Ethical Record The Proceedings of the Conway Hall Ethical Society Vol. 119 No. 3 £1.50 March 2014 EDITORIAL - CRAVEN EDUCATION OFFICIALS COLLUDE WITH CREATIONISTS

Knowledge of our current understanding of the four billion year history of the evolution of life on earth must be essential for any qualification in biology if it’s to be worth the paper it’s written on. It’s emerged (see NSS website) that not only the exam boards but also education officials agreed to redact questions on evolution in biology exams to satisfy head-in-sand creationist schools wishing to ‘protect’ their innocent charges from those ‘dangerous ideas’ (Dan Dennett). The exam boards should simply refuse to allow any exam centre to use their Biology GCSE if some questions are being deleted. Note: Correct answers may demand

knowledge of evolution, which should therefore be taught, but do not demand assent to it – the exam inee’ s opinion, quite ri ghtly, rem ains th e ir own. NB.

f a

Absence of resurrection stories in the earliest complete Bibles (see page 3)

HOW THE CHURCH CHANGED ITS TEXTS Peter Cresswell 3 h H KANT AND OBJECTIVE MORALITY Ralph Walker 10

VIEWPOINTS C Purnell (2), T Rubens, D Langdown, G Bond, D Ibry 14

A FEW THOUGHTS ON ATHEISM Nigel Sinnott 16

HUMANIST PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVACY Frank Furedi 18

LIBRARY ADDITION S Cathy Broad 23

FORTHCOMING EVENTS 24

CONWAY HALL ETHICAL SOCIETY Conway Hall Humanist Centre 25 Red Lion Square, London WC1R 4RL. www.conwayhall.org.uk Chairman: Liz Lutgendorff; Vice-Chair: Giles Enders Treasurer: Carl Harrison; Editor: Norman Bacrac Please email texts and viewpoints for the Editor to: [email protected] Staff Chief Executive Officer: Jim Walsh Tel: 020 7061 6745 [email protected] Administrator: Martha Lee Tel: 020 7061 6741 [email protected] Finance Officer: Linda Lamnica Tel: 020 7061 6740 [email protected] Librarian: Catherine Broad Tel: 020 7061 6747 [email protected] Hon. Archivist: Carl Harrison carl @ethicalsoc.org.uk Programme: Sid Rodrigues Tel: 020 7061 6744 [email protected] Lettings Officer: Carina Dvorak Tel: 020 7061 6750 [email protected] Sunday Events: Donna Yeates Caretakers: Eva Aubrechtova (i/c) Tel: 020 7061 6743 [email protected] together with: Brian Biagioni, Sean Foley, Tony Fraser, Rogerio Retuerma Maintenance: Zia Hameed Tel: 020 7061 6742 [email protected]

New Members The Society welcomes the following new members: Jeremy Abraham, Hants; Emma Bell, Hertfordshire; Laura Clarke, London; David Deacon, London; Lynette Densham, London; Peter Dieckmann, London; Erin Dopp, London; James Edwards, London; Philippa Evans, London; Rachel Fay, London; Willemien Hoogendoom, London; Christopher Horlock, East Sussex; Judith Irwin, London; Bill Keenan, London; Ian Khouv, London; George Lee, Essex; Alex Maguire, Berkshire; Patrick Mbanefo, London; Darian Mitchell, London; Jenny Morgan, London; Omar Sheikho Murad, London; Amma Owusu-Atuahene, London; Martin Robbins, Berkshire; John Rockel, London; Nikola Sivacki, London; Piper Tiger-Moon, London; Martin Wallington, High Wycombe.

If you have any suggestions for speakers or event ideas, or would like to convene a Sunday afternoon informal, get in touch with Sid Rodrigues at [email protected] or 020 7061 6744.

Correction. The title of Rumy Hasan’s book (ER Feb p20) should be: The Clash between Islamism and Zionism.

CONWAY HALL ETHICAL SOCIETY Reg. Charity No. 1156033 Founded in 1793, the Society is a progressive movement whose aims are: the study and dissemination of ethical principles based on humanism and freethought the cultivation of a rational and humane way of life, and the advancement of research and education in relevant fields. We invite to membership those who reject supernatural creeds and are in sympathy with our aims. At Conway Hall the programme includes Sunday lectures, discussions, evening courses and the Conway Hall Sunday Concerts of chamber music. The Society maintains a Humanist Library and Archives. The Society’s journal, Ethical Record , is issued monthly. Memorial meetings may be arranged. The annual subscription is £35 (£25 if a full-time student, unwaged or over 65)

2 Ethical Record, March 2014 HOW THE CHURCH CHANGED ITS TEXTS Peter Cresswell , author of The Invention of Jesus Summary of a lecture given to the Ethical Society, 8 December 2013 The original authors of the gospels introduce many changes to the life story and character of Jesus, a Jewish, messianic rebel leader. There was, however, a significant final phase in the reconstruction of Jesus’s persona. This was when, in the mid fourth century, following the Emperor Constantine’s decision to embrace Christianity alongside existing pagan religions, there was the opportunity to disseminate the Christian message under the auspices of Rome. It represented also a last opportunity to review and revise the text before it became so widely spread that further deliberate change would be untenable. The Codex Sinaiticus There are two surviving bibles, with complete or almost complete texts of the New Testament, from this early period. I found that one of the manuscripts, Codex Sinaiticus, although riddled with a vast number of corrections, was not left abandoned as previously supposed but was effectively completed. This happened through the first of the correctors, designated as ‘ca’, who carefully went through the manuscript and picked up very nearly all the mistakes made by the scribes. But rather than being a later corrector, after an uncompleted manuscript had been abandoned and ignored for many years, this was a contemporary worker, the diorthotes or scriptorium corrector. It is estimated that the cost of such a bible, using many hundreds of animal skins undergoing complex preparation and involving hundreds or even thousands of hours of scribal time, would have run in today’s money to perhaps half a million pounds. The combination of haste, shown by the number and kind of errors, and then careful correction, suggests that the manuscript was needed urgently for some great purpose. The very fact of its survival over the centuries, taken finally to a fortified monastery at Mount Sinai, bears this out. It was, I suggest, created and kept as a master copy, from which to make further approved copies, to serve communities in the Roman Empire. The Codex Vaticanus Developing a method, based on the analysis of errors in copying, I discovered that the second great manuscript from the mid fourth century, Codex Vaticanus, which has been in the Vatican library at least since the first catalogue in 1475, had to have been copied from a common proximate – that is, immediate – exemplar. Furthermore, there were some key indicators that it was in fact, for the majority of the New Testament, copied from Codex Sinaiticus itself. This put the focus back on Codex Sinaiticus, the greater part of which is now held in the British Library. There is a very curious feature of this manuscript, for which no one has yet provided a satisfactory explanation. In the Old Testament, at first four main scribes were identified by characteristics in their styles of writing. It turned out that analysts were misled by form, and the work attributed to one was done by the other scribes. So there were only three: scribes A, B and D.

