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Post-Election Violence in Kenya
Spontaneous or Premeditated? DISCUSSION PAPER 57 SPONTANEOUS OR PREMEDITATED? Post-Election Violence in Kenya GODWIN R. MURUNGA NORDISKA AFRIKAINSTITUTET, UppSALA 2011 Indexing terms: Elections Violence Political violence Political crisis Ethnicity Democratization Kenya The opinions expressed in this volume are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Language checking: Peter Colenbrander ISSN 1104-8417 ISBN 978-91-7106-694-7 © The author and Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 2011 Production: Byrå4 Print on demand, Lightning Source UK Ltd. Spontaneous or Premeditated? Contents Contents ..............................................................................................................................................................3 Foreword .............................................................................................................................................................5 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................7 Post-Election Violence: Overview of the Literature .............................................................................8 A Note on the Kenyan Democratisation Processes ............................................................................13 Clash of Interpretations ................................................................................................................................17 The Ballot Box and -
Kenya General Elections, 2017
FINAL REPORT REPUBLIC OF KENYA General Elections 2017 REPUBLIC OF KENYA European Union Election Observation Mission FINAL REPORT General Elections 2017 January 2018 This report contains the findings of the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) on the general elections 2017 in Kenya. The EU EOM is independent from the European Union’s institutions, and therefore this report is not an official position of the European Union. KEY CONCLUSIONS OF THE EU EOM KENYA 2017 1. The Kenyan people, including five million young people able to vote for the first time, showed eagerness to participate in shaping the future of their country. However, the electoral process was damaged by political leaders attacking independent institutions and by a lack of dialogue between the two sides, with escalating disputes and violence. Eventually the opposition withdrew its presidential candidate and refused to accept the legitimacy of the electoral process. Structural problems and specific electoral issues both need to be addressed meaningfully to prevent problems arising during future elections. 2. Electoral reform needs to be carried out well in advance of any election, and to be based on broad consensus. The very late legal amendments and appointment of the leadership of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) before the 2017 elections put excessive pressure on the new election administration. 3. Despite efforts to improve the situation, there was a persistent lack of trust in the IEBC by the opposition and other stakeholders, demonstrating the need for greater independence and accountability as well as for sustained communication and more meaningful stakeholder consultation. There was improved use of technology, but insufficient capacity or security testing. -
English Version
Diaspora Voting and Ethnic Politics in Kenya Beth Elise Whitaker and Salma Inyanji To cite this article: Beth Elise Whitaker, Salma Inyanji, “Vote de la diaspora et ethnicité au Kenya,” Afrique contemporaine 4/2015 (n° 256), p. 73-89. URL : www.cairn.info/revue-afrique-contemporaine-2015-4-page-73.htm. ABSTRACT: Many African governments have extended voting rights to nationals living abroad, but little is known about the political behavior of diaspora populations. In the context of Kenya, where the 2010 constitution authorized diaspora voting, we ask whether nationals living abroad are as likely to vote along ethnic lines as their counterparts at home. Using data from public opinion polls prior to the March 2013 presidential election, we compare levels of support for presumed ethnic candidates among Kenyans surveyed in the diaspora and those surveyed in the country. Overall, diaspora respondents were significantly less likely than in-country respondents to support the presumed ethnic candidate from their home province. The results provide preliminary support for our hypothesis that diaspora Africans are less likely to vote along ethnic lines than their in-country counterparts, and thus are less reliable for the construction of ethnic coalitions. More survey data are needed from Kenyans and other Africans living abroad to further examine the relationship between diaspora voting and ethnicity in African politics. As migration patterns have become increasingly global, African diaspora populations have emerged as an important political consideration (Akyeampong 2000). The African Union has held a series of conferences to engage the diaspora with a view toward recognizing it as the continent’s “sixth region.” African governments have been reaching out to nationals living abroad to seek their economic and political participation at home. -
Infotrak Public Policy and Governance Research Division Infotrak Harris Popularity Poll
