the picture theory. All of these references date from a period of eighteen months after Russell began work on Theorv of Knowledge. If this is so. 82

then clearly this was the last manuscript of Russell's that Wittgenstein could have possibly read, regardless of his involvement in World War I."°

So it is not surprising that logical form and so many other issues related to the Russellian project are evident in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein argues that the aim of the Tractatus is "to draw a limit to thought, or rather — not to thought, but to the expression of thought..."^" But a limit presupposes that a clear boundary can be drawn, and a demarcation must show what belongs on either side. Clear cases must be demonstrated for both sides — paradigm cases and foils for each side, what belongs and what doesn't.

If I read Wittgenstein correctly, the Tractatus attempts to do this, to draw a limit to philosophy, which is logic, on the one side, and language and the world on the other. This identity of philosophy and logic is absolutely

central, forging a union between the history of speculation and the tool of reason. At 4.112 Wittgenstein claims that "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts."

120 See von Wright, "The Origins of the Tractatus," Wittgenstein, 1983, pp. 63-109. 121 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Loaico-Philosophicus, Pears and McGuinness translation, 1922, p. 3. Hereafter, in this chapter, the references to the Tractatus will either be by the designated proposition numbers, or, in the case of Russell's introduction, by page numbers. 83

This is because, far from speculation about the unanswered questions philosophy "is not a body of doctrine but an activity....elucidations....the clarification of propositions."

This places our focus directly on logic, which is a series of a priori, analytic propositions. These propositions are true or false by virtue of their form, and the validity the Wittgenstein's arguments must be determined by virtue of the underlying logical form.

Why make this the focus? Why start with a discussion of logic? The Notebooks begin with a simple, haunting, profound, a priori claim — "Logic must take care of itself, a claim echoed in the Tractatus at 5.473. If this so, "process and result are equivalent,and there can be no surprises or mistakes. Illogical thinking is ruled out, because logic only allows valid deductions.

Logic, in an important sense, is truly self-contained. In the Notebooks. Wittgenstein remarks that "The tautology shows what it appears to say, the contradiction shows the opposite of what it appears to say....The completely general

Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 1914-1916. p. 2e.

6.1261. 84

propositions can all be formed a priori. " Logic excludes a posteriori, synthetic information about the

world. Rather, logic is a system of tautologies. A

proof in logic is no more than a re-arrangement of information contained in the premises of an argument, the work of "a mechanical expedient to facilitate the recognition of tautologies in complicated cases." Unfortunately, a proof in logic cannot be restated in other terms than logic. It can only be shown. True, we may want to put it into our own words for the expedient of talking about it. However, our linguistic substitution does not constitute a proof, and only the mechanical manipulation of the symbols can reveal the validity or invalidity of a proof. This is very much on Wittgenstein's mind;

The proof of logical propositions consists in the following process; we produce them out of other logical propositions by successively applying

124 Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916, p. 12e.

125 William Kneale and Martha Kneale, among others, understand Wittgenstein's meaning of the term "tautology" as vacuous. Their interpretation is that the use of truth tables actually demonstrates this vacuity, in as much as a truth table does not indicate information about existence or universality. They also add that "The emphasis which Wittgenstein placed on his definitions of truth-functions by truth tables was due, of course, to his conviction that logic did not deal with any special class of things or relations in the world but solely with the nature of what we might perhaps call logical complexity." See The Development of Logic, 1962, p. 630.

6.1262. 85 certain operations that always generate further tautologies out of the initial ones. (And in fact only tautologies follow from a tautology. Of course this way of showing that the propositions of logic are tautologies is not all essential to logic, if only because the propositions from which the proof starts must show without any proofs that they are tautologies.

One example of a logical rule of inference is modus ponens, which states that If (p) materially implies (q), and (p), therefore, (q). The presence of the material implication and the antecedent (p), gives rise to the valid deduction (q). This is not one proposition, but a method for inferring information based on what we know. Yet, the way we infer can only be shown by signs, as one learns a rule of inference in logic, like modus ponens or modus tollens.

Logic, by drawing the limit of philosophy's knowledge of the world, is "a mirror image of the world, " transcendental, over-arching, with no point of contact with the world.

This is a clear difference from Russell's published work through 1913, and in Russell's presentation of logical atomism in 1918, but not in terms of method or goals.

6.126.

6.13 86

Rather, a difference of logical temperament, with Wittgenstein taking logic to an extreme, retaining its purity, recognizing the power, and limitation, of form. Russell wants an axiomatic system of logic to help prove the existence of the external world. Wittgenstein immediately uses it to set a limit which cannot be crossed — logic can never tell us anything about the external world. Pears interprets this notion to mean that "(The formula of logical propositions) must be completely different from factual sentences, which have to measure up to something outside themselves, the contingent layout of the world." This seems obvious, but as Pears sees "This is a simple contrast, but the conclusions that (Wittgenstein) draws are far-reaching. If he is right, Russell's axiomatization of logic in Principia Mathematica is mistaken in more than one way."^^* And note that Wittgenstein's system is not axiomatic, another enigma because there may be no beginning point for the system at all.

We do know that, for Wittgenstein, "the propositions of logic say nothing."^** Logical propositions lack content. They only contain variables. In fact, when the variables are replaced to give the proposition sense, as if it were like a proposition about science (the world), then "this is

Pears, The False Prison. Volume 1, 1987, p. 21.

1*°. 6 .1 1 . 87 a sure sign that it has been construed wrongly.""^ This is not to say that we cannot use logic to reveal transcendental truths about the world — implications which must be valid. For Wittgenstein, "the propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it.""^ Logical propositions tell us about the underlying grid of the world, a grid that must be true regardless of our world picture. Wittgenstein, in a pregnant passage, explains how our current world picture slips into this grid;

(The propositions of logic) have no 'subject matter'. They presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their connection with the world. It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols — whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character — are tautologies. This contains the decisive point. We have said that some things are arbitrary in the symbols that we use and that some things are not. In logic it is only the latter that express; but that means that logic is not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself. If we know the logical syntax of any sign-language, then we have already been given all of the propositions of logic. *

131 6.111. 132 6.124.