Ethical Record, March 2014 3 In the historical books of the Old Testament, scribes A and D worked as a team, with one scribe undertaking a book or part of a book and the other going on ahead a number of pages to write the next part. Sometimes this created problems when the scribe going ahead miscalculated how far to go in the exemplar, from which they were copying, leaving the following scribe with either too much or too little space to fill in the copy. So text had, in consequence, either to be stretched out by the following scribe, with fewer characters per line, or crammed in, with more characters per line and sometimes more lines to a page. In the New Testament, scribe A did almost all the work. At the end, the plan (although it did not entirely work out) seems to have been for one last great push, with each of the three scribes tackling a single book. The curious feature is that scribe D made a contribution not of books or of parts of books, as in the Old Testament, but just three single sheets. Codex Sinaiticus was constructed by binding together a series of quires, consisting of four sheets laid on top of each other and stitched through the middle. Individual quires were thus made up of eight folios, each with a recto and verso and so in all 16 pages. It would have been potentially messy to write on a quire that had already been stitched and folded, so the pages were probably written first and the stitching done later. The previously accepted explanation for the sheets by scribe D was that these were corrections for some very major blunders by scribe A, who wrote all the surrounding text. The proposition was that these errors were so extensive that they simply could not be dealt with on the page by the normal processes of correction. If you look at the diagram (fig 1), you will see that there are four possible positions for a sheet. Scribe D’s three sheets, in three quires widely separated within the text, were in different positions: second from bottom, third from bottom and the middle sheet consisting of folios four and five.

Fig. 1

4 Ethical Record, March 2014 One sheet is entirely within Matthew, while another has text from I Thessalonians on its first folio and from Hebrews on its second folio. The third sheet, the middle sheet of quire 77, runs from the end of Mark to the beginning of Luke. Now it is certainly true that these sheets show indications of major adjustments. All three have columns in both folios where the text is substantially squeezed up, to contain well above the average for the book as a whole (that is 625 characters per column). In fact, this compression is for the most part extreme, matched only in two other places in the New Testament, in Acts and Revelation. More than a third of scribe D’s sheets are densely packed (at over 670 characters per column) compared with only 3 per cent for the rest of the New Testament. Many Questions Arise So that apparently resolves it; scribe A accidentally left out huge chunks of text, too much for corrections in the margin and the sheets had to be rewritten afterwards, cramming the text back in. However, this still leaves a lot that needs to be explained, but is unfortunately not explained. Why is there, as well some cramming, also some very major stretching out in the mid-quire bifolium that has the transition from Mark to Luke? The presumed mistakes in Matthew are not as substantial as in the other sheets, judging by the amount of compression. So why were these not dealt with, as they could have been, by means of marginal corrections? Why is there an unusual association of errors by scribe A at the end of columns, just before scribe D began his sheets? If these were simply correction sheets, it has to be presumed that scribe A would have had (at the time) no awareness of the points at which another scribe would ultimately be coming in to redo the work.

Just before the very end of two of his sheets in Matthew and Hebrews, scribe D abruptly switched from major compression to stretching out. If he had a first attempt by his fellow scribe before him, he should have been able to see how the text fitted and so avoid any need for last ditch fine tuning. So, once again, what is the explanation for this? The biggest problem, however, the most insuperable obstacle to the theory of correction sheets, is this. Let us assume that scribe A did make an unusual, uncharacteristic error in Matthew, missing out text amounting to about 10 lines. How did it come about that he just happened to make a similar error (which is otherwise very infrequent in the text) in the second half of the same, discontinuous bifolium? How did he coincidentally miss out about 18 lines in I Thessalonians and then another 28 lines in Hebrews, in the second half of this also discontinuous bifolium? Unusual compression in both halves of these discontinuous bifolia, is extremely unlikely to have happened by chance and is not explained by the theory of replacement sheets. I struggled with this, and an even odder sequence of compression and stretching in the Mark – Luke bifolium, for long hours, because I believed that the current orthodoxy must be correct.

Ethical Record, March 2014 5 My Theory And then I asked myself, ‘What if these sheets were not correction sheets at all, but simply represented an alternation of work, as had happened in the Old Testament? Now, this would have been an odd arrangement. Why would another scribe have taken away, or been given, just one whole sheet to work on? It would not have been a particular help; in fact, it created a problem for scribe A to calculate his points of reentry to the text, two for each of the discontinuous sheets and one for the Mark-Luke bifolium. It would have neither given scribe A much of a break, nor significantly reduced his overall work load. But the strange thing is that this theory does explain quite well all the otherwise inexplicable features associated with scribe D’s three sheets. The unusual compression in both folios, for example, can now be explained by the problems generated by one scribe (scribe A) going ahead, miscalculating how much text could be comfortably accommodated in each of the other scribe’s folios and so, in consequence, choosing the wrong points to pick up with the text in the exemplar. The errors just before the second scribe (scribe D) took over are, by and large, what might be expected. A weak point in the team effort, as for example quite often happens in a relay. Distraction, a lack of attention, and someone drops the baton. And now there are also no improbable, hypothetical errors involving sometimes hundreds of characters that need to be explained. Scribe D’s slight over-cramming and then later adjustment at the end of his sheets is just what we would expect to find if he had an exemplar to work from and a point to work up to, but not a first attempt by his fellow scribe.

         

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Fig. 2, showing the errors of Iotacism

6 Ethical Record, March 2014 This is all very useful but it is, of course, not sufficient. What would have been the point of such an unusual arrangement between the scribes for just one sheet at a time? There is the glimmer of a possible explanation in some features of the first occasion when scribe A, working his way through the New Testament, encountered a point where scribe D was to take over. This was in Matthew. As scribe A approached the point of transition, he appeared to go to pieces, making an uncharacteristically large number of what have been described as errors of iotacism. That is, he far more often than usual shortened dipthongs, such as AI to E and EI to I. This continued up to and beyond the first folio written by scribe D and then before and after the second folio that formed part of scribe D’s bifolium (fig 2). Scribe A also twice made mistakes, just before the second scribe took over, at the very bottom of the fourth column of the verso of the folio he was working on. It is something that is hard to explain purely as coincidence. In the first instance, just before folio two of quire 75, scribe A skipped some text, missing out the phrase ‘do you not remember’, three lines from the end. In the second instance, at the very bottom of the page, after the last character had been written, he missed out a whole verse. Scribe A, I suggest, was under some stress. This is associated in the text with scribe D’s intervention and therefore quite possibly causally related. Was there something that scribe A was asked to write but did not want to? Did his colleague scribe D take over a sheet at this point to ease scribe A’s predicament? An alternation of work would, for example, certainly account for the missing verse. Scribe A would have informed scribe D of the point he had reached before folio seven of the quire: verse 35 of chapter 24 of Matthew. But this opens the way for a common type of mistake in communication. Did he mean he had just got up to – or had just completed – verse 35? It seems he failed to make it clear and so the scribes between them missed out a whole verse. Characteristic Decoration Another small, but possibly very significant, pointer is provided by the decorative coronis at the end of the gospel of Matthew. These decorations were characteristic for each scribe. You can see in the diagram (fig 3 - see page 8) typical examples for each of the scribes - A, B and D – and also the coronis provided at the end of Matthew. This does not match any of the characteristic styles of the other scribes. It was a strictly observed convention that the last scribe actually doing the writing at the end of a particular book signed it off, whether or not he had written all of it. He did this by providing his own decorative signature and a decorative title, which in this case would have been KATA MA ΘΘ AION, according to Matthew, to complete the colophon. But in this case the title is completely missing and the decorative signature, the coronis , is wrong. So I suggest that scribe A, who was working on the book at this point, declined to sign it off and this work was done later by some other person, such as the scriptorium corrector, following on. My best explanation is

