How the Colombians Shaped US Participation in the Genesis of Plan Colombia Álvaro Ménd
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by LSE Theses Online The London School of Economics and Political Science Negotiating Intervention by Invitation: How the Colombians Shaped US Participation in the Genesis of Plan Colombia Álvaro Méndez A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, June 2012. Page | 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 99,994 words. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Miss Susan Nicolai Page | 2 Acknowledgments It would not have been possible to write this doctoral dissertation without the support and love of all of my family and friends. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Christopher Alden for his support and encouragement, without whom I could have not completed my research. His exceptional supervision guided me through many a dark hour. I would also like to express my heartfelt thanks to Stuart Lippe, Gabriel Marcella, Guillermo Fernández de Soto and Alfonso Lopez Caballero, who opened the door of access to so many important actors both in Colombia and in the US. Over the years in which I have laboured at this work, many more people than I can remember have contributed their valuable comments and suggestions. Several of them stand out for their exceptional help not only in this way but also with the sheer, tedious clerical effort that a PhD imposes. Among them I would like to single out Fiona Ferrer for her love, support and comments; Susan Nicolai for her invaluable help and insightful views. Claudio Galan, Sebastián Nieto, Yves Reymond and Marco Schöenborn also deserve acknowledgement for always being there for me as friends. This dissertation is dedicated to my father, Dr. Alvaro Méndez, and to my mother, Leonor Suárez de Méndez. Page | 3 Abstract The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the genesis of Plan Colombia, the aid programme that transferred US$1.3 billion to Colombia during fiscal year 2000/2001 alone. It was found that President Andres Pastrana invited the intervention of the US in many aspects of Colombia’s internal affairs, from his peace process with guerrilla insurgents to his project to reassert the authority of the state over Colombia’s ‘internal periphery’. A complex, three-way negotiation between the two core Executives and the US Congress ensued, which yielded a more limited intervention than the Colombians desired. It was also found that, the vast power asymmetry notwithstanding, it was the small state that took the initiative and managed to exert influence over the great power. These findings conclusively refute the paradigmatic presumption in the IR literature that Plan Colombia was hegemonically imposed. To the contrary, the protracted (two years long) negotiation of terms showed the ‘hegemon’ decidedly reluctant to be drawn too far into its internal affairs of its ‘victim’. Plan Colombia follows a characteristic pattern in US foreign relations, which has been noted before; a unique form of ‘imperialism’ whereby subject states actually invite the intervention of the great power, in some cases even to the point of occupation. Unlike the approach typical of the IR field, which is predominantly a priori in method, the treatment herein is essentially inductive. For my fieldwork I interviewed the gamut of elite participants in the making of the Plan, from ex-President Pastrana himself to Thomas Pickering, the third-ranking officer in the US State Department. Letting the facts from all sources speak for themselves, I have arrived at counterintuitive results of interest to theorists and practitioners of international relations. Page | 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 11 THE THESIS 11 The genesis of Plan Colombia 11 InterventionbyInvitation 12 THE STATE OF THE ART: THE LITERATURE REVIEWED 14 The literature on Plan Colombia 14 The literature on weak states 23 The literature on Intervention 29 METHODOLOGY 36 PLAN OF DISSERTATION 47 CHAPTER 2: EARLY COLOMBIAN HISTORY FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PANAMANIAN SECESSION AND ITS AFTERMATH (1810-1946) 49 INTRODUCTION 49 EXOGENOUS DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL CULTURE 50 AnexceptionallydifficultGeography 50 Colonial Heritage 53 CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCY OF COLOMBIAN POLITICS 56 Patria Boba [Booby Fatherland]: 1810-1819 56 Weak Bolivarian Colombia (1819-1830) 57 Weak Republican Period (1830-1903) 61 Page | 5 COLOMBIAN