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Abductive Inference, 98 Abstractness, Platonic Vs. Nonplatonic Index Abductive inference, 98 Availability theory, 140 Abstractness, platonic vs. nonplatonic, Avenarius, R., 4 192 Acknowledging the predicament, 55, Basic Laws of Arithmetic (Frege), 32 69–71 Begriffsschrift (Frege), xii, 32, 120, 207, AI 229 strong, 102–106, 108 Belnap, N., 252n18 weak, 103, 105, 108 Benacerraf, P., xxi, 2, 22–25, 71, Analytic inferences, 225 155–156, 182–191, 193, 199–200 Analyticity, 36–37 Benacerraf dilemma Analytic necessity, 197 extended, 184 Analytic philosophy, xx, 1, 3 original, 182–184 Alice, 158–159, 185 Block, N., 93 Antinaturalism, 14–21 Bolzano, B., 5 Antiperceptualism, 186, 189, 191–200 Bonjour, L., 188 Antipsychologism, 14–21 Boole, G., xi–xiii, 25, 31–32, 115–116, Antirealism, 185, 188–189 131, 204–205, 216 Anti-supernaturalism, 9 Braine, M., 130 Aphasias, 86, 106–107 Brentano, F., 1, 4 A priori–a posteriori, xii, 272n20, Broca’s area, 106 273n24 Byrne, R., 135 Apriority of protologic, 29, 44–45, 109, 201 Carnap, R., 36–37, 54, 59–61, 65, 186, Aristotle, xi, xiii–xv, 31–32, 124 210–211, 226–227 Arnaud, P., xii, 204–205 Carroll, L. (Charles Dodgson), 54–59, Artificial intelligence. See AI 61–62, 65, 69, 78, 158, 223 Art of Thinking (Arnaud and Nicole), Carruthers, P., 111 xii Categorical normativity. See Aspects of the Theory of Syntax Normativity, categorical (Chomsky), 86 Causation, 23, 189–190, 242n62 Autism, 112 Central processes, 89, 100–102, 109 310 Index Chalmers, D., 12, 98, 277–278n78 Darwinian evolution, 97, 142–143 Cheng, P., 141 Davidson, D., 110, 173 Cherniak, C., 146, 270n88 Dedekind, R., 36 Chinese brain argument, 106–107 Dedicated cognitive capacity, 88, 101 Chinese nation argument, 93 Deduction, intuitive vs. rote, 199 Chinese room argument, 103–104 Deferred ostension, 187, 190 Chomsky, N., xi, xiii, xxi, 25–26, 30, De Morgan, A., 218 46–52, 78–79, 83–87, 90, 98, “Deny the doctrine, change the subject” 109–111, 121, 128–130, 133, 172, argument, 42, 181 209, 250n57, 250n60 Descartes, R., 78, 98, 110, 134, 174, Church-Turing thesis, 102. See also 176, 224–226, 229, 282n57 Turing computability; Turing Deviant logic, xii, 40–41, 234n12, machines 246n34. See also Nonclassical logic Circular argument, 31 Deviant Logic (Haack), 40 Classical logic, xii, xx, 29, 35–36, Dialetheic logic, xii, 41, 223–224, 40–46, 122, 148, 216, 222, 231, 234n14 233n10 Diehard classicism (about logic), 41–43, Cogito, 224–225 133, 222 Cognitive creativity, 86–88, 102 Diehard nonclassicism (about logic), Cognitive faculties, 79–80 41–43, 122, 133 Cognitive generativity, 86, 102 Discourse on Method (Descartes), 224 Cognitive productivity. See Cognitive Domain-specific cognitive capacities, creativity 88–89, 101 Cognitive relativism, 5, 8, 29, 238n18 Dretske, F., 187–188 Cognitive science, xx, 82, 231 Dualism, 262n56 Cognitivism, xii. See also Logical Dummett, M., 3, 22, 54, 66–69, cognitivism 253n21, 253n22, 253n24 Cognitivist existential predicament, 136, 147–148, 200 Early modern conceptions of ourselves, Cognitivist solution to the logocentric 113–114 predicament, 74 Einstein, A., 98 Cohen, L. J., 117, 128–129 Elementary logic. See Classical logic Competence, 263n6 Embodied rationalism, 13, 283–284n72 Connectionism, 260n38 Empirical psychology, 7, 52 Consequence. See Logical