The Good Canadian Nationalist First Must Be a Good Imperialist”: Sam Hughes and the South African War, 1899-1900

“The Good Canadian Nationalist First Must Be A Good Imperialist”: Sam Hughes and the South African War, 1899-1900

Jordan Alexander Arthur Crosby

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY

NIPISSING UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

NORTH BAY, ONTARIO

Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this Major Research Paper.

I authorize Nipissing University to lend this Major Research Paper to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

Jordan Crosby

I further authorize Nipissing University to reproduce this MRP by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

Jordan Crosby Crosby i

Abstract

Sir Sam Hughes is a name that has either been forgotten in Canadian history, or has been remembered in mostly negative terms. “The Madman”, as he was referred to, was a controversial character in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, whose demeanour, opinions, and acts performed as Member of Parliament and Minister of

Militia and Defence found him a great number of supporters and as many, if not more, enemies. Hughes was an imperial nationalist, one who believed in imperial union with

Britain to both maintain the dominance of the Empire and as a way to build upon a nascent sense of Canadian identity. In the late nineteenth century, Canada was a young Dominion belonging to the British Empire, and imperialists such as Hughes believed that if Canada were to gain more autonomy, influence, and international recognition, Canadians would have to take part in imperial conflicts alongside Britain.

The alternative was reciprocity with the United States, which would lead, Canadian imperialists believed, to Canada being swallowed up by their expansionist neighbours to the south.

The South African War (1899-1902) gave Sam Hughes the ultimate chance to demonstrate his imperial nationalism and help maintain the British Empire’s dominance globally, while simultaneously earning Canada and Canadians recognition abroad.

Hughes believed that nations were defined by their military, and he was a major propagator of the “militia-myth” which argued that Canadian citizen-soldiers defeated the Americans in the War of 1812. As a result, Hughes believed that citizen-soldiers would be the ones who would achieve Canada autonomy as well as a reputation as a strong and great nation. In fighting in the war in South Africa, Hughes’ imperial nationalist and militaristic views would be tested. Crosby ii

The title of my MRP is taken from Historian and Poet Charles G.D. Roberts, who stated the phrase in 1895. As quoted in Pierre Berton’s Marching as to War: Canada’s

Turbulent Years, 1899-1953 (Toronto: Anchor Canada, 2002) page 24.

Crosby iii

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I give thanks to my family. It is often claimed that you can choose your friends, but you cannot choose family, but in many regards I am the luckiest man in the world. To start, I give many thanks to my beautiful fiancée Kacey.

You are not only my world, but you are the main influence in my life and deserve major credit for where I am today. When we met, I was a failing Undergraduate student, but you have brought stability and meaning to my life, and give me a reason to reach and exceed my potential. I want to thank you this year for proofreading all my papers, listening to my ramblings about postmodernism, Gregory of Tours, the Atlantic paradigm, and of course Sam Hughes. And I thank you for always being there for me. I now emerge from the Master’s program victorious, and I am indebted to you. This is only the beginning, and we will encounter many victories throughout life together.

To my father Kevin, what can I really say except for the fact that I am lucky to have the greatest father one could hope for. Even though you cheer for Peyton

Manning and the Indianapolis Colts, you have been a major inspiration in my life. The qualities you possess, namely hard work, perseverance, dedication, and above all, a relaxed, cool under pressure, and laid back personality (a la Joe Montana), have all moulded me into the person I am today. You were also instrumental in allowing me a place in Ottawa to visit on the occasional weekend to forget the letters MRP existed in the alphabet, and to relax, have a beer with, and discuss other issues such as who is truly the better quarterback: Brady or Manning. Obviously Brady is. But in all seriousness, as a person I look up to you, and as a father I strive to be like you.

Secondly and equally important are my advisors who assisted me throughout the year, as well as other professors. To my primary advisor Dr. James Murton (whom I Crosby iv had the pleasure of seeing perform in a choir) I want to thank you for all your assistance over the course of the year. Your knowledge of theories of nationalism, your patience in correcting my plethora of grammar mistakes, suggestions for correction, and our weekly Friday afternoon meetings all allowed me to submit the best MRP possible. To my secondary advisor, Dr. Robin Gendron, your guidance in narrowing my focus towards Sam Hughes’ world view and militarism, and always being available for a discussion of my MRP greatly helped me throughout the year, and I thank you for that.

Although not an official advisor, Dr. Mark Crane is also deserving of credit. Your methods class this year greatly influenced me into thinking about what kind of historian

I am/want to be, and the fact that you were always available to offer any guidance to me, or just lend an ear to my constant rambling, was greatly appreciated.

I would also like to extend a thank you to Dr. Tim Cook, whose Madman and the

Butcher was a major source of guidance, and Dr. Susanne Klausen, my former

Carleton professors who wrote my letters of recommendation to get into Graduate

School. I would not be here if it was not for the both of you.

Crosby v

Table of Contents

Abstract/ i

Acknowledgements/ iii

Table of Contents/ v

Introduction

- Who Was Sam Hughes? And What Have Historians Said About Him?/ 1 - The Concept of Imperial Nationalism/ 5 - The Historiography on Canadian Imperialism and Canadian Participation in the South African War, 1899-1902/ 7 - MRP Additions and Chapter Breakdown/ 15

Chapter 1: Hughes and Canadian Participation

- Sam Hughes: 1853-1897 – From Childhood to Member of Parliament – Hughes’ Militarism Prior to the Outbreak of the South African War/ 19 - A Conflict in South Africa and a Divided Canada/ 25 - How Hughes Received the South African War and His Feud With Edward Hutton /27 - An “Advertisement For Canada” and the Outbreak of the South African War/ 39

Chapter 2: Hughes in South Africa, 1900

- Hughes’ Exploits in South Africa and How They Played Into His Militaristic World View/ 46 - Map of Faber’s Put, A Battle Where Hughes Believed He Deserved a Victoria Cross. Courtesy of the Canadian War Museum/ 57 - Hughes’ Controversial Departure From South Africa/ 59 - The Outcome Of Hughes’ Time in South Africa/ 68

Conclusion

- Recap/75 - Bibliography/ 77

Crosby 1

In turn-of-the 20th century Canada, Sam Hughes was a dominant figure in

Canadian politics and in daily life. Athlete, teacher, newspaper editor, Member of

Parliament and, above all, proud militiaman, Hughes’ relentless energy, fiery temperament, and dedication to matters which deeply interested him made him a central figure in the fierce debate over Canada’s relationship to Britain and the Empire.

According to Charles F. Winter, Hughes was a “bonnie fighter”, whether out on the playing field, in the halls of Parliament, in the editorial columns of his paper, or more amazingly, during his employment in the South African War (1899-1902).1 My MRP will examine the role played by Sam Hughes in the South African War, from mid-1899 when he began to raise a Canadian contingent for service abroad, to 1900 when

Hughes travelled to South Africa to fight the Boers. I will focus on the way in which

Hughes’ imperial nationalist beliefs shaped, and were in turn shaped by, his experience of the South African War.

Hughes was one of those who, in the words of historian Carl Berger, “called their cause imperial unity, their movement imperial federation, and themselves imperialists”.2

A “staunch British imperialist”3, according to an authorless 1900 memorandum detailing his feud with the British General Officer Commanding in Canada, Edward Hutton,

Hughes also advocated for Canadian identity and autonomy while rebelling against claims of Canadian inferiority. My MRP will study his personal form of imperial nationalism and how the South African War shaped and changed it. For Hughes, nationalism and militarism could not be separated. The worth of a nation was defined

1 Brigadier‐General Charles F. Winter, Lieutenant‐General The Hon. Sir Sam Hughes K.C.B., M.P. Canada’s War Minister, 1911‐1916 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, Ltd., 1931), xv. 2 Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Nationalism 1867‐1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 3. 3 Library and Archives Canada, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 6, Memorandum: Re friction between Colonel Hughes and General Hutton, culminating in 1900‐,7. Crosby 2 by its military exploits, and military exploits were best carried out by the Canadian citizen-soldiers that Hughes revered, as opposed to the British professional soldiers of which he was suspicious. Thus the South African War, for Hughes, offered Canada the chance to define itself as a powerful nation and member of the Empire, and to show the superiority of its militia. And though some emerged from the war with their faith in King and Country shaken, Hughes’ convictions came through the horrors of the Boer War unshaken, or even strengthened.

Sam Hughes was, and remains, a controversial character in Canadian history, and as such, has found both supporters and enemies amongst academic historians. To date, there have been five biographies of him. The first was Brigadier-General Charles

F. Winter’s Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Sam Hughes (1931); this was followed by

Alan R. Capon’s His Faults Lie Gently: The Incredible Sam Hughes, which was published in 1969; Ronald G. Haycock’s Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a

Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916, released in 1986; Steering the Course: A Memoir, written by Hughes’ grandson, also named Sam, which was published in 2000, and Tim

Cook’s 2010 book, The Madman and the Butcher: The Sensational Wars of Sam

Hughes and General Arthur Currie.

Brigadier C.F. Winter’s book was written in defence of Sam Hughes, with the intent to shine a light “upon the great and most important period of his career, and if it tends in any way to a clearer appreciation of his methods, and to a deeper knowledge among Canadians of his greatness of his services to Canada and the Empire, the writer will be well repaid”.4 Winter refutes the idea held by some that Hughes was “crazy”, instead declaring that Hughes was “ahead of his day” for offering to raise and

4 Winter, viii. Crosby 3 command colonial troops for imperial service and urging the House of Commons to adopt a system of representative Parliament for the entire Empire.5 Winter makes the claim that Hughes was a champion of constitutional freedom and Canadian autonomy.6

Alan R. Capon and Ronald Haycock have also written biographies of Sam

Hughes which, like Winter’s book, seek to defend Hughes from his critics. Capon’s book His Faults Lie Gently states that “Sir Sam Hughes is a Canadian who deserves to be better known. He has been treated unfairly by historians”.7 Capon, writing in 1969, further commented that Hughes had left little to no personal papers behind, and none organized enough that would allow a biographer to compile a hefty biography.

However, with what Hughes did leave behind, Capon states that he was writing his little book so that future generations could remember the “incredible” Sam Hughes, one of the “most forceful and dramatic men” to ever be part of Canadian history.8

Haycock’s biography of Hughes, on the other hand, is the most complete work written on the man, even though he states that personal and public papers, diaries, and memoirs of Sam Hughes were not known to exist in 1986, except for a small collection belonging to his grandson Sam H.S. Hughes. Haycock claims that Hughes’ contemporaries left important information about or by him, which was housed at the

Public Archives of Canada in files such as Robert Borden or Wilfrid Laurier’s private papers.9 Haycock argues that historians over the years failed to see the nationalist content in Hughes’ desire to see Canada demonstrate its military prowess

5 Winter, 4‐8. 6 Ibid., 5. 7 Alan R. Capon, His Faults Lie Gently: The Incredible Sam Hughes (Lindsay: Floyd W. Hall, 1969), Introduction (untitled page number) 8 Ibid. 9 Ronald G. Haycock, Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885‐1916 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), 6. Crosby 4 internationally. He declares that Hughes demanded Canadian participation as a way to display Canadian nationalism, not imperial patriotism.10

Sam H.S. Hughes, Sam Hughes’ grandson, wrote Steering the Course: A

Memoir in 2000, which is part autobiography of his own life and part biography of both his grandfather Sam and his father Garnet. Sam H.S. Hughes depicts both the actions of his grandfather and tales of his own life interchangeably throughout the book. For example, on page ten the author briefly skims over the feud between his grandfather and the British General Officer Commanding Edward Hutton, stating that as a result of their rivalry his grandfather was deprived of a combatant’s role in the Canadian contingent that sailed overseas to South Africa. The author proclaims that due to the efforts of Hutton, his grandfather had to travel as a civilian at his own expense, and then became a “national figure” through his “spectacular exploits” in South Africa.11

However, on the following page Sam H.S. Hughes depicts his earliest recollections of the first daylight air raids on London in 1916 while he was accompanying his mother shopping.12 Sam H.S. Hughes’ memoir also seeks to defend his grandfather from his critics, as he argues that historians have blown the Sam Hughes-General Arthur Currie rivalry during World War One out of proportion, and have tended to vilify his grandfather too much for it.13

While there have been historians such as Haycock and non-academics such as

Winter who have written books championing Sam Hughes and his imperial nationalism, there have also been many books written which assail and insult him. Historian Roger

10 Haycock, 68. 11 Sam H.S. Hughes, Steering the Course: A Memoir (Montreal & Kingston: McGill‐Queen’s University, 2000), 10. 12 Ibid., 11. 13 Ibid., 5. Crosby 5

Graham argues that Hughes was a megalomaniac, while Ralph Allan states that

Hughes was a man “who would have the utmost difficulty in passing a standard medical test for sanity”.14 Graham and Allan largely ignore his imperial nationalism and view him as a lunatic that did not intentionally do anything positive for Canada. Similarly, Pierre

Berton argues that Hughes was the “worst kind of Canadian nationalist” who hated and looked down upon the British, insulted and mocked the British permanent force, and ignored any Canadians who did not fit his Anglo-Saxon heritage.15 Berton, while begrudgingly admitting that Hughes was a nationalist, ignores his imperial nationalism by separating his nationalism and imperialism and making the claim that Hughes had distaste for all things British, which, as I will show, was not true.

A more useful position is taken by Canadian military historian Tim Cook, who depicts Sam Hughes’ personal vision of imperial nationalism as a dual concept whereby Canada would contribute soldiers to support the Empire, and return from imperial conflicts with a stronger sense of Canadian identity and a larger role on the world stage.16 Cook states that Hughes was distinctly Canadian and also a British imperialist. Imperialism became a way for Canadians like him to not only support the

British Empire, but also to promote a distinct Canadian nationalism.17 Thus for Hughes,

14 Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen, vol.1 (Toronto: Clark Irwin: 1960), 106, and Ralph Allan, Ordeal by Fire: Canada, 1910‐45 (Toronto: Doubleday, 1961), 111. 15 Berton, 136. Hughes did have the utmost belief in the Canadian Militia’s volunteer force, and he greatly resented Hutton’s attempts to subordinate them to the Permanent Force, which he considered lackluster. Carman Miller, A Knight in Politics: A Biography of Sir Frederick Borden (Montreal & Kingston: McGill‐Queen’s University Press, 2010), 110. Hughes also drew “battle lines” between English and French Canadians, as well as between Roman Catholics, whom he despised, and Orangeism, which he fiercely was. Tim Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: The Sensational Wars of Sam Hughes and General Arthur Currie (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2010), 17. However, Berton is incorrect to argue that Hughes hated everything British. Hughes stated to Edward Hutton that he wanted Canadians to fight in South Africa to prevent the “disintegration of the British Empire”. He wished to restore its prestige and preserve Canada’s “patriotism to the Motherland”. LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers, MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Hutton, August 28, 1899, 28. 16 Cook, 18. 17 Ibid. Crosby 6 imperialism and nationalism could not be separated. In making this argument, Cook is drawing on a long historiography on the concept of imperial nationalism.

