Ridho Al-Hamdi: Ideological Cleavage under Open-listJurnal Ilmu Proportional Sosial dan Representation: Ilmu Politik Parties’ Position towardVolume the 2019 24, Indonesian Issue 3, March Presidential 2021 Threshold(205-219) ISSN 1410-4946 (Print), 2502-7883 (Online) doi: 10.22146/jsp.53514

Ideological Cleavage under Open-list Proportional Representation: Parties’ Position toward the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Threshold

Ridho Al-Hamdi Department of Government Afairs and Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Muhammadiyah (email: [email protected])

Abstract This article examines the ideological position of ’s political parties in addressing the 2019 presidential threshold under the open-list proportional representation system. The article aims to determine the political cleavage among Indonesian political parties, whether classifed into the ideological spectrum or the organisational degree. From a methodological standpoint, it is qualitative research by employing in-depth interviews and online news collection as a data gathering technique. The study’s fnding depicts that the ideological cleavage is no longer relevant under the open-list proportional representation system because political parties eventually have pragmatical orientations rather than ideological considerations. It can be proven that the position of nationalist secular parties is not merely in the approval side but also in the denial and dilemma sides. Likewise, the position of nationalist Islamist parties can be found on two sides: denial and dilemma. This fnding verifes that Indonesia’s ideological contestation is waning and inactive when political parties cope with power issues. On the contrary, the ideology is revived when it deals with religious and tribal afairs.

Keywords: Presidential threshold; parties; 2019 election; ideological cleavage; Indonesia

Introduction the 2009 election until the present. In the recent Indonesia is the third-largest democratic Indonesian political debate, the presidential state of the world after India and the USA threshold is one of the fascinating issues. consisting of multiple religions and multiple The presidential threshold conceptually ethnicities. Based on Geert’s (1960) framework, is the minimum level of support, which the Indonesian society can be catalogued into three candidate pair needs to earn representation variants: abangan (nominal Muslim), santri (Reynolds & Reilly, 1997, p.88). If such a pair (devout Muslim), and priyayi (aristocrat). cannot collect the support, it is not allowed by Therefore, Indonesia applies the multiple party the applied system to run for the competition. system with dozens of parties in each national In Indonesia, the presidential threshold applied election. Although political parties are the for the frst time in the presidential election in vital democratic institution that contributes to 2019. According to the 2017 Election Act, only consolidating the state democracy, Indonesia’s parties having a minimum of 20 percent of electoral system is always changing due the parliamentary seats or 25 percent of valid to the process of seeking the most relevant vote in the previous election can nominate system for Indonesian democratic transitions. the president and vice president candidate Although the system is changing, the open- pair. Nonetheless, pro and contra still exist list proportional representation system has among political parties. Some concur with the remained and been applied in Indonesia since presidential threshold, while others reject it.

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The debate of the presidential threshold (2012), and Mietner (2013) argue that the party has been taking place since the 2014 election. system in Indonesia is well institutionalised if At the time, the Constitutional Court contrasted to remaining South American and judges deliberated in 2013, but they did not Asian countries, the Middle East, and Eastern immediately make a quick verdict, and, in Europe. It designates that, consistent with turn, the verdict was close to the 2014 election. Noor’s (2012, p.2) fnding, parties in Indonesia Was the public ever informed about why the have a greater opportunity to maintain cohesion, Court postponed the verdict? What was the but it is possible for them to be fragmented motive? The answer is that the decision cannot parties if they are feebly institutionalised. be separated from the political situation at the Fionna (2013, p.187) believes that the parties time. If the verdict was applied immediately can operate various programs if they are more in 2013, the presidential threshold would no institutionalised. On the contrary, the parties longer have been relevant in the 2014 election. are inclined to be ineffective and passive if The situation could have been unstable due to they are less institutionalised. Furthermore, a lot of presidential candidates running to the Liddle & Mujani (2007, pp. 832-851) postulate stage. that Indonesia’s recent democratic situation Broadly speaking, Randal (2006, pp. demonstrates that the leadership and party 387-388) and Mainwaring (1991, pp. 21-43) ID are more influential on voting behavior assume that studying political parties in rather than religious consideration. It is also developing countries is commonly connected reinforced by Ufen (2009, pp.160) who believes with topics of the party system, institutionalism, that nowadays parties are not social movements democratisation, and ideology. On the one anymore with their robust link of organisations hand, Ufen (2009, pp.160-161) puts forward that like in the period of the 1950s. parties in Indonesia have good performance. Presidentialised parties are also a They are quite in line with democratic values common trend in Indonesia since the direct and can participate in free and fair elections. presidential election in 2004 (Ufen, 2018). It The military involvement in parties decreases can sacrifce the parties’ policy, and, in turn, and voters can deliver their alert to parties that the party organisation will be marginalised in have disappointing performances. On the other inventing the party activities and formulating hand, Ambardi (2008, p. 327-328) argues that its ideology (Samuels, 2002, pp. 471). However, the competition among parties terminated after Kawamura (2013, pp. 1-27) puts forward that the election and followed by the invention of presidentialised parties can happen merely in a cartel. The cartelised party system’s source huge parties which have a robust organisational is the parties’ collective dependence on rent- structure and have an opportunity to contest seeking to meet their financial necessities. in the executive election rather than small- Nevertheless, Mietner (2013, p. 223) is sure that middle parties which are not aggressively not all Indonesian parties are cartelised because engaged in the executive election because they some parties still have solid ties to civil society. desire to maximise votes only in the legislative In terms of the institutionalisation of election. Thus, Poguntke & Webb (2005, parties, Tan (2012, pp.154-176), Tomsa (2008, pp. 1-22) hypothesise that it is a worldwide p.189), Choi (2010), and Hamayotsu (2011, fact in most democratic countries affected pp.133) hypothesise that the party system by the enlarged ability of parties’ leaders to in Indonesia is feebly institutionalised. avoid party mechanisms and appeal electors Nonetheless, in the worldwide trend, Ufen immediately. The result is the rise of dictatorial (2008b), Hamayotsu (2011), Croissant & Völkel leaders. Hence, Ufen (2008a, pp. 5-37; 2009,

