ATTITUDES TO SAFETY AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

IN AUSTRALIAN MILITARY AVIATION

B. T. FALCONER

A thesis submitted in fulfilment

Of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Aviation University of New South Wales

June, 2006 ABSTRACT

This thesis describes original research that examines the extent to which organisational culture, and psychosocial aspects specifically, relate to individuals’ ‘normal’ performance within Australian Defence Force (ADF) aviation. The primary rationale for the research relates to the ‘safety record’ of ADF aviation, whereby more than fifty ‘peace time’ fatalities have occurred in ADF aviation accidents since 1990 and many of these have links to organisational culture attributes. The secondary rationale relates to a more general perspective: previous research identifies human functioning in military aviation – more than any other aviation domain – as being dependent upon psychosocial attributes including interpersonal collaboration, communication and coordination. However, the depth to which such qualities impact the safety of a sociotechnical system remains substantially uncharted.

The methodology of this research has been developed to fit the context of ADF aviation, in contrast to applying pre-existing ‘universal’ methods (e.g., Hofstede’s cultural dimensions) developed without reference to the cultural attributes of specific organisations. More generally, though equally important, this research is further innovative in that it responds to the challenges posed by the need to address systemic aspects of safety confronting aviation and numerous other sociotechnical industries.

This thesis firstly examines both scientific and Australian military literature on organisational behaviour, culture and human factors. Subsequently, it describes the design and implementation of a new 45-item questionnaire – the Australian Defence Force Aviation Questionnaire (ADFAQ). More than four hundred ADF aircrew and engineers completed the ADFAQ. The data analysis involved quantitative and qualitative consideration of survey responses and comparisons between numerous demographic criteria. Following this, the thesis describes the design and implementation of an interview study that was designed to both cross-examine key ADFAQ results and explore more deeply other issues that were only superficially identified by the (largely psychometric) composition of the ADFAQ.

iii The research results offer three main contributions to scientific knowledge. These relate to: (1) the efficacy of triangulated and contextualised methodology in building an understanding of organisational culture; (2) the nature of the safety culture concept and its relationship with organisational culture; and (3) rank-based homogeneity of attitudes.

Firstly, the ADFAQ and interviews provide reasonable contextual and theoretical validity, capturing attitudes of various dimensions (Glendon & McKenna, 1995) relating to common themes of organisational culture characteristics (Glendon & Stanton, 2000) contextualised for the specific operational setting of ADF aviation. Its application here supports the notion that the utility of organisational culture measurement may be improved by methodologies borne from the cultural membership rather than externally developed and universally implemented methods. Observations made by this research support the importance of organisational context proffered by Batteau (2001) in ‘tapping’ an organisation’s cultural idiosyncrasies and understanding their full impact on members’ behaviours. The influence of an organisation’s internal system of personnel ranking (as per the third finding of this thesis) is but one example.

Secondly, with regard to organisational and safety culture aspects in contemporary sociotechnical systems, this research suggests that it is very difficult or impossible to separate safety culture from organisational culture: a conclusion that supports the earlier finding of Glendon and McKenna (2000). The primary indication of this interconnectedness of the safety culture concept within broader organisational constructs stems from this the finding that many participants were unable to define or explain the nature of safety culture, and yet were often convinced that the organisation had a good safety culture.

The third main conclusion of this research relates to the rank-based homogeneity of attitudes amongst ADF aviation professionals relating to key aspects of ADF aviation organisational culture, evident in both the ADFAQ and interview studies. Of particular concern here is that there appears to be a significant attitudinal shift for officers as they progress from junior to senior ranks, and specifically that the shift is towards a more positive perception. This is an important conclusion in that it holds potential implications in other military aviation organisations and hierarchical management

iv organisations generally. Moreover, such a conclusion is fertile ground for future research.

This research shows that survey methodologies are not a panacea, but they can illuminate the nature of attitudes to safety and provide empirical guidance for other methods to explore more deeply the cultural roots of such attitudes and associated behaviours.

v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am greatly appreciative of the many colleagues from academia, industry and government, in addition to many dear friends, who have provided steadfast support, encouragement and guidance with my research. Thank you all for sustaining me, and for feigning interest in my endeavours as often as you did.

Foremost, my research supervisors have provided much guidance and encouragement with various stages of this work, including Associate Professor Ann Williamson, Dr

Steven Shorrock, Professor Jason Middleton, Captain John Faulkner AM and Dr Graham Braithwaite. I am particularly grateful to Associate Professor Ann Williamson for her expert guidance with this thesis’ psychometric analysis. I also wish to especially thank Dr Steven Shorrock for his academic counsel and personal support during the final stages of this work.

I am also grateful to the numerous study participants from the Australian Defence Force, and the helpful staff of the Directorate of Flying Safety, the RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine and the Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and Research. I am also grateful for the support from the President and Members of the Spitfire Association of Australia for awarding me the Spitfire Memorial Defence Fellowship, which became the catalyst for this interesting PhD journey over the past six years.

The greatest acknowledgement and thanks is due to Chantal. Her encouragement and patience remains, and always has been, unwavering. She is one in a million.

Boyd Falconer

June 2006

vi

Dedicated to Eden Tyler, my dearest nephew that I will forever miss

vii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Number

Abstract ii Acknowledgements v Dedication vi Table of Contents vii List of Tables xi List of Figures xv List of Appendices xvi List of Abbreviations xvii

CHAPTER ONE 1

Introduction

1.1 Safety in the Armed Forces 1 1.2 Culture in the Military 9 1.3 Attitudes and the Military 11 1.4 Research Rationale 14 1.5 Aims and Objectives 17 1.6 Chapter One Summary 19

CHAPTER TWO 21

The ADF Aviation System

2.1 Structure and Composition 22 2.2 ADF Aviation Accident Data 30 2.3 ADF Aviation Safety Surveys 40 2.4 Chapter Two Summary 50

CHAPTER THREE 51

Attitude, Culture and Performance

3.1 Organisational Performance Determinants 52 3.2 Attitudes and Behaviours 56 3.3 Cultural Influence 64 3.4 Theoretical Approaches to Culture 73 3.5 Operationalising ADF Organisational Culture 85 3.6 Chapter Three Summary 94

viii CHAPTER FOUR 95

Methodology – Questionnaire Study

4.1 Design 95 4.2 Participants 96 4.3 Materials 104 4.4 Procedure 119 4.5 Chapter Four Summary 122

CHAPTER FIVE 123

Results – Likert-type Data

5.1 Evaluation of the ADFAQ 123 5.2 Chapter Five Summary 142

CHAPTER SIX 144

ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

6.1 Psychometric Properties 144 6.2 Methodological Efficacy 149 6.3 Chapter Six Summary 155

CHAPTER SEVEN 157

Results – Qualitative and Categorical Data

7.1 Safety Aspects 157 7.2 Comparative Analysis 167 7.3 Chapter Seven Summary 169

CHAPTER EIGHT 170

Qualitative & Categorical Data Discussion

8.1 Efficacy and Key Findings 171 8.2 Chapter Eight Summary 179

ix CHAPTER NINE 181

Results – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

9.1 Junior Officers and Senior Officers 181 9.2 Human Factors Training 184 9.3 Force Element Groups 185 9.4 Formal Education 185 9.5 Aircrew and Engineers 186 9.6 Respondent Age and Employment Duration 186 9.7 Chapter Nine Summary 190

CHAPTER TEN 191

Discussion – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

10.1 Demographic Criteria 191 10.2 Chapter Ten Summary 202

CHAPTER ELEVEN 203

Methodology – Interview Phase

11.1 Interview Rationale 203 11.2 Interview Objective 203 11.3 Interview Design 204 11.4 Participants 204 11.5 Materials 206 11.6 Procedure 209 11.7 Chapter Eleven Summary 211

CHAPTER TWELVE 212

Results – Interview Phase

12.1 Evaluation of the Interviews 212 12.2 Chapter Twelve Summary 222

CHAPTER THIRTEEN 223

Discussion – Interview Data

13.1 Interview Content 223 13.2 Methodological Efficacy 229 13.3 Chapter Thirteen Summary 234

x CHAPTER FOURTEEN 235

General Discussion

14.1 Contribution to Existing Theory 235 14.2 Research Implications 241 14.3 Research Limitations 245 14.4 Future Research 248 14.5 Chapter Fourteen Summary 250

CHAPTER FIFTEEN 251

Conclusion

References 256

Appendices 285

xi LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

2.1 Ranks of the Royal Australian Air Force 24 2.2 Aircraft fleets of the RAAF, RAN and ARA 25 2.3 Overview of ADF, USAF, RAF and Qantas aircraft assets 26 2.4 Summary of airline and ADF departures and ROE 27 2.5 Commonality of RAAF, USAF and RAF aircraft assets 28 2.6 C-130 types operated by the RAAF, USAF and RAF 29 2.7 ADF aviation accidents (Category 4 and 5) from January 1990 to January 2006 33 2.8 Topics surveyed by the ADFFMAQ 41 2.9 Summary of ADFFMAQ items relating to ADF organisational factors 42 2.10 Accident risk factors in ADF aviation (adapted from DSPPR, 2001) 44 2.11 Accident risk factors according to service arm (Falconer, 2005) 45 2.12 ‘Top Five’ accident risk factors in ADF aviation reported by ADFFMAQ respondents 46 2.13 Results from RAAF transport aircrew regarding safety (Braithwaite, 2001) 48

3.1 Summary of models of the attitude-behaviour relationship 60 3.2 Summary of models of organisational culture (adapted from Glendon & Stanton, 2000) 90 3.3 Previously tested and validated questionnaire factors (adapted from Glendon et al, 1994) 93

4.1 Descriptive summary of respondents’ ADF rank 97 4.2 Tabular comparison of respondents’ highest level of education completed 99

xii 4.3 Descriptive summary of the respondents’ Age and Employment Duration data 101 4.4 ADFFMAQ (2000) and ADFAQ (2003) human factors training Participation rates 101 4.5 Percentage of respondents having completed human factors training in the past five years 102 4.6 Comparative summary of human factors training providers for Occupation and Officer Rank groups 102 4.7 Force Element Groups, including the number of respondents in each FEG and the percentage of total respondents represented by each FEG 103 4.8 Methods of data collection used in the ADFAQ 105 4.9 Likert-type items comprising the ADFAQ design, themes and item origin (in italics) 108 4.10 Qualitative and categorical-type items comprising the ADFAQ design And item origin 109

5.1 Descriptive analyses of 28 likert-type items, including validation item (item 26) 125 5.2 Aspects covered in the original item pool comprising items with more than 75% of responses distributed in the combined moderate and extreme categories 126 5.3 Intercorrelations of likert-type items (part 1) 127 5.4 Intercorrelations of likert-type items (part 2) 128 5.5 Table of 17 non-skewed likert-type items 132 5.6 Theoretical initial factor loadings for 27 items of the ADFAQ 133 5.7 Scale consistency of themes covered in the original pool 134 5.8 Atheoretical three-factor loadings at 0.32 for 27 items of the ADFAQ 136 5.9 Results of the rotated factor analysis using a critical value of 0.35 showing the name of each factor, percentage of variance accounted for by each factor, the internal consistency between items for each factor (alpha) and the factor loadings for each item 138 5.10 Analyses of scale consistency of atheoretical three-factor solution 139

xiii 5.11 Comparative analysis of the scale consistency of the PCA and a priori solutions 139 5.12 Intercorrelations between factors identified for the long scale 140 5.13 Results for the validation of the scale, showing mean summed scores for each factor and ANOVA results for the validation item 141

7.1 Summary of ADFAQ ADF aviation ‘Risk Factor’ item 164 7.2 ADFAQ Safety Risk items, including the frequency and percentage of response options selected by survey participants 165 7.3 ADFAQ and DSPPR (2001) ‘Top Five’ Accident Risk Factors 167 7.4 ADFAQ and Braithwaite (1998) items relating to respondent proactivity 168

9.1 Pearson correlation analyses of age and employment duration with likert score 186 9.2 Summary of significant differences between Age groupings and PCA Factor 1 score 187 9.3 Summary of significant differences between Employment years and Factor 1 score 188

11.1 Descriptive summary of respondents’ ADF rank 205 11.2 Themes and inter-relationships of interview items 207

12.1 Responses to interview item 1, “Have your attitudes towards safety in ADF aviation changed throughout your career? If so, how?” 213 12.2 Responses to interview item 2, “What factors have influenced your attitudes towards the safe performance of your role?” 215 12.3 Responses to interview item 3, “How do you perceive the safety culture of ADF aviation?” 217 12.4 Responses to interview item 4, “If you were faced with a new rule or SOP that you believed to be unsafe, what would you do about it?” 218 12.5 Responses to interview item 5, “ADF aviation is said to possess a ‘can-do culture’. What is your perception of a can-do culture in ADF aviation?” 219

xiv 12.6 Responses to interview item 6, “Do you think there is any difference in attitudes to safety in ADF aviation between the various ranks? If so, what is the difference?” 221

xv LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

2.1 Management structure of the Australian Defence Force 23 2.2 ADF aircraft destroyed in accidents between Jan 1965 and Jan 2006 30

3.1 A conceptualisation of organisational performance determinants 52 3.2 A conceptual representation of the reflexive nature of culture 54 3.3 A third factor influencing attitudes and behaviour 61 3.4 Helmreich and Merritt’s (1998) model of cultural intersection 64 3.5 The determinism of safety culture (Weinstein & Lyon, 1999) 67 3.6 Levels of mental programming (Hofstede, 2001) 79 3.7 The balance of values versus practices in culture (Hofstede, 2001) 83

7.1 Responses to the ADFAQ item “Based on my ADF experience, the most frequent human factors element in safety-related events is:” showing percentage of respondents in each case 159 7.2 Responses to the ADFAQ item “What factors do you believe have contributed to the ‘safety record’ of ADF aviation?” showing percentage of respondents in each case 162 7.3 Responses to the ADFAQ item “Who influences the size of the safety-margin specific to your work in ADF aviation?” showing percentage of respondents in each case 163

xvi LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A ADF Aircraft Repair Categories Appendix B Australian Defence Force Attitude Questionnaire (ADFAQ) Appendix C Participant Information Sheet Appendix D ADF Aviation Interview Study – Briefing

xvii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAPP Australian Defence Force Accident Prevention Program AAvPA Australian Aviation Psychology Association ACG Air Combat Group ACM Air Combat Manoeuvring ACT Australian Capital Territory ADF Australian Defence Force ADFAQ Australian Defence Force Aviation Questionnaire ADFBFTS Australian Defence Force Basic Flying Training School ADFCRMWG Australian Defence Force Crew Resource Management Working Group ADFFMAQ Australian Defence Force Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire ADO Australian Defence Organisation AEW&C Airborne Early Warning and Control AIB Accident Investigation Board AIR Aircrew AIRDEF Air Defence ALG Air Lift Group ANAO Australian National Audit Office ANOVA Analysis of Variance ARA Australian Regular Army ARDU Aircraft Research and Development Unit ASN Aviation Safety Network ASOR Air Safety Occurrence Report ASPI Australian Strategic Policy Institute ATC Air Traffic Control ATCO Air Traffic Control Officer ATPL Air Transport Pilot Licence ATSB Australian Transport Safety Bureau ATW Air Training Wing AUD Australian Dollar(s) AVM Air Vice Marshal AVMED Institute of Aviation Medicine AVRM Aviation Risk Management

BASI Bureau of Air Safety Investigation BBJ Boeing Business Jet BOI Board of Inquiry BTE Bureau of Transport Economics (Australia) B52 United States Air Force B52 Aircraft B707 Boeing 707 Aircraft

CAA Civil Aviation Authority (Australia) CAF Chief of Air Force CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority (Australia) CDF Chief of Defence Force xviii CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain CMAQ Cockpit Management Attitude Questionnaire CO Commanding Officer CRM Crew Resource Management C-130 Lockheed C-130 Hercules Aircraft

DAHRTS Defence Aviation Hazard Reporting and Tracking System DASET Director of Aviation Safety Education and Training DASM Defence Aviation Safety Manual DCAF Deputy Chief of Air Force DCP Defence Capability Plan DDFS Deputy Director of Flying Safety DFS Director of Flying Safety DFS-ADF Directorate of Flying Safety Australian Defence Force DGTA Directorate of General Technical Airworthiness DI Defence Instruction DOD Department of Defense (United States of America) DoD Department of Defence (Australia) DPO Directorate of Personnel - Officers DSMA Defence Safety Management Agency DSPPR Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and Research DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation

ENG Engineer

FAA Federal Aviation Administration FEG Force Element Group FMAQ Flight Management Attitude Questionnaire FODA Flight Operations Data Analysis FOQA Flight Operations Quality Assurance FSF Flight Safety Foundation F/A-18 Boeing Fighter Aircraft F-28 Fokker 28 Aircraft F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft F-111 General Dynamics Strike Aircraft

HORSCOTI House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport and Communications Infrastructure HORSCOTRS House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport and Regional Services HSC Higher School Certificate HSE Health and Safety Executive

IAPA International Airline Pilots Association IATA International Air Transport Association ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation IFR Instrument Flight Rules IMO International Maritime Organisation ISS International Space Station

xix

JNROFF Junior Officer JSF F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft KC-135 Military version of Boeing 707 Aircraft KC-135R KC-135 aircraft with air-to-air refuelling capability

LOSA Line Oriented Safety Audit

MK48 Marque-48 2,000-pound non-precision bomb MOD Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) MPG Maritime Patrol Group

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NSBRI National Space Biomedical Research Institute NSW New South Wales NT Northern Territory NTSB National Transport Safety Bureau NVG Night Vision Goggles

OFFCDT Officer Cadet OPS Operations

PC-9/A Pilatus Pilot Training Aircraft PNG Papua New Guinea

QAR Quick Access Recorder QFI Qualified Flying Instructor QLD Queensland

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAAFA Royal Australian Air Force Association RAF Royal Air Force RAeS Royal Aeronautical Society RAN Royal Australian Navy RMAF Royal Malaysian Air Force RPT Regular Passenger Transport

SA Situational Awareness SAR Search and Rescue SCG Surveillance and Control Group SI Standing Instructions SNROFF Senior Officer SOP Standard Operating Procedure SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences STOL Short Take-off and Landing SQN Squadron SQNLDR Squadron Leader

xx TAFE Technical and Further Education TTCP Technical Co-operation Program

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNI University UNSW University of New South Wales US United States (of America) USA United States of America USAF United States Air Force USD United States Dollar(s) USMC United States Marine Corps USN United States Navy UT University of Texas

VFR Visual Flight Rules VIC Victoria VIP Very Important Person

WA Western Australia WMO World Meteorological Organisation

2FTS Number 2 Flying Training School

xxi

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the concept of attitudes as a means to describe group performance. The chapter also describes organisational culture, and some specific aspects of attitudes that relate to organisational performance. The chapter introduces those attitudes within military aviation populations that relate to the safe performance of apparently unsafe military functions. This apparent paradox provides a substantive basis for further research. Accordingly, the chapter also includes a description of the problems inherent to such research and the research rationale. The chapter concludes by outlining the aims and objectives of the research presented in this thesis.

1.1 SAFETY IN THE ARMED FORCES

How can safety exist in an inherently unsafe operational environment? Safety, commonly defined as “freedom from unacceptable risk” (Eurocontrol Experimental Centre, 2004, p.2), is a challenging objective in many operational environments – none more so than the armed forces. The armed forces undertake a complex activity that does not seem to exist in any other system involving humans and technology. The core objective of the armed forces is to safely manoeuvre ‘live’ weapons across vast distances to targets in hostile territories, and then return to their home base. Damage to life and property is not so much a risk as an objective: the objective. Indeed, while safety exists in aviation, nuclear power, shipping, rail, chemical processing and space operations to prevent loss and injury, the goals of the armed forces can only be achieved by balancing the safety of the system and its operators with extreme and often unpredictable hazards. This unique juxtaposition of safety and damage to life and property as twin operational objectives may have numerous effects on the personnel that work in military systems. Attitudinal and behavioural influences are a likely outcome. Yet the influence of the military system or culture upon military personnel is a difficult phenomenon to examine: the military does not exist to be openly investigated and ‘published’ in a public forum (Falconer, 2005).

1 Chapter One – Introduction

The greatest impediment to examining safety within the armed forces is that safety deficiencies within military sociotechnical systems can be both intentionally and non- intentionally hidden from external scrutiny. This is primarily due to the fundamentally secretive nature of the armed forces – the need to know. Security of information is paramount to the effectiveness and potency of any defence force. In military aviation, the ‘hiding’ of information is also due to the non-existence of a military version of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Membership of ICAO requires that the airlines in member countries (‘states’) investigate incidents, accidents, and other related events to an international standard. The lack of a military ICAO results in reliance upon smaller and more localised safety efforts amongst military aviation forces that are often not widely publicised. If they are published, they are typically censored in the interests of ‘military intelligence’.

This predicament does not suggest that armed forces are not interested in safety, however. Many Western armed forces have internal safety departments who are staffed by personnel with considerable safety and investigatory experience, and many of these personnel publish research relating to various aspects of military safety performance. The majority of this research, although appearing infrequently in the academic literature, is undertaken by the United States armed forces. Much of the research takes a ‘management’ approach (often case studies) in contrast to the theoretical approach of empirical research. Nonetheless, there is much to be gained from these applied research efforts, as they describe the consequences of safety deficiencies.

1.1.1 Consequences

Falconer (2005) describes how studies by the Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE, 1998), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA, 2000) and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI, 2003) show that the consequences of safety deficiencies often include life and property losses that incur considerable operational, financial and social costs. Such consequences can be apparent over many months and years depending on the severity of the losses, and the “feeling of safety” (Paries, 1996) perceived by the personnel that were exposed to such losses.

2 Chapter One – Introduction

1.1.1.1 Costs – Direct

Direct costs include aircraft damage and injury to crew and passengers. BTE (1998) data show that each fatality and serious injury of an Australian citizen in an aviation accident incurs a cost of $AUD 1.5 million and $AUD 545,000 respectively. These sums should be regarded “as a minimum” (BTE, 1998) due to the conservative nature of the costing algorithms applied by the BTE. The United States Government cites a significantly higher cost of $USD 2.7 million per aviation fatality (FAA, 2000).

1.1.1.2 Costs – Indirect

Indirect costs relate to the more unpredictable, widely influencing and ultimately more costly social impact of accidents upon human and organisational performance. These interpersonal and psychological aspects of human performance such as motivation, group cohesion and morale, are poorly captured by current safety analysis methodologies (Soeters & Boer, 2000; Williams, 1995). Yet human factors such as motivation and morale are recognised as being critical to the performance of employees in sociotechnical systems, including military aviation (Herzberg, 1959, 1968; Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Soeters & Boer, 2000). If morale is low, human performance and, commensurately, system performance will be adversely affected. Australian Government research shows that there is a common perception amongst ADF personnel that the safety, morale and proficiency of the ADF are low (Australian National Audit Office [ANAO], 2000; Department of Defence [DoD], 2001). With regard to ADF aviation specifically, the Directorate of Strategic Personnel and Planning Research (DSPPR, 2001) found that 42% of ADF aircrew indicated agreement with the statement “Pilot/crew morale is high”.

1.1.2 Barriers and Defences

There are numerous barriers and defences present in the aviation systems of the armed forces, and these continue to be developed. These typically include risk management programs and subsequent pre-mission risk analysis, and safety and human factors training. The past decade in particular has seen a shift from reactive to generative 3 Chapter One – Introduction

system defences, whereby safety policy now reflects an approximately equal focus on accident and incident investigation and analysis (reactive defences), and safety audits and line-checks that focus on non-accident ‘normal’ operations (generative defences). This policy shift has developed largely in the wake of advancements in civil aviation, particularly since Moshansky’s (1992) seminal research of the Air Canada accident that occurred at Dryden, Ontario.

Commensurate with this advancement, safety culture has evolved as a key component in the construction of a system’s safety barriers and defences. The concept seeks to describe the enduring safety of an organisation from a more holistic perspective, and is generally considered to be a broad defence of safety breaches in an organisation. However, such a viewpoint assumes that the safety culture is strong or ‘good’. A ‘bad’ safety culture may indeed be a weakness. Nonetheless, it is an increasingly frequent concept encountered in the armed forces literature, despite its theoretical and conceptual infancy.

1.1.2.1 Safety Culture

The conceptualisation of safety culture has reached little agreement amongst neither researchers nor operators in sociotechnical systems. Reason (1997) asserts, “Few phrases are so widely used yet so hard to define as safety culture”. A DSPPR (2001) report of aircrew attitudes regarding flight safety in the ADF states that 83% of respondents agree that their unit “has a positive safety culture”. Indeed, there is strong endorsement of the ‘safety culture’ concept from the most senior levels of management in ADF aviation (McCormack, 1999; 2000; Spence, 2000). Defence management advocates a popular view that safety culture is a transferable commodity that can be imparted upon individuals who may be ‘sub-standard’. The Chief of Air Force (CAF) states that safety culture relies on “the complete acceptance of [its] values across the Services by senior commanders, and practical application by middle managers. The actions of some individuals who do not fully understand or accept our culture have the potential to undo many years of good work” (Directorate of Flying Safety – ADF [DFS- ADF], 2001). In addition, the safety culture concept is sometimes a vehicle for self- praise. The then CAF has argued the notion of a ‘good’ ADF aviation safety culture,

4 Chapter One – Introduction

stating, “our ADF flying safety culture is in a very healthy state” (McCormack, 1999, p. 3) and “attitude and action are the key requirements to safety culture” (McCormack, 2000, p.1). Ledger1 (2003) also praises the ADF safety culture, stating, “I firmly believe the safety culture that has grown over the years in the ADF is second to none”.

While ‘improved safety cultures’ have been correlated with improved safety behaviours (Zohar, 1980, 2000), there is much work to be done in establishing a measurement framework for safety culture that is widely acceptable (Cox & Flin, 1998; Homan et al, 1998, 1999). Falconer (2005) suggests that one of the larger research hurdles is that the safety culture concept assumes that a homogenous, all-pervasive, stable set of beliefs can be generated within or imposed on the modern workplace. However, contemporary civil and military workplaces are dynamic, complex, and often highly fragmented entities (Adams & Ingersoll, 1989; Back & Woolfson, 1999). While both ‘human- human’ and ‘human-machine’ interaction can be observed and measured, multi-person interactions, such as those within large and diverse sociotechnical systems, are considerably more complex (see Batteau, 2001, 2002; Sorenson, 2002; von Thaden et al, 2003). Indeed, Hudson (2001, 2003) points out that in the operations of sociotechnical systems many fallible decisions are made without any knowledge by the decision-maker that they are safety critical. He also describes how many of the decisions made by personnel working in sociotechnical systems are made in an environment removed from the site of the decision’s implementation.

1.1.3 Frequency of safety events

It is useful to examine the aviation accidents of the Australian armed forces here, as they demonstrate the scale of the problem of military aviation safety, particularly considering Australia’s relatively benign topographical and meteorological environment. From January 1990 to January 2006, 53 fatalities have eventuated through 60 Australian Defence Force2 aircraft accidents and subsequent losses (DFS-ADF, 2005). All of the losses occurred in non-combative ‘peace time’ flying operations, and

1 Royal Australian Navy Aviation Group Commander.

5 Chapter One – Introduction

16 aircraft types (23 aircraft types are currently operated by the ADF) have been destroyed or seriously damaged in an accident. More specifically, the ADF has destroyed or seriously damaged five F/A-18 fighters, nine Kiowa helicopters, three Caribou transport aircraft, three F-111 strike aircraft and one Boeing 707 passenger jet amongst many others since 1990 (DFS-ADF, 2005).

Moreover, recent analysis of the ADF aviation safety database shows that there is some concern for an increasing trend (Falconer, 2005a). Ledger (2004) recently stated, “During 2003 I have noted an increasing trend of human factors related incidents. In particular, analysis of the [aviation safety] database has revealed an increasing trend in supervision, human in-attention and violation of procedures as causal factors in reported incidents.” Lee’s (1993, 1996) advocacy for greater research aimed at eliminating such latent failures (Reason, 2000) more than a decade ago is testament to the challenges of aviation safety improvement in military aviation.

1.1.4 Causes and Context

Why do accidents happen in the armed forces? Researchers including Soeters and Boer (2000) suggest that the performance demands upon personnel working in the military aviation domain require strong psychosocial attributes including interpersonal collaboration, communication and coordination. It is further asserted that the requirement for these attributes amongst military aviation personnel is intensified by additional psychological and physiological factors more apparent in military aviation than civil aviation, including stress (Soeters and Boer, 2000), fear and anxiety (Fellows, 1998; Falconer, 2006) and fatigue (United States Air Force [USAF], 1999; Philips, 2001). The ADF aviation safety management review conducted by the Department of Defence (1998) also cites differences between the ADF and civilian aviation populations. It describes how the ADF aviation population, in contrast to civilian professional aviation, comprises relatively young and inexperienced personnel, and how the ADF accident and/or incident profile changes as graduates of the ADF aviation

2 The term ‘ADF aviation’ is used throughout this thesis to describe the aviation operations of the three services that comprise the Australian Defence Force: the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Australian Regular Army (ARA). 6 Chapter One – Introduction

basic training process move to operational ADF aviation. In summary, accurate aerial delivery from military aircraft requires a more intensive and complex cognitive and interpersonally collaborative performance compared to ‘line flying’ passenger services between metropolitan centres.

Lehner et al (1997) found that it is normal for high-risk situations to produce stress, with increased probability of error being a likely consequence. Prince and Salas (1993), Kern (1997, 1999), Helmreich and Merritt (1998), and Soeters and Boer (2000) have achieved considerable success in highlighting some aspects of human performance related to the organisational culture of military vis civil aviation. There are two specific aspects that warrant further attention here: taskload and organisational influence.

1.1.4.1 Taskload

The high taskload of military aviation forces is not surprising given the sustained operations by Western forces around the world, predominantly in response to terrorism over the past decade. Many of these operations are ‘coalition’ efforts, requiring increased inter-operability and effecting increased mission complexity. DFS-ADF (2000b) cites “low aircrew numbers and high operational tempo” as a primary contributing factor towards the crash of a RAAF F-111 while conducting a military exercise in Malaysia. The 2003 Defence Review (DoD, 2003) and Defence Capability Plan (DoD, 2004) outline the Australian Government’s strategy for increasing aviation activity within the ADF to 2010. The plan inaugurates Force Element Groups (FEG) combining Fighter with Strike and Reconnaissance Groups3, and Maritime Patrol with Surveillance and Control Groups4, in addition to Boeing 737 Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle capabilities. The plan also outlines an increased commitment to airborne border surveillance and control.

In addition to the planned increases in ADF aviation activity, significant and rapid operational change within ADF aviation should also be anticipated as a result of short- notice, intensive military events such as Australia’s leading role in the stabilisation of

3 RAAF Fighter and Strike FEGs amalgamated into Air Combat Group in 2001. 4 Maritime Patrol and Surveillance FEGs amalgamated into Surveillance and Response Group in 2001. 7 Chapter One – Introduction

East Timor, South Pacific island nations, Iraq, Afghanistan and the increasing utilisation of peacekeeping forces (ADO, 2001; DoD, 2001; Royal Aeronautical Society, 2001). The speed of changes in operating and organisational priorities often degrades safety margins – indeed Paries (1995) argues that safety precursors are tied to the instability created by management, operational and cultural changes. This notion is also established in the Review of ADF Aviation Safety Management (DoD, 1998). Indeed, the review also acknowledges that due to such rapid management change, ADF aviation safety is dependent on a small number of adequately qualified and experienced aviation supervisors and Commanding Officers. The DoD (2001) regards this risk as a state of “operational over-stretch” for the ADF.

1.1.4.2 Organisational Influence

Much research suggests that the influence of an organisation upon the behaviour of its members is not predictive, simple or direct. For example, the much replicated survey research of Hofstede (1980, 2001) describes in detail “culture’s consequences” upon human performance. Hofstede relates cultural attributes to performance using four (and later five) attitudinal dimensions with considerable success. It is necessary here to point out that his work has been particularly instrumental in promoting awareness of the hierarchical nature of culture, as well as the nature of culture as a highly influential entity. Other significant work in this area with similar implications includes an analysis of flight management attitudes based on the work of Hofstede (see Helmreich & Merritt, 1998) and human factor design theory research relating to safety in transport systems (McDonald & Johnston, 1994; Meshkati, 1996). Particularly over the past decade, organisational culture has been increasingly acknowledged as a powerful influence on the operation of complex human-machine systems, including civil aviation (FAA, 2001) and military aviation (Kern, 1997; Soeters & Boer, 2000). Recent work by Falconer (2005, 2005a, 2006; Falconer & Murphy, 2005) has highlighted this influence in the context of Australian military aviation. In particular, Falconer (2005) describes a potential link between military rank – considered the ‘backbone’ of military operations and culture – and safety in Australian military aviation.

8 Chapter One – Introduction

1.2 CULTURE IN THE MILITARY

The importance of understanding cultural influence amongst military aviation populations is demonstrated by previous research including alcohol usage amongst aircrew (Harris, 2002) and psychological studies with a strong focus on culture and communication (Prince & Salas, 1993; Merket, Bergondy & Salas, 1999). In their study of military culture and aviation safety amongst European based NATO air forces, Soeters and Boer (2000) state that human performance is connected to one’s biopsychological characteristics (such as habits, skills and styles) acquired from the first year of life in a family, through education and training in schools, up to everyday experiences in employment. Merritt and Helmreich (1996) and Hayward (1997) express a similar view. They report that organisational culture ultimately shapes workers’ perceptions of safety.

Other researchers express an alternate view. For example, Simpson and Wiggins’ (1997, 1999) survey research indicates that attitudes borne by aviation personnel during the period of initial training have notable longevity throughout their career. These two studies are noteworthy here because they suggest that human performance in aviation is influenced by a variable combination of both ‘early life’ and occupational experiences. Hofstede (1980) and Helmreich and Merritt (1998) classify these influences into national culture (societal experiences not easily amenable), professional culture (profession-based experiences, often with internal sub-cultures, for example fighter vis surveillance pilots) and organisational culture (based on the employing organisation, for example Qantas vis British Airways pilots).

Kern’s (1997, 1999) extensive case study of the fatal loss of control of a USAF B-52 multi-engine jet aircraft is a valuable example of how safety deficiencies can be hidden within, and arguably fostered by, the military culture for many years prior to an accident. Kern (1997) investigates the June 1994 crash of Czar 52, a B-52 based at Fairchild USAF Base, after flying a practice sequence of maneuvers for an upcoming air show. He states that upon preparing to land at the completion of the flight, the crew of four was required to execute a "go-around" because of another aircraft on the runway. At a point approximately mid-way along the runway at only 250 feet above ground 9 Chapter One – Introduction

level, the pilot of Czar 52, Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Holland, began a tight 360- degree left turn around the control tower. Approximately three quarters of the way through the turn, the aircraft banked past 90 degrees, stalled, clipped a power line with its left wing and then crashed. There were no survivors.

Kern (1997) concludes that supervision and leadership facilitated the accident through failed operational policies and selective enforcement of regulations: at the time of the accident, there was considerable evidence of LTCOL Holland's unsafe airborne behaviour spanning a period of over three years. Indeed, the copilot of Czar 52 (also a LTCOL) had made many unsuccessful efforts to have LTCOL Holland ‘grounded’ for what he perceived as numerous flagrant violations of air discipline. Kern (1997) further concludes that the crash highlights a compilation of human and cultural tendencies that are seen “throughout the spectrum” of military aviation operations.

While Kern’s study provides a comprehensive account of the nature of military aviation safety and culture, it is limited in the context of sampling and generalisability, particularly in terms of the attitudes he identifies. What relationships may exist between attitudes and the safe performance of military aviation tasks? What attitudinal issues may be experienced by the armed forces of other nations?

10 Chapter One – Introduction

1.3 ATTITUDES AND THE MILITARY

Numerous researchers have examined how organisational influences can prescribe the attitudes of personnel working in sociotechnical systems and, in turn, influence individual and group performance (Sanders & Hoffman, 1975, 1976; Pidgeon, 1991; Adams, 1995; Glendon & McKenna, 1995). Whilst few studies have examined military populations exclusively, the slow shift toward generative safety approaches amongst military forces has created the opportunity for some attitude-performance relationships to be hypothesised. The opportunity has arisen through the realisation that safety consequences more frequently occur in non-combative operations (e.g., civil aid, peacekeeping, ocean search and rescue), offering an information-rich and reliable data source as they are deemed less sensitive in a military sense, and are generally more accessible to researchers. This section briefly describes how the attitudinal aspects of positive self-appraisal and simplistic safety perceptions appear likely to hold potential for weakening the safety barriers and defences of military aviation. The aspects are also noteworthy for their apparent basis in the ‘normal’, ego-driven military culture as described by Kern (1997, 1999), as well as their presence in Australian military aviation populations. Indeed, it seems somewhat illogical that Australian civil aviation continues to be ‘the safest’ aviation system in the world, while frequently recruiting from the Australian military aviation domain.

1.3.1 Positive self-appraisal

The ADF Director of Flying Safety (DFS) praises the safety of ADF aviation, stating “What Defence has achieved in aviation safety over the last 10 years has been outstanding. Defence has pro-actively driven our accident rate to such a small number that the mathematicians refer to it as a number so small as to be indistinguishable from zero” (Spears, 2002). Fellows5 (1998) states that a bias towards positive self-appraisal is an entrenched characteristic of ADF aviation, and cites the assessment of RAAF pilot training by RAAF pilots as “world best practice” as an example. The overt positivity expressed by DFS (Spears, 2002, 2003) and senior managers (Fraser, 2002, Ledger,

5 RAAF No. 2 Flying Training School psychologist from 1978 to 1998. 11 Chapter One – Introduction

2003) may have a negative effect upon the perceived need for aviation safety improvement. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) assert that the false sense of security can “encourage complacency rather than vigilance” (p.119).

A recent descriptive analysis of the ADF’s aviation safety database by DFS-ADF shows that human factors can be attributed as causal factors in at least 80% of ADF accidents, but only 30 to 40% of incidents (DFS-ADF, 2001a, 2002; Wood, 2003). Whilst this statistical disparity has yet to be explained, the ‘self-report’ nature of incident vis accident investigation seems an influential factor. This is because personnel unrelated to the accident event investigate ADF aviation accidents, whereas personnel directly involved in aviation incidents investigate and report them. This assertion is based on Pidgeon’s (1988, 1991) empirical research, in which he found that incidents often differ from accidents only by the absence of a final trigger event and the intervention of chance preventing that event. He also found that safety breaches in sociotechnical systems are invariably human made with the following three general characteristics: the causes are multiple over time, qualitatively diverse and compounded in complex interactive ways.

1.3.2 The simplistic approach

Lee (1998) and Prince and Salas (1993) report on the resistance to ‘the academic approach’ to operational issues amongst aviation personnel. There is also a belief that human factor problems can be solved by ‘existing expertise’ within aviation organisations (Maurino, 1999; 2000; McDonald & Johnston, 1994; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999). This is increasingly argued in the industry and regulatory literature (see Maurino, 1999, 2000; Kwok, 2003) and seems to have validity in the ADF aviation arena6. Many researchers argue that slogans that urge personnel to “put safety first” or achieve Mission First – Safety Always – as promoted by ADF aviation – are simplistic because they assume that safety is a universal value, and ignore the social nature of risk perception and tolerance (Lowrance, 1976). Head of ICAO Human Factors Maurino

6 Former DFS-ADF Flying Safety Officer, Squadron Leader Terry MacKinnon asserts “although our operations are quite different, when it comes to the crunch, you’re still just flying an aeroplane” (Learmount, Lopez & Phelan, 1995, p.36). 12 Chapter One – Introduction

(1999, 2000) argues that safety may be judged according to discrete standards but it cannot be universally measured. Indeed, while Mission First – Safety Always clearly expresses safety as being important, the phrase does little to educate ADF aviation personnel about other safety aspects, such as “safety isn’t always easy” or “safety is highly subjective”. Indeed, is a mission or safety more important in ADF aviation?

13 Chapter One – Introduction

1.4 RESEARCH RATIONALE

This chapter has shown that there is much empirical and anecdotal evidence that demonstrates the need for research of attitudes relating to safety that is specific to the Australian Defence Force. This research requires a rationale in contrast to the ‘reactive’ approaches of post-incident statistical analyses and the ‘safety record’ concept. Accordingly, the rationale of this research embraces the need for contextually driven analysis of the ‘normal’ Australian Defence Force aviation system and the underlying values and beliefs guiding attitudes in ADF aviation, particularly those relating to safety.

1.4.1 ‘Normal’ Operations

An expanding body of research suggests that the key to improving the safety performance of a sociotechnical system lies in developing a greater understanding of the dynamics of the system’s ‘normal’ operations. This includes ‘normal accidents’ (Perrow, 1984; Turner, 1989), culture (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998), safety culture (Pidgeon, 1991), the “stabilisation of representations” by personnel (Batteau, 2001) and employee attitudes (Hunter, 2005). However, the majority of aviation safety data gathered to date – including ADF data – does not describe the ‘normal’ attitudes and behaviours of aviation personnel when not under formal surveillance or testing (such as check flights), or why aviation personnel exhibit such attitudes and behaviours (Mattson, Petrin & Young, 2001).

Measuring the impact that normal attributes have upon the safety of a complex sociotechnical system such as military aviation remains problematic and relatively uncharted. This is partly because the traditional quantitative validation criterion of accidents per million departures used extensively in commercial aviation is too small to achieve statistical significance in military aviation calculations. In ADF aviation, such a calculation is impossible because aircraft departure information is not collated by its aviation safety agency. Instead, the ADF conducts its calculations on the basis of 10,000 flight hours – despite the correlation between aviation accidents and ‘hours flown’

14 Chapter One – Introduction

(time) being weak or non-existent (Barnett & Higgins, 1989; Barnett, 1992; Oster, Strong & Zorn, 1992).

1.4.1.1 Operational Context

The predominant reason for the normal operations research rationale acknowledges the importance of contextual relevance in aviation safety research and analysis. Researchers including Meshkati (1996) and Westrum (2000) report that whilst the symptoms of aviation safety deficiencies (eg., loss of Situational Awareness) may appear similar on the surface, underlying highly localised and qualitative factors may dictate radically different solutions. Similarly, Maurino (1994) and Flight International (1996) argue that transferring the conclusions from applied research across operational environments is “fundamentally flawed”. The importance of contextual relevance when examining aviation safety and human performance is also noted by ICAO (1992), stating that despite significant commonalities in areas such as equipment and technology, “there is no single protocol for the operation and functioning of a team of aviation personnel that is valid worldwide” (p.32).

There is no existing comprehensive scientific literature describing the differences between ADF and civil aviation specifically. Despite this, senior ADF aviation personnel and Defence bureaucrats acknowledge that military aviation in Australia is “different” to civil aviation in relation to operations and it’s supporting organisational culture. Examples of this acknowledgement include several ADF aviation Commanders (Fraser, 2002; Ledger, 2004) and the Defence Secretary (Department of Defence, 2001).

1.4.1.2 ADF Research

Despite the highly regarded status of Australian aviation safety, there is no empirical research of the specific attitudinal conditions related to safety in Australian military aviation in the scientific literature. There are two relevant studies however, including a recent survey of flight management attitudes in ADF aviation conducted by the Australian Defence Force’s Directorate of Strategic Planning and Personnel Research (DSPPR, 2001). Though implemented as a study to measure the effectiveness of Crew

15 Chapter One – Introduction

Resource Management (CRM) training, the DSPPR research is the most notable ADF aviation study to date – predominantly because of the magnitude of both the survey instrument (149 items) and respondent sample (914 respondents).

An earlier study by Braithwaite (2001), although not a dedicated Australian military aviation safety research effort, surveyed Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel. His case study comprised a systemic examination of Australian aviation safety, although it was limited to a group approximately ten percent the size of the DSPPR study (n = 133), and further restricted by the respondents being limited to RAAF transport aircraft aircrew. Other research efforts have been limited to generally small literature review studies undertaken ‘in-house’ by middle-ranking officers undergoing training at the ADF Staff College. Most of these studies are not readily available to the public, if at all. Numerous researchers – some of them former operational ADF aviation personnel – including Williams (1995), Fellows (1998) and Falconer (2005, 2005a, 2006) have suggested that the lack of understanding of human factor issues in ADF aviation is attributable to its “mission-focus”, whereby the Australian military’s history of mission-orientation creates a precedent for intolerance towards human constraints that might be perceived as hindering the mission.

The lack of research provides little guidance towards establishing an effective methodology for application to sociotechnical systems - ADF or otherwise. This void is a threat to ADF aviation because it does not allow the creation of interventions that could protect and enhance aviation safety; instead it allows the perpetuation of aviation safety deficiencies and complacency that have serious negative consequences (such as those described earlier). Numerous research efforts focusing upon organisational culture (Erickson, 1997), safety (Maurino, 1999, 2000) and human error (Reason, 2000) report that complacency can hinder innovative and more critical data analysis being undertaken. Indeed, Reason (2000) asserts that the most important feature of high- reliability organisations is the preoccupation with the possibility of failure – a culture of “chronic unease” – hence an organisation’s ‘normal’ attitudes and behaviours take on profound significance. New research must establish aims and objectives that impede the progression of these deficiencies.

16 Chapter One – Introduction

1.5 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

Aim

This research aims to examine the attitudes of ADF aviation professionals that may influence the safe performance of ADF aviation operations.

Objectives

Four objectives are required to achieve the research aim:

1. To review the fundamental concepts within existing research relating to attitudes and organisational culture in sociotechnical systems, and establish a set of a priori themes that is contextually appropriate to aviation operations in the Australian Defence Force. 2. To design a methodology that will test the a priori themes (see objective 1), and implement the method amongst Australian Defence Force aviation personnel. 3. To analyse the results of the methodology in terms of both a priori and atheoretical themes and relate the findings to organisational culture theory. 4. To evaluate the efficacy of the method and applicability of the results to other aviation domains, and make recommendations to develop the method further.

The remaining chapters of this thesis attempt to achieve this research aim. The following chapter examines ADF aviation, including a review of the ADF aviation’s operational platforms as well as accident and non-accident safety data. Chapter Three examines the scientific literature relating to attitudinal studies of personnel working in sociotechnical settings. It examines fundamental concepts, theoretical approaches and scientific studies in detail, and reviews scientific literature relating to organisational behaviour, culture and human factors. Chapter Four describes the theoretical construct and implementation of a new psychometric survey methodology designed to establish various key aspects of organisational culture in ADF aviation. Chapter Five to Chapter Ten describes the results of the new survey instrument, including discussion of the survey results, including discussion in the context of designing and implementing a 17 Chapter One – Introduction

qualitative study that both cross-examines the findings of the survey results and neutralises perceived weaknesses in the survey study. Chapter Eleven to Chapter Thirteen describes the implementation and results of the second (interview) survey study. Chapter Fourteen contains the General Discussion, including the implications of the research results. The final chapter, Chapter 15, contains the Conclusion.

18 Chapter One – Introduction

1.6 CHAPTER ONE SUMMARY

This chapter introduced the apparently conflicting goals of safety in the armed forces, and developed a strategy for new research that aims to establish the influence of the military ‘culture’ upon military personnel. The chapter established that the armed forces undertake a complex and paradoxical activity that does not seem to exist in any other system involving humans and technology, whereby damage to life and property is not so much a risk as the core objective. The activities of the armed forces must balance the safety of the system and its operators with extreme and often unpredictable hazards. The chapter then described how the juxtaposition of safety and damage to life and property as twin operational objectives might have attitudinal and behavioural effects on the personnel that work in military systems. Yet the influence of the military system or culture upon military personnel is a difficult phenomenon to examine because there is scant empirical research in the field that may be applied to the numerous and specialised military populations. Despite the limited quantity of existing empirical research, there are some case studies and small ‘in-house’ research efforts that show that military forces suffer numerous safety deficiencies. These deficiencies have the potential to facilitate aviation accidents, particularly in military aviation where the performance demands on the psychological and social attributes of personnel working in the domain are high. Australian Defence Force aviation was identified as a valuable target population for new research, evidenced by existing ADF and non-ADF post-incident and research data (or lack thereof). The chapter also established that such research must overcome several challenges. The chapter concluded by describing the research rationale and the research objectives. The following chapter, Chapter Two, examines the fundamental concepts and theoretical approaches relating to attitudes and the performance of personnel in sociotechnical systems, and then reviews several studies in detail.

This thesis describes research conducted between November 2000 and May 2006 that examines Australian Defence Force (ADF) aviation safety data, including the development and implementation of a new survey tool distributed to ADF aviation personnel during July and August 2003, and semi-structured interviews conducted between January and April 2006. The research is designed to answer questions of both a 19 Chapter One – Introduction

univariate nature (describing singular variables of safety culture, morale, etc) and correlative nature (summarising the relationship between several variables), and includes several between-group comparisons.

20 CHAPTER TWO

THE ADF AVIATION SYSTEM

The previous chapter established the research problem and, consequently, the aim and objectives of this thesis. The aim of this chapter is to identify the fundamental composition of ADF aviation and aspects of its operational performance in an attempt to fulfil the first and second objectives of this thesis. Having identified the dearth of military aviation studies in the scientific literature in the previous chapter, this chapter reviews literature almost exclusively within ‘industry’ publications (although it should be noted that given the military subject matter, most publications are published by national government publishing services).

The chapter attempts to achieve its aim via three main parts. Firstly, Section 2.1 describes the aircraft fleet that comprises ADF aviation, the rate-of-effort undertaken by ADF aviation and provides comparisons with allied British and American military aviation entities. The outcome of this review is that, further to the uniqueness of ADF aviation described in Chapter One, the incomparability of ADF aviation is established. The second part of this chapter, Section 2.2, examines the aviation safety record of the ADF. This includes both the statistical analyses associated with the accidents incurred by the ADF, and analyses of two fatal aviation accidents that provide contextual relevance towards a greater understanding of the research problem. The examination of such data provides a useful demonstration of the limited efficacy of gauging safety via post-incident statistical analyses. The third part of this chapter, Section 2.3, examines ADF aviation safety data recorded via non-accident means. To date, the only non- accident data is that provided by the survey research of Braithwaite (1998) and DSPPR (2001). The aspects of organisational culture elucidated in this chapter have not been examined by previous research, or presented in the scientific literature. Hence, the aspects of ADF aviation culture presented here provide the only useful indication of areas requiring deeper examination.

21 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

2.1 STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION

ADF aviation is an operationally and systemically complex, geographically diverse, tri- service (i.e., Army, Navy and Air Force) organisation comprising approximately 460 aircraft manufactured by organisations in six nations (DFS-ADF, 2002; RAAF, 2006). The diversity of ADF aviation is argued to create one of the most demanding aviation management tasks in the world (DoD, 1998). In this light, this section examines the management – or rank – structure described briefly for its influence on defence personnel in Chapter One, the overarching organisational management structure of the ADF, and the operational structure of ADF aviation. The latter includes an examination of the current ADF aviation fleet, the mission-load (‘rate of effort’) undertaken by ADF aviation, and a description of the incomparability of the ADF aviation fleet with other major Western aviation fleets, including the Australian flag carrier airline, Qantas.

2.1.1 Management Structure

The Australian Defence Force is governed by a Minister in the Australian Parliament who’s primary responsibility is to provide advice to the Prime Minister via their position in the Federal Cabinet. The Minister for Defence is currently the Honourable Dr. Brendan Nelson, who was sworn in as Minister for Defence in early 2006. The Minister receives advice from and directs the military through one principal ADF source – the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). The CDF is currently fulfilled by RAAF officer, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston. The CDF orders the military through the three defence arm “Chiefs”: the Chief of Navy (CN), the Chief of Army (CA) and the Chief of Air Force (CAF).

Figure 2.1 (overleaf) illustrates this structure, and highlights that aviation expertise resides overwhelmingly with the RAAF. This is due to the primary function and objectives of each defence arm, and will be examined in greater detail when fleet composition is investigated later in this chapter.

22 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

MINISTER FOR DEFENCE

CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

NAVY CHIEF ARMY CHIEF RAAF CHIEF

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AUSTRALIAN ARMY AIR FORCE NAVY PERSONNEL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL

Figure 2.1. Management structure of the Australian Defence Force.

Rank Structure

Although the three arms of the ADF have different rank titles in the tradition of the British military forces on which the ADF is modelled (e.g., Army “Colonel”, Navy “Commander”, Air Force “Squadron Leader”), the rank structure for each arm is identical in terms of both rank types (officers and non-officers ‘other ranks’ [OR]) and levels of seniority. Accordingly, Table 2.1 presents the rank structure of the RAAF (only) for ease of interpretation. It should be noted here that ADF aviation personnel occupy ranks at all levels of each service, therefore the RAAF structure presented here is demonstrative of the wider ADF. The table lists the ranks in order of decreasing seniority, also highlighting that the two rank streams are not ‘connected’ in seniority – personnel do not progress in seniority from the Other Ranks group to the officer group.

23 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

Table 2.1. Ranks of the Royal Australian Air Force.

Officers Other Ranks (OR) Air Chief Marshal ACM Warrant Officer of the RAAF WOFF-AF Air Marshal AIRMSHL Warrant Officer WOFF

Air Vice Marshal AVM Flight Sergeant FSGT

Air Commodore AIRCDRE Sergeant SGT Group Captain GPCAPT Corporal CPL

Wing Commander WGCDR Leading Aircraftman LAC

Squadron Leader SQNLDR Aircraftman AC

Flight Lieutenant FLTLT Flying Officer FLGOFF

Pilot Officer PLTOFF

Aviation Fleet

Excluding minor variances among individual aircraft fleets, 24 different types of aircraft are currently operating within the ADF aviation system. The aircraft range from relatively simple platforms such as the CT-4B piston-engine training aircraft (n = 26) to highly advanced complex weapon systems such as the F/A-18 jet-engine fighter aircraft (n = 71). Indeed, the DoD (1998) states that the technology inherent to ADF aircraft varies “from obsolescence to leading edge”. The largest number of ADF aircraft of one type is the PC9/A (advanced pilot training aircraft), of which the ADF operates 65 including three aircraft that have been significantly modified by the RAAF for Forward Air Control (FAC) operations. The smallest fleet size within ADF aviation is the Boeing Business Jet 737 (BBJ), of which the RAAF operates two.