133 Ibid. 88

Wittgenstein argues that "It is a sign of a proposition's being elementary that there can be no elementary proposition contradicting it."^*^ For Wittgenstein, logic is a hallmark of factual discourse.

4.211. This logical independence is surely a reaction to the Principia Mathematica, which allowed for contradictory elementary propositions. For example, if two people observe an object, and one sees it as red and another sees it as blue, this sense-data would be consistent because the starting point is individual perceptions, which may differ between observers, not the propositions themselves, which may differ. However, for Wittgenstein such cases are ruled out, and Russell say this as a crucial difference. He explained this difference in a strange passage that comes close, but misses the mark; "Wittgenstein maintains that logic consists wholly of tautologies. I think he is right, although I did not think so until I read what he had to say on the subject. There is another point connected with this which is very important, and that is that all atomic propositions are mutually independent. It used to be thought that one fact could be logically dependent on another. This can only be the case if one of the facts is really two facts put together. From 'A and B are men" it follows logically that A is a man, but that is because 'A and B are men' is really two propositions put together. The consequence of the principle we are considering is that any selection of the atomic facts which are true in the actual world, might be the total of atomic facts so far as logic can show, but, as is obvious, the principle of atomicity is essential in this connection, and, if it were not true, we cannot be sure that the simplest obtainable facts may not be sometimes logically connected." Mv Philosophical Development. 1959, pp. 88-89. In other words, Russell sees the problem as a difference in unpacking complex molecular elementairy propositions, whereas Wittgenstein is 1) rejecting sense-data or any other possible instantiation for an atomic proposition because it cannot buy into a particular world picture, and, 2) logic must be self- consistent and tautologous, which ultimately the Principia Mathematica is not because of its "covert epistemology." For Russell, atomic propositions have content, regardless of their content. For Wittgenstein, these propositions have no content, and must be compatible by virtue of their form. This stunning, and often overlooked, difference between the two views of logic is best expressed in this discussion about independent, non-contradictory propositions. 89

Logical forms are inherent in the language we use to describe the world. But, unlike Whitehead and Russell, logic doesn't reach out and uncover the world. Logical form may be revealed by factual discourse. But there is not a revelatory reciprocity. As Pears explains it, logical form is "embedded in the one and only world of facts and, therefore, in the language that we use to describe it." Again, logic can represent the "scaffolding" of the world.

On the other hand, the world "is all that is the case.""* This means that the world is filled with facts

which exist in logical space. Facts are the existence of states of affairs, which is a combination of objects. The existence of these objects is deduced, not independently

substantiated. However, these objects are governed by the laws of logic. They cannot combine in ways that violate their nature; illegitimate combinations are ruled out prima facie. In fact, "if I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs a new possibility cannot be discovered later. There is a logical determinism in all of this, a determinism that reminds one of Leibniz. Wittgenstein's view is that objects contain the possibility of all situations, and this

135 Pears, The False Prison, Volume 1, 1987, p. 23.

136 ,

2.0123. 90

possibility is the form of the object. 138

Objects are simples, which means that they make up the substance of the world. Complexes can be broken down into their constituent simples. Substance is transcendental, subsisting "independently of what is the case.""* Yet, substance is form and content, such as space, time and color. Objects are what is unalterable, what changes in the world is their configuration.

However, when logic transcends the a priori, it leaves itself behind. Now it is in the world of science, a world that Wittgenstein claims is not part of philosophy. Science attempts to be law-like, in the same way as logic, without the benefit of the tautologous nature of logic, which cannot be mistaken. The so-called laws of causality are no such thing. Induction stands in need of justification, and "outside logic everything is accidental.""*

Indeed, for Wittgenstein, the correct method of

Perhaps this is one point that deserves further study. Wittgenstein may be only co-incidently following the lead of Leibniz in his view of logic and possible worlds. However, he may have acquired this similarity through Russell's work on Leibniz and Russell's attempt to carry out a Leibnizian project in the Principia Mathematica. "*. 2.024.

6.3. 91 philosophy would be "to say nothing except what can be said" f which is the language of the world, the language of science. After all, in his view science and logic have no common ground. The propositions of science can be spoken of, but are better shown in terms of their justifying particular instances. One the one hand, it is better to show a phenomena like "the dawn" rather than generalize about it through an indefensible law of induction. On the other hand, the propositions of logic can onlv be shown, and because they are tautologies, they say nothing. This explains Wittgenstein's comments that "anyone who understands me eventually recognizes (my elucidations) as nonsensical....He must transcend these propositions, and then see the world aright.

So, we must pass over the metaphysics of philosophy and logic in silence, unable to shown anything significant, and certainly unable to discover anything about the external world. Russell's covert epistemology is ruled out from the beginning, replaced by a purified, a priori, ultimately sterile philosophical logic that can never transcend its nature. Eames puts this divergence into perspective:

6.53. 6.54, 92

Hence the criticism that Wittgenstein launched against Russell's theory of knowledge in 1913 was grounded in the emerging view of logic as not significant philosophically in the way Russell believed it to be. This destroyed the link by which Russell intended to pass from acquaintance with the forms of a relational complex, via a relational theory of judgment, to atomic propositions, and then, by the use of logical techniques, to molecular propositions and the application of logical arguments to the concepts of science. The new view of logic also made all logical premises unavailable for epistemological use, and made the "proofs" of logic empty of philosophical meaning. For Wittgenstein, the chief significance of his own criticism was in clearing the way for what he perceived as the final solution of the logical, and hence metaphysical, problems which he and Russell faced. But for Russell the grand scheme of an ultimate scientific and philosophical synthesis became impossible.