consequence Empiricism, 8, 10, 29, 84–85, 186, Constructivism, 79, 85–88, 107, 109 188–189 Conventionalism, 60–68, 185, 188–189, Encapsulated cognitive capacities, 89, 210–213 101 Copi, I., 219 Enquiry Concerning Human Cosmides, L., 142, 227 Understanding (Hume), 160 Cox, G. R., 125 Epigenesis of pure reason, 86–87 Craik, K., 135 E pluribus unum problem, xx, 29–52, Creativity. See Productivity 75, 77, 115, 122, 133, 138 Index 311 Erdmann, B., 5 Henle, M., 123, 130 Ethics of logic, 201–231 Herbart, J., 5 Euler diagrams, 136 Heuristics-and-biases theory, 139–146, Evans, J., 126 226 Evnine, S., 254n33 Hilbert, D., 58, 60, 244n7 Extensions of classical logic, xii, 40–41, Holyoak, K., 141 148, 233n11 Human interest postulates, 211 Hume, D., xvii, 84, 115, 160, 163, 164, Fallacies, 217–220 167, 170, 186, 228 Fast cognitive capacities, 88, 101 Husserl, E., xii, xix, 1–9, 14, 20, 24, Fictionalism, 185, 188 27, 205, 206–209, 238n20 Field, H., 185, 189 Fluent aphasia, 106–107 I-language, 90 Fodor, J., xi, xiii, 26, 78–80, 88, 90–91, I-logic, 51, 251n67 94, 110, 121 Imagination Folk psychology, 82 linguistic, 175 Foot, P., 210–212 logical, 35, 192–195, 199–200 Formalism, 244n7 Incompleteness theorems. See Gödel, K. Formal logic, 30–32 Indeterminacy of translation, 161 Form of life, 180 Indexicality, 145 Foundations of Arithmetic (Frege), 7 Indirect perceptualism, 188, 190–191 Frankfurt, H., 281n36 Inductive logic, 30–31 Free logic, 41 Inference-tickets, 57, 63, 65, 207 Frege, G., xii, xix, 1–9, 14, 21, 24, 27, Inference to the best explanation, 52, 98 31–32, 36–37, 81, 90, 116, 174, 182, Inferential role theory of logical con- 204–206, 208, 229, 238–239n29 stants, 63–65, 133–134, 156, Freud, S., 115 168–170 Informal logic, 31 Garden path sentences, 220 Informational encapsulation, 26, Generativity, 249n52 100–101, 132 Genetic logic, 120–122 Informational promiscuity, 100–102, 107 Gentzen, G., 54, 63, 65, 131, 133, 206 Innatism, 79, 83–85, 96–99, 107, 109, Geuss, R., 228 134, 138, 258–259n27 Gödel, K., 36, 38–40, 134, 187, 235n23 Inscrutability of reference, 161 Goodman, N., 66, 70, 161 Intensional logic, 31 Griggs, R. A., 125 Intentionalism. See Representationalism Groundlessness of logic, 55, 69–72, 74–75 Intentionality, 80–82, 256n9 Intuition, 171–182 Haack, S., 1, 28, 54, 66, 68–70, vs. deduction, 174–175 246–247n35, 247n41, 253n23, 253n24 logical (see Logical intuition) Hale, B., 39, 186 mathematical (see Mathematical Harman, G., xxii, 202, 220–223 intuition) Hegel, G. W. F., xvii Intuitionist logic, 41 312 Index Intuition-of, 173 Law of noncontradiction, 31, 41–42, Intuition-that, 173 243–244n3 Investigation of the Laws of Thought Lawrence, D. H., 115 (Boole), xii, 32, 120 Laws of thought, 4, 25–26, 78, 110, 204 “Investigations into Logical Deduction” Leibniz, G. W., 5, 31 (Gentzen), 63 Lewis, C. I., 20, 33, 35, 40–41, 156 Irrationalism, 124–130, 146–147, 150, Liar paradox, 36, 38–39 154, 226 Lingua mentis (mental language). See Language of thought Jackendoff, R., 86 Linguistic competence, 78, 121, James, W., 116–120, 122–123 128–129, 250n55 Jäsche Logic (Kant), xii Lipps, T., 5 Johnson-Laird, P., 116, 135, 193–194 Logical animals, 77–78, 201, 215 Justification, 44 Logical bad faith, 166 Justificational holism, 255n37 Logical cognitivism, xix, 3, 24–29, “The Justification of Deduction” 46–47, 52–53, 75, 77, 115, 