Table 2.2 (overleaf) lists the aircraft fleets of the RAAF, Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Australian Regular Army (ARA). It provides an overview of the magnitude of the aircraft inventories of the ADF’s three services and demonstrates the inter-service fleet commonality (or lack thereof) within the three services. Only the Beech King Air (B200) aircraft is operated by more than one service arm of the ADF.

24 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

Table 2.2. Aircraft fleets of the RAAF, RAN and ARA.

Aircraft Type RAAF RAN ARA Role Base F/A-18 71 No No Fighter NSW, NT F-111 28 No No Strike QLD Boeing 707 4 No No Airborne Refuelling NSW Boeing Business Jet B737 2 No No VIP Transport ACT C-130J Hercules 12 No No Strategic / Tactical Transport NSW C-130H Hercules 12 No No Strategic / Tactical Transport NSW Caribou 14 No No STOL Tactical Transport QLD Challenger CL604 3 No No VIP Transport ACT Hawk 127 33 No No Initial Fighter Trainer WA, NSW B200 King Air 1 No 3 Passenger Transport SA, QLD B350 King Air 7 No No Navigational Trainer VIC P3C Orion 19 No No Maritime Surveillance SA Advanced Pilot Trainer + PC-9/A 65 No No WA, VIC, NSW FAC CT-4B 26 No No Basic Pilot Trainer NSW Black Hawk (H) No No 36 Battlefield Support QLD Chinook (H) No No 6 Medium Lift Transport QLD Iroquois (H) No No 25 Helicopter Gunship QLD Kiowa (H) No No 42 Light Utility Helicopter QLD Twin Otter DHC-6 No No 2 STOL Transport QLD Squirrel (H) No 11 No Lead-in Trainer NSW Sea Hawk (H) No 16 No Surveillance and Attack NSW Sea King (H) No 7 No Medium-Heavy Transport NSW Kalkara No 12 No Pilot-less Target Drone WA, NSW Total 297 46 114 - -

To place the composition of the ADF aviation fleet into a more recognisable framework, Table 2.3 (overleaf) lists the total number of aircraft, aircraft types and associated aircraft type ratio (total number of aircraft divided by the number of aircraft types) for the three services of the ADF and the USAF, RAF and Qantas. The table provides an overview of the diversity and magnitude of the aircraft fleets of the ADF in comparison to other aviation organisations. The table also provides a ratio measure of the internal fleet diversity of each aviation entity. The ratio is a simple calculation of the aircraft total divided by the aircraft types and indicates the relative work each unit undertakes within the extant system.

25 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

Table 2.3. Overview of ADF, USAF, RAF and Qantas aircraft assets1.

Aircraft Aircraft Type Aircraft Aircraft Type Organisation Organisation Types Total Ratio Types Total Ratio RAAF 14 297 1:21 USAF 40+ 1500+ 1:38 RAN 4 46 1:12 RAF 31 904 1:29

ARA 6 114 1:19 Qantas 6 174 1:29

Table 2.3 shows that the ratios of total aircraft to aircraft types applying to the services of the ADF are lower than the ratios for the non-ADF systems. Moreover, there is a significant range of values within the ADF services. The low ratios of the ARA and RAN is perhaps reflective of the relatively small size of the RAN and ARA fleets (ARA and RAN have relatively small aviation sub-groups within their single-service structures whereas aviation is the primary function of the RAAF).

2.1.2 Rate-of-Effort of ADF Aviation

In any given year, the Rate of Effort2 (ROE) recorded by ADF aviation is a relatively small proportion of the flight hours recorded by the non-ADF aviation entities in this section. This notion holds true despite the apparent increases in ADF ROE due to increases in operational tempo commensurate with ADF participation in international operations such as Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The ROE for the ADF and other leading aviation organisations are listed in Table 2.4. The table shows that the ROE recorded by the ADF was approximately 130,000 hours – only 61% of the RAF ROE of 211,552 hours and 32% of the Qantas ROE of 408,000 hours. It is worth highlighting that the ADF ROE is a record of flight hours for all three ADF services (RAAF, RAN and ARA). Accordingly, the single service ROEs would be less than the ADF ROE indicated in Table 2.4 – further contrasting the ROE differences of the non-ADF ROEs with the ADF.

1 Data sourced from RAAF (2006), RAF (2006), USAF (2006) and Qantas (2006). The USAF data is an approximation due to the difficulty experienced by the researcher in verifying the accuracy of the publicly available US military data. 2 Rate of Effort (ROE) is a military term to describe the flying hours (‘work’) undertaken over time. 26 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

Table 2.4. Summary of airline and ADF departures and ROE3. Airline Departures ROE Qantas 134,335 407,831 Lufthansa 529,586 1,092,892 Thai Airways 96,294 248,284 British Airways 242,194 796,917 FedEx 336,174 535,221 United Airlines 820,076 1,972,316 Southwest 848,919 991,643 ADF Not collected by ADF 129,852 RAF 113,130 211,552

Although the incomparability of ADF aviation was established in Chapter One, it is worth reiterating this notion as it applies to the comparison of ROE data here. The incomparability is due to the flaw of ROE multiplication. Simply multiplying the (small) ROE of ADF aviation to match the ROE of another organisation is flawed because the multiplication and commensurate comparison requires a significant assumption: that the organisation being ROE-multiplied will maintain the same incident rate or performance quality in the future.

Similarly, dividing the larger ROE to match a smaller ROE requires the assumption that the organisation with the larger ROE would produce the same incident rate when operating at a fraction of its actual ROE. Such assumptions inherently negate the fundamental utility of a performance comparison. In addition, such a comparison mandates that the operational context and aircraft composition of the individual organisations being compared is ideally identical – or at least highly similar and therefore comparable. The next section examines the notion of aircraft comparability in greater detail.

3 DoD (1999), ICAO (1999), MOD (2006). USAF data could not be verified by the researcher and is therefore not included in this table. 27 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

2.1.3 Aircraft

Comparisons of ADF aviation with other aviation entities are flawed when conducted without regard to individual components and the operational context of these components. This is because ADF aviation comprises aircraft and aircraft variants that other military forces and civilian aviation organisations do not operate – such as the F- 111 Strike aircraft. The RAAF is the only military aviation organisation in the world that operates the F-111, and holds seven F-111 aircraft in long-term storage as sources for spare parts for the 28 operational F-111 aircraft (RAAF, 2006). Table 2.5 lists the aircraft fleet composition of the RAAF and the commonality with the USAF and RAF fleets.

Table 2.5. Commonality of RAAF, USAF and RAF aircraft assets. Operated by Operated by Operated by RAAF Aircraft Type RAAF4 USAF5 RAF F/A-18 71 - - F-111 28 - - Boeing 707 4 - - Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) 737 2 - - C-130J Hercules 12 32 25 C-130H Hercules 12 308 - Caribou 14 - - Challenger 604 3 - - Hawk 127 33 - - B200 King Air 1 - 10 B350 King Air 7 - - P3C Orion 19 - - PC-9/A 65 - - CT-4B 26 - -

It can be seen from Table 2.5 that the only RAAF aircraft type that is common to the USAF and RAF is the C-130 Hercules – a highly versatile transport aircraft that is operated by aviation organisations in approximately 60 nations. Yet despite the apparent commonality of aircraft type, comparison between the C-130 aircraft is also flawed due

4 Data sourced from RAAF (2006). 5 32 C-130J aircraft have been delivered to the USAF and 46 more aircraft are on order. The USAF currently operates 512 C-130 aircraft (USAF, 2006). 28 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

to the magnitude of diversity of C-130 Hercules production model, model variant, role and commensurate capability. This incomparability is best illustrated by undertaking a closer examination of the USAF, RAF and RAAF C-130 aircraft inventories. For example, the RAAF operates 24 C-130 Hercules aircraft (12 C-130H aircraft and 12 C- 130J-30 aircraft) and the RAF operates 69 C-130 aircraft (44 C-130K aircraft and 25 C- 130J aircraft). In contrast, the USAF (2006) operates 514 Hercules aircraft comprising four models (C-130E, C-130H, C-130J, C-130J-30) and seven operational variants (for example, the MC-130P special operations air-to-air refuelling variant) (USAF, 2006). The incomparability of RAAF/USAF C-130 aircraft is even more stark considering that each RAAF squadron of C-130 Hercules comprises 12 aircraft that undertake roles as diverse as search and rescue (SAR), paratrooper insertions, tactical operations at low altitude using infra-red detecting night vision goggles (NVG), aero-medical evacuations and long-range strategic transport missions. In comparison, the USAF C-130 fleet is comprised of predominantly mission-specific aircraft, and the magnitude of the individual fleets is markedly larger than the 12 aircraft that comprise the two RAAF squadrons. For example, the USAF operates 38 MC-130E/H Hercules aircraft purpose- built for the insertion of special operations forces, and ten WC-130 Hercules aircraft equipped specifically for Weather Reconnaissance missions. The C-130 types operated by the RAAF, USAF and RAF are listed in Table 2.6.

Table 2.6. C-130 types operated by the RAAF, USAF and RAF.

Air Force Variant Role Aircraft (N) RAAF C-130H Tactical Airlift RAAF C-130J-30 Strategic Airlift RAAF Total 24 USAF MC-130P Special Operations Refuelling USAF MC-130E/H Infiltration of Special Ops Forces USAF AC-130H/U Close Air Support USAF EC-130H Tactical Information Warfare USAF EC-130E/J Psychological Information Warfare USAF HC-130P/N Combat Search and Rescue USAF WC-130 Weather Reconnaissance USAF Total 514 RAF C-130K Multi-purpose transport RAF C-130J Multi-purpose transport RAF Total 69

29 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

2.2 ADF AVIATION ACCIDENT DATA

This section quantifies ADF aviation accidents and the key outcomes of ADF Accident Investigation Boards (AIB) and Boards of Inquiry (BOI) since January 1990. The rationale for limiting examination of BOI to post-1990 accidents is two-fold. Firstly, several aircraft types operated by the ADF in the period between 1965 and 1990 are no longer operated by the ADF. Secondly, the flying safety reporting structure has changed significantly, with changes in incident and accident reporting methods to include tracking of incident investigations in a new ‘closed loop’ reporting system, safety training (including CRM and Aviation Risk Management [AVRM]) and the functions provided by DFS-ADF. Prior to 1997 DFS-ADF was a RAAF entity with aviation safety functions for the RAN and ARA carried out under different authorities (DoD, 2004).

DFS-ADF (2005) data shows that ADF aviation has incurred 234 aircraft losses due to aviation accidents since 1965 (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2. ADF aircraft destroyed in accidents between January 1965 and Jan 2006.

Figure 2.2 shows a general decrease in accident frequency per year, and that the highest number of aircraft were destroyed in 1969 (n = 19) and the lowest number of aircraft were destroyed in 1982, 1998 and 2003 (n = 0). Interestingly, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) cites a similar downward trend of civil aviation accidents in Australia. Additional ATSB statistics show that total aviation accident rates in Australia

30 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

declined by 42% between 1990 and 1999 (ATSB, 2000). However, such trends are often countered when the accident frequency data is represented as a function of activity (for example, departures and landings) rather than the passage of time.

2.2.1 Quantitative Data - ADF Aviation Statistics

The prominence of basic descriptive statistics as a measure of ADF aviation safety is evident within many publications, including DFS-ADF Annual Reviews and editorials by the Director and Deputy Director of DFS-ADF (1999, 2000, 2002). The Flying Safety Director’s “outstanding” statement also highlights the preoccupation with quantifying aviation safety on the historical basis of low ‘accident rates’ (DFS-ADF, 2002). Indeed, even more recently DFS-ADF Director Group Captain Bill Spears (2003) praised the ‘safety record’ of ADF aviation, stating, “…Defence…has achieved significant mission successes this year and maintained an enviable safety record”.

The ADF analyses incident and accident data according to accidents and incidents per 10,000 flight hours. The ADF compares these to a ‘Previous 5-year Average’ and charts linear and logarithmic projections. ADF aviation records approximately 0.3 accidents every 10,000 hours, and the accident rate per 10,000 flight hours varies significantly over a five-year period. In a five-year period within the last decade, the accident rate per 10,000 flight hours increased by a magnitude of five.

ADF Aviation Accident Chronology 1990 – 2006

Recent ADF aviation activity has resulted in notable aircraft and personnel losses. For example, in the period from January 1990 to January 2006, ADF aviation lost 39 aircraft and incurred 53 fatalities in 60 Category 4 and Category 5 aircraft losses (DFS- ADF, 2005). Category 4 is defined as “Aircraft repairable in more than 14 days”. Category 5 is defined as “Aircraft unrepairable, missing or inaccessible for recovery”. All ADF repair categories are listed in Appendix A. A chronological summary of ADF aviation accidents, including the associated fatalities and injuries, is provided by Table 2.7. The accident categories are based on the level of repair required to an aircraft after an accident. Table 2.7 is limited to these two categories because DFS-ADF classifies

31 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

aircraft damage in Categories 4 and 5 as “accidents” whereas the repair categories below Category 4 are classified as “incidents”. The categories for incidents equate to minor aircraft damage and personal injury, whereas the category for accidents equates to major aircraft damage and serious personal injury. On average, four accidents have occurred every year between 1990 and 2006.

32 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

Table 2.7. ADF Aviation Accidents (Category 4 and 5) from January 1990 to January 2006.

Year Aircraft Location Cat. Fatality Injury Remarks 1990 Nomad SA 5 1 Tail plane broke off in flight 1990 Porter QLD 4 Mishandled landing, slid off runway 1990 F/A-18 NT 5 1 Mid-air collision 1990 F/A-18 NSW 4 Bleed air leak damaging structure 1990 Kiowa NSW 4 Mishandled landing, emergency trng 1990 Macchi WA 5 1 Loss of control during aerobatics 1990 Macchi NSW 5 1 Fatigue failure of wing airborne 1991 Kiowa QLD 4 Mishandled landing, emergency trng 1991 CT-4 VIC 4 Mishandled landing, emergency trng 1991 Kiowa QLD 4 Mishandled during emergency trng 1991 Kiowa QLD 4 Aircraft rolled during approach 1991 P3-C Cocos Island 5 1 Structural failure due high-speed 1991 F/A-18 QLD 5 1 Pilotpass incapacitation 1991 PC-9/A VIC 5 2 CFIT during night IFR training 1991 Nomad NSW 5 4 Accident causes unverified 1991 Boeing 707 VIC 5 5 Pilot lost control during Vmca 1991 Porter NSW 5 2 Pilottraining lost control after take-off 1991 Caribou TAS 4 Runway over-run on landing 1992 PC-9/A WA 5 1 Inadvertent engine shutdown 1992 F/A-18 QLD 5 2 CFIT during weapon delivery 1992 Black Hawk QLD 5 2 2 CFIT during low level flight 1993 Kiowa QLD 5 2 Mishandled landing, emergency trng 1993 F-111C NSW 5 2 CFIT at night 1994 Squirrel ACT 4 Aircraft struck overhead wires 1994 F/A-18 Malaysia 4 Mid-air collision with RMAF F-5E 1994 Macchi (2) NSW 5 Mid-air collision during ACM 1994 Squirrel ACT 4 Aircraft struck overhead wires 1995 Kiowa WA 5 Loss of control during landing 1995 Sea King QLD 5 2 CFIT at night 1996 Squirrel QLD 4 Aircraft struck overhead wires 1996 Squirrel NSW 4 Aircraft struck overhead wires 1996 Black Hawk (2) QLD 5 18 11 Mid-air collision during low-level 1997 Squirrel ACT 5 4 CFITflight during simulated emergency 1997 Squirrel NSW 4 Pilot mishandled ground resonance 1997 Twin Otter PNG 5 4 CFIT low vis steep terrain 1999 F-111G Malaysia 5 2 CFIT during low level operations 1999 Kalkara NSW 5 Uncontrolled flight into terrain 2000 Kiowa QLD 5 Aircraft struck overhead wires 2000 Black Hawk NSW 4 Aircraft mishandling while fast roping 2000 Caribou QLD 4 Aircraft struck terrain 2001 Kalkara SA 5 Uncontrolled flight into terrain 2001 Squirrel NSW 5 Pilot mishandled ground resonance 2001 King Air ACT 4 Birdstrike while taxiing on runway 2001 Kalkara WA 5 Uncontrolled flight into terrain 2001 Kalkara NSW 5 Uncontrolled flight into terrain 2002 Kiowa QLD 5 Rolled over attempting take-off 2002 F-111C NT 4 Fuel tank explosion 2002 Kalkara WA 5 Uncontrolled flight into terrain 2003 Caribou PNG 4 Runway over-run on landing 2003 Kiowa QLD 4 Mishandled during emergency trng 2004 Hercules NSW 4 Aircraft struck by forklift on tarmac 2004 Black Hawk QLD 5 8 Struck trees during low level training 2004 Kalkara NSW 5 Uncontrolled flight into terrain 2004 PC-9/A NSW 4 Airborne hail damage (con’t over)

33 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

(Table 2.7 continued from previous page)

Year Aircraft Location Cat. Fatality Injury Remarks 2005 Kalkara NSW 5 Uncontrolled flight into terrain 2005 PC-9/A VIC 5 Mid-air collision 2005 PC-9/A VIC 4 Mid-air collision 2005 Sea King Indonesia 5 9 2 Total 60 - - 53 37 -

Table 2.7 shows that the aircraft type featuring in the most accidents (n = 9) between 1990 and the present is Kiowa helicopter operated by the ARA (the Kiowa was also operated by the RAN prior to and including 2001). Several aircraft types have not been destroyed in accidents, including C-130 Hercules, King Air, Sea Hawk, DHC-6 and Bell 206 aircraft. The table also shows that four aircraft have incurred accidents within foreign territory: two aircraft (an F/A-18 in 1994 and an F-111 in 1999) in Malaysia and two aircraft (a Twin Otter in 1997 and a Caribou in 2003). The greatest number of fatalities and injuries incurred by an accident is the 1996 collision of two ARA Black Hawk helicopters where 18 personnel were killed and 11 seriously injured.

The remarks cited for each incident have been collated by the researcher from numerous non-classified ADF and non-ADF sources. While the remarks listed are not intended as the nomination of a single factor, or the nomination of an accident cause, they indicate that human factors issues feature frequently in ADF aviation accidents.

Aviation safety assertions based upon past performance and simple statistics are arbitrary and do not reveal any causal relationships towards safety. Per hour denominators, or per 10,000 hours, are not related to workload or activity. Descriptive statistics such as these are therefore of questionable validity. Indeed, Helmreich, Merritt and Wilhelm (1999) note that it is difficult to assess the impact that any single factor has on aviation safety because the validation criterion of ‘accident rates per million departures’ is too small to achieve statistical significance. Accordingly, the following section examines qualitative data provided by aviation accident investigations.

34 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

2.2.2 Qualitative Data – ADF Accident Analyses

Accident and incident investigations can provide a more naturalistic understanding of the human factors underlying safety failures (McDonald & Johnston, 1994) and have become the norm of aviation safety research methodologies. However, as noted by Braithwaite (1998), Zotov (2001) and others, such methodology is historical commentary with the aid of hindsight, is highly heuristic and has little scientific rigour.

Comprehensive data analysis following an accident is critical to the accurate determination of an accident’s causal factors and provides the basis for corrective and preventative measures. However, caution must be taken in applying analytic methods. Single methods will not determine the multiple causes of an accident. Furthermore, Paries (1996) acknowledges Poisson’s Law: that one accident occurrence cannot be generalised as an indication of an entire system’s safety. A lack of accidents is not a sensible measure of current performance in the ADF’s highly diverse aircraft fleet, where operations of any single aircraft type are a relatively small proportion of ADF aviation operations (see Table 2.2). Additionally, a risk may emanate from an occupational commonality (such as pilot or air traffic controller specialisation) or location commonality (such as a squadron) - not merely from the type of aircraft operated.

Despite the limitations associated with aviation investigations, ADF aviation accidents provide a basis from which to glean qualitative data regarding the organisational aspects of the ADF aviation system. The loss of a RAAF Boeing 707 (B707) near East Sale in 1991 is a notable example. The accident was attributed to an organisational culture where information relevant to the instruction of B707 pilots was passed “by word of mouth” (DFS-ADF, 1994). The influence of the ADF organisation upon personnel was also highlighted by DFS-ADF in a report regarding a RAAF C-130 transport aircraft that deviated outside of safe navigational limits on approach to an airfield in poor weather: “Organisational deficiencies manifest as incorrect perceptions by aircrew” (DFS-ADF, 1996, p.2).

35 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

The following two sub-sections describe the findings of the Boards of Inquiry (BOI) relating to two significant ADF aviation accidents that have occurred since 1990. While these two accidents are only a small sample of the accidents incurred by the ADF since 1990, the investigation reports describe the critical influence of teamwork, communication and organisational culture and its behavioural and attitudinal norms. Moreover, the accidents demonstrate how the conceptualisation of accidents are significantly influenced by environmental and often intangible factors – such as culture – that are often undetected prior to an accident event because the factors are considered ‘normal’. This view is argued to assist in the evolution of the preconditions to aviation accidents, and is explored in considerable detail most notably by Perrow (1984), Pidgeon (1988, 1991) and Reason (1997, 2000). The work of these researchers will be explored further in the following chapter as their research does not relate specifically to ADF aviation. Finally, it is also important to note that BOIs comprise both civilian and Defence personnel, and the findings of such boards are generally not available to the public in their entirety.

Accident 1 – Boeing 707 Accident – October 1991

In October 1991, a RAAF Boeing 707 aircraft departed controlled flight and impacted the ocean off the southeast coast of Australia (DFS-ADF, 1994, 2003, 2003a). The aircraft was destroyed and all five crewmembers were fatally injured.

The investigation of the RAAF Boeing 707 accident near East Sale in October 1991 identified several latent conditions that may have contributed to the loss of the aircraft and its five crewmembers. The Boeing 707 had been on a routine instructor training flight where the aircraft captain, a Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI), was training another captain to be a QFI. While conducting a Vmca (Velocity Minimum Control Air6) demonstration that had been devised by the QFI, the aircraft departed controlled flight and crashed into the ocean (DFS-ADF, 1994, 2003, 2003a).

6 Vmca is the minimum airspeed required to maintain directional control of a multi-engine aircraft under asymmetric engine thrust conditions. Vmca is fundamental to controlled flight under simulated or actual engine failure conditions. 36 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

There were several contributory factors cited in the accident review:

• Deficiencies in the acquisition and documentation of B707 operational knowledge • The absence of effective mechanisms to prevent the erosion of B707 operational ‘corporate knowledge’ during periods of high pilot resignation rates • The absence of an official B707 QFI conversion course and associated syllabus • The absence of an adequate B707 Flying Instructors’ manual • Deficiencies in documentation, procedures and limitations of B707 asymmetric flight • The lack of fidelity of the RAAF B707 simulator in the Vmca flight regime

Accident 2 – F-111G Accident – April 1999

In April 1999, an RAAF F-111 Strike aircraft impacted trees on a ridge on Aur Island in Malaysia. The aircraft was destroyed and both crewmembers were fatally injured. The accident BOI found that there were several contributory factors relating to the accident and that the circumstances of this accident were consistent with Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). The contributory factors cited by the BOI were:

• Inadequate flight preparation for the mission • Failure of the pilot to use all the aircraft systems available • Failure of the navigator to prioritise cockpit workload • Low aircrew numbers and high operational tempo • A culture where aircrews fail to check the preparation of other team-members • Development of a culture that blurred the delineation of aircraft command responsibilities • Failure of other formation crew to adequately convey the risks perceived in the mission • Failure of Exercise Headquarters (HQ) to provide timely and accountable distribution of Aircrew Instructions • Failure of all detachment aircrew to read and understand Exercise HQ Instructions

37 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

• Wing (higher authority than Exercise HQ) tasking of additional pilot duties without adequate consideration of the additional workload placed on the pilot, and without the consent of the pilot’s Commanding Officer • Failure of the RAAF to promulgate a risk management policy for aircraft operations • Failure of the RAAF to educate aircrew in the procedures and practices to be adopted in identifying, analysing, assessing, monitoring and controlling risk

Discussion of accident analyses

The data provided by both the B707 and F-111 accident investigations, unlike the quantitative data provided by statistical analyses in the previous section, describes numerous qualitative aspects of ADF aviation and the effect of broader influences upon human performance. For example, both accident reports cite organisational deficiencies as a contributory factor. In particular, workload was cited in both reports as a contributing factor to the accident’s evolution. The reports relate workload to organisational issues such as “high operational tempo”, “low aircrew numbers”, “resignation rates” and “the erosion of corporate knowledge”. This is noteworthy not because of its enduring influence on aviation safety in the ADF (noting that the accidents reviewed here are separated by almost a decade) but also because the organisational aspects associated with high workload cited by the reports (e.g., high operational tempo, erosion of corporate knowledge) are an arguably strong indicator of the more deep-seated organisational influence upon ‘normal’ operations within ADF aviation. This aspect will be examined further in the review of the scientific literature in the following chapter.

Another interesting point to note here is that the BOI relating to the F-111 accident in 1999 also described the formulation of aviation accidents in a manner that had not been reported by the ADF previously, stating, “the majority of aircraft accidents have been identified to result from, not a single catastrophic event, but from a chain of events that have successfully and cumulatively created conditions and environments in which an accident becomes the inevitable outcome. An accident is usually the final result of a sequence of aggregating events” (DoD, 1999). This view by the BOI marks a turning point in the investigation technique (and outcome) of BOIs. Firstly, it marks the

38 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

acceptance of the view that accidents do not relate to a “chain” of events, but instead relate to numerous co-contributing events. Moreover, the BOI of 1999 cites “culture” as a contributing factor. This is relevant to this thesis as it acknowledges that ‘everyday’ elements have the potential to contribute to catastrophic accidents and fatalities in ADF aviation, in contrast to hypotheses of individuals acting ‘alone’, untouched by the influence of widely accepted, normal, culturally-based attitudes and practices.

39 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

2.3 ADF AVIATION SAFETY SURVEYS

This section examines survey data relating to ADF aviation safety and the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel. Although identified and briefly explored by Falconer (2005), this section examines the (only) two studies completed to date that relate, at least in part, to the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel specifically. Accordingly, the following two subsections examine an Australian aviation safety case study undertaken by Braithwaite (1998) and a flight management attitudes study undertaken by the ADF Directorate of Strategic Personnel and Planning Research. These research efforts were described only briefly in Chapter One. A theme common to both studies is that of military hierarchy, hence this aspect will be examined closely here.

2.3.1 The ADF Flight Management Attitude Questionnaire

The only tri-service research work relevant to the examination of non-accident data in ADF aviation is the Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ) developed by Helmreich et al (1993). The FMAQ evolved from the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ) and retains many of the same items that formed the CMAQ instrument. The FMAQ project was a collaborative effort between NASA, the University of Texas (UT) and the FAA. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) examine the subject of aviation and culture based mainly on the results of their survey of 9,400 commercial pilots in 19 countries using the FMAQ (Helmreich et al, 1993). The FMAQ is an exploratory questionnaire comprising 82 items designed to measure pilots’ attitudes toward command, communication, stress, automation, organisational climate and work values. These items are intended to capture the cultural dimensions established by Hofstede (1980) with relevance to the aviation environment.

Studies utilising the FMAQ instrument over several years by numerous researchers established significant replication correlations for all four of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, and confirmed that variable cultures exist within individual aviation organisations despite the commonality of pilot occupation and nationality (DSPPR, 2001; Helmreich and Merritt, 1998; Merritt, 2000).

40 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

In October 2000, the Australian Defence Force conducted a survey – the ADFFMAQ – based on the FMAQ 2.1 developed by Merritt, Helmreich, Wilhelm and Sherman (1996). The survey, conducted by the Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and Research (DSPPR), gathered ‘baseline’ data on safety and flight management attitudes before the introduction of systematic ADF-wide aircrew CRM training. The key items surveyed by the ADFFMAQ are listed in Table 2.8.

Table 2.8. Topics surveyed by the ADFFMAQ.

Leadership and command Quality and type of training Communication and coordination Manuals, documentations and checklists Automation usage Safety reporting procedures Reactions to stress Management issues Organisational climate Teamwork with other employee groups

The survey results, published by the DSPPR in October 2001, highlighted several significant issues that “warrant further examination to determine whether safety is being adversely affected” (DSPPR, 2001, p.9). More specifically, the results exposed several significant human factors within ADF aviation that are associated with the influence of the ADF organisation, including low morale, distrusted management, a can-do culture and poor interpersonal communications. The likert-type ADFFMAQ items are listed in Table 2.9 (overleaf) and expanded throughout the remainder of the section. The table lists the ADFFMAQ items in groups according to the principal theme of each item.

41 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

Table 2.9. Summary of ADFFMAQ items relating to ADF organisational factors7.

Strongly Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree ADFFMAQ Items Disagree Agree (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Morale Pilot / crew morale is high. 13.5 21.5 23.0 29.7 12.3 I like my job. 3.3 5.9 10.0 28.9 51.9 I am proud to work for this unit. 2.1 5.3 14.2 28.1 50.3

Safety Culture This unit has a positive safety culture 0.8 4.2 12.3 45.1 37.6

Safety Incidents are being avoided by predicting risk factors then 3.2 12.3 32.5 37.7 14.3 acting to lower or remove the risk. My unit practices the highest maintenance standards. 3.1 10.4 23.2 34.4 28.9 Flying safety standards are the same at all bases and in 25.4 39.1 29.6 5.1 0.8 all units. Corporate knowledge is obtained internally and externally 4.0 12.8 19.1 47.5 16.6 and is used to update procedures and practices.

Trust Aircrew trust senior management at my unit. 8.1 18.6 24.3 34.2 14.9

Communication The flight commanders / executives in the unit listen to us 6.0 12.7 11.9 33.3 36.2 and care about our concerns. I feel comfortable going to the flight commanders / executives’ office to discuss problems or operational 3.0 7.5 10.8 29.1 49.6 issues.

Management Hierarchy Executive staff constructively deal with poor performing 8.1 16.8 26.9 31.0 17.3 pilots / crew members. Executive staff will never compromise safety concerns in 5.2 14.6 17.6 30.0 32.6 order to achieve a task Senior management at my unit are doing a good job. 6.8 12.2 18.0 36.6 26.4

Procedures Written procedures are necessary for all in-flight 20.8 39.7 13.8 19.7 6.0 situations. The unit rules should not be broken – even when the 2.9 24.5 25.9 24.9 21.8 member thinks it is in the unit’s best interests.

Performance / ‘Can-do’ My decision-making ability is as good in emergencies as 1.4 17.1 17.8 43.5 20.2 in routine flying conditions. My performance is not adversely affected by working with 4.2 24.8 17.0 37.3 16.7 an inexperienced or less capable crew member. I know my capabilities and limitations. 0.2 3.1 7.8 51.5 37.4

7 The likert-scale used in the DSPPR (2001) study comprised strongly disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, and strongly agree. 42 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

2.3.2 Discussion of the ADFFMAQ results

Many of the attitudes reported by respondents seem incongruous. Firstly, the attitudes reported seem to indicate the existence of the ego-defensive characteristic (attitude characteristics and attitudinal theory are examined in detail in the following chapter) whereby an individual’s attitudes are biased towards positive self-appraisal and negative appraisal of others (Glendon & McKenna, 1995). Secondly, the attitudes reported seem to indicate an incongruity relating to safety assessment. This incongruity is evidenced by the strong support for assertions of safety such as “This unit has a positive safety culture” (only 5% of respondents reported disagreement to this item) and weak support for items that describe tangible safety indicators such as “Incidents are being avoided by predicting risk factors then acting to lower or remove the risk” (only 52% of respondents reported agreement to this item). Similarly with respect to the high appraisal of safety culture, only 62% agree with the statement “Executive staff will never compromise safety concerns in order to achieve a task”, and less than 47% reported agreement with the statement “The unit rules should not be broken – even when the member thinks it is in the unit’s best interest”.

Another notable ADFFMAQ result with the potential to affect organisational performance is that of morale. The ADFFMAQ found that only 42% of respondents agreed with the statement “Pilot/crew morale is high”. Despite the morale of aircrew members (as the third person) being reported as relatively low, approximately eighty percent of ADFFMAQ respondents agreed with the statements “I like my job” (81%) and “I am proud to work for this unit” (78%).

Risk Factors

The DSPPR survey also asked respondents to rank ten “risk factors to ADF aviation” in the order of highest to lowest risk. Table 2.10 (overleaf) lists the accident risk factors as ranked by ADF aircrew and present an interesting overview of human factor risks in ADF aviation.

43 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

Table 2.10. Accident risk factors in ADF aviation (adapted from DSPPR, 2001).

ADF Aviation Risk Factor Respondents (n) Agree High Workload 522 Lack of experience 514 Fatigue 487 Loss of SA 418 Lack of currency 383 “Press-on-itis" 317 Lack of continuation training 309 Insufficient time to prepare 243 Departure from SOPs 113 Other* 109 Reducing military airspace 102

*Approximately 15% of respondents nominated an “other” risk factor. The DSPPR (2001) report states that the most common concerns in this category included issues regarding aircraft maintenance and the behaviour of squadron-level managers.

The sequence of risk factors presented by Table 2.10 suggests a mixture of human factor priorities for ADF aviation safety and hence a challenging research agenda. For example, the DSPPR (2001) explanatory notes for the results presented by Table 2.10 cite maintenance issues and behaviour of some senior ADF aviation managers as “common issues” reported by respondents with regard to ‘Other’. Furthermore, Table 2.10 shows that the ADF respondents’ report high workload and lack of experience in approximately equal numbers. The apparent juxtaposition of a high overall workload and lack of experience being simultaneously reported by ADF aircrew is clearly worthy of further investigation. Arguably, such a co-existence of risk factors could exist for only a brief duration because the need for individuals to undertake a ‘high workload’ would naturally lead to a rapid increase in their experience. However, such a view is based on the assumption that the same personnel report these factors, and that the work itself allows an increased ‘experience’.

44 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

Intra-organisational Differences

Table 2.11 lists the risk factors according to Army, Navy and RAAF categories in an attempt to elucidate any such differences. Somewhat surprisingly, the magnitude of RAAF respondents vis Army and Navy respondents does not appear to have influenced the ‘total’ ADF-wide results (see Table 2.10) to any great extent. Additionally, the issue of “Press-on-itis” emerges within the ‘top five’ risks only as a result of the tri-service categorisation.

Table 2.11.

Accident risk factors according to service arm (Falconer, 2005).

Army Risk Factors Navy Risk Factors RAAF Risk Factors

High workload High Workload Lack of experience

Fatigue Lack of experience Fatigue

Lack of experience Lack of currency Loss of SA

Loss of continuation Overconfidence Lack of currency training Lack of continuation Insufficient time to “Press-on-itis" training prepare

Two key aspects of human factor problems within ADF aviation are highlighted by the categorisation presented in Table 2.11. Firstly, the potential for human factors and/or cultural issues to be non-aligned across the three services is clearly evident. Secondly, any differences that exist within human factor data should be fully investigated with a view to establishing the evolution of the differences (in this case, the risk factors to ADF aviation). Indeed, an important question emerges: what are the leading risk factors reported by other key sub-groups of the ADF population, such as rank or squadron? This question has potential implications relating to fundamental aspects of Hofstede’s (1980) work, particularly his measure of the hierarchical influence within cultures – power-distance. The question also has important implications for risk mitigation strategies and potential research, particularly noting that an analysis of the effect of rank upon respondent attitudes was not conducted by the DSPPR (2001) study. 45 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

An additional finding of the ADFFMAQ is the predominance of certain risks (“risk factors”) to ADF aviation safety reported by respondents. Table 2.12 lists the ‘Top Five Accident Risk Factors’ reported by ADF aircrew in the ADFFMAQ survey (adapted from DSPPR, 2001).

Table 2.12. ‘Top Five’ accident risk factors in ADF aviation reported by ADFFMAQ respondents. ADF Respondents Agree (%) RAAF Respondents Agree (%) High Workload 62 Lack of Experience 64 Lack of Experience 61 Fatigue 59 Fatigue 57 Loss of SA 55 Loss of SA 49 Lack of Currency 46 Lack of Currency 45 Press-on-itis 42

It can be seen from Table 2.12 that the ‘RAAF Respondents’ data includes the issue known as ‘press-on-itis'8: an issue that perhaps relates more to a ‘can-do’ cultural influence upon ADF aircrew. The term can-do culture and its effect of mission creep9 is formally recognised and examined, albeit briefly, in the Review of ADF Aviation Safety Management (DoD, 1998). The DSPPR (2001) analysis of the ADFFMAQ does not explore the issues of press-on-itis or can-do culture beyond simply replicating the terms as part of the descriptive analysis portion of the DSPPR report.

2.3.3 Limitations of the ADFFMAQ

Whatever the rationale for the analysis conducted by the DSPPR, it is clear that while the ADFFMAQ provides a useful indication of many human factors relating to ADF aviation operations, the results are somewhat limited in that they are a single ‘snapshot’ of attitudes relating to many aspects of ADF aviation that do not relate to safety. Indeed, despite the claim by the ADF Crew Resource Management Working Group (2000) that “retaining the FMAQ data and resurveying aircrew at predetermined time intervals will yield important longitudinal trend analysis information for the ADF”, the FMAQ survey design is exploratory, not longitudinal. Longitudinal research, in an effort to avoid

8 Press-on-itis is also highlighted in an analysis of 76 approach and landing accidents by the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF, 1999).

46 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

sampling distortion, generally utilises a control group to assist in clarifying comparisons between (for example) ‘training’ and ‘no training’ with regards to attitude change amongst personnel.

Limitations of the Instrument

There are prominent issues in military aviation that are not addressed by the FMAQ including the ability to accommodate non-cockpit and cockpit groups equally (J. Wilhelm, personal communication, April 19, 1999, April 11, 2001). According to Wilhelm, Hines and Helmreich (1996), the FMAQ is intended as a pre/post-training measure of attitude change regarding CRM. The FMAQ is not a measure of safety culture, safety health or other popularised notions of aviation safety. Indeed, within other aviation organisations, the FMAQ is merely one of many measurement tools and intended to be used as a verification of data from other sources.

Limitations of analysis

Only a limited analysis of ADFFMAQ data was conducted by the ADF – predominantly concerning attitudinal differences between ADF services (i.e., RAAF, ARA and RAN) and Force Element Groups (FEG). The differences in attitudes between FEG personnel reported by the DSPPR are not surprising. Replication studies using the FMAQ instrument have shown that respondent attitudes are highly variable between organisations of the same nationality, and occupational groups within the same organisation (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Analysis of attitudinal measures relating to demographic variables such as age or ADF rank was not conducted by the DSPPR.

Subsequent age and rank correlations requested by the researcher and undertaken by DSPPR (DSPPR would not release primary data) found that significant correlations between ADFFMAQ scores and both age and rank existed. The correlation discovered by the researcher is arguably more useful than the attitudinal differences between FEGs reported by the original DSPPR (2001) analysis. This is because age and rank will affect

9 Mission creep is a term used in ADF aviation to describe the notion of operational tasking insidiously expanding beyond the initial tasking authority (DoD, 1998). 47 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

attitudes within each FEG comprising ADF aviation, whereas FEG correlations have no utility outside the FEG. This knowledge should be incorporated into research that seeks to collect attitudinal measures from ADF aviation personnel.

Finally, the ADFFMAQ survey became complex as a result of its reworking by the ADFCRMWG to enable it to “fit” the military population. The original 82-item FMAQ was extended to 149 items. DSPPR (2001) notes that many of the ADFFMAQ forms returned were incomplete.

2.3.4 Australian Aviation Safety Case Study

In a survey of Australian transport aircrew conducted in 1995, Braithwaite (2001) reports that senior officers of the Australian Defence Force influence operational aviation personnel to the extent that the safety of ADF aviation is threatened. The question was designed to explore the effects of hierarchy upon employee attitudes towards safety. The results of the study show that 37% of RAAF transport aircrew are prepared to obey a rule introduced by a senior officer despite considering the rule to be unsafe. These findings are detailed below in Table 2.13.

Table 2.13. Results from RAAF transport aircrew regarding safety (Braithwaite, 2001). Question: “A senior officer introduces a new operating rule you RAAF Respondents consider to be unsafe, which of the following statements best Agreement (%) describes your actions?” I would simply ignore the new rule; it’s my life 4 I would complain about the rule to my colleagues 1 I would complain about the rule to my Wing Commander 9 I would complain directly to the officer responsible for the rule 49 I would obey the rule as it is my job to obey the rules 37

The results recorded by Braithwaite are dichotomous. Approximately half of the respondents report that they “would complain directly to the officer responsible for the rule”, and are therefore arguably not ‘influenced’ by rank. In contrast, a marginally lesser proportion (38%) of respondents seem to be strongly influenced by rank, or perhaps the military culture more generally. These respondents reported that they “would obey the new rule…” despite considering the new rule to be unsafe. 48 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

Interestingly, Braithwaite’s study also found that four percent of the ADF aircrew surveyed “would simply ignore the [senior officer’s] new rule”. While these results appear to hold significance prima facie, it should be noted that Braithwaite’s analysis did not include an examination of the statistical significance of the differences reported by survey respondents.

2.3.5 Summary: the Rationale for New Research

The results of the DSPPR (2001) attitudinal research and Braithwaite’s (2001) case study raise an important and fundamental question: do senior officers of the ADF influence operational aviation personnel to the extent that the safety of ADF aviation is threatened? Indeed, does the reportedly strong willingness to obey unsafe rules suggest poor initiative in communications, a lack of assertiveness or a strong discipline amongst the respondents? Conversely, does the small percentage of respondents reporting a willingness to simply ignore a new rule from a superior officer suggest the presence of a small, but nonetheless hazardous, indifference towards safety in the ADF? Do any attitudinal differences relate to the organisational attributes of the parent organisation? This latter question seems particularly relevant noting that Braithwaite’s study revealed that unlike the ADF aircrew surveyed, none of the Qantas aircrew would “…simply ignore the new rule”.

49 Chapter Two – The ADF Aviation System

2.4 CHAPTER TWO SUMMARY

This chapter placed the ADF aviation system in perspective by describing the magnitude of the ADF aviation system. Where information is available in the public domain, the chapter provided a comparison of aircraft fleets and aviation activity between the services of the ADF with other ‘best-comparable’ aviation entities including the USAF, RAF and Qantas. The chapter also described the aviation accidents incurred by the ADF since 1990 and the limited efficacy of statistical analyses. It was established that from January 1990 to January 2006, 62 accidents have occurred, fatally injuring 61 personnel and seriously injuring almost 40 others. However, akin to much previous work by researchers and accident investigators, this chapter described how such simplistic descriptive statistics have little utility in describing why accidents have occurred. Indeed, examination of ADF aviation accident investigations found that the majority of aircraft accidents have been identified to result from numerous co- contributing events that have cumulatively created conditions in which an accident becomes inevitable.

In addition, this chapter provided data that goes some way to establishing a priori themes or elements relating to normal ADF aviation safety performance for further research. Specifically, this chapter established that the only non-accident data describing the performance of the ADF aviation system is that provided by survey research that does not appear in the scientific literature – highlighted by Falconer (2005). Nonetheless, the aspects identified and described in this and the previous chapter – namely ‘cultural’ aspects related to safety, hierarchy and ego – provide a useful indication of the organisational issues requiring deeper examination. The following chapter, Chapter Three, examines the fundamental concepts within the scientific literature that relate to attitudes, culture and performance in sociotechnical systems.

50 CHAPTER THREE

ATTITUDE, CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE

The establishment of the research problem in Chapter One elucidated several aspects of ADF aviation performance that have prima facie links to safety. The description of the various human and technical components of ADF aviation provided by both Chapter One and Two elaborated upon these safety aspects, and in doing so showed that more ‘generic’ organisational aspects of ADF aviation appear to underline safety in the ADF.

This chapter examines the existing organisational culture theory and establishes it as a ‘parent concept’ (Glendon & Stanton, 2000) to safety culture. In contrast to safety culture, this chapter describes an increasingly established correlation between organisational culture and organisational performance. Accordingly, organisational culture is established as the most suitable avenue through which to explore the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel, in light of both its theoretical establishment and apparent applicability to ADF aviation populations. The chapter subsequently establishes the theoretical framework through which the research aim may be achieved. The framework assumes an anthropological posture to the aviation problem by building upon the approach’s principal tenet of contextual understanding (Batteau, 2001), then employs a psychological-approach framework to the measurement of attitudes of individual culturally based members of ADF aviation.

The chapter shows that the anthropological approach to culture is still in its infancy in the aviation context. In contrast, the psychological approach to culture is well established in the scientific literature and hence forms the bulk of the material reviewed here. A more recent approach to issues of organisational culture is the managerial approach, although researchers including Anthony (1990) and Legge (1994) argue that an organisation’s true culture is “untouchable by managers”, and that the managerial approach to culture represents an attempt to short-cut the established scientific practices of psychology and anthropology as they apply to cultural examination.

51 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

3.1 ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE DETERMINANTS

The deterministic approach to human performance in sociotechnical systems describes how individuals, their organisations and ultimately their cultures are implicated in the design, construction, monitoring and operation of aviation systems. Figure 3.1 provides a conceptualisation of the implication of culture in determining organisational performance.

Workplace Cultural Influences

↓↑ ↓↑ Attitudes Attitudes ↓↑ ↓↑ Behaviour Behaviour ↓ ↓ Outcome ‘A’ Outcome ‘B’ Accident Operations Normal Operations ↓ ↓

Organisational Performance

Figure 3.1. A conceptualisation of organisational performance determinants.

While some may view the deterministic approach to culture as rudimentary, numerous researchers over many decades have conceptualised culture as the influence of individual/organisational performance via attitudes and behaviour. Freud (1927) – while infrequently cited in sociotechnical research literature – provides an emphasis of the omnipotent nature of culture in society, stating, “I scorn to distinguish between culture and civilisation” (p.52). In this light, culture is arguably the foremost component of any persons’ attitudes and behaviours in any given context.

Much of the work regarding organisational performance and its cultural determinants is large-scale research performed on a multi-national national cultures platform, and includes Hofstede (1980, 2001) and Helmreich and Merritt (1998). Other research focuses on ‘smaller’ cultural entities, such as organisational culture (Williams et al, 1997; von Thaden et al, 2003), industrial and professional cultures (Bailey & Petersen,

52 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

1989; Kirwan, 2000; Batteau, 2001, 2002) and safety culture (Pidgeon, 1988, 1991; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Sorensen, 2002; Havold, 2005).

These works have produced diverse results from various methodologies. For example, Bailey and Petersen (1989) found that managers’ attitudes and behaviours (including ‘action’ indicators largely unreported in previous studies, such as supervisory support) appear to impact positive safety performance. These researchers correlated respondents’ attitudes with various downstream factors such as compensation costs and incidence and frequency rates, in an attempt to form safety comparisons between good and bad organisations. More recently, Havold (2005) found that the most important safety issues to personnel working in a Norwegian shipping company were influential across industries.

3.1.1 Culture

Various definitions of the term culture are found within the scientific literature, and both general and organisational parlance. It is generally accepted that culture has dimensions of both interaction and setting: a distinction between the narrow, locally negotiated interaction between personnel and the broad, institutional settings in which the interaction takes place (see Berger & Luckman, 1966; Cicourel, 1992; Schegloff, 1992; Kirwan, 2000). Helmreich and Merritt (1998) describe outer and inner “layers”. Kirwan (2000) highlights “clashing perspectives” relating to the culture of an organisation and its subjective working environment. Lambo and Lambo (1995) assert that culture is a function of the relationship between the actions of the individual and the context in which they occur, and add that culture is doubly reflexive. A feedback loop interconnects the culture (affecting individuals’ attitudes and behaviour) and individuals’ attitudes and behaviour (affecting the culture). Figure 3.2 (overleaf) illustrates this reflexive relationship.

53 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

Feedback Loop

Attitudes Culture Behaviours

Figure 3.2. A conceptual representation of the reflexive nature of culture.

Yet such conceptualisations lack the detail and both theoretical and scientifically measurable framework from which to ‘see’ culture. Indeed, the previous chapters of this thesis have shown that culture is inherently complex and difficult to quantify. This is particularly so when attempting to attribute safety (a subjective, intangible phenomena) to a culture – a highly contextual entity. Moreover, a single culture (whether it be national, organisational, etc) can be host to both accidents and normal operations – both are aspects of ‘performance’. Indeed, researchers including Helmreich and Merritt (1998) have found that Hofstede’s dimensions of culture (these will be described later in this chapter) exhibited a high degree of multi-colinearity – a strong indication of culture’s complexity.

The following sections of this chapter are devoted to the review of the various approaches to culture in the context of establishing the determinants of organisational performance that may be of use in an ADF aviation setting. Section 3.2 examines the characteristics and existing theoretical constructs relating to attitudes and behaviours. Section 3.3 examines the influence of culture in relation to the aviation culture ‘types’ (and their interaction) established by Helmreich and Merritt (1998). It also investigates the distinction between culture and climate. Importantly, the section establishes the relevancy of organisational culture to this research by examining each of the cultural types. Briefly, it is discovered that professional culture, national culture and safety culture are too ‘narrow’ in their potential influence on ADF aviation performance. Indeed, safety culture is found to be an emergent phenomenon that is quite

54 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

underdeveloped theoretically, although it is increasingly agreed that organisational safety aspects exist as a subset of organisational culture rather than an individually examinable entity. Section 3.4 delves deeper into this theoretical dilemma and examines the theoretical approaches to culture and organisational performance. It establishes that a psychological approach offers the most potential to exploratory research of ADF aviation culture, however the anthropological perspective offers additional strength through its contextual focus and multi-method traditions. Section 3.5 takes the next step and operationalises ADF organisational culture in preparation for the implementation of an investigative methodology in the flowing chapter. Section 3.6 provides a chapter summary.

55 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

3.2 ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS

According to Wilkening (1978), an attitude is “a learned and relatively enduring perception, expressed or unexpressed, influencing a person to think or behave in a fairly predictable manner towards objects, persons or situations”. Perhaps more succinctly, Glendon and McKenna (1995) assert that an attitude can be defined as a “learned tendency to act in a consistent way to a particular object or situation”. These definitions follow the approach to attitudes of leading attitudinal researchers Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) and according to Glendon and McKenna (1995) indicate that attitudes are:

• Specific to a particular situation or object, and should not be thought of as being generalisable to other situations or objects. • Generally clustered and consistent with one another; • Learned through social situations and other influences; • A tendency to act, but are not a guarantee that a person with a given attitude will actually act in any particular way.

The relation of attitudes to behaviour has been an enduring source of both fascination and frustration to researchers over many decades – and particularly since the belief and information integration research of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). Ostrom, Skowronski and Novak (1994) assert that despite minor revisions to attitudinal theory (examined later in this section), “the task of most attitude theorists, from the 1920s to the present, has been to develop a model of what leads a person to change his or her attitude” (p. 198). More recently, Flin (1997) argues that “behaviour is governed to a significant degree by the attitudes we hold, and any attempt to change behaviour should begin with an attempt to identify underlying attitudes and beliefs relevant to the behaviours in question.” Flin’s (1997) assertion is noteworthy here because it identifies the two arguably principal aspects to consider when examining attitudes and behaviours. Firstly, Flin recognises that attitudes are multi-dimensional and ‘underlie’ behaviours. Secondly, she identifies the aspect of relevancy in attitudinal analysis. These aspects are similarly highlighted by Glendon and McKenna (1995) in relation to the ‘location’ of the attitudes (underlying behaviour). These researchers suggest that attitudes may be considered as “being located somewhere between deep-seated values and beliefs – which may well remain 56 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

unchanged over a lifetime – and relatively superficial views and opinions – which may change frequently depending upon what information we have most recently been exposed to” (p. 74).

Hence the remainder of this section (3.2) establishes the theoretical framework of attitudes both internally (in terms of components and dimensions) and externally (attitudes influencing behaviour), and subsequently examines the existing methods for attitude measurement. The aim of this section is to establish (a) the characteristics of attitudes that are most closely aligned and hence examinable via applied research amongst the ADF aviation population and (b) the means by which such attitudes will be measured.

3.2.1 Attitude Components

Attitudes are commonly considered to have three components (Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960): affective, cognitive and behavioural intention. The affective component is concerned with feelings and emotions. For example, Glendon and McKenna (1995) suggest that a witness to a serious accident is “likely to feel more strongly about safety than a person who has not learned through such an experience” (p. 74). The cognitive component is concerned essentially with the thinking aspect of an attitude, such as having an attitude as to whether something is (or is not) dangerous, and is subject to influence from potentially numerous influences (Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). The behavioural intention component is analogous to the ‘tendency to act’ characteristic of attitudes described earlier.

Glendon and McKenna (1995) clarify that while the attitudinal components can be separately identified, the relationship between them may be problematic. The researchers use the experimental work of Breckler (1984) to illustrate this problematic nature. In brief, Breckler’s dual experiment involved placing two sets of participants in a room with a snake in the corner of the room. For one set of participants, the snake was a real, live snake. The second group of participants were asked to imagine that there was a snake in the room. Breckler (1984) concluded that merely asking people to imagine

57 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

what their reactions would be in a situation involving threat is not a valid predictor of their actual behaviour or of their feelings in respect of the threat.

3.2.2 Attitude Dimensions

There are ten main characteristics of attitudes. These characteristics are often referred to as dimensions, and are listed below with a brief description of each. Arguably in any given attitudinal study each of the dimensions that comprise attitudes are fully relevant and hence explored, however the aim and objectives of this research necessitate that selection of some dimensions of attitudes is desirable because some dimensions may be more applicable and indeed measurable (see attitude measurement in the following section) than others during the survey and interview stages of this project. The five dimensions to be focussed upon during the survey phase are marked with an asterisk in the list below, and to a certain extent reflect the attitudinal and organisational characteristics described in the first and second chapters of this thesis.