As a result, the work of Principia Mathematics is rejected, and so is the attempt to do epistemology with

logical tools, such as the Problems of Philosophv and Theory of Knowledge. Wittgenstein's intense dislike of these projects certainly must stem from his rejection of this use of logic to do "covert epistemology." Because this difference goes to the core of both philosopher's methods and view of logic, the fact that they are both analytic philosophers developing systems of logical atomism masks a serious, profound, and deep disagreement.

143 Eames, Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with his Contemporaries. 1989, p. 166. 93

It is fair to say that this discussion is not far removed from Russell's work in Theory of Knowledge. In fact, it is designed to address many issues in that manuscript.

I would identify at least three: logical data, the theory of judgment, and self-evidence.^*

Even considering the distinction we have drawn above, that Wittgenstein's logic work is a purification of Russell's, it is amazing how close Russell was in Theorv of Knowledge. The discussion of logical data in Theory of Knowledge is one of the most remarkable parts of the

manuscript. Russell explicates a clear theory of logical form. The recognition of a form, even the unconscious use of a form, constitutes a "logical experience", composed of "logical objects" that are not entities. We have this

experience through "immediate knowledge", other than judgment. A proposition which mentions a definite entity, whether universal or particular, is logical. Logical constants, rather than objects, compose logical propositions

There may be more, for example the discussion of knowledge by acquaintance, the nature of a proposition and other issues. However, a less clear-cut case can be made for these issues. Russell had previously published in 1911 and 1912 versions of his ideas on knowledge by acquaintance. He had also published several pieces discussing the nature of propositions, and. Therefore, I merely note in passing the possibility for further research. 94 and are simply concerned with pure form, not the constituents in the verbal expressions we might use in which their names occur. This acquaintance is a primitive form of experience, a "logical intuition", which we have in any understanding of a proposition other than through actual acquaintance with the complex whose existence it asserts.

If I am correct in my analysis above, the Tractatus takes a similar course. The objects of the Tractatus are not, per se. logical objects. But Wittgenstein is reluctant to identify them as the physical objects of the world. Of course, he claims that "There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable form."^*^ In fact, objects are "unalterable and subsistent", only their "configuration is subject to change."^** This is far from a ringing endorsement of objects as the physical components of the world. The defining characteristic of these objects is their logical structure, not their empirical content. Objects are simples and they make up the substance of the world. Again, it is significant that they are the unalterable form of the world.

It is worth noting that Wittgenstein's discussion of

145 . 2.026. 146 . 2.0271. 147 . 2.02 95 experience is relevant here. In the Tractatus at 5.552 Wittgenstein claims that "The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is.: that, however, is not an experience."

In addition, Wittgenstein's discussion of propositions outlines the transcendental nature of objects, and the representation of objects through naming and thoughts, which are both potential components of propositions. A proposition must be constructed so that it "does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it."^*® A name is a primitive sign. A thought is a propositional sign, which is a fact. Objects can only be named. Signs are their representations. Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are. 149 Thus, we are concerned with propositions as vehicles for a logical process of naming, thinking and, ultimately, forming pictures. This is also very close to

Russell's position. His concern is about logical objects as constituents of logical experience. Russell posits logical propositions, as opposed to other propositions that talk about entities, to act as the grid for the use of logical

3.13. Also, note the cross reference to the discussion in footnote 96.

14Q . See 3.14, 3.26 and 3.221. 96

constants. Wittgenstein seems to be making a case for the same underlying grid. If this is so, then this chapter in Theorv of Knowledge is a brilliant, tentative first attempt at the Scime program Wittgenstein conducts in the Tractatus.

The theory of judgment is explicitly mentioned in the letter from Wittgenstein to Russell cited in Chapter One, dated June, 1913. But a detailed discussion may be found in the "Notes on Logic", written just three months after Russell stopped work on Theorv of Knowledge. Russell had argued that a proposition is either true or false depending on the way a belief is translated into constituents and logical form, and whether or not it corresponds with the world. If it does, then it is true, if not, then false. Belief or judgment help us determine the constituents and composition of the proposition. Thus, the proposition itself is dependent on the judgment of the individual constructing the proposition. Unfortunately, such a view allows for poor or mistaken judgments that could help form false or nonsensical judgments.

However, Wittgenstein argues that "the proper theory of judgment must make it impossible to judge nonsense Virtually the same point is made in the Tractatus at 5.5422,

Wittgenstein, "Notes on Logic, " Notebooks, 1914-1916, 1979, p. 95. 97 with a specific reference to "Russell's theory." Correct logical form would remove the process of judgment completely. The proposition would indicate the proper place and direction of the subject, copula and predicate because of their individual logical natures. Wittgenstein remarks in the "Notes on Logic" that "every right theory of judgment must make it impossible for me to judge that this table penholders the book. Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement because he requires an act of judgment by an individual. " Elsewhere in the "Notes on Logic" he adds:

There is no thing which is the form of a proposition, and no name which is the name of the form. Accordingly we can also not say that a relation which in certain cases holds between things holds sometimes between forms and things. This goes against Russell's theory of judgment.

In fact, whether one is reviewing Wittgenstein's discussion of logical notation, the nature of propositions of any other issue in the "Notes on Logic", one gets the feeling that the entire manuscript is an attack on Russell's theory of judgment. Arguments against it are intertwined throughout the text, virtually on every page.

151 Ibid. p. 103.

152 . Ibid. p. 105. 98 Of course, the question arises, "Was it the 1913 explication that Wittgenstein is referring to in his manuscripts?" After all, Russell's theory of judgment has not been a static concept. Russell revised it many times.But surely there is a high probability.