206 Ridho Al-Hamdi: Ideological Cleavage under Open-list Proportional Representation: Parties’ Position toward the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Threshold pp.161-168), Tan (2012, pp.175), and Al-Hamdi periphery, urban and rural areas, land and (2017) postulate that political ideology is feeble industry, or workers and owners. Ambardi and claim seven constraints which cause (2008, p. 35-80) categorises three political the feebleness of ideology: the increase of cleavage paterns in Indonesia: the religious- presidentialised parties, the rising intra-party secular cleavage, the national-regional cleavage, dictatorial person, the rampant use of vote- and the class cleavage. The frst two pairs of buying, the absence of the party’s meaningful cleavages were invented during the colonial platform, feeble loyalties to parties, cartel-like period. In the meantime, the later shows the collaboration, and the rise of new elites at the confict between working classes and the one local level. created by capitalism during the New Order Different from previous studies, this Era when vast industrialisation took place. This article analyses the response of Indonesia’s article intends to examine the religious-secular parties in addressing the 2019 parliamentary cleavage. threshold. The upshot is to prove whether the Parties can be categorised into ideology is still robust, vague, or submerged. various distinctive standards, based on the The study’s focus is mapping the political organisational degree, the social and political cleavage among Indonesian political parties aim, the social classes which they tend to in addressing the 2019 presidential threshold. represent, the positioning toward the political With such a map, the diference of position system, or the name that symbolises particular of each party can be known. Based on this social and political aims that the parties want consideration, the article aims to determine to be recognised with (Hofmeister & Grabow, the political cleavage among political parties 2011, p. 20-23). This article categorises parties based on their ideological spectrum and the based on two primary considerations. First is organisational degree. As a considerable a social and ideological conviction in post-1998 suggestion, the House of Representatives by applying the concept of Geert (1960) on could pay serious attention to the electoral abang and santri and Machmudi (2006) of Jemaah justice approach in deciding the presidential Tarbiyah because lots of parties institute their threshold. programs based on ideological orientations. Second is the organisational degree, as parties Political Cleavage and Party Classifcation invent their programs based on their human In Mair’s (2006, p. 372-373) concept, the and financial abilities. In the ideological cleavage is frequently related to belief systems classification, considering various scholars’ like religion or class; thus, there are three classifcations (Liddle, 2003, p.5; Baswedan, critical characteristics of cleavage. Firstly, a 2004, pp.672-684; Mietner, 2013, p.169-176; Al- cleavage encompasses a social separation Hamdi, 2017, p.80-88) on political parties, this like religion, ethnicity, or status. Secondly, it study catalogues them into three main groups: includes a shared identity where the cleavage nationalist-secular, nationalist-Muslim, and is justifed on collective identity and issues such nationalist-Islamist. According to Al-Hamdi as workers, farmers, Muslims, Christians, etc. (2017), these three groups are categorised as Thirdly, it needs to look for an institutional nationalist because the frst two groups declare expression, whether through a trade union, as their ideological foundation. a religious organisation, a party, and the like. Although the later does not adopt Pancasila Randall (2006, pp. 389) and Vassallo as its ideological base, it welcomes Pancasila as & Wilcox (2006, p. 415) identify prospective the core values within the party platform. Thus, cleavages: state and religion, center and the third group is friendly towards Pancasila.