• Valence* – the manner in which the object of an attitude is evaluated most notably encompassing the degree of positive or negative feeling; • Multiplexity* – the degree to which an attitude is differentiated from other attitudes, such as the differentiation between attitudes about organisational culture and attitudes about safety; • Breadth* – the number of attributes that characterise the object of the attitude from broad to narrow; • Intensity – the strength of feeling about an object (analogous to affective, described earlier); • Stability* – how resistant to change; • Centrality – the extent to which a person feels that it reflects their identity (e.g., a pilot feeling that holding strong attitudes towards safety is part of their self-concept; • Salience – the degree to which an attitude occupies a person’s awareness from total preoccupation to complete absence; • Interrelatedness* – how related the attitude is to other attitudes; • Behavioural expression – the degree to which an attitude is acted upon; and

58 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

• Verifiability – the extent to which an attitude can be checked against evidence (e.g., attitudes towards personal protective equipment [PPE] being verified by observing PPE use) (Glendon & McKenna, 1995).

The remaining five dimensions (those dimensions not marked with an asterisk above) are not to be disregarded, however. These characteristics will be explored in the interview phase of this study, as they relate more to ‘verification’ aspects and are suited to the more open-ended examination provided by interview methodology. To this end, the following section examines the theoretical framework of attitude and behaviour. Having explored the internal aspects of attitudes, the break down between attitude and behaviour – the external aspect – requires greater clarification. This will both explain the role and functioning of ‘attitude’ as it appears in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 and make explicit the theoretical assumptions that apply to this work in relation to the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel and why they behave as they do.

3.2.3 Theory of Attitude and Behaviour

It is generally accepted that there are four types of attitude and behaviour theory: (1) attitudes influencing behaviour, (2) behaviour influencing attitudes, (3) mutual influence and (4) influence of other factors. For three of these types, the relationship between attitude and behaviour described by the theoretical models are self-evident. Hence only a brief description of the first three theories will be provided in this section (see Table 3.1, overleaf).

The fourth theory provides a more comprehensive framework to the theory of attitude and behaviour, and is also more complex than the first three theory types. Accordingly, the theory encompassing the ‘influence of other factors’ is examined here in greater detail. The aspect of attitude measurement follows naturally from this point, and is hence described in the latter part of this section.

59 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

Table 3.1. Summary of models of the attitude-behaviour relationship.

Model Description

Attitudes influencing If a person’s attitude about something (e.g., PPE) is known, then behaviour their behaviour in respect of PPE can be reasonably predicted.

Behaviour influencing If methods are implemented that change people’s behaviour, then attitudes their attitudes will change to correspond with that behaviour.

This theory is a summation of the previous two. It reflects one Mutual influence obvious conclusion from the dual premises represented in the two model previous unidirectional theories.

This model acknowledges the importance of cognitive consistency Influence of other while considering the possibility of additional factors that could factors influence both attitudes and behaviour.

The notion of consistency, introduced by the fourth model type in Table 3.1, is worthy of elaboration here. The basic premise of consistency, congruity or balance is that people strive to make their attitudes and behaviour consistent (Ostrom et al, 1994). In relation to the Influence of other factors theory specifically, Glendon and McKenna (1995) state that the apparent consistency between attitudes and behaviour is “not necessarily a basis for judging one to be a prime causal agent in respect of the other” (p. 81).

Influence of other factors theory

The Influence of other factors approach to the attitude-behaviour link is a progression on the first three theories of the nature of the link, as it suggests that a separate factor exists that may address both attitudes and behaviour of a section of the workforce. Figure 3.3 (overleaf) provides an illustration of the concept of Influence of other factors relating to the nature of the attitude-behaviour link.

60 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

FACTOR X (e.g. safety campaign)

Influences attitudes Influences behaviour (e.g. supervisory (e.g. incentives to use PPE) reminders to use PPE)

Remain mutually consistent ATTITUDE BEHAVIOUR

Figure 3.3. A third factor influencing attitudes and behaviour.

The stand-alone ‘X’ factor depicted in Figure 3.3 may stem from a wide variety of potential influences. One of the most common is a factor that reflects a ‘campaign’ – similar to a marketing approach that influences consumers. In this manner, Glendon and McKenna (1995) suggest that messages designed to influence attitudes towards a product, while not necessarily making people purchase it, are reinforced by promotional activity. Kirwan (2000) describes a similar phenomenon relating to “selling” human factors within organisations, stating that internal presentations describing the value of human factors to the organisation “must focus on how [a human factors project] did the company good, not how clever psychologists/HF people are. If non-HF people can be persuaded to stand up and say how useful the work was to the company, so much the better” (p. 676).

It is easy to recall the same three-way dynamic yielding potential influence upon ADF aviation personnel from the previous chapters of this thesis. Indeed, the Mission First – Safety Always message is worth specific mention here for its simplicity and arguable effectiveness in ‘improving attitudes’ to safety (see section 1.3, Attitudes and the Military). Additional “Factor X” influences described by previous chapters include the can-do, safety culture, positive self-appraisal, and existing expertise ‘campaigns’. These factors are widely acknowledged and even promoted by ADF aviation senior management, yet the nature of this relationship is not known. The appropriateness of the Influence of other factors theory to this research is hence made clear. This

61 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

appropriateness also acknowledges the importance of contextual relevance in this research, established early in this thesis.

Attitude measurement

Thurstone (1928) first developed the ‘point on a continuum’ theory about the nature of attitudes and their measurement that remain largely unchanged to this day. Indeed, Ostrom et al (1994) point out that attitude continues to be viewed as a point on an evaluative continuum that ranges from low to high, or negative to positive.

There are two main reasons for attempting to measure attitudes. Glendon and McKenna (1995) assert that the primary reason is to establish whether a person has a positive or negative view of a particular issue or object, as well as establishing the strength of that feeling. Secondly, they suggest that attitude measurement is necessary in relation to attitude change: an objective measure is required to gauge attitudes before and after any intervention such as a campaign (described earlier).

Although indirect attitudinal measures are available to researchers (e.g., unobtrusively observing the behaviour of personnel), direct measures are considered to be reliable and valid. Direct measures – commonly referred to as attitude scales – comprise various types, and the most widely used in aviation settings and social research more generally is the Likert scale. It is also appropriate for this research as it is designed to measure the intensity of an attitude. Indeed, according to Glendon and McKenna (1995), a Likert scale is “relatively easy to construct and administer” (p. 90).

The drawback of this apparent simplicity is that for a Likert scale to be used as a valid measure of attitudes, the scale items often require several iterations after application across numerous respondent groups before they achieve the best available measure of the attitude. Noting that this thesis’ objectives include the establishment of contextually driven items that form a priori themes for application within the ADF aviation population, issues relating to scale validity should be expected. Indeed, this difficulty in achieving validity exists in many attitudinal studies in sociotechnical settings that use

62 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

Likert scale measures – including civil aviation (Hunter, 2005) and ground transport (Williamson et al, 1997).

63 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

3.3 CULTURAL INFLUENCE

The conceptualisation presented by Helmreich and Merritt (1998) – arguably the most widely acknowledged aviation-context model to date – provides an informed perspective of the influence and interactions of the various cultural types (see Figure 3.4) within a typical aviation system.

!"#$%&&'#()*+ /")'('(0 ,-*.-"%

2"0)('3).'#()*+ 4)$%.5+ 4)$%+ ,-*.-"% ,-*.-"% 6%7)8'#"

1).'#()*+ 2"0)('3).'#()* ,-*.-"% ,*'9).%

Figure 3.4. Helmreich and Merritt’s (1998) model of cultural intersection.

However, it is less informative regarding the relative influence of each culture upon one another and, ultimately, upon the performance of the system. It also does not elucidate the internal workings of the various cultural sub-sets. This is not surprising given the continuing controversy of cultural ‘measurement’ within industrial systems, described in detail within numerous previous sections of this thesis. These sections have clearly shown that research conducted since the 1970s – particularly Hofstede (1980, 2001), and related work by Gregorich, Helmreich and Wilhelm (1990), Merritt (1993a, 2000), Helmreich and Merritt (1998) – suggests that the “deconstruction” of the various human factors at play within aviation culture (particularly ‘group’ aspects such as teamwork – see Salas et al, 1999) and their subsequent attribution to various internal and external cultural influences is problematic and even inappropriate to the extent that it is subjective. Batteau (2001) argues, “The culture of aviation, the remaking of human culture through flight, consists of a set of representations and mediations that defy the gravitas of conventional cultural forms. Concepts of distance and familiarity, like

64 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

markers of status, have all been altered by this new large-scale system” (p.202). He further explains, “Culture here is a far different matter from questionnaire responses or national stereotypes: culture here is a matter of collective representations and negotiated differences that resist fixed or authoritative characterisation. Authoritative efforts to fix (mend, correct, neuter, hypostatise) cultural differences elicit resistance” (p.206).

3.3.1 Culture and Climate

Another concept that complicates the scientific analysis of culture is the idea of an organisational climate. Various researchers have mentioned this idea; some consensus has been reached on what it is and how it is different from the culture itself. In general, climate is viewed as the perception of given aspects (e.g., safety) within an organisation at a particular time (Williamson et al, 1997). According to Glendon and Stanton (2000), organisational climate is “regarded as a more superficial concept than organisational culture, describing aspects of an organisation’s current state” (p. 198). Climate is hence related to situational and environmental factors and is temporary, relatively unstable and subject to change (Gibbons et al, 2004). Climate affects the performance of a company just as the culture of it does, however the effects of the culture are seen to be more time enduring than those of each passing climate. The climate can mean the economic climate, the influence of the present management, environmental factors, pressures or political movements, and can be both internal and external. In Rousseau’s (1988) review of thirteen definitions of organisational climate derived over two decades, employee attitudes and perceptions featured prominently.

Glendon and Stanton (2000) suggest that studying an organisation over an extended period of time can reduce the possibility of confusing climate and cultural characteristics with one another (e.g., organisational climate vis organisational culture). Indeed, the purpose of studying an organisational culture is to gain insight into why it performs the way it does and perhaps if it is performing to its full potential. With this purpose in mind, building an accurate model requires distinctions to be made over what is stable or temporary, and what is internal and what is external.

65 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

Applicability to this research

In this light, it is arguable that this study represents an attempt to measure and define organisational culture, in that the research model used is exploratory, derived from a ‘bottom up’ cultural perspective (this will be examined later in this chapter in some detail), and implemented via triangulated means. Indeed, Glendon and Stanton (2000) report, “if a psychometric scale is the exclusive measurement instrument, then some aspect of organisational climate is being measured” (p. 198).

Moreover, other research relating to organisational climate shows that the factor structure of climate surveys typically relate to ‘human resource management’ aspects of an organisations environment. Koys and De Cotiis (1991) produced a composite eight- dimensional scale (components: fairness, support, recognition, autonomy, cohesion, pressure, trust, innovation) based on a review of 35 scales found in the literature. The researchers found that substantive elements of organisational life such as risk and safety perception do not feature as components of organisational climate measures. This holds a strong implication for this research in that it suggests that this work represents an attempt at organisational culture measurement in contrast to safety culture. The following section examines safety culture in detail.

3.3.2 Safety Culture

The search for explanations as to why employees behave unsafely has led to the development of the notion of safety culture1 as a significant potential indicator of an organisation’s propensity to “be safe” (Helmreich, Merritt & Sherman, 1996). Safety culture is generally defined as an amalgamation of values, standards and norms of acceptable behaviour aimed at maintaining a self-disciplined approach to the enhancement of safety beyond legislative and regulatory requirements: “the constructed system of meanings through which a given people or group understand the hazards of the world” or similar (see Turner, Pidgeon, Blockley & Toft, 1989; Pidgeon, 1991).

1 Some researchers argue that safety culture and safety climate are subsets of an organisation’s culture. Safety climate is argued to be a reflection of culture, often assessed by gathering survey data that provides a view of employee perceptions, attitudes and beliefs regarding safety (Litwin & Stringer, 1968; Sarkus, 1999, 2001; Williamson, Feyer, Cairns & Biancotti, 1997). 66 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

McDonald and Johnston (1994) refer to the organisation’s members’ shared understanding of the meaning of these norms, values and practices.

The concept of safety culture was largely popularised as a result of the nuclear plant disaster that occurred at Chernobyl in 1986 (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996; Meshkati, 1995, 1996, 1997), although several years earlier Zohar (1980) researched the “climate for safety” by measuring employee perceptions based on a questionnaire completed by 400 employees. Zohar (1980) used eight dimensions to measure these perceptions. His concern was individual performers and how their perceptions related to ratings of a safety inspector.

The notion of safety culture has taken on a pivotal role in contemporary safety management initiatives and regulation (Back & Woolfson, 1999; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 1995). Yet the work of these researchers has illuminated the poorly defined and generally simplistic indicators of safety culture, such as that proffered by Weinstein and Lyon (1999) (see Figure 3.5).

Safety Culture ↓ Identification of Hazards ↓ Implementation of System Defences ↓ Accident Rate

Figure 3.5. The determinism of safety culture (Weinstein & Lyon, 1999).

Reason (1997) asserts that safety culture comprises interacting elements that enhance safety health as a natural by-product. More specifically, safety culture refers to the norms, roles, values and common practices that govern the way in which the organisation performs its work, and the organisation’s members’ shared understanding of the meaning of these norms, rules and practices (Turner, Pidgeon, Blockley and Toft, 1989). The UK-based Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 1991) highlights the shared understanding aspect of safety culture, arguing that safety culture secures involvement 67 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

and participation at all levels. McCormack (1999) similarly asserts that a safety culture is “one in which everyone willingly becomes involved for the prevention of accidents” (p. 9). Akin to the broad definition offered by Turner et al (1989), Pidgeon and O’Leary (1995) define safety culture as: “the set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices within an organisation which are concerned with minimising the exposure of individuals, both within and outside an organisation, to conditions considered to be dangerous” (p. 49).

Pidgeon (1991) asserts that there are three characteristics of safety culture: (1) norms and rules governing safety, (2) attitudes towards safety, and (3) reflexivity on safety practice. Pidgeon and O’Leary (1995) amended the theory to include a fourth principle characteristic: responsibility for safety at strategic management level. To illustrate their usefulness to the ADF aviation system, it is worthwhile examining the key characteristics provided by Pidgeon in greater detail.

First Characteristic – Norms and rules governing safety

Pidgeon (1991) asserts that the norms and rules governing safety within an organisation are central to a safety culture, regardless of whether the norms and rules are explicit or tacit. As the organisations’ ‘guidelines for action’, the norms and rules will shape the perceptions and actions of the individuals in the organisation in particular ways – defining significant, known risks and appropriate ‘endorsed’ responses. However, Pidgeon (1991) observes that there is a tension between and need to cope with those hazards that are well defined in advance, and those that are ill defined or beyond the boundaries of current knowledge.

Second Characteristic – Attitudes towards safety

Pidgeon (1991) asserts that safety attitudes refer to individual and collective beliefs about hazards and the importance of safety, together with the motivation to act on those beliefs. He further states that a minimum requirement in this regard includes senior management holding a realistic view of the world and of the short- and long-term hazards entailed by the organisation’s activities. Equally important, the rules and norms

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must be distributed, supported and endorsed throughout the organisation. Accordingly, concern with safety needs to be representative of organisation members, not imposed, often somewhat punitively, by one group on another. Recognition of the desirability of safety rules provides a motivation to conform to them in their spirit and according to letter. Within such a culture, Pidgeon (1991) argues that everybody in the organisation would regard the policing of hazards as a personal and collective goal.

Third Characteristic – Reflexivity on safety practice

Reflexivity over current practices and beliefs can be characterised as a learning process, and similarly a search for new meanings in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity about risk. Moreover, reflexivity acts as a precaution against the over-rigid application of existing rules to the neglect of unanticipated hazards (Pidgeon, 1991).

Fourth Characteristic – Strategic Safety Management

Strategic safety management can be characterised as the simple regulatory requirement for safety responsibility at the strategic management level. The previous characteristic (reflexivity) is facilitated by the mechanisms of accident and incident feedback systems that are implemented and promoted by strategic safety management. Pidgeon (1991) asserts that the critical role of strategic safety management arises because it is common to find that the general patterns displayed by particular disasters invariably have precursors in other similar incidents.

Given these seemingly valid characteristics, it must now be asked how might safety culture be suitable to ADF aviation research? Recent research by Glendon and Stanton (2000) and others (which is examined in considerable detail in Section 3.5 as it relates to the operationalisation of ADF aviation culture) offers a clear answer to this question. Safety culture – whilst argued by some to be all-pervasive in organisations – appears to be a sub-set of attributes within an organisation. Indeed, even Pidgeon’s work offers a first hint at the utility of safety culture as an examinable entity and the applicability of safety culture to new ADF research. Pidgeon and O’Leary (1995; 1995a) assert that the principles correspond to Cohen’s (1977) and Zohar’s (1980) accounts of ‘organisational

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factors’ that influence occupational safety, and Lautman and Gallimore’s (1987) survey of Boeing operators with exceptional safety records. Nonetheless, several seemingly valuable hypothesised aspects of safety culture are identified by Pidgeon et al, and will be revisited by this thesis in preparing a research methodology.

3.3.3 National Culture

National cultural differences have been extensively documented (see Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Hofstede, 1980, 1991, 2001; Soeters & Boer, 2000) and are shown to affect numerous social phenomena, including education, defence policy, social security and the administration of justice. National cultural characteristics also play a part in aviation. Several researchers have examined national culture across cultures within aviation (Johnston, 1993; Merritt, 1994), most notably including Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001) whose isolation of five dimensions on which national cultures can be classified was examined earlier in this chapter.

National culture is an inappropriate means through which to assess cultural influences upon safety in ADF aviation for numerous reasons. The principal reason is that national culture has been found to be the most distal element and the least amenable to change (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Secondly, Hofstede’s scores represent the average of the scores of the questionnaire respondents. This averaging has a tendency to promote an “ecological fallacy” (Hayward, 1997): that individualistic scores across countries correlate directly to individual residents of particular nations. For example, because Australia scores higher on the dimension of Individualism than Indonesia, the result is often interpreted to mean that a particular Australian must be more individualist than a particular Indonesian. This notion is reinforced by Jeanniot2 (in Vandyk, 1995), who also notes that two of the Hofstede cultural indices (Power distance and Individualism) provide a strong temptation to jump to the conclusion that “the reason for a higher accident rate in Region X is primarily that cultural influence Y is present”. Thirdly, despite aviation’s increasingly multicultural population (Hayward, 1997), census data

2 IATA Director General. 70 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

shows that the ADF aviation population is predominantly Australian-born (DoD, 2001). This has resulted in a somewhat ‘mono-cultural’ organisational environment.

3.3.4 Professional Culture

Certain cultural norms can be associated with those who work in various industries and occupations. This is particularly so in ADF aviation, where there is little (if any) variety in ethnicity and similar uniformity in socio-economic background. There is a range of sub-cultures within aviation organisations, commonly described as vocational or professional cultures. For example, a typical commercial flight crew comprises pilots and cabin crew. Whilst the two groups work together as part of the same crew, there are many differences between them in terms of cultural characteristics and demographical origins (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).

In ADF aviation, the roles may be somewhat ‘militarised’, yet similar differences were highlighted in the FMAQ survey of ADF aviation personnel (DSPPR, 2001). Within these occupational groups, further sub-cultures may exist, including fighter and maritime pilots, or Qualified Flying Instructors and line pilots. While these occupations share various vocational norms, there are many differences between the sub-cultures. The importance of understanding the cultural differences becomes apparent when two or more differing cultures interact. In the ADF, significant levels of interaction occur during peak periods of operational tempo or military exercise. During such periods, groups that infrequently interact (such as fighter, transport and maritime aircrew) bring numerous intangible cultural idiosyncrasies into the organisational context, such as attitudinal norms and squadron values.

While professional culture clearly has relevance to ADF research in that the organisation of ADF aviation comprises several different co-contributing professions, research designed specifically for professional culture would be necessarily more limited in scope than research based on organisational culture. This is shown clearly by Helmreich and Merritt’s cultural intersection provided by Figure 3.4. However, new research that focuses on organisational culture could embrace profession as a

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demographic measure; the results of which may provide a rationale for more focussed professional culture based research at a later date.

3.3.5 Organisational Culture

The culture ‘type’ that relates to the influence of the organisation upon personnel working within the organisation is ‘organisational culture’. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) define organisational culture as “the values, beliefs, assumptions, rituals, symbols and behaviours that define a group, especially in relations to other groups or organisations” (p.109). Further, they depict organisational culture with direct influence upon training practices and safety culture (see Figure 3.4). The role of these organisational factors in the genesis of accidents is becoming better understood and more widely accepted. However, according to McDonald and Johnston (1994), understanding how organisations can play a proactive and preventative role in managing the human factors of safety is still largely unknown.

Much scientific evidence suggests that the influence of an organisation upon the behaviour of its members is not a predictive or direct influence (e.g., Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; McDonald & Johnston, 1994; Meshkati, 1996). Organisational factors are influences upon employees’ attitudes and behaviours due to their employment within a specific organisation, and reflect the context or culture of organisations. Organisational culture is increasingly acknowledged as a powerful influence on the operation of complex human-machine systems, most notably within civil and military aviation spheres (FAA, 2001; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 1995; Soeters & Boer, 2000). Kern (2001) provides a salient example of this recognition in military aviation, stating, “Becoming aware of cultural factors will make you a better pilot” (p. 188). Similar assertions are common amongst ADF aviation safety experts and senior ADF management, including DFS and CAF. These were established in Chapter One. It is therefore necessary at this point, having examined the relevant aspects of the culture ‘types’ in aviation, to progress to an examination of the existing approaches to organisational culture.

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3.4 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CULTURE

The analysis of culture remains a matter of controversy. This controversy is primarily due to the existence of three differing approaches to organisational culture: psychological, managerial and anthropological. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) provide a breakdown of these discipline-related methodologies as follows:

• Managerial Approach – this approach tends to define organisational culture as a phenomenon that can be managed and manipulated. • Anthropological Approach – this approach adopts a more ethnographic viewpoint stressing that each organisation is a unique, historically derived, subjective phenomenon beyond simple manipulation. • Psychological Approach – this approach encompasses the viewpoint of empirically based organisational psychology that seeks to reduce the organisational culture phenomenon to its sub-components.

The following subsections review the literature in each of the above domains, and in this context it is interesting to note Helmreich and Merritt’s (1998) assertion that organisational culture analysis is usually undertaken via the approach directly associated with “the discipline from which the scientist originates”.

3.4.1 The Managerial Approach

The managerial approach to organisational culture encompasses the view that organisations possess a single, unified culture that can be altered and transformed as a direct consequence of the actions of the managers within an organisation. Culture in this sense is not slowly fashioned by its members, but simply ‘exists’ within an organisation. Under this approach, all of an organisation’s personnel share a single culture that is instilled in them at the time of entering into a new organisation. Further to this idea exists the notion that once an organisation has the desired culture, it can be easily modified to create a new culture. Buchanan and Huczynski (2004) state, “the managerial perspective sees culture as something that an organisation has. It further assumes that it is capable of being created and modified by organisational founders and 73 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

corporate leaders” (p. 659). Hence a managerial approach suggests management can and should take responsibility for cultural development and direction as the power holders within the organisation.

The managerial approach to culture is a relatively recent introduction to the debate and examination of organisational culture - traceable back to the early 1980s (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Buchanan & Huczynski, 2004). Since the 1980s, there have been numerous works published on organisational culture theory from the managerial perspective. One of the most widely discussed works has been Schein’s (1984) model of cultural development. He describes culture as a “pattern of shared basic assumptions that have been learned by the organisation in response to problems of external adaptation and internal integration that...is therefore taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems”. Schein’s work was further developed by Young (2000), who used Schein’s model to identify the different ‘levers’ used to maintain or modify an existing culture. Some of these levers include authority and influence, motivation, management control, conflict management, and customer management. It is through these ‘levers’ that senior management can preserve or modify the culture in accordance with their preferences.

The use of organisational culture management to improve profitability, growth and stability has been widely popularised. Casey (1999) and Grugulis and Wilkinson (2002), argue that this view is still upheld today where cultural change programs that are ‘designed to benefit stakeholders’ and improve ‘organizational efficiency’ are adapted by organisations.

According to Bernick (2001), the managerial approach to organisational culture takes a “pragmatic view; recommending what the culture should be, suggesting how it might be changed so as to encourage greater efficiency and even encourages managers to act as if the preferred culture actually exists.” Buchanan and Huczynski (2004) also support this theory: “the focus is on what culture should be and not what it actually is. Managers are then encouraged to act as if the preferred culture actually does exist and by doing so, will cause the culture to develop” (p. 640). This approach essentially supports managers’ ignorance to the actual environment within an organisation, leading them to

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act on the belief that the preferred culture exists. As a part of this approach, managers are constantly under the assumption that all aspects of their organisation are working in harmony and that all employees are content in their workplaces.

Ogbonna and Harris (2002) discuss organisational culture in terms of three broad typologies: the optimists, the pessimists and the realists. Cultural optimists openly support the concept of managing organisational culture. They not only assume the existence of united organisations but also imply that “cultural control by management is possible and most desirable.” The view that organisational culture can be managed is frequently based on the assumption of “single identifiable unifying values in organisations.” In this case, the interests of management can either be imposed upon, or be accepted by all other employees in the organisation.

Criticism and utility of the managerial approach

By the early 1990s, more cynical views of the manipulation of culture began to arise. The pressure on middle managers to increase output and decrease input to raise profits lead to the development of more goal-specific organisations characterised by downsizing, outsourcing and redundancies that in turn have created employee unrest. But due to the managerial assumption that everyone has the same goals, managers are unaware of this unrest (Buchanan & Huczynski’s, 2004).

Willmott (1993) explores the concept of power abuse within organisations: “cultural change interventions are both ‘manipulative and totalitarian’ seeking as they do influence and control over the thoughts, values, attitudes and norms of others” (p. 42). Employees are now more aware of these managerial techniques and as such, are prepared to struggle against such controlling concepts. Buchanan and Huczynski (2004) assert that the managerial approach tends to cause many problems among employees who resent the idea of being controlled, and rebel as a result. Such issues can escalate to cause many bigger issues for the business.

In summary, researchers including Schein (1984), Willmott (1993) and Ogbonna and Harris (2002) have provided the building blocks for further growth of the managerial

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approach to organisational culture. It is reasonable, therefore, to anticipate that the managerial approach to organisational culture will retain its place in business and academic study as long as people believe that culture is, in a sense, a tangible element worthy of manipulation.

3.4.2 The Anthropological Approach

There are four areas that comprise the scientific discipline of anthropology: physical anthropology, archaeology, linguistic anthropology and cultural anthropology. The study of organisational culture is concerned with cultural anthropology. There are two main branches of cultural anthropology: ethnography, which is the study of a culture by personally observing and studying that culture; and ethnology, which compares and analyses different cultures through studying their history, and uses theoretical constructs to distinguish them (Haviland, Prins, Wakrath & McBride, 2005).

While the psychological and managerial approaches embrace the notion that organisational culture can be measured, changed and manipulated, the anthropological approach stresses that organisational culture is beyond simple manipulation (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Batteau, 2001). The anthropological approach studies an organisational culture in terms of its context and the individuals that it is comprised of: it looks for the meaning behind underlying structures of symbols, myths, social drama and rituals (Gibbons et al, 2004).

Cultural anthropology has been primarily concerned with the study of human behaviour. However, in recent decades the discipline has evolved to include the effects of society on human behaviour (Batteau, 2001). Batteau (2002) asserts, “within anthropology, culture is everything. Culture, the ability to use culture, and the shared project of cultural evolution are what makes us human” (p.20). He further argues that through an anthropological approach, the character that forms and represents a particular culture can be determined (Batteau, 2002). To gain insight to this deeper structure, a cultural study is conducted that consists of intensive and extensive observations and employee interviews (Schein, 1992).

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The study of organisational culture via an anthropological approach involves using orthogonal viewpoints and ethnographic observations (Batteau, 2002). This is done by observing the operations and environment without assumptions and knowledge – the orthogonal view through which “neutral judgments” may be made. To obtain orthogonal viewpoints, anthropologists are required to be part of the group for a period of time to experience its culture. Ethnographic observations, as well as cultural theories, may be used to strengthen the orthogonal viewpoints. Batteau (2002) suggests that ethnographic observations should be gathered by holding informal interviews with personnel and observing them within the organisation. The ideal situation to hold such observations should be during the daily activities of the personnel. Furthermore, the anthropological approach would allow the interviewee to speak freely rather than employing a set of standard questions as this may engender attitudinal bias within the interviewee.

While researchers such as Bate (1997) argue that the managerial approach has difficulty in bridging the gap between macro and micro levels of behaviour, the anthropological approach is argued to allow ways to understand the behaviour of the individuals as part of the pattern of behaviour as a whole. In a similar vein, Mearns and Flin (1999) assert that the anthropological perspective of organisational culture suggests that the complexity of organisational culture means that it cannot be broken down through the traditional analytical methods of the other approaches, and that it is sufficiently complex to resist attempts at direct manipulation. Batteau (2002) argues that the classical human factors studies are rooted within social psychology and engineering, and its emphasis on physical relationships do not adequately address cultural issues. He argues that the addition of conceptual apparatus from disciplines that have not yet addressed themselves to the challenges of improving industrial operations needs to be incorporated into the development of a dynamic and more realistic human factors systems model in aviation.

Criticism and utility of the anthropological approach

In the previous section it was shown that the managerial approach tends to focus on organisational culture and the means by which it may be manipulated and managed to

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improve productivity. In comparison, the inability of the anthropological approach to accept direct manipulation could well be viewed as a disadvantage of the approach – stemming from the inability to breakdown the culture into smaller components. As Weigmann et al (2004) point out, the majority of the attempts to measure and change aspects of organisation culture have been through other perspectives. In comparison to the psychological approach (examined in detail in the following section), Schein (1990) suggests that the psychological approach to the concept of culture lacks anthropology’s ethnographical perspective that in turn clearly identifies “the dimensions and variables of the culture’s sub-components” (p.109).

In relation to aviation specifically, Batteau (2002) argues that the cultural anthropological approach is not sufficient to replace the existing approaches to the study of human factors. Given that the study of human factors and cultural anthropology are always evolving with new cultures, created by technical personnel, managers and safety supervisors, and maintenance personnel amongst many others, he suggests that the cultural anthropological approach can only complement and contribute to the study of human factors in aviation.

3.4.3 The Psychological Approach

The ‘psychological approach’ reflects the position of researchers who approach the problem of organisational culture measurement by breaking it down into categories in order to understand it. Researchers taking the psychological approach to culture often compartmentalise cultural characteristics into external and internal aspects. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) describe the two distinct components of culture as the outer and inner layers of culture. The outer layer is the surface structure that consists of observable behaviours and recognisable physical manifestations such as members’ uniforms. The inner layer is the deep structure that consists of the attitudes, beliefs and assumptions that underlie the surface structure and provide the logic that guides the members’ behaviours (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).

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Hofstede (2001) asserts that akin to forces in physics, mental constructs are “defined into existence” and therefore cannot be observed. Hofstede (2001) suggests that the ‘mental programming’ of an individual is partly unique and partly shared by others. He asserts that there are three levels in mental programming that are broadly distinguishable as universal, collective and individual. These levels are illustrated by Figure 3.6 and expanded below.

Individual

Collective

Universal

Figure 3.6. Levels of mental programming (Hofstede, 2001).

The middle layer – collective mental programming – is of interest to this research as it encompasses the decision making of the individual with specific regard to the environment in which the decision process takes place. Hofstede (2001) describes collective mental programming as the level whereby the majority of an individual’s mental programming occurs. He states, “The collective level of mental programming is shared with some but not all other people; it is common to a certain group or category, but different from people belonging to other groups or categories” (p.2). The remaining layers of the mental programming construct refer to personality (individual) and the broad, Homo sapiens (universal) aspects respectively.

Hofstede is considered as the frontrunner of cross-cultural psychology, conducting what has been considered as the most extensive research of national and organisational cultures, spanning 66 countries and including almost 120,000 employees of the multinational firm IBM. Although his study was conducted in the 1980’s it continues to appear in and hold relevance to present day human factors literature – most notably in replication studies. By collecting data over a period of 6 years Hofstede was able to more readily identify what characteristics were a product of the company’s true culture and not simply of a passing climate (the distinction will be explored later in this

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chapter). Hofstede clearly defined the differences between national culture and organisational culture throughout his research. His psychological approach sees an organisation as a differing social system than that of a nation, because members (a) have a decision to join it, (b) are only involved in it during working hours, and (c) will leave it one day.

Hofstede’s analysis suggests five areas of cultural differences, which could categorise organisational and national cultures. Each IBM subsidiary from the 66 countries studied was then given a comparative score on each of these dimensions. The five dimensions of culture are described by Hofstede (2001) as:

• Dimension One – Power distance. This dimension describes the extent to which the less powerful members of organisations and institutions accept and expect that power be distributed unequally. The basic problem involved is the degree of human inequality that underlies the functioning of each particular society. • Dimension Two – Uncertainty avoidance. This dimension describes the extent to which a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Unstructured situations are novel, unknown, surprising, and/or different from usual. The basic problem involved is the degree to which a society tries to control the uncontrollable. • Dimension Three – Individualism versus collectivism. This dimension describes the degree to which individuals are supposed to look after themselves or remain integrated into groups, usually around the family. Positioning itself between these poles is a very basic problem all societies face. • Dimension Four – Masculinity versus femininity. This dimension describes the distribution of emotional roles between the genders, which is another fundamental problem for any society; it opposes “tough” masculine to “tender” feminine societies. • Dimension Five – Long-term versus short-term orientation. This dimension refers to the extent to which a culture programs its members to accept delayed gratification of their material, social and emotional needs (added in 2001).

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Hofstede (2001) demonstrated that the five dimensions are empirically verifiable, and each of the participating countries can be positioned between the poles of the five dimensions. Other researchers have successfully replicated Hofstede’s dimensions, including Redding and Ogilvie (1984) that focus on the dimensions of individualism versus collectivism and power distance in a cross-cultural study of the effect of hierarchy on crew communication. Weener (1993) and Weener & Russell (1993) found a significant relation between the number of accidents per million departures (between 1959 and 1992) and some of the national cultural characteristics as distinguished by Hofstede (1980, 1991).

Helmreich and Merritt (1998) similarly used Hofstede’s dimensions in their study of the attitudes of flight crew with regard to CRM and flight management. A replication study of Hofstede’s work by Soeters (1997; Soeters & Recht, 1998) showed reasonably substantial correlations between military and civilian culture relative to national scores; namely power distance and uncertainty avoidance. That is, each country exhibits significant national cultural differences between the various armed forces. Soeters and Boer (2000) argue that national cultural heterogeneity in the military sector is at least as large as in the civilian sector.

Degani and Wiener (1990) subcategorise an organisation by its philosophies, policies, procedures and practices (The four P’s). This model is not dissimilar to the generic three level classification model built by Hofstede - first looking at the immediately observable behaviours and associated norms before probing the attitudes and values and finally the core values. Sub categorising an organisation is a characteristic of the organisational psychological approach, however probing to find meaning (philosophy) hints towards a socio anthropological approach. Between these categories is a hierarchical relationship where the philosophies affect policies, procedures and practices. Then the policies affect the procedures and practices and the procedures affect the practices. The outside investigator must work backwards from what he sees happening (practices) until the philosophy behind it all is reached. The concept that philosophy filters through the rest of the organisation to shape the policies, procedures and practices parallels the functionalist cause and effect simplicity. That is, the philosophy is the essence of the organisation and provided it directs the company in the

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right direction the rest will follow (in the ideal world). This approach sees management as the creator of an organisations philosophy, policy and procedure (“the three P’s”). These were the original categories Degani and Wiener (1990) used in their model.

Against this backdrop of ‘firm’ procedure and policy it is interesting to note that Dekker (2004) raises the point that many actions take place that are not standard, but are to the person involved not considered errors and so they are not reported and largely go unnoticed. Management cannot fix what it does not know and this is where many shortfalls are created. Dekker (2004) labels this phenomenon incrementalism where systems over time drift towards the edge of their safety envelope. The difference between what should be done, and what was successfully done today is not considered different enough to file a report. This is because it is not viewed by the person involved as a safety concern requiring a solution. If a sequence of these slight changes is allowed to continue, erosion in the safety model takes place that is largely invisible to management (Gibbons et al, 2004). A possible solution to this dilemma is found by returning to the work of Hofstede, and specifically his conceptualisation of balance of values and practices by personnel in the workplace (see Figure 3.7).

Level Socialisation Nation Family Values Occupation Formal Education

Practices Organisation Workplace

Figure 3.7. The balance of values versus practices in culture (Hofstede, 2001).

The implication of Hofstede’s concept of values-versus-practice for ADF aviation safety research is that the research construct should focus upon the experiential

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practices in the ADF organisation more than the more personal values held by employees.

Criticism and utility of the psychological approach

This largely reductionist psychological perspective should be tempered by the knowledge that the omnipresence of culture may be ‘lost’. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) describe this as “losing sight of the culture while counting the trees” (p.110). Studies that have been conducted under the psychological approach have broken down culture into different sub categories. This lack of unification implies that none of the models are ideal, thus many different approaches are on trial. The debate on safety culture is in its early developmental stage; this is signified by the lack of consensus between differing models. Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000) explain that until an adequate theoretical model is developed, the depth of understanding a safety culture is limited. The inability to prove a theory right or most correct further aggravates the situation making an end to controversy unforeseeable in the near future. In the studies conducted by Degani and Weiner (1990) and Hofstede (2001), the sub categories that were first applied to the subject were modified, either during or after the study. Hofstede’s were modified to include long-term orientation and Degani and Weiner’s (1990) to include practices.

Cray and Mallory (1998) also cite Hofstede’s inaccuracy in thoroughly depicting IBM’s organisational culture through the small number of respondents in some of the countries studied, for example, in fifteen countries the sample size was less than 200, whereas numerous other major nations had more than 1,000 individuals in their sample. Hofstede responded ‘if a sample is really homogenous with regard to the criteria under study, there is very little to gain in reliability over and an absolute sample size of 50…’ (1991). This challenge and response between Cray and Mallory (1998) and Hofstede illustrates the integrity of Hofstede’s method.

According to Weigmann et al (2004), organisational psychologists tend to focus on organisational culture and the means by which it might be manipulated to improve productivity, which is similar to the managerial approach. Psychologists tend to

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approach organisational culture armed with a set of sub categories that might be used to simplify the picture. Anthropologists would investigate the relationship between these coexisting cultures. Psychologists look within the character of each individual culture to predict whether or not these characteristics are complimentary to cross cultural interaction. It is this subtle distinction where psychologists seek to model what they are seeing that readily enables predictions to be drawn. This is arguably the major advantage of the psychological approach.

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3.5 OPERATIONALISING ADF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

Interventions that work in one organisation may not be successful in another, because of the complex dynamics internal to the organisational structure. Accordingly, new research should be confined to the elements of organisational culture that are reasonably expected to affect performance and safety. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate Hofstede’s (2001) psychological approach (i.e., describing culture via its components) to the conceptualisation of culture, and the correlation of values and practices amongst the national, occupational and organisational culture types. Hofstede’s (2001) conceptualisation provides a platform for the theoretical construct of new research relating to the organisational culture of ADF aviation. Specifically, it suggests that at the organisational level, culture is influenced more by practice than by values.

This research attempts to combine the psychological approach and the anthropological approach in recognition that the organisational culture of ADF aviation is socially constructed, contextually driven and is comprised of smaller sub-components. These sub-components came to light as ‘organisational factors’ in the first two chapters of this thesis, and the importance of understanding such factors in context is well described by Batteau (2002) in reference to civil aviation: “…the large-scale integration of civil aviation is freighted with cultural practices and assumptions whose acceptance and comprehension in any part of the world is not to be taken for granted” (p.206).

Military aviation culture

Moreover, it has been shown by both researchers and this thesis that while the influence of culture predominates in shaping human behaviour, social influences have a critical yet subtle impact in the formation of behaviours and the attitudes that guide them (Amalberti, 2001; Batteau, 2001; Falconer, 2005). Soeters and Boer (2000), largely based upon the work of Hofstede (1980), assert that culture can be seen as the result of attitude formation that takes place chiefly during the formative years of human life (e.g., family experiences, formal education and early career experiences). Berger and Luckman (1966), Johnston (1993) and Zotov (2001) take a slightly different view. They argue that the culture’s influence relates to more recent aspects of a person’s life, and is 85 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

revealed by the manner in which humans non-critically accept various actions, attitudes, practices, values and definitions of “reality” as being normal and beyond challenge.

Soeters and Boer (2000) investigated the relationship between accidents involving NATO air forces (total losses per 10,000 flying hours) and Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) cultural dimensions. The study did not include non-NATO air forces due to unreliable statistics through a lack of primary data (J. Soeters, personal communication, July 16, 2001).

Soeters and Boer (2000) argue that the most significant finding of their analysis of culture and flight safety in military aviation highlights the dichotomy between flexible, generative organisations and the historically regimented way of regulating the performance of the aviation system. They assert that the higher level of collectivism in the organisational orientation of the military aviation culture, the higher regulation orientation, and the larger the power-distance, the higher the chance of total-loss accidents in military aviation (p. 130). Interestingly, Soeters and Boer argue that the conclusion questions whether military aviation forces would be right in ‘adjusting’ the organisational culture towards a more professional orientation, greater accountability for performance, less domination by rules and procedures (increasing improvisation), and a less hierarchical line of thought. The inadequacy of Hofstede’s dimensions to explain the dynamic, cognitive aspect of human activity, and the inefficacy of the Hofstede dimensions as a tool for intra-national assessment (of organisational culture), makes it imperative that this research investigate other more suitable models of behaviour.

ADF aviation culture

In relation to ADF aviation specifically, Hopkins (2005) – a member of the board of inquiry relating to ADF F-111 aircraft fuel tank sealing procedures – observes that in the ADF, attempts to enhance aviation safety “can be entirely negated by existing features of an organisation’s culture, and these features need to be tackled directly before real safety improvement can be achieved” (p. 81).

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Against the backdrop of these various views, and with both individual and group attitudes shown to be of relevance, it is necessary to establish some specific aspects of attitudes worthy of further research within the ADF aviation setting. The following two sections complete the establishment of the theoretical construct that shall apply to new ADF research. The first section summarises the existing models of organisational culture and establishes intermediate level aspects of culture (Glendon & Stanton, 2000) as the most appropriate for new research. The second section examines the existing attitudinal dimensions and subsequently establishes the specific attitudinal dimensions that shall be applied in the ADF aviation setting.

3.5.1 A Model of Organisational Culture

It is now well established in the literature, particularly through the work of Schein (1990), Waring (1996), Waring and Glendon (1998) and Glendon and Stanton (2000), that there are two broad and contrasting perspectives that describe organisational culture. These two perspectives have been described as functionalist and interpretive. According to Glendon and Stanton (2000) most organisations display elements of both approaches in unequal measure.

Functionalist and interpretive models of organisational culture

The functionalist perspective – a ‘top down’ modelling approach – views organisational culture as an ideal to which organisations should aspire. It suggests that the prime function of organisational culture is to support management strategies and is “premised on the assumption that it can be reduced to relatively simple models of prediction and control” (Glendon & Stanton, 2000, p. 194). Smircich (1983) observes that the ‘top down’ approach aligns organisational culture in support of managerial goals and strategy, and often involves managerial use of culture to coerce and control. Put simply, a functionalist perspective serves the strategic imperative of members of the controlling group.

The interpretive perspective – a ‘bottom up’ modelling approach – views organisational culture as an emergent complex phenomenon of social groupings that serve as the prime 87 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

medium for all members of an organisation to interpret their collective identity, beliefs and behaviours (e.g., Waring, 1996). Schein (1991) and Glendon and Stanton (2000) suggest that the interpretive approach is more “developmental”, whereby the culture is taught to new members as the framework for cognitions and behaviours in response to problems. Put simply, an interpretive perspective allows for the existence and development of sub-cultures within an organisation.

Model suitability

Given the contrasting perspectives of theoretical models of organisational culture, and the recognition by researchers that most organisations display elements of both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ perspectives, the choice of a theoretical model for ADF research must be approached with a “best fit” objective in mind. The remainder of this section is dedicated to this objective.

Given the lack of research relating to the organisational culture of the ADF – and ADF aviation specifically – established by the earlier chapters of this thesis, the interpretive perspective provides a seemingly correct platform from which to launch an examination of organisational culture within the ADF aviation context. However, it is also correct to consider that the organisational culture of ADF aviation, with it’s hierarchical structure and apparent hierarchical influences (see Chapter One), may be better suited to a functionalist approach. This structure and influence relating to rank is a significant consideration, and is dealt with in detail in the following paragraphs.

Rank and organisational culture in a theoretical construct

Falconer (2005) argues that perhaps the most defining aspect of the ADF aviation system is the hierarchical, rank-based nature of the organisation and the effect of such a framework upon the attitudes and beliefs of aviation personnel. Kern (1999) notes that the existence of rank in the military population impedes communication: to the extent that subordinates are extremely reluctant to inform management of ‘bad news’.

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Similarly, with regard to the ADF, Fellows (1998) cites a “fear operating at grass levels [that] encourages aggression in personnel and adds to the negativity of the group norm” (p. 28). The results of the ADFFMAQ relating to attitudes towards ADF flight commanders (middle managers) do not reveal whether such delineation exists. A breakdown of responses according to flight commander and non-flight commander categories was not conducted, and the ‘raw’ descriptive statistics published by DSPPR (2001) indicate prima facie satisfaction amongst respondents. For example, 69% of respondents indicated agreement with the statement “The flight commanders/executives in the unit listen to us and care about our concerns”, and 78% reported agreement with the statement “I feel comfortable going to the flight commander’s/executive’s office to discuss problems or operational issues”. However, the CDF and Defence Secretary (ADO, 2001) noted that cynicism and criticism regarding the ADF’s management was widespread. Similarly, DSPPR (2001) found that 20% of ADFFMAQ respondents perceive that management personnel at their unit are not “doing a good job”. Eighteen percent of respondents indicated feeling “neutral” on this item. The DSPPR (2001) also reported that ADF leaders within the unit-level hierarchy were less consultative in style than would be preferred by most aircrew.

Experienced defence aviation personnel including former USAF pilot and now aviation safety researcher Kern (2001) and former Chief of the RAAF McCormack (1999) also suggest that management and leadership has an extremely powerful influence upon defence force aviation. Similarly, according to the Department of Defence (2001), leaders in ADF workplaces have a strong influence on job performance and job satisfaction “by the kind of performance culture that they create in their units”. Indeed, an earlier Department of Defence (1999) observation states that in military organisations “clear chains of command allow achievement of objectives in both peace and war”.

Having therefore considered both perspectives, it is important to conclude here that an interpretive perspective on organisational culture is more appropriate than a functionalist perspective for ADF aviation research. This is primarily because the fundamental premise of the interpretive approach is one of modelling to understand behaviours and cognitions in respect of safety and other aspects of organisational life

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(Waring & Glendon, 1998; Glendon & Stanton, 2000). In addition, the lack of empirical guidance relating to ADF aviation culture makes any near-future ADF cultural examination exploratory in nature ipso facto. Such research will provide an early contribution toward the establishment of a theory that could be formulated only after further data gathering and conceptual refinement.

3.5.2 Dimensions of Organisational Culture

Particularly since the 1980s, several attempts have been made to map the broad levels of organisational culture. A summary of these levels of organisational culture is provided by Table 3.2, while acknowledging that other dimensions that contribute to the identification of organisational culture have been proffered by many other researchers. Table 3.2 should therefore be seen as a summary of the models that have strong concurrence. Details relating to these “other” dimensions are described by Glendon and Stanton (2000), and are not described here.

Table 3.2. Summary of models of organisational culture (adapted from Glendon and Stanton, 2000).

Culture Level: Culture Level: Culture Level: Shallow Intermediate Deep

1984 Behaviours and Underlying Beliefs and values (Schein) artefacts assumptions

‘Manifest level’ - ‘Core level’ – 1986 language, stories, ‘Strategic level’ - ideologies, values, (Deal and Kennedy) rituals, normative beliefs assumptions behaviours Behavioural norms and values; as Fundamental Observable company 1988, 1990 expressed assumptions, core artefacts and (Rousseau) consciously by values that may not patterns of behaviour organisation be articulated members

Inspection of the table reveals that if organisational culture is to be measured at all three levels and across several dimensions within each of these levels, then the popular questionnaire methodology, including instruments such as the ADFFMAQ, will be inadequate. Moreover, as an instrument “tailored” from an off-the-shelf commercial 90 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

aviation instrument (i.e., the FMAQ), the ADFFMAQ will not align with the interpretive perspective of organisational culture necessary for this exploratory research.

Based on a review of existing measurement strategies for organisational culture, Glendon and Stanton (2000) report that to comprehensively assess organisational culture – or some aspect of it – the measures used “must be based on an adequate model of culture, taking account of its multi-faceted nature” (p. 197). Their review concludes that there are three methodologies that have been used to assess and analyse organisational culture, namely:

• A broad soft-systems methodology that can incorporate both quantitative and qualitative data. • Attitudinal surveys supported by triangulated methods. • Grid-group analysis.

To date, none of the methods listed above has demonstrated comprehensive coverage for all aspects of the organisational culture framework, and no study has yet been reported on the combination of all these approaches. Despite this, attitudinal surveys supported by triangulated methods – such as Locatelli and West’s (1996) Twenty Statements Test combined with group discussions – are argued by Glendon and Stanton (2000) to have performed best, “being both the quickest and producing the most relevant information” (p. 197). With this in mind, it is rational for this research to be modelled upon a similar construct (large-scale attitudinal survey supported by triangulated methods). However, given the human resources focus of existing organisational climate work (described earlier) it is necessary to base any new ADF- context attitudinal survey research on factors established in safety questionnaires vis organisational questionnaires.

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3.5.3 Establishing Factors for New Research

It is well reported in the literature that the establishment of an empirical association between attitudinal dimensions and organisational (behavioural) measures has been elusive. This elusiveness may be due to methodological difficulties as much as the absence of an empirical association, and is noted by researchers across various domains including commercial aviation (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998), air traffic management (Kirwan, 2000), and shipping (Havold, 2005). Nonetheless, it is necessary here to establish the factors or dimensions amongst existing research that ought to be applied in an ADF aviation setting. The following chapter will then be able to build a methodology, and individual attitudinal items specifically, based on these factors.

The dimensions that appear to offer the greatest research potential in the literature are arguably those established by Glendon et al (1994). This is because the dimensions are seemingly both valid and reliable due to (a) their derivation from over 300 generic items sourced from numerous previous studies, and (b) their existence in remarkably similar guises in several other studies (e.g., Williamson et al, 1997; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Havold, 2005). According to Glendon and Stanton (2000), their dimensions have been “factor analysed for a number of samples to produce a reasonably consistent eight-factor structure” (p. 203). The eight factors developed by Glendon and Stanton (2000) are presented in Table 3.3 (overleaf).

The factors are listed in two groups: the first four represent (italicised) those that shall be applied in the ADF aviation setting; the last four are those dimensions that will not be specifically included (although it is acknowledged that aspects of these dimensions may be present within the first four dimensions).

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Table 3.3. Previously tested and validated questionnaire factors (adapted from Glendon et al, 1994).

Factor Description Work pressure The degree to which employees feel under pressure to complete work, balance of workload Relationships The degree of trust and support within the organisation, working relationships with others and general morale Adequacy of procedures The accuracy, clarity and appropriateness of procedures, ease of selection and use of procedures Communication and training The degree of openness and extent to which communication reaches all organisational levels, extent to which training incorporates all aspects of the job Incident investigation The extent to which incident investigations get to underlying causes of incidents Personal protective equipment The degree to which the organisation is concerned with the design, issue, use, and enforcement of personal protective equipment Spare and back-up equipment The availability and general efficiency with which spares and back up equipment are provided Safety policy and procedures The extent to which safety is a priority, practicality of implementing safety policy and procedures

The grouping presented by Table 3.3 represents an attempt to focus on the strongest dimensions in any new ADF study; in recognition of both this research’s exploratory nature and that some dimensions may not suit a military aviation setting ‘off-the-shelf’. Moreover, while those dimensions that are excluded from this study are excluded predominantly because of their established reliability (via Cronbach alpha, see Glendon et al, 1994) it is anticipated that in the creation of items that will comprise each dimension for this research (described in the following chapter), upon analysis some dimensions may be found to be more complex3 than how they appear here.

3 Items may load across several dimensions. 93 Chapter Three – Attitude, Culture and Performance

3.6 CHAPTER THREE SUMMARY

This chapter reviewed the organisational determinants of safety performance and showed that while culture is inextricably linked to safety, the attitudes of personnel are a fundamental and accessible component. The chapter also identified safety culture as an inadequate and underdeveloped concept despite the popularity of the term as an arbiter of the apparent safety of sociotechnical systems. In recognition of the significance of operational context within the various approaches to cultural examination and apparent measurement, the chapter reviewed the existing literature and identified organisational culture – more than other culture ‘types’ – as the culture that affects organisational safety performance to the greatest extent. Indeed, the previous chapter described ADF aviation accident investigations and found that the majority of aircraft accidents have been identified to result from numerous co-contributing events that have cumulatively created conditions and environments (including the fundamentality of organisational culture in employees’ attitudinal determination) in which an accident becomes the inevitable outcome. The following chapter, Chapter Four, describes the development and implementation of a psychometric survey instrument. The instrument to be designed and implemented shall, as a result of the existing literature reviewed here, take a psychological approach to the examination of ADF aviation organisational culture. Moreover, it shall be constructed upon an interpretive cultural perspective (Glendon & Stanton, 2000) and comprise the (four) strongest attitudinal dimensions demonstrated by previous research: work pressure, relationships, adequacy of procedures and communication and training.

94 CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY – QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY

The previous chapters established the research problem and rationale, and a theoretical construct. This chapter describes the design and implementation of a psychometric survey tool. Through a synthesis of existing data on organisational behaviour, culture and human factors, a 45-item questionnaire was developed – the Australian Defence Force Aviation Questionnaire (ADFAQ). The ADFAQ focuses upon the psychosocial preconditions to ‘normal’ performance in ADF aviation and was designed to elicit respondents’ attitudes towards organisational culture within the context of ADF aviation.