INFOTRAK PUBLIC POLICY AND GOVERNANCE RESEARCH DIVISION INFOTRAK HARRIS POPULARITY POLL APRIL 2012 103 Manyani East Rd, Lavington P.O. Box 23081- 00100 Nairobi, Kenya, Tel: +254 20 4443450/1/2, For more information contact: Raphael Mulwa +254 736 360 964 1. Introduction The implication of the new constitution on Kenyan politics cannot be underestimated. All political candidates must adhere to the national values and pass the integrity test under chapter six of the Constitution. It is possible that the mind-set of the Kenyan voter has changed after the 2007/2008 post-election violence. Through opinion polls, politicians are able to tell what the voters perceive to be most important in terms of policies, voting preference, the message and also a candidate’s popularity among Kenyans from different socio-economic backgrounds. The forthcoming general elections will be the first under the new constitution. Alliances have been formed as part of the strategies to win the presidential race. The campaigns have also witnessed new entrants into the race. Ultimately, the Kenyan voter will be the determinant of who holds which elective post. In executing its mandate as a pollster and in bid to inform Kenyans, Infotrak Research and Consulting conducted a nationwide opinion poll to establish the popularity of various presidential hopefuls and political parties. The survey further sought to establish the preferred running mates for various presidential hopefuls. 2. The Methodology The poll was sponsored and conducted by Infotrak Research and Consulting between 11th and 13th March, 2012 through face to face interviews with a nationwide sample of 2400 respondents, to represent the Kenyan adult population of 19,462,358 translating into a margin of error of -/+ 2 at 95% degree of confidence. -
Forty Days and Nights of Peacemaking in Kenya
Page numbering! JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ELECTIONS FORTY DAYS AND NIGHTS OF PEACEMAKING IN KENYA Gilbert M Khadiagala Gilbert Khadiagala is Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg e-mail: [email protected] We are ready to go the extra mile to achieve peace. Today, we take the first step. My party and I are ready for this long journey to restore peace in our land …We urge our people to be patient as parties work day and night to ensure that negotiations do not last a day longer than necessary. Raila Odinga, leader of the Orange Democratic Movement (East African Standard 25 January) Kenya is a vital country in this region and the international com- munity is not ready to watch it slump into anarchy. Norwegian Ambassador Hellen Jacobsen (East African Standard 5 February) I will stay as long as it takes to get the issue of a political settlement to an irreversible point. I will not be frustrated or provoked to leave. It is in the interest of the men and women of Kenya, the region, Africa and the international community to have a new government. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Daily Nation 6 February) ABSTRACT Recent studies on resolving civil conflicts have focused on the role of external actors in husbanding durable agreements. The contribution of authoritative parties is vital to the mediation of conflicts where parties are frequently In the interests of avoiding repetition citations will carry the date and month only unless the year is anything other than 2008. -
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VOLUME 7 NO 2 135 ‘WE’VE BEEN TO HELL AND BACK…’1 Can a Botched Land Reform Programme Explain Kenya’s Political Crisis? (1963–2008) Samuel Kariuki Dr Samuel Kariuki is a senior lecturer in the Sociology Department, School of Social Sciences of the University of the Witwatersrand e-mail: [email protected] ABSTRACT A central argument pursued in this paper seeks to accord primacy to the unresolved land reform programme in Kenya in debunking the genesis of the country’s intermittent political crises since independence. It is argued that one cannot come to terms with Kenya’s failed democratic process without acknowledging the extent to which patrimonial politics were systematically developed and sustained, and the key to this was land. Land as a resource of political patronage, to reward, and punish, those who were part of, or were perceived as outsiders in an evolving political system that personified the ideals of its leaders gained a particular premium, easily manipulated across the three presidential epochs: Kenyatta (1963-1978), Moi (1978-2002) and Kibaki (2002-2007). The failure of land reform contributed immeasurably to the conflict that followed the December 2007 elections. The spatial character of the electoral violence (eg, Rift Valley and Coastal Province) suggests systemic faults that have marked decades of historic injustices brought about by a land reform policy largely informed not by a constitutional pronouncement but by the interests of the incumbent president. The paper concludes that an end to Kenya’s political crises is not fully contingent on resolving the land issue, but rather on transcending the quest for land reform as a contributor to economic growth and political stability. -
The Kenya General Election