DIPLOMATIC TRADITION 68 Unique relationship with the U.S. 68 Personal Diplomacy (the European case) 70 Inviting a Defender 71 Inviting a Guarantor 74 CONCLUSION 88 CHAPTER 3: THE CONTEMPORARY RECRUDESCENCE OF VIOLENCE (1946-1998) 89 INTRODUCTION 89 La Violencia—the state debilitated (1946-1966) 89 ‘Frontier justice’: guerrillas, militias and mafias (1966-1981) 92 Violent Nexus: Triangular Conflict (1982-1991) 98 NARCO-VIOLENCIA IN THE AGE OF EXTRADITION 109 The Nadir: The Samper Presidency (1994-1998) 122 TheStateteetersonthebrinkoffailure 128 COLOMBIA AT THE END OF THE SAMPER PRESIDENCY 135 CHAPTER 4. PLAN COLOMBIA—PHASE ONE: THE COLOMBIAN INVITATION 137 INTRODUCTION 137 Theprospectofstatefailure—theseedofPlanColombia 138 Andrés Pastrana’s election campaign 141 Pastrana engages with Washington 144 Pastrana takes office (7 August 1998) 148 Page | 6 Pastrana seeks help from the international community 153 Pastrana’s official State Visit to the U.S.: 26-30 October 1998 156 PASTRANA BEGINS NEGOTIATING WITH THE FARC 161 TheStateDepartmentresponds:RomeroinBogotá 161 Apartnershipisborn 163 TheStateDepartmentsecretlymeetstheFARCinCostaRica 165 CONGRESS APPROVES AID FOR COLOMBIA 166 The professionalisation of the army 167 PASTRANA ANNOUNCES GREATER PLAN COLOMBIA 168 The empty seat: the FARC baulk at the plan 169 PastranapursueshisvisionofpeacedespitetheUS 169 TheFARCkillUSparticipationinthepeaceprocess 170 Congressional fallout from the FARC affair 172 Anotherblowtothepeaceprocess:DefenceMinisterLloredaresigns 173 THE U.S. RE-ENGAGES—ON MORE LIMITED TERMS 174 USscepticismoverthepeaceprocesscontinuestogrow 175 CONCLUSION 176 CHAPTER 5. PLAN COLOMBIA PHASE 2: THE INVITATION NEGOTIATED 179 INTRODUCTION 179 THE U.S. ACCEPTS COLOMBIA’S INVITATION 182 TheStateDepartmentlobbiesCongressforPlanColombia 183 Page | 7 Dual strategy for Bogotá and Washington 185 TheClintonAdministrationmakesitscasetoCongress 186 Mellman Poll: Clinton looks soft on drugs 187 PASTRANA ACCEPTS THE LIMITED OFFER 188 MadeinColombia 188 Pastrana officially announces his greater Plan 189 Terrorism by the FARC 191 TheleftdrivesawedgebetweenColombiaandtheUS 193 THE ALIANZA ACT—CONGRESS’S OWN AID INITIATIVE 195 Nocoincidence 195 Colombians in DC 197 Opposition to the Alianza Act 197 The Colombians react with proactivity 198 AlbrightmeetsMoreno 200 PLAN COLOMBIA BACK ON TRACK: YEAR 2000 201 Clinton announces Plan Colombia—to criticism 202 Lobbying Plan Colombia—Pastrana goes on the offensive 203 ThelobbyingofCongressbegins:Clintonofficiallyrequestsfunding 208 CONCLUSION 214 CHAPTER 6—PLAN COLOMBIA PHASE THREE: NEGOTIATION THROUGH INTERVENTION 216 INTRODUCTION 216 Page | 8 THE COLOMBIAN LOBBYING OF CONGRESS 216 Lobbying Congress mano à mano: the Colombians ‘face up’ 217 USCongressmenvisitColombia:carefullycraftedtours 220 THE LEGISLATIVE JOURNEY BEGINS 225 Initial opposition to Plan Colombia 227 TroubleintheSenate 229 Theelitespeaks:theInterimReportoftheCFR 231 COLOMBIA SEEKS AID IN BUT ALSO BEYOND THE U.S. 232 PastranagoestoEurope 233 THE END-GAME: DEBATES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 234 USSenateconsidersPlanColombia 236 Colombia reacts to the Senate 238 The full Senate swings into action 241 PlanColombiaontheflooroftheSenate 244 US Senate approves Plan Colombia 248 VictoryinWashington,troubleinBogotá 250 CLINTONSIGNSPLANCOLOMBIAINTOLAW 252 CONCLUSION: THE ISSUE OF COLOMBIAN AGENCY 254 CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 256 WHAT THIS STUDY REPRESENTS 256 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 257 ColombianhistorythoroughlydeterminesColombianpoliticstoday 258 Page | 9 The Colombians pursued their own strategic vision in Plan Colombia 260 ColombianentrepreneurshipchieflydrovePlanColombia 264 The US strategic role in Plan Colombia was inertial and reactive 267 US and Colombian Executive elites informally ‘fused’ 270 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 272 Systemic indeterminacy 272 The inadequacy of first approximations in IR 275 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 275 Page | 10 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ‘If Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their fighting for them, they must be studied as carefully as the giant’.1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION THE THESIS This dissertation expounds and empirically substantiates the thesis that ‘Plan Colombia’, the United States (US) foreign aid programme for the South American nation, was not a scheme that originated in the US