4.1 DESIGN

A between-groups design was used, implemented via a psychometric survey. Such methodology is appropriate for this research for several reasons. Foremost, it has proven efficacy as a research methodology in a broad range of safety-critical systems including aviation (Zohar, 1980; Soeters and Boer, 2000), heavy and light manufacturing (Williamson, Feyer, Cairns & Biancotti, 1997), nuclear energy (United States Department of Energy, 1999) and medicine (Helmreich and Merritt, 1998). Secondly, the use of psychometric methodology is useful when examining phenomena localised and contextual, or lacking in empirical data (see Johnston, 1991; McDaniels & Gregory, 1991; Nunnally, 1978; Schein, 1992; Trice & Beyer, 1993). Thirdly, psychometric survey methodology can indicate the organisational ‘deficiencies’ (preconditions to accidents) in aviation not yet detectable by post-incident analyses.

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4.2 PARTICIPANTS

The participants comprised 402 Australian Defence Force officer aircrew and engineer personnel that have graduated aviation-specific training such as flying training or aeronautical engineering. The participant sample comprised the full population base of RAAF pilots and engineers to the senior officer rank of Wing Commander. There are only a small number of officers above this level (approximately 50), and the Directorate of Personnel excluded these personnel from the study citing reasons of security.

4.2.1 Research Participation

An invitation to participate in the study was made to the relevant Aviation Safety Director of the three armed services (ARA, RAN and RAAF). The researcher and several aviation safety officers followed up the invitation from the Directorate of Flying Safety on numerous occasions. The RAAF Aviation Safety Director supported the research, however the researcher did not receive replies from the Army and Navy Aviation Safety Directors.

4.2.2 Research Approval and Support

Support for the conduct of the research was obtained from the relevant Australian Government Minister. This acknowledged the broader responsibility of the Federal Government to ensure the safety of ADF aviation personnel wherever possible. Accordingly, the researcher sought support for the conduct of the ADFAQ research from the Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, The Honourable Danna Vale MP. The Minister outlined her support for the ADFAQ research in a letter to the researcher (Vale, personal correspondence, 2003). The ADF Director of Flying Safety, Group Captain Bill Spears, stated his support for the ADFAQ research in a letter to the researcher (Spears, personal correspondence, 2003).

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4.2.3 Population Sample

In order to take into account the notable geographical diversity of ADF aviation, participants working in ADF aviation units in every State and Territory of Australia (except Tasmania, where there is no ADF aviation unit) were included in the study; completing the ADFAQ. Whilst the ADFAQ canvassed both male and female ADF aviation personnel, the survey did not collect gender information. This is due to the significantly larger relative population of male employees within the ADF (25:1 according to the most recent ADF census data) and the commensurate difficulty in achieving reliability and hence meaningful analysis from such a small sample of ‘female attitudes’.

The 402 ADFAQ respondents represent a response rate of 40%; equalling the quantity of respondents surveyed by Zohar (1980) in his research of the ‘climate for safety’ (n = 400). 401 respondents provided details of their ADF rank. A summary of the respondents’ rank details in relation to both surveys sent and completed is provided in Table 4.1. ‘Other’ indicates non-officer ranks.

Table 4.1. Descriptive summary of respondents’ ADF rank.

ADF Rank1 Surveys sent Surveys completed Junior Officer (JNROFF) 589 (59%) 244 (61%) Senior Officer (SNROFF) 319 (32%) 146 (36%) Officer Cadet (OFFCDT) 92 (9%) 9 (2%) Other 0 (0%) 2 (0.5%)

The categories of JNROFF and SNROFF are considered representative samples, as they are comparable to the ADF census percentages for the two groups and were completed by an approximately representative proportion of each rank group. There were notably less OFFCDT surveys returned than those sent, hence the survey returns from these personnel are excluded from further analysis. The possible reasons for this lack of response relate to the unwillingness of the then-Commander of the ADF Flight Training School to allow OFFCDT personnel to participate. There may also have been a

1 One respondent did not supply their rank details. 97 Chapter Four – Methodology – Questionnaire Study

reduction in the number of available OFFCDT participants (due to their course failure) between the time of list production (at the RAAF Personnel headquarters) and survey distribution. Some returns were assigned to the ‘other’ category, and were due to inaccuracies in the personnel database. These returns were manifest by non-officer personnel who were fulfilling an officer-assigned posting. Again, this was probably due to the time lapse between participant list production at personnel headquarters and ADFAQ distribution. The returns from this group were also excluded from further analysis as the returns (n = 2) were insufficient in number to achieve meaningful analysis and hence generalisability.

The notion of representative sampling describes the comparability of the research respondents to the ‘real’ population. Representative sampling aims to select a group that is “not systematically different” (Davis & Rose, 2000) from the population being generalised with regard to any important variables (recall that the study included the full population base of RAAF pilots and engineers to WGCDR level). While the ADFAQ was developed as a tri-service test (allowing sampling across the three ADF service arms – RAAF, RAN, ARA), only the RAAF aviation safety commander agreed to the researcher’s request for research participation. The lack of agreement from the equivalent RAN and ARA commanders occurred despite both ethical and Ministerial approval for the ADFAQ study being provided with each request. Nonetheless, this study ensured protection from any notable systematic differences that may result from such external factors by focussing on a respondent sample that generalises ADF aviation.

While the tri-service composition of ADF aviation was examined extensively in both Chapter One and Chapter Two, in terms of overall size (aviation personnel, aircraft, rate of effort), the magnitude of the RAAF is at least twice as large as both the ARA and RAN combined. Additionally, ADFAQ respondents were limited to those personnel serving in Australian-based posts within ADF aviation (i.e., not ‘exchange’ or ‘deployed’ posts). This assists in increasing the generalisability of this study. Nonetheless the lack of participation by Army and Navy aircrew and engineers is a shortcoming of this particular study; a shortcoming that is addressed in the second (interview) study of this research.

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Occupation

The occupation of respondents was acquired to enable the grouping and comparison of attitudes based upon occupation, noting that research shows that errors can occur due to the lack of interaction between occupational groups – specifically pilots and technical personnel (Mattson, Petrin & Young, 2001; McDonald & Johnston, 1994). Fifty-four percent of respondents reported occupational specialisation in the Aircrew (AIR) category and 46% reported occupational specialisation within the engineering (ENG) category. A small percentage of respondents (0.8%) cited employment as Air Traffic Control Officers (ATCO) and Air Defence Officers (AIRDEF). These latter categories are excluded from any occupation-based analysis due to the small quantity of respondents.

Education

The respondent sample included many ADF personnel who have attained tertiary education qualifications – these are listed in Table 4.2. The inclusion of this demographic marker enabled the relative differences of education-based and occupation-based correlations to be established during data analysis.

Table 4.2. Tabular comparison of respondents’ highest level of education completed.

Respondents Percentage of Total Highest Education Level Achieved (n) (%) Undergraduate Degree 141 35 Postgraduate Degree 73 18 Higher School Certificate (HSC) 67 17 Honours Undergraduate Degree (HONS) 65 16 Technical and Further Education (TAFE) 20 5 Other College 17 4 Other 14 3 School Certificate 4 1 TOTAL 401 99.7

“Other College” (COL, n = 17) comprised military colleges and Trade Schools of the Australian Defence Force, and foreign military colleges. “Other” (OTH, n = 14)

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comprised qualifications awarded under the National Recognition of Training Scheme, including the Diplomas and Associate Diplomas mostly in Management or Applied Science (Military Aviation).

Sixty-nine percent of respondents held a degree, comprising Undergraduate degrees (51%) and Postgraduate degrees (18%). With regard to the occupational category of respondents, a significantly larger percentage of ENG (80%) than AIR (61%) held degrees. With regard to the officer rank of respondents, 44% of officer cadets (OFFCDT) held a degree, whilst the spread of tertiary qualifications between junior and senior officers was approximately equal. Seventy-one percent of junior officers (JNROFF) and 70% of senior officers (SNROFF) held a degree.

Age and ADF Employment Duration

The age and aviation experience of participants was acquired to enable the relative impact of a participant’s experience to be established during data analysis. Previous studies have shown that exposure to cultural influences become embedded over significant time periods to foster durable thought patterns (Johnson, 1991). For example, Simpson and Wiggins (1999) found a significant relationship between personal experience and increased positive attitudes towards safety. Other researchers assert that culture manifests as the result of experiences that occur primarily during the formative years of a human life, comprising those years spent within a family, throughout schooling and the first phases of a person’s career. Beyond these years, cultural messages are merely perpetuated (Soeters & Boer, 2000). However, practitioners including Kern (1999) assert that whilst personal experiences in aviation clearly increase over time, the experiences themselves may not provide the ‘right’ attitudes towards safety. Collecting data on employee experience in ADF aviation will enable the impact of age and ADF employment duration to be analysed.

The sample included respondents varying in age from 18 to 56 years of age. The (total) respondents’ average age was 33.8 years (SD = 7.9). The duration of participants’ employment within the ADF also varied greatly, with respondents reporting ADF employment duration between one year and 36 years inclusive. The average duration of

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ADF employment for all respondents was 14.0 years (SD = 7.5). Table 4.3 summarises the respondents’ average age, average duration of ADF employment and standard deviation (SD). These summaries are listed in groups according to occupational category and officer rank.

Table 4.3. Descriptive summary of the respondents’ Age and Employment Duration data.

Occupation Age (SD) Employment Years (SD) Aircrew 34.7 (8.0) 14.6 (7.4) Engineer 32.7 (7.6) 13.4 (7.5) Officer Rank Senior Officer 40.0 (6.5) 20.0 (6.2) Junior Officer 30.4 (6.1) 10.8 (5.7) Officer Cadet 23.6 (4.0) 2.8 (2.5)

Human Factors Training Participation

The ADFAQ also recorded whether respondents had completed human factors training. Sixty percent of respondents had reported completing human factors training in the past five years (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4. ADFFMAQ (2000) and ADFAQ (2003) human factors training participation rates.

ADFFMAQ ADFAQ

(2000) (2003) Human Factors training completed during the last five years 46 % 59 %

An understanding of the human factors training participation rates according to rank and occupation is an important demographic criterion as it is fundamental to the promotion of many safety-related attitudes in aviation (see Chapter One) and is likely to provide a means for rationalising the analysis of results. Table 4.5 lists the percentage of personnel that reported completing human factors training within the previous five years according to officer rank and occupational category.

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Table 4.5. Percentage of respondents having completed human factors training in the past five years.

Occupation HF-trained personnel within each group (%) Aircrew 77 Engineer 39 Officer Rank Officer Cadet 100 Junior Officer 62 Senior Officer 51

The provider of respondents’ human factors training was also recorded, as the source of training is known to influence attitudes in aviation populations. Respondents reported that they had received training from various training providers, both within and external to the ADF. Four key training sources were reported, comprising the RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine, the ADF Directorate of Flying Safety, Force Element Groups (FEG) and University courses – including theory training for the Air Transport Pilot Licence. These training sources are respectively identified as ‘AVMED’, ‘DFS-ADF’, ‘FEG’ and ‘UNI’ in Table 4.6. The table illustrates the percentages describing the human factors training providers for occupational groups and officer ranking groups.

Table 4.6. Comparative summary of human factors training providers for Occupation and Officer Rank groups.

AVMED DFS-ADF FEG UNI Occupation % % % % Aircrew 49 13 22 16 Engineer 10 13 29 48

Officer Rank

Officer Cadet 67 0 0 33 Junior Officer 38 11 27 25 Senior Officer 31 17 23 29 All Respondents 37 13 24 26

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Respondents’ Force Element Group Membership

The ADFAQ also recorded the FEG of each respondent, noting previous research suggests that the different services of defence forces report different attitudes towards aspects of ADF aviation (DSPPR, 2001; Trotti, 1996). Respondents reported eleven Force Element Groups, although the majority of the respondents reported employment with four key FEGs: Air Combat Group, Air Lift Group, Maritime Patrol Group and Air Training Wing. The FEGs are listed in descending order of frequency in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7. Force Element Groups, including the number of respondents in each FEG and the percentage of total respondents represented by each FEG.

Respondents Percentage of Total Force Element Group (N) (%) Air Combat Group (ACG) 110 27 Air Lift Group (ALG) 92 23 Maritime Patrol Group (MPG) 64 16 Air Training Wing (ATW) 50 12 Section Left Blank 40 10 Surveillance & Control Group (SCG) 16 4 Aircraft Research & Development Unit (ARDU) 10 3 Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 10 3 Other (OTH) 6 2 Australian Regular Army (ARA) 3 1

“Other” (OTH, n = 6) comprised respondents from the Directorate of General Technical Airworthiness (DGTA), the Directorate of Flying Safety (DFS-ADF) and the Directorate of Personnel – Officers (DPO) personnel. ARA and RAN respondents comprised ADF personnel fulfilling RAAF positions. FEGs represented by ten or less respondents will be excluded from any further analysis.

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4.3 MATERIALS

4.3.1 The Australian Defence Force Aviation Questionnaire

Through a synthesis of existing data on organisational behaviour, culture and human factors, the 45-item ADFAQ was developed. The ADFAQ focuses upon the psychosocial preconditions to aviation safety in the ADF. The ADFAQ was designed to elicit respondents’ attitudes towards aviation safety and human factors within the context of ADF aviation.

The ADFAQ comprises four sections encompassing demographic, qualitative and quantitative parameters:

• Section One – recorded demographic details of each respondent, including age, rank category, occupational specialisation, level of education completed, ADF aviation group, employment duration and human factors training. • Section Two – comprised 28 statements of opinion to which ADF participants were asked to respond using a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. Each question also offered a sixth option that was detached from the Likert scale, labelled “Don’t know”. • Section Three – comprised seven questions regarding the way ADF aviation operates. Three questions asked respondents to choose a response from a series of qualitative statements. This section of the ADFAQ also included four open-ended questions. • Section Four – comprised one question in two parts. The first part asked participants to rank in the order of highest to lowest importance (from 1 to 10) a list of potential risks to ADF aviation safety. The second part of the question asked participants to explain why the risk factor they nominated as the highest risk is most likely to cause an accident in ADF aviation.

Table 4.8 lists each ADFAQ item according to its data category, and is followed by a description of the design rationale for the survey parameters used in the ADFAQ.

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Table 4.8. Methods of data collection used in the ADFAQ.

Demographic Quantitative Qualitative Section 1 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 Section 2 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,

10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,

16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,

22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,

28

Section 3 1, 2, 3, 4 4, 5, 6, 7 Section 4 1 1

The design rationale for the survey parameters used in the ADFAQ is as follows:

• Demographic Measures – the ADFAQ included demographic details of each respondent, including age, rank category, occupational specialisation, level of education completed, ADF aviation group, employment duration and human factors training. The ADFAQ design included these demographic questions because these aspects were included in the ADFFMAQ study conducted earlier by the ADF, allowing the potential for comparative analysis between the two studies.

• Quantitative Measures – quantitative measures are generally designed to summarise a complex set of data. Quantitative data provides the basis for eliciting differences between groups and similarities, while qualitative data provides the basis for understanding the source of these differences and similarities. The ADFAQ includes 33 quantitative items, comprising 28 five-point likert-scale items (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, strongly agree) and five categorical items. These items asked respondents to select a response from a small quantity of given alternatives.

• Qualitative Measures – open-ended questions designed to elicit qualitative attitudinal data were included in the questionnaire to enable respondents to explain their perceptions in broader and qualitative detail. Qualitative analysis by definition has the potential to yield significant information in terms of the descriptions and explanations of events that occur within a specified environment. Miles and Huberman (1994) assert that the key advantage of qualitative data analysis is the 105 Chapter Four – Methodology – Questionnaire Study

capacity to situate the data collection and analysis within the real world environment.

4.3.2 Rationale and Development of an Item Pool

This section describes the rationale for the ADFAQ items and the modifications made to some items during the pilot test of the ADFAQ. The section then establishes the framework relating to attitudinal homogeneity, and the key aspects of attitudinal, perceptual and military rank measures. The ADFAQ rationale is based on the assumption that since decisions made by personnel working in sociotechnical systems are made based on norms, values and assumptions, a measure of the attitudes amongst ADF aviation personnel relating to the specific context of ADF aviation may expose an indication of the relationship between the attitudes of organisational personnel and the safety performance of the organisation. In operationalising this rationale, it was necessary to design new survey items rather than apply existing items to the ADF population. There are four principal reasons for this:

1. Due to the lack of existing ADF aviation performance research and the uniqueness of ADF aviation established in previous chapters, applying an ‘off-the-shelf’ questionnaire would disregard the need for contextual relevance. The importance of contextual relevance in studying aviation organisations is promoted by all three ‘approaches’ to culture (see previous chapter), and is supported by researchers from various disciplines, including Helmreich and Merritt (1998), Batteau (2001, 2002) and Batteau et al (2003).

2. The items applied to the ADF population by the DSPPR in the ADFFMAQ study, while “adjusted” from the original FMAQ by the DSPPR, were constructed upon a theoretical and factor structure borne from within airline aviation. The previous chapters of this thesis established the incomparability of ADF aviation with such entities. Indeed, ADFFMAQ respondents reported the ‘bias’ of the survey toward the pilot population: an outcome that a new survey would be designed to avoid.

3. The establishment of the research problem (Chapter 1) and the subsequent review of ADF literature (Chapter 2) suggested that unexplored issues including rank and a ‘can- 106 Chapter Four – Methodology – Questionnaire Study

do’ philosophy are present in ADF aviation. Existing questionnaires do not specifically address these ‘new’ issues.

4. The review of the scientific literature (see Chapter Three) indicated that some existing themes (factors) could be used to create (new) exploratory a priori themes in the design of a customised attitudinal measure for the ADF population. The items comprising these themes could be previously untested items: based on the existing ADF and scientific research described in chapters 1 to 3 – not exploratory in an ad hoc sense.

To enable an exploratory analysis of the ADFAQ items in accordance with traditional item evaluation, the 28 likert-type items comprising the ADFAQ relate to four a priori themes (Military Efficacy, Organisational Confidence, Adaptive Focus and Safety Perception). In keeping with the exploratory and contextual intention of this study, none of the 28 items are implemented in the ADFAQ directly from existing questionnaires. Rather, most likert-type items are inspired by the items and results of the DSPPR’s (2001) ADFFMAQ study (see Table 4.9 for individual items). A small number of items were ‘new’ and are marked in Table 4.9 accordingly. In addition to the 28 likert-type items, eight categorical and qualitative items were included, and comprise sections 1, 3 and 4 of the ADFAQ (six of these items were new). Three of these questions related to human factors, four questions related to safety, one question related to respondents’ proactivity in the workplace and seven questions related to the demographic aspects of respondents (see Section 3.2.1). Two of the categorical-type items are adapted from two other questionnaires: Braithwaite (1998, item 1 from section 3) and the ADFFMAQ (DSPPR, 2001, item 1 from section 4).

Tables 4.9 and 4.10 provide a taxonomy of the ADFAQ themes and the individual items that comprise them. The rationale and development of the themes are then expanded in the paragraphs following the table.

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Table 4.9. Likert-type items comprising the ADFAQ design, themes and item origin (in italics).

A Priori No ADFAQ Section / Item / Item Origin Theme Section 2 1 ME ADF aviation operations can be entirely specified in standardised procedures D (01) 19s Written procedures are necessary for all in-flight situations 2 ME More extensive procedures will result in improved ADF aviation safety D (01) 19c The unit rules should not be broken – even if thought to be in unit’s best interest 3 ME More disciplinary measures by management will result in improved ADF aviation safety D (01) 17i Executive staff constructively deal with poor performing pilots/crew 4 AF In ADF aviation, deviations from Standardised Procedures are a necessity of ‘real life’ D (01) 19s Written procedures are necessary for all in-flight situations 5 AF Deviations from Standardised Procedures are a potential threat to safety of ADF aviation D (01) 19c The unit rules should not be broken – even if thought to be in unit’s best interest 6 SP Errors are inevitable events in aviation operations D (01) 17ii Incidents are being avoided by predicting risk factors then acting to lower the risk 7 ME Safety events can easily occur within my area of operation D (01) 19t A true professional does not make mistakes 8 SP ADF aviation is safe New 9 SP ADF aviation is safer than Australian Regular Passenger Transport (RPT) aviation New 10 SP There is a margin of safety ‘built in’ to ADF aviation New 11 SP ADF aviation often requires the use of a built-in safety margin to complete a mission New 12 ME Safety events are a cause for disciplinary action by management New 13 OC I trust ADF Senior Officers with operational aviation decisions D (01) 17rr Aircrew trust senior management at my unit 14 OC I trust ADF Senior Officers with decisions regarding safety D (01) 17k Executive staff will never compromise safety concerns to achieve a task 15 OC Open communication is a key feature of ADF aviation D (01) 17b I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding safety issues 16 OC ADF Management encourages innovative thinking D (01) 17m My suggestions would be acted upon if I expressed them to Executive staff 17 OC ADF Management offers positive feedback in response to employee suggestions D (01) 17m My suggestions would be acted upon if I expressed them to Executive staff 18 AF I am hesitant to offer suggestions to ADF Management D (01) 17d I feel comfortable going to the flight commander’s office to discuss problems 19 ME ADF management enforces strict compliance to rules and procedures D (01) 15o Satisfaction with disciplinary policy and enforcement 20 OC My work environment has a positive safety culture D (01) 17tt This unit has a positive safety culture 21 SP I communicate safety-relevant events, regardless of how minor, to my boss D (01) 17g I am encouraged by my supervisors to report any unsafe conditions I may observe 22 SP A lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety culture New 23 AF The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” is often used by ADF aviation personnel New 24 AF The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” describes how I feel about ADF aviation New 25 OC My morale is generally high D (01) 17nn Pilot/crew morale is high 26 Validation ADF aviation represents “world’s best practice” Item New 27 AF The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be improved D (01) 17v I am exposed to flying operations that will further improve my operational skills 28 AF The safety performance of ADF aviation can be improved New

Notes: ‘ME’ indicates Military Efficacy, ‘OC’ Organisational Confidence, ‘AF’ Adaptive Focus, ‘SP’ Safety Perception. ‘D (01) 17i’ indicates that the ADFAQ item was adapted from item 17i of the DSPPR (2001) study.

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Table 4.10. Qualitative and categorical-type items comprising the ADFAQ design and item origin.

No. Item ADFAQ Section / Item Origin Section 3

1 B (98) A senior officer introduces a new operating rule you consider unsafe, which of the following statements best describes your actions?

a. I would simply ignore the rule, as the new rule puts my safety at risk. b. I would discuss the rule with my colleagues, but not with unit management. c. I would ask the Unit’s Commanding Officer to change the new rule. d. I would ask the senior officer responsible for creating the rule to change the new rule. e. I would obey the new rule, as it is my job to obey all operating rules.

2 New Based on my ADF experience, the most frequent element in safety-related events is:

a. Technical / Equipment problems b. Human Factors c. Natural (environmental) phenomena

3 New The most significant human factors problem in ADF aviation exists as a result of:

a. Life experience prior to recruitment b. Initial ADF training (eg. ADFA, RAAFCOL) c. Specialist training (eg. Pilot, ATC) d. Operational conversion training e. ‘Everyday’ experiences within ADF aviation

4 New Based on my ADF experience, the most frequent human factors element in safety-related events is:

a. Poor communication b. Complacency c. Poor safety culture d. A ‘can-do’ culture e. Other: (please specify)

Thinking about the human factors element you nominated above, please describe the ideas you have that may help reduce this risk to safety:

5 New What factors do you believe have contributed towards the ‘safety record’ of ADF aviation?

6 New What does the term ‘safety culture’ mean to you?

7 New Who influences the size of the safety-margin specific to your work in ADF aviation?

Section 4

1 D (01) Rank the following “risk factors” in order from ‘1’ (the highest risk) to ‘10’ (the lowest risk), that you consider would be likely to cause an accident at your current unit.

a. Lack of experience b. High workload c. Insufficient time to prepare d. Fatigue e. Lack of continuation training f. Lack of currency g. Overconfidence h. Departure from SOPs / Unit Regulations i. Loss of situational awareness j. ‘Can-do culture’

Thinking about the factor you nominated as ‘1’ (the highest risk) above, please explain why the factor you nominated is most likely to cause an accident at your unit:

Note: ‘B (98)’ indicates that the ADFAQ item is adapted from Braithwaite’s (1998) case study of Australian aviation.

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Overall approach/rationale of items

1. Psychosocial Preconditions. Although appearing in the Journal of Aviation Medicine shortly after World War Two (Deemer & Rafferty, 1949), research relating specifically to the psychosocial attributes of human performance in sociotechnical systems has increased only relatively recently. Indeed, while acknowledging the work of Turner (1978, 1989), Perrow’s (1984) normal accident theory seems to have been a turning point for research relating to safety preconditions, followed almost a decade later by Pidgeon (1991), then several key human factors practitioners and safety scientists at the turn of the millennium (Maurino, 2000; Sarkus, 2001; Stanton, Chambers and Piggott, 2001). Much of this latter research relates to ‘high-end’ sociotechnical systems, particularly aerospace and the ramifications of long-duration deployments to the International Space Station (Kanas et al, 2002; NSBRI, 2004).

Researchers including McDonald and Johnston (1994) and Mattson, Petrin and Young (2001) state that the increasing acceptance that many of the human factor problems underlying major safety failures can be traced back to psychosocial attributes including problems in crew coordination, communication and shared decision making. This has, in turn, forced cognitive psychology to broaden its individual focus to a dual consideration of individuals’ understanding and social aspects of human group functioning. Other researchers, describing social learning theory, assert that these psychosocial characteristics can permeate successive groups of aviation personnel as they ‘grow up’ watching other personnel as role models (Hofstede, 2001; Kern, 1999). Batteau (2001), taking an anthropological approach makes a similar assertion. He states, “The culture of a large-scale technical system supplies the resources for sense making needed by those involved in the system and the symbols of legitimation for those who govern the system” (p.206). Indeed, Chong (2001) finds that the majority of pilot stress is not from in-flight operational incidents but from organisation-related ‘social’ matters such as management style. Lufthansa research also shows that social relationship factors occur more often than human error, operational or technical problems: less than one percent of safety events reported in a survey of four thousand pilots involved the “man- machine interface” (See Goold, 2001). Reason (1997), akin to Pidgeon’s (1991) earlier assertion, states that because preconditions to accidents are “latent and ever present”, it

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is possible that a ‘safe’ operator may have a catastrophic accident, whilst an ‘unsafe’ operator may, simply through chance, escape such accidents for a longer period of time.

2. Attitude Toward Work. Chapter One established that, for many decades, researchers and aviation safety practitioners have warned that several culturally based characteristics affect organisational functioning in aviation, the utilisation of technology and, ultimately, aviation safety (Merritt, 1993, 2000; Batteau, 2001, 2002). More important to note is that of all culturally based characteristics noted by the research, the most fundamental cultural element is argued to be the attitude toward work (Meshkati, 1996). Herzberg (1959, 1968) and Hofstede (1980, 2001) found this aspect to be a significant influence upon the decision-making processes of personnel in industrial and sociotechnical settings. Therefore the collection of new data via the ADFAQ focuses upon attitudes relating to ‘work’ in ADF aviation.

3. Attitudinal and Perceptual Items. Because of the need for contextual relevance in studies relating to safety, perceptual/reality based items dominated the item composition of the ADFAQ (perceptual = 89%, attitudinal = 11%). Perceptual items focussed on the experiences of personnel working in their ADF aviation workplace (e.g., item 7 “Safety events can easily occur within my area of operation”) and beliefs about other personnel working in ADF aviation (e.g., item 16 “ADF Management encourages innovative thinking”), whereas attitudinal items related to more generalised beliefs (e.g., item 6 “Errors are inevitable in aviation operations” and item 22 “A lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety culture”).

4.3.3 Composition of ADFAQ A Priori Themes

Theme 1 – Organisational Confidence

Seven likert-type items (items 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 25) focused upon the theme of organisational confidence. Two of these items (items 13, 14) are based on the notion of trust in ‘senior management’ and ‘executive staff’ (senior officers) put forward in the ADFFMAQ (e.g., “Aircrew trust senior management at my unit” and “Executive staff will never compromise safety concerns in order to achieve a task”). The DSPPR (2001) 111 Chapter Four – Methodology – Questionnaire Study

report, based on the ADFFMAQ study, states that trust in senior management is not high: less than half of the ADFFMAQ respondents agreed with the statement “Aircrew trust senior management at my unit”. Moreover, the level of trust is highly variable between the respondents of each FEG: the DSPPR (2001) found that 37% of ARA respondents and 89% of TFG respondents agreed with the statement “Aircrew trust senior management at my unit”. Both former RAAF Chief (McCormack, 1999) and current Deputy Chief (Spence, 2000) acknowledge that the ADF’s hierarchical structure has not always been conducive to the development of trust in ADF aviation.

The remaining five likert-type items (items 15, 16, 17, 20, 25) focused upon the theme of confidence. This theme recognises that in military aviation, attitudes towards safety are significantly influenced by individuals’ pride – a cultural feature noted by Fellows (1998), McCormack (1999) and Maurino (2000) as being fundamental to the cohesiveness of military personnel. A notable example of pride in the ADF is provided by the ADFFMAQ, whereby only 7% disagreed with the statement “I am proud to work for this unit”. Other research, including surveys of ADF aviation personnel by the Department of Defence (2001) and incident investigations by DFS-ADF (2000), indicates that there is a “can do” mentality perhaps associated with confidence, and that it is so strong that a mentality of “must do” has evolved. Interestingly however, some researchers acknowledge that the ‘can-do’ attitude is an important aspect of “the military psyche” (Philips, 2001). Trotti (1996) claims that military aircrew will not attribute an error’s blame to the weather, materiel failure or imperfect design. Kern (2001) argues that the inculcation of this attitude is evident early in the careers of military aviation personnel. He specifically notes the expertise of USAF Academy undergraduates “at masking their weaknesses” (p. 191).

Theme 2 – Military Efficacy

Six likert-type items (items 1, 2, 3, 7, 12, 19) focused upon the perception of the efficacy of the military ‘way’ in a more general sense than the perceptions probed by the organisational confidence theme. Procedures often appear to be closely related to military efficacy, yet a can-do approach may influence employees to ‘bend’ or ‘break’ rules – or ‘short-cut’ procedural guidelines. A notable example of this influence upon

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the procedural behaviour of ADF aviation personnel is provided by a RAAF Engineering Officer who states that the pressure to get the job done from management consistently leads employees to short-circuit procedures (DFS-ADF, 2001). The officer states that short cuts may be being used to achieve tasks in the belief that this is in accord with the can-do nature of the RAAF (such as maintaining serviceability and planning difficult sorties at short notice). Similarly, the results of the ADFFMAQ relating to attitudes towards procedures paint an interesting picture of the treatment of rules and procedures in ADF aviation. Specifically, 61% of respondents indicated that written procedures are not necessary for all in-flight situations, and 27% of respondents reported that unit rules should be broken when considered by the respondent as “in the unit’s best interests”. DFS-ADF (1996) has highlighted the existence of such influence on numerous occasions, most notably in the investigation of a significant safety incident involving a RAAF C-130 Hercules crew in 1996. In the incident report, DFS-ADF (1996) states that because the crew accepted that the task needs were important, despite minimal planning and preparation time, “the crew felt a professional need to do its best” (p.8). DFS-ADF also recognises the commitment to performance of the ADF’s culture, stating, “it is appreciated that people in the military are very busy, seemingly forever being asked to do more with less” (DFS-ADF, 2001b, p. 8).

Theme 3 – Safety Perception

Seven likert-type items (items 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, 22) focused upon the theme of safety. The rationale for inclusion of these items was based predominantly upon the results of the ADFFMAQ study. One quarter of respondents agreed with the statement “Even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical times in flight”. Other results worthy of note here include the following: only 43% of respondents reported agreement with the statement that “On my last check flight the instructor effectively debriefed the flight’s human factors issues”, 49% of respondents agreed that “I am receiving sufficient flying hours to maintain currency”, 61% of respondents reported agreement with the statement “Adequate time is made available for safety training”, and 63% of respondents reported agreement with the statement “My unit practices the highest maintenance standards”. The ADFAQ items were designed to reflect a more fundamental approach to safety (e.g., “ADF aviation is safe”), and avoid the

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preoccupation with the role of pilots reflected in the ADFFMAQ. Indeed, several ADFFMAQ respondents provided comments to this effect on their returns, including “this questionnaire had an unbalanced bias towards the pilots role” (DSPPR, 2001, p. 35).

Some of the items in this theme focused upon the aspect of discipline and safety, based upon the results of the ADFFMAQ and Erickson’s (1997) survey research suggesting that organisations maintain their assumptions, values and beliefs via their disciplinary or “reward and punishment” system. The ADFFMAQ found that 48% reported agreement with the statement “Executive staff constructively deal with poor performing pilots/crewmembers” (a relatively high 27% reported having a ‘neutral’ attitude towards this statement), and 63% reported agreement with the statement “Executive staff will never compromise safety concerns in order to achieve a task”. The remaining respondents disagreed (20%) or reported being ‘neutral’ (18%) to this item. The attitude that safety events are “a disciplinary issue” is a noteworthy issue in ADF aviation. Indeed, DFS-ADF Flying Safety Officer Squadron Leader Terry McKinnon, stated that ADF personnel “are not as dictatorial as they used to be” (Learmount, Lopez & Phelan, 1995, p34). Six years after McKinnon’s interview, the then-Chief of the RAAF (McCormack, 2001) highlighted the existence of fear of disciplinary actions in ADF aviation: “…some of our commanders are applying outdated thinking and values when it comes to our safety investigation and reporting system. Two personnel who had committed honest human errors and had openly and honestly reported them were dealt with in a punitive manner”. The RAAF Chief had also made similar comments in 1999, asserting that the safety of the ADF aviation system depends upon “being open and honest, and free of fear of punishment” (p. 5).

Theme 4 – Adaptive Focus

Based on the results of the ADFFMAQ and the case study research of Fellows (1998), seven likert-type items (items 4, 5, 18, 23, 24, 27, 28) related to the theme of change and adaptation. Reluctance to change amongst personnel in aviation organisations is widespread and pervasive. Paries (1995, 1996), former Director of the French aviation investigation agency Bureau Enquetes-Accidents, argues that aviation organisations are

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conservative systems that hate changes – especially regarding safety. Conservatism and reluctance to change is also evident amongst military aviation populations (Fellows, 1998; Kern, 2001). The expression “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” has been cited by numerous personnel, perhaps highlighting a reluctance to change amongst aviation personnel (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Further evidence of such conservatism in the organisational culture of ADF aviation is provided by Fellows (1998): “Selection and training remain complacently amateurish, as if the RAAF…cannot see even a remote need for a ‘new broom’ approach to its thinking”. In light of these assertions, it is interesting to note the results of the ADFFMAQ relating to organisational conservatism and the attitudes of respondents towards the notion of ‘change’. Only half of the ADFFMAQ respondents reported agreement with the statement “Incidents are being avoided by predicting risk factors then acting to lower or remove the risk”. Relative to most other ADFFMAQ items, a very high proportion of respondents (33%) reported being ‘neutral’ towards this item. A marginally higher proportion of respondents (64%) reported agreement with the statement “Corporate knowledge is obtained internally and externally and is used to update procedures and practices”. Nineteen percent of respondents reported being ‘neutral’ towards the statement.

Qualitative and categorical items

The validation items were structured around three key aspects of respondents’ work in ADF aviation: human factors (three items), safety (four items) and proactivity towards potential risks in the workplace (one item). Only two items were adapted from previous questionnaires: the item relating to respondent proactivity regarding the proposed introduction of an unsafe rule (Braithwaite, 1998); and an item relating to human factors risks to ADF aviation safety (DSPPR, 2001). While minor modifications were made to the terms used in these questions, both questions were repeated in the ADFAQ such that a comparison of ADFAQ results can be made with the earlier studies.

The remaining items, comprising nominal and open-ended questions, were designed specifically for the ADFAQ. Moreover, they provided an opportunity to explore the key aspects of the ADFAQ to a much greater extent than using likert-type data exclusively. For example, three open-ended items (section 3, items 5, 6 and 7) asked respondents to

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(a) nominate factors that they believe have contributed to the ADF safety record (whatever that record might be), (b) define what ‘safety culture’ means to them, and (c) describe who or what influences “the safety margin” relating to their specific work in ADF aviation. Item 4 (see Table 4.10) included the ‘can-do’ cultural aspect, as it is an emergent phenomena in the ADF literature (and parlance), yet remains poorly defined and understood. The ADFFMAQ explored the related notion of ‘can-do’, and found that personnel are working long hours and under-resourced “causing high workloads and safety concerns” (DSPPR, 2001, p. 35). Indeed, 54% of the ADFFMAQ respondents (totalling approximately 400 personnel) indicated that they did not have enough time to complete their duties in normal working hours. Respondents also nominated “high workload” as the primary risk factor that may cause the next ADF aviation accident. The ADFFMAQ results suggest that, akin to the findings of Lehner et al (1997), time stress may be influencing the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel by inducing a bias towards less effective decision-making. The ADFFMAQ found that 64% of respondents agree with the statement “My decision-making ability is as good in emergencies as in routine flying conditions” and 54% agree with the statement “My performance is not adversely affected by working with an inexperienced or less capable crew member”.

4.3.4 Content Validation – Pilot Test of the ADFAQ

Prior to the ‘full’ (n = 1000) distribution of the ADFAQ, the researcher administered the initial ADFAQ to a small sample (n = 30) of the ADF aviation population from which the research sample was later drawn. Accordingly, the pilot-study included personnel from engineering and aircrew categories, comprising both junior and senior officers. The personnel were also geographically separated to inhibit collaboration of pilot-study participants (participants were based in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory).

Sixteen personnel (53%) completed and returned the pilot-study questionnaires, including the Director and Deputy Director of the ADF Directorate of Flying Safety. The feedback from these personnel allowed amendments to be made to the ADFAQ that increased the reliability of the survey by ensuring that participants could easily understand the ADFAQ instructions for completion, and the ADFAQ items themselves.

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These relatively minor amendments comprised the rephrasing of one likert-type item (item 12), one categorical item (item 1, section 3) and one open-ended item (item 7, section 3) and re-aligning the demographic ADFAQ items such that the response options were displayed in the simplest manner possible (usually alphabetically, or in order of military seniority). The amendment to item 12 was required because the respondents suggested that “safety events” was a broader and hence more appropriate description of an operational mishap relating to safety that ought to be reported. The initial version of this item used the term “incident”. The amendment to item 1 (section 3) comprised changing the phrase “I would complain to…” to “I would ask…” The modification to item 7 (section 3) comprised changing the term “relating” to “specific”. A small number of respondents provided feedback suggesting that the initial phrasing of the item was too ambiguous, and that further ‘guidance’ was needed as to “how far the influence (being referred to in the question) actually goes”. Some other respondents said they were unsure of the answer to the item. However, this response was expected due to the open-ended nature of the question, and it was decided to keep the open-ended format to avoid potential clustering of (categorical) responses. These amendments increased the simplicity and clarity of the ADFAQ items.

The pilot-study process was also useful in providing an indication of the reliability of the ADFAQ. Accordingly, the pilot-study results were examined for outlying respondent data as well as attitudinal ‘clusters’ that may produce a floor or ceiling effect when applied to the full ADFAQ sample. One item, “My work environment has a positive safety culture” (item 20) recorded a high level of agreement from respondents in the pilot-test sample. It was decided to keep the item for the larger sample, however, as it was anticipated that the larger sample size would allow for comparison of responses to the item based on demographic criteria. Differences between such criteria were apparent in the DSPPR (2001) study, and may be replicated in the current study.

No other indications of skewed data were evident in the pilot-study sample, nor did pilot-study respondents indicate any such concern in their narratives accompanying their pilot-study ADFAQ returns. In summary, the pilot-study of the draft questionnaire confirmed that the ADFAQ was perceived by the survey group as non-invasive, relevant and requiring an acceptable level of effort to complete.

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Additional consultation undertaken

The researcher consulted the project’s relevant supporting agency in the ADF – DFS- ADF and provided briefing material to the Director (DFS) and Deputy Director (DDFS) of the Directorate, in addition to the Director of Aviation Safety Education and Training (DASET). This allowed the opportunity for any concerns regarding the survey to be addressed.

4.4 PROCEDURE

A total of 1,000 Australian Defence Force Aviation Questionnaires were individually addressed and distributed by post to ADF aviation officers across Australia. A reply- paid and pre-addressed return envelope accompanied each questionnaire so that the participants were able to complete the survey after-hours and in a comfortable environment of their choice with no financial cost. Respondents were asked to complete the questionnaire and return it via post to the researcher at the University of New South Wales (UNSW).

Upon receipt by the researcher, the completed surveys were numbered chronologically in order of receipt and the survey data entered into statistical software (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences [SPSS]) in preparation for analysis.

The attitudinal increments of the likert scale were assigned numerical values from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”). “Don’t know” responses were not assigned a numerical value. The coding of quantitative responses into numerical values ensured that responses were properly aligned to measure their absolute value along consistent psychological dimensions. Once recoded and summed across the 28 likert- scale items, the higher the mean response achieved, the greater the extent to which respondents’ perceptions reflected agreement towards the dimensions of ADF aviation examined by the survey. Coding of the qualitative items was conducted using open coding, and included samples for reliability testing.

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4.4.1 Coding

The ADFAQ collected quantitative and qualitative data in an attempt to aid the validity and reliability of the instrument. In contrast to the ADFAQ quantitative data analysis, the qualitative data analysis occurred concurrently with data acquisition. The analysis of qualitative data utilised the open coding approach commonly used in survey research within industrial populations (e.g., Strauss, 1987; Miles & Huberman, 1994) and aviation populations specifically that develops the responses into a series of themes to allow interpretation and analysis. This approach recognises that qualitative survey questions often yield a series of statements that display prima facie distinctiveness. In this light, the thematic approach is particularly useful with respondent numbers of the magnitude of the ADFAQ as it is both a process of data analysis and reduction.

Two qualitative items (item 4, ADFAQ section 3 and item 1, section 4) immediately followed categorical survey items; designed specifically to validate and qualify the response to the categorical-data item. The remaining three qualitative items were similarly designed to validate specific quantitative aspects of the ADFAQ, however the three items were separated from the likert-type items to which they related in order to maintain uniformity of the likert-data section. In light of this ‘validation’ intention, the focus of the qualitative analyses was upon causal attribution and hence utilised the unrestricted open coding methodology to identify and develop causal themes in the respondents’ written responses (Strauss, 1987).

The open coding of the ADFAQ qualitative items utilised the broad and somewhat traditional approach of three cyclical inter-related aspects: data coding and reduction, and verification of results (see Miles & Huberman, 1994). These aspects are described in general terms below.

An open coding strategy was used to avoid restricting the complexity and the variety of information that could be considered. This strategy was used in conjunction with strategies to address both inter-rater and intra-rater reliability (these aspects are described separately in the paragraphs following). The analysis process focused on progressively coding and displaying the data in a manner that facilitated interpretation. 119 Chapter Four – Methodology – Questionnaire Study

Each line of the respondents’ answers was examined with the aim of producing a series of concepts to best fit the data. In the early stage of the analysis process (approximately 50 survey returns received) the concepts were considered provisional. However, once the process had progressed beyond 100 survey returns, the concepts had become relatively well grounded. This consolidation was due to the predominance of very brief qualitative responses by the majority of respondents. Approximately three-quarters of respondents provided responses to each qualitative item, and approximately 80% of these responses were restricted to one line or less. The ADFAQ provided five lines for each qualitative item. Hence a quantity of 50 surveys was deemed appropriate for the inter-rater process. The final aspect of the analysis process focused on inter-rater and intra-rater reliability.

Intra-rater Reliability

Each ADFAQ qualitative item was coded by the researcher upon receipt of each ADFAQ return, and subsequently (cumulatively) entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Approximately four weeks later, when all ADFAQ returns had been received (i.e., the cut-off date for ADFAQ returns had passed), the researcher began the process of intra-rater coding the ADFAQ qualitative responses into themes ‘from scratch’. The spreadsheet created from the second coding pass was then combined with the data from the first coding pass and a discriminant analysis conducted to determine whether rating conducted by different personnel would be predictable. Agreement was recorded on 90% of the qualitative items. The variable relating to the factors that have contributed to the safety record of ADF aviation (S3.5) recorded the lowest level of agreement (82%) between raters. In order to take into account chance agreement, a Cohen’s kappa coefficient was calculated for this variable and obtained 0.74, which is considered good.

Inter-rater Reliability

Following coding by the researcher, an independent postgraduate researcher from the Department of Aviation at the University of New South Wales inter-rater coded a randomly selected sample of 50 ADFAQ returns. Full agreement was reported on two

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of the five items, whereas the variables relating to ‘safety record’ (item 5, section 3), safety culture definition (item 6, section 3) and ADF aviation risk (item 1, section 4) recorded Cohen’s kappa values of 0.81, 0.83 and 0.92 respectively. These results are considered good, although they are not unexpected in the context of the generally brief responses provided by respondents to the ADFAQ qualitative items, and the few points that were made by participants within their responses.

4.4.2 Statements and Assurances

An information sheet (see Appendix C) informed respondents that participation in the research was voluntary and that the survey should take approximately 25 minutes to complete. The information sheet also advised respondents that participation in the research would not prejudice future employment or any aspect of their workplace performance assessment.

4.4.3 Avoiding Bias

The researcher’s former employment prompts consideration of potential confounding factors on data acquisition. The Hawthorne effect causes participants to bias their behaviour as a result of being involved with research. The measures of this effect can only be established through comparisons between experimental and control groups. This research does not include experimental and control groups. Therefore to minimise influencing data as a result of the Hawthorne effect, the researcher limited the information released to ADFAQ participants regarding the specific research subject being examined (see Appendix, ADFAQ Participant Information Sheet). Moreover, the potential for such biases were further minimised by limiting researcher-participant interaction via the use of mailing the surveys and information sheets (outwards) and completed surveys (return).

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4.5 CHAPTER FOUR SUMMARY

In recognition of the need and utility of contextually relevant methodology for research relating to organisational culture in aviation (Batteau et al, 2003), this chapter described the methodology for an exploratory attitudinal study encompassing the design and implementation of a psychometric survey tool – the Australian Defence Force Aviation Questionnaire. The chapter noted that the overall purpose of such (exploratory) research is to describe the attitudinal norms relating to ADF aviation operations and safety ‘as they naturally occur’ – in contrast to examining the impacts of a safety program or intervention. Hence the ADFAQ focussed upon the psychosocial preconditions to ‘normal’ performance in ADF aviation and was designed to elicit respondents’ attitudes towards organisational culture within the context of ADF aviation. The chapter included a detailed description of the rationale and development of each item, as well as practical aspects of the method’s implementation. The chapter also described how the methodology includes between-group comparisons, and is designed to answer questions of both a univariate nature (describing singular variables of inter-personal communication, safety culture, morale, etc) and correlative nature (summarising the relationship between several variables). The participants comprised 402 Australian Defence Force officer aircrew and engineer personnel that have graduated aviation- specific training such as flying training or aeronautical engineering. The participant sample comprised the full population base of RAAF pilots and engineers to the senior officer rank of Wing Commander. Despite ministerial support for the ADFAQ study, an unfortunate shortcoming of the method was that it was not successful in reaching the entire aircrew and aeronautical engineer officer population from all three ADF Service Arms. While this is not a great impediment in terms of overall sample size (the participating service is the predominant aviation organisation within the ADF), participation by Army and Navy aviation officers would have allowed a service-based between-groups comparison that may have indicated single-service cultural attributes within the greater ADF aviation culture. The following chapter, Chapter Five, describes the results of the ADFAQ study.

122 CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS – LIKERT-TYPE DATA

Responses were obtained from 402 ADF aviation personnel which represents a 40% overall response rate. The ADFAQ responses were subjected to traditional item evaluation. This chapter examines the likert-type data, including descriptive analyses, data distribution, and analyses of skewness, reliability, principal components and validity. Analyses of the qualitative and categorical ADFAQ data are described in Chapter Seven. The demographic analyses (comprising comparisons of attitudinal data based on respondents’ officer rank, occupation, ADF Force Element Group, education and human factors training) and examination of the correlations between respondent age and duration of ADF employment with ADFAQ responses is presented in Chapter Nine.

5.1 EVALUATION OF THE ADFAQ

In light of the exploratory rationale of the ADFAQ and the subsequent need to similarly explore the fundamental aspects of the questionnaire’s structure, the strategy employed to evaluate the results of the ADFAQ study consists of four phases. The first two phases are presented in this chapter. The first phase comprises an overview of the results data in order to gain a prima facie understanding of the results. The second phase is predominantly a testing phase. Testing the ADFAQ results is important because it will indicate whether the data provided by the ADFAQ application are normally distributed or skewed, and valid both internally (consistent) and externally (validation of scale/s). This finding will be useful when considering the data in the third and fourth phases of the evaluation. The third evaluation phase examines the qualitative and categorical ADFAQ data. The fourth and final phase of the evaluation examines the data via demographic analyses. Specifically, it includes consideration of the data in relation to respondents’ rank, occupational specialty, formal education, age and employment duration.

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5.1.1 Likert-type Results Overview

The 28 likert-type questions were subjected to traditional item evaluation. The item means ranged from 2.00 (item 27 “The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be improved”) to 4.15 (item 20 “My work environment has a positive safety culture”). Table 5.1 (overleaf) lists the key descriptive analyses for each likert-type item. The table uses three descriptors: ‘DIR’ to indicate the percentage of respondents in the main direction (agree/disagree) for each item, ‘MP’ to indicate the midpoint response (%) for that item, and ‘DK’ to indicate the percentage of respondents that reported Don’t know. The DIR for each item was calculated by comparing two summations: (a) the percentage total for ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’; and (b) the percentage total for ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. The summation with the higher value was then recorded as the DIR.

Table 5.1 shows that, in general, respondents indicated clear agreement or disagreement towards the likert-scale items, with relatively few items recording noteworthy levels of uncertainty (i.e., Don’t know) or no opinion (i.e., Neither agree or disagree). Item 11 “ADF aviation often requires the use of a built-in safety margin to complete a mission” recorded the highest level of uncertainty (10% of respondents reported Don’t know to this item). Item 26 “ADF aviation represents ‘world’s best practice’”, which was the validation item for the ADFAQ likert-type data (included at the end of Table 5.1), recorded the second highest level of uncertainty (7%). The remainder of the items recorded low levels of respondent uncertainty – typically only 1% or 2%.

Two items recorded MP percentages of 30% or more. Item 17 “ADF Management offers positive feedback in response to employee suggestions” recorded the highest level of lack of opinion (33% of respondents indicated neither agreement nor disagreement). Item 2 “More extensive procedures will result in improved aviation safety” recorded 30% of respondents indicating neither agreement or disagreement. Eight other items recorded MP percentages of between 20% and 29%. The remainder of the items recorded an average MP percentage of 10%.

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Table 5.1. Descriptive analyses of 28 likert-type items, including validation item (item 26).

DIR MP DK Item Mean SD Direction % % % 1 ADF aviation operations can be entirely 2.34 1.05 Disagree 70 8 2 specified in standardised procedures 2 More extensive procedures will result in 2.84 0.95 Disagree 40 30 2 improved ADF aviation safety 3 More disciplinary measures by management will 2.16 0.99 Disagree 73 13 2 result in improved ADF aviation safety 4 In ADF aviation, deviations from Standardised 3.23 1.05 Agree 53 16 1 Procedures are a necessity of ‘real life’ 5 Deviations from Standardised Procedures are a 3.65 0.89 Agree 73 13 1 potential threat to the safety of ADF aviation 6 Errors are inevitable events in aviation 3.86 0.94 Agree 81 5 1 operations 7 Safety events can easily occur within my area of 3.45 1.17 Agree 63 12 2 operation 8 ADF aviation is safe 3.91 0.78 Agree 84 9 1

9 ADF aviation is safer than Australian Regular 2.91 1.41 Agree 42 26 9 Passenger Transport aviation 10 There is a margin of safety ‘built in’ to ADF 3.85 0.82 Agree 84 11 2 aviation 11 ADF aviation often requires the use of a built-in 2.84 1.31 Agree 44 24 10 safety margin to complete a mission 12 Safety events are a cause for disciplinary action 2.29 0.97 Disagree 61 26 1 by management 13 I trust ADF Senior Officers with operational 3.50 0.93 Agree 67 19 2 aviation decisions 14 I trust ADF Senior Officers with decisions 3.60 0.81 Agree 69 22 1 regarding safety 15 Open communication is a key feature of ADF 4.12 0.93 Agree 86 7 1 aviation 16 ADF Management encourages innovative 3.35 0.94 Agree 54 26 2 thinking 17 ADF Management offers positive feedback in 3.16 0.98 Agree 45 33 2 response to employee suggestions 18 I am hesitant to offer suggestions to ADF 2.12 0.82 Disagree 77 16 2 Management 19 ADF management enforces strict compliance to 3.54 0.84 Agree 62 27 1 rules and procedures 20 My work environment has a positive safety 4.15 0.68 Agree 93 3 1 culture 21 I communicate safety-relevant events, 3.91 0.76 Agree 82 11 1 regardless of how minor, to my boss 22 A lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety 2.21 0.91 Disagree 71 18 2 culture 23 The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” is 2.64 1.06 Disagree 49 25 3 often used by ADF aviation personnel 24 The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” 2.07 0.72 Disagree 79 17 1 describes how I feel about ADF aviation 25 My morale is generally high 3.61 0.87 Agree 69 19 1

27 The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can 2.00 0.64 Disagree 86 10 4 be improved 28 The safety performance of ADF aviation can be 3.87 0.69 Agree 82 14 2 improved 26 ADF aviation represents “world’s best practice” 3.12 1.34 Agree 55 29 7 (validation item)

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5.1.2 Data Distribution

The distribution of each likert-type score was examined to estimate the internal consistency of the items. For the majority of items, responses were fairly normally distributed without a high degree of skewness. The greatest distribution of responses within an extreme category (i.e., Strongly Disagree or Strongly Agree) was recorded by the item “Open communication is a key feature of ADF aviation”, where 37% of respondents reported Strongly Agree. Most items recorded a distribution of less than 20% in the extreme categories.

