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Diccionario Italiano-Alemán Para Tra- Hanno Messo Un Cartello Di Divieto

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Diccionario Italiano-Alemán Para Tra- Hanno Messo Un Cartello Di Divieto DICCIONARIO ITALIANO - GALEGO ᇽᇽ Edita: XUNTA DE GALICIA CONSELLERÍA DE EDUCACIÓN E ORDENACIÓN UNIVERSITARIA CENTRO RAMÓN PIÑEIRO PARA A INVESTIGACIÓN EN HUMANIDADES Conselleiro de Educación e Ordenación Universitaria: CELSO CURRÁS FERNÁNDEZ Director Xeral de Política Lingüística: XESÚS P. G ONZÁLEZ MOREIRAS Coordinador Científico: CONSTANTINO GARCÍA Directora do proxecto: ISABEL GONZÁLEZ Redactores: CARMEN F. BLANCO VALDÉS BENEDICT BUONO ANA MARÍA DOMÍNGUEZ FERRO MARÍA CONSUELO DE FRUTOS MARTÍNEZ ISABEL GONZÁLEZ JAVIER GUTIÉRREZ CAROU CRISTINA MARCHISIO MARÍA MONTES LÓPEZ ALESSANDRA PAVANELLO MARÍA TERESA SANMARCO BANDE Colaboradores: SEMINARIO DE LEXICOGRAFÍA DA REAL ACADEMIA GALEGA (XESÚS DOMÍNGUEZ DONO,ANA FACHAL FRAGUELA,MARÍA DO CARME PAZOS BALADO, MANUELA PÉREZ RODRÍGUEZ,ISOLINA SALGADO BASOA, MARÍA DO MAR VÁZQUEZ VIVIANI) MARÍA ASUNCIÓN CANEDA CABRERA MARÍA ASUNCIÓN DÍAZ BERNÁRDEZ VINCENZO JACOMUZZI CARMEN PRADOS ANAYA ISBN.: 84-453-2937-5 Dep. Legal: C. 794/2000 Deseño e impresión: GRAFINOVA, S.A. SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA DICCIONARIO ITALIANO - GALEGO ᇽᇽ Edita: XUNTA DE GALICIA CONSELLERÍA DE EDUCACIÓN E ORDENACIÓN UNIVERSITARIA CENTRO RAMÓN PIÑEIRO PARA A INVESTIGACIÓN EN HUMANIDADES Conselleiro de Educación e Ordenación Universitaria: CELSO CURRÁS FERNÁNDEZ Director Xeral de Política Lingüística: XESÚS P. G ONZÁLEZ MOREIRAS Coordinador Científico: CONSTANTINO GARCÍA Directora do proxecto: ISABEL GONZÁLEZ Redactores: CARMEN F. BLANCO VALDÉS BENEDICT BUONO ANA MARÍA DOMÍNGUEZ FERRO ISABEL GONZÁLEZ JAVIER GUTIÉRREZ CAROU CRISTINA MARCHISIO MARÍA MONTES LÓPEZ ALESSANDRA PAVANELLO MARÍA TERESA SANMARCO BANDE Colaboradores: SEMINARIO DE LEXICOGRAFÍA DA REAL ACADEMIA GALEGA (XESÚS DOMÍNGUEZ DONO,ANA FACHAL FRAGUELA,MARÍA DO CARME PAZOS BALADO, MANUELA PÉREZ RODRÍGUEZ,ISOLINA SALGADO BASOA, MARÍA DO MAR VÁZQUEZ VIVIANI) MARÍA ASUNCIÓN CANEDA CABRERA MARÍA ASUNCIÓN DÍAZ BERNÁRDEZ VINCENZO JACOMUZZI CARMEN PRADOS ANAYA ISBN.: 84-453-2937-5 Dep. Legal: C. 794/2000 Deseño e impresión: GRAFINOVA, S.A. SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA A Consellería de Educación e Ordenación Universitaria da Xunta de Galicia, a través da súa Dirección Xeral de Política Lingüística, leva traba- llando dende a década dos oitenta na difusión da nosa lingua e do ensino en galego. Para favorecer esta tarefa, adoptáronse os medios máis eficaces, entre os que ocupan un lugar privilexiado as obras lexicográficas. Conscientes disto, apoiamos a creación e publicación de léxicos xerais e específicos, abordando distintos eidos do saber como as Ciencias Naturais, a Química, a Electricidade, a Electrónica, a Medicina... Agora dáse un paso máis, entrando tamén no campo da lexicografía bilingüe gracias a este diccionario, un dos proxectos máis interesantes e novi- dosos do Centro Ramón Piñeiro para a investigación en Humanidades, do que hoxe presentámo-lo primeiro volume italiano-galego que se verá completado en breve co segundo, galego-italiano, e o correspondente CD-ROM. Esta obra, dirixida por