AAFFRRIICCAA NNOOTTEESS Number 14 January 2003 The Kenya General Election: senior ministerial positions from 1963 to 1991; new Minister December 27, 2002 of Education George Saitoti and Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka are also experienced hands; and the new David Throup administration includes several able technocrats who have held “shadow ministerial positions.” The new government will be The Kenya African National Union (KANU), which has ruled more self-confident and less suspicious of the United States Kenya since independence in December 1963, suffered a than was the Moi regime. Several members know the United disastrous defeat in the country’s general election on December States well, and most of them recognize the crucial role that it 27, 2002, winning less than one-third of the seats in the new has played in sustaining both opposition political parties and National Assembly. The National Alliance Rainbow Coalition Kenyan civil society over the last decade. (NARC), which brought together the former ethnically based opposition parties with dissidents from KANU only in The new Kibaki government will be as reliable an ally of the October, emerged with a secure overall majority, winning no United States in the war against terrorism as President Moi’s, fewer than 126 seats, while the former ruling party won only and a more active and constructive partner in NEPAD and 63. Mwai Kibaki, leader of the Democratic Party (DP) and of bilateral economic discussions. It will continue the former the NARC opposition coalition, was sworn in as Kenya’s third government’s valuable mediating role in the Sudanese peace president on December 30. -
Macro Report Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4: Macro Report September 10, 2012
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1 Module 4: Macro Report Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4: Macro Report September 10, 2012 Country: Kenya Date of Election: 4 March 2013 Prepared by: Matthias Krönke, Abel Oyuke and Robert Mattes Date of Preparation: 23 November 2016 NOTES TO COLLABORATORS: . The information provided in this report contributes to an important part of the CSES project. The information may be filled out by yourself, or by an expert or experts of your choice. Your efforts in providing these data are greatly appreciated! Any supplementary documents that you can provide (e.g., electoral legislation, party manifestos, electoral commission reports, media reports) are also appreciated, and may be made available on the CSES website. Answers should be as of the date of the election being studied. Where brackets [ ] appear, collaborators should answer by placing an “X” within the appropriate bracket or brackets. For example: [X] . If more space is needed to answer any question, please lengthen the document as necessary. Data Pertinent to the Election at which the Module was Administered 1a. Type of Election [] Parliamentary/Legislative [X] Parliamentary/Legislative and Presidential [ ] Presidential [ ] Other; please specify: __________ 1b. If the type of election in Question 1a included Parliamentary/Legislative, was the election for the Upper House, Lower House, or both? [ ] Upper House [ ] Lower House [X] Both [ ] Other; please specify: __________ Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2 Module 4: Macro Report 2a. What was the party of the president prior to the most recent election, regardless of whether the election was presidential? Party of National Unity and Allies (National Rainbow Coalition) 2b. -
The Kenya Gazette
THE KENYA GAZETTE Published by Authority of the Republic of Kenya (Registered as a Newspaperat the G.P.O.) Vol. CVITI—No. 42 NAIROBI, 16th June, 2006 Price Sh. 50 CONTENTS GAZETTE NOTICES GAZETTE NOTICES—{Contd,) ; PAGE PAGE The State Corporations Act-—Appointments .........0-sc0 1228 The Companies Act—Intended Dissolution,etc. ............. 1277-1278 The Agricultural Development Corporati on The Valuers Act-Revocation of Gazettment.................04. 1278 ACt—AppOimtMent 0... ceessssetessssesesaleceeseeseesrensenneaneene 1228 Local Government Notice..cccsssscsscssssssccssccscscccccssssoseeccccooes 1278-1279 The Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Deposit Protection Fund—Paymentof First Dividend to ACt—Appointment ....srsenetscesenernnrseinrenetnaseneeines 1228 Creditors .cessssessssstuensstsesssisstistsesssssiassstinesaten 1279 The Water Act—Appointimient............ccccsecstsecseeeeesenneees 1228-1229 The Environmental Management and Co-ordination The National Museums Act—Appointment... 1229 Act-Environmental Impact Assessment Study Report 1279-1280 The Kenya Railways Corporation Act—Appointment.... 1229 Disposal Of Uncollected Goods ..........:ccccsseccscsssscccessseeeee 1280 The Civil Aviation Act—Release of Aircraft Accident. LossofPolicy 1280 Report, etc. ” 1229, 1275-1277 Change of Names .............cecscsssscssssesssseessesseseceatsseessessseesies 1281 The Law of Succession Act—Appointment.................. 1229 The Magistrates’ Courts Act—Increase of Limits of Jurisdiction 1229 SUPPLEMENTNo.40 The Children Act—Appointment.........ccssssesssweseseeccee -
The Relationship Between Influential Actors' Language and Violence: A