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In the degree of organisation, this article by applying the case study as the research adopts Feith’s theory (1957, p.61) regarding approach. According to Creswell (2013, p. 97) the party classification into three different and Flyvbjerg (2011, pp. 301-302), this article categories. First, major parties, which reach conceptualises the case study as the intensive the minimum vote of 10 percent in the 2014 investigation that describes one or more election, such as PDIP, , Gerindra, cases for particular aims within a tied case or and Demokrat. Ideologically speaking, these multiple cases through in-depth data collection four parties are nationalist-secular. Second, by gathering various sources. medium parties, which collect the vote between In-depth interviews and a compilation 3.5 and 9.9 percent in the 2014 election. PAN, of news media stories were utilised as data PKB, PKS, PPP, Nasdem, and Hanura can be gathering techniques (Silverman, 2001, p.83- included here. Third, small parties. Parties that 144). The in-depth interviews with elites of 16 have not gained the minimum parliamentary political parties were carried out over roughly threshold of 3.5 percent in the 2014 election eight months between November 2017 and but still participate in the 2019 election, they June 2018. One informant was interviewed are categorised in this group, such as PBB twice. Meanwhile, the collection of news stories and PKPI. New parties established after 2014 was conducted before, during, and after the are also part of this group, i.e., Perindo, PSI, feld research, namely compiling stories from Berkarya, and Garuda. reputable online media. After the data was Therefore, this article classifes Indonesian collected, as postulated by Creswell (2013, political parties into three categories. First is p.179-180), the last step is a four-step analysis: nationalist secular. In this category, there three reducing data, displaying data, verifcation, kinds of parties: major parties (PDIP, Golkar, and conclusion. Gerindra, and Demokrat), medium parties (Nasdem and Hanura), and small parties (PKPI, Results and Discussion Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda). Second is This article classifies three parties’ nationalist-Muslim, which consisting of PAN distinctive positions in addressing the and PKB. Third is nationalist-Islamist, which presidential threshold: approval, dilemma, and encompassing PKS, PPP, and PBB. These three denial. Each party has its own arguments. The categories are applied as the analytical framework approval position consists of four parties (PDIP, of the study. It can be seen in Figure 1. Golkar, Nasdem, and PKB). The dilemma position includes PPP, Hanura, and PKPI. Methods Meanwhile, the denial side encompasses nine This article utilises qualitative method as parties (Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, PKS, PBB, theorised by Denzin & Lincoln (2011, p. 3-4) Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda).

Figure 1. The Flow of Analysis Source: Compiled by the Author.

208 Ridho Al-Hamdi: Ideological Cleavage under Open-list Proportional Representation: Parties’ Position toward the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Threshold

Four Parties Approve the Presidential Yuni Satia Rahayu, secretary of PDIP Threshold in Yogyakarta, puts forward the opinion that These four parties have a main argument mentions the 20 percent is violating the 1945 that the presidential threshold is more benefcial Constitution is coming from small parties. For for all parties, not merely for major parties. her, fghting to win the presidential candidate They reject the claim that the presidential requires a lot of support from parties and the threshold violates the 1945 Constitution and is parliament. If the presidential candidate has harming small parties. PDIP is at the forefront no positive encouragement in the parliament, in supporting the 20 percent of the presidential it can cause problems for this position. In threshold. It puts forward that the 20 percent his first administration between 2004 and can guarantee that the government earns most 2009, the SBY leadership is evidence that the of the parliamentary support (Arkhelaus, government does not have a good relationship 2017). , the PDIP cadre, assumes with the parliament. Rahayu did not want that the 20 percent aim is to guarantee the this experience to happen again in the Jokowi stability of the electoral system for a long- administration. That is why Rahayu still argues time period, not merely for every fve years. that the presidential threshold is essential.1 Hasto Kristiyanto, secretary-general of PDIP, Furthermore, the former chairperson strengthens Widodo’s statement. Kristiyanto of Golkar, , presumes that the states that 20 percent is not to establish a single threshold of 20 percent is reasonable because candidate, but it can increase the quality of the previous elections were taking place in the democracy and stabilise it for policymaking in right way also. It makes sense for Kalla if small the future (Swasty, 2017). parties wish to have a low threshold, and major Arif Wibowo, the PDIP cadre, presumes parties tend to reinforce the high threshold that the 20 percent does not mean that PDIP (Jaramaya, 2017). Thus, John S. Keban, vice- is scared of other presidential candidates. It chairperson of Golkar in Yogyakarta, stresses denotes that the Constitutional Court’s verdict in the election is not merely about the presidential 2013 does not regulate the presidential threshold threshold but also on how the election looks in detail so that it allows the parliament and for the country’s best leader. If a party has no government to formulate the threshold. It chance to nominate its candidate, it can join the can be called an open legal policy (CNN party, which has the potency to nominate the Indonesia, 2017). Hence, Wibowo postulates presidential candidate.2 that the 20 percent is a good commencement The Nasdem party just participated for the government to create a stable coalition in the election once, but it encourages the and, in turn, the government which adopts threshold of 20 percent (Viva, 2017) and rejects the presidential system will be more assertive the assumption that the threshold harms in executing its decisions and operating its small parties. According to Johnny G. Plate, programs (Mursid, 2017a). For PDIP, Wibowo secretary-general of Nasdem, this percentage continues, the ideological and strong coalition demonstrates that the elected president has should have been built since the beginning to robust political power in the parliament. Small have the robust presidential system and the and new parties can unite themselves with the simple multiparty. Therefore, the presidential president coalition (Metro TV, 2018). Plate’s threshold is a must. Otherwise, the coalition is broken while the government is still working. 1 The upshot is that government performance is Interview with Rahayu was on 04 December 2017. 2 Interview with Keban was on 04 December 2017 and inefective (CNN Indonesia, 2017). 29 March 2018.