Ethical Record, March 2014 7 Fig. 3 that the purpose of scribe D’s interventions was to introduce changes to the exemplar that scribe A was following, from competing sources that scribe A might well have felt had inferior provenance. By this means the Church was able to reinforce its doctrines and also introduce a final refining of the picture it presented of Jesus and his relationship with the Jewish community from which he came. There are, as you will have anticipated, some really hotly controversial aspects that just happen to be found within the three sheets written out by scribe D. It is possible to see, with the first sheet in Matthew, what may have discomfited scribe A there. What the scribe would have ended up writing, had he continued on a few more lines, was the famous statement attributed to Jesus, giving the Church a claim for succession back to the followers of Jesus through Simon Peter:

8 Ethical Record, March 2014 And I tell you, you are Peter and on this rock I will build my Church and the gates of Hades will not overcome it (or you) This statement is not in Mark, from which Matthew copied. Nor is it in Luke, who was at this stage in the narrative also following Mark. There is no reference anywhere else in the New Testament to Jesus founding a church. He was indeed a Jew, attending the temple and observing the Jewish Law. So it is probable that this element was added later to the text, in the second century. And I suggest that it may not have been in scribe A’s exemplar and that he (much nearer to the time these manuscripts were written) was aware that the alternative version it was proposed to use was of inferior provenance. Hence, his apparent anxiety when, on the first occasion, he was confronted with the prospect of having his text substituted. As for the other two sheets by scribe D, the controversial text associated with these is dealt with in some detail in my book, The Invention of Jesus . In the Mark – Luke bifolium, I have suggested the objective was to exclude an ending of Mark that was in scribe A’s exemplar. The Resurrection Verses Are Not In The Two Codices The outcome is that, in Codex Sinaiticus and Codex Vaticanus, Mark stops short. So the 12 verses describing a miraculous resurrection, which most scholars acknowledge were a second century addition, are not there. But, neither are the verses from scribe A’s exemplar that may have told a different story. In the first folio of the third sheet, a passage may have been introduced – offensive perhaps to scribe A then, as it is to us now – stating that it was the Jews and not the Romans who had killed Jesus. This would have been a welcome adjustment for the former persecutors who had become the Church’s new sponsors. My theory of an alternation of work for the three sheets by scribe D is, I believe, the best available, in that it provides the best fit with all of the evidence. As to why this was done, I can only offer a suggested explanation, based on content and scribe A’s erratic behaviour, which does not of course reach the level of a proof. I want to end by emphasising one point. My aim, in analysing the texts, has been to find the theory or theories that provide the best explanation for the evidence as a whole. This contrasts with a Christian, apologetic approach where the objective is often to provide support for what is already believed. So evidence that fits, or can be made to fit, is accepted while evidence that does not is disregarded, or put aside as something that is just inexplicable. Any theory that might undermine some cherished doctrinal tenet has to be attacked, regardless of its merits. This may be why so little real progress has been made in New Testament textual analysis over a very long period. There are real discoveries to be made – but probably not in the still-hallowed grounds of religious academia.

Ethical Record, March 2014 9 KANT AND OBJECTIVE MORALITY Ralph Walker Lecture to the Ethical Society, 16 February 2014 Kant is often misunderstood, because his efforts to make things simple result in needless complication. This is particularly true in his best-known work in moral philosophy, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). Many have understood this as an austere exaltation of formal, rigoristic Duty. Others have thought it so abstract as to lack any real content at all. He holds that morality is objective, obtaining in its own right, independently of what anyone thinks or feels about it. It is a law for all rational beings, not just for us; it cannot be derived from human nature, because it would apply to extraterrestrials as well. There is something compelling about it, in a way there never is for ordinary matters of fact. If one grasps the conception of morality at all, one cannot just be indifferent to it. One may not act on what morality requires, but one will be conscious of an impulsion towards doing so. To take something to be a moral requirement is to be prepared to act on it if other things are equal – though because of other desires one may choose to do something else instead. Kant’s Imperatives Are Known To Us A Priori Moral truths are thus commands, despite their objective character. More recent philosophers call them prescriptive requirements; Kant calls them imperatives . But they are not the commands of God; they command us in their own right, independent of any attitude we may have towards God. They cannot be learnt from experience; they must be known a priori , independently of experience, in the way that we know logical and mathematical truths, and other principles – like the principle of induction – on which we have to rely to interpret our experience. These principles too are really imperatives: objective imperatives. So it will not do to dismiss Kant’s objective moral imperatives by saying that they would have to be ‘queer’, and ‘unlike anything else in the universe’ (J.L. Mackie). We follow objective imperatives a great deal of the time. He calls the moral law a Categorical Imperative, ‘categorical’ because the requirements it places on us hold in their own right, and aren’t simply instructions on how best to fulfil objectives we may happen to have. The basic requirement is: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”. A ‘maxim’ is a ‘subjective principle of action’ – roughly, an intention. This might mean: you should only act on intentions you would be happy for everyone else to act on in similar circumstances. But if ‘in similar circumstances’ means ‘in exactly similar circumstances’ it rules out virtually nothing. If it means ‘in circumstances that are very broadly similar’ it means we must adhere to rigid rules; never lie, never break a promise, under no circumstances kill yourself, and so on. Kant’s examples encourage this interpretation. But that is because he is oversimplifying. In his Metaphysics of Morals (1797) he makes this clear, raising ‘Casuistical Questions’ - discussions of difficult cases where simple rules will not apply. 10 Ethical Record, March 2014 His initial statement of the Categorical Imperative is itself misleading. “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” is naturally read as though ‘will’ meant the same as ‘want’. It does not, though Kant does not make this clear. It means ‘want rationally’ ; and since Kant equates pure practical reason with morality, it means ‘want morally’ . In one of his own examples, the maxim of neglecting one’s talents for the sake of having fun is said to be ruled out because, as a rational being, one necessarily wills that one’s talents be developed: in other words, because developing one’s talents is a duty . So there is hidden content in that first formulation of the Categorical Imperative. He makes that explicit in another formulation, which he says is equivalent: “Act in such a way that you treat every rational being, whether in your own person or in that of another, never simply as a means but always as an end”. To neglect one’s talents is to treat oneself as a means to the end of enjoyment. To exploit other people, e.g. by cheating them, is to treat them as means to one’s own ends. But in the Groundwork Kant leaves this vague. In later works it becomes clearer: what the moral law requires is that we pursue perfection and happiness, and thus promote the ideal that he calls the Highest Good. That is a state of the world in which perfection and happiness are jointly maximized, in a way that ensures that each rational being enjoys happiness in direct proportion to its virtue. Kant’s Definition of Happiness By ‘happiness’ he means the most effective satisfaction of someone’s needs and desires over the long term, not the satisfying of short-term inclinations or of desires that are immoral, or desires that conflict with others that are deeper and more important to the person concerned. By ‘perfection’ he means (a) the cultivation of talents and capacities: hence the need to promote education for oneself and for others; (b) “the cultivation of morality in us”. By this he does not mean just the cultivation of moral behaviour . Moral behaviour is behaviour that is consistent with what the moral law requires: Kant calls such behaviour right , or in accordance with duty , but he also says that agents “lack moral worth” if their behaviour is merely consistent with what the moral law requires. Morality takes the form of an objective imperative, which all rational beings are aware of: an agent has moral worth only when she acts “out of respect for the law”, i.e. acts because she sees that the moral law requires her to act in this way. Kant does not mean that someone has moral worth only if they act from duty despite a strong desire to do otherwise. Someone can perfectly well act both from duty and from inclination: the important thing is that the motive of duty must be in control. There is a parallel here with what Aristotle thinks about practical wisdom ( phronesis ), which can act as a second-order motive preventing the kind and friendly agent from acting out of kindness when that would be inappropriate (helping a terrorist). Kant and Aristotle both agree that helping people just because one enjoys it is a dangerous propensity to have: it must be under the control of a second-order motive, duty (Kant) or practical wisdom (Aristotle). Kant would presumably agree with Aristotle that the second-order motive need not always be conscious. What matters is that it