Isabel González e avaliada pola Real Academia Galega, non só achega os galegos á lingua italiana e á súa cultura, senón que tamén dá boa conta do estado da nosa lingua, mostrando un léxico galego nor- malizado en tódolos eidos. Quero deixar constancia da miña gratitude ós autores desta obra pola estupenda iniciativa e polo esforzo realizado. Trátase dun traballo ben docu- mentado, resultado do rigor científico e do amor polas linguas italiana e gale- ga. Por isto, teño a seguridade de que será unha utilísima ferramenta de traba- llo para docentes e investigadores e, en xeral, para a sociedade galega. Celso Currás Fernández Conselleiro de Educación e Ordenación Universitaria ÍNDICE Prólogo 9 Introducción 17 Guía de uso 25 Lista de abreviaturas 31 CORPUS 33 Antropónimos 613 Topónimos 623 Paremias e locucións 627 Compendio de gramática italiana 637 Táboas de verbos 675 Prólogo ella vivace proliferazione di dizionari bilingui che segna la nostra epoca non è usuale imbattersi in un’opera priva di antecedenti. Ma Nnon di questo dovremmo meravigliarci, se è vero che la stessa lessi- cografia monolingue galega è assai giovane: al 1990 risale un primo diziona- rio di circa 12.000 entrate e al 1997 il Diccionario da Real Academia Galega (RAG), di mole doppia e di mire più ambiziose. Sorprende piacevolmente, semmai, che un dizionario italiano-galego sia la prima impresa bilingue che confronti questo idioma iberoromanzo con una lingua viva diversa dal casti- gliano. L’opera prende le mosse dal Diccionario della RAG, non tanto nelle proporzioni (qui, comprensibilmente, assai più ridotte) quanto nei criteri ispi- ratori e in alcune precise soluzioni di tecnica lessicografica. La scelta di fondo è stata quella di puntare sulle informazioni essenziali, a beneficio di un pub- blico identificato con chiarezza negli studenti e nei traduttori interessati al per- corso italiano-galego. In sostanza, come si legge già nella sobria Introducción del Diccionario della RAG, ci si è fondati su «tres piares fundamentais: as entradas, as acepcións, e a expresión das definicións». Ciò ha comportato conseguenze coerenti. Il lemmario è stato orientato in direzione del lessico fondamentale e di quello di alta disponibilità, con le integrazioni suggerite dall’esperienza e dalla sensibilità dei compilatori (per esempio, per quel che riguarda la scelta degli etnici da includere); giudiziosa- mente aperto al nuovo, bello o brutto che sia (da macrobiotica a aids), ma senza nessuna concessione all’effimero né al substandard. Le accezioni privi- legiano quella più usuale (così macchina reca al primo posto il traducente coche - vale a dire quel che a Santiago de Compostela o a Roma è la “mac- china” per antonomasia; e solo in seconda posizione máquina, ossia il signifi- cato semanticamente più ampio e più antico, rispetto al quale quello di “auto- vettura” rappresenta uno sviluppo successivo), Le definizioni sono estremamente asciutte, senza una parola di troppo. La grafica è insieme ele- gante e funzionale, consentendo di ricavare immediatamente l’informazione desiderata. Ma scegliere significa anche rinunciare. Nel nostro caso le indicazioni ortoepiche sono ridotte all’essenziale, ossia all’accento tonico, segnalato opportunamente - per non creare ambiguità tra ortografia e pronuncia - mediante