Wittgenstein's letter to Russell, cited above, discusses the theory as presented in the unpublished manuscript. In addition, only in Theorv of Knowledge is judgment, coupled with acquaintance, given such a prominent role. We must also remember that the only place where Russell extends acquaintance to logical objects is in this manuscript, and where Russell formulates this theory so that Wittgenstein's objection applies. Wittgenstein's target is a theory that cannot through logical form preclude mistakes, errors, false propositions and absurdities. Wittgenstein argues that

"There is no thing which is the form of a proposition, and no name which is the name of a form. Accordingly we can also not say that a relation which in certain cases holds between things holds sometimes between forms and things.

This goes against Russell's theorv of judgmentWhy? Because "the epistemological questions concerning the nature of judgment and belief cannot be solved without a correct

153 See Griffin's 'Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Judgment," Russell. 1985-86, pp. 132-145. ISA "Notes on Logic", p. 105. 99 155 apprehension of the form of a proposition."

Also, Wittgenstein discusses Russell's notion of self evidence overtly in the Notebooks. He argues that "The 'self-evidence' of which Russell has talked so much can only be dispensed with in logic if language itself prevents any logical mistake. And it is clear that 'self evidence' is and always was wholly deceptive. " He repeats this claim against Russell in the Tractatus virtually word for word, but adds that "What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogic thought. Again, self evidence in Russell's view is an atomic proposition, which may have epistemological content. This evidence could be illusionary or deceptive. For Wittgenstein, a proper notion of logic and propositions would prevent such a mistake. Logic cannot be mistaken. Propositions must be structured to preclude mistakes, just as a square peg cannot fit into a round whole.

155 Ibid. p. 106. 156 Wittgenstein, Notebooks. 1914-1916. p. 4e.

157 5.4731. CHAPTER FIVE:

RUSSELL'S TRACTATUS?

Of course Russell did not write the Tractatus. But he was a significant influence, and perhaps a fertile ground for ideas that Wittgenstein either viewed with favor or reacted against. In the preceding chapter, I argued that Wittgenstein was very aware of Theorv of Knowledge. Many of his views from 1913-1918, as found in the Tractatus and other available works, are in direct opposition to arguments suppressed by Russell in the unpublished manuscript. Each argument examined in the previous chapter concerned points of disagreement. In this chapter I will emphasize some significant areas of agreement.

That there is substantial agreement between these too former collaborators is not surprising. Quine has written that "Wittgenstein's philosophy was an evolution from views that Russell and the young Wittgenstein shared.

Willard Van Orman Quine, "Russell's Ontological Development," The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 63, 1966, p. 657.

100 101

Of course, there is much in common between Russell's work and Wittgenstein's. The notion of logical atomism, the analysis of atomic propositions as constituent names, the demand for an artificial language, and the use of the analytic method in philosophy are all shared, and certainly had their origins with Russell.

Perhaps the most famous doctrine of the Tractatus is the picture theory. G.E.M. Anscombe has noted that "Wittgenstein's 'picture theory' of the proposition is much influenced by Russell's Theory of Description. There is much room for commonality here. Merrill Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka have even argued

It may even be that Wittgenstein's entire picture theory was largely inspired by the notation of Principia Mathematica and modelled on it. It is, for instance, significant that the ideas of logical portrayal and of a representation of logical properties play an important role in Wittgenstein's very first remarks on his "picture theory", as shown by pp. 7-8 of Wittgenstein's Notebooks 1914-1916. "Logical pictures are repeatedly mentioned also in the Tractatus; see 2.18-2.19, 3, 4.03. It does not seem misleading to think of them as propositions represented in a logical notation. The enormous influence of Russell's and Whitehead's work on Wittgenstein is easily obscured by his criticisms in the Tractatus of several different details of the Principia notation. These criticisms nevertheless concern other features than the basic parts of logic, with

G.E.M. Ans combe. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 1959, p. 41. 102

the sole exception of Russell's treatment of identity. They hide the large area of agreement between Russell and Wittgenstein, as far as the structure c^f the basic logical language is concerned.

In fact, given my analysis of Russell's views of logical form and knowledge by acquaintance, as expressed in a correspondence theory of truth, a proposition does act like a model, mirroring the world.

The chapter on logical form in Theorv of Knowledge may actually have more similarity with the picture theory of propositions than the notation of the Principia Mathematica. There Russell discusses logical form, and how there is an underlying form in any proposition and in any argument. Because the picture theory is concerned with the logical structure of a proposition and the world it pictures, logical form does come into play. At 2.18 Wittgenstein develops his picture theory by explaining "What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it — correctly or incorrectly — in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality."

Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka. Investigating Wittgenstein. 1986, p. 94. 103

A picture represents a situation in "logical spacebut it is not true a priori. In order to decide if a picture is true or false, it must be compared to reality.One of the major propositions of the Tractatus is that "A logical picture of facts is a thought."^**

This notion of an underlying logical form, and its relationship to reality, sounds strangely like the project in the unpublished manuscript. We have knowledge by acquaintance of logical form. This knowledge is indubitable, a priori. Yet, it is connected to an atomistic view of the world. The only difference is that Russell needs someone to do the judging, whereas Wittgenstein simply would use the picture like a model, and compare it to the world we are trying to describe.

I realize I am stretching the point past good scholarship. But it is a possibility worth considering.

Next let us turn to the development of truth tables. There was much agreement on the use of truth tables, another revolution associated with Wittgenstein and the Tractatus.

2.202. 2.225.

2.223. 164 This is proposition number 3. 104 Surprisingly, there is evidence that Wittgenstein and Russell even discussed the idea of representing truth possibilities in a table.