Writer W. Sanford Evans first elaborated on the concept in 1901, while the South

African War was still occurring. For Evans, imperial nationalism had “two main constituent elements”.18 Firstly, Evans stated that Canadians supported imperial federation and British imperialism for all the rewards associated with the British Empire.

He claimed that the British connection, with its many “traditions and its prospects” accorded to English-Canadians, was what caused many English-Canadians to support the imperial war in South Africa.19 Secondly, Evans contends that the continuation of the British connection had caused national life to grow around the Empire.20 Evans argued that while English-Canadians were eager to support an imperial war in the name of the British Empire, a surreptitious reason they also desired Canadian participation overseas was due to an awareness of “Canadian national life”.21 The

British connection, in other words, accorded Canada a high position as a Dominion within the British Empire, and as Canadians began to feel recognition and loyalty to their particular “nation”, they wished to see it become more important and influential abroad.

For Evans, Canadians supported British imperialism as a way to maintain both the dominance of the British Empire, and to promote the Canadian “nation”. After all,

Canada was a British country, aware of its high position as a Dominion within the

British Empire. Evans claims that before the South African War, Canada had never

18 W. Sanford Evans, The Canadian Contingents and Canadian Imperialism: A Story and a Study (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1901), 9.

19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 10. Crosby 7 consented to an imperial defence alongside Britain, contributing to a feeling in the

Empire that Canada was not carrying out its responsibilities. In order for Canada to maintain its prestigious position in the Empire, it would have to send men into combat.22

The thinking of writers like Evans was challenged in 1921 by Oscar Douglas

Skelton, who helped establish the “Liberal Nationalist School”. Though he does not directly mention Evans, it appears as though Skelton was directly challenging him, as he was opposed to the “oppression of imperialism”.23 According to Canadian historian

Norman Hillmer, Skelton believed that the threat to Canada’s self-government, his

“ideal”, came from Canadian and English imperialists, not from the United States.24 As a supporter of the Liberal party and a “continentalist” as well as a free trader, Skelton supported union with the United States and rejected claims of possible American annexation of Canada.25 According to Hillmer, Skelton believed that the “Britishness” and attachments that English-Canadians felt towards Britain posed a threat to Canada because it reinforced family loyalties, therefore placed legal and constitutional limits on

Canadian freedoms.26 The extent of Canadian participation in imperial wars was the ultimate determinant of Canadian freedoms. Before the Great War of 1914 erupted, a

British war was a Canadian war by association, but each dominion had the right to establish the level of participation.27 Hillmer argues that Skelton believed that behind

22 Evans, 14. 23 Norman Hillmer, “The Anglo‐Canadian Neurosis: The Case of O.D. Skelton,” in Britain and Canada: Survey of a Changing Relationship, edited by Peter Lyon (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1976), 67. 24 Ibid., 68. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid., 69. 27 Ibid. Crosby 8 every British government “scheme” was a desire to consolidate the British Empire and an attempt to “compromise Canadian freedom of action”.28

The Liberal Nationalist School, exemplified by Skelton’s Life and Letters of Sir

Wilfrid Laurier, vol.2, argue that imperialism was nothing but a “scramble for prestige and profit”, 29 and that national rivalry and the need to outmanoeuvre other nations led many countries to stake out new lands for exploitation.30 Aside from asserting that the imperial movement in Canada was mainly about economic gains, the “Liberal

Nationalists” also contended that imperialism was enforced externally from the British

Colonial Office and ran “antithetical” to Canadian nationalism.31 Skelton drew a similar conclusion, acknowledging Canadian Governor General Lord Minto and Secretary of

State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain’s attempts to exert pressure on Prime

Minister Wilfrid Laurier into sending an official Canadian contingent overseas.32

Skelton’s interpretation dominated until 1965, when it was challenged by

Norman Penlington. Penlington’s Canada and Imperialism, 1896-1899, rejects the belief that imperialism was mainly about economic gains or was enforced by outside forces such as Britain, instead declaring that it was a discourse of Canadian

“nationalism” that led to the pressure for Canada’s participation in the South African

War. 33 He claims that Canadian supporters of imperial unity were ardent Canadian nationalists who did not want to give up on their hard earned rights of responsible government. Their desired end in fighting in South Africa was the strengthening of

Canada, and not aid to Britain, because the looming threat the United States posed to

28 Hillmer, 75. 29 O.D. Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier: Volume II (London: Oxford University Press, 1921), 60. 30 Ibid., 60‐1. 31 Berger, 6, 8. 32 Skelton, 92‐4. 33 Berger, 9. Crosby 9

Canada.34 America was quickly becoming expansionist, which made Canadians begin to believe their existence was coming under threat.35

In the imminent years prior to and after Confederation, American imperial ambitions, according to Penlington, hovered over the new Dominion’s existence. In

1866, the United States denounced the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 and raised a tariff against imports of natural products from the British North American colonies. In 1866 and in 1870, Canada came under attack from the Fenians who raided from bases in the

United States, and in 1869, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs implied that Canada could be accepted as a settlement for British conduct during the

Civil War. These threats were all “climaxed”, Penlington argues, by Riel’s Red River

Rebellion of 1869-70, which “menaced” Canada with the loss of the West, and the belief that the United States desired the territory. To make matters worse, British support of Canada appeared to be “reluctant and half-hearted”, and the fear that

Canada would be left alone to fend off the Americans grew.36 The United States, by contrast, was powerful, prosperous, and everything Canada was not. Canada was enduring a depression, and Penlington states that many Canadians left Canada to live a life in the wealthy US.37 According to Penlington, imperial unity with Britain could be seen as “Canadian nationalism writ large”. As Reverend George Monro Grant, Principal of Queen’s University and prominent Presbyterian speaker and publicist, declared in

1898, “We are Canadian, and in order to be Canadian we must be British”.38 Penlington argues that as long as Britain was strong, the movement for imperial unity would grow,

34 Norman Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, 1896‐1899 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 11. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 3‐4. 37 Ibid., 3. 38 Ibid., 35, 66. Crosby 10 which helped guide Canada through a troubled period.39 The threat of the United States and depression in Canada, it seems, could be fought off by joining in an imperial union with Britain, whereby self-government could be retained, and the Canadian nation could be made stronger.

In 1970, the argument that Canadian imperialists displayed a form of nationalism was cemented by Carl Berger. Berger’s The Sense of Power argued that advocates of

Canadian imperialism had been unfairly judged as being “misguided colonials who showed an obsequious deference to everything British and disparaged native things”.40

Berger argues against the stereotype of the “misguided colonial”, instead insisting that

Canadian imperialism was one display of Canadian nationalism.41 Closer military and economic union with the British Empire, which would in turn give Canada and the other dominions influence over their imperial policy, was one thing imperial nationalists called for.42 Berger declares that imperialism constituted a variation of Canadian nationalism, one which was built on an understanding of history, the national character, and the belief that Canada was moving towards an acquisition of “full national rights and freedom” alongside Britain within an imperial federation.43

Berger argues, similarly to Penlington, that the fear of American influence and dominance compelled many people to support imperial federation alongside Britain.

Berger states that in the late 19th century, Canada was in a depression. The Liberal

Party realized that former Prime Minister John A. Macdonald’s “nation-building policies”, which included the protective tariff, had failed. In order to overcome the

39 Penlington, 66. 40 Berger. 8. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 3. 43 Ibid., 109. Crosby 11 depression, the Liberal Party committed itself to a policy of “freer trade” with the United

States. The elimination of tariffs between the two countries thrust many Canadians into the campaign for imperial unity.44 Hughes drew this same conclusion, stating in 1901 before the House of Commons that he did not like the movement being made for greater commercial union and trade with the United States as it was beginning to disrupt ties with the Empire. Hughes proclaimed that if greater trade with the United

States was permitted, there would be one “termination”, which would be the annexation of Canada by the Americans.45 Berger claims that imperialists, who understood “the realities of power”, knew that if Canada advocated for independence or free trade with the United States they would be annexed by their expansionist American neighbour.46

Imperialists believed that the only way Canada could become a “nation” was to stay aligned with the Empire behind them, where Canadians could fight off the threat of

American assimilation, and where full self-government could be retained and greater influence could be attained.47

Penlington and Berger’s argument that Canadian imperialists demonstrated a form of nationalism is an argument that has been up for debate, most notably from

Canadian historian Douglas Cole. For Cole, the definition of “nationalism” itself is problematic and has been misrepresented by historians too often. In his opinion, the problem can be solved by making a distinction between nations (and “nationalism”) and state (and “patriotism”).48 Cole argues that the “nation”, and “nationalism” by association, relates to an ethnic group of people who share certain characteristics,

44 Berger, 4. 45LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers, MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901, 4. 46 Berger, 169. 47 Ibid., 170. 48 Douglas Cole, “The Problem of ‘Nationalism’ and ‘Imperialism’ in British Settlement Colonies” Journal of British Studies (1971): 164 Crosby 12 such as language, tradition, culture, “race”, and religion, which differentiates it from other groups. The “state” and “patriotism” on the other hand, is a political body which desires autonomy for the geographic entity of the country. Whereas “nationalism” by

Cole’s definition means being an ethnically differentiated people showing loyalty to their ethnic nation, patriotism is depicted as showing loyalty to the geographic territory and political state, wanting to promote its best interests.49 Cole argues that while many promoters of nationalism associate the term with the political goal of attaining autonomy and self-government for a geographic state, this is patriotism since its motives are for the state and not for an “ethnically-circumscribed nation”.50

Cole argues that in English-Canada, the “renunciation of an ethnic differentiation

‘from one common forefather’” was not as great as it was in other dominions such as

Australia.51 In Cole’s opinion, there was no movement at all being made for a distinct

Canadian culture, ethnic identity, or “nation”. He acknowledges that Canadian imperialists did advocate Canadian interests as well as a “unified” and “vigorous”

Canada with a “superior culture”, and wished to create a country they could be proud of and display their differences to Britain and the rest of the world.52 However, Cole argues that because imperialists shared the same ethnic identity as their British counterparts they were not nationalists because they had no intention of creating a separate Canadian culture, ethnicity, or nation.53 In his opinion, “nationalistic

49 Cole, 164‐5. 50 Ibid., 165. 51 Ibid., 169. 52 Ibid., 171. 53 Ibid. Crosby 13 imperialists” merely demonstrated a “variety of Britannic nationalism”.54 For Cole,

Britannic refers to the ethnic identification Canadians held towards Britain.

I agree with the arguments put forth by Penlington and Berger, and not only disagree with Douglas Cole’s arguments, but his definition of nationalism itself. I believe Cole’s argument, that the ethnic makeup of a nation is the ultimate determiner of nationalism, is extremely limited and exclusive. Similar to Anthony D. Smith, a leading professor of nationalism, I feel that a nation is not a “state” and is not an “ethnic community”. Smith argues that the nation is not a state because the state refers to

“institutional activity”, while the nation is a “felt and lived community” where people share a geographic homeland. However, the nation is not an “ethnic community”, as argued by Smith, because it has no “political referent” and lacks both a public culture and a territorial dimension since an ethnic community does not have to be in physical possession of its territory.55 Anthony D. Smith argues that the definition of nationalism corresponds to an “overriding concern with the nation”.56 It is an ideology where the nation is the center of all focus, with the intent to promote its well being.57 His official definition of nationalism is that it is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential “nation”.58 Smith’s definition of nationalism will be the guideline for my MRP and my efforts to analyze Hughes’ imperial nationalism. A

54 Douglas Cole, “Canada’s Nationalistic Imperialists”, Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 5, no., 3, (1970), 44. 55 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 12. 56 Ibid., 9. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. Certainly Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983) has been a landmark book on nationalism and the nation state. The reason why my MRP is not using Anderson as a backdrop in defining Hughes’ nationalism and conception of the Canadian nation is because his work focuses too much on the geographic and territorial aspect of the nation, whereas Smith focuses largely on the movement for identity, unity, and autonomy involved in nationalism. Crosby 14

Canadian nationalist, by this definition, is somebody who acts in the interests of

Canada by attempting to build a stronger identity and autonomous position for the country. As argued by Tim Cook, imperial nationalism was one way Canadians, such as Hughes, could promote Canadian nationalism.59

My MRP will illustrate Hughes’ actions, which I believe correspond with the arguments put forth by Penlington and Berger. I demonstrate his efforts to strengthen the Canadian nation and detail his advocacy for a heightened status and identity for

Canada. In supporting their beliefs, I also reject the argument put forth by Doug Cole. I feel that historians are correct in saying that Hughes and other Canadian imperialists were “nationalists”, not “patriots”. I believe this is so because while he is not championing a distinct Canadian ethnicity or culture, he is advocating a major change within the British Empire and how nations were perceived. Canada could no longer remain passive, inferior, and subservient, Hughes believed, and he fought for an altered nation. Canada had to be equal partners with Britain and attain more influence within the Empire. Canada had to have influence over its own foreign affairs, and that in itself is promoting a distinct nation in that they would be full partners, but individually autonomous. Therefore while Canada would still be aligned with the Empire, the

Canadian “nation” would be stronger, better recognized, and more independent.

The arguments put forth by Penlington and Berger have continued to be widely accepted by historians. One possible explanation for this comes from Philip Buckner, who states that Cole’s argument is rarely discussed due to the “total disinterest” of most Canadian historians to tackle the issue of imperialism and its significance in the

59 Cook, 18. Crosby 15 twentieth century.60 Twentieth century Canadian imperialism has become an outdated subject, and after Berger’s The Sense of Power was released, historians have accepted it as truth and moved on to other topics. Yet the case of Sam Hughes has not been fully explored. Certainly Hughes was an imperial nationalist, but he was one of a certain sort. While some saw the Empire as a chance to carry out overseas works of charity and progressive reform, for Hughes, imperial nationalism was all about military muscle-flexing. This is a fact acknowledged by Sam Hughes’ historians, but I am going to analyze Hughes’ world view in-depth to depict how he believed that the Canadian nation could be created by the military through the South African War, and how be believed it was, following his return from South Africa.