Ethical Record, March 2014 11 should be in control of one’s inclinations, stopping one from helping the terrorist. Kant’s Conception of Duty So Kant’s conception of duty does not exclude feeling, nor is it unreasonably demanding: it is closer to Aristotelian virtue than is generally thought. He does not deny the value of cultivating those character-dispositions that make us kindly, courageous, fair-minded. But unlike some modern virtue ethicists he does not consider those dispositions valuable for their own sake. They can be misdirected if not under the control of duty. And he differs from Aristotle in holding that duty (unlike practical wisdom) consists in following the law of pure reason, known independently of experience. He rightly rejects consequentialist systems, like utilitarianism, which tell us to promote an end, like happiness. For they place the source of value in that ultimate end. The moral law does tell us to promote an end – the Highest Good. But the Highest Good has no independent value of its own, independent of the moral law. It gets its value from the fact that the moral law requires us to promote it. It must be that way round, because morality is prescriptive: what makes it morality is that it places requirements upon agents. So, even if the only requirement that it placed upon us were to maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest number, would Kant not be right to say that it is that requirement that is the source of value, and that happiness gets its value from the requirement to promote it? Thus Kant’s moral philosophy should not be dismissed. It fits well with our moral intuitions. But Kant does claim that morality is a matter of imperatives that are objective , independent of anything that people think or feel about them. How can he defend that claim to objectivity?

Why Kant Claims Morality is ‘Objective’ He says it is too fundamental for any kind of proof: the moral law is basic in the sphere of practical reason, just as our a priori theoretical principles are basic in the sphere of theoretical reason. One always has to presuppose something in order to get started (cf. Descartes, who presupposes that he is not mad). So we cannot establish its objectivity positively: “nothing is left but defence ”, that is, to answer the arguments of those who claim that it is not objective. And that is very much how the question needs to be seen in our own day, as well as in Kant’s. Philosophy always has to start from somewhere. In general it starts from common sense, and rejects common sense only when there are good reasons for doing so. Kant starts from “the common rational knowledge of morality” – commonsense thoughts about morality, refined by rational reflection on them; so do Plato and Aristotle and Bentham. It is hard to see where else to start from. And it is a part of this commonsense view of morality that it is objective, independent of anything we think or feel about it. As already noted, there is no force in the objection that the idea of an objective imperative should be rejected as “quite unlike anything else in the universe”. It is not, and anyway it would not be surprising if the Moral Law did have a unique position.

12 Ethical Record, March 2014 People say morality cannot be objective because it varies between places and times. But so does science. Our scientific understanding improves as time goes on, through reflection and experience; so does our moral understanding, cf. on women’s rights. Apparently barbaric practices can commonly be understood by filling in the background beliefs of those concerned, e.g. on human sacrifice. The most serious objection to the idea that morality is objective is that our moral attitudes can be explained in some other way than by supposing their truth. Thus Hume sought to explain them in terms of natural feelings of self-love and sympathy, together with the workings of social pressure. Now people argue that evolution produces a degree of altruism in many species including ours. Neither Hume nor the evolutionists can give a satisfactory account of the fact that morality is universal and requires us to treat everyone as ends in themselves. Extending the Scope of Morality Evolutionary accounts have difficulty with explaining why we should be concerned, as morality requires us to be, for the whole human race. Even if they could, they would not explain why we should extend our concern to all rational beings , something Kant seems clearly right about. Hume offers a plausible account of how our sympathies extend beyond families and friends, but he cannot explain is why we should feel the same concern for people remote in time or place. He recognizes the problem, but all he can say is that our sympathies cannot extend that far, only our words can. This is plainly unsatisfactory. The imperative to treat all rational beings as ends in themselves is central to Kant; and should be to us. Rational beings derive their value from the moral law, which prescribes this objective imperative to us. The moral law is the source of all moral value; and the good will is the will to follow that law.

A NEW MOMENTUM FOR PEACE: NO SYRIA INTERVENTION - WHAT NEXT? A Major Uniting for Peace Conference - Saturday, 29th March , 2014 Spring Conference 12 - 4:30pm (1:00pm - 2:00pm lunch) Wesley’s Chapel, 49 City Road, London EC1Y 1AU Free public meeting - all welcome Chair: Rita Payne, Commonwealth Journalists Association Speakers: Tim Llewellyn, Former BBC Middle East Correspondent Baria Alamuddin, Foreign Editor, Al Hayat Dilip Hiro, Journalist, Commentator and Middle East Expert Cilina Nasser, Amnesty International [TBC] Vijay Mehta, Chair Uniting for Peace The speakers will explore how UK should develop a new ethical foreign policy based on ‘soft power’ and UN institutions, following the historic Parliamentary vote rejecting military action against Syria.