Simply put, a truth table can define primitive notions, like disjunction, conjunction, negation, and material implication. Even the validity of deductive arguments can be determined with this device.

Consider the following table for the "horseshoe", a device used to signify material implication.

p implies a T TT T FF F TT F FT

Truth tables are one of the major achievements of the Tractatus, linked to Pierce and Post, but rarely to Russell. Yet, according to McGuinness, on the back of a paper Russell read in 1912 (perhaps in April) to the Moral Sciences Club entitled "Matter — the Problem Stated, "there are logical jottings in Wittgenstein's hand, and one "not-p" in 105 Russell's. The device of the truth table does not appear in the "Notes on Logic" nor in the "Notes Dictated to Moore." McGuinness, for one, has argued that "the jottings are certainly earlier than both, since Wittgenstein did not see Russell between the composition of 'Notes on Logic' and the end of the war. "

Of course, some type of notion of truth-functionality was clearly in play in the Principia Mathematica. The

McGuinness, Wittgenstein. A Life, 1988, pp. 161-2. McGuinness sees this find as one more indication of the need to carefully reconsider the discussion between Wittgenstein and Russell during this time period: "These jottings are a valuable reminder of how little we know about the genesis of the Tractatus and how misleading the fragmentary preliminary work we have can be. Without this accidental find it might easily have been supposed that the devices of truth-tables and the fundamental logical operation occurred to Wittgenstein after reflections recorded in the wartime Notebooks. whereas it now seems as if he recurred, at the time of the Tractatus. to an old device (recorded perhaps in one of the lost or destroyed notebooks), p. 162. Here McGuinness also provides a careful discussion of the development of Wittgenstein's symbolism for the truth tables that are found in the Tractatus at 5.101. Emil Post, who is often said to have independently "discovered" truth tables, noted in 1921 that Whitehead and Russell had a discussion of truth values, truth functions and primitive truth tables. This is very apparent in the explanation of truth values in terms of the primitive logical operators, such as disjunction and negation. See in the Principia Mathematica pp. 7-8 and Section 4 on "Equivalence and Formal Rules," pp. 115-122. While Whitehead and Russell did not explicitly use truth tables. Post argues that the notion is evident in Jevons, Venn, Boole, Schroder and Lewis. Schroder is given a lion's share of the credit for this achievement. See an "Introduction to a General Theory of Propositions," in From Frege to Godel: A Sourcebook in Mathematical Logic, p. 267, note 6 and p. 268, not 7. 106 very definition of "material implication," one of the key terms in the logical system, requires a sophisticated notion of the possibilities outlined in a truth table. Whitehead and Russell define the "horseshoe" as

... when a proposition (q follows from a proposition (p), so that if (p) is true, (q) must also be true, we say that (p) implies (q)....The essential property that we require of implication is this :' What is implied by a true proposition is true.' It is in virtue of this property that implication yields proofs....What it does determine is that, if (p) implies (q), then it cannot be the case that (p) is true and (q) false, i.e. it must be the case that either (p) is false of (q) is true. The most convenient interpretation of implication is to say, conversely, that if either (p) is false or (q) is true, then '(p) implies (q)" is to be true. Hence '(p) implies (q)' is to be defined to mean: 'Either (p) is false or (q) is true.' ^

This definition is not possible without a notion of

Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica, 1910, p. 94. It is interesting to note how close this definition is to the so-called paradoxes of material implication, which state a) anything is implied by a true proposition, or b) a false proposition implies anything. Each paradox is dependent on the notion of a truth table, with the first generated by lines 1 and 3, and the second generated by lines 3 and 4. The real proof of Whitehead and Russell's understanding of the truth table notion comes from the careful wording of this definition, clearly designed to avoid the paradoxes by reminding the reader that material implication is simply a formal notion, and not transferable to a natural language. However, an understanding of truth possibilities surely extends all the way back to Aristotle's notions of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. 107

truth possibilities, which would have to be expressed through consideration of every possible combination of truth values. Simply put, that is a truth table.

Finally, given my interpretation of the Tractatus as a logical text, one could make the argument that the chapter on logical forms is Russell's acknowledgment of the importance of considering logic as a series of tautologies. Of course, there is ample evidence that Bussell did not understand the importance of Wittgenstein's notion of tautologies And he certainly would not agree that every logical proposition is a vacuous statement. However,

his emphasis on logical form brought his language very close to that of Wittgenstein. Certainly, the major difference between the Principia Mathematica and the Tractatus is Russell's logic as covert epistemology verses Wittgenstein's logical puritanism. It appears that the Tractatus is an extreme view of Russell's attempt to use logic to tell us about the world, with Wittgenstein demonstrating that logic cannot do this job.

Does this commonality make a strong case for a close collaboration? I believe it does. At the very least, Wittgenstein took his logical system to an extreme to solve

See Russell's comments about a tautology being a "new addition to the zoo" in An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 1919, p. 108 the common problems he encountered with Russell. In addition, Principia Mathematica was a necessary precondition for the development of the Tractatus. Both Wittgenstein and Russell present an atomist system, much of it with the same terminology, yet with different accounts of key terms. The picture theory was perhaps generated by any or all of the following: consideration of the notation of the Principia Mathematica, Russell's correspondence theory of truth, and Russell's arguments on logical form. The notion of truth tables was popularized by Wittgenstein, but its origins go deeper, and clearly back to and through Whitehead and Russell. The entire view of logical form, perhaps in my interpretation the most important issue in the Tractatus, may be traced back to Theorv of Knowledge.

Of course, one could argue that the Tractatus was written while Wittgenstein was away from Russell, and that is true enough. But as we discovered in the previous chapter, Russell was very much on Wittgenstein's mind, and the Tractatus was partially written in reaction. But I am also claiming that there is much common ground on the key issues. In addition, the proximity in time between their collaboration and the formation of the key concepts of the Tractatus must not be overlooked.