Several items recorded a low range of responses. These items recorded varying distributions across the moderate (Agree, Disagree) and extreme likert-type categories. Only one item, “My work environment has a positive safety culture”, recorded a very low combined response range as more than 90% of respondents reported agreement summed across the moderate and extreme categories. A further nine items had a low response range with more than 75% of respondents reporting agreement or disagreement in the moderate and extreme category combined (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2. Aspects covered in the original item pool comprising items with more than 75% of responses distributed in the combined moderate and extreme categories.

Moderate Extreme Items with more than 75% of responses in Combined Direction Category Category extreme and moderate categories % % % My work environment has a positive safety culture Agree 68 25 93 (item 20) The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be Disagree 71 15 86 improved (item 27) Open communication is a key feature of ADF Agree 49 37 86 aviation (item 15) There is a margin of safety built in to ADF aviation Agree 72 12 84 (item 10) ADF aviation is safe (item 8) Agree 68 15 83 The safety performance of ADF aviation can be Agree 71 12 83 improved (item 28) I communicate safety-related events, regardless of Agree 66 16 82 how minor, to my boss (item 21) Errors are inevitable events in aviation operations Agree 61 20 81 (item 6) “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” describes how I feel Disagree 63 16 79 about ADF aviation (item 24) I am hesitant to offer suggestions to ADF Disagree 61 16 77 management (item 18)

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5.1.3 Inter-correlation of Items

Analyses of the intercorrelations between the 28 likert-type items gave an important first insight into the item groupings within the ADFAQ. The complete set of item intercorrelations is provided in Table 5.3 (part 1) and Table 5.4 (part 2). Decimal points have been omitted from both tables to ease visual interpretation of the data.

Table 5.3. Intercorrelations of likert-type items (part 1).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 1 2 22** 1 3 18** 33* 1 4 20** 05 -03 1 5 08 20** 10 -31** 1 6 -04 -05 -11* 04 09 1 7 09 13* 16** -12* 08 -28** 1 8 .02 -03 03 -04 -01 04 -10* 1 9 .05 05 03 -01 02 -15** -11* 28** 1 10 -02 -05 -04 09 -04 02 02 20** 19** 1 11 -01 06 11* -03 -03 -03 04 -05 -02 26** 1 12 -03 19** 36** -02 16** -11* -16** 07 13* 06 19** 1 13 16* 06 05 -05 -04 01 -06 19** 05 17** 01 03 1 14 09 05 -06 -05 -01 02 -07 32** 07 21** -02 -03 69** 1 15 09 02 -24** 01 -09 01 -01 13* 02 08 03 -08 21** 40** 16 -02 01 09 -02 10 02 06 -09 -13 -12 09 -04 -25** -38** 17 -02 -05 -10 -06 -08 -06 -01 04 06 07 -06 06 32** 33** 18 04 .09 12* 04 03 08 04 -07 -04 -04 07 15** -23** -24** 19 14** -03 -02 -07 03 -11* -06 07 09 14** 09 06 12* 15** 20 -04 -12* -14** 03 -05 -04 05 25** 11* 17** -06 -07 24** 32** 21 -06 -01 -06 -01 -08 -07 05 -01 03 04 14** 05 02 -01 22 .04 04 10 06 -01 -06 -14** 07 -08 09 13* 24** 11 14** 23 -04 08 16** -02 10 02 08 -03 -18** -02 13* 05 -12* -15** 24 -07 -10 08 07 -13* -03 06 06 -08 13** 14** 11* -03 -09 25 04 -07 -01 -01 -08 -04 -03 10* 05 05 -03 07 27** 24** 27 -05 -11* -03 -05 -11* -03 04 07 12* 06 -08 -03 17** 20** 28 -02 11* -03 01 19** 07 04 -14** -07 -06 05 -04 -16** -18** 26 04 06 01 06 -01 01 -09 20** 25** 19** 03 23** 31** 30**

A total of 142 inter-item correlations were recorded. Approximately 80% of the correlations were significant at a level of 0.01 (marked with a double asterisk); the remainder were significant at a level of 0.05 (marked with a single asterisk). 127 Chapter Five – Results – Likert-type Data

Approximately 60% of the correlations recorded values of between r = 0.25 and r = 0.35, although statistically significant correlations were also recorded at values between 0.10 and 0.15.

Table 5.4. Intercorrelations of likert-type items (part 2).

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15 1 16 -36** 1 17 30** 57** 1 18 -23** -34** -40** 1 19 17** 11* 09 04 1 20 34** 26** 25** -25** 15** 1 21 11 01 09 -14** -04 27** 1 22 07 02 09 01 15** 10 01 1 23 -18** -18** -18** 13* -09 -25** -10 11* 1 24 -07 -10 -08 17** -03 -05 -07 21** 27** 1 25 28** 28** 29** -31** -02 30** 12* 08 -06 -08 1 27 08 20** 19** -04 02 14** 06 04 -12* 09 05 24** 1 28 -11* -18** -17** 03 -06 -11* -04 -13* 14** -16** -08 -21** -40** 1 26 27** 22** 19** -14** 14** 29** 05 09 -16** 03 36** 1

The strongest correlation between two items (r = 0.69, significant at 0.01) was recorded between item 13 (“I trust ADF senior officers with operational aviation decisions”) and item 14 (“I trust ADF senior officers with decisions regarding safety”), followed by item 16 (“ADF Management encourages innovative thinking”) and item 17 (“ADF Management offers positive feedback in response to employee suggestions”) (r = 0.57, significant at 0.01). The correlation between items 13 and 14 is not surprising in that both items relate to respondents’ perception of their trust in senior officers. The correlation between items 16 and 17 is similarly not surprising as both items relate to employee-manager relations specifically, and suggests that respondents who perceive that ADF managers encourage innovative thinking are likely to perceive that feedback is forthcoming from ADF management. A surprising negative correlation (r = -.40, significant at 0.01) was recorded between item 27 (“The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be improved”) and item 28 (“The safety performance of ADF aviation can be improved”), suggesting that respondents perceive that a type of imbalance exists

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between the ‘room for improvement’ for the ADF aviation’s operational and safety performance.

Other items are noteworthy for the quantity of correlations that they hold with other items. Visual inspection of Table 5.3 and 5.4 reveals a remarkable clustering of inter- correlated items between (and including) item 13 and item 28, item 14 and item 28, and item 12 and item 20. Item 20, “My work environment has a positive safety culture” recorded more item inter-correlations than any other item; correlating with 18 items. Following closely, in frequency of intercorrelations, is the validation item 26, “ADF aviation represents ‘worlds best practice’”, which recorded correlations with 16 items.

Items that recorded either low scoring or few significant correlations are also worthy of note here, for they also contribute to a clearer view of the likely atheoretical factor structure of the items. Item 4, “In ADF aviation, deviations from Standardised Procedures are a necessity of ‘real life’” recorded the least number of significant correlations (at 0.01) than other items: correlating with only two items at 0.01, and one item at 0.05. Furthermore, five of its correlations with other items recorded a correlation of almost zero (specifically 0.01). Item 21, “I communicate safety-related events, regardless of how minor, to my boss” recorded very few significant correlations. This item correlated significantly with only three items (all at 0.01), and recorded five correlations of almost zero (0.01), as per item 4.

Summary of data distribution and item inter-correlations

In summarising the inter-correlation analyses, it should be noted that most of the intercorrelations produced were moderately sized. A small number of inter-correlations could be considered very high. A few of the items correlated with many others. Indeed, an interesting nexus was revealed between (and including) items 12 and 20, 13 and 28, 14 and 28, as well as a smaller concentration of items around item 25 and the validation item 26. Most correlations could be considered ‘expected’ in the sense that they related to respondents’ perceptions of a common aspect of organisational performance. For example, items 13 and 14 both relate to respondents trust of senior officers in ADF aviation, although they specifically address respondents’ trust of operational decisions

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and safety decisions respectively. Even the larger groupings of correlations, such as between and including item 12 and item 20, are unsurprising in that the items relate to managers’ roles, the discipline associated with safety and policy issues. The latter issues certainly relate to, and perhaps could be considered subsets of, the role of managers in ADF aviation. Two correlations, however, were particularly surprising. The first, a negative correlation between item 27 (“The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be improved”) and item 28 (“The safety performance of ADF aviation can be improved”), is unexpected in that it demonstrates an interesting contrast: that while respondents perceive that operational efficiency cannot be improved they simultaneously perceive that safety performance can be improved. The result provides an interesting insight into the potential mindset of aircrew and engineers: that improving safety will not lead to improvement in operational efficiencies. This correlation is perhaps even more interesting in light of a second correlation between items 27 and 28 with item 20 (“My work environment has a positive safety culture”), whereby an employee that perceives that their (i.e., local) work environment has a positive safety culture is likely to (a) perceive that the operational efficiency of ADF aviation (i.e., system perspective) can be improved and yet (b) perceive that the safety performance of ADF aviation cannot be improved. The analyses also revealed several ‘stand alone’ items that do not contribute strongly to a larger item group, but appear to instead indicate perceptions about specific aspects of individuals’ performance within ADF aviation (for example, item 21 “I communicate safety-related events, regardless of how minor, to my boss”). The following section explores the characteristics of the items further, and examines the internal consistency and collective structure of the ADFAQ likert-type items.

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5.1.4 Exploration of ADFAQ structure

Following the analysis of the inter-correlation of ADFAQ likert-type items, an exploration of the collective structure of the items is presented in this section. The exploration of the likert-data structure represents an attempt to summarise the data into interpretable themes. The rationale for seeking such a summary relates to the difficulty in examining the relationships between the 27 items, and hence the need to elucidate groups among the items (Stevens, 1992). There are four aspects of exploration of data variance and structure that are examined in this section: (a) the full set of likert-type items (n = 27); (b) the non-skewed set (n = 18); (c) the theoretical initial structure; and (d) the data-derived structure through analysis of the items’ factor structure.

Cronbach’s alpha was used to estimate the proportion of the total variance across each set of items that is attributable to a common source. In light of the exploratory objective of the ADFAQ, Cronbach’s alpha was chosen for its parsimony and tendency toward providing a low estimate of reliability compared to other variance methods (Hammond, 2000). Again in light of the exploratory objective of the ADFAQ, the justification for the exploration of the variance of the non-skewed set embraces the convention that skewed cases may have more influence on the factor solution than non-skewed cases (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). A Cronbach alpha value in excess of 0.7 is considered very good (Gregory, 2000), and would suggest that the items comprising the particular theme of the ADFAQ elicit responses along a consistent dimension.

The Cronbach alpha for the full set (recall that item 26 ADF aviation represents “world’s best practice” is a validation item and excluded from Cronbach alpha analyses) of likert-type items (n = 27) was alpha = 0.46 (poor). The Cronbach alpha for the non-skewed set of likert-type items was only marginally higher: alpha = 0.49 (poor). These results suggest that neither the non-skewed (n = 17) nor full-set (n = 27) likert- type items elicited responses along a consistent dimension. Table 5.5 (overleaf) lists the non-skewed item set. The full set of likert-type items is listed in Table 5.1.

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Table 5.5. Table of 17 non-skewed likert-type items.

DIR MP DK Item Mean SD Direction % % % ADF aviation operations can be entirely 1 2.34 1.05 Disagree 70 8 2 specified in standardised procedures More extensive procedures will result in 2 2.84 0.95 Disagree 40 30 2 improved ADF aviation safety More disciplinary measures by management will 3 2.16 0.99 Disagree 73 13 2 result in improved ADF aviation safety In ADF aviation, deviations from Standardised 4 3.23 1.05 Agree 53 16 1 Procedures are a necessity of ‘real life’ Deviations from Standardised Procedures are a 5 3.65 0.89 Agree 73 13 1 potential threat to the safety of ADF aviation Safety events can easily occur within my area of 7 3.45 1.17 Agree 63 12 2 operation ADF aviation is safer than Australian Regular 9 2.91 1.41 Agree 42 26 9 Passenger Transport aviation ADF aviation often requires the use of a built-in 11 2.84 1.31 Agree 44 24 10 safety margin to complete a mission Safety events are a cause for disciplinary action 12 2.29 0.97 Disagree 61 26 1 by management I trust ADF Senior Officers with operational 13 3.50 0.93 Agree 67 19 2 aviation decisions I trust ADF Senior Officers with decisions 14 3.60 0.81 Agree 69 22 1 regarding safety ADF Management encourages innovative 16 3.35 0.94 Agree 54 26 2 thinking ADF Management offers positive feedback in 17 3.16 0.98 Agree 45 33 2 response to employee suggestions ADF management enforces strict compliance to 19 3.54 0.84 Agree 62 27 1 rules and procedures A lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety 22 2.21 0.91 Disagree 71 18 2 culture The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” is 23 2.64 1.06 Disagree 49 25 3 often used by ADF aviation personnel 25 My morale is generally high 3.61 0.87 Agree 69 19 1

Table 5.6 (overleaf) lists the item loadings across the four theoretical initial themes using the full set (n = 27) of variables. The table shows that while the majority of items load strongly on one factor while not similarly on others, other items (e.g., item 1, 11 and 22) load to a similar extent across more than one factor. Three prominent examples are item 1 (“ADF aviation operations can be entirely specified in standardised procedures”), item 11 (“ADF aviation often requires the use of a built-in safety margin to complete a mission”) and item 22 (“A lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety culture”).

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Table 5.6. Theoretical initial factor loadings for 27 items of the ADFAQ.

No Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 14 I trust ADF Senior Officers with decisions .73 .23 -.08 .29 regarding safety 16 ADF Management encourages innovative thinking .65 .09 -.05 -.16 17 ADF Management offers positive feedback in .64 -.01 -.01 -.12 response to employee suggestions 15 Open communication is a key feature of ADF .61 -.04 -.06 .27 aviation 13 I trust ADF Senior Officers with operational .60 .29 -.06 .27 aviation decisions 20 My work environment has a positive safety culture .59 -.08 .06 .07 25 My morale is generally high .47 -.01 -.05 .02

3 More disciplinary measures by management will -.25 .61 .05 -.12 result in improved ADF aviation safety 12 Safety events are a cause for disciplinary action -.14 .56 .21 -.22 by management 2 More extensive procedures will result in improved -.16 .52 -.30 .12 ADF aviation safety 7 Safety events can easily occur within my area of .07 .46 -.15 -.46 operation 1 ADF aviation operations can be entirely specified .04 .39 -.37 .19 in standardised procedures 19 ADF management enforces strict compliance to .14 .28 .02 .13 rules and procedures 24 The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” -.18 .18 .62 .16 describes how I feel about ADF aviation 5 Deviations from Standardised Procedures are a -.17 .33 -.52 .14 potential threat to the safety of ADF aviation 4 In ADF aviation, deviations from Standardised -.01 .20 -.44 .09 Procedures are a necessity of ‘real life’ 28 The safety performance of ADF aviation can be -.37 -.08 -.41 .24 improved 27 The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be .39 .03 .35 -.21 improved 18 I am hesitant to offer suggestions to ADF -.57 .21 .23 .05 Management 23 The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” is often -.38 .19 .14 .33 used by ADF aviation personnel 6 Errors are inevitable events in aviation operations -.04 -.26 -.06 .52 9 ADF aviation is safer than Australian Regular .21 .24 -.04 -.38 Passenger Transport aviation 11 ADF aviation often requires the use of a built-in -.17 .25 .37 .34 safety margin to complete a mission 10 There is a margin of safety ‘built in’ to ADF .19 .18 .35 .30 aviation 22 A lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety .09 .36 .37 .12 culture 8 ADF aviation is safe .36 .27 .06 .08

21 I communicate safety-relevant events, regardless .20 -.16 .16 -.04 of how minor, to my boss

Table 5.6 shows that in general items comprising the a priori themes loaded in a manner consistent with the theoretical initial structure, however some items loaded to a greater strength on factors outside of the a priori structure to an equal or greater 133 Chapter Five – Results – Likert-type Data

strength. For example, item 22 (“A lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety culture”) was included a priori as an item within the Safety Perception theme although it loaded at 0.12 on this theme while loading at 0.36 and 0.37 on Military Efficacy and Adaptive Focus respectively.

Analysis of the consistency of the a priori themes of the ADFAQ revealed Cronbach alpha values ranging from ‘excellent’ to ‘poor’ (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001) for the four themes: Organisational Confidence (alpha = 0.77, excellent), Military Efficacy (alpha = 0.52, fair), Adaptive Focus (alpha = 0.45, fair), and Safety Perception (alpha = 0.33, poor). For the Military Efficacy and Safety Perception themes, the Cronbach alpha values of 0.52 and 0.33 respectively were achieved by excluding one item from the a priori theme, providing an improvement to the measure of internal reliability across the dimension. Specifically, the removal of item 19 and 6 from the Military Efficacy and Safety Perception dimensions respectively increased internal validity from an alpha value of 0.49 to 0.52, and 0.26 to 0.33. The Cronbach alpha values for the remaining two dimensions (Organisational confidence and Adaptive focus) could not be improved through the exclusion of items from the dimension.

Table 5.7 lists the original item themes and the corresponding initial alpha values and demonstrates that item elimination created only marginal or nil alpha improvement.

Table 5.7. Scale consistency of themes covered in the original item pool.

Original Item/s Potential Theme Original Item Pool Alpha Removed New Alpha

Organisational Confidence 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 25 0.77 Nil 0.77

Military Efficacy 1, 2, 3, 7, 12, 19 0.49 19 0.52

Adaptive Focus 4, 5, 18, 23, 24, 27, 28 0.45 Nil 0.45

Safety Perception 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, 22 0.26 6 0.33

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Atheoretical full set three-factor solution

Given the limited success of the four a priori themes in achieving good internal consistency in each dimension, an exploration of the atheoretical component structure of the likert-type items was undertaken. This is because further (atheoretical) exploration may expose underlying factors in the data set that perhaps allow the size of the ADFAQ to be reduced while recording alpha values equal to or greater than the a priori themes. Accordingly, the full set likert-type items (n = 27) were subjected to a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation to simple structure (excluding validation item 26, “ADF aviation represents world’s best practice” as noted earlier). The number of factors to be retained and rotated was determined by inspection of the scree plot. This yielded a solution of three factors and accounted for 22% of variance.

An initial critical value of 0.32 (considered the minimum value for interpreting factors [Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001]), was used for two principal reasons: (a) in light of the level of complexity in the theoretical initial factor loadings (see Table 5.6); and, (b) a full appreciation of the complexity cut-off as an interpretability ‘filter’ was in line with the exploratory nature of the likert-type items.

The three-factor solution included 18 items that loaded at or greater than 0.32 on one of the three factors. Two of these items (item 3 and 18) were complex: loading at or greater than 0.32 on two factors. Eight items failed to load to 0.32 on any factor. The items that failed to load all held values of 0.25 or less, suggesting heterogeneity amongst the items. Table 5.8 (overleaf) presents the rotated factor matrix, listing the item loadings across three factors using the full set (n = 27) of variables. Although less complex than the theoretical initial factor loadings, Table 5.8 shows that while some items load strongly on one factor while not similarly on others (e.g., item 14 “I trust ADF Senior Officers with decisions regarding safety”), other items (e.g., item 2 “More extensive procedures will result in improved ADF aviation safety”) load to a similar extent across more than one factor.

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Table 5.8. Atheoretical three-factor loadings at 0.32 for 27 items of the ADFAQ.

No Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 14 I trust ADF Senior Officers with decisions regarding .84 .15 .01 safety 13 I trust ADF Senior Officers with operational aviation .72 .21 .11 decisions 16 ADF Management encourages innovative thinking .54 -.11 -.09

15 Open communication is a key feature of ADF aviation .51 -.10 -.17 17 ADF Management offers positive feedback in response .51 -.17 -.12 to employee suggestions 20 My work environment has a positive safety culture .45 -.22 -.13

18 I am hesitant to offer suggestions to ADF Management -.42 .13 .34

25 My morale is generally high .37 -.08 -.10 8 ADF aviation is safe .35 .04 .13

27 The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be .32 -.30 .19 improved 2 More extensive procedures will result in improved ADF -.01 .53 .16 aviation safety 5 Deviations from Standardised Procedures are a -.10 .45 -.10 potential threat to the safety of ADF aviation 1 ADF aviation operations can be entirely specified in .09 .37 .03 standardised procedures 28 The safety performance of ADF aviation can be -.29 .32 -.26 improved 24 The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” describes -.11 -.21 .52 how I feel about ADF aviation 3 More disciplinary measures by management will result -.11 .34 .43 in improved ADF aviation safety 12 Safety events are a cause for disciplinary action by -.07 .16 .40 management 22 A lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety culture .12 -.04 .35 11 ADF aviation often requires the use of a built-in safety -.09 .01 .32 margin to complete a mission

Items that did not load at 0.32

4 In ADF aviation, deviations from Standardised .04 .26 -.13 Procedures are a necessity of ‘real life’ 6 Errors are inevitable events in aviation operations -.02 -.01 -.11 7 Safety events can easily occur within my area of .09 .21 .12 operation 9 ADF aviation is safer than Australian Regular .14 .02 .03 Passenger Transport aviation 10 There is a margin of safety ‘built in’ to ADF aviation .18 -.09 .21 19 ADF management enforces strict compliance to rules .14 .06 .09 and procedures 21 I communicate safety-relevant events, regardless of .09 -.20 -.07 how minor, to my boss 23 The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” is often used -.23 .16 .25 by ADF aviation personnel

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The initial critical value (0.32) was re-examined with a view to increasing it to a level where the two complex items would load on one factor only. While the trade-off for using a higher critical value would be that fewer items loaded, greater interpretability of factors would be achieved. This filtering rationale aligns with the guidance of Tabachnik and Fidell (2001) whereby “the cut-off is selected because one can interpret factors with that cut-off but not with a lower cut-off” (p. 625). Closer inspection of the rotated factor matrix found that a critical value of 0.35 provided the necessary filter that allowed items to load on one factor only. Hence the final atheoretical solution included 17 items that loaded at or greater than 0.35 on one of the three factors while not loading similarly on another factor. Ten items failed to load to 0.35 on any factor.

Table 5.9 (overleaf) shows the percentage of variance accounted for by each new factor in the final solution, the Cronbach alpha for each factor and the name given to each factor that describes a reasonable interpretation of the comprising items’ theme. The table also shows the component items of each factor (loaded at or above 0.35) as well as their factor loadings.

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Table 5.9. Results of the rotated factor analysis using a critical value of 0.35 showing the name of each factor, percentage of variance accounted for by each factor, the internal consistency between items for each factor (alpha) and the factor loadings for each item.

Factor 1: Organisational confidence (11.4%, alpha = 0.78) 14 I trust ADF Senior Officers with decisions regarding safety 0.84 13 I trust ADF Senior Officers with operational aviation decisions 0.72 16 ADF Management encourages innovative thinking 0.54 15 Open communication is a key feature of ADF aviation 0.51 17 ADF Management offers positive feedback in response to employee suggestions 0.51 20 My work environment has a positive safety culture 0.45 18 I am hesitant to offer suggestions to ADF Management -0.42 25 My morale is generally high 0.37 8 ADF aviation is safe 0.35

Factor 2: System rigidity (5.1%, alpha = 0.48) 24 The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” describes how I feel about ADF aviation 0.52 3 More disciplinary measures by management will result in improved ADF aviation safety 0.43 12 Safety events are a cause for disciplinary action by management 0.40 22 A lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety culture 0.35

Factor 3: Disposition toward procedural operations (5.0%, alpha = 0.38)

2 More extensive procedures will result in improved aviation safety. 0.53 5 Deviations from standard procedures are a threat to the safety of ADF aviation. 0.45 1 ADF aviation operations can be entirely specified in standard procedures. 0.37

Not included:

4 In ADF aviation, deviations from standardised procedures are a necessity of ‘real life’ 6 Errors are inevitable in aviation operations. 7 Safety events can easily occur within my area of operation. 9 ADF aviation is safer than Australian Regular Passenger Transport (RPT) aviation. 10 There is a margin of safety built in to ADF aviation. 11 ADF aviation often requires the use of a built-in safety margin to complete a mission. 19 ADF Management enforces strict compliance to rules and procedures. 21 I communicate safety-related events, regardless of how minor, to my boss. 23 The expression “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” is often used by ADF aviation personnel. 27 The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be improved. 28 The safety performance of ADF aviation can be improved.

This three-factor composition achieved internal consistency values of 0.78 (excellent), 0.48 (fair) and 0.38 (poor) respectively. Examination of the data revealed that factor 1 could achieve a marginally improved alpha value (0.79) if item 8 were deleted. The deletion of items within factors 2 and 3 did not improve alpha (see Table 5.10 overleaf).

138 Chapter Five – Results – Likert-type Data

Table 5.10. Analyses of scale consistency of atheoretical three-factor solution.

Potential Theme Original Item Pool Initial Alpha Item/s Removed New Alpha

Factor 1 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18r, 20, 25 0.78 8 0.79

Factor 2 3, 12, 22, 24 0.48 Nil 0.48

Factor 3 1, 2, 5 0.38 Nil 0.38

This three-factor solution gave a reasonably clear indication of the aspects being measured by each factor. The first factor extracted was interpreted as Organisational confidence as it resembles the first a priori theme and comprises nine items that reflect the confidence of personnel towards operational and management aspects of ADF aviation. The second factor was interpreted as System rigidity because it contains items that reflect a perception of the discipline of personnel and adherence to the status quo. The third factor was interpreted as Disposition toward procedural operations as the items focus on the achievement of safety through standardised operations procedures. The three factors contained 9, 4 and 3 items respectively, and the internal consistency across items in each factor (alpha) was excellent for the first factor, yet respectively fair and poor for the second and third factors.

Summary of Internal Consistency

Cronbach alpha values ranging from excellent to poor were achieved in both a priori and PCA-derived structures. Table 5.11 compares the version of both the a priori and PCA structures with the highest internal consistency.

Table 5.11. Comparative analysis of the scale consistency of the PCA and a priori solutions.

A priori Final Item Pool Alpha PCA Final Item Pool Alpha

Organisational 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 25 0.77 Factor 1 0.78 Confidence 17, 18r, 20, 25 Military Efficacy 1, 2, 3, 7, 12 0.52 Factor 2 3, 12, 22, 24 0.48

Adaptive Focus 4, 5, 18, 23, 24, 27, 28 0.45 Factor 3 1, 2, 5 0.38

Safety Perception 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, 22 0.33 - - -

139 Chapter Five – Results – Likert-type Data

The similarity of the first dimension of the a priori and PCA derivations should be noted. In recognition of the similarity of the first factor across the a priori and PCA derivations, and the marginally higher internal consistency of the a priori structure in toto, the following section completes the analysis of the likert-type data and examines the intercorrelations and validation of the a priori themes.

5.1.5 Inter-correlation and validation of themes

The a priori themes were found to be largely independent from one another as the inter- correlation scores were low on four of the six inter-correlations (see Table 5.12). Two significant correlations were found for factor 1 (between factors 1 and 2, and factors 1 and 3). The first correlation between factors 1 and 2 is interpreted as a confirmation of many of the item inter-correlations identified earlier: that as respondents’ confidence in the organisation increases, the ‘need’ to have an open mind to potential system changes diminishes. This may be a reflection of the ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ attitude probed in the ADFAQ, espoused by many in the ADF literature (see Chapter Two) and noted by Helmreich and Merritt (1998) in other aviation domains. The second correlation is similarly unsurprising in that it suggests that employee confidence in the parent organisation correlates positively with perceptions of safety performance in the organisation.

Table 5.12. Intercorrelations between factors identified for the scale.

Factor 1: Factor 2: Factor 3: Factor 4: Organisational Adaptive Safety Military Confidence Focus Perception Efficacy Factor 1: Organisational Confidence 1.00 - 0.329* 0.280* 0.038 Factor 2: Adaptive Focus 1.00 0.032 0.024 Factor 3: Safety Perception 1.00 0.092 Factor 3: Military Efficacy 1.00

*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The validity of the factor structure was examined using responses to the aforementioned validation item. The examination of validity was based on the respondents’ perception of ‘best practice’ (“ADF aviation represents world’s best practice”). Factor scores were

140 Chapter Five – Results – Likert-type Data

created and compared for respondents reporting agreement or disagreement to the item using one-way ANOVA. The results of this validation analysis can be seen in Table 5.13.

Table 5.13. Results for the validation of the scale, showing mean summed scores for each factor and ANOVA results for the validation item.

Response Best Practice Factor 1: Factor 2: Factor 3: Factor 4: Organisational Adaptive Focus Safety Perception Military Efficacy Confidence Disagree 21.7 16.1 18.8 24.9 Neither 24.9 15.6 19.8 26.0 Agree 27.5 15.0 20.2 26.1

F (2,343) = 98.31 F (2,343) = 5.98 F (2,343) = 6.04 F (2,343) = 2.70

p < 0.001 p = 0.003 p = 0.003 p < 0.07*

*Approaches significance

Three of the four a priori themes (Organisational confidence, Adaptive focus, Safety perception) discriminated significantly between respondents based on their agreement with the item. The fourth factor, Military efficacy, approached significance (p < 0.07). Respondents who reported agreement that ADF aviation represents world’s best practice showed a greater tendency to have confidence in the ADF organisation, and were more perceptive of the nature of safety in ADF aviation. Respondents who reported agreement that ADF aviation represents best practice were less likely to have an adaptive focus in their roles within ADF aviation. This result, whereby Factor 2 decreases by response in contrast to the other factors, is not surprising in that it indicates respondents’ satisfaction with the manner in which ADF aviation operates (hence a disposition toward adaptation and change is less important). The fourth factor, Military efficacy, showed a positive relationship with respondents’ perception of ‘best practice’.

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5.2 CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY

This chapter described the traditional item evaluation of the likert-type data provided by ADF aviation personnel in response to the ADFAQ. The analyses described the overall responses and attempted to summarise the data using PCA. Specifically, the chapter included considerations of data distribution and inter-correlation, skewness, principal components analysis, reliability and validity.

In light of the exploratory rationale of the ADFAQ and the subsequent need to explore the fundamental aspects of the questionnaire’s structure, the strategy employed to evaluate the results of the ADFAQ study consists of four phases. The first two phases were presented in this chapter. The first phase comprised an overview of the results data in order to gain a prima facie understanding of the results. The second ‘testing’ phase demonstrated that the likert-type data provided by the ADFAQ application are distributed with only a relatively small skew, and valid both internally (fair consistency) and externally (good validity of scale/s). In summarising the inter-correlation analyses, it should be noted that most of the intercorrelations produced were moderately sized, while only a few could be considered very high. A few of the items correlated with many others. An interesting nexus was revealed between (and including) items 12 and 20, 13 and 28, 14 and 28, as well as a smaller concentration of items around item 25 and the validation item 26. Most correlations could be considered ‘expected’ in the sense that they related to respondents’ perceptions of a common aspect of organisational performance. Two correlations, however, were particularly surprising. The first, a negative correlation between item 27 (“The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be improved”) and item 28 (“The safety performance of ADF aviation can be improved”), is unexpected in that it demonstrates an interesting contrast: that while respondents perceive that operational efficiency cannot be improved they simultaneously perceive that safety performance can be improved. The result provides an interesting insight into the potential mindset of aircrew and engineers: that improving safety will not lead to improvement in operational efficiencies.

This chapter demonstrated that poor alpha values were common to both a priori and PCA-derived structures. The a priori derivation is the only derivation that achieved an 142 Chapter Five – Results – Likert-type Data

alpha value that can be considered ‘very good’. The similarity of the first two factors of the a priori and PCA derivations was also noted, as well as the two additional factors comprising the a priori structure. This finding will be useful when considering the data in the third and fourth phases of the evaluation. The third evaluation phase examines the qualitative and categorical ADFAQ data (Chapter Seven). The fourth and final phase of the evaluation examines the data via demographic analyses (Chapter Nine). The following chapter, Chapter Six, discusses the psychometric properties and methodological efficacy relating to the results presented in this chapter.

143 CHAPTER SIX

ADFAQ LIKERT DATA DISCUSSION

This chapter discusses the ADFAQ likert-type results in relation to their psychometric properties, the efficacy of the likert-type items as a group and individually, and the attitudinal theory upon which the items were based. It is important to note here that this chapter is the first of several chapters that discuss the various portions of the ADFAQ results. The discussion of the results is divided into three key areas: (1) likert-type data (this chapter); (2) qualitative and categorical data (Chapter 8); and (3) demographic criterion (Chapter 10). The limitations and implications of the ADFAQ are considered in combination with the implications and limitations of this thesis’ second (interview) study, and hence are presented in Chapter 14 (General Discussion) following the analysis and discussion of the interview data.

6.1 PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES

In accordance with the aim of this research, and in conjunction with the open-ended and categorical items of the ADFAQ (presented in the following chapter), the likert-type items of the ADFAQ examined the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel relating to safety and the organisational culture of Australian military aviation. Accordingly, the likert-type items (section 2 of the ADFAQ) took an exploratory psychometric standpoint.

Scale development

In scale development within exploratory studies such as the development of the ADFAQ, a fundamental objective is to obtain a full range of scores across the population of interest, producing a non-skewed distribution and high item variance (De Vellis, 1991). In this light, and with specific regard to the psychometric properties of the ADFAQ likert-type items, the results suggest that the psychometric attributes of the ADFAQ possess both weaknesses and strengths. While some of the 28 likert-type items

144 Chapter Six – ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

displayed a moderate measure of skewness, analysis of the groups of a priori theme- based items showed that internal consistency was ‘excellent’ to ‘poor’ across these sub- scales. One themed grouping (Organisational confidence) achieved an alpha score of 0.77 without the deletion of items from the original set. The atheoretical solution (elucidated via factor analysis using principal components extraction with varimax rotation) behaved similarly to the thematically grouped (a priori) approach, achieving a result of mixed success. Nonetheless, the items appear to have reasonable validity in measuring what they are intended to measure (i.e., a priori themes relating to organisational culture) since the employees who indicated that they are satisfied with the overall ‘normal’ functioning of ADF aviation (indicated by their agreement to the validation item 26 “ADF aviation represents ‘world’s best practice’”) differed from those employees who perceive that ADF aviation does not represent world’s best practice. The correlative properties of the ADFAQ against this validation construct were quite strong, suggesting that the perception of ADF aviation as ‘world’s best practice’ is a useful indicator of the main themes of the ADFAQ (achieving significance at 0.05 for three of the four a priori themes and approaching significance on the fourth). A criticism of this approach however is that some respondents may variously interpret ‘best practice’ (i.e., in a manner different to how the item was intended – as a single- statement indicator of general satisfaction with the inherent attributes of ADF aviation). Indeed, previous work toward the development of ‘climate’ scales where safety was a consideration, the measures were validated against individual accident experiences (Brown & Holmes, 1986) and different industries with different incident rates (Zohar, 1980). While these validating criteria were not relevant in this study due to the broader aspects of organisational culture being examined, such validating criteria would be useful in future studies in an attempt to validate the safety perception scale. However, akin to the potential for various interpretations of ‘best practice’ by respondents in this study, use of ‘incident experience’ should be clearly defined on any re-application of the ADFAQ (or amended versions of it).

Skewedness

While skew was recorded against some of the likert-type items (see Table 5.2), the existence of skew in the results should not be viewed as a wholly negative attribute of 145 Chapter Six – ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

the ADFAQ – particularly since the skewed items were relatively moderate in strength. For example, item 15 (“Open communication is a key feature of ADF aviation”) recorded a low distribution range (combined agreement of 86%), but this was split relatively evenly between ‘agreement’ (49%) and ‘strong agreement’ (37%). An additional consideration related to skew encompasses the common issue of bias in psychometric approaches (Bryman & Cramer, 1990; Stanton et al, 2005) and recognises that some of the items were ‘framed’ positively, and this may have contributed to respondents’ approach to the items, and resultant skew. Examples of such items include item 8 (“ADF aviation is safe” – this item in particular may have issues of organisational ‘pride’ entwined in respondents’ perception to the item) and item 21 (“I communicate safety-related events, regardless of how minor, to my boss” – this item recorded a combined agreement of 82%).

In contrast to the high level of skew recorded by previous studies encompassing some measure of safety perception (e.g., Williamson et al, 1997), this study recorded a relatively moderate level of skew amongst its safety and non-safety items. Interestingly, Williamson et al (1997) recorded skew in 30 of the 62 items used, and seven items recorded 90-100% of responses in the extreme categories. The moderate skew recorded against some items should not allow these items to be automatically disregarded in further ADFAQ iterations that may evolve following this questionnaire study. Indeed, Helmreich and Merritt (1998) highlight that skewed items are highly suited to inter- cultural analyses such as those just suggested because “the high level of endorsement amongst members of the culture indicates that an item reflects a commonly held belief or cultural norm” (p. 237). This is a particularly important consideration for potential studies of a comparative nature. For example, cross-Service Arm studies comparing RAAF, RAN and ARA aviation personnel, or a comparison between ADF and Australian civil aviation personnel (many of which are former ADF aviation employees, as noted in Chapter Two). The latter would of course need to take into account the contextual changes that the ADFAQ would require prior to application in an Australian civil aviation environment. The implications relating to such potential new work, stemming from the results of the ADFAQ study, are discussed in detail in the general discussion chapter of this thesis (Chapter Fourteen).

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Intercorrelative properties

An additional aspect of the psychometric properties of the ADFAQ data that warrants discussion here is the intercorrelations between individual items. The correlative attributes of the items showed an interesting predominance of items that were significant at the 0.01 level and, to a lesser extent, the 0.05 level (see Table 5.3 and 5.4). These items produced an expected pattern in so much as they clustered around common themes (Stevens, 1992). However the magnitude of the correlations were only moderate – in most cases correlating between the values of 0.25 and 0.35. A typical example is provided by the correlation between item 13 (“I trust ADF Senior Officers with operational aviation decisions”) and item 17 (“ADF Management offers positive feedback in response to employee suggestions”) which recorded a correlation of 0.32 significant at 0.01. In approximately 85% of cases, the correlation between items could be rationalised predominantly due to the prima facie similar content of the individual items. A typical example of such similarity exists in the correlation between item 8 (“ADF aviation is safe”) and item 9 (“ADF aviation is safer than Australian Regular Passenger Transport aviation”) which recorded a correlation of 0.28 significant at 0.01.

Beyond these correlations based on item content themes, there was little patterning evident in the correlations. Hunter (2005) found a similar trait amongst a minority of items relating to ‘hazardous’ pilot attitudes. Indeed, the remaining cases (approximately 15%) of item intercorrelations were less ‘obvious’ in that they did not comprise such readily similar content. Perhaps the best example relates to the correlations between respondents’ perception of the safety performance of the organisation and operational efficiencies. This example relates to the correlation between item 27 (“The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be improved”) and item 28 (“The safety performance of ADF aviation can be improved”), which recorded a correlation of -0.40 significant at 0.01. This indicates that those respondents who perceive that the operational efficiency can be improved are likely to report that the safety performance of ADF aviation cannot be improved. The most likely reason for this result is that respondents readily distinguish between safety and efficiency in their perception of the ‘output’ of ADF aviation. Another interesting and related aspect of the item intercorrelations was the large number of correlations recorded against item 20 “My work environment has a 147 Chapter Six – ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

positive safety culture”. This is interesting because the item refers to respondents’ individual working circumstances (i.e., the local conditions within several different Force Element Groups and squadrons [see Chapter Four]) and correlates with numerous items that refer to broader and more generic aspects of ADF aviation. This result would perhaps be less noteworthy if similarly referenced items that required respondents to refer to themselves (e.g., item 21, “I communicate safety-related events, regardless of how minor, to my boss”) did not record so few inter-item correlations.

To summarise these aspects to this point, the extent to which safety can be differentiated (from other organisational attributes) and the nature of safety culture as a stand-alone concept are not made clear on the basis of the likert-type data. While this issue of efficacy is discussed in the following section, it should be noted here that the qualitative and categorical items relating to safety and safety culture may offer a more meaningful insight into this aspect of ADF aviation. The results relating to the ADFAQ’s qualitative and categorical items are presented in the following chapter.

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6.2 METHODOLOGICAL EFFICACY

This section discusses the methodological efficacy and shortcomings relating to the implementation of the ADFAQ likert items and the resultant data. There are three main issues relating to methodological efficacy described in this section. These relate to: (1) likert measurement of organisational culture and climate; (2) the relationship of safety and organisational culture; and (3) the ‘influence of other factors’ attitudinal theory. Two shortcomings in the likert-item approach undertaken by the ADFAQ are then discussed: the derivation of exploratory likert-type items and the characteristics of the survey sample. Overall, the likert-data partially contributes to the achievement of the aim and objectives of this research. While the contribution of this extant research to new theory is discussed in Chapter Fourteen, it should be noted here that the likert items’ resultant data have provided an opportunity to examine an aspect of cultural influence in military aviation that has not been reported elsewhere.

Likert measurement of organisational culture and climate

The first issue of methodological efficacy encompasses whether likert-type methodology is suitable for organisational culture measurement. The ADFAQ likert items represent the first approach by this research at capturing attitudes of various dimensions (Glendon & McKenna, 1995) relating to common themes of organisational culture characteristics (Glendon & Stanton, 2000) via a contextualised approach. The likert-type data collected as part of the ADFAQ is therefore considered a part- contribution to building the ADF aviation organisational culture ‘picture’. To this end, the data collected in the likert section of the ADFAQ is arguably a measure of organisational climate, certainly not culture.

According to Helmreich and Merritt (1998) and Glendon and Stanton (2000), organisational climate is a more superficial concept than organisational culture and describes aspects of an organisation’s current state. Climate is hence related to situational and environmental factors and is temporary and subject to change (Gibbons et al, 2004). This finding follows the earlier work of Cooke and Rousseau (1988), who found that employee attitudes and perceptions were the major contributors to climate 149 Chapter Six – ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

measures (they reviewed thirteen definitions of organisational climate over a period of two decades). Indeed, Chapter Three summarised how climate affects the performance of a company just as the culture of it does, however the effects of the culture are seen to be more enduring than those of each passing climate. Glendon and Stanton (2000) suggest that studying an organisation over an extended period of time can reduce the possibility of confusing climate and cultural characteristics with one another. They also assert that organisational climate (only) is being measured if a psychometric scale is the exclusive measurement instrument. With these perspectives in mind, it can be seen that a particular purpose of studying an organisational culture is to gain insight into why it performs the way it does and perhaps (if a managerialist cultural perspective is predominant) if the organisational culture is performing to its full potential. Clearly, the question of ‘why’ remains unexamined at this point in the extant research.

Measuring safety within organisational culture

The second aspect of methodological efficacy relates to the relationship (or lack thereof) between safety perception and organisational culture. The likert-type results appear to support the findings of much previous attitudinal research relating to organisational performance and safety in industrial settings (e.g., Williamson et al, 1997; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Hunter, 2005). Specifically, it demonstrates that the perception of safety is subjective at the level of individual employees, therefore creating weak consistency for ‘measurement’ and, hence, is difficult to analyse meaningfully. Evidenced in particular by the results of the principal components analysis of the questionnaire study, safety is presented by this study (this far) as an abstract and intangible concept. Various researchers have offered numerous reasons for this state over many decades, and these rationales appear readily applicable here. For example, Lowrance (1976) and Otway and Wynne (1989), investigating the perception of safety, identified the fundamental premise that attitudes or behaviours that are considered safe to one person can often be considered unsafe to another. More recently, and in relation to aviation specifically, Helmreich and Merritt’s (1998) research of flight management attitudes identified safety as a construct generally inferred from human behaviour and self-reports rather than overtly definable (and hence measurable).

150 Chapter Six – ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

A related aspect worthy of mention here is that of the safety concept’s generally accepted ‘placement’: either within the organisational culture/climate (as a component of the overall structure) or something that relates more strongly to non-organisational, external factors. Research relating to organisational climate shows that the factor structure of climate surveys typically relate to ‘human resource management’ aspects of an organisations environment. Koys and De Cotiis (1991) produced a composite eight- dimensional scale (components: fairness, support, recognition, autonomy, cohesion, pressure, trust, innovation) based on a review of 35 scales found in the literature. The researchers found that substantive elements of organisational life such as risk and safety perception do not feature as components of organisational climate measures. Their finding holds an interesting parallel with this research in that it suggests that this work represents an attempt at organisational culture measurement in contrast to safety culture.

‘Influence of other factors’ attitudinal theory

The results of this research thus far suggest support for the theory of a three-way dynamic yielding potential influence upon ADF aviation personnel in so far as hypothesised organisational cultural ‘themes’ may influence the attitudes and behaviour of personnel. Chapter Three described the four types of attitude and behaviour theory: (1) attitudes influencing behaviour, (2) behaviour influencing attitudes, (3) mutual influence and (4) influence of other factors (see Table 3.1). The fourth theory – influence of other factors – provides a more comprehensive framework to the theory of attitude and behaviour. This approach to the attitude-behaviour link suggests that a separate ‘X’ factor exists that may influence both attitudes and behaviour of a section of the workforce (see Figure 3.3). This factor can stem from a wide variety of potential influences. Glendon and McKenna (1995) suggest that one of the most common influences is a factor that reflects a ‘campaign’ and Kirwan (2000) relates the influence to “selling” human factors within organisations. What is not particularly clear however is whether the ‘X’ influence affects employees’ attitudes and behaviour equally. Nor is it clear how and to what extent the ‘X’ influence impacts the cognitive consistency of employees. The influence of other factors theory acknowledges the importance of cognitive consistency while considering the possibility of additional factors that could influence both attitudes and behaviour. Ostrom et al (1994) point out that the basic 151 Chapter Six – ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

premise of consistency, congruity or balance is that people strive to make their attitudes and behaviour consistent. Glendon and McKenna (1995) state that any apparent consistency between attitudes and behaviour is “not necessarily a basis for judging one to be a prime causal agent in respect of the other” (p. 81).

In relation to this study, possible “Factor X” influences revealed by the likert-type results include the can-do culture, safety culture, positive self-appraisal, and an indication of a potential ‘seniority’ influence. Indeed, the first two chapters of this thesis showed that these factors are widely acknowledged and even promoted by ADF aviation senior management.

6.2.1 Shortcomings

There are numerous issues that may have contributed to the various deficiencies displayed by the ADFAQ likert-type results. These issues stem predominantly from two separate aspects of this ADFAQ study: item design (and the exploratory nature of the items in particular) and the population sample to which the likert items were applied. These aspects are addressed in the following sub-sections.

Exploratory item derivation

The exploratory rationale and subsequent design of this study – in contrast to experimental or quasi-experimental research – is an investigative ‘first pass’ of the broader problem of safe ‘normal’ performance in the hierarchical operating environment of Australian military aviation and therefore necessarily examines perceptions relating to numerous aspects of ADF aviation’s functioning. Indeed, the interpretation of some likert items – particularly relating to safety and safety culture – may affect the internal validity in recognition of the highly ambiguous nature of the concept established by previous research (see Chapter Three). In this study, such ambiguity towards safety is arguably suggested by the lack of internal consistency that could be achieved by the dimension relating to safety (Safety perception scored the lowest alpha value of the four a priori themes).

152 Chapter Six – ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

The exploratory item-design rationale, and any resultant ambiguity in the items, may also have contributed to the items recording an apparent ‘positive attitude’ bias. Several attitudinal differences were made evident that appear to support the apparent bias towards positive self-appraisal apparent within ADF aviation described earlier in this thesis (see also Falconer, 2005). Glendon and McKenna (1995) liken this trait to ego defensiveness. Overall, respondents’ likert-type results indicated that they perceive themselves to be proactive in their communication with management, especially with matters relating to safety, and that ‘open communication’ is a key feature of ADF aviation. In contrast, only a relatively small percentage of respondents agreed that ADF management offers positive feedback to the suggestions of employees. It is equally interesting that respondents reported feeling less positive regarding their morale and their trust of senior officers. More specifically, the likert-type ADFAQ items relating to the respondents’ self-perception – either through direct reference (e.g., item 21 “I communicate safety-related events, regardless of how minor, to my boss”) or inference (relating to participation in operations, e.g., item 7 “Safety events can easily occur within my area of operations”) – were positive, while respondent attitudes relating to third parties – particularly management (e.g., item 17 “ADF Management offers positive feedback in response to employee suggestions”) – were generally less positive. This result also appears to align with the positive self-appraisal evident within the ADF accident data analyses (whereby human factors are attributed as causal factors in at least 80% of ADF accidents, but only 30 to 40% of incidents – see DFS-ADF, 2001a, 2002; Wood, 2003). While described fully in Chapter Two, it should be reiterated here that the ‘self-report’ nature of incident vis accident investigation seems an influential factor because personnel unrelated to the accident event investigate ADF aviation accidents, whereas personnel directly involved in aviation incidents investigate and report them.

Survey sample and item pool size

The overall weak internal consistency of the ADFAQ is also likely to have been contributed towards by the relatively small n. In a sample size of approximately 400 interviewees out of an ADF (n.b., tri-service) aviation officer population of approximately 1800 across three service arms, some of the diversity of perceptions between different ADF units is likely to remain uncaptured. A related shortcoming is 153 Chapter Six – ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

the ‘depth’ of the likert-type data that can often accompany studies using a relatively small number of likert items (Stanton et al, 2005). The components of the final PCA solution comprised between an average of five items, whereas the a priori themes comprised an average of six items each (see Chapter Five). Although this is within the common range of items for multi-factor studies (where several items may have been discarded during factor analysis), it seems reasonable to expect that in combination with the aforementioned potential ambiguity of some items in this study, some aspects of the likert-type data may be quite shallow (Wilson & Corlett, 1995).

This potential artefact may have been compounded by the use of mail-out delivery of the ADFAQ, as opposed to ‘personal’ (on-base) delivery, perhaps accompanied by a briefing for each Force Element Group or squadron. These aspects could probably be overcome by further iterations of the likert items, although a significantly larger and more ‘public’ respondent recruitment campaign would be necessary in order to achieve significantly higher numbers of participants with the potential to create a richer data base of responses. Undertaking on-base ADFAQ delivery and participant briefing rather than mail-out would present additional logistical, security and funding difficulties that may not be justified.

Indeed, despite the instruments design focus towards the broader interaction of the three ‘service arms’ in the output of successful ADF aviation operations, a considerable deficiency of this study was the lack of support from the aviation safety directors of the navy and army service arms (see Chapter Four). The inclusion of aviation personnel from these two services would have added considerably to the breadth of perceptions recorded by the ADFAQ, and perhaps mitigated the presence of skewness within the current sample. Particularly with regard to the perception and subsequent analysis of safety, a larger sample size may help clarify this subjective and hence psychometrically ‘difficult’ concept.

154 Chapter Six – ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

6.3 CHAPTER SIX SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the psychometric properties and methodological efficacy of the likert-type data collected by the ADFAQ study. In conjunction with the open-ended and categorical items of the ADFAQ (presented in the following chapter), the likert-type items of the ADFAQ aimed to examine the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel relating to safety and the organisational culture of Australian military aviation from an exploratory psychometric standpoint. In terms of item content, it was noted here that respondents perceive themselves to be proactive in their communication with management, especially with matters relating to safety, and they perceive that ‘open communication’ is a key feature of ADF aviation. In contrast, only a relatively small percentage of respondents agreed that ADF management offers positive feedback to the suggestions of employees. Another interesting aspect of the likert-type data relating to content noted here was that respondents reported feeling less positive regarding their morale and their trust of senior officers. The psychometric properties of the items demonstrate that there are weaknesses and strengths evident in the approach taken by the ADFAQ.

However, the questionnaire’s full potential as an indicator of organisational cultural attributes will be better indicated following the analysis of the demographic and qualitative items in the following chapters. With this in mind, the principal weakness of the likert-type data appears to be the mostly weak internal consistency of the ADFAQ themes, although this may be improved following further refinement, replacement or elimination of some items, and subsequent re-application. The principal strength appears to be that, to some extent, the data supports the contextualisation of attitudinal components of organisational culture (as set out by Glendon and Stanton, 2000 – see Chapter Three). Moreover, of these attitudinal components, safety appears the least clear as a reliable organisational culture ‘component’ which is a finding that aligns with much previous research relating to attitudes to safety and culture (or climate) within various sociotechnical systems (e.g., Zohar, 1980, Williamson et al, 1997, Helmreich & Merritt, 1998, Merritt, 2000). A further strength of the data relates to the relatively low level of skew in the data collected by the likert-type items. Finally, from the perspective of the likert-items’ application, it is worth noting the reasonable length of the 155 Chapter Six – ADFAQ Likert Data Discussion

questionnaire may have promoted an ‘ease’ with which respondents were able to complete the items – a 40% response rate is certainly higher than what is typical for questionnaire studies (Stanton et al, 2005). Williamson et al (1997) assert the importance of this aspect in their development of a measure of safety climate, in which they seek to establish a questionnaire “of a suitable length for application in workplaces where lengthy questionnaires are likely to affect response rates” (p. 24). It should be reiterated here that this chapter is the first of several chapters that discusses the ADFAQ results. The following chapter, Chapter Seven, presents the ADFAQ results for qualitative and categorical items (section 3 and 4 of the ADFAQ).

156 CHAPTER SEVEN

RESULTS – QUALITATIVE AND CATEGORICAL DATA

The previous result chapter (Chapter Five) introduced the four-phase strategy to evaluate the results of the ADFAQ study aligned with the exploratory rationale of the ADFAQ design. Chapter Five presented the first and second phase of the ADFAQ analysis, describing and testing the likert-type data. The third phase of the ADFAQ evaluation is presented here: Chapter Seven examines the categorical and qualitative data collected in ADFAQ sections three and four. The rationale behind the inclusion of categorical and limited qualitative items in the ADFAQ was to enable a deeper examination of aspects relating to safety. This is because previous studies limited to likert-type data (e.g., Williamson et al, 1997; Hunter, 2005) achieved only limited success in capturing the diversity of perceptions regarding safety that is argued by some researchers to be largely inseparable from the safety concept (e.g., Lowrance, 1976; Adams, 1995; Maurino, 1997). This chapter presents aspects relating to safety captured by the ADFAQ in the order in which they appear in the ADFAQ instrument. Section 7.1 describes several aspects of safety: safety culture, safety preconditions and influences, and risk factors to safety. It also includes regression analysis of the principal risk to aviation safety in ADF aviation reported by respondents. Section 7.2 presents comparative analyses of items from this study with research conducted in 1995 (Braithwaite, 2001) and 2000 (DSPPR, 2001). Section 7.3 presents a summary of the chapter.