My MRP will be largely based on Sam Hughes’ private papers. The Sam

Hughes collection consists of sixteen different volumes, with the second one devoted entirely to the South African War. Within the second volume, there are seventeen different files, with the majority of one to six relating to his feud with Edward Hutton, files seven to nine detailing correspondence letters during his time in South Africa, files ten to fourteen being his personal field notes kept while in South Africa, and files fifteen to seventeen consisting of maps, notes, and address books. These private papers were donated to the Library and Archives in 1993 by Hughes’ grandson Sam H.S. Hughes, and were not available to previous biographers such as Ronald Haycock.61 While

Haycock did have access to correspondence letters of Sam Hughes found in the private papers of Governor General Lord Minto, Minister of Militia and Defence

Frederick Borden, and future Prime Minister Robert Borden, I had the opportunity to

60 Phillip Buckner, “The Long Goodbye: English‐Canadians and the British World” in Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis’ Rediscovering the British World (Calrgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 182. 61 Haycock, 6. Haycock claims he was constantly refused access to the private papers by Sam H.S. Hughes. Crosby 16 work with papers that other historians did not have access to. Tim Cook’s The Madman and the Butcher is the only academic book on Hughes written after the donation of the private papers, and which sources from them, that I have found. Luckily for me, Cook’s book places heavier emphasis on World War One than he does on Hughes’ exploits in

South Africa. My MRP will show that Sam Hughes’ world view was shaped by the militia, and it was his imperial nationalist belief that the South African War gave

Canadian citizen-soldiers the chance to gain international recognition and autonomy for

Canada, while fighting off claims of inferiority. Similarly, while many Canadians sailed to South Africa as loyal Britishers and returned home dismayed with Britain and the

Empire, Hughes’ faith in the Empire remained and his ties with Britain grew stronger.62

My MRP will be divided into two chapters. The first will detail Hughes’ ideas of imperial nationalism and how they shaped his attempts to lead a contingent overseas in

South Africa. I will make the argument that Hughes loved the Canadian Militia, composed of citizen-soldiers and not professionals, and wanted to push them and

Canada’s reputation forward. In order to depict Hughes’ admiration of the citizen-soldier and how he was convinced they would be the ones to actively promote Canadian interests abroad, I will highlight his infamous feud with the British General Officer

Commanding Edward T.H. Hutton, a man described by the Canadian South African

War expert Carman Miller as an “energetic, though tactless, arrogant, and self- promoting officer”,63 who arrived in Canada in 1898 as the Canadian military commander. Hutton had just been excused from his position as the General Officer

62 See Carman Miller, “The Unhappy Warriors: Conflict and Nationality among Canadian Troops during the South African War”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 23:1, (January 1995), 77‐104. He made the argument that Canadians sailed to South Africa as soldiers of the British Empire and returned home as distinct Canadians disgusted with the acts committed by British soldiers in the name of imperialism. 63 Miller, A Knight in Politics, 99. Crosby 17

Commanding in New South Wales for his egotism, self promotion, and abuse of power, and upon arriving in Canada he “boasted that he had upset one government – New

South Wales, and would another in Canada if the Minister did not yield to him”.64 A

“self-appointed missionary of imperialism”, Hutton believed that a soldier’s primary responsibility was to the British Crown, and the Empire and its citizens, and not to the elected colonial governments. He also asserted that British regular soldiers had to play an active role in politics while colonial soldiers did not.65 Hutton believed in the superiority of professional soldiers, British first, and to a lesser degree Canadian, and actively promoted professional soldiers over Canadian volunteers, much to the dismay of Hughes. Their feud reveals Hughes’ belief that a military defined a nation and his confidence that Canadian volunteers would be the ones to build upon a nascent sense of a distinct Canadian identity, while professional soldiers, British or Canadian, would only damage Canada’s reputation.

The second chapter of my MRP will analyze Hughes’ actual presence in South

Africa to detail the effects that his participation in the war had on his imperial nationalism. As Ronald G. Haycock asserts, Hughes’ time in South Africa and his successes as a Canadian reinforced his beliefs of “the inherent superiority of part-time soldiers over regulars and of the leadership potential of Canadians”66 Haycock asserts that Hughes also “considered his case a microcosm of the national one: Canadians had to be recognized and treated as equals in a reborn Empire”.67 Hughes returned home with the belief that he and the other Canadians had been a success in South Africa, that fighting a war had made Canada a more identifiable place on the map, and as

64 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hughes to Borden, March 31, 1900, 7. 65 Miller, A Knight in Politics, 99. 66 Haycock, 93. 67 Ibid. Crosby 18 such, Canadians had to have military equality with Britain and greater autonomy within the British Empire. Similarly, I am going to argue that the horrors of the war in South

Africa, as well as his perceived blunders of the British Generals, really had no effect on his faith in Britain and the Empire.

Crosby 19

Chapter 1: Hughes and Canadian Participation, 1899

Sam Hughes was born in Darlington, Canada West in 1853, and educated in

Toronto.68 The son of John and Caroline Hughes, Sam was brought up in a family that had come from Northern Ireland, which was extremely loyal to the British Crown.69 His family was fiercely Protestant and linked to the Orange Order.70 As a young man growing up on a farm, Sam was awed by his “martial ancestry”, namely the fact that both his grandfathers had fought in the Battle of Waterloo, a battle which drastically altered Empires in Europe, with one grandfather fighting on the side of Wellington and the other fighting under Napoleon.71 As he would later admit in life “Among my earliest memories were the stories repeated by my parents and others of those two old veterans, and let me frankly confess, they gave not only an inspiration but an education throughout my entire life”.72 Fascinated by the tales of military adventures of both his grandfathers, it came as no surprise that at the age of twelve, Hughes joined the militia and served with the local 45th Battalion.73

One year later, in 1866, at the age of thirteen, Hughes helped defend Canada against Fenian raids launched by Irish-American Civil War veterans who wished to conquer the Dominion of Canada to ransom it back to Britain as a way to secure a free

Ireland. 74 It was in these series of battles against the Fenians that Hughes began a love affair with the Active Militia and came to believe that part-time soldiers were the

68 J.L. Granatstein and Dean F. Oliver, The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 204. 69 Haycock, 9. 70 Cook, 12. 71 Ibid., 13. And Capon, 20. 72 LAC, The Papers of Sir Sam Hughes, MG 27 II D 23, vol.1, file 3, Hughes’ Memoir, 1. 73 Cook, 13. 74 Ibid., 14 Crosby 20

“bulwark” of Canadian defence.75 This experience undoubtedly helped shape his lifelong belief that a Canadian citizen, whether a farmer or shop clerk, would be a more adequate defender of Canada than any professional soldier, British or Canadian.76

After American authorities captured the major Fenians and effectively ended the raids,

Hughes returned home with not only the belief that he had done his duty well, but also with the belief in his superiority over those who had not served.77

Following his experiences with the Fenians, Hughes focused primarily on education for a “brief sojourn”. He took classes at the University of Toronto, and at the age of sixteen he became a teacher at several public schools and then became an

English master in the Toronto Collegiate Institute.78 In 1885, Hughes decided to quit teaching as the classrooms did not “satisfy his energy or his gregariousness”.79 That same year, Hughes purchased the Victoria Warder which was a small newspaper in

Lindsay, ON, which served Prime Minister John A. Macdonald’s Liberal-Conservative party.80 Throughout his life, Hughes had flirted with different political entities. Samuel

H.S. Hughes claims that his grandfather had contracted strong “Liberal party leanings after the death of his first wife” when he was twenty-one, while Haycock argues that

Hughes had “flirted” with the Reform Party in his younger days. 81 While he had flirted with political affiliations in his youth, Hughes ultimately was a Conservative. He grew up in a town that was overwhelmingly Conservative, and was part of the generation that

“responded” to Macdonald’s national dream in 1867, and in later years to its “political

75 Haycock, 12 76 Granatstein and Oliver, 204 77 Cook, 14 78 Winter, 3 79 Haycock, 13 80 Ibid. 81 Hughes, 7, and Haycock, 16. Crosby 21 application, the National Policy”.82 Similarly, his father and elder brother James were both Conservatives, and his family bled Orange and were intensely loyal to the British

Connection.83 Also, the Conservatives were the party in power, and the Conservative government gave out patronage to all loyal and hard working followers of the party.

Hughes secured income from government advertising in his paper, and in turn he began supporting Conservative policies.84 He would also send Prime Minister John A.

Macdonald dozens of letters arguing that no local Liberal should assume a position of public office when a deserving loyalist could fill the position.85

As its publisher, Hughes also used the Warder to express his views of the military and the relationship between Canada and the British Empire. On the subject of the military, Hughes became entangled in a debate with men like William Dillon Otter, a professional soldier in the Canadian army, who was convinced by his experiences with the Fenians in 1866 that Canada needed a regular, professional military service based on the British model, with its routine, discipline, and order.86 Hughes, on the other hand, labelled as the “propagator of the militia myth of 1812” by Canadian military historian

Desmond Morton, believed that volunteer soldiers were better than professional ones.87

In the Warder, Hughes pointed out that during the second Riel rebellion of 1885, it was

Canadian volunteers that defeated the Metis at Batoche with a force that had little to no help from British or Canadian professional soldiers.88 Regular soldiers, Hughes argued, had proved that they were nothing but an “injury to the nation”.89 Canada’s “first real

82 Haycock, 16. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., 17 86 Ibid. Also found in Granatstein and Oliver, 317. 87 Desmond Morton, The Canadian General: Sir William Otter (Toronto: Hakkert, 1974), 80‐1. 88 Haycock, 18. 89 Haycock, 18. Crosby 22 military test since Confederation”, according to Haycock, further convinced Hughes that professional soldiers had to be subservient to citizen soldiers.90 He declared that all farmboys should join the “Volunteers” at age eighteen because they could shoot straighter, had more endurance, were cheaper to raise as “Volunteers”, and were the ones who had done all of the “real military work” since the War of 1812.91

Tied into his military beliefs were his thoughts about Canada’s relationship with

Great Britain. Hughes dreamed of building up the volunteer force to ward off the

“Yankees”, and felt that Canada should join an imperial federation of Great Britain and all the colonies, whereby each country would be domestically autonomous while sending representatives to a great imperial parliament in England. The benefits of this would be more local autonomy for the colonies, and better defence with fewer “standing armies”.92 The Warder ultimately became a supporter of the Imperial Federation

League, which demanded that Canada should be entitled to a more influential say in its imperial policy.93 He denounced Catholics, Liberals, and all opposed to the militia.94

Hughes always paid a very close eye to politics, and in 1891, he unsuccessfully contested the constituency of North Victoria, ON. The next year, a vacancy opened up in the same riding, and Hughes was elected to Parliament as a Conservative. He would be re-elected in 1896, 1900, 1904, 1908, 1911, and 1917.95

90 Ibid. One possible explanation as to why Riel’s “North‐West Rebellion” has been labelled by some, including Haycock, as Canada’s “first real military test since Confederation” instead of the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870, comes from Granatstein and Oliver. They argue that The Fenian Raids were a “comic opera, largely a military farce”, whereas Riel’s provisional government set up in Batoche posed a legitimate challenge to the authority of Canada in the area. Granatstein and Oliver, 167, 376. 91 Ibid., 20. 92 Ibid., 23 93 Ibid., 25 94 Cook, 16 95 Winter, 4 Crosby 23

As a Member of Parliament, Hughes was an intense supporter of the British

Empire and imperial federation, though the movement rarely achieved much due to the fear of alienating Quebec or other hesitant Canadians.96 The majority of Quebec was opposed to an imperial partnership with Britain. Parliament would obviously have been hesitant to pass legislation that would offend an entire province, such as Quebec, or the large number of English-Canadians who did not fully support the idea of imperialism alongside Britain, especially since they would count as votes in a future election.

Hughes also lobbied for the upgrading of the Canadian militia. He constantly demanded more money for the militia, to come at the expense of the professional army, and

Canadian military historian Desmond Morton states that Hughes even used intimidation tactics to get his point across.97 Tim Cook argues that Hughes’ efforts to invest in the

Canadian volunteer, or the “self-made Dominion man” held a “nationalistic appeal”, as the militia was a way to have a cheap army that was, in Hughes’ view, better than the professional soldier and was more independent and effective in combat.98 Thus the citizen-soldier was more distinctly Canadian, and would better represent Canada abroad.

The belief that citizen-soldiers would be the ones to adequately protect Canada and its interests, the so-called “militia myth” was strong in Canada. It was the view established after the War of 1812, and in 1855, the Militia Act declared that a Force of

5,000 volunteers would best defend the country.99 However, due to claims of poor leadership and equipment, it was decided in 1874 that a General Officer Commanding

96 Cook, 20. 97 Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868‐1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 17. 98 Cook, 21. 99 Granatstein and Oliver, 272. Crosby 24 would lead the Canadian Militia, maintain relations with Britain, and serve the Minister of Militia and Defence.100 In 1883, a tiny Permanent Force was set up, but it was still believed by a majority of the population that the citizen-soldiers were the best soldiers

Canada had to offer.101

In 1896, the Conservatives lost to the Liberals under Wilfrid Laurier, but Cook notes that Hughes “kept his seat”.102 Hughes was able to maintain his influence in

Parliament due to his knowledge of the Canadian military, but also because he was friends with Frederick Borden, the Minister of Militia and Defence. As Borden’s erratic

“Tory friend” and “political opponent”, Hughes worked with Borden to improve the militia, much to the dismay of his fellow Tories.103 Borden, described as “wily” by Cook, saw the advantage of keeping Hughes happy and throwing off the Conservatives, whose chief military critic often sided with the Laurier government. While this type of activity could get a person kicked out of their political party, Hughes was a “force” among the Conservatives after their party was severely reduced by the 1896 election results.104

In 1897, in a letter to Lord Roberts, a renowned British military commander,

Hughes claimed that he learned at the Diamond Jubilee that a “probable South African

War” was on the horizon, and that it was his belief that Britain, already dealing with a conflict in India, would be unable to handle a war in South Africa alone and would need colonial assistance.105 In an effort to defend the interests and glory of the British

Empire, Hughes travelled to Australia, New Zealand, and the Fiji Islands to seek

100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Cook, 22. 103 Carman Miller, A Knight in Politics, 5, and Cook, 22. 104 Cook, 22 105 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers, MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Lord Roberts, November 27. Crosby 25 assistance from the colonies.106 The threat of a war in South Africa excited Hughes, promising the fulfillment of his lifelong dream of the “utilization of the services of

Canadian troops in the imperial service”.107

In 1899, Hughes was forced to sell the Warder for financial reasons, but Cook argues that Hughes no longer needed the newspaper. Even though he could no longer reach wide audiences through his paper, a war in South Africa was becoming very likely, and was about to be a war which would thrust him onto the global stage.108 In the last year of the nineteenth century, it seemed undeniable that the British Empire would soon become entangled in an overseas war. However, it would not be against its traditional European rival France, or the rising power in Germany, but against two small

Boer republics in South Africa.109 The British tried to sell the likely war back home as a civilizing mission which would bring long lasting peace, freedom, and justice to an alleged barbaric and repugnant continent.110 Despite their claims, this was a war of imperialism, the late nineteenth century movement by British politicians and activists to reorganize the British Empire to provide greater economic, political, and military security in a competitive and hostile international environment.111 The soon-to-be war was ignited by the discovery of gold and diamonds in 1886 in the South African republics, which brought thousands of British citizens into the Transvaal with dreams of wealth, a frenzied search which transformed the South African economy virtually

106 Ibid. 107 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers, MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, R.H. Knox to Lord Roberts, November 3, 1897. 108 Cook, 23. 109 Ibid. 110 Carman Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899‐1902 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill‐Queen’s University Press, 1993), 10. 111 Carman Miller, Canada’s Little War: Fighting for the British Empire in Southern Africa, 1899‐1902 (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company Ltd., 2003), 7. Crosby 26 overnight.112 The situation between the British and the Boers became intense as the

Boers wanted to drive “the British to the Sea” while the British imperialists wanted to extend British influence and dominance from “the Cape to Cairo”.113

In Canada, news of the impending war in South Africa was met with both anticipation and disgust. Canada, a country of two predominant cultures, was divided along racial, linguistic, and cultural lines about how to approach the war in South Africa.