So I am not arguing that Wittgenstein "pinched it." But 109

I am claiming that the collaboration with Russell may have been even more significant than many philosophers have realized. CHAPTER SIX:

REWRITING HISTORY

In the preceding chapters I have presented the history of the excavation of Theorv of Knowledge and the content of this manuscript. I have also explicated three related themes of great importance to philosophers: the manuscript's importance in the development of Russell's thought, its place as a missing reference for understanding Wittgenstein's early writings and its relevance in determining whether the Russell/Wittgenstein collaboration was much stronger than commonly realized. If any, most or all of these themes have been convincing, then Theorv of

Knowledge must be given careful review and evaluation.

Recognizing its contribution to philosophy, Eames, whose outstanding commitment to Russellian scholarship is evident, has claimed that the time is right for a careful re-assessment of Russell and Wittgenstein in this time period, and of their manuscripts. She writes

110 Ill There are signs of a change; both philosophers are now historical figures, and the number of those who feel a personal loyalty to either of them is now small. Further research in the archival materials lately made available has removed some misconceptions and opened new lines of inquiry in which historical and textual accuracy is a guiding principle, and in which philosophical insights guide the interests of the reader. *

This paper has been an attempt at such a reassessment. If I am correct, then the Theorv of Knowledge manuscript is a major work by Russell, deserving careful study and assessment. Yet, regardless of its historical interest, this book is of particular interest in its own right, providing important arguments on knowledge by acquaintance and by description, logic form, self-evidence and many other issues in epistemology. But, the historical interest of Theorv of Knowledge is considerable, offering insights into

the development of Russell's philosophy and the reaction of Wittgenstein. For Russell in 1913, the theory of judgment,

coupled with knowledge by acquaintance, would work within the logic of the Principia Mathematica to enable logic to conduct covert epistemology. Wittgenstein, understanding the importance of these concepts, and unable to agree with Russell's tainted logic, responds by shredding the theory of

Eames, Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with his Contemporaries. 1989, p. 169. 112

judgment and constricting logic by the notion of tautology. For Wittgenstein, logic cannot prove the existence of the external world. What is needed is "a correct theory of propositions" of logic. Finally, this document indicates that the collaboration of Russell and Wittgenstein was more extensive than previously known, and there is considerable evidence to indicate that Lackey was correct: the Tractatus is a "purified version of ideas that really originated with Russell.

Of course, I realize that I have looked for new, more consistent interpretations of the evidence in the available

See a letter from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Bertrand Russell, July 22, 1913, found in Appendix III of the Notebooks 1914-1916. 19179, p. 122. Douglas Lackey, "Russell's 1913 Map of the Mind," Midwest Studies in Philosophv, 1981, p. 128. This thesis will be discussed below. However, it would not be surprising to discover that it is true. Russell was intimately involved in discussions with Wittgenstein from 1911 until 1914, formative years for the young student. However, it may be shocking for those who argue that Wittgenstein has long history of prior philosophical interests, such as von Wright (1981) and Monk (1990). However, Russell's work at that time nd immediately prior to his contact with Wittgenstein provided the groundwork for their discussions. It was Russell's constant support of Wittgenstein's early work that ignited Wittgenstein's original contributions. The German influences mentioned by Monk pale in comparison, as does the constant championship of Frege by Anscombe, Malcolm and others. If there was one dominant influence of the early Wittgenstein, it was Russell. If there was one dominant influence that Wittgenstein rebelled against in his later philosophical work, other than himself, it was Russell. The revisionism that attempts to marginalize Russell simply ignores the mountains of evidence, including correspondence, explicit and implicit reference, to the contrary. 113

manuscripts. This is not an easy task, given the clarity of Russell's writings and the tenacity of Wittgenstein's disciples. The "party line" has been set and followed for years — the wonderful mystery of Wittgenstein the student eclipsing Russell the teacher; the fascination of Russell unable to fathom Wittgenstein's arguments, in part because of his philosophical tradition, in part because of the genius of Wittgenstein, in part because Russell was an old fogey; the power of a manuscript conceived and written in the trenches of Italy; and the excitement of a new approach to philosophy. But the real story is much different, revolving around earlier dates, a forgotten manuscript and a violent reaction to Russell's mixture of logic and epistemology. That reaction was the genesis of many key propositions in the Tractatus.

Now that all of the manuscripts are available for study — such as the Theorv of Knowledge, the "Notes on Logic" and other texts, we stand in a better position now to understand the dynamics of the discussion between Russell and

Wittgenstein than at any other time since those two great philosophers shaped the history of philosophy in our century. Almost eighty years later, it is now time for a new look, and a different telling of a familiar philosophical tale. For that, I offer no apologies. APPENDIX: A DISCUSSION OF GODEL

Russell's theory of types can be used to sort out the many fascinating problems and arguments raised by Godel's incompleteness theorem.

Godel's theorem may be expressed as follows: In a formal system adequate for number theory, one might believe that these axioms and rules of inference are sufficient to

decide any mathematical question that can be formally expressed in these systems. However, Godel shows that this is not the case. He demonstrates that there exists an

undecidable formula — that is, a formula that is not provable and whose negation is not provable. In other words, there is a statement that is expressible in the system but not provable in it. This statement is not only true, but recognizable to be true, the statement being of

the form Vx A(x) with A(x) a decidable predicate. A corollary of this theorem is that the consistency of a

fointnal system adequate for number theory cannot be proved within the system.

To demonstrate this proof, Godel assumes that the

114 115 system has a finite sequence of primitive signs and that it is possible to put these signs into well-formed formulas, and to demarcate well-formed formulas from those that are not well formed. Godel numbers are introduced to uniquely correspond to each primitive sign, and the number sequence of each proposition uniquely states that proposition.