Ethical Record, March 2014 13 VIEWPOINTS Another View of Ataturk As mentioned in the Editorial ( Ethical Record Feb 2014 p1), Ataturk may have been responsible for establishing Turkey as a secular state. But he was a dictator as well as a moderniser and some of the Turkish modernisers in the early part of the 20th century were responsible for the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Armenians. Moreover, the military men responsible for this ‘unknown’ genocide were, until recently at any rate, often commemorated on Turkish street names and such like. It is important that we condemn the early 20th century genocide of Armenians with the same vigour that we condemn the holocaust of Jews in the 1940s or the Khmer Rouge’s genocide of Cambodian people in the 1970s. Chris Purnell – Orpington The Meritocratic Outlook In reply to Peter Wilkinson’s challenge to my advocacy of a meritocratic society (Viewpoints, ER February 2014 p16), I note that he focuses on the linkage between merit and economic reward. But this focus is too exclusionary. Yes, in many cases (though not, in fact, in all) people are paid more for doing jobs which require a higher level of skill and responsibility. However, pay is not the only factor in the meritocratic outlook. That outlook’s basic and most important tenet is that positions requiring exceptional ability should only be held by people possessing that ability. It is in this way that the outlook has consistently challenged the whole mentality founded on social privilege and the socially-biased selection of people to fill high positions. Also, the tenet applies to all occupational contexts, whether high pay is involved or not. Further, and even more broadly, it applies to all activities, paid or otherwise, where advanced capacity is called for. Hence, if Peter disagrees that a meritocratic society is the best kind, he is in effect saying that the best kind is that in which activities are not matched to ability to perform them: that is, precisely the problem endemic in all non-meritocratic societies. A genuine meritocratic society would indeed display a measure of inequality in income, though this need not and should not be very large; but it would also display disparity of a non-economic kind i.e difference in degree of praise and esteem accorded to individuals in relation to their personal attainments. Neither kind of disparity is lacking in ‘humane’ quality, or is a way to ‘punish’ those who do not have exceptional capacity. Moreover, even if economic differences were completely done away with, the non-economic kind would still remain — as long, at any rate, as people went on possessing critical faculties. In this situation, ‘resentment’ might well persist, but that would not point to faultiness in the people who were its object. As a postscript to the above, I agree with Jay Ginn (Viewpoints, ER February 2014, p20) that distinctive ability is only one of several factors which make a society tick: certainly, many different kinds of activity are needed in an active and vibrant community. Nonetheless, the endorsement of this point, and the pursuit of general social justice, should not mean a de-valuing of extraordinary capacity and achievement; and the only way to maximise the possibility of such achievement, as of much else, is to have equality of opportunity. Tom Rubens, London N4

14 Ethical Record, March 2014 Is A ‘Citizen’s Income’ Utopian? Hopefully, a minimum ‘Citizen’s Income’ is what the welfare state is meant to provide, a system which we would all support, but humanists cannot afford to support some naïve utopia put forward in Jay Ginn’s letter ( ER Feb 2014 p20). A simple test: if everyone were paid the same regardless of the skill, effort or risk involved, how would teachers motivate their pupils? Who is going to volunteer to work on an oil-rig in the North Sea? Donald Langdown - Orpington Beyond Equality of Opportunity The thrust of Jay Ginn’s Viewpoint ( ER Feb 2014 p20), namely her case for a Citizen’s Income payable unconditionally to all legally resident for a number of years, will be welcome to many. However the Equality Act 2010, to cite it correctly, did not introduce the provision for “men and women employed in the same company, doing work rated as ‘equivalent’ in terms of skill and demands” to receive equal pay. This provision, work rated as equivalent via a job evaluation scheme, in fact arose under predecessor legislation – the Equal Pay Act 1970 (see, eg, England v. Bromley LBC 1978, Industrial Case Reports p1, Employment Appeal Tribunal). But, of course, the equal pay provisions, and, indeed, the large part of anti- discrimination legislation, have now all been consolidated into the Equality Act 2010 and anyone bringing a case should refer to that Act. Chris Purnell – Orpington Note: On Wednesday 19 March 1900h, the Rational Parliament will debate the above issues at Conway Hall {Ed.} Don’t Forget the Evolutionary View Richard Frith Godbehere’s article (Do you really know how you feel? ER Jan 14 p15) misses an angle that, in my view, is vital: the evolutionary programming of our sentiments and emotions for life in the Pleistocene. It is a commonplace that fear (for example) is part of the fight or flight response. Similarly, feelings of disgust against excrement and vomit are a universal. But there is much more – notably for regulating behaviour in a social species like ours. So, in a world without a police force, the need to maintain in-group equilibrium evolved feelings of outrage and revenge against norm breakers (for example). It evolved feelings of hostility and wariness towards out-groups. It evolved strong feelings to protect in-group identity and territoriality. The list goes on. Geoff Bond (Evolutionary Lifestyle Anthropologist) – Chlorakas, Cyprus Can One Define Atheism? I notice the variety of definitions of atheism in the February 2014 ER . How could one define what does not exist? Religion, all religions, are very dangerous because not only do they preach the reality of phantoms but they convince people to kill and kill themselves in the name of those phantoms. David Ibry - London

The views expressed in this Journal are not necessarily those of the Society.

Ethical Record, March 2014 15 ESSAY - A FEW THOUGHTS ON ATHEISM Nigel Sinnott Life member of C.H.E.S living in New South Wales, Australia I have enjoyed the correspondence about atheism in the January and February issues of the E.R .; and, as I am a grumpy curmudgeon on the cusp of threescore years and ten 1, and have been an atheist for about sixty of these, I wonder if I may contribute my penn’orth. I do not find the tags weak or strong helpful in explaining my atheism. I am an atheist because I do not believe in the existence of God (alias Jehovah, Yahweh and Allah), gods and goddesses. I do not know that these entities do not exist, and I am more confident about not believing in God than in the others because an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good deity seems an obscene absurdity in a world I see full of suffering and injustice. (But in high theory my perceptions of the world around me may be a total delusion.) I have almost always described myself as a militant atheist, by which I mean not a browbeater or bully, but an atheist who is prepared, when necessary and appropriate, to stand up to theistic and religious arrogance and demands for privilege. A militant atheist behaves like a decent professional soldier, not a mercenary or a bandit. I do not insist that every atheist has to be a militant atheist. You need the temperament and skills for it, and you need motivation or a “vocation” for it. My motivation was ten years of childhood exposure to Anglican boarding schools and their semi-fascist ideology of muscular Christianity (lots of compulsory sport and incessant Christian indoctrination).