7.1 SAFETY ASPECTS

7.1.1 Safety Culture

Prior to examining the qualitative results relating to safety culture, it is worth recalling here that the likert-type data recorded how respondents reported strong agreement (93%) that their work environment “has a positive safety culture” (x = 4.16, SD = 0.65). Additionally, 71% of respondents reported disagreement to the likert-scale item that

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stated “a lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety culture” (x = 2.23, SD = 0.88). Three respondents added hand-written comments to their responses to these items. The first stated, “Yes, my work environment has a positive safety culture, but I feel it may be based on fear more than understanding”. The second respondent stated, “Military aviation already has a ‘healthy’ witch hunt mentality – always looking for someone to fuck up [sic]”. A third respondent stated, “Standard procedures should be a guide (they started out that way) but now have become rules. Excessive standardisation procedures reduce the scope for decision making by crews (Captains in particular) and quality of decisions is improved by practice”.

Respondents’ written responses (n = 366) regarding the definition of the term ‘safety culture’ (item 1, section 3) related to seven themes, decreasing in frequency in an approximately linear manner from 22% to 5%. As would be expected, the most frequent definition nominated by respondents (22%) embraced the theme of safety as the foremost quality of a safety culture. Some of the written responses included “safety culture means safety first”, “an inherent acknowledgement that safety is paramount” and “safety should not have to be forced upon personnel. Safety should be first naturally – or it isn’t a safety culture”. The second and third most frequently reported themes reflected the notions of a common ethos towards hazards (17%), and a common willingness to change in order to improve safety (16%). The latter theme often included the notion of ‘all ranks’ such as “a willingness to accept safety related criticism at all levels”. The remaining four themes and their respective respondent percentages comprised open communication (11%), risk minimisation (10%), professionalism (9%) and organisational support for personnel (5%). The final theme comprised several negative qualifying statements from respondents, including “safety culture means senior officers tin-plating their backsides”, “safety culture is the opposite of ACG maintenance” and “safety culture is just management speak”.

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7.1.2 Safety Preconditions

Four ADFAQ items related specifically to aspects of preconditions to the safe performance of ADF aviation. These items comprise three categorical items (section 3 questions 2, 3 and 4) and one qualitative item designed to qualify the response to the first part of the question (section 3, question 4). In response to section three item two, the majority of respondents (86%) indicated that based on their ADF aviation experience, human factors is the most frequent element in safety-related events, followed by technical problems (13%) and environmental phenomena (0.3%). Figure 7.1 describes the results of a related item, summarising the responses to the ADFAQ item “Based on my ADF experience, the most frequent human factors element in safety- related events is:”. The responses to this item, and the remaining categorical items in this section sum to 100%, as the ADFAQ recorded only one reported element per respondent. This instruction was included in the ADFAQ form.

Figure 7.1. Responses to the ADFAQ item “Based on my ADF experience, the most frequent human factors element in safety-related events is:” showing percentage of respondents in each case.

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Figure 7.1 shows that one third of ADFAQ respondents nominated can-do culture as the most frequent human factors element in safety related events. One respondent who nominated can-do culture annotated “But at the same time our can-do attitude is our biggest strength” on their survey form. Twenty-four percent of respondents nominated poor communication, 23% nominated complacency and 3% nominated poor safety culture. Eighteen percent of respondents nominated (an)other human factors element. These responses included lack of experience (5%), poor situational awareness (5%), poor judgement (3%), poor self discipline (3%) and a lack of resources (3%). Ninety- nine percent of respondents completed this question. One respondent pen-amended a sixth category to the ADFAQ return, stating, “There are too many human factors to list here”.

Another ADFAQ item related to the experiential ‘source’ of human factors problems in ADF aviation found that 81% of respondents indicated that the most significant human factors problem in ADF aviation exists as a result of everyday experiences within ADF aviation. Notably less support was reported for the other responses offered in this item, namely specialist training (8%), life experience prior to recruitment into the ADF (5%), initial ADF training (4%) and operational conversion training (2%). Ninety-eight percent of respondents completed this question. Two respondents annotated “all of the above” against this item on their ADFAQ return.

There was considerable diversity in the ideas reported by respondents that may help reduce the human factors risk to ADF aviation despite a lower response rate (73%) to this ADFAQ item (section 3, question 4) than most others. The most frequently reported theme related to the attitudes and/or performance of senior ADF officers: one in five respondents cited human factors training for senior officers as an initiative to help reduce the human factors risk to safety. Many comments within this theme related to the perceived need for senior officers to “learn to say no to tasking”, “an ability (and willingness) to say NO [sic]” and “Get executives who are already competent in the operational role before giving them executive duties”. Sixteen percent of respondents nominated various forms of safety training (human factors training, CRM) as a potential means to reduce the human factors risk to ADF aviation safety. Following these respondent suggestions, equal proportions of respondents nominated risk management

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(12%) and supervision (12%). The latter included several responses that cited mentoring junior personnel by senior personnel. Several ideas were specified by respondents comprising the risk management group, including mandating that basic recreation leave be expended, quarantining aircrew before flight, lengthening flying tours so that there is less pressure to ‘progress’ at an unsustainable rate and installing greater radar coverage at lower altitudes within Australia’s airspace structure. The final three themes reported by respondents related to communication training (10%), increasing internal (ADF) testing (3%) and external auditing of ADF aviation (2%).

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7.1.3 Influencing Aspects of Safety

Two ADFAQ items (section 3, questions 5 and 7) related to the influences upon safety. The first of these items is summarised by the bar graph provided by Figure 7.2, and then expanded below.

Figure 7.2. Responses to the ADFAQ item “What factors do you believe have contributed to the ‘safety record’ of ADF aviation?” showing percentage of respondents in each case.

Eighty-six percent of respondents reported a positive regard for the safety record. Four percent of respondents reported a negative regard, citing factors including ‘arrogance’ and ‘outdated practices’. Professionalism was cited by 24% of respondents as the key contribution, followed closely by ADF training (23%). ‘No blame’ culture was

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nominated by 18% of respondents and included aspects driven by the ADF’s financial imperative (or lack thereof) such as “no dollar imperative [in ADF aviation]”. Interestingly, Good luck – a notion also cited by the ADF respondents in Braithwaite’s (1998) case study – was nominated by 12% of respondents.

Figure 7.3 shows that almost half of the ADFAQ respondents reported that the size of the safety margin specific to their work in ADF aviation is primarily influenced by factors other than themselves. Thirty-eight percent reported that senior officers or managers (including the authorising officer and tasking authority) influenced the safety margin and 11% reported that the safety margin was influenced by ADF regulations or training curriculum. One respondent gave additional qualitative data in response to this ADFAQ item, stating, “In reality it’s the tasking authority [that influences the size of the safety margin] for once a task is accepted it will get done by whatever means”. Thirty-two percent of respondents reported that “everyone” influences the safety margin of ADF aviation. Eight percent of respondents reported that (only) they influence the ADF safety margin. Eleven percent of participants did not respond to this item.

Figure 7.3. Responses to the ADFAQ item “Who influences the size of the safety- margin specific to your work in ADF aviation?” showing percentage of respondents in each case.

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Question 1 of section 4 related to the risks to ADF aviation safety and comprised two parts – a categorical initial measure and a qualitative qualifying measure. The categorical measure recorded a response rate of 100%. The qualitative follow-up item scored a response rate of 87%. These items are listed in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, and expanded thereafter. The mean scores for this item have potential values from 1 (highest risk) to 10 (lowest risk) in accordance with the respondents’ ranking of each factor. Accordingly, a lower mean score indicates a higher perceived risk.

Table 7.1. Summary of ADFAQ ADF aviation ‘Risk Factor’ item.

Rank the following “risk factors” in order from ‘1’ (the highest risk) to Highest Highest ‘10’ (the lowest risk), that you consider would be likely to cause an Mean SD Risk Risk accident in ADF aviation: (n) (%)

High workload 3.37 2.21 81 21.0 Lack of experience 4.29 2.92 80 20.6 Fatigue 4.81 2.66 48 12.6 Can-do culture 5.19 3.02 59 15.5 Loss of situational awareness 5.34 3.00 63 16.5 Insufficient time to prepare 5.35 2.63 33 8.7 Lack of currency 5.93 2.87 41 10.8

Lack of continuation training 6.07 2.64 20 5.5 Overconfidence 6.15 2.89 35 9.2 Departure from SOPs / SIs / Unit Regulations 6.43 3.14 45 11.8

Respondents nominated high workload as the risk most likely to cause an accident in ADF aviation, closely followed by lack of experience. Respondents then nominated fatigue, can-do culture and loss of situational awareness. Although this item did not require a qualitative response to be returned, one respondent noted “No one wants to admit that a task assigned to them may be beyond them – we all [sic] task focussed. HOWEVER [sic] this is not necessarily a bad thing. We are military and we generally need to get the job done”. Notably, the greatest difference between any two consecutive risks exists between high workload and lack of experience (difference = 0.92). It is also worth noting that the standard deviation recorded for high workload is the smallest value of all the standard deviation values recorded within this ADFAQ item. The reasons offered by respondents (the second part of the ADFAQ item) for the existence of the principal risk factor show some continuity of contributory factors (items are listed

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in Table 7.2). Some of the suggestions provided by respondents did not offer new data: the risk factor was merely rephrased by the respondent. This was evident in respondents’ suggestions to ameliorating the risks of lack of experience, high workload and fatigue (the ‘top three’ risks).

Table 7.2. ADFAQ Safety Risk items, including the frequency and percentage of response options selected by survey participants.

Thinking about the factor you nominated as ‘1’ (the highest risk) above, please explain n % why the factor you nominated is most likely to cause an accident in ADF aviation:

Reasons why ‘High Workload’ is the highest risk to ADF aviation safety: “High operational tempo / workload” 50 62 “Inexperience” 6 7 “Ego” 3 4

(73% of respondents that nominated high workload responded to the ‘why’ prompt)

Reasons why ‘Lack of Experience’ is the highest risk to ADF aviation safety:

“Not enough time to gain experience” 47 55 “Poor decision making” 11 13 “High operational tempo / workload” 9 11

(78% of respondents that nominated lack of experience responded to the ‘why’ prompt)

Reasons why ‘Fatigue’ is the highest risk to ADF aviation safety:

“Tiredness related to work” 19 37 “High operational tempo / workload” 14 27 “Poor decision making” 4 8

(73% of respondents that nominated fatigue responded to the ‘why’ prompt)

Reasons why ‘Loss of SA’ is the highest risk to ADF aviation safety:

“High operational tempo / workload” 19 27 “All factors listed in this question lead to SA loss” 15 22 “Poor decision making” 13 19

(73% of respondents that nominated loss of SA responded to the ‘why’ prompt)

Reasons why ‘Can-do Culture’ is the highest risk to ADF aviation safety:

“Ego” 18 30 “Poor decision making” 15 25 “High operational tempo / workload” 11 18 (73% of respondents that nominated can-do culture responded to the ‘why’ prompt)

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The theme of high operational tempo and/or workload was cited by respondents in each of the top five risks, and validates the ranking of high workload as the highest risk in the first (categorical) part of the ADFAQ item. Poor decision-making and ego also featured frequently. Indeed, statements by respondents such as “get a grip on ego” and “ego and machismo are still as rampant as ever” were common in response to the risk that the can-do culture may affect upon ADF aviation.

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7.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSES

Comparison 1 – ADF accident risk factors

As noted earlier, question 1 from section 4 was based upon a similar question examined by the DSPPR (2001). Table 7.3 compares the ‘Top Five Accident Risk Factors’ reported by ADF aircrew in the DSPPR study and the ADFAQ. The DSPPR (2001) ‘RAAF Respondents’ data includes the factor Press-on-itis. The ADFAQ presented this option to respondents as ‘can-do culture’ – a term more frequently used in ADF literature and readily interpretable by the ADF aviation population (see DFS-ADF, 2000, 2001, 2002). The ADFAQ study did not publish mean or percentage data in relation to this item (only relative rankings), hence Table 7.3 presents a comparison of the DSPPR and ADFAQ rankings only.

Table 7.3. ADFAQ and DSPPR (2001) ‘Top Five’ Accident Risk Factors.

DSPPR (2001) ADFAQ

Lack of experience High workload

Fatigue Lack of experience

Loss of SA Fatigue

Lack of currency Can-do culture

Press-on-itis Loss of SA

It can be seen from Table 7.3 that the sequence and apparent importance of risk factors considered by RAAF respondents as likely to cause an accident have changed considerably: high workload is reported as the greatest risk factor in this study, yet did not feature in the ‘Top Five’ risks in the DSPPR (2001) study. The marked increase for this factor has been accompanied by an increase in the ranking of the can-do culture or press-on-itis aspect.

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Comparison 2 – Proactivity towards safety risks

Some attitudes measured by the ADFAQ showed notable change in comparison to similar measures from 1995 (Braithwaite, 1998) and 2000 (DSPPR, 2001). For example, the willingness to obey unsafe rules reported by ADF aviation personnel in Braithwaite’s (2001) study changed from 37% to only 1% of ADFAQ respondents. The willingness to ignore unsafe rules changed from 4% to 0.2% (see Table 7.4).

Table 7.4. ADFAQ and Braithwaite (1998) items relating to respondent proactivity.

Braithwaite (1995 data) % ADFAQ (2000 data) % I would complain directly to the officer I would ask the senior officer responsible for 49 50 responsible for the rule. creating the rule to change the new rule. I would obey the rule as it is my job to obey I would obey the new rule, as it is my job to 37 1 the rules. obey all operating rules. I would complain about the rule to my Wing I would ask the Unit’s Commanding Officer to 9 36 Commander. change the new rule. I would simply ignore the rule, as the new rule I would simply ignore the new rule; it’s my life. 4 0.2 puts my safety at risk. I would complain about the rule to my I would discuss the rule with my colleagues, 1 11 colleagues. but not with unit management.

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7.3 CHAPTER SEVEN SUMMARY

This chapter described the analysis of qualitative and categorical data provided by approximately 400 ADF aviation personnel in response to the ADFAQ. There were two particularly strong themes that arose within the analysis of the qualitative and categorical items examined in this chapter. Firstly, the pervasiveness of culture – either manifested as ‘safety culture’ or a ‘can-do culture’ – across the items presented here. A related noteworthy aspect is the apparent predominance of the can-do culture over safety culture. Indeed, can-do culture was nominated by respondents as the most frequent human factors element in safety-related events, and was nominated by respondents more than safety culture by a magnitude of more than ten. The second strong result relates to the concept of ‘rank’, and its influence on both safety performance and ADF aviation personnel generally. This influence was indicated via various means, including the open-question relating to respondents’ perception of the principal influence over the safety-margin specific to respondents’ work in ADF aviation. Moreover, the existence of such influence was reinforced in the regression analyses finding that the perception of high workload is related to the rank of the respondent. The ADFAQ measure relating to respondents’ reaction to an unsafe rule showed notable difference in comparison to similar items surveyed by Braithwaite (1998). Similarly, the risk factors considered likely to cause an accident have changed: high workload is reported as the highest risk factor in this study whereas it ranked outside the ‘top five’ risks in the DSPPR study conducted in 2000. The following chapter, Chapter Eight, discusses the efficacy and key findings relating to the results presented in this chapter.

169 CHAPTER EIGHT

QUALITATIVE & CATEGORICAL DATA DISCUSSION

This chapter is the second of four chapters that present the Discussion of the ADFAQ results. The remaining results discussion is divided into three areas: qualitative and categorical data (this chapter), demographic criterion (Chapter Ten), and research implications and limitations (Chapter Fourteen). Chapter Six discussed how various weaknesses and strengths exist in a solely psychometric approach to investigating aspects of organisational culture. In contrast to the ADFAQ likert-type items, Section 3 and 4 of the ADFAQ aimed to examine the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel relating to ‘normal’ operations and the organisational culture of Australian military aviation from a more open-ended exploratory standpoint. The rationale behind the inclusion of categorical and qualitative items in the ADFAQ aligns with much previous research of social phenomena (Stanton et al, 2005) – to enable a deeper examination of aspects relating to organisational culture – particularly safety. This is because previous studies related to perceptions of hazards, safety culture, safety climate, etc constructed exclusively for likert-type data have achieved only limited success in establishing the amenability of these aspects. For example, Williamson et al (1997) find that the extent to which workplace perception and attitude scales reflect differences in safety climate with varying exposure to hazards “is not really clear” (p. 24), and “as far as worker attitudes influence, or are influenced by, the prevailing culture or climate in an organisation, only some aspects of safety attitude and perception vary across individuals and organisations” (p. 26). Section 8.1 discusses several aspects of efficacy and key findings relating to the qualitative and categorical items (section 3 and 4 of the ADFAQ). The discussion includes the influence of organisational culture, the apparent normality of the can-do element in ADF organisational culture, safety and culture and the apparent influence of rank – particularly in relation to ADF aviation as a ‘top-down’ culture (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). Section 8.2 presents a summary of the chapter.

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8.1 EFFICACY AND KEY FINDINGS

Akin to the likert-type results, the categorical and qualitative items confirm the notion that the conceptualisation of safety, and particularly the popular concept of safety culture, is under-developed, and seemingly poorly understood by ‘sharp-end’ personnel. In particular, the qualitative and categorical ‘phase’ of the ADFAQ appears to have identified the concept of safety culture as a problematic issue for ADF aviation personnel: there is a strong indication that safety culture is perceived by personnel as being a high-calibre indicator of the safety of ADF aviation operations, but this support exists amongst numerous differing interpretations regarding the true meaning of safety culture. A broader discussion of the implications of this research in relation to safety culture is provided in Chapter Fourteen (Chapter Fourteen discusses safety culture in light of the results of both the ADFAQ and the interview phase).

The previous discussion chapter relating to the likert-type results noted that the attitudinal attribute of positive self-appraisal (perhaps akin to ‘ego defensiveness’, see Glendon & McKenna, 1995) was one of three key aspects of the likert-type analyses relating to item content (the others being safety culture and rank-based attitudinal influence). The results of the qualitative and categorical items appear to similarly elucidate these aspects, while also reiterating some of the strengths and weaknesses of the ADFAQ evidenced by the likert-type items. Moreover, the case for further and more qualitative research aimed at examining rank-influence, safety and culture aspects exposed by the ADFAQ is strengthened.

8.1.1 Influence of Organisational Culture

The need for an improved measure of the nature of culture (organisational, safety, etc.) and its ‘social’ influence (upon ADF aviation personnel) is particularly well highlighted by the results of the qualitative and categorical items of the ADFAQ. The single item that perhaps best indicates this need is the item that relates to the most frequent human factors element in safety related events, where one third of ADFAQ respondents nominated can-do culture. The other higher-frequency aspects nominated by respondents were also related to the social, inter-personal attributes of the ADF aviation 171 Chapter Eight – Qualitative and Categorical Data Discussion

environment. Interestingly, the can-do culture was nominated by almost 35% of respondents in contrast to poor safety culture, which was nominated by only 3%. The result emphasises the ‘pro-safety culture’ perspective that was made evident in the likert-type data, but also presents an interesting perspective on the nature of the can-do culture: that it can be a predominant contributor to safety-related events despite being viewed as a cultural ‘strength’ of ADF aviation (this was first highlighted in Chapter One). While the item’s option of ‘poor communication’ was similarly useful, in that it confirmed the existence of poor communication recorded by the likert-type items, the issue of complacency – recording 23% of respondents’ agreement – was somewhat unexpected. It is concerning certainly from a practical perspective, but also from a methodological perspective in that perhaps the ADFAQ likert-type items could have addressed the issue of complacency more directly. It is worthy to note Kirwan’s (2002) analysis of human centred automation, although not of a military context, points out that there are two significant problems relating to complacency in aviation workplaces: a tendency for human operators to delay responding to system problems, and an atrophying of the skills necessary to recover system performance following malfunctioning and disturbances. These problems are not limited to the air traffic management context in which Kirwan’s (2002) study is based. Indeed, in an indication of the pervasiveness of the problem of complacency and the potential to underestimate its influence, he asserts, “a further and important consideration is that humans naturally tend to trust something that appears to benefit them, even if it is not that reliable. This can lead to over-reliance on a system that is not actually always accurate” (p. 117). With this in mind, and in light of the issue of complacency identified by this particular item (and to a lesser extent inferred by some of the secondary data relating to ADF aviation performance – see Chapter Two), it is reasonable to describe the can-do attribute as a dichotomous concept. This is an issue of theoretical and practical interest and is discussed in detail in the following sub-section (8.1.2).

A related aspect of organisational culture that is also intriguing is the finding that approximately 80% of respondents indicated that based on their ADF aviation experiences the most significant human factors problem in ADF aviation exists as a result of everyday experiences within ADF aviation (section 3, item 3). Significantly less support was reported for the alternative responses offered in this question (notably 172 Chapter Eight – Qualitative and Categorical Data Discussion

including pre-ADF experiences – these recorded an average of only 5% support each). The implication of this result is that the perceived principal ‘driver’ of safety incidents in ADF aviation comprises an interesting paradox: that a key perceived strength of ADF aviation culture (the can-do attitude) is perhaps simultaneously the leading human factors element that contributes to safety incidents (a threat or deficiency). Moreover, this threat is created within the working environment of ADF aviation. In summary, the result appears to confirm the paradoxical aspect of the ADF’s can-do cultural “strength” first questioned by Falconer (2005), and it is an aspect that would be a valuable issue to cross-examine in the interview phase of this research.

8.1.2 A ‘Can-do’ Cultural Norm?

Interestingly, the results recorded against the items relating to safety risks highlight the existence of cultural qualities not immediately associated with the ‘nature’ of safety risks offered by the ADFAQ item. Indeed, as has been shown in other aspects of the ADFAQ results, the attitudes reported in response to the ‘risks to ADF aviation safety’ item (item 1, section 4) show evidence of there being ‘can-do attitudes’ amongst personnel. This aspect has arisen from the results on several occasions; hence the following section focuses on respondents’ nomination of high workload as the risk most likely to cause an accident in ADF aviation.

High Workload

On the basis of the results of the ADFAQ and the earlier DSPPR (2001) study related to respondents’ perception of high workload as a continual presence within their work in ADF aviation, there can be little argument that workload is of great practical significance. Interestingly, however, the significance of workload as the leading risk factor to ADF aviation safety is not matched by the quantity or quality of respondents’ insights into how the risk of high workload may be overcome, or at least minimised. Recall that a considerable proportion of the suggestions provided by respondents did not offer new data or “ideas” (as phrased in the ADFAQ item) in that the risk factor was described in such a way by the respondent that it closely resembled the phraseology of the line of inquiry. This is disappointing from an exploratory research perspective, as 173 Chapter Eight – Qualitative and Categorical Data Discussion

the second part of this item was designed specifically as an open-type question in order to explore the nature of the highest risk nominated by individual respondents. While the poor response to the item may be related to respondents’ reluctance toward the more apparently ‘cognitive’ open questions (more workload!), analysis of the human performance framework across its three ‘levels’ ([1] mental functions, [2] interface and [3] work situation) by Kirwan (2002) provides an interesting backdrop from which to briefly consider the time management aspects of high workload here. These aspects relate to secondary tasks (these are known as ‘secondary duties’ in ADF parlance) and task-paced versus self-paced work.

Secondary duties. In relation to the aspect of secondary tasks and time management, Kirwan (2002) notes that aviation automation has contributed to the creation of secondary tasks (sometimes administrative), resulting in the nature of the workload changing (often with somewhat unexpected workload increases). He notes that this workload change and/or increase can affect motivation and skill degradation since the personnel “are working as hard as before, but with less rewarding tasks” (p. 123).

Task-paced work. It is generally accepted that personnel in most – if not all – working environments prefer to be flexible regarding the pace of their work. According to Kirwan (2002), both flying and non-flying personnel “tend to organise tasks to occur in a cluster, for example, saving up and then dealing with a set of related tasks all at once, rather than dealing with everything reactively as it arises” (p. 123). Although Kirwan (2002) refers to automation in his analysis, it is the aspect of having control of tasking pace removed from the operator that is relevant here. Indeed, revisiting the notion of automation as a concept that may be analogous to ‘mission taskload’ (or rate-of-effort: see chapters 1 and 2) appears to hold prima facie potential for new research, particularly considering the results of the likert-type items relating to an operational safety margin, and ‘who’ controls magnitude of such a margin (these items are reported in Chapter Five).

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8.1.3 Safety and Culture

Batteau (2002) asserts that many studies that purport to measure the influence of culture in aviation “do not capture the emergent and adaptive character of culture” (p. 152). He further argues, “flattening the nuances of culture into [Hofstede’s] numerical indices can create the illusion that one has at hand the tools to manage the habits of the heart” (p. 152). Batteau’s (2002) assertion, particularly his reference to the illusion of culture and its adaptive, emergent nature, provide both a summary of the rationale for inclusion of a open-type safety culture item and a warning of the reliability of singular items attempting to define a concept as fluid and emergent as culture.

It is worth recalling here that 93% of respondents indicated agreement with the likert- scale item, “My work environment has a positive safety culture” (the strongest single attitudinal agreement measured by the ADFAQ). Indeed, it was noted in Chapter 1 that within ADF aviation the safety culture concept is sometimes a vehicle for self-praise. The then Chief of Air Force has argued the notion of a ‘good’ ADF aviation safety culture, stating, “our ADF flying safety culture is in a very healthy state” (McCormack, 1999, p. 3) and “attitude and action are the key requirements to safety culture” (McCormack, 2000, p.1). Royal Australian Navy Aviation Group Commander Ledger (2003) also praises the ADF safety culture, stating, “I firmly believe the safety culture that has grown over the years in the ADF is second to none”.

Chapter Seven reported that approximately 370 respondents submitted a total of seven definition themes relating to the definition of the term ‘safety culture’. Respondents’ nomination of these seven themes decreased in frequency approximately linearly. The most frequent definition nominated by respondents (22%) embraced the theme of safety as the foremost quality of a safety culture, often written by respondents as “safety culture means safety first”, “an inherent acknowledgement that safety is paramount” or “…an environment where safety comes before everything else”. Another respondent stated, “…safety should not have to be forced upon personnel. Safety should be first naturally – or it isn’t a safety culture”. The second and third most frequently reported themes reflected the notions of a common ethos towards hazards, and a common attitude to safety that is willing to develop and change in order to improve safety. The 175 Chapter Eight – Qualitative and Categorical Data Discussion

latter theme often included the notion of ‘all ranks’ such as “a willingness to accept safety related criticism at all levels”. The remaining themes comprised open communication, risk minimisation, professionalism and organisational support for personnel. The prudence that accompanies these definitions of safety culture here is notable for its ‘pro-safety’ pervasiveness similar to other research. For example, Batteau (2002) clarifies the inarguable nature of safety culture’s ‘good for safety’ existence. He argues, “if ‘safety culture’ is seen as a set of homilies toward prudence, following rules, and communicating openly, no one can argue with it. If ‘safety culture’ is proceduralised, or packaged as a checklist, then it becomes no more than a gloss for managerial ideology” (p. 158). The final theme comprised several negative qualifying statements from respondents, including “safety culture means senior officers tin-plating their backsides”, “safety culture is the opposite of ACG maintenance” and “safety culture is just management speak”. Another respondent stated, “…[safety culture] is a ‘buzz word’ that is not well acted upon”.

While the pro-safety perception of respondents is perhaps not surprising against the backdrop of such ‘pro-safety culture’ rhetoric from ADF leaders, it is nonetheless a concern in the context of human factor concepts such as vigilance. Moreover, the overt positivity expressed by these leaders (e.g., McCormack, 1999, 2000; Fraser, 2002, Ledger, 2003) may have a negative effect upon the perceived need for aviation safety improvement. Indeed, Helmreich and Merritt (1998) assert that the false sense of security can “encourage complacency rather than vigilance” (p.119). The safety culture perspectives expressed in this ‘phase’ of the ADFAQ are also worthy of note from a disciplinary perspective, recalling that the Chief of the Air Force published an editorial in the Directorate of Flying Safety journal, stating that safety culture relies on “the complete acceptance of [its] values across the Services by senior commanders, and practical application by middle managers. The actions of some individuals who do not fully understand or accept our culture have the potential to undo many years of good work” (DFS-ADF, 2001). Indeed, numerous researchers have noted that there is much work to be done in establishing a measurement framework for safety culture that is widely acceptable (Cox & Flin, 1998; Homan et al, 1998, 1999). Other researchers acknowledge that while both individual human-human and human-machine interaction can be observed and measured, the more ‘social’ multi-person interactions, such as 176 Chapter Eight – Qualitative and Categorical Data Discussion

those within large and diverse sociotechnical systems, are considerably more complex (Batteau, 2001, 2002; von Thaden et al, 2003). One such example within the ADF aviation context that follows the view of these researchers is the issue of rank influence, and is discussed in the following section.

8.1.4 Rank Influence

Akin to the likert-type results, the categorical and qualitative items of the ADFAQ revealed strong and self-nominated perceptions of poor performance from senior officers positioned to influence ADF aviation policy and/or personnel. In this instance, the results revealed considerable diversity in respondents’ ideas that may help reduce the human factors risk to ADF aviation (section 3, item 4). The most frequently reported theme related to the attitudes and/or performance of senior ADF officers, where 19% of respondents cited human factors training for senior officers as an initiative to help reduce the human factors risk to safety. Interestingly, many comments within this theme demonstrated aspects of cynicism and poor trust of the skills and abilities of senior officers: aspects similarly indicated amongst the likert-scale data. Perhaps the most indicative respondent comment in this regard is: “Get executives who are already competent in the operational role before giving them executive duties” (see section 7.1.2).

‘Top down’ versus ‘bottom up’ culture

A key aspect of the influence of rank that is also worthy of discussion relates to Glendon and Stanton’s (2000) notion of cultural frameworks within organisations being either ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’ (see Chapter Three for details). The results of the ADFAQ items relating to aspects of rank indicate that the top-down approach is the predominant ‘cultural framework’ applicable to ADF aviation. Glendon and Stanton (2000) argue that safety culture in particular is often a ‘top-down’ management initiative that dictates safe working practices in a comprehensive manner, rather than exchanging knowledge about safety among equal partners. Back and Woolfson (1999) argue that because the notion of a workplace safety culture tends to pre-suppose a unified system of values and ideas, it misdirects attention from the context of power 177 Chapter Eight – Qualitative and Categorical Data Discussion

within which the respective culture is embedded. They state, “Culture, far from facilitating free and open communication between the top and bottom of the hierarchy, can actively impede the collective articulation of the view from below” (p. 47). Moreover, the interview results seem to align with the findings of attitudinal studies by Bailey and Petersen (1989), Helmreich and Merritt (1998), Soeters and Boer (2000) and Bernick (2001) that suggest individuals’ attitudes are continuously influenced (i.e., not ‘limited’ to early-career experiences) as a result of exposure to organisational norms. Indeed, the results of the interview study suggest that the actions and supervision of ‘management’ (senior ranked officers in the context of ADF aviation) have a considerable impact on individuals’ attitudes towards safety and system performance. Nonetheless, the results do suggest support for the notion that a ‘top-down’ culture (Glendon & McKenna, 1995; Glendon & Stanton, 2000) predominates in military aviation contexts, and this should be explored further via both demographic analyses of rank and triangulated exploration of the rank influence in the interview phase of this research.

178 Chapter Eight – Qualitative and Categorical Data Discussion

8.2 CHAPTER EIGHT SUMMARY

This chapter – the second of several chapters that contain the Discussion of the ADFAQ results – discussed various aspects related to the qualitative and categorical data collected by the ADFAQ study. Overall, the qualitative and categorical aspects of the ADFAQ provided additional theoretical and contextual validity to the thesis in toto, particularly by describing the situational factors. Moreover, the technique of open questioning was useful in confirming a range of organisational aspects first evidenced by the likert-type data. The aspects of attitudinal influences arising from cultural and rank-based attributes were perhaps the most notable because (a) they appear to align with the results of the likert-type data; and (b) of their potential to be cross-examined further in the interview study. There were two particularly strong themes that arose within the analysis of the qualitative and categorical items. Firstly, the pervasiveness of culture – either manifested as ‘safety culture’ or a ‘can-do culture’ – across the qualitative and categorical items. A related noteworthy aspect is the apparent predominance of the can-do culture over safety culture. The second strong result relates to the concept of ‘rank’, and its influence on the attitudes and perceptions of ADF aviation personnel generally. This influence was indicated via various means; particularly respondents’ perception of the principal influence over the safety-margin specific to respondents’ work in ADF aviation.

Another interesting aspect that arose from the discussion of the results of the qualitative and categorical items was the potential for new research relating to the conceptualisation of automation and its seemingly analogous existence to the ‘control’ element of workload – or rate-of-effort – in ADF aviation. This notion of more fundamental potential research is both intriguing and an unexpected outcome of this study. On the basis of these results, it is reasonable to suggest that further research and, in turn, training of personnel in the meaning, ramifications, measurement potential (or lack thereof) and desired outcomes related to ADF safety culture should be explored. It is evident from the results of the ADFAQ (and indeed the secondary evidence examined by the earlier chapters of this thesis) that the concept of safety culture – while certainly an emergent phenomenon – is perhaps the most poorly understood concept facing contemporary ADF aviation. Such poor understanding is related to the current 179 Chapter Eight – Qualitative and Categorical Data Discussion

ambiguity surrounding the concept – as evidenced by both the quantitative and qualitative items of the ADFAQ. The following chapter, Chapter Nine, describes the final phase of the analysis of the ADFAQ results – analysis of the results in relation to demographic groups.

180 CHAPTER NINE

RESULTS – ADFAQ DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS

The third phase of the ADFAQ evaluation examines the ADFAQ data via demographic groups (and sub-groups). Demographic analysis of ADFAQ data comprised categorical variables (eg. Aircrew, Engineering) and dependent variables in three forms: interval (five-point likert-scale); categorical; and qualitative. The first sections of this chapter describe five analyses conducted against the demographic criteria captured by the ADFAQ: officer rank, occupational category, education, FEG and recent participation in human factors training. These analyses confirmed that there are statistically significant differences between some demographic variables and responses to the ADFAQ. The analyses of the demographic criteria of respondent age and employment duration (continuous dependent variables) conclude the chapter, and are examined in Section 9.6. In this chapter, the mean result for an individual likert-scale item is annotated x and can range in value from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The mean result for the PCA Factor 1 score – comprising the sum of the 9 comprising likert-scale items – is annotated X (italicised upper case ‘X’) and can range in value from 9 to 45 (9 items with values from 1 to 5). Accordingly, the higher the mean response achieved by these summations, the greater the extent to which respondents’ perceptions reflected agreement towards the PCA Factor 1 (Organisational Confidence – see Table 5.11 for PCA-derived factor structure). The PCA Factor 1 was used as the basis for analysis in this chapter as it was the factor that achieved the highest level of internal consistency (an alpha of 0.78, considered excellent) and comprised the greatest number of items (the first a priori theme achieved a similar alpha value [0.77] comprised of seven items).

9.1 JUNIOR OFFICERS AND SENIOR OFFICERS

Rank is an important criterion upon which to evaluate ADFAQ scores, since responses to both likert-type and qualitative items indicated that attitudinal differences seem to exist between junior and senior ranks (akin to employees and managers). A small

181 Chapter Nine – Results – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

difference exists in the attitudes held by JNROFF respondents (X = 32.7, SD = 4.4, n = 224) and SNROFF respondents (X = 34.4, SD = 4.1, n = 141) towards the PCA Factor 1. A one-way ANOVA confirmed that the difference in responses to the 28 likert-type items between JNROFF and SNROFF groups is significant (F(1,363) = 11.7, p < 0.01). Given the practical significance of this result (JNROFF and SNROFF personnel operate across the entire ADF – not just in small geographical, squadron or FEG locales/units) the individual items that are significantly different between ranks are explored further in the following paragraphs.

Statistically significant differences at or less than 0.05 were found between the JNROFF and SNROFF groups with regard to eight likert-scale questions and four categorical items1. The perceptions towards taking action in recognition of an unsafe new rule differ significantly amongst JNROFF and SNROFF groups. With regard to the response option “I would discuss the rule with my colleagues, but not with unit management”, 17% of JNROFF respondents chose the response in contrast to only 0.7% of SNROFF respondents. Higher percentages of SNROFF respondents also indicated that they would initiate communication with a higher ADF authority regarding the new rule: 40% of SNROFF (35% of JNROFF) would ask the unit’s CO to change the new rule, and 58% of SNROFF (47% of JNROFF) would ask the senior officer responsible for creating the new rule to change the rule.

The clear majority of both JNROFF (84%) and SNROFF respondents (88%) indicated that based on their ADF aviation experience, human factors is the most frequent element in safety-related events, whereas 16% of JNROFF respondents nominated technical / equipment problems as the most frequent element in safety-related events in comparison to 10% of SNROFF respondents. Less than 1% of SNROFF respondents and JNROFF respondents nominated environmental phenomena as the most frequent element in safety-related events.

1 ADFAQ Section 2 items 1, 6, 13, 14, 18, 24, 26 and 28, and Section 3 items 1, 2 and 4 (two parts). 182 Chapter Nine – Results – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

Approximately one third of both JNROFF (34%) and SNROFF (29%) respondents nominated can-do culture as the most frequent human factors element in safety related events. A greater percentage of JNROFF (27%) than SNROFF (19%) nominated poor communication. A similar percentage of JNROFF (23%) than SNROFF (21%) nominated complacency, and a similar percentage of SNROFF (3%) and JNROFF (3%) nominated poor safety culture. Twice as many SNROFF (27%) as JNROFF (13%) respondents nominated other and provided a brief qualitative response. The other responses were reported in Chapter Seven.

Considerable diversity is evident in the ideas reported by respondents that may help reduce the human factors risk to ADF aviation – despite a notably lower response rate (73%) to this ADFAQ item than most other items. The most frequent theme reported by both JNROFF respondents and SNROFF respondents relates to the attitudes and/or performance of senior ADF officers: JNROFF (21%) and SNROFF (19%) respondents cited human factors training for senior officers as an initiative to help reduce the human factors risk to safety. The only other item where JNROFF respondents recorded a higher percentage of agreement relates to communication / assertiveness training; suggested by 12% of JNROFF and 7% of SNROFF respondents. Many JNROFF (28%) and SNROFF (22%) respondents did not respond to this item.

SNROFFs report viewing ADF aviation in a more positive sense than JNROFF respondents. JNROFF respondents indicated disagreement (x = 2.92, SD = 1.44) that “ADF aviation represents world’s best practice” in contrast to SNROFF respondents who reported agreement (x = 3.40, SD = 1.11). JNROFFs reported less agreement (x = 3.37, SD = 0.99) than SNROFFs (x = 3.65, SD = 0.80) that they trust senior ADF officers with operational aviation decisions, and decisions regarding safety (JNROFF x = 3.50, SD = 0.87; SNROFF x = 3.72, SD = 0.68). SNROFF indicated higher agreement (x = 3.98, SD = 0.86) that errors are inevitable in aviation operations than JNROFF (x = 3.78, SD = 0.99), and higher disagreement that ADF aviation can be entirely specified in standardised procedures (SNROFF x = 2.18, SD = 0.99; JNROFF x = 2.43, SD = 1.07).

183 Chapter Nine – Results – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

9.2 HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING

Completion of human factors training is an important criterion upon which to evaluate ADFAQ scores, since a considerable proportion of respondents reported recent completion of human factors training. An inspection of the mean results for the nine- item PCA Factor 1 score suggests that a negligible difference exists in the attitudes held by respondents who had completed human factors training in the past five years (annotated “HF”) (X = 33.3, SD = 4.3) and respondents who had not recently completed human factors training (annotated “NO HF”) (X = 33.6, SD = 4.5). An independent samples t-test confirmed that there was no significant difference in the likert-scale responses based upon respondents’ participation in human factors training within the past five years (t(1,366) = 0.48, p > 0.05). There was no significant linear relationship between respondents’ recent participation in human factors training and PCA Factor 1 score (r(366) = - 0.03, p > 0.05).

9.2.1 Human Factors Training Type

It was decided to explore the Human Factors training participation result further to establish whether the lack of significant differences in HF and NO HF groups was also evident amongst the various HF training providers. The ‘ATPL’ HF training type scored the lowest score (29.7) and the ‘WG’ HF training type recorded the highest PCA Factor 1 score (35.7). All other training types held very similar scores to the NO HF scores (scores were within 1.0 of the NO HF value). A one-way ANOVA revealed that there were no significant differences between PCA Factor 1 score and HF training ‘type’ (F(8,357) = 1.7, p > 0.05). Post-hoc tests for equal variances assumed and not assumed did not reveal any significant differences between the types of HF training reported by respondents.

184 Chapter Nine – Results – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

9.3 FORCE ELEMENT GROUPS

An inspection of the PCA Factor 1 mean scores indicated that only negligible differences exist in the respondent attitudes between the larger FEG populations represented in the survey (FEGs with less than 10 respondents were excluded). The highest mean result towards the PCA Factor 1 was recorded by the SCG group (X = 34.6, SD = 2.9, n = 14). The lowest mean result was recorded by the ALG group (X = 31.9, SD = 4.6, n = 90). The likert-type differences between the remaining four FEG populations represented in the survey (ACG, ARDU, ATW and MPG) are: ARDU (X = 32.8, SD = 3.3, n = 10), ACG (X = 34.3, SD = 4.0, n = 104), ATW (X = 33.7, SD = 4.5, n = 41), MPG (X = 33.8, SD = 4.0, n = 60). A one-way ANOVA revealed that the difference in PCA Factor 1 scores on the basis of respondents’ employment with individual FEGs approached significance (F(5,358) = 2.9, p < 0.08). Post-hoc tests (Tukey HSD and Dunnett’s C) did not reveal any significant differences between individual Force Element Groups.

9.4 FORMAL EDUCATION

The PCA Factor 1 mean results show that only a minor difference exists in the respondent attitudes between the Education groups represented in the survey. The highest mean result towards the PCA dimension measured by the survey was recorded by the Postgrad Degree group (X = 33.8, SD = 5.2, n = 71). The Other group recorded the lowest mean result (X = 31.9, SD = 4.6, n = 13). The attitudinal differences between the other populations represented in the survey are HSC (X = 33.1, SD = 4.1, n = 59), School Certificate (X = 32.8, SD = 4.1, n = 3), Undergraduate Degree (X = 33.1, SD = 4.4, n = 135), Other college (X = 32.5, SD = 4.4, n = 72) and TAFE (X = 32.3, SD = 4.2, n = 18). A one-way ANOVA confirmed that no significant difference exists between respondents’ educational level and the TOTAL scores of the likert-type questions (F(7,357) = 0.44, p > 0.05). Post-hoc tests (Tukey HSD and Dunnett’s C) did not reveal any significant between-group comparisons.

185 Chapter Nine – Results – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

9.5 AIRCREW AND ENGINEERS

A negligible difference exists in the attitudes held by Aircrew (AIR, n = 192) respondents (X = 33.3, SD = 4.6) and Engineer (ENG, n = 170) respondents (X = 33.4, SD = 4.1) towards the likert-type items of the ADFAQ. An independent samples t-test confirmed that the difference between AIR and ENG respondents regarding the perceptions measured by the PCA Factor 1 scores of likert-scale items was not significant (t(1,364) = 1.1, p > 0.05).

9.6 RESPONDENT AGE AND EMPLOYMENT DURATION

This survey measured both the age of respondents and duration of respondent’s employment with the ADF in whole years. Fractional years reported by the respondents were rounded down to the nearest whole year. Pearson correlation analyses were conducted for both respondent age and employment duration against PCA Factor 1 score. The analyses confirmed that a significant correlation does not exist between respondents’ age and the PCA Factor 1 score (r(364) = 0.067, p > 0.05) or between respondents’ employment duration and TOTAL likert-scale scores (r(364) = 0.068, p > 0.05). The results of Pearson correlation analyses for both ‘age’ and ‘employment years completed’ against likert-scale score are presented in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1. Pearson correlation analyses of age and employment duration with likert score.

Likert-scale score (Total) Age Employment years completed

Pearson correlation 0.067 0.068

Sig. (2-tailed) 0.193 0.185

N 364 364

In light of the significant difference in PCA Factor 1 score recorded by the JNROFF and SNROFF groups, it was decided to explore the age and employment duration data further with the aim of establishing whether the apparent influence of rank upon attitudes may be aligned with attitudinal ‘shifts’ along age or employment duration

186 Chapter Nine – Results – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

continuums. It was anticipated that while continuous linear correlations between age and employment duration may not be evident, further analysis might reveal a point (or points) of change in the age and employment duration data that may relate to the (significant) rank-based attitudinal change. First, scatter-plot analyses were used as a means to examine the spread of data based on both respondent age and PCA Factor 1 score and respondents’ employment duration and PCA Factor 1 score. The plots revealed a visually distinctive change in the pattern of data for both age and employment duration at the 45-year and 25-year points respectively. In light of these approximate indications of potential attitudinal shifts amongst respondents, each year of age and employment duration reported by respondents was examined as a means of forming two groups within each demographic set. A series of independent sample t-tests revealed that there were key periods in which PCA Factor 1 scores changed in relation to both respondent age and employment duration. Table 9.2 lists the respondent age groups that held significant differences in relation to PCA Factor 1 score.

Table 9.2. Summary of significant differences between Age groupings and PCA Factor 1 score.

Age (yrs) N TOTAL Score SD t-test

< 44 318 31.6 5.55 t(1,364) = 2.29, p = 0.02 44 and above 48 34.2 3.77 < 45 325 31.6 5.50 t(1,364) = 2.74, p = 0.01 45 and above 41 34.9 3.66 < 46 333 31.6 5.47 t(1,364) = 2.65, p = 0.01 46 and above 33 35.2 3.63 < 48 343 31.7 5.47 t(1,364) = 2.04, p < 0.05 48 and above 23 35.0 3.35 < 50 350 31.8 5.41 t(1,364) = 2.09, p < 0.04 50 and above 16 35.7 3.87 < 51 354 31.8 5.40 t(1,364) = 2.03, p < 0.05 51 and above 12 36.2 3.73

Three additional age ‘cut-offs’ approached statistical significance: the 42-year (scores 31.6, 35.0), 47-year (scores 31.7, 34.4) and 49-year (scores 31.8, 35.0) groups held significance levels of p = 0.06. Table 9.3 lists the four respondent employment duration groups that held significant differences in relation to PCA Factor 1 score. The 20-year employment duration cut-off held score differences (31.5, 33.0) that approached statistical significance (p = 0.09).

187 Chapter Nine – Results – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

Table 9.3. Summary of significant differences between Employment years and Factor 1 score.

Emp. Dur. (yrs) N TOTAL Score SD t-test

< 25 329 31.6 5.48 t(1,364) = 2.07, p < 0.04 25 and above 37 92.3 4.11 < 26 339 31.6 5.45 t(1,364) = 2.81, p < 0.01 26 and above 27 93.7 3.40 < 27 346 31.7 5.41 t(1,364) = 2.40, p < 0.02 27 and above 20 93.8 3.92 < 28 348 31.8 5.44 t(1,364) = 1.95, p = 0.05 28 and above 18 93.2 3.59

An important and less obvious feature of both age and employment duration was also examined: the relationship between the two (split) groups along a year-based continuum. Indeed, although tables 9.2 and 9.3 show that there is a clustering of significant differences from 44 to 51 years of age, and from 25 to 28 years of ADF employment, further extrapolation was required to understand the data on each end of these clusters and whether the differences in responses to the PCA Factor 1 likert-type items due to age, employment duration and rank may be related.

An inspection of the descriptive data for each ‘year’ showed a remarkable characteristic that was common to both the continuum of age and employment duration. It was discovered that when the respondents were split into two groups on the basis of age, there was negligible difference in TOTAL scores (approximately 0.3) up to the age of 34 years. In addition, the ‘younger’ group in each of these year-splits were slightly more positive towards the items measured by the ADFAQ than the ‘older’ group. Beyond the 34-years of age point, the scores reversed (i.e., the ‘older’ respondents were more positive towards the ADFAQ items) and the differences in the scores of the two (split) groups increased commensurate with age. The differences between groups reached a maximum value of approximately 4.0 and then tapered slightly at the 55-year point. The ‘older’ group score increased beyond 34-years while the ‘younger’ group score remained constant. This increase can be seen in the TOTAL score data for the t-tests presented in Table 9.2 (as well as the year-splits that approached significance).

Similar behaviour was observed in the TOTAL score data in relation to respondents’ reported years of employment duration. There was a negligible difference in TOTAL

188 Chapter Nine – Results – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

scores (approximately 0.4) up to 13 years of ADF employment. Akin to the continuum of respondents’ age, the ‘less experienced’ group in each of the year-splits was slightly more positive towards the items measured by the ADFAQ than the ‘more experienced’ group. Beyond 13 years of employment duration, the scores reversed (i.e., the ‘more experienced’ respondents held more positive perceptions) and the differences in the scores of the two (split) groups increased commensurate with age.

Again akin to the age continuum, the differences between employment duration groups reached a maximum value of approximately 4.0 and then tapered slightly at the 35-year point. Likewise the ‘more experienced’ group score increases beyond 13-years while the ‘less experienced’ group score remained constant. This increase can be seen in the PCA Factor 1 score data for the t-tests presented in Table 9.3.

189 Chapter Nine – Results – ADFAQ Demographic Groups

9.7 CHAPTER NINE SUMMARY

This chapter described the analysis of demographic groups including respondents’ rank, age and ADF employment duration, human factors training and Force Element Groups. Some issues showed considerable consistency across demographic groups, whereas others showed significant variation. The most striking result within these analyses in terms of both statistical and practical significance is the attitudinal differences between junior officer and senior officer respondents (F(1,363) = 11.7, p < 0.01). In contrast to the rank demographic, the analyses of the occupational, education completed, human factors training completion, human factors training type and force element groups revealed weak F or t values: Occupation Specialisation t(1,364) = 1.1, p > 0.05; Education completed F(7,357) = 0.44, p > 0.05; HF training completed t(1,366) = 0.48, p > 0.05; HF training provider F(8,357) = 1.7, p > 0.05; and Force Element Group F(5,358) = 2.9, p < 0.08. Neither the age nor ADF employment duration of the respondents significantly correlated to PCA Factor 1 score.

The pervasiveness of ‘rank’ as an apparent attitudinal influence upon ADF aviation personnel was indicated in this chapter via various means, including one-way analyses of variance of the various demographic sub-groups, and the deeper examination of rank and its relationship with age and employment duration. Indeed, the significant differences between the junior and senior officer groups in particular, has been indicated to varying degrees in the analysis of the each phase of the ADFAQ results. The following chapter, Chapter Ten, discusses the results of the demographic analyses and the aspects relating to rank attitudinal differences in particular.

190 CHAPTER TEN

DISCUSSION – ADFAQ DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS

This chapter is the third of four chapters that present discussion of the ADFAQ results. The remaining ADFAQ discussion is divided into two areas: discussion of the analysis of the results according to demographic criteria (this chapter) and research implications and limitations (Chapter Fourteen). The rationale behind the inclusion of analyses of the ADFAQ data in relation to demographic criteria was to explore and potentially clarify the nature of any attitude change – particularly any relationship between demographic attributes and attitudes – amongst the respondent population. The theoretical base supporting a person’s attitude change was described in Chapter Three (see also Glendon and McKenna, 1995). The applied aspects of attitude change as they apply to the ADF aviation population are described in Chapter Two, as well as Falconer (2005, 2006). In particular, Falconer (2005) establishes a need to explore the nature of rank – often considered the ‘backbone’ of military culture – upon a person’s attitude in the military. The rationale behind Falconer’s assertion was that if rank were shown to be related to shifts in attitude, then attitudinal guidance (through various means, as described by Glendon and McKenna, 1995) could be enacted and monitored with considerable performance ‘returns’ over the long-term. The appearance of such a benefit however is tempered by the view of Batteau (2001, 2002), Kirwan (2000), Soeters and Boer (2000) and others: the link between attitudes and system performance remains a “soft” (Kirwan, 2000) methodological issue, with “issues that are so naturally complex that achieving clarity becomes an art form” (p. 664). This chapter discusses the results of the ADFAQ and the elucidation of such attitudinal behaviour amongst demographic groups and sub-groups recorded by the ADFAQ.

10.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA

This section discusses the implications of the analyses conducted against the demographic criteria captured by the ADFAQ (officer rank, occupational category, education, Force Element Group (FEG), recent participation in human factors training,

191 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

respondent age and employment duration. Section 10.2 presents a summary of the chapter.

10.1.1 Officer Rank

Military rank is an important and highly fundamental criterion upon which to evaluate the ADFAQ results, since all respondents reported holding ADF officer rank of Officer Cadet (OFFCDT), Junior Officer (JNROFF) and Senior Officer (SNROFF). The OFFCDT returns comprised only 2% of the total ADFAQ forms returned. This return rate was significantly lower than the two officer categories, and is most likely due to two factors. Firstly, it should be noted that 187 ADFAQ envelopes were returned to the researcher marked “Incorrect Address – Return to Sender”, suggesting that the list of current ADF aviation personnel provided to the researcher by DPO-AF was notably inaccurate. The inaccuracy of the personnel list is exacerbated at training units where students can be failed from the course at short notice. The second factor relates to the reluctance to participate in the ADFAQ research as indicated by the Commanding Officer of the ADF Basic Flying Training School (ADFBFTS) (M. Sullivan, personal correspondence, July 16, 2003). Indeed, the objection of the Commanding Officer to the participation of BFTS students in the ADFAQ study was noted in an email to the researcher. Despite the researcher’s assurances that survey data would not allow the identification of any survey respondents, only a small number of OFFCDT returns were received (n = 9). Such a small number excluded the category from analysis and discussion in this study, although clearly follow-up research should address this deficiency as the typical duration of personnel in the rank of OFFCDT is brief, yet is nonetheless the first period of employment for ADF aviation officers and hence provides an important initial attitudinal ‘snapshot’.