Given this move, Godel shows through an ingenious reductio ad absurdum proof that there is a proposition that is undecidable in PM or in any given system. This proposition could say that it is "provable in the system." It could also say that it is not provable. Either way, it would be a well formed formula in the system.

The theorem has been widely, almost universally acclaimed. Ernest Nagel and James Newman have written

(Godel) presented mathematicians with the astonishing and melancholy conclusion that the axiomatic method has certain inherent limitations, which rule out the possibility of even the ordinary arithmetic of the integers that can never be fully axiomatized. What is more, he proved that it is impossible to establish the internal logical consistency of a large class of deductive systems — elementary arithmetic for example — unless one adopts principles of reasoning so complex that their internal consistency is as open to doubt as that of the systems themselves. In the light of these conclusions, no final systematization is attainable, and no absolutely impeccable guarantee can be given that many significant branches of mathematical thought are 116 entirely free from internal contradiction.

John van Heijenoort noted that

Since mathematics has often been regarded as the standard of rational thought, Godel's theorems seem to acquire significance for the whole body of human knowledge; they clearly establish that the old ideal of a deductive system cannot be maintained....(these results) should not be rashly called upon to establish the primacy of some act of intuition that would dispense with formalism.

Thus, the impact of Godel's theorem was remarkable.

According to John Dawson, "The image of shaken foundations is irresistible." Dawson has added elsewhere that the "incompleteness theorems and set-theoretic consistency proofs are among the most celebrated results of twentieth- century mathematics. " Ernest Nagel and James Newman

called it a "milestone in the history of logic and

Nagel and Newman, Godel's Proof, 1958, p. 6. van Heijenoort, "Godel's Theorem," Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Volume 3, 1967, p. 356. Dawson, "The Reception of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems," Godel's Theorem in Sharper Focus. 1988, p. 74. Dawson, "Kurt Godel in Sharper Focus," Godel's Theorem in Focus. 1988, p. 1. 117 mathematics....(an) "epoch-making paper." 176

The acceptability of this theorem is virtually complete. Stephen Kleene has argued that perhaps no theorem in modern logic has been proved more often than Godel's completeness theorem for the first-order predicate calculus.When Harvard awarded Godel an honorary degree in 1952, the citation described his work as one of the most important advances in logic in modern times.

Yet, Stanislaw Ulam was reported by Ed Regis to have the impression that Godel suffered in later life from " a gnawing uncertainty that maybe all he had discovered was another paradox a la Burali Forte or Russell."

In fact, Godel's theorem was accepted too readily.

Surprisingly, Dawson discovered, after reviewing contemporary comment, that

If these accounts are correct, one of the most profound discoveries in the history of logic and mathematics was assimilated promptly and almost

176 Nagel and Newman, Godel's Proof. 1958, p. 3. 177 Kleene, "The Work of Kurt Godel," Godel's Theorem in Focus. 1988, pp. 48-71.

Regis, Who Got Einstein'sEint Office. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 66. 118

without objection by Godel's contemporaries — a circumstance so remarkable that it demands to be accounted for. The received explanation seems to be that Godel, sensitive to the philosophical climate of opinion and anticipating objections to his work, presented his results with such clarity and rigor as to render them incontestable, even at a time of fervid debate among competing mathematical philosophies. The sheer force of Godel's logic, as it were, swept away opposition so effectively that Godel abandoned his stated intention of publishing a detailed proof of the second theorem.^ *

Godel himself said that it is conceivable that there exists finitary proofs that cannot be expressed in the formalism of an axiomatic system. In fact, Nagel and Newman

are careful to point out that

The possibility of constructing a finitistic absolute proof of consistency for arithmetic is not excluded by Godel's results. Godel showed that no such proof is possible that can be represented within arithmetic. His argument does not eliminate the possibility of strictly finitistic proofs that cannot be represented within arithmetic.

A correct application of the theory of types shows that

Dawson, "The Reception of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems," Godel's Theorem in Focus, 1988, p. 75.

Nagel and Newman, Godel's Proof. 1958, p. 98, note 31. 119

Godel's proof itself is a paradox. There is an obvious paradox, stated right at the beginning of the proof — a proposition that self-refers to the axiomatic system may not be provable in the first order calculus involved. Thus, even if everything Godel argues is correct, we could question if this is a proof or an example of paradox. Perhaps we could also say that the proof is a paradox, by definition.

As well, the move to Godel numbers assumes that logical operators can be replaced by integers, and then these formulas correspond to propositions in an axiomatic system. While Godel numbers are a brilliant method to examine this problem, and may have considerable value in terms of first order propositions, self-reference in terms of numbers smells like a type mistake. In fact, Wittgenstein warns us that self-referring propositions are different from other propositions at several places in the Tractatus, including a powerful claim at 3.332. After all, there is no move in a chess game that can describe the consistency and completeness of chess, and if each move was rendered uniquely through conversion into numbers, you would not have a proposition or a number or a sequence of numbers that could express a self-referential proposition, because, by definition, this proposition can only be shown, not said. 120

But one could claim that this was Godel's point. If so, then why pick the provability proposition as an example of an unprovable proposition. After all, with a good notion of type theory, it would never have even been considered. A stronger argument might have been made precisely with a proposition that Godel would have viewed as weaker — a first order proposition.

But this is more than trivial nit-picking: Godel has a burden to show that the propositions excluded are first order propositions. If not, he only excludes that which has already been excluded. In turn, unless first order propositions have the possibility of exclusion, he has demonstrated far less than claimed. At this point, it would be fair to ask if anything was proven at all.

Of course, there is a tremendous desire to want to believe Godel. After all, we think longingly of Euclid and the incompleteness of his geometry. We are drawn to a conclusion that explains Euclid. But it is fair to claim that a proposition about self reference is not the same type of creature as a theorem about parallel lines, and that transforming propositions into numbers does not show that a Euclidian sort of proposition is the result.