209 Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 24, Issue 3, March 2021 argument was backed up by Cornus Dwisptha Three Parties Are in the Dilemma Position Hekseko, secretary of Nasdem in Yogyakarta.3 While other parties are in a strong position In addition to that, Teuku Taiqulhadi, a member between approval and denial, three parties face of the expert board of Nasdem, assumes that a dilemma where their cadres have diferent the threshold is enough to represent the people responses. It cannot be separated from the who vote. situation where PPP has a long-term internal conflict, Hanura is scared not to pass the ‘Small parties could join other parliamentary threshold, but it somehow parties to support one candidate should support the Jokowi coalition, and PKPI 20 percent,’ Teuku said to Tirto has no stable internal organisation. (Nathaniel, 2017a). Some cadres of PPP are in the approval position toward the threshold of 20 percent. PKB advocates the PDIP, Golkar, and Achmad Baidowi, vice secretary of PPP, said Nasdem’s positions. Agus Sulistiyono, that the Constitution Court allows the 2014 chairperson of PKB in Yogyakarta, underlines election result for the 2019 election (Septianto, that there is no term of advantaged 2018). Thus, 20 percent avoids the elected or disadvantaged because if a party can president from the parliament’s political trap perform well, it obtains the people’s support. (Puspita, 2017). Likewise, Umaruddin Masdar, the PKB cadre in Yogyakarta, states that if the presidential ‘We did not want the 2019 elected election has many candidates, voters have president to be held hostage by the difculties recognising them one by one so that parliament,’ Asrul Sani, secretary- the 20 percent can help voters to acknowledge general of PPP, said to Antara the small number of the candidates.4 (Jingga, 2017). Nevertheless, although , general chairperson of PKB, already proposed If 20 percent of the presidential threshold the threshold of 10 percent (Nugraheny, 2017), does not meet the agreement, PPP proposes PKB can situate Ma’ruf Amin as the Jokowi another alternative between 10 and 15 percent partner in running for the presidential election. (Ibrahim, 2017). The approval of PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem, Baidowi and Sani’s opinion is rejected and PKB is caused by the fact that they are in the by other PPP cadres such as Lukman Hakim same coalition in nominating the presidential Saifuddin. Saifuddin even rejects the presidential candidate. Moreover, they tend to restrict the threshold since the 2014 election because he emergence of other potential candidates and, argues that the threshold is unconstitutional. He in turn, can guarantee Jokowi as the elected underlines that any percentage is not in line with president for a second-term period because of the 1945 Constitution in Article 6A, which states the small number of the candidates. In other that political parties, and the election participants, words, they are solid in winning the pair of have the same right to nominate the president and Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amien. vice president (Akuntono, 10 July 2013).

‘Article 6A does not mention the minimum requirement of seat or 3 Interview with Hekseko was on 28 November 2017 and vote. The Presidential Election Act 28 April 2018. should understand the main value 4 Interview with Sulistiyono was on 20 November 2017 of the 1945 Constitution,’ Saifuddin and 22 May 2018 while Masdar was on 15 December said to Kompas (Akuntono, 2013). 2017.