In English-Canada, the majority of citizens felt a personal tie to the British Crown, and were excited at the prospect of fighting for the Empire.114 For many English-Canadians,

Britain was the Motherland, and the South African War meant defending the honour of the Crown. A great number of English-Canadians believed that Canada was an

“enthusiastic daughter of the Empire”, and felt that since the Empire was the greatest organization that the world had ever seen, it should be strengthened in every way possible.115

Opposition to the English-Canadian desire for participation and to the war itself came from Quebec, where enthusiasm and excitement for the war was hard to find.

French-Canadians, unlike English-Canadians, did not share the same connection with the British, and sympathized with the Boers, a non-English people being colonized by the English.116 La Patrie (a French-Canadian newspaper) asked, “why should French-

Canadians fight the Boers who were struggling for their independence, language, and

112 Keith Surridge, “All you Soldiers are what we call Pro‐Boer’: The Military Critique of the South African War, 1899‐1902”, History, October 1997, vol. 82 (268), 587. 113 Miller, Canada’s Little War, 11. 114 Skelton, 95. 115 Michael Bliss, Right Honourable Men: The Descent of Canadian Politics from Macdonald to Chretien (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 1994), 42‐3. 116 Skelton, 95‐96. Crosby 27 peculiar customs?”117 There was a belief in Quebec that French-Canadians belonged only to Canada, while English-Canadians served both Canada and Britain. 118 Prime

Minister Wilfrid Laurier knew that the upcoming war in South Africa would divide the country, and as such, originally refused to commit Canada to involvement. Laurier warned Governor General Lord Minto, who was asking for a Canadian contribution of men, about the “inadvisability of moving French-Canadian troops”,119 stating that they did not share the same eagerness as English-Canada possessed.

As for Sam Hughes, he “desperately” desired the South African War. Hughes felt that it was time for Canada to demonstrate its military might to the rest of the world.120

As an imperial nationalist, Hughes desired using the South African War to build up and promote the Canadian militia and the Great Empire simultaneously.121 Hughes was one of those who, as outlined by Carman Miller, thought that the war could be a way for

Canada to shed its colonial status and gain greater influence and responsibility within the “imperial community”.122 Canadian participation to this group of people was about establishing a greater voice for Canada within the Empire and extending its autonomy.123 By fighting an imperial war alongside Britain, Canada’s military could ultimately gain the country more influence and autonomy.

In May 1899, when talks between the British and the Boers seemed likely to result in violence, Hughes offered to raise and command a Canadian contingent of

117 Penlington, 246. 118 Skelton, 96. 119 Penlington, 190. 120 Cook, 23. 121 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 1, Hughes to Hutton Re: A Transvaal Force, 58. Haycock claimed that Hughes wanted Canada to participate to demonstrate the country’s military prowess rather than any form of imperial patriotism, 68. 122 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 19. 123 Ibid. Crosby 28 volunteer soldiers to serve in South Africa, but nothing came of it.124 In July, both

Hughes and General Hutton, the General Officer Commanding since 1898, “perceived a rising sentiment to give military aid to Great Britain” and both were quick to try to exploit it,125 which would ultimately lead to one of the most infamous feuds in Canadian history. On July 13th, Hughes stood before the House of Commons and declared that

Canada had to send a force of 5,000 men to uphold the honour of the country, and he would be more than willing to lead a private contingent.126 The military, in his eyes, would be the ones who would protect Canada’s dignity within the British Empire. As the largest Dominion within the Empire, Hughes seemed to believe that Canada had to send men overseas in accordance with the size and prestige of the country. He was hinting at the idea that should Canada fail to do so, national shame would be placed upon the country.127 But Hughes’ offers to lead a private contingent served to infuriate some important figures in Canada, including the Governor General of Canada, Lord

Minto, and the General Officer Commanding Edward Hutton.

Lord Minto, like Hughes, wanted Canada to support the Empire in the event that war broke out, but he detested private contingents as they would allow the Laurier government to distance themselves from the war. Rather, Minto wanted Laurier to make an official commitment that would set a precedent for future wars.128 Hutton also had practical reasons for abhorring Hughes’ plans, as the General would have no control over private contingents and he would derive no professional credit.129 Hughes and Hutton seemed to have clashed from the first time they met. Carman Miller argues

124 Miller, A Knight in Politics, 110. 125 Haycock, 68. 126 Cook, 24. 127 Ibid., 23. 128 Ibid., 24. 129 Miller, A Knight in Politics,110. Crosby 29 that they were essentially the same person, and as such, could not stand the other.

Although both were competent officers, both were eccentric, narcissistic, and temperamental, and both saw war as a way to advance their dreams of “rank and distinction”.130

In mid-July, Edward Hutton began to step up his pressings for a Canadian contingent by secretly planning for a dispatch of Canadians overseas to South Africa.

Hutton’s private scheme would compose of two small infantry battalions, one field battery, and one hundred mounted rifles, for a combined “total strength” of twelve hundred men and $300,000.131 Hutton’s plan would effectively put him in charge of the

Canadian militia and make them subject to British rule and officers. Hutton declared the

Canadian government to be too inexperienced to lead or give commands, and pursued his own ends in his attempt to be a “military missionary of Empire”.132 By attempting to raise a private contingent without the permission of Laurier or Borden, Hutton was failing to report to the Minister of Militia as outlined in the position of the General Officer

Commanding, and he was trying to force Laurier’s hand into making a decision.

With Sam Hughes’ desire for Canadian troops in imperial wars and Edward

Hutton’s lack of “respect for the martial talents of Canada’s civilian Militia”133, the two were bound to clash. On July 24th, Hughes, a Colonel in the Canadian Militia, sent three offers to lead a private Canadian contingent in the likely war in South Africa. In a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel C.E. Montizambert, the man in charge of the commanding artillery during the battle at Batoche, in September, Hughes stated that one offer was

130 Carman Miller, The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto: The Education of a Viceroy (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980), 70. 131 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 33. Also sourced in Haycock, 68, and Penlington, 229. 132 Miller, A Knight in Politics, 100‐1. 133 Ibid., 110. Crosby 30 sent “as an officer in the Canadian militia through the regular channel of the District

Officer Commanding to raise a Corps for Imperial service abroad”.134 This was sent directly to General Edward Hutton. The second offer sent was “as citizen of Canada and the British Empire to the Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, for a similar purpose”.135 The last offer was sent to Minister of Militia of

Canada Sir Frederick Borden.136 In the proposal to Frederick Borden, Hughes proclaimed “I have the honour to renew my offer made thrice previously in writing, and several times orally, to enrol and lead an active service abroad in the Imperial Service a regiment or a brigade of Canadians”.137 In the letter to the Defence Minister, Hughes proclaimed that “I am prepared to serve either as leader of a Canadian regiment under pay of Canada, or which I deem better policy, under pay of the Empire”.138 If Britain paid for the contingent, official Canadian government recognition of British policy might not occur, according to Haycock.139

Hughes’ rationale for sending offers to these three high ranking men was simple.

As the General Officer Commanding in Canada, Hutton was entitled to receive one.

The offer to Frederick Borden was sent because should Canada think favourably on the offer, “enrolment could proceed under the direction of Canadian authorities”.140

Similarly, the offer to Borden was sent in the event that Hughes’ offer to Hutton would be “pigeon-holed”141 and never heard by the Canadian authorities. Not only was

Hughes going over the head of an appointed British General who was legally in

134 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hughes to Montizambert, September 2, 1899, 18. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid. 137 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers, MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Borden, July 24, 1899. 138 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hughes to Montizambert, September 2, 1899, 19. 139 Haycock, 69. 140 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hughes to Montizambert, September 2, 1899, 19. 141 Ibid. Crosby 31 command of the Canadian military in foreign wars, but he was stating that recruitment and enrolment for the war could be placed under Canadian authority and direction. The offer to Chamberlain was sent in case the other two offers were ignored.142

By sending an offer to Joseph Chamberlain, Hughes was acting on his belief that “any citizen of Canada, civilian or militiaman, can properly volunteer to the Imperial

Authorities direct, to enrol a corps”.143 In declaring that, Hughes was stating that

Canadians had the same right as any British citizen to volunteer to British authorities to offer his service and lead a contingent in an imperial war. Hughes cited a complicated example of an “officer high in authority in Canada, a then Deputy Adjutant General” who volunteered directly as a Militiaman to the Imperial authorities to raise a Canadian corps in 1878.144 Hughes argues that the “Halifax Officer” had successfully volunteered to raise a corps to His Excellency, arguing that the officer, though a Canadian, was entitled to the same rights as any British, Scottish, or Irish subject within the Empire, and as such was entitled to volunteer and raise a private Corps.145 Hughes’ point in making this claim was twofold. Firstly, Not only did he feel that as a Canadian and

British citizen he had been deprived by Hutton of the right enjoyed by other British citizens, but that ordinary Canadians should be equal with British, Scottish, and Irish subjects as had been the case with the high ranking Canadian officer. Secondly,

Hughes was arguing that the proper course of volunteering to raise a corps was through the British Authorities, and that ordinary Canadians should be able to raise a private contingent.

142 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hughes to Montizambert, September 2, 1899, 19. 143 Ibid., 20. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid., 19. Crosby 32

Hughes’ case for that argument was no doubt shaped by Edward Hutton’s complete disapproval of Hughes’ plans and the paths taken to try to attain them. On

July 31st, 1899, Hutton responded to Hughes’ actions in a letter to Borden stating that

Hughes, who always signed his letters with his military rank, “has corresponded direct with you in his Military capacity as commanding the 45th Battalion, and has, moreover, offered his military service without my sanction or approval. His attention has been directed to this irregularity and breach of military procedure”.146 Hutton charged Hughes with not caring so much for either the interests of the British Empire or Canada, but solely having an “anxiety for employment”, a charge Hughes viciously refuted.147

Hughes assured Hutton that he had in the past refused much higher and lucrative positions, as in the late Cuban War, than he could ever hope to attain in the South

African War.148 Hughes also claimed, in a letter to Laurier on October 28th, that shortly after he sent offers to Borden and Chamberlain, articles in the Canadian press and

London Times began appearing which declared that Sam Hughes had usurped functions of government. Hughes proclaimed that he had, through many investigations, linked the articles back to Edward Hutton.149

Despite the best efforts of Hughes and Hutton in July to try to force Prime

Minister Laurier into offering a formal Canadian contingent or allowing a private contingent to sail overseas to South Africa, the Prime Minister remained firm on not promising any men. Standing before the House of Commons on July 31st, Laurier announced “The object to be sought is that we should extend to our fellow-countrymen

[i.e. Britishers] in South Africa the right-hand of good fellowship, that we should assure

146 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hutton to Borden, July 31, 1899. 147 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Hutton, October 28, 1899, 28. 148 Ibid. 149 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Laurier, October 28, 1899, 45. Crosby 33 them that our heart is with them and that in our judgment they are in the right”.150

Canada was siding with Britain informally, but would not oversee the departure of any

Canadian citizens.

From August to late October 1899, Hughes and Hutton escalated their rivalry into a public fight, with each throwing claims of inferiority upon each other’s army.

According to Hutton, Canadians would only be a problem in South Africa. Canadian militiamen, he declared, “were unfit to serve in the Field short of three years training as regulars and then only if led by Imperial Officers”.151 Hutton also told Hughes that “you might as well try to fly to the moon as to take the field alongside of British troops”.152

Hutton’s view of course angered Hughes, who failed “to see wherein I am unfit to serve alongside British troops”.153 It was his belief that he as a Canadian was just as qualified as any British Officer to lead a Corps. He believed that given a chance, Canadian citizen-soldiers could prove as efficient as any professional British soldier. He also felt that should the Canadian militia be led by a British General, they would be held back, which would prevent them from being successful in battle and possibly gaining global recognition as great Canadian fighters.

For Sam Hughes, the fear was not about whether or not Canadian soldiers could fight, but about being placed under “some Imperial incompetent” who has brought disgrace to Britain time and time again in the past.154 Hughes challenged Hutton’s assertions about the poor fighting skills of Canadians, sarcastically asking “You say I would be incapable to serve alongside British regulars? Why? Could I not retreat or

150 Skelton, 92. 151 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hughes to Borden, March 31, 1900, 6. 152 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Laurier, October 28, 1899, 46. 153 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Hutton, August 28, 1899, 34. 154 Ibid., 29 Crosby 34 surrender quick enough to the Boers?”155 Hughes, hinting at the “militia-myth” of 1812, claimed that Canadian volunteers could always defeat American soldiers despite numerical disadvantages, while American soldiers would always defeat the numerically advantageous British troops.156 Hughes claimed to Hutton that whenever disaster occurred during the War of 1812, there were no Canadians present, while whenever

Canadian volunteers and British fought side by side, victory was all theirs.157 Hughes predicted the same outcome in South Africa, as the Boers were a smaller and less trained group of people fighting for their own independence. Canadian volunteers would not be the problem in South Africa, according to Hughes, rather it would be the

British professional troops who would prove inefficient, and would probably be wiped out by the Boers rather quickly.158

It was thus the mission of Sam Hughes to rebel against claims of Canadian inferiority. The South African War, for him, became a chance to display a form of nationalism by challenging the notion of Canadian reliance on and dependence towards Britain. As he told General Hutton, it “is our desire to form part of the great

Empire; and so far as I am concerned, I am ready now to have Canada assume her direct responsibility and subsequent control in the Imperial Machine. But such movements must be approached gradually”.159 If they proved successful in battle,

Hughes believed that Canadians could begin taking control over their own foreign policy, and notions of dependence and inferiority would dissipate.