156, 180, (Dummett), 66 202, 209, 213, 230 “The Justification of Deduction” Logical communitarianism, 69–71 (Haack), 68 Logical competence, 51 Justification of deduction problem, 54, Logical consequence, xv, 27, 133–34, 66–69 214–215, 231, 234n17 Logical expressivism, 70–71, 186, 188–189 Kahneman, D., 116, 140 Logical form, 51 Kant, I., xi–xiii, xvii, xx, xxi, 1, 5, Logical intuition, 156–157, 170–182, 25–26, 31, 37, 45, 85–87, 110, 115, 168, 197–201 131, 204–205, 208–214, 217, 230, Logical knowledge, 155–200 231, 236n32 Logical necessity, 158, 195–197 Kantian constructivism in ethics, 212 Logical nihilism, 227, 230 Katz, J., 186, 189 Logical nonfactualism. See Logical Kim, J., 11 expressivism Kirk, R., 111 Logical possibility, 196, 225 Kosslyn, S., 193–194 Logical pragmatism, 70–71 Kripke, S., 41, 98, 156, 158–168, 178 Logical prudentialism, 69, 71 Kripkenstein, 161, 163–168, 170. See Logical psychologism, xii, xix–xx, 1–29, also Rule following paradox 75, 115–116, 206–208, 222 Kusch, M., 5 Logical structuralism, 156, 191–192, 199–200 Language of thought (LOT), 26, 47, 78, Logical Syntax of Language (Carnap), 80, 90–92, 94–96, 107–110, 151, 213 54, 59–61, 210 L’art de penser (art of thinking), 204 Logical truth, 61–63, 225 Law of bivalence, 31, 41, 243–244n3 Logic faculty thesis, xiii, 3, 25–26, 28, Law of excluded middle, 31, 41, 46–53, 73–75, 77, 107–108, 115, 243–244n3 154, 157, 168, 200–202, 230 Index 313 Logicism, 36, 40 Modal downsizing, 8, 29 Logic-liberated-animals, xxii Modality, xv Logic of thought, 51, 107–110, Modes of presentation (MOPs), 81, 93 132–133, 135, 154, 213–214, 226 Modularity, 25, 79, 88–90, 100–102, Logic-oriented conception of human 107, 109, 131–132, 259n30 rationality, xviii, 77–78, 113–115, Monty Python’s Flying Circus, 156, 201–202 115–116, 152 Logocentric predicament, 53–75, 115, Mooney, C., 88 157, 211 Mooney faces, 88 Lotze, H., 5 Moore, G. E., 2, 14–18, 20, 24, 27 Lowe, E. J., 136 “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” (Foot), 210 Mach, E., 5 Moral science conception of logic, Machine functionalism, 26, 103, 205–206, 231 243n74 Mr. Spock, 215 Macnamara, J., 130, 266n37 Multiple embodiability, xviii, 25, 52 Mad Hatter, 78 Manktelow, K.I., 126 Nagel, T., 281n36 Many-valued logic, 41 Nativism. See Innatism Mathematical intuition, 23 Natorp, P., 5 Mathematical logic, 3, 32–35 Naturalistic fallacy, 2, 15–17 “Mathematical Truth” (Benacerraf), 182 Natural logic, 51, 251n68 Meditations on First Philosophy “The Nature of Judgement” (Moore), 15 (Descartes), 224, 229 Necker cube, 89, 219 Mein Kampf, 229 Negation, 165–166, 180–182, 225 Meinong, A., 41 Negativity, 165–166, 180–182 Mentalese. See Language of thought Neo-Fregeanism, 39 Mental language. See Language of Neo-Kantianism, 9, 13 thought Neo-Nietzscheanism, xii, 224, Mental Logic, 131–135, 138, 145 226–231 Mental logic theory, xxi, 130–136, Nicole, J., xii, 204–205 145–146, 151, 266–267n45, 267n46 Nietzsche, F., 226, 227–229 Mental models theory, 135–140, 145, Noncausal perceptualism, 187, 190–191 267n51 Nonclassical logic, 40–46, 73, Metalogic, 61 216, 231 Metalogical principles of protologic, Noncontact causal perceptualism, 187, 45–46 189, 191 Metaphysical necessity, 196–197, Nonepistemic perception, 187, 190 234–235n21, 278n79 Nonformal logic, 30–31 Mill, J.
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