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Other PPP cadres strengthen Saifuddin’s for major parties, and the success of PKPI being statement. Syukri Fadholi, the PPP cadre, the election participant is part of the reward rejects the threshold because it violates the of its approval to the threshold of 20 percent. 1945 Constitution. Fadholi also believes that As the cadre in the grassroots, Tapir regrets the Election Act seems to be ruined by the the lousy performance of PKPI due to a lack Jokowi regime. The 20 percent demonstrates of solidity.7 that the existing regime has a big ambition The dilemma position suffered by PPP, to take over the power and eliminates small Hanura, and PKPI can be seen from two and new parties. The 20 percent is not in line interrelated sides. On the one hand, they are in with the people’s interests and real life in the the same coalition with the parties nominating democratic state.5 Jokowi as the presidential candidate. On the other Hanura is also in a dilemma situation. hand, these three parties have an internal confict On the one hand, Hanura should back up that is causing two opposing views toward the the Jokowi coalition, where the coalition presidential threshold: approval and denial. agrees with the threshold of 20 percent. On Thus, they are not in solid agreement. the other hand, this party is concerned that it cannot pass the parliamentary threshold. Nine Parties Concur that the Presidential According to Hasnanto, for the Hanura cadre in Threshold Violates the 1945 Constitution Yogyakarta, anyone can be nominated if there Nine parties reject the presidential is no threshold, and it is very unsafe. Other threshold of 20 or 25 percent. Among them Hanura cadre in Yogyakarta, Abe Nindito are those having the parliamentary seats, Radite, agrees that the 20 percent violates namely Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, and PKS. the 1945 Constitution so that it is okay if all The remaining are small and new parties parties have the same chance to nominate their that fail to reach the threshold: PBB, Perindo, presidential candidates.6 PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda. These parties The dilemma situation in Hanura is also principally concur that the 20 percent violates proven by the internal elite confict in 2017, the 1945 Constitution, harms small parties, and disturbing the party’s solidity and electability. is more benefcial for major parties. Therefore, as Kompas (Tashandra, 2017) and Gerindra is one of the parties which Viva (2017) cited, Hanura wanted to eliminate believes that the threshold violates the the presidential threshold to be zero percent. 1945 Constitution because the presidential Furthermore, as one of the Jokowi coalition candidate primarily can be nominated by parties, PKPI agrees with the threshold of 20 any political parties which were part of percent. Although many small parties reject it, the election participant. Dharma Setiawan, the party with a military family network still secretary of Gerindra in Yogyakarta, thinks supports it (Majid, 2018). Nevertheless, while that the constitution implies that each party the central board of PKPI agrees with the 20 can propose its candidate to be the president. percent, some local cadres reject it. Supri Tapir, Nonetheless, Gerindra is not scared of that the chairperson of PKPI in Yogyakarta City, threshold because this competition does not assumes that the threshold is more benefcial depend on the party power but the candidate image to the public. In , the Anis-Sandi 5 Interview with Fadholi was on 13 December 2017 and case is one of the good examples where the 26 May 2018. party power is not the only driving factor that 6 Interview with Hasnanto was on 03 December 2017 and 02 April 2018 and Radite was on 04 December 2017 and 22 May 2018. 7 Interview with Tapir was on 02 December 2017.

211 Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 24, Issue 3, March 2021 can win the election. Thus, Gerindra is always ‘It is impossible if we nominate ready to fght in the electoral campaign.8 the president in 2019, but we use Likewise, Demokrat asks to change the the result of 2014. If this happens, threshold to zero percent (Simanjuntak, 2017a). the parliament can also use the 2014 result, and we do not need to Demokrat believes that 20 percent is no longer organise the election again,’ Hanaf relevant to the 2019 simultaneous election was annoyed.10 (Prasetia, 2017). The Demokrat’s denial is based on three considerations: the threshold Zulkifi Hassan, the general chairperson is not in line with the 1945 Constitution, it of PAN, reinforces Hanafi’s statement. He hurts democratic values, and it is not logical argues that the presidential threshold should because the 2019 election is simultaneous while be removed from the Election Bill because of the guidance is the previous election. Benny the Constitutional Court verdict No. 14/PUU- K. Harman, the Demokrat politician, who XI/2013 on the 2019 simultaneous election originated from East Nusa Tenggara, claims between president and parliamentary. If the that the more the threshold is restricted, it threshold is not removed, Hassan proposes makes people more apathetic due to limited that the percentage between the president and candidates (Nathaniel, 2017a). parliament is similar to logical consideration According to Didi Irawadi Syamsudin, (Simanjuntak, 2017b). Vice Secretary of the Demokrat, if the 2019 However, PAN already proposed three election is an agreement, the threshold of alternative options regarding the presidential 20 percent refers to what kind of guidance? threshold. The frst option is zero percent (Viva, This is strange. Thus, it is normal if people 2017). The second option is between 10 and 15 eventually presume that the incumbent is percent as the middle ground between two scared and wants to eliminate his opponents contrasting factions: the zero percent faction (CNN Indonesia, 2017). The Demokrat cadre in and the 20-25 percent faction (Mursid, 2017b). Yogyakarta, Heri Sebayang, is in as agreement Otherwise, PAN follows the government option with the other Demokrat politicians who of 20 percent but with quota hare as the vote believe that 20 percent is castrating mainly allocation method (Prasetia, 2017). small parties and preventing them from being Two Islamist parties, PKS and PBB, are 9 able to nominate their presidential candidates. also refusing the realisation of the presidential PAN strengthens the denial position with threshold of 20 percent. PKS rejects it with a three arguments. Firstly, if a party can pass the fourfold argument. First, while new parties are election commission (KPU) verifcation, then emerging, the zero percent of the presidential it should be eligible to nominate its candidate. threshold is appropriate by referring to the Secondly, the threshold of 20 percent restricts 1945 Constitution and the Constitution Court’s citizens’ choices. Thirdly, the threshold seems verdict on the 2019 simultaneous election to beneft the single candidate and gets rid of (Tribun, 2017). Second, zero percent aims to other potential candidates. Ahmad Hanaf Rais, avoid the hegemony of major parties toward the Vice General Chairperson of PAN, states the elected president. Third, 20 percent is not that his party ofcially rejects the threshold of logical for the simultaneous election. Fourth, 20 percent because of those three arguments. 20 percent is more benefcial for major parties and geting rid of small parties. For PKS, such a threshold is detrimental to people. 8 Interview with Setiawan was on 06 December 2017 and 28 May 2018. 9 Interview with Sebayang was on 18 December 2017. 10 Interview with Rais was on 16 December 2017.