My loathing of muscular Christianity explains why I would not, in a million years, describe myself as a “muscular” atheist or, for that matter, a “cultural Christian”. Also, of course, an atheist who wants to be militant, but lacks aptitude, insight and tolerance, can be a liability for freethought, not an asset. Atheists have much to be angry and dismayed about, but anger needs to be guided by reason and patience, otherwise we are in danger of becoming the thing we hate. Atheists do not, I repeat: do not, have to accept straw-man definitions of atheism concocted by atheophobes (people with a dislike of atheism or atheists or both) . So atheists do not have to be “absolutely sure” that gods do not exist, do not have to have read every book on theology ever published, and do not have to know how life or the universe began. 2

Atheophobes will continue to malign atheists as arrogant, immoral and antisocial; but we should bear in mind that atheists have copped far less vile abuse over the centuries than the Jews have done in Europe or opponents of slavery did in North America. And atheophobes are very versatile exponents of spin and doubletalk: trotting out honeyed words and sickly sentiments about love and forgiveness while busily spreading industrial-strength hate. 16 Ethical Record, March 2014 May I caution people about depicting the enemy as “religion” (in the singular). The world has many religions and sects within religions. Many of these entities do more harm than good, at least in our eyes, but is every single religion Bad (with a capital B)? I have yet to read a book on the crimes against humanity of the Quakers, Jains and Unitarians! The enemy of freethought is authoritarian ideology in its many manifestations. It usually provides a herrenfolk mentality to the leadership and a diet of processed, easy-to-digest groveldom and infantilism to the led. Many of the forms are indeed religious, but just as toxic are the quasi-religious political doctrines of, and “true believers” in, fascism (and right-wing nationalism), bolshevism and Maoism, not to mention the nauseating cult of emperor-worship in North Korea (where possessing a Bible will earn you an appointment with the firing squad). Be careful also in assuming that every self-described agnostic is just a timid boot-licker of the churches. I have certainly come across a few who merit this criticism. On the other hand I have read few more, well, trenchant declarations of freethought militant than Robert Green Ingersoll’s “Why I Am an Agnostic” (1889–90). In essence, atheism is about belief; agnosticism about knowledge. Finally, I have been guided in my atheist campaigning by the semi-facetious but curiously wise words of the witty radical politician and “Christian” M.P. for Northampton, Henry Labouchere: “The mere denial of the existence of God does not entitle a man’s opinion to be taken without scrutiny on matters of greater importance.” 3 But atheism is important, and well worthy of championing. Notes: 1 Born 25 February 1944..; editor (1972-73) of The Freethinker . 2 My talk, Why Atheism and Atheophobia Matter (2013), is available on the internet or on application to me by e-mail. 3 PEARSON , Hesketh, 1936. Labby (The Life and Character of Henry Labouchere) . (London: Hamish Hamilton): 224.

THE HUMANIST LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES The Library has an extensive collection of new and historic freethought material. Members are able to borrow books from the Library. Readers will be asked to complete a Reader Registration Form, and must provide photographic ID, proof of address and proof of membership. They will be issued with a Reader’s card, which will enable them to borrow three books at a time. The loan period is one month. Journals, archive material, artworks and other non-book material cannot be borrowed. Full details of the lending service are available from the Librarian The Library is open to the public Sunday to Thursday, 1000 - 1700*. When evening courses are running, the Library will remain open in the evenings until the start of the classes. The Library will be closed on Fridays. Check the website for details or contact the Librarian. *Closed on Wednesdays until 19th March (inc) Cathy Broad, Librarian Tel: 020 7061 6747. Email: [email protected]

Ethical Record, March 2014 17 HUMANIST PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVACY Frank Furedi School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, The University, Canterbury, Kent Lecture to the Ethical Society, 23 February 2014 The privacy of individuals, groups and of institutions is constantly tested by a variety of forces who are determined to undermine it. Computer hackers threaten to uncover the most personal details of our lives. News of phone-hacking journalists preying on the parents of kidnapped children reminds us that not even the right to grieve in practice can be taken for granted. Indeed most of us have become so used to being monitored by CCTV cameras and by digital technology that even the revelation of the massive scale of the National Surveillance Agency’s activity did not cause much of a stir. The Public’s Ambiguity What is remarkable about 21st century western cultural attitudes towards privacy is that the periodic expressions of outrage against its violation in some domain of life co-exist with a casual acceptance of such breaches in other spheres. Indeed, at the very least, there are as many calls to limit or to weaken the private realm as there are to defend it. Western society is deeply ambivalent about the status it ought to assign privacy. In September 2013, The Observer ran an article by Harry Porter titled ‘Perhaps I’m out of step and Britons just don’t think privacy is important’. Porter’s article addressed what he took to be the ‘complacency’ and lack of interest in the revelations surrounding revelations of mass snooping by the NSA. The question raised about public indifference to the erosion of privacy was indirectly answered by the negative manner with which it was represented in another article published in the same issue of The Observer . Titled ‘Hundreds of thousands of elderly people were abused last year’ it claimed to expose a ‘hidden national scandal’ i. This association of abuse with a world hidden to the public eye – that is the coupling of abuse and privacy – conveyed a sentiment widely circulated in society. Is it any surprise that when the private sphere is regarded in such ambiguous terms attempts to expose it to public scrutiny will unlikely provoke serious resistance? Perceptions regarding the distinction between private and public are influenced by what society values. As Weintraub pointed out, ‘Debates about how to cut up the social world between public and private are rarely innocent exercises, since they often carry powerful normative implications ii . For example, the frequently repeated argument that the innocent have nothing to fear from the prying eyes of Big Brother convey a moral sensibility that assigns little intrinsic value to the aspiration for a protected private space. In contrast the phrase ‘an Englishman’s home is his castle’ expresses the contrasting sentiment of idealising private space. In this talk I outline an argument for valuing privacy and go on to explore the main forces that threaten its integrity.

18 Ethical Record, March 2014 The Need for Privacy Although the separation of social life into a distinct public and private sphere is the historic accomplishment of modernity, there is considerable evidence of the aspiration to be ‘left alone’ and to limit the involvement of the state in people’s life at home at a much earlier era. In his famous 431 BCE funeral speech, where he celebrated the greatness of Athens, Pericles boasted that:

‘The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens’.

