THE POLARIZA T ION OF T HE PALES T INIAN POLI T ICAL FIELD JAMIL HILAL Arguing that the polarization of the Palestinian political field did not start with Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the author analyzes the factors that have eroded the cohesiveness and vitality of the Palestinian polity, namely, the paralysis of Palestinian politi- cal institutions, territorial and social fragmentation, and egregious outside interference. In this context, and in the absence of an internal Palestinian debate about the objectives of holding elections under occupation, the author shows that the timing and circumstances of the 2006 legislative elections were bound to precipitate the current state of disarray. Finally, he considers the way forward, highlighting the potential of public pressure in promoting national reconciliation. NO O N E WOULD QUESTIO N today the utter disarray of the Palestinian political field,1 where two separate entities governed by bitterly rival factions are ensconced in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, one under Israeli occupa- tion, the other under a suffocating Israeli siege. Each of the two governments, one primarily secular (controlled by Fatah), the other “Islamist” (controlled by Hamas), has its own security forces and, to the extent possible, bans the activi- ties of members of the rival faction within “its” territory (if it does not arrest or imprison them). Both political “entities” are heavily dependent on external funding (from different donors) and are allied to different regional powers overtly or covertly opposed to one another. As time passes, the two entities grow further and further apart, threatening a repetition in some form of the Pakistan-Bangladesh experience. This state of polarization did not begin in June 2007 when Hamas installed itself as the dominant political, military, and administrative power in the Gaza Strip while Fatah took steps to tighten its control over the West Bank. Rather, these events deepened trends long in the making, enfeebling still further a political field that had been battered since the early 1990s by many changes and events, regional and international. The present essay2 seeks to highlight the factors underlying the precarious- ness and vulnerability of the Palestinian polity and its consequent polarization, JAMIL HILAL , an independent Palestinian sociologist and author of numerous books and articles on Palestinian society and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is the editor ofWhere Now for Palestine? The Demise of the Two-State Solution (Z Books, 2007). His latest book, Across the Wall: Towards a Shared View of Israeli-Palestinian History, coedited with Ilan Pappé, will be published by I.B. Tauris in October 2010. Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (Spring 2010), pp. 24–39, ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614. © 2010 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: jps.2010.XXXIX.3.24. This content downloaded from 193.54.110.56 on Wed, 28 Jun 2017 13:25:37 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms JPS3903_04_Hilal.indd 24 7/1/10 12:31:35 PM THE POLARIZA T ION OF T HE PALES T INIAN POLI T ICAL FIELD 25 the paralysis of its national institutions, and egregious foreign interference. Similar situations have been noted in other regional states subject to invasion and war (Lebanon, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and the Sudan, among others), but the disarray is perhaps more visible in Palestine for reasons relating to its history, its specific regional and international context, and its ongoing subjec- tion to settler-colonialism and territorial fragmentation. THE MAKING OF T HE PALES T INIAN POLI T ICAL FIELD The Palestinian political field differs from most others in that it includes Palestinian communities with differing socioeconomic, state, and civil society structures, not only in historic Palestine (the 1967 occupied territories and Israel) but also in the diaspora (al-shatat) created by the 1948 Nakba. It was also formed outside the national territory, not by a state but by a national lib- eration movement that arose in the Palestinian shatat. From the outset then, lacking a sovereign state, the Palestinian political field has been subject to powerful outside influences and pressures. Its leading institution, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was founded at the initiative of the Arab states in 1964 and was initially under their control. It was only after the 1967 war, when the PLO was democratically taken over by Palestinian resistance orga- nizations led by Fatah, that it became a popular mass movement and, several years later, the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” For the next twenty-some years, the PLO and its constituent organizations con- ducted their political, military, and other activities from bases in countries bordering Israel and later from Tunisia. While this situation made it vulner- able to the machinations of various regional powers seeking to determine the political and economic shape of the Middle East, the fact that the pressures were conflicting helped the PLO maintain to a tangible degree its hegemony over a relatively autonomous Palestinian political field throughout the 1970s and 1980s. PLO hegemony over the Palestinian political field began to be challenged in the late 1980s with the emergence in the occupied territories of political Islam, whose main embodiment, Hamas, had been established at the start of the first intifada in 1987, and the smaller Islamic Jihad several years earlier. Both these organizations were indigenous, having grown out of local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, and their prominence in the first intifada showed them to be a force to be reckoned with. However, it was not until the 1993 signing of the Oslo accords, which laid out the stages that were supposed to lead to full peace with Israel by the end of the decade, that the magnitude of the challenge posed by political Islam became fully apparent. Under the Oslo accords, the PLO leadership returned from its long exile to the Palestinian territories, thus moving the center of gravity of Palestinian politics to the “inside” for the first time since 1948. There it established the Palestinian Authority (PA), a self-governing body whose powers were sharply limited by the Israeli occupier but which was understood as the first step on This content downloaded from 193.54.110.56 on Wed, 28 Jun 2017 13:25:37 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms JPS3903_04_Hilal.indd 25 7/1/10 12:31:35 PM 26 JOURNAL OF PALES T INE ST UDIES the road to statehood. The accords were fiercely opposed by political Islam, as well as by a number of secular PLO factions, most importantly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). With a growing following, and already endowed with a high degree of discipline and organization, political Islam and espe- cially Hamas found in opposition to Oslo a powerful cause around which to mobilize. Fatah, as the principal political organization of the PLO and the main Palestinian force behind the Oslo accords, dominated the institutions (gov- ernment, security apparatuses, the judiciary, and the Palestinian Legislative Council [PLC]) of the PA even more fully than it had dominated those of the PLO, especially since the PFLP and DFLP, among other factions, refused par- ticipation in the new body. These factions, together with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, also boycotted (ineffectively) the democratic presidential and legislative elections of 1996 that conferred upon Fatah the legitimacy to rule over the parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip designated by the Oslo accords. Fatah’s dominance of the Palestinian national movement had been based on its leader- ship of the PLO and its history as a resistance organization. Once it became the ruling party of the PA, however, its preoccupation with its bureaucratic and security apparatuses, and especially with the political negotiations with Israel, the results of which were increasingly unpopular in the face of constant Israeli backtracking, gave a further boost to political Islam as a rival movement. At the same time, the clientelism and nepotism that flourished under the Fatah-led PA were fully exploited by Hamas to expand its constituency. This was espe- cially the case as of the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, when the suicide operations of Hamas and Islamic Jihad galvanized a public distraught and outraged by Israel’s brutally punitive assaults at a time when Fatah was stymied in its armed response by its contradictory role of pursuing negotiations with Israel. It was during the second intifada that the Palestinian political field was con- clusively transformed into a field dominated by two rival parties. Yasir Arafat’s mysterious death in 2004 deprived Palestinian politics of its sole undisputed central figure of authority. Israel’s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005 only fueled the rivalry, with each movement trying to claim credit for the withdrawal. The polarization exploded into open conflict fol- lowing Fatah’s resounding defeat by Hamas in the January 2006 legislative elections (at least partly because of its insistence on changing electoral rules) and the formation of an all-Hamas government that spring, prompting inter- national powers led by the United States to impose financial sanctions and a political boycott and to suspend all direct aid to the PA. Even the formation of a short-lived Hamas-Fatah national unity government in March 2007 could not bridge the divide, and escalating armed clashes, at times taking on aspects of civil war, culminated in Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007.