FEBRUARY 2019 The relationship between influential actors’ language and violence: A Kenyan case study using artificial intelligence Chris Mahony Eduardo Albrecht Murat Sensoy Abstract Scholarly work addressing the drivers of violent conflict predominantly focus on macro-level factors, often surrounding social group-specific grievances relating to access to power, justice, security, services, land, and resources. Recent work identifies these factors of risk and their heightened risk during shocks, such as a natural disaster or significant economic adjustment. What we know little about is the role played by influential actors in mobilising people towards or away from violence during such episodes. We hypothesise that influential actors’ language indicates their intent towards or away from violence. Much work has been done to identify what constitutes hostile vernacular in political systems prone to violence, however, it has not considered the language of specific influential actors. Our methodology targeting this knowledge gap employs a suite of third party software tools to collect and analyse 6,100 Kenyan social media (Twitter) utterances from January 2012 to December 2017. This software reads and understands words’ meaning in multiple languages to allocate sentiment scores using a technology called Natural Language Processing (NLP). The proprietary NLP software, which incorporates the latest artificial intelligence advances, including deep learning, transforms unstructured textual data (i.e. a tweet or blog post) into structured data (i.e. a number) to gauge the authors’ changing emotional tone over time. Our model predicts both increases and decreases in average fatalities 50 to 150 days in advance, with overall accuracy approaching 85%. This finding suggests a role for influential actors in determining increases or decreases in violence and the method’s potential for advancing understandings of violence and language. -
Kenya: Post Election Analysis, Iposos
Post-Election Analysis: Prepared by Ipsos Synovate Kenya Release Date: 15th March 2013 © 2012 Ipsos. All rights reserved. Contains Ipsos' Confidential and Proprietary information and may not be disclosed or reproduced without the prior written consent of Ipsos. Contents . Objectives . County outcomes: how close were the results of the last Ipsos poll, and what explains the difference? . Presidential race outcome: how close was the outcome to the last Ipsos poll, and what explains the difference? 2 Objectives The key objectives of this presentation is as follows: To show the difference between the last (22nd February) Ipsos poll and the IEBC election results To explain the differences between the two 3 Key Assumption That the IEBC figures with regard to both turnout and results are accurate (in light of the pending court petition) 4 National / Presidential Ipsos Poll vis a vis IEBC Results 5 Opinion Polls Trends from April 2012 Ipsos last poll (Released 22nd February 2013) 100% Raila Odinga Kalonzo Musyoka Uhuru Kenyatta William Ruto Martha Karua Musalia Mudavadi 80% Eugene Wamalwa Peter Kenneth Prof James Ole Kiyapi Others None/Undecided 60% Upward trend for Uhuru and Raila from April 2012 but steep rise from December 2012 46% 44.4% 40% 36% 34% 34% 44.8% 33% 33% 40% 30% 26% 27% 22% 23% 22% 20% 13% 12% 13% 8%9% 9%8% 9% 8%9% 7% 7%6% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5.3% 3% 3% 2% 2%3% 2% 3.1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0%1% 0%1% 0%1% 0.1%0.8% April 2012 Jul 2012 Sept 2012 Nov 2012 Dec 2012 Jan 2013 Feb 2013 6 IEBC Results vis a vis Final Ipsos poll (Released 22nd February -
Ol- Kalou Constituency Poll Release the Opinion Poll Was Conducted Throughout 25 Wards in Nyandarua County
Kitamu House 6th Floor, Rm. 25, Tubman Road P.O. Box 987 – 00300, Nairobi, Kenya. Tel: 0735 555 518 / 0735 555 512 Email: [email protected] Website: www.mizaniafrica.com Brands Rating, Research & Consultancy Ol- Kalou Constituency Poll Release The Opinion poll was conducted throughout 25 Wards in Nyandarua County. Period: 23rd June to 30th June 2020. Sample Size: 600 Margin of Error: +/- 3 Confidence Level: 95% The Demographic Split was by: AGE GENDER Under 30 40% Male 48% 31 - 50 35% Female 52% Above 50 25% FINANCE: SELF-FUNDED • The data outlined in this document is collected at ward level and aggregates done on the parameters used. • The data presented herein represents pure opinions from people of Ol-Kalou Constituency in regards to the survey questions asked. • The data was collected across Nyandarua County but released in constituency-based segments. • Ward based data will be availed upon request via WhatsApp No. 0735 555 518 M.P 02 Hon. David Kiaraho, M.P Ol-Kalou 57.6% Approval Rating Ol Kalou Constituency: Performance Approval Rating for Hon. David Kiaraho in Ol Kalou Constituency: Re-election Possibility for Hon. David Kiaraho the scale of 1-10 by Ward 59.4% 63.4% 61.8% 55.6% 54.6% 52.8% 24.9% 15.7% Kaimbaga Kanjuiri Range Mirangine Rurii Karau YES NO NOT SURE Ol Kalou Constituency: Comparative Analysis of Possible Parliamentary contestants if Other Possible Elective Position for Hon. David Kiaraho elections are held today. M.P 37.0% Hon David Kiaraho 51.8% Governor 35.9% Senator 12.0% Hon George Wambugu a.k.a Delight 35.3% GO HOME 10.4% Deputy Governor 2.6% Hon Peter Kimari 12.9% Speaker 2.1% AD 03Governor Hon.