No doubt the freedom to do what one liked in ‘ordinary life’ was severely limited by the realities of life in this ancient city-state. However, Pericles’ affirmation for this freedom indicated that this was a convention that was valued by the citizens of Athens. It wasn’t until the rise of capitalism and modern society in Europe that arguments for the maintenance of a dichotomous sphere of public and private were rigorously formulated. The need to protect the private sphere was forcefully promoted by advocates of liberalism who insisted that what happened in the household was not a matter for state intervention. Since the 16th century, arguments for privacy have been made in a variety of ways. Early claims coupled private with property and the defence of individual conscience. During the past two centuries the case for the private sphere has evolved and it is justified on moral, psychological, and political grounds. Defining Privacy A useful working definition of privacy is provided by Alan Westin in his study, Privacy and Freedom : ‘Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and of what extent information about them is communicated to others’ argued Westin iii . This definition has as its focus the attempt by individuals to establish a balance between the aspiration for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication. Historically this goal was motivated by the exigency of curtailing the power of the state to intrude into the private activities of people. Today concern with restraining state intervention in private life is still an important concern. However arguments for privacy are increasingly focused on the psychological and moral necessity for a retreat from a busy public world so that insulated from the immediacy of outside pressures people can be themselves. According to Westin, privacy has four important functions for the individuals. The first and arguably most important is the quest and necessity for personal autonomy. The distinct qualities of an individual can only be cultivated in circumstances of privacy. The development of individuality and autonomy ‘requires time for sheltered experimentation and testing of ideas, for preparation and practice in thought and conduct without fear of ridicule or penalty, and for the opportunity to alter opinions before making them public’ iv Indeed the Ethical Record, March 2014 19 capacity to go public and play an effective role as a citizen presupposes the acquisition of the sense of independence that comes from the struggle to gain a measure of autonomy. Privacy also serves as an important medium for emotional release. The intensity and uncertainty of life creates a circumstances were periods of privacy is ‘required from the pressure of playing social roles’ v. Constant exposure to conflicting social demands would be unbearable if people could not move off- stage and dropped their social mask to try to be themselves. Privacy provides a space where people can deviate even violate some of the prevailing social norms. Another dimension of this release is the ability to manage bodily and sexual functions and behaviour without being monitored. The third important function of privacy is the space it provides for the act of self- evaluation. Through self-evaluation individuals are able to reflect, integrate and give meaning to their experience. Self-evaluation can only be conducted in privacy. Westin argued that ‘the evaluative function of privacy has a major moral dimension’ as it allows for the ‘exercise of conscience’ through which the individual ‘repossesses himself’. vi Finally, privacy allows limited and protected communication. Limited communication is essential for harmony and stability of social interaction. Total openness would create confusion and conflict. At the same time privacy allows for the sharing of confidences which in turn encourages the consolidation of friendships and intimate relationships. Limited communication sets boundaries between the most intimate and the most public of social situations. Limited or protected communication is also necessary for relationships with professionals offering advice. The prohibition of public disclosure is assumed in relationships with doctors, lawyer or priests. Privacy is required to ensure that knowledge of our pain and distress is not used against us by people who have become aware of our vulnerabilities. The Distinction Between Public and Private Spheres A tolerant state respects the distinction between public and private spheres because it recognises that the ability to expose in some contexts parts of our identity that we may conceal in others is indispensable for freedom. Privacy and protected communication is the pre-requisite for the forging of the close bonds and ties through which people establish relations of intimate trust. It serves as the medium for the consolidation of intimate relationships as it allows us to reveal parts of ourselves to friends, family members or lovers that we withhold from the rest of the world. Privacy is the precondition for friendship and the cultivation of love. From this perspective privacy should not be interpreted as either good or bad but as necessary. The need to protect people’s attempt to find themselves or to be themselves underscores the necessity for a domain of life that is distinct from the workings of public life. Liberal theory has as its premise the assumption that it is not only desirable but also necessary that individuals are able to have a life that is separate to the one they conduct as citizens in public life. It was thought that without the existence of the private sphere it would be difficult to contain the

20 Ethical Record, March 2014 totalising dynamic of state activity. Its consequence would be the subjection of individual pursuits to a bureaucratic imperative, which would in turn lead to the politicisation every dimension of human existence. Such a development would not only diminish the flourishing of personal autonomy it would also disorient public life from its pursuit of the common good. Experience shows that whenever the state seeks to politicise private life, eg Cultural Revolution in China public life itself becomes depoliticised. The protection of the private realm is essential for the conduct of a healthy public life. Privacy is essential for exercising our capacity to make something of ourselves. It is within the confines of the private realm that people can reflect, test out ideas on their intimates, develop their political capacities and acquire the moral resources necessary for the conduct of public life. The Assault on Privacy Although privacy is rarely an explicit target of political invective or of moral condemnation it is under constant assault from a variety of sources. The periodic rhetorical affirmation of the right to privacy is continually paralleled by its practical devaluation. The one threat to privacy, which is most frequently noted is that of technologically assisted invasive attempts to render people’s private life and affairs public. Yet, technologically assisted surveillance and monitoring threatens people’s privacy but does call into question its moral status. Indeed this is the one form of anti-privacy behaviour that is likely to always provoke a measure of outrage. The main threat to privacy has little to with the usual suspects, such as On-line and Off-line Business and Government surveillance, new technology or intrusive tabloid journalism. The real danger facing the privacy is constituted by powerful cultural forces that both implicitly and explicitly devalue, demoralise and at times pathologise it. By far the most powerful driver of anti-privacy sentiment is the tendency to represent family and intimate life as a site of abuse, exploitation and violence. The narrative of the ‘dark side of family life’ invokes a sense of dread about private and invisible relations. Policymakers and moral entrepreneurs have been in the forefront of a clamour for more public scrutiny of private life. Cultural feminists in particular have pursued a trenchant critique of privacy. Some claim that in the private sphere, women are rendered invisible; their work is unrecognised and therefore devalued, and their lives becomes subject to male violence. The view that the private sphere is an intensely dangerous place, particularly for women and children, has become an unquestioned truth in popular culture. Hence, intrusive policies have been introduced in order to open up private life to the public gaze. The claim that only ever-vigilant public institutions can protect children from adult predators is widely promoted by moral crusaders and their friends in officialdom. It has become one of the most frequently repeated arguments against the demand to preserve the autonomy of the private sphere. vii

Privacy is frequently described as a ‘cloak’ or a ‘sham’ that allows unspeakable horrors to take place in family life. This assumes that, left to their own devices