212 Ridho Al-Hamdi: Ideological Cleavage under Open-list Proportional Representation: Parties’ Position toward the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Threshold

‘Deleting the presidential threshold chance for Mahendra to run as the presidential makes the election is fairer, and all candidate in the 2019 election (Firmanto, parties can propose their candidates,’ 2017). This is contrary to common sense. The Tifatul Sembiring, former PKS threshold is not applied when the legislative president, said as cited by Tirto and executive elections co-occur (Saubani, (Nathaniel, 2017a). 2017). Mahendra’s argument is strengthened by Ray Sitoresmi Prabuningrat, chairperson Hence, PKS believes that 20 percent of PBB in Yogyakarta. Prabuningrat states tends to beneft a single candidate. According that the 20 percent intends to minimise other to M. Darul Falah, chairperson of PKS in potential candidates so that there are merely Yogyakarta, this is not good for Indonesian two candidates.12 democracy because citizens can only choose Although PBB vehemently denies the between limited candidates. Dwi Budi Utomo, presidential threshold, Mahendra’s position secretary of PKS in Yogyakarta, also underlines is on the Jokowi coalition side. It can be seen that if there is a potential candidate who is with his engagement as the lawyer of Jokowi- not supported by major parties, he/she can Ma’ruf during and after the electoral campaign. be advocated for by small parties.11 These It causes the PBB position in the 2019 election, arguments are strengthened by Hidayat Nur where mainly Muslim communities disbelieve Wahid, chairperson of the Syuro Council it anymore so that the party failed in passing the of PKS. Wahid stresses that if the choices of parliamentary threshold. Thus, the refusal of candidates are limited, we are afraid, many Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, and PKS is afected citizens do not want to give their vote (Firdaus, by the fact that they are in a similar coalition 2017). in nominating , although the Afterward, PBB is one of the leading parties Demokrat seemingly demonstrated its ‘half- in rejecting the presidential threshold. Yusril hearted’ support. Despite part of the Jokowi Ihza Mahendra, the general chairperson of PBB, coalition, PBB atempted to strive for Muslim argues that the threshold is unconstitutional interests in rejecting the presidential threshold and violates the 1945 Constitution Article 6A to earn the popular vote. Regarding the denial point 2 because the legislative and presidential argument of small parties, this article presents elections in 2019 are held simultaneously it further. (Hakim, 2017). Mahendra sued based on the Election Act Article 222 on the presidential Small Parties Reject the Presidential Threshold threshold consisting of 20 percent or 25 percent Due to It Causing Them Harm (Rakhmatulloh, 2017) because this regulation Four small parties reject the presidential harms small parties, including PBB so that threshold: Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda. his party cannot nominate its presidential These four parties are new participants in the candidate (Fachrudin, 2017). 2019 election. Although three parties are part PBB rejects the threshold that is rooted of the government coalition excluding Berkaya, in a twofold consideration: constitutional and they still insist on removing the threshold. political interest. The former is based on the According to Perindo, if the election is held 1945 Constitution Article 6e and 22e so that simultaneously, there are no diferent rights the simultaneous election does not adopt the between old and new parties participating threshold. The latter is because there is no in the legislative and executive elections.

11 Interview with Falah was on 23 November 2017 and 28 April 2018 while Utomo was on 30 March 2018. 12 Interview with Prabuningrat was on 02 December 2017.