sottolineatura della vocale interessata. Mancano invece la distinzio- ne tra e e o aperte e chiuse (ciò può colpire, dal momento che il galego - come PRÓLOGO il catalano e a differenza del castigliano - conosce opposizioni fonematiche del tipo di presa /e/ ‘presa’ e présa /ε/ ‘fretta’; ma la scelta sarà stata suggerita dal limitato peso di cui la norma ortoepica toscana, almeno su questo punto, gode attualmente in Italia) e quella tra s e z sorde e sonore (qui avrà agito, accanto all’oscillazione della norma italiana, l’intento di semplificare l’apprendimen- to di parlanti galeghi, giacché il galego moderno conosce solo sibilante e interdentale sorde). D’altra parte, le indispensabili indicazioni grammaticali sono tutte presenti: parte nelle consuete marche morfologiche, parte in una rubrica posta alla fine del lemma (OBS, cioè Observacións). Spazio particola- re è stato dato, ai cosiddetti “falsi amici”, non solo discriminando tra omoni- mi come tasca (“osteria” in galego), ma anche suggerendo al lettore il termi- ne adeguato per rendere in italiano il galego tasca. Ma se le informazioni grammaticali esplicite sono ridotte all’osso, quel- le implicite sono in realtà numerose. Ancora una volta ispirandosi al modello del Diccionario della RAG (nel quale «tódalas acepcións van ilustradas con un ou con varios exemplos»), s’è dato il massimo spazio all’esemplificazione. Potrebbe lasciare perplessi vedere muniti di esempi una parola del lessico di base come macellaio o un tecnicismo come meteorologia, dato che il rispetti- vo significato è stabile e predicibile quale che sia il contesto sintattico. Ma mettendo a confronto, per il primo vocabolo citato, l’esempio italiano («Suo padre è macellaio al mercato») e quello galego («O seu pai è carniceiro no mercado»), non è difficile fare affiorare ben due informazioni microsintattiche sommerse: nel produrre una frase elementare come questa le due lingue si dif- ferenziano - oltre che per il lessico - nella costruzione del complemento di luogo e concordano, invece, nell’omissione dell’articolo davanti al nome del predicato che indichi una caratteristica del soggetto (come avviene tipicamen- te con i nomi professionali). Un nuovo dizionario bilingue, specie se pionieristico, non è solo un prezioso strumento di lavoro; è anche l’occasione per riflettere sul modo in cui le due lingue percepiscono e organizzano linguisticamente la realtà. Un piccolo assaggio ricavato dai modi idiomatici. Non sono rari i casi di perfetta coincidenza; casi che rimandano indietro - ad abissale distanza dall’odierno “villaggio globale” - ad altre, antiche, omologie nella scansione di una giornata dominata dal lavoro agricolo, quando l’idea di coricarsi per tempo evocava il riferimento ai familiari animali da cortile (andare a letto con le galline = ir para a cama coas galiñas) e un “lavoro massacrante” non era PRÓLOGO quello del dirigente d’industria ma quello brutalmente fisico, in genere svolto da animali (lavorare come un asino = traballar como un burro). Di là da ita- liano e galego, l’idiomatismo si ritrova in altre lingue romanze e non romanze (e di norma si tratterà, più che di prestiti, di poligenesi): talvolta con piccole variazioni (lavorare comme une bête de somme dicono i francesi; wie
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