155 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Hutton, August 28, 1899, 33. 156 Ibid. 157 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 1, Hughes to Hutton: Re: A Transvaal Force, 59. 158 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Hutton, August 28, 1899, 34, also found in James Wood, Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier 1896‐1921 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 77. 159 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 1, Hughes to Hutton: Re: A Transvaal Force, 58. Crosby 35

Hughes’ dream of using the South African War to showcase Canadian talents while proving the doubters wrong, was the reason why he got upset when the General allowed British Officers to get the “pull” over equally deserving Canadian soldiers.160

Hughes despised Edward Hutton, whom he claimed practically knew nothing of

Canada or Canadians,161 because he believed that Hutton’s perceived disregard for

Canada would prevent him from showcasing Canadian military talents which would in turn allow him to not give a good reflection of the country. Hughes pointed out that

Hutton declared in April 1899 that if a Canadian force was sent to South Africa, it would consist of couple of hundred men from the Permanent Corps, and it would be

“absolutely out of the question” for a militia officer not from the Permanent Corps to have any sort of command.162 Hughes claimed that both General Hutton and his chief staff officer, Colonel Hubert Foster, acknowledged that the Permanent Corps Officer might be inferior to a civilian militia officer, but the reputation of the Permanent Corps

“demanded the appointment”.163

Hughes’ belief that Canada needed to be sufficiently represented in South Africa by the best soldiers the country had to offer, which in his mind were citizen-soldiers, was a reason why he was so irritated with Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence Buchan, whom

Hutton appointed to lead a Field Force in the Transvaal. Due to the public and bitter feud between Hughes and Hutton, the General Officer Commanding struck Hughes’ name off the list of officers he had originally proposed for a secret contingent and replaced him with Buchan.164 What made Hutton’s selection of Buchan so bothersome

160 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Laurier, October 28, 1899, 47. 161 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hughes to Borden, March 31, 1900, 5. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Haycock, 73. Crosby 36 to Hughes was that Buchan was a Canadian Permanent Force soldier, and not a citizen-soldier.165 Upon hearing that Buchan, and not he, would be sent to South Africa,

Hughes complained to Hutton in a series of letters detailing why the General made the incorrect choice. Hughes claimed that “failure”, “disaster”, and “want of success” had plagued Buchan throughout his entire career, and that Hutton had even believed

Buchan to be “unfit for the service and incompetent”.166 Hughes argued that “Failure” is the word to not only describe Buchan’s entire career, but the man himself.167

Hughes believed, with a high possibility that he was speaking out of jealousy, that Buchan’s record of failure would continue into South Africa, and he would give

Canadian Colonels and the soldiers serving with them, as well as Canada, a bad name.

After all, Hughes accused Buchan of being “stranded” in Winnipeg during Riel’s North-

West Rebellion (1885) while the citizen-soldiers saved the day.168 Hughes appears to have felt that Buchan, and Hutton’s professional army by association, would fail in

South Africa, which would damage the reputation of Canadian fighters. This is why he believed Hutton should reconsider his selection and appoint him as part of the

Transvaal Force since he claimed to have always been marked by success.169 Hughes thought that if given the chance, he could show the rest of the world that Canada was a strong nation that produced excellent fighters. But at the same time, he was a man desirous of fame and recognition, and as such, felt that success in battle would also heighten his own reputation globally and within the British Empire. Even though Buchan

165 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 1, Hughes to Hutton: Re: A Transvaal Force, 51., Haycock, 73. 166 Ibid., 50 and LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hughes to Borden, March 31, 1900, 5. 167 Ibid., 51. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid., 56. Crosby 37 was a Canadian, as a Permanent Corps member, he was still not acceptable to

Hughes.

On September 20th, Hughes advertised in Canadian newspapers for volunteers to serve with him in South Africa.170 In response, Hutton forwarded a memo to Hughes threatening to charge him with Section 98 of the Army Act which read “1. If a person without due authority – Publishes or caused to be published notices or advertisements for the purpose of procuring recruits for Her Majesty’s Regular Forces, or in relation to recruits for such forces”171 they will be “liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds”.172 Hutton even recommended to Frederick Borden that

Hughes should lose command of his regiment and be forced into retirement.173 Hutton argued to Hughes that the Montreal Star’s publication which read “WANTED

SOLDIERS” “misled you. I did not ask a man to enrol, induce a man to enrol, attempt to recruit a man – for any service; much less for the British Regular Army”.174

Hutton publically accusing Hughes of “usurping government” was ironic, since on October 3rd, 1899, Hutton privately made a publication in the Canadian Military

Gazette, which announced his plans of an armed contribution to South Africa.175 It was a secret plan by Hutton, which again went over the head of Minister of Militia and

Defence Frederick Borden, to create his own corps to go to South Africa.176 In the

170 Haycock, 72. Hughes’ advertisement for Canadians to serve with him in South Africa is contained within the Toronto Globe and Mail, A Call To Arms: Lt.‐Col. Hughes Begins to Raise a Transvaal Corps, Wednesday, September 20, 1899, 13. 171 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers, MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Headquarters Memo from Foster, September 25, 1899, 47. 172 Ibid. 173 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hutton to Borden, October 26, 1899, 45. 174 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Memo from Hutton, 73. 175 Colonel Bernd Horn, The Canadian Way of War, Serving the National Interest (Toronto: Dundurn Press Limited, 2006), 145. 176 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Borden, December 20, 1910, 8. Crosby 38 same publication, Hutton also stated that it was “a criminal act of folly to appoint an amateur militia officer without army experience to command a battalion”.177 With the publication in the Canadian Military Gazette, Hutton was stepping up his efforts to lead an official Canadian contingent to South Africa by ignoring the authority of Borden and attempting to push Laurier’s decision into sending men in the event of war.

While Edward Hutton was doing everything he could to lead a Canadian contingent overseas, Sam Hughes was also trying to exert more influence over Prime

Minister Laurier in hope that the latter would send an official force. In the October 5th

Mail and Empire newspaper, an article was published under the headline “Col. Hughes is Emphatic”. The article read “Col. Sam Hughes, M.P., passed through the city yesterday morning, returning home from Ottawa for a day before going out again.

Asked re a Transvaal contingent, he stated his belief that Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Dr.

Borden were prepared to send any force from 1,200 to 50,000 men if the people could be made to show the desire to have them go.”178 In a letter from Hughes to Prime

Minister Laurier dated on October 6, 1899, Hughes pointed out that “Britain has accepted four hundred and fifty jointly from New Zealand and Queensland; pro rata that equals fully four thousand from Canada. Kindly follow your own plan and send at least fifteen hundred, less would look beneath Canada’s dignity”.179 Canada’s reputation within the British Empire was at risk. In order to save face, Laurier had to send at least fifteen thousand men to maintain Canada’s dominance over other British colonies such as New Zealand.

177 Miller, A Knight in Politics, 112. 178 LAC, The Papers of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, MG. 26, Finding Aid 91, C – 769 Reel 33, Toronto Mail and Empire: Col. Hughes is Emphatic”, October 5, 1899, 37891. 179 LAC, The Papers of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, MG. 26, Finding Aid 91, C – 769 Reel 33, Hughes to Laurier, October 6, 1899 page 37888. Crosby 39

In the same letter, Hughes described what the South African War could possibly do for Canada declaring, “Really it would be a grand advertisement for Canada”.180

Regarding who should be sent to South Africa, standing before the House of Commons in 1901, Hughes declared that the number of Canadians sent overseas was not as important as long as the force sent would be “one that will give a good account of itself and reflect credit on the country”.181 It was better to send 1,000 good men than 5,000 who would prove to be an encumbrance.182 Hughes did not desire Canadian participation solely for the sake of providing numbers to defend Britain’s honour in war.

Rather, in wanting a limited, but effective fighting force, Hughes wanted the best fighters Canada had to offer, which would gain Canada international respect and identity.

On October 11th, 1899, war between Britain and the two South African states was declared. Hughes despaired that he would not be travelling overseas, and as such began to plead with Hutton.183 Lord Minto, a close friend of Hutton’s and an enemy of

Hughes, eventually appealed to Hutton stating that if Hughes, the imperialist, was “left out, feeling would run high among the Canadian public”.184 After many attempts by

Hughes to embark to South Africa were rebuffed by Hutton, on October 28th, Hughes received a telegram from Hubert Foster, the Quartermaster General of the Canadian

Forces, on behalf of General Hutton informing him that it would be in his best interests to withdraw his “previous insubordinate and highly improper correspondence” and

180 LAC, The Papers of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, MG. 26, Finding Aid 91, C – 769 Reel 33, Hughes to Laurier, October 6, 1899 page 37888. 181 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901, 26. 182 Ibid. 183 Haycock, 75. 184 Ibid. Crosby 40 completely and fully apologized for his “unfortunate line of conduct”.185 Foster declared that Hughes should act quickly and apologize to Hutton, and “If the opportunity offers, I shall be glad to see you at Quebec”.186

Hughes wrote an apology to Hutton and withdrew his private offers to lead a contingent. Shortly afterwards, a telegram was sent by Foster to Lt.-Col. Otter,

Commanding 2nd (Special Service) Battalion declaring that “Permission has been granted for Lt.-Col. S. Hughes, 45th battalion, to have passage to South Africa by S.S.

Sardinian conveying the Canadian troops” on October 30th.187 However, while Hughes was granted permission to sail overseas to South Africa, it was understood that he would be doing so only as a civilian, with Foster demanding that “It is to be clearly understood that this officer does not proceed in any military capacity whatever. He accordingly will not wear uniform on board ship”.188

On his way to South Africa, Hughes received a letter from a couple of Canadian civilians championing his imperial nationalism. Hughes was informed,

We believe that the cause you are going to uphold is a just one, which is in the language of England’s Premier ‘to make clear that the great objects essential to the power of England in South Africa, to the good Government of South Africa, and to the rights of the races concerned are the objects of the British Government, objects with the full support of the nation and without distinction of party the government are now pursuing and which will bring about a safe, and perfectly established supremacy of the English people’ in that distant land.189

185 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Foster to Hughes, October 28, 1899, 78. 186 Ibid. 187 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Lt.‐Col. Hughes, 45th Battalion Memo by Foster, October 30, 1899, 82‐3. 188 Ibid. 82. 189 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 7, Hopkins, LaMaster, Williamson to Hughes, October 20, 1899. Crosby 41

The cause which Hughes was adopting, that of “preserving undaunted Imperial

Patriotism”,190 to the Empire, was appreciated by a large portion of Canadian citizens who supported the glory of the British Empire. Imperialist Canadians, eager to find someone who supported the British Empire and the values and honour it espoused, were happy to back Hughes. Before he set sail for South Africa, the citizens and Mayor of Lindsay, Ontario (Hughes’ hometown) presented Hughes with a sum of money and an “address”.191 In it, the Mayor and Warden of Lindsay congratulated Hughes for assisting,

the Imperial authorities in the vindication of British rights in the Transvaal, and we feel confident that you and your men will afford good and meritorious service to the cause which Canada has adopted and that the valor and loyalty to our beloved Sovereign which has in the past characterized the people of Canada will be upheld by yourself and the force with which you are identifying192 His supporters, like him, believed that the imperial war in South Africa was a just war about upholding the British Empire and the rights and civility that went along with it.

At the same time however, there are two references to Canada in the address. Hughes is being acknowledged as leading a distinctly Canadian force into battle, with the purpose of also upholding Canada’s dignity in an imperial federation alongside Britain in South Africa. Canada had a reputation within the Empire to uphold, and Sam Hughes would be the one who would fight for British progress while also fighting for Canadian dignity and identity. The citizens of Lindsay appreciated Hughes’ militarism, and much like him, shared the belief that his efforts to lead Canadians into battle and uphold the

British Empire, will continue to “characterize the people of Canada” and place greater recognition upon Canada.

190 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 7, Walters and Bryant to Hughes, October 26, 1899. 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. Crosby 42

Hutton and Foster’s actions to let Sam Hughes travel to South Africa reflect the fact that the Canadian public stood firmly behind Hughes. Hutton’s arrogant demeanour and public humiliations of Hughes, as evident in the Ottawa Citizen whereby Hutton charged the latter with not “being in the right mind”, led many people, according to

Haycock, to believe that Hughes’ personal rights had been violated.193 Almost inadvertently, Hughes became not only “a martyr but now he was a heroic martyr”.194

There was a belief among a portion of the Canadian population that Sam Hughes was fighting a distinctly “Canadian” battle against British representatives including Hutton and Lord Minto.195

Sam Hughes’ efforts to raise a contingent for South Africa reveal two main ideas about his imperial nationalism and his militaristic world view. First, Hughes was deeply devoted to the British Empire, to Canada, and to Canadian volunteers, and secondly,

Hughes felt that citizen-soldiers were the best way to promote Canadian identity and interests abroad. As discussed, Hughes was an imperial nationalist. He supported imperial union alongside Britain as a way to uphold the supremacy of the British Empire and spread its values abroad. But at the same time, Hughes was displaying a distinct

Canadian nationalism in his faith that the South African War provided Canada with the opportunity to attain greater autonomy and recognition while fighting off claims of inferiority.

Hughes’ military beliefs were shaped by his love of the citizen-soldier, which he held in high regard over the professional soldiers of both Britain and Canada. He was a propagator of the “militia-myth” of 1812, which claimed that Canadian volunteers

193 Haycock, 78. 194 Ibid. 195 D.C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870‐1914 (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1965), 168. Crosby 43 defeated the Americans, not British professional soldiers, and whenever disaster occurred, Canadians were not present. His love of the citizen-soldier was established as a young boy fighting off the Fenians. Hughes came to believe that regular farmers or clerks could prove as effective, if not more so, than trained armies. He came to this same conclusion following Riel’s North-West Rebellion of 1885, where he argued that

Canadian citizen-soldiers defeated Riel and his men at Batoche, while professional soldiers like Buchan were unable to make any significant contributions. This was

Canada’s first skirmish following the birth of the nation in 1867, according to Haycock, and this event no doubt reinforced his ideas that citizen-soldiers could adequately defend Canada.

For Hughes, militarism and imperial nationalism were inseparable. Using his paper, the Warder, as a way to broadcast his opinions, Hughes declared that the volunteer army must be built up to defend Canada from the United States, and Canada must join an imperial federation with Britain. Within the imperial federation, Hughes advocated for domestic autonomy for the colonies, and less standing armies. Britain should not protect the colonies, Hughes felt, rather citizen-soldiers would defend

Canada, while promoting its interests abroad. Historian Tim Cook argues that Hughes’ love of the civilian-soldier was a display of nationalism. There was a deeper sense of independence associated with them, he argues, and it was believed they were superior in battle, thus able to earn a greater degree of recognition.

A second major facet of Hughes’ militarism is that he tried to push citizen- soldiers forward, with the belief that they were the best way to earn Canada a greater degree of recognition and autonomy, while fighting off claims of Canadian inferiority.

The infamous feud between Sam Hughes and Edward Hutton was over the issue of Crosby 44

Canadian participation, with Hughes championing Canadian volunteers going to South

Africa, an idea frowned upon by the General Officer Commanding. Hutton considered

Canadian citizen-soldiers to be a menace and believed that they would have to be trained as professionals for at least three years, and then be led by British Generals.

Hutton’s remarks about the fighting ability of Canadians were not only taken as a personal insult by Hughes, but also as an insult to Canada. If Canada’s “best” fighters, in Hughes’ opinion, were perceived as failures, then so was Canada.