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All parties have equal rights. Ahmad Rofq, Afterward, Berkarya and Garuda did secretary-general of Perindo, argues that his not want to worry about the presidential issue party already made a proposal to the special because both are still focused on succeeding their committee of the Election Bill regarding parties in the legislative election. Nonetheless, removing the presidential threshold so that Berkarya rejects the threshold because it has a zero percent should be eliminated from the Bill diferent view of politics with Golkar, where because there is no percentage. Perindo’s denial Golkar is on the Jokowi position while Berkarya is supported by the argument that this threshold is on the Prabowo side. More specifcally, Prio is unconstitutional and only causes major Budisantoso, secretary-general of Berkarya, parties to re-take over the government (INews emphasises that although Berkarya focuses on TV, 2017). Rofq’s argument was reinforced succeeding the legislative election frst, it also by Nanang Sri Roekmadi, chairperson of campaigns to reject the threshold (MNC 104.6 Perindo in Yogyakarta, who states that there Trijaya FM, 2018). is no relationship between the 2014 election Likewise, Sunu Tri Waluyo, secretary of result and the 2019 election. This regulation Garuda in Yogyakarta, puts forward that his gives a public impression that the existence of party has no chance to reject the regulation a threshold is the forced logic.13 because the parliament decided it. Waluyo Similarly, although PSI is part of the presumes that his party is new, while the Jokowi coalition, it assumes that the threshold regulation was decided in 2014. ‘What can we of 20 percent is too high, and new parties cannot do for that?’ Waluyo said.15 Some considerations reach it. According to PSI, if the party already trigger the rejection of Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, succeeded in passing the KPU verification, and Garuda. First, these four parties share the it can nominate its presidential candidate identity as new parties in the 2019 election. (Nathaniel, 2017b). Grace Natali, the general Second, they need to demonstrate their chairperson of PSI, believes that the realisation existence to the public by having their own of such a threshold merely strengthens the presidential candidate. Thus, the threshold oligarchic politics and obstructs citizens’ right of 20 percent can harm their expectation to to elect the best leader (Teresia, 2017). nominate their candidate. The three parties’ distinctive positions ‘The 2014 election result is no longer indicate that non-ideological considerations are appropriate to be the consideration stronger determinants of the parties’ actions in to calculate public aspiration in responding to the presidential threshold. It can the 2019 election because a lot of be proven by some facts. First, if PPP, Hanura, political changes take place during fve years between 2014 and 2019,’ PKPI, PSI, Perindo, PBB, and Garuda are Natali said (Teresia, 2017). consistent with their position inside the Jokowi Coalition, they should be in the approval block. Sigit Nugroho, chairperson of PSI in Second, from an ideological standpoint, PKS Yogyakarta, supports Natali’s statement. and PPP should be in the same position due to Nugroho states that the presidential threshold Islam as their foundation. However, because of 20 percent harms new parties because they both parties are in a different coalition, it cannot nominate their candidates.14 causes a dilemma for PPP. Third, the coalition, whether the Jokowi Coalition or the Prabowo Coalition, is not built ideologically. It was

13 Interview with Roekmadi was on 20 November 2018. 14 Interview with Nugroho was on 30 November 2017. 15 Interview with Waluyo was on 03 November 2017.

214 Ridho Al-Hamdi: Ideological Cleavage under Open-list Proportional Representation: Parties’ Position toward the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Threshold

Table 1. Parties’ Position toward the 2019 Presidential Threshold No Position Arguments Parties • The stable coalition should be built since the beginning to enter the presidential election. • The elected president has a durable power in the parliament. PDIP, Golkar, 1 Approval • It helps citizens to vote for the president due to the small number of Nasdem, PKB candidates. • Small-middle parties could join the existing coalition. • Although these parties reject the presidential threshold, they still approve it due to part to the Jokowi coalition. PPP, Hanura, 3 Dilemma • Some politicians in each of these parties approve the threshold, while others PKPI who reject it are still found. • It violates the 1945 Constitution because parties which passed the KPU verifcation principally can nominate the presidential candidate. Gerindra, • The simultaneous election afects the removal of the presidential threshold. Demokrat, 3 Denial • Zero percent is relevant with the emergence of new parties. PAN, PKS, PBB, • It restricts people’s choices. Perindo, PSI, • It is more benefcial to major parties to be more oligarchic. Berkarya, Garuda • It gives an image that Jokowi has a big ambition to retake power. Source: Compiled by the Author. strengthened by the fact the Prabowo Coalition From an ideological standpoint, the parties’ was wrecked after Gerindra joined the Jokowi position in addressing the 2019 presidential administration. It could be that PAN desires threshold demonstrates that nationalist-secular to join the Jokowi cabinet after the internal parties do not block themselves merely in the confict in the 2019 Congress. Thus, although same cleavage. It is also taking place with pragmatism is part of political parties’ nature nationalist-Muslim and the nationalist-Islamist in gaining power, at least there is a symmetrical parties. They are spreading in all positions. The linkage between ideology, agenda, and actions, approval position consists of nationalist-secular as was theorised by Budge (1994) and Freeden and nationalist-Muslim parties, the dilemma (2013). In other words, there is an unintegrated position encompasses nationalist-Islamist and bond between the party’s ideology and its nationalist-secular parties, while the denial actions. position contains all kinds of political ideology. Although all new parties reject the presidential Conclusion threshold, their denial consideration is not This article provides three different ideological but more pragmatic orientations. cleavages among political parties in addressing From a theoretical view, this article rejects the presidential threshold of 20 percent or 25 Budge (1994) and Freeden’s (2013) hypothesis, percent in the 2019 presidential election. The positing that the ideology can be manifested frst cleavage is the approval position toward in the party’s agenda. The article fnds that the threshold. This is strengthened by mainly the ideology is no longer relevant under the four parties: PDIP, Golkar, PKB, and Nasdem. open-list proportional representation system The second cleavage is the dilemma position adopted in the contemporary Indonesian that takes place in three parties: PPP, Hanura, election. It indicates that the ideological and PKPI. The third cleavage is the denial contestation is waning, as there are no notable position, which is followed by nine parties: differences among parties’ platforms. This Demokrat, PAN, PKS, PBB, Perindo, PSI, article also rejects Mietzner’s (2013) view, Berkarya, and Garuda. which argued that Indonesian parties have an