Ethical Record, March 2014 21 and away from public view, people tend to be dominated by destructive emotions. Men in particular are condemned for using the privilege of privacy to terrorise women and children. This unflattering representation of intimate relationships promotes the idea that everyone is under threat from imminent victimisation. From this standpoint, privacy has no redeeming features at all. On the contrary, for some, particularly cultural feminists, intimacy by definition is a relationship of violence. The conduct of human relationships has become an important site for the promotion of anxieties and fears. Human relationships have become transformed into a territory fraught with danger and a veritable army of relationship professionals – therapists, counsellors, life coaches, parenting gurus – are continually warning people about the perils that they face in their private life. Relationship professionals are oriented towards frightening people about their connection with members of their community, their neighbours, their lovers and their family members. It is important to note that in the 21st century many of the high profile dreaded crimes are associated with inter-personal relationships. Rape, date rape, child abuse, elder abuse, bullying and stalking – off-line and on- line – are crimes that remind us to beware of those closest to us. Privacy used to be represented as a haven from a heartless world. These days, initimacy and family life are often presented as a site of violence, danger or emotional trauma. Warnings about toxic relationships and toxic families promote alarms that are no less intense than those about terrorism or the environment. Their effect is to disorganise and pathologise private life The Therapeutic Turn in Culture The disorganisation of private life is reinforced by the therapeutic turn of western culture. Therapeutic ideals call into question the idealisation of personal autonomy. It demands that people open up and share their problems with others – particularly with therapeutic professionals. From this perspective personal secrets are invariably treated as a marker of an emotional deficit. Private secrets are now frequently interpreted as the precursor for criminal behaviour. The statement ‘this is our secret’ is regularly presented in popular culture as a prelude to an act of abuse. When the therapeutic critique is recast in a cultural form it turns into the apotheosis of the confessional. The television confessional casts a net of suspicion over those who retain reserve and discretion. In turn talk television and the hundreds of ‘reality’ programmes foster a climate were voyeurism becomes equated with responsible behaviour. Is it any surprise that a growing number of people – especially among the young are prepared to disclose intimate details of their lives to strangers? There is little doubt that private life can be sometimes unpleasant, violent and degrading. Privacy can provide a space for the exercise of destructive behaviour. But these negative aspects of private life do not provide a coherent argument for eradicating the private sphere altogether, any more than the existence of street crime is an argument for eliminating the public sphere. Today’s casual dismissal of the private sphere denigrates one of the most important sites of human experience. The separation of the public and private spheres has been essential for

22 Ethical Record, March 2014 the emergence of the modern individual. The aspiration for autonomy and identity cannot be entirely resolved in the public sphere. The private sphere not only provides a potential space for reflection but also for the development of personality. Intimate relationships require privacy if they are not to disintegrate under the pressure of public scrutiny. Whatever problems might exist in the private sphere, it is the pre-requisite for the exercise of freedom. i Harry Porter, ‘ ‘Perhaps I’m out of step and Britons Just don’ think privacy is important’ in The Observer ; 8 September 2013. Also see ‘Hundreds of thousands of elderly people were abused last year’ in the same issue. ii Weintraub (1997)p.3. iii Alan Westin (1967) Privacy And Freedom , The Bodley Head : London, p.7. iv Westin (1967) p.34. v Westin (1967) p.34. vi Westin (1967) p.37. vii See Frank Furedi, Moral Crusades In An Age of Mistrust: the Jimmy Savile Affair

LIBRARY ADDITIONS – DEC 2013 - FEB 2014 Brewer, Talbot The retrieval of ethics 2011 Brown, Andrew Keeper of the nuclear conscience 2012 Clapp, Elizabeth J. Women, dissent and anti-slavery 2011 Clayton, Philip The predicament of belief 2011 Cresswell, Peter The invention of Jesus 2012 Dawkins, Marian Stamp Why animals matter 2012 Dawkins, Richard An appetite for wonder 2013 Evans, C. Stephen Natural signs and knowledge of God 2010 Fauser, Bart Baby-making 2011 Fisher, David Morality and war 2011 Gaukroger, Stephen The collapse of mechanism 2010 Glynn, Ian Elegance in science 2010 Goldfarb, Michael Emancipation 2009 Helm, Paul Faith and reason 1999 Hills, Alison The beloved self 2012 Holden, Thomas Spectres of false divinity 2012 Kay, William K. Pentecostalism 2011 Lavin, Deborah Bradlaugh contra Marx 2011 Miller, Richard W. Globalizing justice 2010 Murray, Michael Nature red in tooth and claw 2011 Nash, David Blasphemy in the Christian world 2010 Rodin, David Just and unjust warriors 2010 Schools, Norman Virginia shade 2012 Sherine, Ariane The atheist’s guide to Christmas 2010 Taliaferro, Charles Turning images in philosophy, science & religion 2011 Trigg, Roger Equality, freedom and religion 2013 Wellman, Carl The moral dimensions of human rights 2011 Worthington, Ian Greening business 2012 Zalabardo, Jose L. Scepticism and reliable belief 2012 Zimmerman, Jens Humanism and religion 2012

The Librarian is always pleased to receive suggestions for new acquisitions. Please email any recommendations to [email protected]. Cathy Broad, Librarian

Ethical Record, March 2014 23 FORTHCOMING EVENTS Conway Hall , 25 Red Lion Square, Holborn, WC1R 4RL. Tel: 020 7405 1818 Registered Charity No. 1156033 For programme updates, email: [email protected] Website: www.conwayhall.org.uk Admission to Sunday morning lectures is free for members of CHES and £5 (£2 conc) for non-members. For other events, no charge unless stated. MARCH 2014 Saturday 15 CENTRAL LONDON HUMANISTS, CHES & NSS 1000 – 1700 present, for International Women’s Day: THE OPPRESSION AND RESILIENCE OF WOMEN Many speakers. Donation £5. Sunday 16 INTELLIGENTLY DESIGNED: 1100 THE CREATIONIST ASSAULT ON SCIENCE Paul Braterman , Hon Senior Research Fellow, Glasgow University 1400 ‘THE IDEA OF ISRAEL’ Ilan Pappé on his new book. (postponed from 2 March) Monday 17 GIVING OFFENCE: IN WORDS AND PICTURES 1930 Martin Rowson , cartoonist (postponed from 5 March) Sunday 23 GODLESS AND BROKE: Making secular groups less middle class 1100 Alex Gabriel, author of the blog Godlessness in Theory Sunday 30 SEX WORK, ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1100 Melissa Gira Grant, freelance journalist APRIL Tuesday 1 5x15 PRESENTS – JAMES LOVELOCK on A ROUGH RIDE TO THE FUTURE in conversation with John Gray £15 (£12) Sunday 6 THE ETHICS OF NEUROMARKETING 1100 David Lewis Saturday 12 CFI UK & CONWAY HALL ETHICAL SOCIETY 1030-1545 GLOBAL WARMING – WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? With Mayer Hillman, Rupert Read. Vicky Pope and Saci Lloyd Fee £10 (£5 students) Sunday 13 CRACKED: WHY PSYCHIATRY IS DOING MORE HARM 1100 THAN GOOD. James Davies (U. Roehampton) Sunday 20 Easter Bank Holiday - No Meeting Sunday 17 THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS: CONTOURS OF BELIEF 1100 Philip Davies

CHES’s SUNDAY CONCERTS, SPRING 2014 Artistic Director: Simon Callaghan Doors open at 1730 Concerts start at 1830 Tickets £9; students £4; under 16 free Full details on: www.conwayhallsundayconcerts.org.uk

Published by the Conway Hall Ethical Society, 25 Red Lion Square, WC1R 4RL Printed by J.G. Bryson (Printer). 156-162 High Road, London N2 9AS. ISSN 0014 - 1690