Hutton informed Hughes that if, and when, men were sent overseas to South

Africa, it would be the permanent forces of Britain and Canada who would fight against the Boers, not citizen-soldiers. Hughes claimed that Hutton had acknowledged that the

Permanent Forces may not be the ideal force to send to South Africa, but the professional forces had a reputation to uphold. Hughes viciously defended the abilities of Canadian volunteers and rebelled against claims of their inferiority. He informed

Hutton that though Canada had been greatly outnumbered by its enemies before, such as in the War of 1812 against the Americans, citizen-soldiers would eventually win out at all costs. He also informed Hutton that Britain’s professional army would be soundly beaten by the Boers, despite having far greater numbers and better trained armies, just as they had been in the past. Hughes believed that Canadian citizen-soldiers were equal to, if not better than, their British counterparts. The South African War, for

Hughes, served as an “advertisement” to demonstrate the strength of Canada’s citizen- soldiers. But it was much larger than that. Hughes predicted that the Canadian militia would achieve Canada victories in battle, international recognition, and possibly autonomy for the young nation. By travelling to South Africa, Hughes aimed to prove it. Crosby 45

Aside from criticising the British permanent forces, Hughes also rallied against the use of permanent soldiers from Canada. He was engaged in a debate with men such as William Otter, a professional Canadian soldier who believed in the superiority of professionals, and he was incensed with the appointment of Col. Buchan into

Hutton’s force. The selection of Buchan, a permanent soldier in the Canadian forces and a major failure in the eyes of Hughes, upset Hughes because he felt that Buchan’s alleged poor reputation and status as a permanent soldier under Hutton would give

Canadians a bad name in South Africa. Hughes appears to have believed that

Buchan’s streak of failure would continue into South Africa, which would make Canada appear weak on a global stage. It demonstrates that even though men such as Buchan were Canadian, his status as a professional soldier made them unacceptable and inferior to Sam Hughes and his belief in the citizen-soldier.

Crosby 46

Chapter Two: Hughes in South Africa, 1900

Aboard the S.S. Sardinian, Sam Hughes began appearing in military uniform, despite orders not to do so, and frantically writing letters back home complaining of his perilous situation.196 By wearing uniform aboard ship, Hughes proudly “proclaimed his independence of all military authority”.197 Among the many letters sent back to Canada, among his most frequent recipient was Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier. On October 30th, the same day he set sail for South Africa, Hughes penned a letter to Laurier stating

“General Hutton has tried to disgrace me all he can, and I hope you will show that he does not bully you – Really the public wonders why he has been allowed to override you all and degrade me all he has done. He has even ordered that I go to S. Africa in plain clothes”.198

Hughes also tried to force the Prime Minister into giving him a greater role in

South Africa, pleading “Send me in my military capacity, with rank and pay but no command...This should be done at once, and General Hutton be ordered to cancel his other order and so notify Col. Otter and me at once”.199 Sam Hughes’ occasional pandering and shameless complaining on board the S.S. Sardinian was reminiscent of his October 4th letter sent to Laurier which declared that if sent to South Africa, Hughes, a hardened Conservative, would become a warm friend to Laurier and begin to see real merit in the Liberal point of view.200

196 Brian A. Reid, Our Little Army in the Field: The Canadians in South Africa, 1899‐1902 (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 1996), 29. 197 Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007), 115. 198 LAC, The Papers of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, MG. 26, Finding Aid 91, C – 769, vol.128, Hughes to Laurier, October 30, 1899, 38436 199 Ibid. 200 LAC, The Papers of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, MG. 26, Finding Aid 91, C – 769, vol.126, Hughes to Laurier, October 4, 1899, 37834. Crosby 47

Sam Hughes arrived in South Africa in early December 1899 as a civilian

“feeling the ban of the GOC” Edward Hutton, and constantly finding “every avenue closed against me”.201 In the Toronto Globe and Mail, dated Monday April 2, 1900, a letter from Hughes was published stating that “there was uncertainty, whether or not, owing to Gen. Hutton’s having written out here against me, I was actually enrolled as an Imperial officer”.202 According to Hughes, General Hutton, knowing that he was determined by any means to travel to South Africa, wrote to leading officers stationed there and told them not to associate with Hughes at all, and above all not to offer him any employment.203 Historian Brian A. Reid states that even though Hutton had blocked

Hughes from amassing employment early on, Hughes was not the kind of person to sit idly by as others amassed fortune and fame, and the need for soldiers as well as his status as a Member of Parliament allowed him access to power where he continuously lobbied for “an appointment”.204 This was, after all, the opportunity as Hughes himself put it, to “carry out in practise the theories of years”.205

From December 1899 to February 1900, two events transpired which propelled

Sam Hughes into the spotlight and gave him an opportunity to live out his dream of imperial nationalism. Fresh off the boat in South Africa on December 1, Hughes convinced the authorities that he was entitled to pay. As Reid argues, the pay itself was not as important as the symbolism it provided. It was the proverbial sharp stick in the eye to Hutton and all his efforts to keep Hughes off the pay sheet.206 That same month,

201 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 69, and LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Laurier, March 20. 202 Toronto Globe and Mail, Col. Hughes: Another Breezy Letter from Lindsay’s Representative, Monday, April 2, 1900, 5. 203 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Laurier, March 20. 204 Reid, 44. 205 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Laurier, March 20. 206 Reid, 86. Crosby 48

Hughes assumed a minor and unspecified position in transport matters, while in

January and February 1900 he took on a more important role as a Supply and

Transport Officer in charge of Lines of Communication affairs all over South Africa.207

Hughes boasted to Borden that “my success here has been far beyond my most sanguine expectations”.208

The second factor allowing Hughes to test his imperial nationalist claims was the firing of the General Officer Commanding Edward Hutton in February, whose arrogance and threats to Canadian constitutional authority could be ignored no more.209 His disregard for Borden and Laurier, and his attempts to bypass their authority and raise his own force, were integral to his firing. In his attempts to create and lead a force of his own, Hughes had acknowledged Canadian authorities such as Borden and Laurier, even though he ignored Hutton’s. Upon his termination as the General Officer

Commanding in Canada, Hutton requested a Royal Commission to investigate the issue and a brief debate took place in the House of Commons. Unfortunately for

Hutton, the Conservative opposition had no desire to defend someone who had persecuted Sam Hughes, a prominent member of their party.210

With his major rival effectively out of his way, Hughes began to gain more influence in South Africa. In February 1900, Hughes, having just secured a job as a supply and transport officer on the lines of communication supporting Lord Roberts’ advance northwards from Cape Colony, became enmeshed in the fighting against the

207 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hughes to Borden, March 31, 1900, 3. 208 Ibid. Hughes’ letter to Borden discussing his various occupations contradicts Haycock’s claim that Hughes did not find employment until after Hutton had been fired. Haycock, 83. 209 Miller, The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto, 115‐6. 210 Ibid., 117. Crosby 49

Boers.211 Lord Roberts, a commander of British troops in South Africa, began pushing hard on what Haycock called “the Boer seats of government” in the so-called “Karoo

Campaign”.212 In retaliation, the Cape Colony civilians sympathetic to the Boer cause began an attack on the British in the area of the Orange River (to the west of Roberts’ men). With this “northwest rising” occurring, Britain’s forces were vulnerable. There was a fear that the “northwest insurrection” would become a “general Cape rebellion” and spread towards the rear of Britain’s main forces. In order to deal with the Boer resistance, Lord Roberts began pressing the need for more fighters and Generals.213

Lord Roberts’ request forced Brigadier-General Herbert Settle, the Commander of the Orange River Station sector of the Lines of Communication, into a dilemma. On one hand, he was hastily attempting to assemble his own column, one that would be strong enough to fight the “Karroo”. However, this was problematic since he was also responsible for the steady flow of supplies to Lord Roberts’ army.214 Haycock argues that these events “provided Sam Hughes with the opening he had been waiting for”.215

In the effort to defeat the “Karroo”, while not jeopardizing the flow of men to Roberts’ army, Settle considered Hughes an “obvious candidate for a job in the field”.216 Hughes was given a field command, Reid argues, because at the time colonials were felt to have “innate abilities as scouts and skirmishers”,217 and Settle’s force was already very limited. Hughes argued that there were two armies fighting the enemy. The first was the “Regular Army”, the British professional soldiers, while the second comprised

211 Haycock, 83. 212 Ibid., and Miller, Painting the Map Red, 175. Miller spells “Karoo” with one r 213 Ibid. 214 Reid, 86. Reid spells “Karroo” with two r’s 215 Haycock, 84. 216 Reid, 86. 217 Ibid. Crosby 50 colonial and irregular soldiers from Canada and Australia, which Hughes referred to as

“the other and better”.218

Hughes would serve under Brigadier-General Herbert Settle in the North-West

Cape Colony until mid-May 1900.219 Under Settle, Hughes was promoted to Chief of

Intelligence and Commander of Scouting. Since he was always the first to make first contact with the enemy, his main task, as assigned by Settle, was to find Boer soldiers or sympathizers, as well as seize munitions and “forage”.220 Hughes bragged of constant successes at his position and discussed some of the “very pretty affairs” he encountered. He claimed to have put down various rebellions and allegedly captured

450 Boers, extended his line for almost three miles, took prisoners and horses, and

“bowled out” twenty-seven Boers.221

A typical excerpt of his reports to Settle reads like this: In a note addressed to the General on March 11th, regarding the forces at Prieska, one of the “principle towns” along the Orange River where “rebels” were stationed,222 Hughes declared “There were no occupants – at that moment my servant described a party of the enemy far on our right hidden among trees – We gave chase for a few hundred yards”.223 One prisoner was brought to “a halt by a well directed returning fire”.224 Haycock argues that Hughes

“reconnoitred Prieska prior to its occupation”,225 since he was usually the first to

218 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 10, Field Notes Kept in South Africa by Sam Hughes. February 13, 1900, 8. 219 Haycock, 84. 220 Ibid., as quoted in Major‐General Sir Frederick Maurice and Captain Maurice Harold Grant, Official History of the War in South Africa, 1899‐1902 (London: Hurst and Blackette Ltd., 1906‐1910), 10‐7. 221 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Lord Roberts, November 27. 222 Haycock, 84. 223 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 10, Hughes to Settle, March 11, 1900, 20. 224 Ibid. 21. 225 Haycock, 86. Crosby 51 examine an area and make contact with the enemy. Hughes’ insights unquestionably had an impact on the taking of Prieska, even if he was not actually present during it.

Leading his men to Doornberg Hek, Hughes met up with Lord Kitchener, the

British Field Marshal, and subsequently moved into Upington for what he termed a

“reckless dash”, where he would eventually control the area with only nine rifles and hundreds of prisoners.226 Hughes’ actions and success at Upington demonstrate the

“unconventional side of warfare”.227 Heading to Upington, where three hundred enemy

“rebels” (as the British referred to them) were believed to be stationed, Hughes had only six men by his side. Knowing that the small size of his force stacked the odds against him, Hughes ordered his force to raise as much dust as possible to give the enemies the impression that his little force was much greater than it actually was.228

Hughes, described by Miller as being “in his element – relentless, resourceful, and intrepid”, was so successful in making his army appear larger and more frightening that

Jooste, the enemy Boer Commander at Upington, and his men retreated across the

Orange through Griqualand to the Transvaal.229

With the arrival of Settle’s forces three days later, the Boers anxiously began surrendering their arms, marking the end of the rebellion to the south of the Orange

River.230 Hughes’ bluff and bravery led to a minor victory over the Boers, with Lionel

Curtis, a British officer at the time and later author, declaring that he was “one of the

226 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Lord Roberts, November 27. 227 Reid, 86. 228 Haycock, 86. As quoted in Major‐General Sir Frederick Maurice and Captain Maurice Harold Grant, Official History of the War in South Africa, 1899‐1902 (London: Hurst and Blackette Ltd., 1906‐1910), 15‐6. Haycock also uses the term “Rebel” 229 Miller, Painting the Map Red,175. 230 Reid, 86‐7. Crosby 52 ablest persons I have come across out here”.231 Hughes himself was careful to give the victory to Canada. In the June 9th Globe and Mail, Hughes declared that he “relieved

Upington with two Canadians, Phillips of Belleville and Turpin of Coburg”.232 Canadians and colonial troops could, it seems, play a prominent role in an imperial war. Similarly, in the June 30th edition of the Globe and Mail, an article written by a London Times correspondent accredited the success at Upington to Hughes. Col. Hughes’ victories was depicted as “not the least amongst the services which Canada has rendered the mother country, and it is to be hoped, in the interests of the empire, that larger opportunities will be found for the qualities he has displayed throughout this expedition”.233

Shortly after his successes at Upington, Hughes wrote a letter to Frederick

Borden on March 31st detailing the events that had recently transpired. Hughes proclaimed that from the beginning of his tenure in South Africa and following his victory at Upington, “every British officer here, who heeded Hutton’s letter against me, has proven a failure,”234 just as he had predicted they would. The various successes in

South Africa also served to uphold his belief in the fighting ability of ordinary

Canadians. In the same letter Hughes stated “Anything I said or wrote of a Canadian officer or British Generalship and systems, I can strengthen enormously now”.235

Hughes also sent many letters home which were published in the Toronto Globe and Mail, detailing the many successes of Canadians. In the April 13th, edition, under the headline “Col. Sam’s Lively Letter”, Hughes proclaims “the Canadian Regiment has

231 Lionel Curtis, With Milner in South Africa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1951), 27. 232 Toronto Globe and Mail, Col. Hughes to Dr. Borden: He Says Gen. Hutton Could Teach Dutchmen to be Slim, Saturday, June 9, 1900, 18. 233 Toronto Globe and Mail, The Relief of Upington, Saturday, June 30, 1900, 2 234 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 2, Hughes to Borden, March 31, 1900, 7. 235 Ibid. Crosby 53 had another hard scrap, I hear this time covering themselves with glory and really accomplishing something”.236 For the eye-witnesses that saw it, it was a victory like no other. It was the finest one witnessed.237 Hughes even stated that after the first day of battle, it was the Canadian, and not the British troops, that were dreaded by the

Boers.238 Hughes’ letters, sent back home and published in Canadian newspapers, showed ordinary Canadians that they could produce great fighters on a global stage and could prove victorious in battle.