215 Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 24, Issue 3, March 2021 ideological foundation. In contrast, the article www.youtube.com/watch?v=pHo_ verifies Ufen (2009) and Al-Hamdi’s (2017) wInJUhI&feature=youtu.be thesis, which posit that the political ideology Creswell, J. W. (2013). Qualitative inquiry is feeble and waning. Therefore, the ideology and research design: Choosing among fve is not applicable when parties address power approaches, Third Edition. Thousand Oaks, issues. Instead, the ideology is revived when United States: Sage Publications. parties cope with religious and ethnic issues. Croissant, A., & Völkel, P. (2012). Party system types and party system References institutionalization: Comparing new Akuntono, I. (2013, 10 July). PPP: “Presidential democracies in East and Southeast Asia. threshold” inkonstitusional. Kompas. Party Politics, 18(2), 235-265. htps://doi. Retrieved from htps://nasional.kompas. org/10.1177/1354068810380096 com/read/2013/07/10/1700057/PPP. Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2011). Presidential.Threshold.Inkonstitusional Introduction: The discipline and practice Al-Hamdi, R. (2017). Indonesian political ideology: of qualitative research. In Denzin, N. K., Political parties and local governance in & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.), The sage handbook Yogyakarta Municipality 1998-2015. Baden- of qualitative research (pp. 1-19). Thousand Baden: Tectum. Oaks, United States: Sage. Ambardi, K. (2008). The making of the Indonesian Fachrudin, F. (2017, 05 September). Yusril multiparty system: A cartelized party system resmi gugat ambang batas pencalonan and its origin. PhD Dissertation, Columbus, presiden ke MK. Kompas. Retrieved Ohio State University. from https://nasional.kompas.com/ Arkhelaus. (2017, 22 June). PDIP lobi partai read/2017/09/05/12052231/yusril-resmi- soal ambang batas pencalonan presiden. gugat-ambang-batas-pencalonan- Tempo. Retrieved from htps://nasional. presiden-ke-mk tempo.co/read/886740/pdip-lobi-partai- Feith, H. (1957). The Indonesian election of 1955. soal-ambang-batas-pencalonan-presiden New York, Cornell University Ithaca. Baswedan, A. R. (2004). Political Islam in Fionna, U. (2013). The institutionalisation Indonesia: Present and future trajectory. of political parties in post-Authoritarian Asian Survey, 44(5), 669-690. htps://doi. Indonesia: From the grassroots up. org/10.1525/as.2004.44.5.669 Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Budge, I. (1994). A new spatial theory of party Press. competition: Uncertainty, ideology and Firdaus, R. F. (2017, 18 October). PKS takut policy equilibria viewed comparatively golput menang di pemilu 2019 jika pakai and temporally. British Journal of Political ambang batas capres 20 persen. Merdeka. Science, 24(4), 443-467. Retrieved from https://www.merdeka. Choi, J. (2010). District magnitude, social com/politik/pks-takut-golput-menang- diversity and Indonesia’s parliamentary di-pemilu-2019-jika-pakai-ambang-batas- party system from 1999 to 2009. Asian capres-20-persen.html Survey, 50(4), 663-83. https://doi. Firmanto, D. (2017, 07 August). 2 alasan Yusril org/10.1525/as.2010.50.4.663 Ihza bakal ajukan uji materi UU Pemilu. CNN Indonesia. (2017, 20 June). Prime Tempo. Retrieved from htps://nasional. News: Apakah presiden takut bersaing tempo.co/read/897735/2-alasan-yusril- di 2019? Retrieved from https:// ihza-bakal-ajukan-uji-materi-uu-pemilu

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