Significant attitudinal differences exist between Junior Officers and Senior Officers. These groups differed significantly in their attitudes regarding one third of the ADFAQ items, including eight likert-scale items, three categorical items and one qualitative item. These results are highlighted throughout this section and hold several implications, particularly in relation to the effect of rank upon the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel. 192 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

Recent work by Falconer (2005, 2005a, 2006) has highlighted this influence in the context of Australian military aviation: describing a potential link between military rank – considered the ‘backbone’ of military operations and culture – and attitudinal change relating to performance in Australian military aviation. This result is important to note here because rank, as a ‘universal’ attribute of military aviation both in Australia and internationally, has the potential to affect attitudes across all spectrums of military aviation operations. In contrast, other demographic variables such as Force Element Group, aircraft specialisation and human factors training are markedly more localised both geographically and operationally (and hence socially or culturally). It is also important to note that the results suggest support for the notion that a ‘top-down’ culture (Glendon & McKenna, 1995; Glendon & Stanton, 2000) predominates in the Australian military aviation context. The data supporting this view has been highlighted and discussed in both the likert-type and qualitative phases of the ADFAQ analysis and hence will not be discussed further here. Importantly, however, these aspects are clearly worth examining via a cross-methodological approach, and hence will be revisited in the second (interview) study of this thesis.

The ADFAQ also found that SNROFF respondents revealed a tendency for higher agreement with their peers coupled with a more positive view towards organisational factors including safety. The principal indication in this regard seems to be the statistically significant difference relating to the disagreement expressed by JNROFF respondents that ADF aviation represents “world’s best practice” and the SNROFF respondents who reported agreement. The largest attitudinal difference between JNROFF and SNROFF respondents was also recorded by the “world’s best practice” ADFAQ item, where the difference in scores between the JNROFF and SNROFF groups was approximately half a point. The ‘positive’ view is also evident in the attitudinal differences of JNROFF and SNROFF respondents to the items relating to the trust of senior officers. Specifically, JNROFF respondents reported less agreement than SNROFF respondents that they trust senior ADF officers with operational aviation decisions, and decisions regarding safety. This finding seems to encompass the attributes of the positive self-appraisal identified in both the likert-type and qualitative data, discussed in Chapters Six and Eight. 193 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

The finding also offers an interesting contrast with research that suggests cultural influence upon attitudes of aviation personnel are predominantly formed during the early years of individuals’ development: family experiences, schooling and formal education (Hofstede, 1980, 2001), and the early training of a career (Simpson & Wiggins, 1997). Rather, the ADFAQ results seem to align with the findings of Helmreich and Merritt (1998), Soeters and Boer (2000) and Bernick (2001) that suggest individuals’ attitudes are continuously influenced (i.e., not ‘limited’ to early-career experiences) as a result of exposure to organisational norms. In relation to rank specifically, the scientific literature is devoid of studies that demonstrate the pervasive nature of this fundamental organisational trait of military aviation, although it has been hypothesised elsewhere as ‘rank influence’ (Falconer, 2005, 2006), inherent to military culture (Kern, 2001) and associated with ‘power’ (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Maurino, 2000) within various aviation environments.

A less obvious but important result of the ADFAQ study that warrants discussion here relates to the differences reported by JNROFF and SNROFF respondents regarding their most frequent human factors element in experiential safety-related events, and the ideas that respondents have that may help to reduce the human factors risk. The results show that JNROFF respondents nominated ‘poor communication’ notably more frequently than SNROFF respondents as the most frequent human factors element in their safety incident experiences, and (perhaps not surprisingly) cited the potential for training in assertiveness and communication as a counter-measure to the risk that poor communication poses. The ratio of JNROFF and SNROFF respondents who nominated communication training is approximately 2:1. In contrast, SNROFF respondents nominated ‘other1’ human factors elements as the most frequent in their safety incident experiences (27% of SNROFF nominated ‘other’, compared to only 13% of JNROFF) and risk management training (including CRM and ‘safety training’) notably more frequently than JNROFF respondents.

A possible explanation for the differences between JNROFF and SNROFF results (and arguably the more contemporary understanding of aviation safety principles) may

1 Experience (5%), SA (4%), judgement (3%), self-discipline (2%), lack of resources (2%). Percentages listed here are relative to total ADFAQ respondents (n = 402). 194 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

simply be a function of the age of respondents. It is perhaps worth recalling here the ten-year difference in the average age of JNROFF and SNROFF respondents reported by Chapter Four. Specifically, the average age of JNROFF and SNROFF respondents is 30 years (SD = 6.1) and 40 years (SD = 6.5) respectively. Similarly, the employment duration of ADF aviation personnel may have an influence here. Indeed, this influence appears more likely than respondent age, noting the higher frequency of employment duration correlations with respondent attitudes (than age correlations) that were reported in the previous chapter. Specifically, the average employment duration of JNROFF and SNROFF respondents is 11 years (SD = 5.7) and 20 years (SD = 6.2) respectively.

A further noteworthy aspect of the difference between officer rank relates to human factors training. Chapter Four reported that 62% of JNROFF respondents and 52% of SNROFF respondents had completed human factors training in the five years prior to completing the ADFAQ survey. While the difference in the participation rates of the two groups is relatively minor, it is important to note the differences in training providers for the two officer groups – particularly the dominance of short-course AVMED human factors training amongst JNROFF respondents and longer duration university training amongst the SNROFF respondents. Chapter Four reported that 38% and 24% of JNROFF respondents had completed AVMED and university human factors training, whereas equal percentages (30%) of SNROFF respondents had completed AVMED training and university human factors training. The key implication of these differences is perhaps that the more academic, and longer duration (typically a minimum of one semester or fourteen weeks) university courses have a more positive influence on the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel.

The implications of the ADFAQ results with regard to Officer rank are especially noteworthy in recognition of the composition of JNROFF and SNROFF groups within the respondent population – approximately 2:1. Specifically, the JNROFF and SNROFF groups comprised 61% and 36% of the population respectively. Perhaps more significant, however, is the implication relating to the relative consistency or ‘tightness’ of the SNROFF respondents (indicated by predominantly smaller standard deviations to the ADFAQ likert-scale items). This suggests that the influence of rank upon the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel may be analogous to a magnet, whereby attitudes 195 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

are ‘pushed’ in one direction, and simultaneously consolidated or ‘pulled’ towards a certain attitudinal point.

10.1.2 Occupation

The occupation of respondents was acquired to enable the grouping and comparison of attitudes based upon occupation, noting that research shows that errors can occur due to the lack of interaction between occupational groups – specifically pilots and technical personnel (Mattson, Petrin & Young, 2001; McDonald & Johnston, 1994). As stated in Chapter Four, 53% of respondents reported occupational specialisation in the Aircrew (AIR) category and 46% reported occupational specialisation within the engineering (ENG) category. Less than one percent of respondents were employed as Air Traffic Control Officers (ATCO) and Air Defence Officers (AIRDEF). Akin to the OFFCDT group in the previous section, the small number of ATCO and AIRDEF respondents excludes these groups from further discussion here.

Significant differences between the AIR and ENG demographic groups were found in nine likert-scale items and one categorical item. Foremost, the perceptions towards the introduction of an unsafe rule by a senior officer provided some notable occupation- based contrasts. Aircrew indicated that they are less likely to take action with a higher authority (eg., CO) than ENG respondents: 92% of ENG respondents reported that they would take follow-up action with their CO or the Senior Officer responsible for the new rule, compared to 82% of AIR respondents. AIR respondents indicated that they are almost three times more likely to discuss an unsafe rule with colleagues, but not with unit management, than ENG respondents. AIR respondents also reported that they are twice more likely to ask the Unit’s Commanding Officer to change the rule than ENG respondents, and half as likely to ask the senior officer responsible for the new rule to change the rule than ENG respondents.

The ADFAQ results suggest that ENG respondents indicated higher disagreement than AIR respondents towards the statement that deviations from standard procedures are a potential threat to the safety of ADF aviation. However, Aircrew reported stronger disagreement than ENG respondents towards the notion that increased disciplinary 196 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

action by Management will improve ADF aviation safety. AIR respondents reported stronger agreement that errors are inevitable in aviation operations than ENG respondents. AIR respondents also reported stronger agreement that safety events cannot easily occur within their area of operation, and are not a cause for disciplinary action by Management. The remaining items that recorded statistically significant differences between occupation groups were relatively minor in magnitude.

Akin to the potential implication of respondent age and employment duration associated with the consideration of Officer rank, an explanation of attitudinal differences relating to respondents’ occupation may also reside in the consideration of the average age and employment duration of aircrew and engineers. The average age of AIR and ENG respondents is 35 years (SD = 8.0) and 33 years (SD = 7.6) respectively. The average employment duration of AIR and ENG respondents is 15 years (SD = 7.4) and 13 years (SD = 7.5) respectively.

An additional noteworthy implication relates to human factors training. Chapter Four reported that 77% of AIR respondents had completed human factors training in the five years prior to the ADFAQ study, in comparison to only 39% of ENG respondents. More interesting perhaps is the finding that approximately 50% of AIR respondents had completed AVMED human factors training, whereas only 16% had completed university human factors training. In contrast, completion of human factors training conducted through a university was reported by approximately 50% of ENG respondents and AVMED human factors training was completed by only 10% of ENG respondents.

10.1.3 Education

The implication of the ADFAQ results on the basis of Education groups is an important criterion to consider here, since a considerable proportion of personnel complete higher education prior to, and during, their employment within ADF aviation. In general, the results show that the education level of personnel does not have a notable relationship with the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel. Indeed, on numerous occasions TAFE and HSC respondents reported similar attitudes to HONS and Postgraduate (PG) 197 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

respondents. For example, undergraduate (UG) respondents reported a greater willingness to discuss the introduction of an unsafe rule with their colleagues (and not management), compared to HSC and Postgraduate respondents. Approximately half of the HSC respondents would ask the unit’s Commanding Officer to change the new rule, compared to 41% of UG, 34% of PG, and only around fifteen percent of HONS and TAFE respondents. Seventy percent of HONS respondents would ask the senior officer responsible for the new rule to change the rule, compared to 65% of PG and TAFE respondents, and marginally less than 40% of UG and HSC respondents.

A possible explanation for these results is that the number of ADFAQ respondents (n = 402) is relatively small in relation to the number of educational categories, and therefore meaningful interpretation and discussion of the education-based results is at best difficult, if not statistically contrived. Further research, or indeed repeating the ADFAQ study across a wider population, could alleviate this impediment. Noting that this study was limited to officer ranks, a replication study using a larger population sample would not be difficult.

10.1.4 Age and ADF Employment Duration

The age and aviation experience of participants was acquired to enable the relative impact of a participant’s experience within ADF aviation to be established. Acknowledging that research suggests that the attitudes of personnel in a military aviation environment relates, to some extent, to the experience gained by personnel within their immediate sphere of military aviation employment (DSPPR, 2001; Soeters & Boer, 2000). Previous studies have shown that exposure to cultural influences become embedded over significant time periods to foster durable thought patterns (Johnson, 1991), and that a significant relationship exists between personal experience and increased positive attitudes towards safety (Simpson & Wiggins, 1997, 1999).

In general, the ADFAQ results suggest that the attitudinal norms of ADF personnel may be shown to consolidate with respect to time, rather than ‘increase’ or ‘decrease’ in one direction. This is in notable contrast with previous research relating to military aviation safety that asserts that culture manifests as the result of mental programming that occurs 198 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

primarily during the formative years of a human life, comprising those years spent within a family, throughout schooling and the first phases of a person’s career (Soeters, 1997; Soeters & Boer, 2000).

The similar standard deviation for respondents’ average age and employment duration supports the notion that ADF employees enter ADF employment during their late teen years. Moreover, the finding that aircrew are on average two years older than engineers is most likely a reflection of the longer contractual obligation associated with aircrew training (currently ten years for pilots) than engineers (five years). The implications of the ‘Age’ and ‘Employment duration’ analyses are outlined separately in the following sections.

10.1.5 Human Factors Training Participation

An understanding of the human factors training participation rates according to rank and occupation is an important demographic criterion as it is fundamental to the promotion of many safety-related attitudes in aviation (see Chapter One) and is likely to provide a means for rationalising the analysis of results. In general, the results suggest that only a minor difference exists in the attitudes held by respondents who had completed human factors training in the past five years (annotated “HF”) and respondents who had not recently completed human factors training (annotated “No HF”). Chapter Five reported that there is no significant difference in the likert-scale responses, or a significant linear relationship between respondents’ recent participation in human factors training and ADFAQ score. However, statistically significant differences were found between the HF and No HF groups with regard to eight likert-scale items and one qualitative item. Moreover, akin to the consolidation evident in the age and employment duration correlations, HF respondents consistently reported attitudes that were ‘tight’ around an average score (demonstrated by a consistently smaller standard deviation) than the respondents who had not completed human factors training in the five years prior to the ADFAQ study.

A possible explanation for the ADFAQ results relating to respondents’ human factors training is made apparent by a longitudinal consideration of the ADFAQ results and 199 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

human factors training within ADF aviation. Given that any possible influence of ADF human factors training is limited to sixty percent of the ADFAQ sample, and that the ADFAQ measured respondents’ participation in human factors training in the preceding five years (to the ADFAQ study), perhaps the consolidation of attitudes that is evident in other demographic criteria (see age, employment duration described earlier) does not have the opportunity to develop. Indeed, perhaps the five-year window is ‘too long’, allowing any attitudinal changes due to HF training to dissipate. The implementation of a shorter measurement window in a future study may ameliorate the current ambiguity regarding human factors training.

10.1.6 Force Element Groups

The implication of the ADFAQ results in relation to the Force Element Group (FEG) of respondents is also important, noting previous research suggests that the different services of defence forces report different attitudes towards aspects of ADF aviation (DSPPR, 2001; Trotti, 1996). Indeed, it is worthwhile restating a key finding of the ADFFMAQ here: that only six percent (6%) of respondents agreed with the statement “Flying safety standards are the same at all bases and in all units”. The majority of the ADFAQ respondents reported employment with four key FEGs (a total of eleven FEGs were nominated): Air Combat Group (27%), Air Lift Group (23%), Maritime Patrol Group (16%) and Air Training Wing (12%).

In general, the ADFAQ results relating to Force Element Groups were not surprising, given the breadth of scientific and anecdotal evidence that suggests that attitudes towards aviation safety and human factors in a military aviation environment relates, to some extent, to the respondents’ exposure to the localised working environment of the squadron or unit. The ADFAQ TOTAL mean scores suggest that only a minor difference exists in the respondent attitudes between the larger FEG populations (ACG, ALG, ATW and MPG), whereas notable differences exist between the smaller FEG populations surveyed in the ADFAQ study – although these differences were not statistically significant. However, there were six significant differences in likert-scale responses based upon respondents’ employment within particular Force Element

200 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

Groups. Five additional likert-scale survey items approached statistical significance between FEGs.

Respondent attitudes differed significantly with regard to the introduction of an unsafe rule by a senior officer. Only one respondent from ACG (0.9%) indicated that they would ignore the new rule. Twenty-nine percent of ATW indicated that they would discuss the new rule with colleagues (but not with management); compared to approximately fourteen percent of ALG and MPG respondents, and 6% of ACG respondents. Forty-six percent of ALG respondents (41% of ATW) would ask the CO to change the unsafe rule, compared to only 29% of MPG and 31% of ACG. Sixty percent of ACG and MPG (57%) would ask the senior officer responsible for the new rule to change the rule, compared to only 26% of ATW and 38% of ALG. Less than 4% of respondents from ACG, ALG and ATW indicated that they would obey the unsafe rule.

Every FEG except ARA reported agreement that errors are inevitable in aviation operations, but only SCG and ARDU reported that errors could easily occur within their area of operation. ATW indicated strong agreement that errors are inevitable in aviation (as well as RAN, ALG and MPG), in contrast to ARA respondents who reported disagreement. SCG and ARDU reported agreement that safety events can easily occur within their area of operation, whereas every other FEG reported disagreement (strong disagreement was reported by ATW and ARA respondents).

201 Chapter Ten – Discussion – Demographic Groups

10.2 CHAPTER TEN SUMMARY

This chapter discussed various aspects of the demographic data collected by the ADFAQ study, and how demographic groups related to attitudinal data. Additional discussion aspects of the ADFAQ are presented in Chapter Fourteen, in which the implications and limitations of the ADFAQ are considered in conjunction with the same aspects of the second (interview) study comprising this research (the interview study methodology is described in the following chapter). The aspects of attitudinal influences arising from rank-based attributes were clearly the most notable as they align with the results of the likert-type data, and the qualitative and categorical data. A related noteworthy aspect is the predominance of rank as a differentiator of attitudinal differences over the other demographic criteria collected by the ADFAQ. Indeed, even when respondents were divided on the basis of age and employment years at various points (forming sub-groups as a result), the attitudinal differences notably clustered around the ‘shift’ point of the rank-based data. Another noteworthy aspect that arose from the discussion of the results from a demographic perspective was the potential for new research that should seek to explore the findings of the ADFAQ using an alternative methodology. Specifically, the aspects of rank and culture in ADF aviation, and the relationship of these aspects with employee attitudes ought to be examined further. Such an approach aligns with the more holistic and “soft” view of safety and performance in aviation proffered by Batteau (2001, 2002), Kirwan (2000, 2002) and others. It also represents an attempt to mitigate any influence upon the results that may be attributed to method bias: “familiarity with survey techniques” (p. 236) is well noted by Helmreich and Merritt (1998) in their FMAQ study. The following chapter, Chapter Eleven, describes the development and implementation of an interview methodology to be applied to the ADF aviation population, in accordance with the aim of this research.

202 CHAPTER ELEVEN

METHODOLOGY – INTERVIEW PHASE

This chapter describes the design and implementation of an interview methodology, complementing the psychometric survey methodology described in the previous six chapters. Through a synthesis of the results of the ADFAQ study, a six-item semi- structured interview schedule was developed. Akin to the ADFAQ, the questions contained in the interview schedule similarly focus upon the ‘normal’ attitudes of personnel relating to the psychosocial preconditions to ADF aviation safety.

11.1 INTERVIEW RATIONALE

It was described extensively in Chapter Three that many researchers across various academic disciplines assert that culture ‘measurement’ necessitates the use of multi- methodologies (e.g., Merritt & Helmreich, 1996; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Batteau, 2002), hence semi-structured interviews were selected as the second methodology for this research.

The rationale for selecting semi-structured interviews as the second methodology consists of three elements. Firstly, interviews would allow deeper probing of issues that were studied in the ADFAQ study. Secondly, interview data would allow a means of triangulating the ADFAQ data. Thirdly, the qualitative nature of interview data would allow exploration of whether culture, in the organisational and safety contexts, is amenable to discussion. This point is particularly important in light of the ADFAQ study that found participants were able to ‘score’ safety culture (very positively) but were limited in their description and explanation of the characteristics of safety culture.

11.2 INTERVIEW OBJECTIVE

The objective of the interview phase was to further explore the key aspects of organisational culture revealed by the findings of the ADFAQ study, namely: the 203 Chapter Eleven – Methodology – Interview Phase

influence of rank, and cultural attribution relating to the perception of safety (including safety culture) and the ‘can-do’ effect.

11.3 INTERVIEW DESIGN

The interview design comprised an exploratory and semi-structured format. The interview structure was divided into two phases: a briefing phase and a data collection phase. During the briefing phase, each interviewee was provided with a verbal briefing on the nature and rationale for the interview (see Appendix D). The data collection phase involved the recording of the participants’ responses to six questions.

11.4 PARTICIPANTS

Thirty-six Australian Defence Force aviation personnel were interviewed, comprising both aircrew and engineers of both junior and senior officer ranks. In order to enhance the generalisability of the ADFAQ results, and to take into account the diversity of ADF aviation, interview participants included personnel working in seven aviation units in every State and Territory of Australia (except Tasmania, where there is no ADF aviation unit). This strategy also aligns with the sampling process employed for the ADFAQ study. The interview participants included both male and female ADF aviation personnel.

The researcher contacted a senior officer at RAAF Headquarters via telephone approximately six weeks prior to the conduct of the interviews. Contact with the officer was made using the officer’s contact details listed in the ADF ‘Aviation Safety Spotlight’ publication. The researcher asked the officer to distribute a recruitment poster inviting ADF aviation personnel to participate in a brief interview study. The officer agreed, and passed the poster to one or more squadrons in each FEG (FEGs are listed in Chapter Four). Following the distribution of the notice, the researcher was contacted via telephone by 41 personnel who stated their interest in the study. Thirty-six of these personnel agreed to participate.

204 Chapter Eleven – Methodology – Interview Phase

The participants’ gender and junior/senior rank details were recorded with each interview – no other demographic details were collected. A summary of the respondents’ gender and rank details is provided in Table 11.1.

Table 11.1. Descriptive summary of respondents’ ADF rank.

Demographic ADFAQ completed Interviews completed Junior Officer 244 16 Senior Officer 146 9 Male Not recorded 34 Female Not recorded 2

The JNROFF and SNROFF samples for both the ADFAQ and the interview studies are considered representative of ADF aviation, as they are (a) comparable to the ADF census percentages for the two groups; and (b) an approximately matching proportion of each rank group in the ADFAQ phase of this study. The interview samples for each gender are also comparable to the ADF census percentages for males and females employed as aircrew and engineers within the aviation specialty.

205 Chapter Eleven – Methodology – Interview Phase

11.5 MATERIALS

11.5.1 Semi-structured Interview Schedule

Through a synthesis of the results of the 45-item ADFAQ (see Chapter Four), a six-item semi-structured interview schedule was developed.

The basic structure of the interview format was ‘open question – probing question’, whereby open questions established the content and relevance of the subject matter being investigated and focussed the interviewee, and probing questions established a means of furthering the line of enquiry or their own points of interest. The six items of the interview schedule are listed below.

Interview Items

1. Have your attitudes towards safety in ADF aviation changed throughout your career? If so, how? 2. What factors have influenced your attitudes towards the safe performance of your role? 3. How do you perceive the safety culture of ADF aviation? 4. If you were faced with a new rule or SOP that you believed to be unsafe, what would you do about it? 5. ADF aviation is said to possess a ‘can-do culture’. What is your perception of a can-do culture in ADF aviation? 6. Do you think there is any difference in attitudes to safety in ADF aviation between the various ranks? If so, what is the difference?

Interview Item Development

The six interview items were developed on the basis of the results of the ADFAQ and specifically seek qualitative data on three themes: (a) attitudinal change; (b) cultural aspects relating to ADF aviation performance, and (c) rank-based effects. The interview items were designed to capture any potential inter-relation between the three themes. 206 Chapter Eleven – Methodology – Interview Phase

Accordingly, each interview item related to at least one other item in forming each themed line of enquiry. The interview items and their potential interrelations with other interview and ADFAQ items are listed in Table 11.2.

Table 11.2. Themes and inter-relationships of interview items.

Item Key Theme Related Interviews Items ADFAQ Triangulation

1 Attitudinal change 2, 6 Age, Experience, Rank 2 Cultural aspects 4, 5, 6 Age, Experience, Rank 3 Cultural aspects 5, 6 Perception vis knowledge 4 Rank-based effects 2, 3, 5, 6 Underlying rank influence 5 Cultural aspects 2, 3, 4, 6 Perception vis knowledge 6 Rank-based effects 1, 2 Underlying rank influence

Items 1 and 2 were included in the interview schedule as a two-prong approach to triangulate an ADFAQ finding. The items were designed to explore the seemingly strong ADFAQ result indicating that rank (over the ADFAQ’s other demographic factors, including both age and experience) influences the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel. Item 1 was constructed as a means to explore the ADFAQ finding that attitudes towards the ADFAQ factors were different between junior and senior officers and, more specifically, a change in attitude appeared to take place at around the time that an officer would leave the junior officer ranks and enter the senior officer group. Item 2 was also constructed as an attempt to triangulate the rank-difference finding of the ADFAQ. However, this item explored the notion of attitudinal influence from a more general perspective, and so was open-ended.

Items 3 and 5 were designed to explore the aspects of culture that were defined by respondents in the ADFAQ study. In the ADFAQ study, respondents strongly agreed that ADF aviation has a “good safety culture”, yet they were unable (or reluctant) to describe the qualities of a safety culture. Item 3 was designed to examine this further. This was included in the interview schedule because further evidence of personnel supporting a senior-management-promoted ‘line’ without understanding the entity being promoted would add an interesting element to the triangulation of the rank-effect being examined by items 1 and 2.

207 Chapter Eleven – Methodology – Interview Phase

Item 5 was phrased as an open question and was included in the schedule to specifically examine the can-do culture and its influence upon the attitudes of personnel. This inclusion was particularly in light of the ADFAQ results that seem to align with the findings of Helmreich and Merritt (1998) and others that suggest individuals’ attitudes are continuously influenced (i.e., not limited to early-career experiences) as a result of exposure to organisational norms. Furthermore, a higher age and/or a longer exposure to the ADF organisation (‘employment duration’) was generally representative of the SNROFF group, and revealed a tendency for higher agreement with their peers. Qualitative analysis of the open-ended responses in the ADFAQ and interview responses also confirmed this view.

Items 4 and 6 were designed to explore the more underlying factors relating to the influence of rank. Item 4 was constructed as a means to explore the ADFAQ finding relating to respondents’ reactions to a ‘new unsafe rule’. However, unlike the ADFAQ item, item 4 of the interview schedule posed the question in an open manner to allow interviewees to describe their reactions to the unsafe rule without being constrained by response categories. Item 6 explored the rank-difference finding of the ADFAQ from a more general perspective.

208 Chapter Eleven – Methodology – Interview Phase

11.6 PROCEDURE

As stated earlier, interviewees included personnel working in seven aviation units across Australia. The interviews were conducted via telephone as this was the only means by which the researcher could reach such a geographically diverse sample.

The researcher conducted each interview separately during participants’ breaks from duty at their workplace, or at their home. Interviewees chose where they would be situated when the interview was conducted and advised the researcher via telephone or e-mail. Interviewees were also asked to ensure that there were no distractions present when the interview was conducted, including the presence of any other people.

In order to minimise confounding data as a result of the interviewer effect, the researcher limited the information released to interviewees regarding the specific subject being examined. The information released to participants is included in the interview briefing (Appendix D). Interviews were recorded using a cassette recorder, and lasted approximately 30 minutes each. The interview tapes were numbered chronologically in order of completion and the interview data transcribed into a Microsoft Word document, and subsequently loaded into Atlas transcription analysis software. A copy of the transcribed interview document was sent to the relevant interviewee via email. Each interviewee was requested to confirm the accuracy of the transcript, and was also provided access to the interview cassette in order to check the transcript. Confirmation of interview accuracy was received from all interviewees.

Coding of the interview data was conducted using content analysis for each of the six items. All items were examined using the same method, however the content triggers were specific to each theme or ADFAQ finding being triangulated. This method of analysis was conducted in the traditional manner for semi-structured interviews: beginning with ‘expected triggers’ for each item – specific data required by the interview objective (Stanton et al, 2005), then re-analysing each item in order to gather ‘unexpected’ extra data not initially outlined in the objectives of the specific item or the interview generally.

209 Chapter Eleven – Methodology – Interview Phase

For example, the expected triggers of item 1, “Have your attitudes towards safety in ADF aviation changed throughout your career? If so, how?”, included the terms yes, no, don’t know, maybe and not sure in relation to the closed question, and age, rank, experience, training, personal and self for the latter question (completing the item). Once the transcripted interview text containing these terms was coded and their frequency tabulated, the coded text would be examined for smaller categories or themes within the expected trigger. This step was particularly useful over the course of the interview data analysis as it provided data that consequently offered an early indication of potential unexpected triggers. Once this second, deeper analysis of the expected triggers was complete, the data was examined again in toto with a view to identifying new and unexpected themes. The analysis of each item was conducted in the same manner, with varying expected triggers providing the framework for the analysis of individual items (these were built on the designed theme for each item and are listed in Table 11.2).

In summary, the analysis applied here allowed the content of the interviews to be reduced to numerical form, and tables constructed according to: firstly, the frequency with which the resultant concepts were mentioned by respondents; and secondly, the frequency with which concepts occur together. These tables are presented and elaborated upon in the following chapter (Results – Interview Phase).

210 Chapter Eleven – Methodology – Interview Phase

11.7 CHAPTER ELEVEN SUMMARY

In an effort to triangulate the results of the survey method contained within the ADFAQ and to probe deeper into some of the findings of the ADFAQ study, this chapter described the methodology for a series of exploratory, semi-structured interviews. The interviews were based on a synthesis of the results of the ADFAQ study and existing literature relating to cultural examination via attitudinal analysis. The key objective of conducting the interviews subsequent to the ADFAQ analysis was to further examine the attitudes to ADF aviation operations and safety ‘as they naturally occur’ in accordance with the aim and objectives of this research. The following chapter, Chapter Twelve, describes the results of the interview study.

211 CHAPTER TWELVE

RESULTS – INTERVIEW PHASE

Interview responses were obtained from 36 ADF aviation personnel (aircrew and engineering officers). The responses to each interview question were subjected to content analyses. This chapter describes the evaluation of the interview data. The following chapter, Chapter Thirteen, comprises the Discussion of the results in the specific context of the interview methodology.

12.1 EVALUATION OF THE INTERVIEWS

The interview data varied in both quantity and content. Some interviewees described responses in considerable detail, while others responded to the interview questions in only two or three sentences. This was particularly evident once the interviewees’ responses were transcribed and cleaned. 580 items of coded text were recorded using the open coding methodology described in the previous chapter. The greatest number of codes recorded in an interview was 26 (interview 20), and the minimum was 9 items of code (interview 4). Interviewees described an average of 18 issues in response to the six interview questions.

This section describes the content analyses of the transcripted interview data. The section examines each interview item separately, although each interview item related to at least one other item.

12.1.1 Item 1 – “Have your attitudes towards safety in ADF aviation changed throughout your career? If so, how?”

Twenty-nine interviewees (80%) reported that their attitudes towards safety had changed throughout their career. Eight interviewees (22%) reported that their attitudes towards safety had not changed. The respondents who reported that their attitudes had not changed reported only a few reasons for their response, including three respondents

212 Chapter Twelve – Results – Interview Phase

who did not elaborate on their earlier ‘no change’ response. In contrast, the respondents who reported that their attitudes towards safety had changed throughout their careers agreed on numerous issues relating to how their attitudes had changed. The responses to both ‘change’ and ‘no change’ interview responses are listed in Table 12.1.

Table 12.1. Responses to interview item 1, “Have your attitudes towards safety in ADF aviation changed throughout your career? If so, how?”.

Attitude toward safety changed N Attitude toward safety not changed N

Personal approach to safety reflected in all On the job experience 16 4 aspects of interviewee’s life

Structured education about risk 10 On the job experience 1

Personal approach to safety reflected in all 8 Structured education about risk 1 aspects of interviewee’s life Realisation of potential to set an example to 6 others Peer pressure forced interviewee to amend 6 their attitude to safety On the job experience (specifically causing a 5 change toward a conservative attitude) Age (causing a change toward a conservative 3 attitude)

Distrust of ADF Managers / Safety Policy 3

Operational Pressure 2

Direct influence of family 1

Attitude change necessary due to changes in 1 technology

Total 61 Total 6

There are several aspects of the responses to interview item 1 that are worth highlighting here. Firstly, the three issues related to the ‘no attitude change’ scenario are also reported by respondents who report that their attitudes toward safety had changed throughout their career. The results also show that on the job experience was the most prominent issue reported by interviewees; described by approximately half (n = 17) of the interviewees. Table 12.1 shows that while most interviewees did not offer a ‘direction’ for the change that they reported relating to their operational experience, five 213 Chapter Twelve – Results – Interview Phase

interviewees specifically nominated a change toward a more conservative attitude. When an interviewee cited the direction of change, the direction of change was clearly espoused by the interviewee in all cases. Examples include, “with operational experience my attitudes have become more conservative” (interview 14), “I guess [safety] has been brought more to the fore in day to day operations” (interview 22) and referring to ADF aviation operational norms as achieving “much more adherence to rules and procedures” (interview 8).

12.1.2 Item 2 – What factors have influenced your attitudes towards the safe performance of your role?

Fifteen codes were derived from 103 individual portions of text from the transcripted responses to this interview question. This interview item elucidated predominantly ‘job- related’ issues that influence attitudes towards the safe performance of roles in ADF aviation. The responses are listed in Table 12.2 (overleaf).

214 Chapter Twelve – Results – Interview Phase

Table 12.2. Responses to interview item 2, “What factors have influenced your attitudes towards the safe performance of your role?”.

Factors influencing attitudes towards safe performance N

An improved self-understanding 20

An improved understanding of the role being fulfilled 16

Learning from the experience of others 16

Peer pressure 11

Achieving pride through professionalism in work duties 11

Operational and on-the-job experience 10

The ADF’s can-do culture 6

Poor leadership from senior ADF officers 2

Programs and literature from the Directorate of Flying Safety 2

The ADF’s ‘just culture’, as defined by James Reason 2

Increasing personal age 2

Personal assessment of a mission’s merit 2

Boredom through job routine 1

Family 1

Fear of disciplinary action 1

Total 103

Only a small proportion of interviewees (n = 7) described issues that can be reasonably categorised as ‘personal’ issues – or at least issues that are not work-related. This proportion includes personnel who described an improved understanding and knowledge of themselves, their skills and personality, and two interviewees who cited increasing age (“getting older”, interview 20 and interview 26). The remainder of the issues described by interviewees focus heavily upon on the job aspects relating to either the interviewee’s specific role (n = 16) or operational experience generally (n = 10), or the social environment in which their role is performed. The latter focus comprised approximately 30% of the issues recorded, and included descriptions of peer pressure (n = 11) and learning from the experience of others (n = 16) – referred to by several interviewees as “war stories” (a tongue-in-cheek description of others’ experience in the defence force – the content of the story told usually does not relate to actual combat or ‘war’). Respondents’ descriptions of learning from the experience of others also 215 Chapter Twelve – Results – Interview Phase

included some remarkably personal insights from several interviewees. Examples include “close friends perishing in military accidents” (interview 9), “accidents have obviously contributed to the views that I take now” (interview 14) and “other people’s mistakes” (interview 1).

A further aspect of the social environment that was mentioned previously is peer pressure. Many of the interviewees that cited peer pressure were particularly frank about the veracity of this social aspect. Some key examples include: “your local working environment can be pretty influential” (interview 17), “peer pressure has been a huge influence” (interview 23) and “team membership is everything in the RAAF” (interview 11). However, one interviewee considered the influence of peer pressure to have been an occupational experience with positive implications for safety and performance: “at a peer level, I think there exists a positive pressure to do the right thing” (interview 24).

12.1.3 Item 3 – “How do you perceive the safety culture of ADF aviation?”

While ADF aviation personnel were found by the ADFAQ to strongly agree that ADF aviation has a “good safety culture” (ADFAQ item 20 “My work environment has a positive safety culture”), personnel were unable (or reluctant) to describe the qualities of a safety culture in response to the related open-ended item (ADFAQ section 3). The issues described by interviewees in response to question three in this study demonstrate a similar trait amongst ADF aviation personnel, yet offer some indication as to the apparent ‘lack of definition’ of safety culture recorded by the ADFAQ. Interviewees did report strong advocacy of the ADF’s aviation safety culture being good vis bad (or weak). Two thirds of interviewees (n = 24) described the safety culture in a positive manner by using the terms ‘good’ or ‘very good’. The remainder of the interviewees described how they perceive the safety culture to be misunderstood (n = 8) or non- existent (n = 2). The latter perception was described in both cases as safety culture being “nonsense”. None of the interviewees described the safety culture of ADF aviation in a negative sense (e.g., ‘bad’, ‘weak’ or similar).

216 Chapter Twelve – Results – Interview Phase

The definition and meaning of safety culture described by interviewees was quite diverse. Interviewees reported nineteen characteristics of safety culture. However, a tendency towards characteristics with positive connotations was evident. This can be seen in Table 12.3, where few ADF aviation safety culture attributes are described with negative connotations.

Table 12.3. Responses to interview item 3, “How do you perceive the safety culture of ADF aviation?”.

Definitions (inputs to safety culture) N Definitions (safety culture outputs) N

A non-punitive safety philosophy 9 Additional pressures on personnel 11

Associated with the can-do culture 7 ‘Bureaucratic’ 8 Calculated acceptance of risk (pro- 5 Institutionalised pretence 6 conservative) Complication of organisational procedures Individuals’ responsibility to safety 5 4 to meet safety culture ‘expectations’ A concept to distract from the expectation Calculated acceptance of risk 4 2 of fatalities Split and confusing responsibilities for Organisational maturity 4 2 safety A low accident rate 1 ‘Generative’ 1

Dependent upon operating funds available 1 Increasing promotion prospects 1

Total 36 Total 35

Table 12.3 shows that interviewees described the co-existence of either the can-do culture or can-do attitude with their perception of the safety culture in ADF aviation on seven occasions. Half of these descriptions were offered in the context of the can-do culture being a consistent negative influence on the safety culture (this finding is also reflected in the results for item 5, “ADF aviation is said to possess a ‘can-do culture’. What is your perception of a can-do culture in ADF aviation?”). The remainder described how the can-do culture was simply ‘a part of the safety culture’ (or similar) without suggesting whether the ‘direction’ of the influence was positive or negative.

217 Chapter Twelve – Results – Interview Phase

12.1.4 Item 4 – “If you were faced with a new rule or SOP that you believed to be unsafe, what would you do about it?”

Unlike the ADFAQ item that (similarly) examined the action/s of personnel regarding a “new unsafe rule”, this interview item posed the question in an open manner – allowing interviewees to describe their reactions to the unsafe rule without being guided into response categories. Seventy-five items of transcribed and coded interview data were recorded in response to this item. Almost all interviewees reported that they would take action in response to the unsafe rule. Approximately half of the interviewees described how they would act on the unsafe rule’s implementation by expressing their concerns via verbal means only using their “chain of command” (also expressed as “talking to my boss” or “speaking to my commanding officer”). Approximately one third of interviewees stated that they would express their concern both verbally and in writing. Half of the interviewees also described an intention to “follow up” their original expression of concern in writing (n = 5) and verbally (n = 6).

Four respondents stated that they would comply with the rule. Three of these respondents stated that their intention to comply with the new rule was due to their experience whereby raising such issues was ignored. One respondent cited “the lack of union protection in the defence force” as the rationale for his compliance with the new unsafe rule. These are listed in Table 12.4 and elaborated below.

Table 12.4. Responses to interview item 4, “If you were faced with a new rule or SOP that you believed to be unsafe, what would you do about it?”.

Intended actions following introduction of a new unsafe rule N

Raise issue verbally within immediate (Squadron) chain of command 29

Respondent follow-up of initial action 18

Raise issue in writing 13

Acknowledgement of potential career retribution, or punishment 7

Follow set procedures 4

Total 71

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While only four interviewees expressed an intention to simply “follow” or “comply” with the implementation of an unsafe rule, they represent more than ten percent of the personnel interviewed via this study. In contrast, the ADFAQ recorded less than one percent of respondents as indicating a willingness to “ignore the rule” when framed as a categorical question (see Chapter Seven).

12.1.5 Item 5 – “ADF aviation is said to possess a ‘can-do culture’. What is your perception of a can-do culture in ADF aviation?”

Item 5 attempted to validate cultural aspects of ADF aviation identified by the ADFAQ study, however this item related specifically to the can-do culture and its influence. Eight response codes were derived from 85 individual portions of text from the transcripted responses to this interview question. This interview item elucidated predominantly ‘negative’ issues related to the existence of the can-do culture in ADF aviation. The responses are listed in Table 12.5.

Table 12.5. Responses to interview item 5, “ADF aviation is said to possess a ‘can-do culture’. What is your perception of a can-do culture in ADF aviation?”.

Perceptions of the ADF ‘can-do culture’ N

Problematic 24

Operational pressure 19

Organisational Pride 16

The can-do culture is a ‘good’ aspect of ADF aviation 12

Promotion 7

‘Press-on-itis’ 5

The can-do culture does not exist 1

Personal gain; promotion not directly cited 1

Total 85

The most frequent response, and perhaps most remarkable in the context of the can-do culture being advocated so readily in the ADF literature (see Chapter Two), embraced the notion of the can-do culture as a problematic entity. Two thirds of the interviewees

219 Chapter Twelve – Results – Interview Phase

described the can-do culture in this manner. The principal descriptor for interviewees’ responses to be included within this particular code was interviewees’ use of the word “problem” in their answer to the question. Examples include, “it becomes a problem when the can-do culture is unnecessarily maintained” (interview 1), “the culture of doing more with less is a significant problem” (interview 2), “the feeling I have towards the concept is negative” (interview 4), “the can-do attitude is also dangerous and needs to be balanced by a more mature understanding of safety” (interview 20), “the can-do culture has killed many aviators, but has won many battles” (interview 21), and “the can-do culture can compromise safety when people lose perspective” (interview 25).

However, some respondents who described the can-do culture as problematic also reported that they considered the can-do culture to be a fundamentally ‘good’ concept. Specifically, half of the interviewees that described the can-do culture as being problematic also described the can-do culture as a good – often “motivating” or “useful” – concept in ADF aviation operations. The remaining half who expressed a view of the can-do culture being problematic noted either the pressure of operations undertaken by ADF aviation personnel (n = 7) or pride in the ADF as an organisation (n = 5).

12.1.6 Item 6 – “Do you think there is any difference in attitudes to safety in ADF aviation between the various ranks? If so, what is the difference?”

Interview respondents almost unanimously stated that there are differences in attitudes to safety between the various ranks of the ADF. The reported differences between ranks were based predominantly upon aspects of seniority (in contrast to non-seniority related aspects such as “personal circumstances”, n = 5), and interviewees generally reported several reasons in support of their difference/no difference view. The responses to this item are listed in Table 12.6 (overleaf). Only two of the 36 interviewees reported a perception that attitudes to safety do not vary between variously ranked ADF aviation personnel. Thirty-one interviewees perceived that differences exist, while three interviewees expressed uncertainty. Interviewees reported approximately one dozen aspects of attitudinal differences, although the most frequently reported aspect (the

220 Chapter Twelve – Results – Interview Phase

‘distance’ of senior ranks to risk, n = 20) was reported twice as many times as the second most frequent characteristic of attitudinal difference (an increase in ego commensurate with rank, n = 10).

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the results is the apparent duality amongst the reported reasons as to why attitudinal differences exist. This apparent duality exists throughout the responses – from the less frequently reported aspects to the more frequent. For example, the aspect of peer pressure was cited by three interviewees in a negative manner (that rank increases peer pressure which increases the perceived need to allow or take greater risks in operations) while two separate interviewees reported that professionalism increases with rank, which in turn decreases an officer’s likelihood of taking undue risk. Similarly, operational experience can be contrasted with a direct influence of senior personnel upon junior personnel. Specifically, just as many interviewees reported that senior officers’ lack of operational currency (n = 6) placed their decision-making in a less accurate context as reported that operational experience accumulates with rank, and hence gives that officer a better understanding from which to make decisions about safety.

Table 12.6. Responses to interview item 6, “Do you think there is any difference in attitudes to safety in ADF aviation between the various ranks? If so, what is the difference?”.

Yes – difference exists N No – difference does not exist N

The proximity to risk amongst senior roles 20 Flight safety is a priority to all ranks 1

Egocentrism increases with rank 10 Based on personal circumstances 1

Many ‘juniors’ influenced by one ‘senior’ 8 Professionalism is equal to all ranks 1

Due to education available/completed 7

Importance of promotion increases 7

Senior officers are not operationally ‘current’ 6

Operational experience higher with rank 6

Differences based on personal circumstances 5

Peer pressure increases with rank 3

Professionalism increases with rank 2

Senior ranks are pro-punishment 1 Total 75 Total 3

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12.2 CHAPTER TWELVE SUMMARY

The interview phase of this research recorded attitudes towards a diverse range of safety related issues within ADF aviation identified in the analysis of the ADFAQ. This chapter described the analysis of qualitative data provided by 36 ADF aviation personnel in response to a semi-structured interview schedule comprising six items. The analyses of these items included considerations of the themes developed and implemented for the ADFAQ that produced interesting results in the ADFAQ phase of this project, and an exploration of the influence of rank upon the attitudes of personnel in ADF aviation. In general, the attitudes recorded in this interview phase showed consistency with the results of the ADFAQ although the interviews were more successful than the ADFAQ study in elaborating upon the more holistic ‘reality’ of the organisational culture of everyday aviation operations in the ADF. Akin to the ADFAQ, there seemed to be a social or cultural delineation between junior and senior aviation officers. This result defies the ‘one team’ rhetoric within much ADF aviation literature and senior manager parlance presented throughout this thesis. This particular result is discussed in the following chapters, both in the context of the interview study as a stand-alone methodology and as a joint consideration of the results of both studies presented in this thesis. The following chapter, Chapter Thirteen, presents a Discussion of the results of the interview phase of this research.

222 CHAPTER THIRTEEN

DISCUSSION – INTERVIEW DATA

This chapter contains the Discussion of the interview study results and is divided into two key areas: interview content (section 13.1) and methodological efficacy (section 13.2). Interview content includes discussion on the main findings of the interviews, whereas methodological efficacy encompasses discussion on the specific applicability of the interviews as a means of analysing aspects of organisational culture. Chapter Fourteen presents a more general discussion of the results recorded by both the ADFAQ and interview studies, specifically including the contribution of this research to existing theory, and the limitations and implications of the studies.

13.1 INTERVIEW CONTENT

In general, the interviews confirmed many of the findings of the ADFAQ, also adding depth to the rationale for the ADFAQ responses. The interview data illustrated predominant attitudes relating to cultural and rank-based influences in ADF aviation, as well as some of the factors that contribute to such attitudes. The main findings of the interviews are discussed in the following subsections. There are two primary aspects discussed: rank and attitude change, and organisational culture and safety culture. Both of these aspects relate directly to the objectives of the interview study (see Chapter Eleven).

13.1.1 Rank and Attitude Change

It is worth reiterating here that the ADFAQ study revealed SNROFF respondents’ tendency for higher agreement with their peers coupled with a more positive view towards organisational factors including safety. In a similar vein, the interview study confirmed that the attitudes (and behaviours) of SNROFF personnel are influential upon the attitudes of JNROFF personnel. The interview data also provided support for the existence of attitude change and the associated influence of rank upon the attitudes of 223 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

personnel working in ADF aviation. Item 1 (“Have your attitudes towards safety in ADF aviation safety changed throughout your career? If so, how”), was designed to specifically examine the issue of attitude change amongst personnel. While the overwhelming initial response to this item was in the affirmative (suggesting that respondents perceive that attitudes are not ‘set’ by early training and career experiences), the rationale for respondents’ attitude change was split between aspects that relate to the participants’ work and aspects that relate to participants’ personal lives (even to the extent of citing family responsibilities). This finding offers an interesting contrast with research that suggests cultural influence upon attitudes of aviation personnel is limited to the early years of an individual’s development: family experiences, schooling and formal education (Soeters & Boer, 2000) or, at the latest, the early years of a career (Simpson & Wiggins, 1997). Rather, the ADFAQ and interview results seem to align with the findings of Williamson et al (1997), Helmreich and Merritt (1998), Glendon and McKenna (1995) and others that suggest individuals’ attitudes towards aspects of work and performance are continuously influenced (i.e., not ‘limited’ to early-career experiences) as a result of exposure to organisational norms.

Items 4 and 6 elucidated data that elaborated upon the more underlying factors relating to rule compliance and the influence of rank. Item 4 (“If you were faced with a new rule or SOP that you believed to be unsafe, what would you do about it?”) identified the magnitude and rationale of personnel who reported an intention to ‘comply’ with an unsafe rule in ADF aviation operations. More than 10% of interviewees stated an intention to comply with the rule. In contrast, the ADFAQ framed this probe as a categorical-type response item, and recorded only 1% of respondents as being willing to comply with the (unsafe) rule. Perhaps more remarkable is that all of the interviewees who expressed an intention to comply with the unsafe rule or procedure (i.e., to simply follow the given procedure) cited either the likelihood of their concern being ignored by senior ranked personnel or the lack of union protection as the rationale for their decision. This perception appears to reinforce the finding recorded by the ADFAQ that communication is not considered by the ‘sharp-end’ operators in ADF aviation to be as open – and hence effective – as it could be. In all cases the rationale cited by interviewees was that senior ranked personnel would ignore their protests. This relates

224 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

to the issue of ineffective communication, previously identified in both the DSPPR (2001) study and ADFAQ phase of this study.

Item 6 (“Do you think there is any difference in attitudes to safety in ADF aviation between the various ranks? If so, what is the difference?”) provided confirmation of the perception of attitude-based differences amongst the ADF aviation population. Only two of the 36 interviewees reported a perception that attitudes to safety do not vary between variously ranked ADF aviation personnel. Thirty-one interviewees perceived that differences exist, while three interviewees expressed uncertainty. The relationship between the reported rank-related egocentrism and the influence of senior over junior ranks was a little less clear. While the aspect of ego cited by interviewees was often accompanied by aspects of ‘power’ and the notion that junior personnel can be forced to undertake unsafe operations against their will, the aspect of senior ranks influencing junior ranks may be a positive contribution toward safer operations. Hence rank can influence attitudes towards safety both positively and negatively. Interview item 6 suggests that the attitudinal change related to rank is predominantly negative.

13.1.2 Organisational Culture and Safety Culture

The second main aspect of the interview study results worthy of discussion relates to the concept of organisational culture. Indeed, it was noted earlier that there are questions regarding whether and how organisational culture is different to both organisational climate and safety culture (see Chapter Three).

The results of the interview study support the argument that it is very difficult or impossible to separate safety culture from organisational culture. Because an organisation has responsibilities for both production and protection, an imbalance in these priorities will tend to lead to ineffective performance. Both production and protection need to be considered in unison when it comes to culture within organisations. What is clearly suggested from the results of this research is that the concepts are not mutually exclusive: a conclusion that supports the findings of researchers including Glendon and McKenna (1995). The primary indication of this interconnectedness of the safety culture concept within broader organisational 225 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

constructs stems from the finding that many participants were unable to define or explain the nature of safety culture, and yet were often convinced that the organisation had a good safety culture.

‘Top down’ versus ‘bottom up’

Glendon and Stanton (2000) argue that safety culture is often a ‘top-down’ management initiative that dictates safe working practices in a comprehensive manner, rather than exchanging knowledge about safety among equal partners. The results of the interview study (and the ADFAQ) indicate that the top-down approach is the predominant ‘cultural framework’ applicable to ADF aviation. Back and Woolfson (1999) argue that because the notion of a workplace safety culture tends to pre-suppose a unified system of values and ideas, it misdirects attention from the context of power within which the respective culture is embedded. They state, “Culture, far from facilitating free and open communication between the top and bottom of the hierarchy, can actively impede the collective articulation of the view from below” (p. 47). Moreover, the interview results seem to align with the findings of attitudinal studies by Bailey and Petersen (1989), Helmreich and Merritt (1998), Soeters and Boer (2000) and Bernick (2001) that suggest individuals’ attitudes are continuously influenced (i.e., not ‘limited’ to early-career experiences) as a result of exposure to organisational norms. Indeed, the results of the interview study suggest that the actions and supervision of ‘management’ (senior ranked officers in the context of ADF aviation) have a considerable impact on individuals’ attitudes towards safety and system performance. Notably, Erickson (1997) suggests that management can direct cultural change by articulating the desired values and enforcing the appropriate norms – though the efforts of management must be sincere and continually applied. Nonetheless, the results do suggest support for the notion that a ‘top-down’ culture (Glendon & McKenna, 1995; Glendon & Stanton, 2000) predominates in military aviation contexts.

Safety Culture

The interviews highlighted some confusion surrounding employees’ perceptions of the concept of safety culture in ADF aviation operations (item 3, “How do you perceive the 226 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

safety culture of ADF aviation?”). Many interview participants were unable to define or explain the nature of safety culture, yet believed that the ADF had a ‘good’ or ‘positive’ safety culture. This finding was also evident from the ADFAQ. There are several possible explanations for the dichotomy between respondents’ understanding of the safety culture concept and belief in the presence of a ‘good safety culture’ in the ADF. Firstly, various RAAF Chiefs and other senior defence leaders have espoused safety culture as being ‘fundamental to the success’ of the ADF over many years (e.g., McCormack, 1999; Shepherd, 2005). Consequently, it could be that the frequently espoused top-down message of the ADF’s ‘positive safety culture’ is being reiterated compliantly without further thought. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) note this aspect of compliance and an aversion to ‘rocking the boat’ in their study of aviation cultures. They liken the attitude to “don’t mess with a winning formula”, and warn that it “can encourage complacency rather than vigilance” (p. 119). Secondly, it could be that safety culture is not readily amenable to verbal explanation, or is perhaps considered too complex to even conceptualise. Merritt (2000a) certainly suggests that the exploration of culture may not be particularly amenable to interview methods. If such unsuitability to verbal explanation were the case, then interview methods, indeed survey methods generally, may have limited utility for the study of culture as a wholesale concept (as opposed to aspects of culture). This, in itself, is an interesting and important methodological issue that should be interrogated further by other researchers. This issue is discussed in the context of both ADFAQ and interview studies in the following chapter).

Cultural inter-connectedness

The interviewees described the co-existence of either the can-do culture or can-do attitude with their perception of the safety culture in ADF aviation on seven occasions. Half of these descriptions were offered in the context of the can-do culture being a consistent negative influence on the safety culture (this finding is also reflected in the results for item 5, “ADF aviation is said to possess a ‘can-do culture’. What is your perception of a can-do culture in ADF aviation?”). The remainder described how the can-do culture was simply ‘a part of the safety culture’ (or similar) without suggesting whether the ‘direction’ of the influence was positive or negative. 227 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

The most frequent response, and perhaps most remarkable in the context of the can-do culture being advocated so readily in the ADF literature (see Chapter Two), embraced the notion of the can-do culture as a problematic entity. Two thirds of the interviewees described the can-do culture in this manner. However, some respondents who described the can-do culture as problematic also reported that they considered the can-do culture to be a fundamentally ‘good’ concept. Specifically, half of the interviewees that described the can-do culture as being problematic also described the can-do culture as a good – often “motivating” or “useful” – concept in ADF aviation operations. The remaining half who expressed a view of the can-do culture being problematic noted either the pressure of operations undertaken by ADF aviation personnel or pride in the ADF as an organisation.