With British authority restored in Prieska and Upington, and with his and

Canada’s reputation for success on the rise, Hughes was transferred in late May over to the command of Sir Charles Warren, where he would stay until June.239 Warren was an aging Royal Engineer whose claim to fame was failing to catch Jack the Ripper despite serving as London’s chief of metropolitan police in 1880s.240 In South Africa,

Warren was put in charge of a little force where he could be “both out of the way and of value”.241 Hughes claimed that on first being offered the position of Intelligence Officer in Warren’s Forces, he consulted with the highest officers in Capetown who advised him to decline joining Warren, stating that “he always brought trouble and disaster upon those under him; had always quarrelled with and ruined every officer serving under him”242 However, at Lord Roberts request, and with a promise of the position of

Intelligence Officer, Hughes accepted the offer to join Warren in Griqualand West.243

Hughes wrote to Warren stating that even though the latter had suffered many

236 Toronto Globe and Mail, Col. Sam’s Lively Letter: What He Started Out to Do About Five Weeks Ago, Friday, April 13, 1900, 5. 237 Ibid. 238 Ibid. 239 Haycock, 87. 240 Ibid. and Cook, 28. 241 Ibid., 88. 242 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Laurier, March 20. 243 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Lord Roberts. November 27. Crosby 54 disasters in battle, had a bad reputation among the leading officers in Capetown, and did not offer Hughes the “brighter prospects” that Settle did, in the interests of “best serving the Empire” that Hughes decided to join Warren as Chief of Intelligence.244

At the city of Douglas, Hughes and his troops were among the first to enter the city. Here he showed, according to Haycock, “the same dash and bravery [which] had…won for him the leadership of the advance party on practically every occasion”.245

According to Hughes’ writings, he was in command of the mounted troops. He sent troops under Captain Mackie and Captain Parkin to the mountains known as Orpen’s

Heights. Four hundred Boers hiding along the way opened fire on them.246 Hughes proclaimed in a letter to Warren that he immediately ran over to Warren and asked the

General for permission to “cross the Vaal, to meet and rally our retreating forces and

‘retrieve the honour of the day’”.247 In response, according to Hughes, Warren was stated to have sounded very “excited” and proclaimed “Yes, go Hughes, but be careful and may God bless you”.248 Quickly, Hughes claimed that he crossed the Vaal River, rallied less than a hundred yeomanry soldiers, who were British volunteer soldiers, and his own Griqualand force and advanced on the enemy.249 With a small force of roughly

125 men, Hughes attacked the enemy’s left and centre to drive them out, meanwhile attacking and shelling the Boer right under cover. Hughes, in a note addressed to

Warren, claimed that he gave the Canadian Battery a chance at the right position of the

Boers, which was the strongest. As he predicted, Canadians effectively “silenced the

244 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 8, Hughes to Warren, December 19, 4. This updates the historiography on why Sam Hughes joined Warren’s forces. Haycock claimed in 1986 that the details of the transfer were unknown, 88. 245 Haycock, 88. The only play‐by‐play summary of Hughes’ actions in Douglas and Orpen’s Heights is in his own writings, which may not always be reliable and can sometimes be labelled as “fact and apocrypha”. Capon, 38. 246 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Borden, December 20, 1910, 6. 247 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 8, Hughes to Warren, December 19, 6. 248 Ibid. 249 Ibid. Crosby 55 enemy’s fire” and the Canadian Battery played an integral role in the victory at

Douglas.250

Returning to camp victorious, Hughes claimed he was berated by Warren, not for cowardice or incompetence, but for the exact opposite. Hughes was scolded by

Warren for his reckless, though well planned, attack.251 Upon Hughes informing Warren that he had twice asked the General’s permission to cross the river, rally the troops, and “retrieve the honour of the day”, Warren, in Hughes’ account, broke down and apologized profusely, and even informed Hughes that he would recommend him for the

Victoria Cross.252 Sam Hughes’ alleged heroics at the city of Douglas are only found in detail within his own personal papers. Hughes, a shameless self-promoter, recited a tale where Warren supposedly saw Hughes as a heroic saviour of the people, while

Warren looks like an emotional fool who is embarrassed to have overstepped his boundaries when scolding Hughes for his professed heroics. As questionable as the content might be, it does give insight into Hughes’ mind. Hughes’ version of the events at Douglas demonstrates that Canadians were not inferior to the British in his mind.

Rather Canadian citizen-soldiers could be assigned the strongest position against the enemy and be the ones to save the day.

Being recommended for the Victoria Cross, the most prestigious military decoration available would be an honour, especially for a Canadian. It would stand as high recognition of heroics and bravery performed in battle by a Canadian, disproving the notion that Canadians were not equal alongside British professional soldiers. It was

250 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers, MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 12, “Field Notes Kept in South Africa by Sam Hughes” Hughes to Warren, May 21, 1900, 42‐3. 251 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 8, Hughes to Warren, December 19, 7. 252 Ibid. Hughes’ claim that Warren declared that he would nominate Hughes for the Victoria Cross after the actions at Douglas is noted by Haycock, 90, and Reid, 89. Crosby 56

Hughes, after all, who was the first to enter Douglas while British General Warren stayed within the confines of his camp. Hughes proclaims to have effectively rounded up the small band of soldiers and led them to victory over the much larger Boer enemy.

Hutton had stated that Canadian troops would be a menace in combat, but it appears as though Canadians could effectively “retrieve the honour of the day”.

One recommendation for the Victoria Cross is a sure recognition of one’s bravery and skills, but two is even more impressive. On May 29th, at a farm called

Faber’s Put, which housed some members of the British militia and large numbers of colonial irregulars, General Piet de Villiers, the great Boer commando, launched a surprise attack with six hundred men on the farm.253 De Villiers’ men had moved one hundred yards towards the middle of the centre, when a half dressed Sam Hughes picked up a gun, grabbed some men, and began opening fire at a very close range.

Hughes proved able to drive the enemy off the ridges into bushes in the south.254 Due to the “steadiness” of the volunteer troops, and the actions of Hughes, the Boers were once again defeated.255 Hughes notes that upon victory at Faber’s Put, Warren constantly gushed about his “splendid behaviour”, and stated that his actions there

“merited him” the Victoria Cross.256

253 Haycock, 89. 254 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 203. 255 Haycock, 89. 256 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 8, Hughes to Warren, December 19, 13‐4. Also stated in Miller, Painting the Map Red, 203, and Haycock, 90. Crosby 57

Map of the Battle of Faber’s Put, 30 May 1900, Courtesy of the Canadian War Museum.

Whether or not Warren actually planned to recommend Hughes for two Victoria

Crosses is up for debate. On one hand, Haycock states that the promises could have been hastily made in the heat of the moment, but Warren was smart enough to acknowledge that Hughes had constantly saved his life. Haycock also states that there is a chance that Warren would have recommended Hughes for military decorations, but was dissuaded from doing so after Hughes’ reports back home about his successes and Warren’s blunders were made public.257 After the Battle of Faber’s Put, Hughes wrote letters to senior British Commanders and Canadian friends condemning the incompetence of Warren, while at the same time desperately wanting his General to recommend him with an award.258 Regardless of that, what is important is that a

Canadian, originally deemed incapable and inferior to the British forces, had proven his

257 Haycock, 90. 258 Cook, 28. Cook also argues that Hughes deserved to win a Victoria Cross at Faber’s Put because his ”lightning charge” saved dozens of lives. Crosby 58 skill in battle. Hughes believed that his alleged heroics deserved him the honour and recognition as an individual associated with the medal. Similarly, the medals would also bestow glory and recognition on Canada as a country that produced superb soldiers.

June 1900 was Sam Hughes’ last month on duty in South Africa, and he was instructed to scout the town of Kuruman, where it was believed that Piet de Villiers and three hundred of his men were “holed up” and wished to surrender. He was sent by

Warren with strict instructions to do no more than investigate, and under no circumstances was he to enter into negotiation with the Boers.259 True to form, and trying to show that he was more competent than Warren, Hughes, a good two days ahead of Warren’s Force, made contact with de Villiers’ alone. Arriving in Groote Konig, he demanded the surrender of de Villiers.260 He allegedly informed de Villiers that “your forces are desirous of surrendering; but are deprived from so doing owing to a fear of harsh treatment”261 He was even so bold to state that the former “Orange Free State” had now become a British province known as the “Orange River Colony”.262 Hughes had already created his own terms of surrender that “will be accepted” by General

Warren, saying all are to surrender ammunition, transport, store supplies, animals, and vehicles of all kind. Furthermore, the Boers were to be escorted to the district headquarters in the main cities of Upington and Prieska, where they would await trial.263

259 Reid, 89. 260 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 205. 261 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 14, Hughes to The Officer Commanding the Enemy’s Forces, June 17, 1900, 56. 262 Ibid. 263 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 14, Hughes to the Officers Commanding the Enemy’s Forces, June 19, 1900, 69. Crosby 59

While negotiations were still occurring, de Villiers, the “traitor to his own men”, according to Hughes, fled with horses, saddles, and rifles with 40 or 50 of his best men to the desert.264 Hughes returned to camp with a large number of prisoners, numbering from 258-400, which impressed the Canadian gunners but infuriated Warren.265

Hughes had shown the Canadian soldiers that they were capable of great things, while proving to Warren that he was also capable of great blunders. Warren, who was now aware of Hughes’ public assessment of him made after Faber’s Put, ordered Hughes to go to the Cape to explain himself.266 While Hughes had effectively captured a large number of Boers singlehandedly, de Villiers had escaped, and he was the target.

Hughes’ actions allowed Warren to use Hughes as a scapegoat for everything that had gone wrong.267 Hughes’ actions were a result of his ego and his belief in the superiority of colonial troops over their British compatriots. Hughes, a Canadian, had been successful many times in battle whether it was at Upington, Daniel, or Faber’s Put. He had constantly saved British troops and British Generals (Warren) from defeat on numerous occasions. But on this occasion, his beliefs clouded his judgment.

Why Sam Hughes departed from South Africa is unclear. What is known for sure is that Hughes’ arrogance served to alienate many important people in both South

Africa and in Canada. Haycock argues that due to his fight with Hutton in Canada, and his controversial performance with Warren in South Africa, he was dismissed from service.268 As already mentioned, de Villiers had escaped into hiding and it was all

Hughes’ fault. Warren pointed the finger at Hughes, who immediately became the

264 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 14, Hughes to Warren, June 20, 1900, 74. 265 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 205. 266 Ibid. 267 Reid, 89. 268 Haycock, 92. Crosby 60 scapegoat for everything that had gone wrong. However, Hughes wrote a letter back home which was published in the Globe, boasting about how he singlehandedly captured not only 300 men, but de Villiers himself. 269 Within the dozens of letters sent home to friends which were published in Canadian newspapers, many insults about

British Generals and commanders fighting in South Africa came to the attention of

Hughes’ enemies, who passed them along to those British commanders he was criticising.270 Cook claims that his “outraged superiors” sent him home in July 1900 (two years before the war ended) as retaliation for those letters.

On March 23, 1900, the infamous feud between Hughes and Hutton was detailed in major newspapers across Canada. Unfortunately for Hughes, the information carried within the paper placed all the guilt for the bitter public fight on his shoulders. Headlines such as Hughes “Criticized the British Army,” were rampant throughout the pages.271 The stories contained within detailed how he severely attacked Col. Buchan’s reputation, and declared that “we in Canada know of Britain’s fossil ways”.272 Haycock argues that Hughes’ letters in the papers were published by the Liberals who were victorious in ruining the Conservatives’ attacks on the government over the GOC’s dismissal.273 On June 8th, Hughes responded to the

“unmanly criticisms” asking “What was the object in giving only General Hutton’s brief against me? He was on trial as well as I”.274 Hughes’ point in writing the article was not

269 Toronto Globe and Mail, Col. Sam Hughes: He Says the War is Over, Save in Remote Areas, Tuesday, August 14, 1900, 5. 270 Cook, 29, as quoted in Robson Black, “General – The – Honourable – Sam: An Uncensored Character‐ Sketch of the Minister of Militia” Maclean’s (January 1915), 39. 271 Toronto Globe and Mail, Hutton and Hughes: The Correspondence Regarding the South African War, Friday, March 23, 1900, 4. 272 Ibid. 273 Haycock, 92. 274 Toronto Globe and Mail, Col. Sam Hughes to the Globe: A Reply to Various Criticisms Concerning his Letters, Friday, June 8, 1899, 5. Crosby 61 only to deflect criticisms of himself, but to once again state that he was in South Africa to help Canadians and honour both the country as well as the British Empire.275

What we can be reasonably sure happened was that Hughes’ insults about the incompetence of British soldiers and Generals in letters and newspapers found him an ardent enemy in Lord Minto, who was largely responsible for not only having Hughes sent home, but having his forced removal revealed to the Canadian public. Haycock, having access to both Lord Roberts’ and Lord Minto’s private papers, argues that due to Hughes’ response in the Globe whereby he also claimed the inferiority of British arms, Minto cabled Roberts, who then wired Warren demanding that Hughes give a satisfactory explanation for his blunders with de Villiers and insults of British fighters, or be sent home.276 Warren replied to Roberts that due to both his “improper” letters and his failure to obey orders, Hughes had been sent down to the Cape, from which

Roberts then sent Hughes home to Canada.277 In a letter to Laurier, Hughes acknowledged that Warren gave him a memo from Lord Roberts ordering him to explain a letter Hughes sent to Canada which allegedly insulted Lord Minto, a charge he refuted. He also acknowledged the fact that Warren sent him to Capetown to explain the letter to the authorities.278

Upon arrival back home in Canada, Hughes began boasting of his exploits, which were unrecognized by “envious, incompetent British regulars”.279 His public boasting greatly annoyed Lord Minto, who had the utmost belief in the superiority of

British soldiers. Hughes arrived in Canada gloating about how he and other Canadians

275 Toronto Globe and Mail, Col. Sam Hughes to the Globe: A Reply to Various Criticisms Concerning his Letters, Friday, June 8, 1899, 5. 276 Haycock, 92. 277 Ibid., 93. 278 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Laurier, March 20. 279 Miller, The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto, 74. Crosby 62 were able to defeat the enemy, while the British soldiers and Generals proved as incompetent as he had always claimed they were. In retaliation, Minto announced to the Canadian press that he possessed secret files from Lord Roberts which discussed how Hughes had been removed from his position in South Africa.280 In September

1900, he gave the “true” story of Hughes’ dismissal to the press.281

Hughes, on the other side, claimed that he voluntarily left South Africa, rather than being sent home. On June 22nd, 1900, Hughes claimed he reached camp after four dreary days transporting four hundred and seventy five prisoners and a vast array of ammunition, arms, cattle, and sheep. After reaching safely, Hughes stated that he wrote a letter to General Warren, asking to be relieved from duty in South Africa.282 In a letter to Prime Minister Laurier, Hughes gave numerous reasons as to why he decided he wanted to leave South Africa. The first was Lord Roberts was alleged to have sent out a telegram declaring that the war was “virtually over”. The second was because the

Canadian election was occurring, and as a Member of Parliament he had the responsibility to be present. And the third was because Hughes claimed that when he returned back to the camp, he found out that Warren’s men had shot to death the only

“loyal” Boer girl, right in the middle of the village.283

Similarly, in a letter to Frederick Borden in 1910, Hughes claimed that after hearing about possible rapes committed by the British soldiers, as well as the murder of the young loyal Boer girl, Hughes was “disgusted and angry”.284 In a letter to Warren,

280 Miller, The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto,74. 281 Ibid. 282 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Borden, December 20, 1910, 2, this story is also reported in Miller, Painting the Map Red, but Hughes is carrying the vast amount of prisoners after unsuccessfully capturing de Villiers, 205. 283 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Laurier, March 20 . 284 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Borden, December 20, 1910, 5. Crosby 63

Hughes referred to those British soldiers as “mutinous”.285 Hughes noted that in the week or two prior to the murder of the Boer girl, he had taken Daniel’s Kull and driven out over five hundred Boers. However, no loyal or innocent Boers were killed by

Hughes or the men under his command.286 Hughes stated that even when he walked four hundred yards with his prisoners, he treated them as “comrades” and with the utmost respect.287 Hughes was known for the humane treatment of prisoners and innocent civilians caught in the war, which was especially significant in the context of this war. It was reported that in one instance, Hughes had to arrest an old Boer “rebel” named van Schroeder, and once he had done it, he went out of his way to comfort his upset wife and provide accommodations for her well being.288 The fact that Sam

Hughes used the murder of the young Boer girl as an excuse for leaving South Africa showed that he did not outright support the actions taken by the British soldiers. As a man who believed in the humane treatment of civilians, it appears as though Hughes at times could be disgusted or bewildered by cruel acts done in the name of imperialism.