Frankly, Godel may have mixed apples and oranges. 121

Godel may have literally tried to call a non-equivalent entity a proposition, and then, when it failed to act like a proposition, blamed propositions for the problem. Strange as this may sound, it cannot be ruled out. And if this is so, then it is a type mistake.

But there is more too it than this. The proof itself should be examined. For instance, the entire proof is ultimately a reductio ad absurdum argument (RAA^, attempting to prove one side of a disjunction, ultimately claiming that neither side is provable. Clearly, the choice of argumentative proof is odd. An RAA argument is more than a one-sided failure leading to another-sided success. As St.

Anselm and others surely realized, such a proof requires several presuppositions: that both sides of the disjunction are true contradictories, that it at least one side of the

contradiction is logically possible, that such a proof is complete (ie that the proposition to be denied has the possibility of proof in that system, otherwise what's the

point), and that the disjunction is fairly constructed. Imagine for a moment a proof that attempts to prove the logically impossible. Imagine if the disjunction was of two propositions logically impossible in that system — the disproof of one tells us nothing about the other. Consider a self-referential disjunction: if Whitehead and Russell are correct, this would be a logically impossible 122

disjunction, no matter how reasonable it looked on paper. In fact, a RAA argument must presuppose a consistent and complete system in order to have any merit as an argument form. Otherwise, the disproof of one side of the disjunction establishes nothing about that proposition or its contradictory mate.

Godel, of course, recognized some of this. That is why his disjunctive propositions literally claim either "This proposition is provable" or "This proposition is not provable." And as he argues, provability relies on "meta- mathematical" considerations, and is not demonstrable in the first order system.

But the proof model itself is suspect. Wittgenstein

for one doubts that philosophical proofs can be established mathematically. This point is important because the premises of the argument, and the argument form itself, initiate a line of thought which is simply unintelligible to him. In fact, Wittgenstein once wrote to Moritz Schlick that "If you hear that someone has proved that there must be unprovable propositions in mathematics there is nothing astonishing about that because you have no idea as yet what this apparently clear prose proposition actually says. You then have to go through the proof from A to Z in order to 123 see what it proves." 181

Wittgenstein reminds us that the interpretive function is critical in the disposition of this, and any, theorem. The mathematics gives us results, but translating those results into concepts in a natural language is difficult, and may perhaps beg the question, establishing the grounds for a vicious-circle argument, which the proof saying what we want it to say, proving what we want it to prove. In fact, try to find two different commentators who agree straight down the line on what this theorem proves.

Wittgenstein takes the argument further, demanding that we consider what sort of an explanation that a RAA provides. In the Remarks on Mathematics, Wittgenstein appears to argue that the Godel theorem tells us that if one takes an unproved expression and treats it as a theorem then a contradiction results, which a mathematician could have told you straightaway. However, provability must be shown, not deliberated as a proposition. The system must be demonstrated to be consistent and complete. There is no proposition that can do this (which recalls many of the points made by Whitehead and Russell). As Wittgenstein objected in his Philosophical Remarks :

This remark is quoted in S.G. Shanker's "Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Significance of Godel's Theorem," Godel's Theorem in Focus. 1988, p. 183. 124 What is a proof of provability? Its different from the proof of a proposition. And is a proof of a provability perhaps the proof that a proposition makes sense? But then such a proof would have to rest on entirelv different principles from those on which the proof of a proposition rests. There cannot be a hierarchy of proofs! On the other hand there can't in any fundamental sense be such a thing as meta­ mathematics. Everything must be of one type (or what is the same thing, not of a type).

In fact, an RAA could never be used for self-reference without the risk of contradiction. Specifically, propositions about provability or completeness cannot be legitimately disjoined with propositions about unprovability or incompleteness. Rather, such notions are demonstrated by the entire system, not just parts of it.

Hence, Godel's theorem, through its use of RAA. must generate such a contradiction, which is a problem of self­ reference, and hence a paradox. It does not conclusively tell us anything about the axiomatic system itself, precisely because the system and the argument form cannot validly self-reference. Godel's theorem is another paradox. Far from showing that axiomatic systems are incomplete, he has constructed an argument that confuses meta-mathematical and first order propositions, which was something he wanted

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, translated by R. Hargreaves and R. White, Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1957, Section 153. 125 to avoid. As well, he uses an argument form that was guaranteed to give him propositions that were unprovable, but only because of the nature of this argument form. The use of a RAA for a meta-mathematical proposition does not demonstrate, by itself, that provability is a higher order function. However, because provability and other self­ reference questions are not propositions that belong in the first order system, but rather must be shown by the first

order system and discussed on a higher type level, the RAA argument shows us nothing. In fact, the RAA argument can be inverted, to deny the possibility of denying provability in a first order system, thereby creating a more sophisticated paradox.

Godel's theorem is wrapped in paradox like layers of bark on a tree. They are intertwined and connected at several points. All of this demonstrates the vital importance and undeniable value of a logically sound theory of types. Such a theory would address his meta-mathematical

concerns quite easily, without calling into question either the consistency or completeness of an axiomatized system.

Perhaps this helps to explain a cryptic comment by Russell: 126

In my introduction to the Tractatus, I suggested that, although in any given language there are things which that language cannot express, it is yet always possible to construct a language of higher order in which these things can be said. There will, in the new language, still be things which it cannot say, but which can be said in the next language, and so on ad infinitum. This suggestion, which has then new, has now become an accepted commonplace of logic. It disposes of Wittgenstein's mysticism and, I think, also of the newer puzzles presented by Godel.

If I am correct, Russell's theory of types provides an answer, which Godel examined as he advanced his incompleteness theorem.

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