Summary of interview content

The interview content provided a good level of support for the findings of the ADFAQ, providing data that triangulates well with the ADFAQ across the six interview items. The interviews also elaborated on previously identified safety issues within ADF aviation. What is clear from this study, particularly in light of the predominantly quantitative nature of the ADFAQ data, is that attitudes towards safety and performance in the workplace appear to focus towards aspects of social interaction between individuals and the interaction of an individual with their immediate working environment. Indeed Hutchins (1995), who studied the cognitive properties of a flight deck environment via a framework that used the flightdeck as its primary unit of analysis in contrast to the more traditional focus on an individuals’ cognition, concludes, “much of what we care about is in the interaction of the people with each other and with physical structure in the environment” (p. 286). In the military aviation context, Helmreich and Merritt (1998) observe that “military pilots feel more sense of community with other military aviators than with civilian pilots and, among the military, bonds are stronger among those in the same service flying the same aircraft” (p. 39).

228 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

13.2 METHODOLOGICAL EFFICACY

Overall, the interview phase achieved its objective – to cross-examine the key findings of the ADFAQ relating to organisational culture and safety. These cross-examinations comprised influence of rank, and cultural attribution relating to the perception of safety (including safety culture) and the ‘can-do’ effect. The interview phase provided additional theoretical and contextual validity to the thesis in toto, particularly by describing the situational factors. Moreover, the technique of open questioning was able to confirm a range of organisational aspects or ‘themes’. While the contribution of this research to new theory is discussed in the following chapter, it should be noted here that the interviews’ resultant data have provided an opportunity to examine an aspect of cultural influence in military aviation that has not been reported elsewhere. In summary, interview items 1 and 2 took a two-prong approach to triangulate an ADFAQ finding. The items were designed to explore the seemingly strong ADFAQ result indicating that rank (over the ADFAQ’s other demographic factors, including both age and experience) influences the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel. Items 3 and 5 explored the aspects of culture that were defined by respondents in the ADFAQ study (ADFAQ respondents strongly agreed that ADF aviation has a “good safety culture”, yet they did not readily describe the qualities of a safety culture). Items 4 and 6 explored the more underlying factors relating to the influence of rank.

13.2.1 Strengths of the Method

The relative success of semi-structured interviews as the second methodology of this research was demonstrated in three separate ways. Firstly, the interview study allowed deeper probing of issues that were studied in the ADFAQ study. Secondly, the interview data allowed a means of triangulating the ADFAQ data. Thirdly, the qualitative nature of interview data provided evidence that culture, in the organisational and safety contexts, is perhaps only moderately amenable to discussion. This point is particularly important in light of the ADFAQ study that found participants were able to ‘score’ safety culture (very positively) but were limited in their description and explanation of the characteristics of safety culture. Moreover, it is worth reiterating that many researchers across various academic disciplines assert that culture ‘measurement’ 229 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

necessitates the use of multi-methodologies (e.g., Merritt & Helmreich, 1996; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Batteau, 2002).

While interviews are often susceptible to interviewee self-censoring (e.g., see Nagel, 1988; Stanton & Young, 1999), the data collected from participants in this interview study appears to reject this trend in that most of the interview items elucidated an issue that had been undetected – either fully or partially – by the ADFAQ’s less personal survey methodology. It is possible that the reason for this apparent lack of censoring by interviewees is due to either the trust that interviewees may have had in the researcher or the procedure whereby interviewees were allowed to keep the interview cassette once the researcher had transcribed it and the transcript subsequently verified by the interviewee.

The technique of content analysis used via Atlas software provided a satisfactory means of identifying and subsequently categorising the data collected from interviewees. The software also enhanced the reliability of the coded data in comparison to the ADFAQ analysis (although the inter-rater reliability of the ADFAQ open questions was considered good – see Chapter Seven) as the software’s ability to consistently recognise words and phrases with minimal specific programming by the user helps to eliminate user-error and subjectivity of analyses. Nonetheless, in line with previous semi- structured interview studies of the attitudes of aviation personnel (e.g., Shorrock, 2005), it is anticipated that some categories of responses may be merged, adapted or deleted with further application of the technique used in this study.

Finally, the interview method identified a small number of issues that were not identified via the ADFAQ study. For example, item 2 (“What factors have influenced your attitudes towards the safe performance of your role?”) highlighted the relative importance of employees’ understanding of themselves (i.e., their personal abilities, perceptions and motivations), as well as peer pressure and occupationally based pride. The most frequently cited responses were an improved self-understanding, an improved understanding of the role being fulfilled and learning from the experience of others. These ‘personal’ influences upon respondents were not elucidated via the ADFAQ technique and were mentioned more frequently than other influences, including the 230 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

Directorate of Flying Safety (whose mission features the promotion of aviation safety to ADF personnel via training, safety campaigns and flying safety publications) and the can-do culture. Indeed, interviewees reported the combined influence of DFS and the can-do culture upon employee attitudes approximately half as frequently as peer pressure. The likely reason for this is that peer pressure manifests as a more localised and ‘immediate’ interaction amongst operators, whereas both DFS (a unit based exclusively within ADF headquarters in Canberra) and the can-do ‘culture’ are geographically (DFS) and metaphysically (can-do culture) more distant influences.

13.2.2 Limitations of the Method

Despite the moderate success of the interview study, it is reasonable to consider that interviewees’ recollection of instances relevant to their responses may have been subject to cognitive biases or simply forgetting – particularly amongst the senior ranked (and hence older) interviewees since their operational ‘currency’ is weaker commensurate with their predominantly management roles.

A further criticism is potential for bias from interviewees that may have known the researcher from his former employment as a Royal Australian Air Force pilot. This could be overcome by having a researcher perform the interviews who has had no previous connection to the armed forces in Australia. Nonetheless, the researcher conducting this study was able to limit any such bias by conducting the interviews strictly via telephone, and in private. In defence of the approach taken, and in accordance with Stanton and Young (1999), the interviewer was able to communicate with respondents clearly and with confidence due to his ADF experience and specifically his familiarity with the topic in question. Furthermore, interviewer naivety would not necessarily eliminate, or even reduce, interviewer bias.

The interview technique could be improved in several ways. The concurrent validity could be examined further by comparing this study’s interview analysis with an alternative validated technique. For example, this may include replication work conducted by another researcher (ADF and/or non-ADF), or a team of ‘mixed background’ interviewers. Face to face interviews could also be considered, though 231 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

subject to the constraints above. Adding to the interview approach, observational approaches guided by an anthropological perspective (such as that proffered by Batteau [2001, 2002]) perhaps with subsequent debriefing, might also be considered. A key limitation in taking such an approach would be human resource constraints, and the ‘need to know’ principle that guides the dissemination of information in ADF aviation, including safety (Falconer, 2005).

13.2.3 Shortcomings of the Method

Beyond the potential shortcoming relating to the amenable nature of culture to survey methods discussed earlier (Merritt, 2000a), the key shortcoming of the interview phase of this thesis is probably the size of the interview sample. In a sample size of approximately 40 interviewees out of an aviation officer population of approximately 1000, some of the diversity of perceptions between different ADF units is likely to remain uncaptured.

A related shortcoming is the depth of interview data. On average, each interview lasted 30 minutes and interviewees cited 18 separate issues in response to the six interview items. Although this is within the generally recommended interview duration of between 20 and 40 minutes (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992), it is possible that the interview data may in some instances be quite shallow. A possible reason for this brevity is that some respondents may have felt unwilling or unable to speak about the deeper or specific aspects of safety and culture within ADF aviation (issues that are both complex and sensitive). This potential artefact may have been compounded by the use of the telephone, as opposed to a face-to-face interview. These aspects could probably be overcome by further iterations of the interview schedule, although a significantly larger and more ‘public’ interviewee recruitment campaign would be necessary in order to achieve (a) significantly higher numbers of interviewees, and (b) richer interview data that describes the issues being examined to a greater depth. Performing face-to-face rather than telephone interviews would present additional logistical and funding difficulties that may not be justified.

232 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

Summary – Methodological efficacy

The interview study was designed and implemented in response to the need to maintain contextual and cultural relevance. Researchers support this need for contextual relevance across the various discipline-based cultural ‘approaches’ (e.g., Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Batteau, 2001, 2002). The moderate success of the interview method in this study provides some support for the argument that the utility of organisational culture measurement may be improved by methodological frameworks that embrace the cultural membership rather than externally developed and universally implemented methods – such as Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) dimensions of culture. Indeed, this interview study adds to the current scientific knowledge of the organisational and psychosocial conditions within a military population that appear to be influential (e.g., rank) and those that are ambiguous (such as respondents’ understanding of safety culture).

The findings support the work of researchers from anthropology, psychology and managerial disciplines that cite the engagement of personnel or related aspects as the critical nexus to maintaining and improving system performance in aviation. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) cite inter-employee and employee-manager trust as the essential element in accessing the true nature of organisational culture, whereas Batteau (2001) stresses the importance of self-organising and self-regulating capabilities in aviation systems. Clearly, survey methodologies are not a cure-all, but they can illuminate the nature of attitudes to safety and provide empirical guidance for other methods to explore the cultural roots of such attitudes across other dimensions and to a greater level of detail.

233 Chapter Thirteen – Discussion – Interview Data

13.3 CHAPTER THIRTEEN SUMMARY

This chapter discussed two key areas relating to the interview study: interview content and methodological efficacy. It was established that while the data collected are to an extent particular to the individuals and their widely varying operational contexts (e.g., geographically diverse, various squadrons and units), the interviews were ‘typical’ in that they obtained detailed responses to items that were less successful in the questionnaire phase of this research. There were three main findings of the interview study that were discussed in this chapter. These related to rank influence and attitude change, the concept of cultural influence in the workplace, and methodological issues relating to the difficulty in ‘accessing’ culture via survey methods. Each of these findings is also evident in the ADFAQ study. Accordingly, they are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, Chapter Fourteen, in the context of both the ADFAQ and interview studies, and in relation to future research. Chapter Fourteen is followed by the Conclusion of this thesis.

234 CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The problems facing aviation today will be solved not through improved airfoils, propulsion, or flight management systems, but through a better understanding of the meaning that flying has for its multiple stakeholders. Allen Batteau (2002), Anthropologist

GENERAL DISCUSSION

This chapter discusses issues relating to the combined findings of the ADFAQ and interview studies. The chapter is divided into four key areas: (1) the contribution made by this research to existing theory, (2) the implications and (3) limitations and shortcomings of this research, and (4) future research that ought to be considered in light of the results of the studies described here.

14.1 CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING THEORY

The research presented in this thesis is the first to specifically examine the organisational culture of aviation personnel in the Australian Defence Force. Moreover, the questionnaire and interview studies comprising this thesis have been designed and implemented in response to the need to maintain contextual and cultural relevance. Researchers support this need for contextual relevance across the various discipline- based cultural ‘approaches’ (e.g., Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Batteau, 2001, 2002). Other researchers, perhaps most notably Amalberti (2001) and Dekker (2001, 2004), suggest that such moves toward freshly conceptualised research frameworks represent the next era of safety improvement in sociotechnical systems. Dekker (2001) describes a focus away from taxonomies of error per se as representing ‘the new view’ of human performance in complex systems. Indeed, it is worth restating here that the ADFFMAQ research conducted by DSPPR (2001), whilst complementing this research in its attempts to capture attitudes (in relation to ‘flight management’) across the ADF Force Element Groups, was adapted from a survey conceptualised and designed for

235 Chapter Fourteen – General Discussion

commercial airline pilots. Indeed, Chapter Two described how the application of the ADFFMAQ (DSPPR, 2001) met with some confusion amongst the non-pilot participants.

14.1.1 Rank and Attitude Change

This thesis adds to the current scientific knowledge of the organisational and psychosocial conditions within a military population that appear to be most influential (e.g., rank) and those that are ambiguous (such as respondents’ understanding of safety culture). This influence was made evident by both the questionnaire and interview studies. SNROFF respondents revealed a tendency for higher agreement with their peers coupled with a more positive view towards organisational factors including safety.

This finding offers an interesting contrast with research that suggests cultural influence upon attitudes is predominantly formed during the early years of individuals’ development: family experiences, schooling and formal education (Hofstede, 1980, 2001) and the early training of a career (Simpson & Wiggins, 1997). Rather, the ADFAQ and interview results appear to support the findings of Helmreich and Merritt (1998), Soeters and Boer (2000) and Bernick (2001) that suggest individuals’ attitudes are continuously influenced (i.e., not ‘limited’ to early-career experiences) as a result of exposure to organisational norms. In relation to rank specifically, the scientific literature is devoid of studies that demonstrate the pervasive nature of this fundamental organisational trait of military aviation, although it has been hypothesised elsewhere as ‘rank influence’ (Falconer, 2005, 2006), inherent to military culture (Kern, 2001) and associated with ‘power’ (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Maurino, 2000) within various aviation environments.

Akin to the findings of the safety perception survey research of Bailey and Petersen (1989), the results of this research suggest that the actions and supervision of ‘management’ (senior ranked officers in the context of ADF aviation) have a considerable impact on individuals’ attitudes towards safety and system performance. Indeed, previous cultural research shows that management can direct cultural change by articulating the desired values, and enforcing the appropriate norms, though the efforts 236 Chapter Fourteen – General Discussion

of management must be sincere and continually applied (see Erickson, 1997). However, such an assertion seems at odds in the context of ADF aviation, where posting cycles are ‘rapid’ (typically two to three years) (ASPI, 2004). Indeed, in light of these results, this research suggests support for the notion that a ‘top-down’ culture (Dixon, 1994; Glendon & Stanton, 2000) predominates in military aviation contexts.

14.1.2 Theory of Attitude and Behaviour

Chapter Three described the four types of attitude and behaviour theory: (1) attitudes influencing behaviour, (2) behaviour influencing attitudes, (3) mutual influence and (4) influence of other factors. For three of these types, the relationship between attitude and behaviour described by the theoretical models is self-evident (see Table 3.1). The fourth theory – influence of other factors – provides a more comprehensive framework to the theory of attitude and behaviour. This approach to the attitude-behaviour link suggests that a separate factor exists that may address both attitudes and behaviour of a section of the workforce. It was asserted in Chapter Three that the stand-alone ‘X’ factor depicted in Figure 3.3 can stem from a wide variety of potential influences. Glendon and McKenna (1995) suggest that one of the most common influences is a factor that reflects a ‘campaign’. Kirwan (2000) describes a similar phenomenon relating to “selling” human factors within organisations (see Chapter Three).

The influence of other factors theory acknowledges the importance of cognitive consistency while considering the possibility of additional factors that could influence both attitudes and behaviour. The basic premise of consistency, congruity or balance is that people strive to make their attitudes and behaviour consistent (Ostrom et al, 1994). Glendon and McKenna (1995) state that the apparent consistency between attitudes and behaviour is “not necessarily a basis for judging one to be a prime causal agent in respect of the other” (p. 81). The results of this research suggest support for this theory of a three-way dynamic yielding potential influence upon ADF aviation personnel. Additional possible “Factor X” influences include the can-do, safety culture, positive self-appraisal, and existing expertise ‘campaigns’. This research shows that these factors are widely acknowledged and even promoted by ADF aviation senior management. The theory further acknowledges the importance of contextual relevance in this research. 237 Chapter Fourteen – General Discussion

Another aspect of consistency that has relevance to this research in relation to the attitude-behaviour link is attitudinal homogeneity. Homogeneity is used to describe how the consistency rather than the content of employees’ attitudes relates to ‘work’ and organisational performance. Research has shown that such homogeneity is a direct indication of cultural strength and is therefore predictive of organisational performance. Cultural strength is variously defined: coherence (Deal & Kennedy, 1982), homogeneity (Ouchi & Price, 1978), stability and intensity (Schein, 1992), congruence (Schall, 1983), and internalised control (DiTomaso, 1987). The work of these researchers seems to indicate that the values and beliefs of the organisation’s employees have less influence on organisational performance than the level of intra-organisational agreement. Indeed, Helmreich and Merritt (1998) point out that although numerous aviation experts and aviation agencies have hypothesised that a ‘negative’ organisational climate (encompassing morale, pride, etc.) poses a threat to safety, no empirical evidence has been found to support this view. While this research makes no attempt to establish a direct causal link between organisational culture and safety- related incidents (or reports thereof), this study contributes to existing attitude and behaviour theory in military environments. Specifically, this research suggests that management and employee attitudinal differences can co-exist, despite there being an apparent pervasive ‘one-team’ culture in place.

14.1.3 Culture and Climate

The third main contribution of this research to existing theory relates to the concept of organisational culture. Specifically, there are questions regarding whether and how organisational culture is different to both organisational climate and safety culture. Chapter Three describes how the concept of organisational climate can complicate the scientific analysis of culture. According to Glendon and Stanton (2000), organisational climate is a more superficial concept than organisational culture and describes aspects of an organisation’s current state. Climate is hence related to situational and environmental factors and is temporary and subject to change (Gibbons et al, 2004). Indeed, Chapter Three summarised how climate affects the performance of a company just as the culture of it does, however the effects of the culture are seen to be more 238 Chapter Fourteen – General Discussion

enduring than those of each passing climate. In Rousseau’s (1988) review of thirteen definitions of organisational climate derived over two decades, employee attitudes and perceptions featured prominently.

Glendon and Stanton (2000) suggest that studying an organisation over an extended period of time can reduce the possibility of confusing climate and cultural characteristics with one another (e.g., organisational climate vis organisational culture). Indeed, the purpose of studying an organisational culture is to gain insight into why it performs the way it does and perhaps if it is performing to its full potential. These objectives certainly hold true for this research. In this light, this study represents an attempt to measure and define organisational culture, in that the research model used is exploratory, derived from a ‘bottom up’ cultural perspective, and implemented via triangulated means. Indeed, Glendon and Stanton (2000) report that organisational climate (only) is being measured if a psychometric scale is the exclusive measurement instrument.

The ADFAQ and interviews attempted to capture attitudes of various dimensions (Glendon & McKenna, 1995) relating to common themes of organisational culture characteristics (Glendon & Stanton, 2000) via a contextualised approach. The application of this approach suggests that the utility of organisational culture measurement may be improved by methodologies borne from the cultural membership rather than externally developed and universally implemented methods – such as Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) dimensions of culture. Indeed, the findings support the work of researchers from anthropology, psychology and managerial disciplines that cite the engagement of personnel or related aspects as the critical nexus to maintaining and improving system performance in aviation. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) cite inter- employee and employee-manager trust as the essential element in accessing the true nature of organisational culture, whereas Batteau (2001) stresses the importance of self- organising and self-regulating capabilities in aviation systems. Survey methodologies are clearly not a panacea, but they can illuminate the nature of attitudes to safety and provide empirical guidance for other methods to explore the cultural roots of such attitudes to a greater depth.

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With regard to ‘safety culture’ specifically, this research supports the argument that it is very difficult or impossible to separate safety culture from organisational culture. Because an organisation has responsibilities for both production and protection, an imbalance in these priorities will tend to lead to ineffective performance (production here equates to mission success – see Chapter One). Both production and protection need to be considered in unison when it comes to culture within organisations. What is clear from this research is that the concepts are certainly not mutually exclusive: a conclusion that supports the earlier finding of Glendon and McKenna (2000). The primary indication of this interconnectedness of the safety culture concept within broader organisational constructs stems from the finding that many participants were unable to define or explain the nature of safety culture, and yet were often convinced that the organisation had a good safety culture.

Johnston (1991) posits that if the ‘safety culture approach’ to aviation safety is rooted in a faulty and biased framework, why is it so popular? Scott (1990) observes that safety culture ‘resonates comfortably’ with the contemporary preoccupation of human resource management to ‘empower’ personnel and ‘facilitate total quality’, entirely on managerial terms. In this light, the workplace culture concept (in its various guises) seems to mandate involvement and participation from employees at all levels of an organisation. Yet this begs the question: who should generate the cultural beliefs adopted by the organisation? Glendon and Stanton (2000) argue that safety culture, as advocated by contemporary industrial organisations, is often a ‘top-down’ management initiative that dictates safe working practices in a comprehensive manner, rather than exchanging knowledge about safety among equal partners. This research uncovered the top-down approach as the predominant framework applicable to ADF aviation. Back and Woolfson (1999) argue that because the notion of a workplace safety culture tends to pre-suppose a unified system of values and ideas, it misdirects attention from the context of power within which the respective culture is embedded. They state, “Culture, far from facilitating free and open communication between the top and bottom of the hierarchy, can actively impede the collective articulation of the view from below” (p. 47).

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14.2 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

This research holds several implications for military and civil aviation operations and research in Australia, and internationally. Beyond the identification of the influence of ‘rank’ upon organisation members’ attitudes, this thesis demonstrates that there are many issues in ADF aviation that have the potential to negatively influence safety. Many of these issues are applicable in other organisational settings. The issues include poor management-employee communication, complacency, ego defensiveness and a ‘can-do culture’, and have been identified in both studies reported in this thesis. The main implications made apparent by the survey and interview studies are discussed throughout the remainder of this section.

Complacency

Complacency towards safety amongst employees is a significant threat to the performance of an aviation system. The positive bias regarding aviation safety performance identified by this research can hinder innovative and more critical safety analysis being undertaken. Moreover, despite assertions that the ADF has a safety culture and that human behaviour is of vital concern to ADF aviation (McCormack, 1999), without a demonstrable commitment to safety through continual critical examination of current practices, it is reasonable to suggest that operational aviation personnel will not be convinced of the importance of safety over other organisational issues. The potential effect is that the peer pressure associated with a ‘can-do culture’ will override the willingness of personnel to express an inability to complete a task. Paradoxically, the apparent positivity and ‘strength’ of a can-do culture in focussing toward mission outcomes may have a flow-on effect of engendering complacency towards safety that in turn affects mission outcomes. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) describe this as “an organisation becoming complacent and lowering [its] defences” (p. 179).

A related practical implication is that this research may assist in redefining existing conceptions and misconceptions of the social aspects of work in technical systems such as ADF aviation. In turn, this may help to prevent the onset of complacency towards 241 Chapter Fourteen – General Discussion

aspects of work amongst aviation professionals. Batteau (2001) concisely summarises this social impact, stating, “In most cases what appears to be a technological failure is in fact a social failure organised around a technological nexus: an escalating system failure that the users and managers failed to notice or contain” (p209). This implication also has applicability across other complex sociotechnical systems more generally, particularly including other transport modes. This may be particularly beneficial in organisations akin to ADF aviation that have large ‘technology spans’ – where modifications to equipment have been made from differing design periods (Amalberti, 2000, 2001) with resultant varying interface complexity (Kirwan, 2002).

Evidence of ego-defensiveness or perhaps’ can-do extremism’?

The ADFAQ and interview studies suggest that the ego defensive effect is present within the ADF aviation population. There were many prominent examples of this evidenced by the ADFAQ. A useful example of this issue is provided by the respondents’ perception of the ADF aphorism “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. When framed with reference to the respondents’ own attitudes and beliefs (item “The expression If it ain’t broke don’t fix it describes how I feel about ADF aviation”) the ADFAQ recorded significant disagreement from respondents. While 80% of respondents reported disagreement or strong disagreement with the ADFAQ item, less than half of the ADFAQ respondents (47%) reported disagreement or strong disagreement with the statement when framed with reference to other ADF personnel (item “The expression If it ain’t broke don’t fix it is often used by ADF aviation personnel”). Interestingly, the attitudes reported by the participants seem to suggest that an apparent bias or different decision processing strategy may be influencing the attitudes of ADF aviation personnel akin to the findings of Lehner et al (1997). In this light, it is interesting to recall Kern’s (2001) observation of aviation cadets at the USAF Academy, and specifically the cadets’ “expertise at masking their weaknesses”. Fellows (1998) makes a similar observation regarding student pilots at the ADF’s flying training school 2FTS.

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Cultural change management

A further aspect of interest is the resistance to cultural change, as it seems to support much previous research. Indeed, such research suggests that much like a nation’s culture, organisational culture is inertly stable and therefore highly resistant to change (Schein, 1984; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 1995, 2000). Indeed, Helmreich and Merritt (1998) state that when employee groups feel that they cannot trust management, they will reject with suspicion any new initiatives. In the context of ADF aviation, this issue seems likely to remain as a significant issue into the future, commensurate with management’s ‘push’ for a safety culture.

A number of issues associated with institutional design and the cultural challenges that it necessitates are also worth noting. Pidgeon and O’Leary (1995) warn that it is doubtful whether a set of unified guidelines for culture change can be designed to accommodate cultural and resource variations both within and between organisations. Amalberti (2001) refers specifically to the age of technical resources, and managing the transition from older technologies to innovative ones, under the best possible economic, human and technological conditions. Pidgeon (1991), Trompenaars (1993), Helmreich and Merritt (1998) and others argue that another important element of organisational culture change is the continuous creation and recreation of culture, as members of the particular group repeatedly behave in ways that seem to them to be natural, obvious and unquestionable ways of acting, and serve to construct a particular version of risk, danger and safety. This view seems to align with the results of this research, particularly with regard to the relative importance of organisational pride reported as being synonymous with the ADF can-do culture by interview respondents. Such pride suggests there is a sense of ‘ownership’ of the ADF culture by its members, and this appears to be supported by the ADFAQ data (particularly the items relating to organisational and military efficacy [see Chapter Five]). Accordingly, it is suggested that future research in the context of ADF aviation be constructed such that it takes a long-term view to any form of cultural change within the organisation.

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Intra-organisation cultural congruency

The final implication that should be considered here is intra-organisation cultural congruency. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) state that humans experience multiple cultural influences deriving from membership in national, organisational and vocational or professional cultures. When these cultures are congruent, there is no uncertainty or hesitation because the underlying values and beliefs are convergent. However, when these cultures are in conflict the divergent cultural messages can cause confusion, especially in time-pressure situations, and significantly impede learning. Indeed, research by Kotaite (2000) conducted across several professions highlights that learning occurs more effectively in the “specific cultural milieu of the student group”. Any impediment to learning is of particular concern should the skills or knowledge being taught have an impact on safety. In their study of almost ten thousand pilots across several countries, Helmreich and Merritt (1998) found that aviation safety may be directly compromised by cultural incongruity because mixed messages can produce hesitation, confusion, frustration and poor morale that, in turn, compromise safety. Other research by Weick and Roberts (1993) suggests that in military aviation, a congruent ‘group mind’ is needed to enable people to interrelate heedfully – in contrast to influential heroic individuals. Similarly, Reason (2000) suggests that the somewhat unplanned (conflicts often occur with little notice) bursts of aviation activity synonymous with the operational tempo of military aviation require personnel to share the organisation’s aspirations: all parts of the organisation must be congruous in operational and cultural focus.

Despite the strong case for addressing and subsequently enhancing cultural congruity from these researchers, ADF airworthiness boards frequently cite safety issues emanating from deeply incongruous ADF cultural characteristics, and highlight the incongruous views of frontline aviation personnel and aviation managers: “The cultures of the two groups are seriously out of kilter” (DFS-ADF, 2001, p1). This statement from a DFS-ADF incident report several years ago reflects the sentiment recorded by the ADFAQ and interview studies.

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14.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

There are several limitations associated with this research. The shortcomings of the methodologies used in this research were described in the discussion chapters for the questionnaire and interview studies. The limitations of this research encompass two main areas: attitudinal and behavioural correlations, and cultural attribution. It is important to highlight these factors so that this research can be understood in the context of its limitations, and so that future research can be designed to minimise or eliminate the influence of such factors.

14.3.1 Attitudes and Behaviour Correlations

The primary limitation of this research is that the attitudes of personnel within an organisation or group do not necessarily translate into behaviour (Meshkati, 1996). Johnson (1991) argues that attitudes expressed via survey responses may reflect significant cultural norms, but may not affect actual behaviour. Moreover, he argues that attitudes expressed in questionnaires “may say as much about what the respondents think the researcher wants to hear as what their compatriots want to hear” (p. 143). However, Deutscher (1973) has suggested that statements about cultural attitudes are as much behaviour as they are reflections of what people think. The relationship between the organisation and the ways in which its members behave is probably not a simple direct causal influence. This has been identified by researchers over the past two decades including Rasmussen (1987), Pidgeon (1988, 1991), McDonald and Johnston (1994) and Pidgeon and O’Leary (1995). Also it is probably not possible to predict the behaviour of individuals from the shared understandings and collective meanings that make up an organisation’s culture.

Predictive validity is defined as the measure of a questionnaire’s potential to predict a given outcome (Simpson & Wiggins, 1997). For example, the ADFAQ may be an effective mechanism from which to predict respondents’ successful performance in operational ADF aviation, based on ADFAQ scores. However, in light of the complexity of the relationship between attitudes and behaviour relating to the working environment, and limitations of the ADFAQ’s present factor structure, the utility of 245 Chapter Fourteen – General Discussion

pursuing predictive validity of this research may be limited. Nonetheless, a further application of the ADFAQ coupling the respondents’ ADFAQ data with the paradigm of their subsequent performance in ADF aviation would be useful. Aspects of further research that ought to be considered in light of this research are described in Section 14.4.

14.3.2 Cultural Attribution

Helmreich and Merritt (1998) assert that every employee brings their history and multiple cultural memberships to their employment, hence an organisation consists of many sub-cultures based on profession, work history, position, location, gender, age and nationality. This view is also supported by Pidgeon and O’Leary (1995) who state that organisational management of safety, and indeed the management of safety culture occurs “against the backdrop of pre-existing culture(s)” (p. 51). Accordingly, they strongly advocate an understanding of existing cultures before undertaking any aspect of risk management, procedural frameworks, or ‘installation’ of safety cultures. There are two key reasons for this. Firstly, existing cultures may generate unintended consequences that subvert the intended outcomes of an otherwise well-designed program. Secondly, the introduction of a new program has some potential to change the existing culture. Importantly, they warn that safe cultures can be harmed as well as encouraged.

Tse et al (1988), Johnson (1991) and Smith and Bond (1993) assert that behaviour can be a manifestation of culture, providing that the culture-influenced component of behaviour can be separated from the situational and personal variations. Accordingly, any contrast across groups highlighted by research may be attributable to culture only if one groups’ apparent preference for one attitude or behaviour over another is paralleled in other aspects of life. For example, control for the effects of education, income, and ethnic groups’ higher exposure to risk must be achieved to avoid attributing characteristics to cultures invalidly. This is a major ongoing limitation of examining and analysing culture. Indeed, it may be impossible to achieve such a reliable indicator of cultural causality.

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A further limitation of this research (and culture-focused research generally) relates to a ‘cultural fallacy’ that is commonly interpreted from the cultural research of Hofstede (1980, 2001). IATA Director General Pierre Jeanniot notes that where aviation accident rate data show ‘regional differences’, the Hofstede cultural indices provide a strong temptation to jump to the conclusion that “the reason for a higher accident rate in Region X is primarily that cultural influence Y is present” (Vandyk, 1995). Wilhelm, Hines and Helmreich (1996) and Helmreich and Merritt (1998) note that it is difficult to assess the impact that culture has on aviation safety because the ‘most obvious’ validation criterion – accident rates per million departures – is too small to be statistically significant.

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14.4 FUTURE RESEARCH

As is often the case with exploratory research, the research described in this thesis appears to conclude with more questions than it first sought to address. As a consequence, this study provides a solid basis for further exploration of the effect and significance of attitudinal variances amongst military aviation personnel.

As the ADFAQ and interview schedule relate to the specific context of Australian Defence Force aviation, its reliability cannot be tested amongst other (non-ADF aviation) subjects via replication (see Yin, 1981) without amendments to the instruments. However, it is possible to apply a different parallel methodology to the examination of attitudes amongst ADF aviation personnel and compare the results with the findings of this study.

It is recommended that further research should comprise initiatives focused on long- term timescales. Since the mid 1990s researchers including McDonald and Johnston (1994), Amalberti (2001) and others have claimed that it takes at least a decade to discover that managers’ interventions based upon conventional strategies do not work in practice. This view reinforces the previously discussed need for the construction and implementation of holistic, collaborative, yet customised multi-methodologies in order to meaningfully improve sociotechnical system safety. Accordingly, it is recommended that the methodology for new research should be both broad and narrow akin to the ADFAQ and interviews here, and would benefit from taking a more anthropological approach. To this end, a three-stage study of: ethnographic observation within several ADF force elements groups (holistic), followed by questionnaires (broad, but shallow), followed by interviews (narrow, but deep) is recommended. This strategy would also overcome any bias that may have influenced this research whereby the researcher’s own experiences as a former pilot in the ADF aviation organisation would be negated by another researcher using ‘fresh’ ethnographic observations of the ADF aviation culture, and adjusting the subsequent questionnaire and interview studies accordingly. Furthermore, application of the techniques used in this research amongst the aviation populations of other defence forces, such as those of the American, British, Canadian or New Zealand military would be valuable, taking into account the differences between 248 Chapter Fourteen – General Discussion

these forces and the ADF. Indeed, the individual military aviation populations of America, Britain and Canada are considerably larger than that of Australia’s military aviation force, whereas New Zealand’s military aviation population – arguably the best cultural ‘fit’ to that of Australia – is considerably smaller (New Zealand’s military aviation force includes no fighter or strike elements).

Future research should examine the paradox that seems to exist within ADF aviation: that despite the pervasive can-do perception present (and its potential impact upon ADF aviation safety), the anti-change ‘view’ of ADF aviation personnel is arguably the primary antagonist to aviation safety improvement. Indeed, it was noted earlier in this thesis that there is often a perception amongst military aviation personnel that many of the human factors problems in aviation can be solved by the application of in-house or ‘existing expertise’. This is clearly short sighted when considering the multiplicity of causal and contributory factors that need to be investigated, and the limited in-house resources available to do so.

In concert with ongoing research initiatives, future examination of the combined use of self-assessment of operational safety and independent external auditing is an important mechanism that should be pursued for use in military aviation organisations. The objective of self-assessment most relevant to new research is the promotion of improved safety performance through the direct involvement of personnel in the critical examination and improvement of their own work activities and performance (Amalberti, 2001; Simpson, 2001). This aligns with Batteau’s (2001) self-organising and self- regulating capabilities in contemporary aviation systems. The construct of self- assessment methods should be designed to ensure that line management is effective and monitoring operational safety performance, and takes timely corrective actions to improve performance. It should also allow for potential weaknesses to be detected and resolved before they reduce any margin of safe operation at ‘lower’ levels of the organisations. Self-assessments are also designed to identify and overcome process weaknesses and obstacles to the achievement of safety performance objectives, resulting in the accurate prioritisation of resources. Clearly, the perceived poor and ignored communication reported by junior personnel is an aspect worthy of closer examination.

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14.5 CHAPTER FOURTEEN SUMMARY

This chapter described the implications and limitations of this research, suggesting priorities for future research initiatives and outlining the key innovations of the research. The key implication is the finding that the rank of ADF aviation personnel appears to influence the attitudes of employees in a manner that may have negative implications for system production; suggesting that an employee’s senior ranking relates to more positivistic perceptions of organisational performance. The limitations of this research encompass two main areas: attitudinal and behavioural correlations, and cultural attribution. The ramifications of the attitudinal difference between junior- ranked and senior-ranked personnel is considered problematic in that senior-ranked personnel were identified as being more detached from operations. Hence their tendency to view organisational performance positively may be unrealistic. This chapter also discussed the implications not directly related to rank that have the potential to influence organisational outcomes, including complacency and cultural congruity.

The studies described by this thesis created numerous new questions that additional research may examine. However such research must be long-term in its focus, and use a holistic approach to the concept of culture (and culture-related performance) in industrial settings. The attitudes of ADF aviation personnel recorded by this research suggest that observations such as Batteau’s (2001) – regarding the importance of understanding the full extent of social impacts – are yet to gain true acceptance in ADF aviation. Despite such evidence, it is interesting to note a recent address by the Chief of the RAAF. Speaking at the most recent Safeskies international aviation safety symposium, he reiterates both the principle rationale of this research and the implicit need for continued vigilance and research: “military flying presents challenges and dangers that civil operators do not have to face, but just because we are involved in a dangerous occupation that is no reason to operate in a dangerous or unsafe way” (Shepherd, 2005). This research shows that the pursuit of understanding the specific and contextual influences upon human behaviour through the purposeful examination of organisational culture holds useful theoretical and practical implications. The following chapter, Chapter Fifteen, describes the completion of this thesis’ objectives and the main conclusions of this research. 250 CHAPTER FIFTEEN

The tragic loss of the Navy Sea King helicopter with nine ADF members in Nias this April is testament that we are always at risk in the environment we choose to operate in. RAAF Chief, Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd (2005)

CONCLUSION

This research has advanced existing knowledge of the systemic and psychosocial factors in a complex sociotechnical system: ADF aviation. Moreover, despite the limitations of the research described in the previous chapter, this thesis demonstrates that engineer and aircrew officers poorly understand the nature of human performance at the operational ‘sharp-end’ of the ADF aviation system. There are three main findings of this thesis. These relate to: (1) the efficacy of triangulated and contextualised methodology in building an understanding of organisational culture; (2) the nature of the safety culture concept and its relationship with organisational culture; and (3) rank-based homogeneity of attitudes. In light of the findings, and the advancement of existing knowledge of the systemic and psychosocial factors within ADF aviation generally, it is considered that the research aim of this thesis, to examine the attitudes of ADF aviation professionals that may influence the safe performance of ADF aviation operations, has been achieved. The fulfilment of the specific objectives of this research set out in Chapter One allowed the achievement of the research aim, and the main findings of this research relate closely to the aim and objectives. This chapter describes the main findings, as well as a more general conclusion of this research.

The ADFAQ and interviews provide reasonable contextual and theoretical validity, capturing attitudes of various dimensions (Glendon & McKenna, 1995) relating to common themes of organisational culture characteristics (Glendon & Stanton, 2000) contextualised for a specific operational setting (see Chapter Three). The reasonable success of this method and its application here, supports the notion that the utility of organisational culture measurement may be improved by methodologies borne from the

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cultural membership rather than externally developed and universally implemented methods – such as Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) dimensions of culture. Indeed, the findings of this research support the work of researchers from anthropology, psychology and managerial disciplines that cite the engagement of personnel or related aspects as the critical nexus to (a) understanding the influence of culture in organisations and (b) ‘improving’ cultural aspects that may impede performance. For example, psychologists Helmreich and Merritt (1998) cite inter-employee and employee-manager trust as “the essential element” (p225) in accessing the true nature of organisational culture. They describe the criticality of employees’ “faith in the system” (p177), “complete trust” (p179) and “confidence [in managers]” (p177). Similarly, anthropologist Batteau (2001) stresses the importance of self-organising and self-regulating capabilities in aviation systems.

Despite the reasonable success of this research in achieving its aim, in order to pursue the achievement of validity purposefully the concurrent validity of the ADFAQ and interview implements should be explored in new research. This could be accomplished via a comparison with another validated methodology applied to the same data set. Such methodology should be both broad and narrow akin to the ADFAQ and interviews here, and would perhaps benefit from taking a more anthropological approach. To this end, a three-stage study of: ethnographic observation within several ADF force elements groups (holistic), followed by questionnaires (broad, but shallow), followed by interviews (narrow, but deep) is recommended. Furthermore, application of the techniques used in this research amongst the aviation populations of other defence forces, such as those of the American, British, Canadian or New Zealand military would be valuable, taking into account the differences between these forces and the ADF.

This research supports the findings of much previous attitudinal research relating to organisational performance and safety in industrial settings (e.g., Williamson et al, 1997; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Hunter, 2005). Specifically, it demonstrates that the perception of safety is subjective at the level of individual employees, diverse across employee groups within the same system and, hence, difficult to analyse. Evidenced in particular by the results of the principal components analysis of the questionnaire study, safety is an abstract and intangible concept. Various researchers have offered numerous

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reasons for this state over many decades, and these rationales appear readily applicable here. For example, Lowrance (1976) and Otway and Wynne (1989), investigating the perception of safety, identified the fundamental premise that attitudes or behaviours that are considered safe to one person can often be considered unsafe to another. More recently, and in relation to aviation specifically, Helmreich and Merritt’s (1998) research of flight management attitudes identified safety as a construct generally inferred from human behaviour and self-reports rather than overtly definable (and hence measurable).

With regard to ‘safety culture’ specifically, this research suggests that it is very difficult or impossible to separate safety culture from organisational culture. Because an organisation has responsibilities for both production and protection, an imbalance in these priorities will tend to lead to ineffective performance (in the context of this research’s organisational domain, production equates to mission success – see Chapter One). Furthermore, because the focus on ‘quality’ in an organisation also impacts upon both production and protection, the value of the concept of safety culture as a concept distinct from organisational culture is questionable. Both production and protection therefore need to be considered in unison when it comes to culture within organisations. What is clear from this research is that the concepts are certainly not mutually exclusive: a conclusion that supports the earlier finding of Glendon and Stanton (2000). The primary indication of this interconnectedness of the safety culture concept within broader organisational constructs stems from the finding that many participants were unable to define or explain the nature of safety culture, and yet were often convinced that the organisation had a good safety culture. There are several possible explanations for this. It could be that the frequently espoused top-down message of the ADF’s ‘positive safety culture’ is being reiterated compliantly. Alternatively, it could be that safety culture is not readily amenable to explanation verbally, or is perhaps considered so complex to ‘sharp-end’ personnel that they simply repeat the descriptors that they hear. Indeed, Helmreich and Merritt (1998) assert that a full understanding of the role of cultures “necessarily includes elements of cognitive, industrial and organisational, social and personality psychology, as well as management, sociology, anthropology and human factors” (p226).

253 Chapter Fifteen - Conclusion

The third main conclusion of this research relates to the rank-based homogeneity of attitudes amongst ADF aviation professionals relating to key aspects of ADF aviation organisational culture, evident in both the ADFAQ and interview studies. Of particular concern here is that there appears to be a significant attitudinal shift for officers as they progress from junior to senior ranks, and specifically that the shift is towards a more positive perception. This is an important conclusion in that it holds potential implications in other military aviation organisations and hierarchical management organisations generally. Indeed, the attitudinal homogeneity found within the ADF aviation population by this research may be present (and influential) in other systems where individuals operate within a strict regulated environment, under limited ongoing and direct supervision, and with a strong culture or camaraderie. This perspective does not suggest that there is a single ‘hierarchical management’ problem, however. Rather, observations made by this research support the importance of organisational context proffered by Batteau (2001) in ‘tapping’ an organisation’s cultural idiosyncrasies and understanding their full impact on members’ behaviours. The influence of an organisation’s internal system of personnel ranking is but one example.

The extent of behavioural guidance given to operators – by their peers and managers – that can be traced to organisational culture origins remains an area of great interest for numerous stakeholders within industrialised societies (passengers, patients, governments, consumers, insurers, and of course researchers). This is because the extent and veracity of such guidance, whether viewed through a psychological, anthropological or managerial paradigm, ultimately shape safe production (e.g., flights, surgical procedures, mining excavations, delivery of humanitarian aid, train journeys) in numerous contemporary sociotechnical systems where fatalities are constantly avoided by skilled and appropriately applied decisions and behaviours. It is this continuous avoidance of failure that offers researchers ‘normal’ behaviour from which to examine culture.

More interesting perhaps is that aspects of organisational culture that might be considered ‘unsafe’ are by no means universally understood or agreed upon. Indeed, this research suggests that as a junior officer progresses to senior officer, safety perception changes in a self-assuring manner. Such a finding is, at the very least, fertile

254 Chapter Fifteen - Conclusion

ground for replication studies. This research shows that survey methodologies are not a panacea, but they can illuminate the nature of attitudes to safety and provide empirical guidance for other methods to explore more deeply the cultural roots of such attitudes and associated behaviours.

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284 APPENDIX A

ADF AIRCRAFT REPAIR CATEGORIES

Category Definition

Category 0 No aircraft component requires replacement or repair Category 1 Aircraft and/or its components repairable within four hours or less Category 2 Aircraft repairable in two days or less Category 2E Damage confined to aircraft engine, but necessitating an engine change Category 3 Aircraft repairable in more than two days and up to fourteen days Category 4 Aircraft repairable in more than fourteen days Category 5 Aircraft unrepairable, missing, or inaccessible for recovery

285 APPENDIX B

Australian Defence Force Aviation Questionnaire

This survey is part of an aviation research project being undertaken by the University of New South Wales and supported by the Australian Defence Force. The survey has been designed specifically for ADF members that specialise in aviation operations.

Your participation in this study is voluntary and your responses to the survey questions remain confidential at all times. You cannot be identified as a result of the responses that you provide.

There are four (4) sections to complete. Section One asks basic questions about your age, Service background, etc. Section Two, Section Three and Section Four ask you to answer questions relating to your experiences within ADF aviation.

There is no time limit for survey completion. However, it is anticipated that the survey should take you approximately 20-25 minutes to complete.

Please complete every section of this survey and return to the address provided at the conclusion of the survey. If you are unable to answer every question, please return the survey partially completed.

Please return your completed survey by Friday 01 August 2003.

286 Section 1

To ensure that we have a good cross section of people in our survey, we would like you to answer some questions about yourself.

Please indicate your response to the following questions by marking a cross ‘x’ in the box adjacent to your reply. Mark one box only for each question.

1. Your employment/rank category:

[ ] Non-Commissioned Officer [ ] Junior Officer (FLTLT/LEUT/CAPT or below) [ ] Warrant Officer [ ] Senior Officer (SQNLDR/LCDR/MAJ or above) [ ] Officer Cadet [ ] Other ______

2. Your professional specialisation:

[ ] Air Movements [ ] Aircrew [ ] Air Traffic Control /Air Defence [ ] Engineering / Maintenance

3. Your highest level of education completed:

[ ] School Certificate [ ] Undergraduate Degree [ ] Higher School Certificate [ ] Undergraduate Degree with Honours [ ] TAFE [ ] Postgraduate Degree [ ] Other college [ ] Other ______

5. Your current ADF aviation group:

[ ] Air Combat Group (ACG) [ ] Maritime Patrol Group (MPG) [ ] Air Lift Group (ALG) [ ] Navy Aviation [ ] Air Training Wing (ATW) [ ] Surveillance and Control Group (SCG) [ ] Army Aviation [ ] Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU)

For the following question, please write your age.

6. Your age: [ ] years

For the following question, please write the number of years of employment you have completed with the Australian Defence Force.

7. Number of years of ADF employment completed: [ ] years

For the following question, please indicate whether you have undertaken a course of study in the last five years that includes human factors.

8. Undertaken a course of study in the last five years that includes human factors:

[ ] No [ ] Yes => Please write the name of the organisation that conducted the course:______(eg. AvMed, DFS, University, 36 SQN)

287 Section 2

In this section you are asked questions relating to your attitude towards certain aspects of ADF aviation. An example is provided below:

Example only:

Neither Strongly Strongly Don’t Disagree disagree/ Agree Disagree Agree know agree

ADF aviation requires more government funding X

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by marking a cross ‘x’ in the box below your chosen response:

Neither Strongly Strongly Don’t Disagree disagree/ Agree Disagree Agree know agree

ADF aviation operations can be entirely specified in

standardised procedures

More extensive procedures will result in improved

ADF aviation safety

More disciplinary measures by management will

result in improved ADF aviation safety

In ADF aviation, deviations from Standardised

Procedures are a necessity of ‘real life’

Deviations from Standardised Procedures are a

potential threat to the safety of ADF aviation

Errors are inevitable events in aviation operations

Safety events can easily occur within my area of

operation

ADF aviation is safe

ADF aviation is safer than Australian Regular

Passenger Transport (RPT) aviation

There is a margin of safety ‘built in’ to ADF aviation

ADF aviation often requires the use of a built-in

safety margin to complete a mission

Safety events are a cause for disciplinary action by

management

I trust ADF Senior Officers with operational aviation

decisions

I trust ADF Senior Officers with decisions regarding

safety

288 Section 2 - continued

Neither Strongly Strongly Don’t Disagree disagree/ Agree Disagree Agree know agree

Open communication is a key feature of ADF

aviation

ADF Management encourages innovative thinking

ADF Management offers positive feedback in

response to employee suggestions

I am hesitant to offer suggestions to ADF

Management

ADF management enforces strict compliance to rules

and procedures

My work environment has a positive safety culture

I communicate safety-relevant events, regardless of

how minor, to my boss

A lack of safety incidents indicates a good safety

culture

The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” is often

used by ADF aviation personnel

The expression, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” describes

how I feel about ADF aviation

My morale is generally high

ADF aviation represents “world’s best practice”

The operational efficiency of ADF aviation can be

improved

The safety performance of ADF aviation can be

improved

289 Section 3

In this section, you are asked about your opinions regarding the way ADF aviation operates.

Please mark your chosen response to each of the following statements by marking a cross ‘x’ in the box adjacent to your reply. Please mark only one box for each question.

1. A senior officer introduces a new operating rule you consider unsafe, which of the following statements best describes your actions?

[ ] I would simply ignore the rule, as the new rule puts my safety at risk. [ ] I would discuss the rule with my colleagues, but not with unit management. [ ] I would ask the Unit’s Commanding Officer to change the new rule. [ ] I would ask the senior officer responsible for creating the rule to change the new rule. [ ] I would obey the new rule, as it is my job to obey all operating rules.

2. Based on my ADF experience, the most frequent element in safety-related events is:

[ ] Technical / Equipment problems [ ] Human Factors [ ] Natural (environmental) phenomena

3. The most significant human factors problem in ADF aviation exists as a result of:

[ ] Life experience prior to recruitment into the ADF [ ] Initial ADF training (eg. ADFA, RAAFCOL) [ ] Specialist training (eg. Pilot Course, ATC Course) [ ] Operational conversion training [ ] ‘Everyday’ experiences within ADF aviation

4. Based on my ADF experience, the most frequent human factors element in safety- related events is:

[ ] Poor communication [ ] Complacency [ ] Poor safety culture [ ] A ‘can-do’ culture [ ] Other: ______(please specify)

Thinking about the human factors element you nominated above, please describe the ideas you have that may help reduce this risk to safety:

______

290 Section 3 - continued

Questions 5 to 8 ask you to write your reply using your own words.

5. What factors do you believe have contributed towards the ‘safety record’ of ADF aviation?

______

______

______

______

______

6. What does the term ‘safety culture’ mean to you?

______

______

______

______

______

7. Who influences the size of the safety-margin specific to your work in ADF aviation?

______

______

______

______

______

291 Section 4

In this section you are asked to rank your choices from ‘1’ to ‘10’ relating to the safety risks you perceive within ADF aviation.

Example:

1. Rank in order from ‘1’ (being the best) to ‘10’ (being the worst), the airline you think has the best reputation for safety:

6 Qantas 4 Cathay Pacific 8 United Airlines 5 Air New Zealand 2 Virgin Blue 1 British Airways 7 Japan Airlines 9 easyJet 3 Emirates 10 East China Air

Please mark a ‘1 to 10’ ranking concerning the statement below.

1. Rank the following “risk factors” in order from ‘1’ (the highest risk) to ‘10’ (the lowest risk), that you consider would be likely to cause an accident at your current unit.

Lack of experience Lack of currency High workload Overconfidence Insufficient time to prepare Departure from SOPs / Sis / Unit Regulations Fatigue Loss of situational awareness Lack of continuation training ‘Can-do culture’

Thinking about the factor you nominated as ‘1’ (the highest risk) above, please explain why the factor you nominated is most likely to cause an accident at your unit:

______

______

______

______

______

______

______

292

Thank you for your participation.

Please use the postage paid envelope enclosed with this survey package and return your completed survey to:

ADF Aviation Safety Study

Department of Aviation

University of New South Wales

SYDNEY NSW 2052

Please post your survey by 01 August 2003

293 APPENDIX C

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES

‘Aviation Safety in the Australian Defence Force’

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

You are invited to participate in a study of military aviation safety. We hope to learn what factors may affect aviation safety in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). You were selected as a possible participant in this study because you are currently employed within the aviation specialisation of the ADF. Please note that there is no financial cost to you associated with your participation in this survey.

If you decide to participate, we request that you complete the survey provided with this information sheet. The survey should take approximately 25 minutes to complete. Once completed, please post your survey to the address provided on the final page.

We plan to publish the results of this study in a report that will be available to you from the Defence Library network, or downloaded from the Defweb Intranet Website. Please note that the information you provide in the survey is not able to identify you. You will not be identified in any publication resulting from this study.

Any complaints regarding this study may be directed to the Ethics Secretariat at UNSW via telephone (02) 9385 4234, fax (02) 9385 6648 or email [email protected]

Your decision to participate in this study will not prejudice your employment or future relations with the Australian Defence Force or the University of New South Wales.

Please feel free to retain this information sheet for your records. If you have any questions regarding this study, please do not hesitate to contact us directly via telephone (02 9385 4194), facsimile (02 9385 6637) or email [email protected]

Mr Boyd Falconer Dr Graham Braithwaite

Department of Aviation University of New South Wales SYDNEY NSW 2052 Research Approval No. 8/03/4

294 APPENDIX D

ADF AVIATION INTERVIEW STUDY – BRIEFING

“UNSW Aviation is conducting a comparative study of attitudes amongst aviation professionals in Australian military aviation. The study hopes to build upon current knowledge and further establish what factors may affect aviation safety in Australian military aviation specifically. More than 400 participants from ADF aviation have responded to the earlier questionnaire phase of the study. The research approval number for this study is 8/03/4 and is authorised by the UNSW Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel.

This phase of the study includes interviews with a number of individuals with different levels of experience in ADF aviation.

The personal details of respondents will not be recorded, therefore you cannot be identified in ANY analysis or reports associated with this study.

I am most grateful for your support”.

Boyd Falconer

(University of New South Wales, Department of Aviation)

295