Seneca and the Contemplatio Veri De Otio and Epistulae Morales

SENECA AND THE CONTEMPLATIO VERI DE OTIO AND EPISTULAE MORALES Margaret Graver Seneca makes a formal case for the theoretical life in the fragmentary trea- tise titled De otio.1 Leisure, a term with multiple connotations in Roman letters, here appears in the more speci c sense of the σχολή needed for philosophical study; while contemplatio just as clearly lls the role of θεωρία as used in Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 10.7 and in many Hellenistic sources.2 Though incomplete, the De otio is of considerable interest for the manner in which it combines standard themes of Stoic ethics with elements from the Platonist and Aristotelian tradition, setting these over against Epicurean quietism. Working from familiar Stoic axioms concerning the mutual responsibil- ity of all rational beings and the naturalness of intelligent inquiry, Seneca presents what he believes to be a characteristically Stoic justi cation for a retired life devoted to philosophical pursuits. Not every such life is justi ed, he argues, but only that which confers real bene ts—that is, bene ts other than pleasure—on oneself and others. The study of cosmological and theological topics is important in that it elevates the mind above mundane concerns and brings it closer to the divine (a claim developed further in the Naturales quaestiones).3 Yet even so, legitimate concerns may be raised about the demands philosophical study imposes upon a limited lifespan. The sheer expenditure of time required by philosophy demands some justi cation, and this he seeks to provide through a medley of arguments concerning the nature of the individual, the demands of circumstances, the need for personal moral improvement and the ethical bene ts conferred through teaching. The result is a rather puzzling treatment that leaves us with no clear conception of what the contemplative activity of philosophers actually 1 Text in Reynolds (1977); critical edition with commentary Dionigi (1983); edition with commentary Williams (2003). The title is known from the contents-list of the Codex Ambro- sianus; see Williams (2003) 63–64. 2 For the moral and political implications of otium in Roman culture see Grilli (1953); André (1966 and 1962a). Seneca touches on the topic more broadly in his dialogues De brevitate vitae and De tranquillitate animi. 3 Especially in Nat. quaest. 3 praef. 10–18; 1 praef.; see Barnes (1997) 21–23; Inwood (2009). 76 margaret graver consists in (astronomy? spiritual exercises? writing books?) and which of the philosopher’s endeavors is supposed to impart value to the enterprise as a whole. The De otio takes on new meaning, however, when read in con- junction with Seneca’s most comprehensive work, the Epistulae morales.4 Close to De otio in date, the longer work shares many of its themes and arguments, and develops on a much larger scale its concern with the role of speci cally philosophical activities in a virtuous life.5 Moreover, the Epis- tulae morales makes explicit a tension that is present without acknowledge- ment in De otio: the diference between philosophical study for the sake of personal moral development, to tame the passions and prepare oneself for courageous action, and theoretical activity for its own sake, simply to increase one’s understanding of the world. Having argued at some length for the importance of a philosophical retirement in providing opportunity for self-improvement, Seneca recognizes that he is at odds with himself when he proceeds with the more abstract theoretical investigations in which he is also interested. To resolve the tension, he resorts to a series of rhetori- cal strategies calculated to win favor for the inclusion of technical material while preserving the epistolary decorum he has established. In addition, the Epistulae morales do a good deal to esh out the sparse indications given in De otio as to what Seneca understands of the nature of philosophical pursuits. Although we cannot treat the letters as straightfor- wardly autobiographical, we can learn much from them about how Seneca conceives of θεωρία from the sketches and descriptions he includes in the work. In particular, the gure of Claranus in Ep. 66 provides us with our best Neronian portrait of a theoretical philosopher. Through that portrait, as well as through the epistolographer’s reports of his own activities and those of his addressee Lucilius, we glimpse a distinctively Senecan understanding of what the contemplative life should look like: a life of self-cultivation but also of abstract thought, lled with solitary reading and writing but also with long philosophical conversations. 4 Text in Reynolds (1965); some useful notes in Préchac (1945–1964); full commentary for many of the more philosophically interesting letters in Inwood (2007a). 5 If the De otio is dedicated to L. Annaeus Serenus, then it must have been composed in or near 62, around the time the Epistulae morales were begun. Unfortunately, the dedication is attested only by a ‘virtually illegible’ notation in the Codex Ambrosianus. See Gri n (1976) 316–317, 399; Williams (2003) 12–13..

Load more