Hughes also cited General Warren as a reason why he decided to exit South

Africa voluntarily. Hughes stated that Warren not only offered “indignities” to Boer prisoners, which was contrary to the rules of warfare, but he was also guilty of sending false information to Sir Alfred Milner about the surrender of the Boers.289 Hughes claimed that Warren had also fallen under the influence of a disloyal Boer “Fenian” named Donovan, and decided to keep him in camp despite the fact that he had taken up to five pounds from the “rebels” as a way to get them off free from punishment, and

285 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 8, Hughes to Warren, December 19, 14. 286 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Borden, December 20, 1910, 5. 287 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Lord Roberts, November 27. 288 Curtis, 17. 289 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Borden, December 20, 1910, 2. Crosby 64 his brother was the head of one of Kruger’s secret services.290 While he was a British imperialist, it appears that Hughes was not completely ecstatic with how imperialism actually operated on the ground. Hughes stated that on June 26th, when he was to leave for Capetown, Warren allegedly “begged me, once weeping like a girl, to remain”.291 Warren also allegedly told him that he no longer had a single officer who could handle any aggressive work, and constantly begged him to remain.292 Hughes’ claim would undoubtedly reaffirm his belief that he, as a Canadian, was superior to

British Generals and soldiers.

On July 19, 1900, Hughes reported in his field notes that he had been granted permission from General Warren to leave South Africa and set sail for England aboard the S.S. Gascon.293 Similarly, in the August 14th edition of the Toronto Globe and Mail, a letter was published by Hughes stating that he had asked Warren personally to be relieved.294 Not only had Canadians proven a success so far, but Hughes also proclaimed that he helped witness “the triumph of Britain – the Greater Britain – in her greatest struggle”.295 The war, in his mind, was practically over. Hughes believed that

Canadians had been rewarded through recognition of their successes in battle, and felt that the British Empire had triumphed in the war (though it was not over until 1902).

However, shortly after he left South Africa in July, Hughes claimed that upon arrival in

London, England, he picked up a Toronto paper with the report about how he had been forcefully removed from South Africa and sent home.296 The main reason given was

290 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Borden, December 20, 1910, 7. 291 Ibid., 3. 292 Ibid. 293 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 14, Basl to Hughes, July 19, 1900, 83. 294 Toronto Globe and Mail, Col. Sam Hughes: He Says the War is Over, Save in Remote Areas, Tuesday, August 14, 1900, 5. 295 Ibid. 296 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Borden, December 20, 1910, 2 Crosby 65 that Hughes had been removed from duty for writing libellous letters about Edward

Hutton.297 Hughes’ forceful dismissal was even reported in the July 18th, Globe and

Mail.298 In an effort to save face, Hughes penned a letter to General Warren asking for him to tell everyone how valuable he had been, and fight off those insults.299 He claims that he fearlessly fought the Boers, was “loyal and disinterested” in personal motives aside from being thick in the fight for the “old flag”.300

In the historiography of Sam Hughes, historians have unanimously declared that

Hughes was forced home. Haycock and Cook claim it was a mixture of both his irresponsibility and scathing letters about the British in South Africa, as well as his feud with Hutton appearing in various newspapers that lead to his forced removal. Hughes’ grandson, Sam H.S. Hughes, even attributes his grandfather’s insults about Warren and his staff as to why his career in South Africa “ended abruptly”301 Sam H.S. Hughes also argues that while his grandfather never publically admitted to being sent home, it is clear to all that Sam Hughes was “not deceived”.302 A point which further proves that

Hughes was sent home was that shortly after he was re-elected to Parliament, he was constantly requested passage back to South Africa. Hughes tried to appeal unsuccessfully to both Lord Milner and Frederick Borden, arguing that Canadians needed more recognition, that Canadian citizen-soldiers could end the war immediately, and that British were incompetents, which makes it clear that he truly did

297 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 3, Hughes to Laurier, March 20. 298 Toronto Globe and Mail, Dr. Borden’s Bereavement: The House Expresses Sympathy With Him on the Death of Lieut. Borden Wednesday, July 18, 1900, 6. 299 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 8, Hughes to Warren, December 19, 16. 300 Ibid., 15. 301 Sam H.S. Hughes, “Sir Sam Hughes and the Problem of Imperialism” Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, vol.29, no.1, 1950, 35. 302 Ibid. Crosby 66 not understand why he was sent back to Canada.303 It is interesting to note that no historian has analyzed Hughes’ justifications for why he claimed he voluntarily went home. There is the chance that historians have not believed a single word they have read and have completely discarded Hughes’ justifications as not being noteworthy. But there is also the chance that historians, when they wrote their books, did not have access to them. As mentioned in the introduction to my MRP, in 1986 Ronald Haycock declared that personal papers of Sam Hughes were not known to be in existence, except for a collection of letters and memos in the hands of his grandson, and some correspondence letters in the private papers of other politicians such as Laurier or

Borden. While Tim Cook had access to the Hughes Papers, his focus is primarily on the First World War, and as such, there is the possibility that I highlighted new arguments that historians prior to 1993 (when the Hughes Papers were donated to

Archives Canada) did not have access to. Hughes’ justifications reveal a lot about the man who believed the world was unfairly against him, and depict how he perceived imperialism.

Historians, like Haycock, have argued that the public did not pay any attention to

Minto’s rumours and treated Hughes as a hero upon arrival.304 In Lindsay, Ontario, a celebration was held for Hughes, and he was presented with a sword and a belt to honour his time in South Africa.305 It was professed that “no act of his had brought dishonour on British arms: he had left South Africa without a mark against him directly or indirectly”.306 Cook argues that Hughes returned from South Africa as a “martyr” in

303 Haycock, 97‐8. 304 Ibid., 93. 305 Toronto Globe and Mail, Col. Hughes’ Return” Presented With a Sword and Belt at Lindsay, Thursday, October 4, 1900, 5. 306 Ibid. Crosby 67 the eyes of many Canadian nationalists. 307Similarly, Hughes’ grandson, Sam H.S.

Hughes, argues that his grandfather left Canada as a “martyr” and returned as a

“hero”.308 He states that due to his service overseas, his grandfather, a “man of action”, was honoured by men who welcomed Canadian imperialism, as he had flattered

Canadian battlefield “susceptibilities”.309

While Hughes might have been honoured by members of his hometown,

Canadian nationalists, and men sympathetic to imperialism, what has been overlooked is the fact that Hughes claimed that there were a large group of people who actually believed Minto and thought of him as a coward. As Hughes complained, though he always “trimmed” the Boers in every fight, risked his life a thousand times, and was always a complete success, there were many who constantly tried to slight him.

Hughes argues that he was subjected to insults and scrutiny upon his arrival back into

Canada, with people stating that he had been a “failure in the field”, had shown

“cowardice”, and some even declaring that he only had a “civil position in Capetown”.310

The fact that many people during Hughes’ time, as noted by Winter, thought he was

“crazy”, or was a “raving lunatic”, according to Cook,311 as well as the fact that Hughes begged Laurier, Borden, and Warren to inform the Canadian public that he was not a coward, provides a degree of legitimacy to Hughes’ claims that he was subjected to criticism upon arrival back in Canada.

Sam Hughes’ time in South Africa reinforced both his militaristic and imperial nationalist views. As Sam H.S. Hughes argues, his grandfather’s theories about the

307 Cook, 30 308 Sam H.S. Hughes, “Sir Sam Hughes and the Problem of Imperialism”, 35. 309 Ibid. 310 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 8, Hughes to Warren, December 19, 13. 311 Cook, 31. Crosby 68 merit of colonial troops proved correct as he believed that the “colonial contingents” rode and shot better than their British “comrades” in South Africa. Sam H.S. Hughes, on the other hand, claims that British actions became the “jest” of Europe.312 The first main outcome of Sam Hughes’ his time in South Africa was that he believed that the

Canadian militia successfully made the South African War an advertisement for

Canada and heightened the nation’s status globally. Secondly, Hughes’ faith in the

British Empire was not shaken despite his justifications for why he claimed he voluntarily left South Africa. In a speech delivered to the House of Commons in 1901,

Hughes proudly proclaimed that,

great as the expense and great in some respects as the loss has been to Canada in connection with the war, it has been many times returned by the advertisement which we have had as an immigration scheme alone. Canada is known today by the world as she was never known before, and I venture to say that the money that has been expended in the war has been more than returned by the immigration attracted to our shores.313 This proclamation in the House of Commons perfectly reinforced both his declaration in his letter to Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier on October 6, 1899, and served to uphold his militaristic world view that a military can define a nation. As already mentioned, Hughes declared that the war in South Africa could serve as an

“advertisement” for Canada. Back in Canada in 1901, Hughes argued that the South

African War performed that objective. Hughes stated that due to Canadian victories in

South Africa, Canada was more internationally recognized than ever before. According to him, citizens around the world had begun to take notice of Canada and their successes in battle, and for many people Canada became an attractive place to immigrate to. For Hughes, Canada’s alleged newfound heightened status was all the

312 Sam H.S. Hughes, “Sam Hughes and the Problem of Imperialism”, 34. 313 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901, 4. Crosby 69 work of the military, meaning that Canadian efforts in South Africa created the new

Canadian nation. Hughes also reiterated his statement to Hutton in 1899 and told the

House of Commons that Canadian participation in South Africa affirmed his desire that

Canada should take steps to gain some control over imperial matters.314 The South

African War also proved to Hughes that long conflicts and standing armies were outdated, and instead, mobile and well-trained citizen-soldiers, who could shoot accurately and withstand “field hardship”, were what would adequately represent

Canada on a global stage.315

Hughes’ time in South Africa also heightened his belief that Canada had to have an elevated status and position within the British Empire. As already mentioned,

Haycock argues that Hughes’ actions in South Africa were a microcosm of a larger issue, namely that Canada had to be “treated as equals” within a newfound British

Empire. Without a doubt, Hughes believed that the utmost good came from the colonies participating in an imperial war alongside Britain, and he felt that colonial recognition and status should continue to grow.316 It was his wish that the Imperial parliament should remove itself from corruption and enter into the fair and equal

“Imperial politics proper”.317 Hughes asserted that the British system of giving preference to the British army over colonial militias was outmoded and Canadian and other colonial soldiers needed to be recognized. In his speech to the House of

Commons, he declared that it was his wish to see “Canada represented in an informal council, ultimately to become a formal council, for the promotion of the best interests of

314 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901, 9. 315 Haycock, 99. 316LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901 , 31. 317 Ibid. Crosby 70 the British Empire and the upbuilding of the human race”.318 Canada and Britain should be equals within the Empire, according to Hughes, all with the goal of spreading its values.

Similarly, in a February 14th article in the Globe and Mail entitled “For Canada and the Empire”, it was announced that Sam Hughes, among many others, attended the annual Empire League meeting held in Ottawa which deemed its policy that colonial militias should be on equal footing with the British force.319 The Empire League also stated that it was important that Canada equip its own civilian forces to garrison and maintain the strength of Halifax, Quebec, and Esquimalt should a future war occur.320

Being a nation, for the Empire League as for Hughes, meant having a strong militia able to defend one’s own country and fighting one’s own war together as Canadians.

Four years later, at a speech delivered to the Empire Club in 1905 about how to properly defend the Empire, Hughes proclaimed his lifelong views, saying,

At the outset I may say that I can regard no possible defence of the Empire that does not involve a full partnership union of Great Britain and all her colonies. I maintain, and as you are well aware, have always maintained, that any system must be largely democratic – must be of the people...There will be thousands of high prominent positions that will thus be thrown open to the young men of the Dominion of Canada because we will then be full partners in the Empire....321 A second major outcome of Hughes’ time in South Africa was that despite his grievances that he held with British soldiers, generals, and the corruption of the British military system, he remained faithful and loyal to the British Empire. One of Hughes’ biggest complaints prior to, and during, the South African War, was about the

318 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901 , 31. 319 Toronto Globe and Mail, For Canada and the Empire: Strong Resolutions Adopted by the Empire League, Thursday, February 14, 1901, 1. 320 Ibid. 321Capon, 43. Also quoted in Sam H.S. Hughes’ “Sir Sam Hughes and the Problem of Imperialism”, 36. Crosby 71 incompetence of British Generals. Hughes had quarrelled with Hutton, disobeyed

Warren, and constantly insulted both their leadership and abilities. However, what must not be forgotten is that back in Canada, Hughes still championed having a British

General in Canada. He stated that while many people advocated having a Canadian

General in command of the Canadian militia,

On the contrary, I desire that our general officer commanding should be a British general. I know that a great many of my friends, both on other side of the House and on this side, in view of the conduct of some of the general officers in recent years, have expressed the wish that a Canadian officer should be appointed to that position. I wish to say, standing here, that it is my desire that the general officer commanding should be an Imperial officer, and I believe that if we paid that officer $10,000 a year, which is the pay of a major-general in England, and is about what little New South Wales pays to her general officer commanding we would get an officer to come out here to take command of our troops who would be a credit to the position and to the empire”. 322 Therefore, while other Canadians were advocating a distinct Canadian control over imperial matters, Hughes still argued that a paid British general, who respects

Canadian officers and soldiers and knows about Canada, would best serve and promote the country. Through proper training, and under the leadership of trained, elite

British Generals, Hughes believed that Canadian soldiers would become an elite fighting force which could help maintain the supremacy of the British Empire, all while protecting the interests of the Canadian nation. Hughes believed that closer military co- operation with Britain by any means was essential because it encouraged military growth, involved contributions to the Empire’s defence, promised more Canadian representation on imperial councils, and implied endorsement of Canada’s citizen force.323

322 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901, 31. 323 Haycock, 109‐110. Crosby 72

During his time in South Africa, Hughes cited examples, such as the murder of a young Boer girl, giving the impression that he did not always approve of how imperialism operated on the ground. However, this did not change his loyalty to the

British Empire, his view of imperialist rhetoric, and his appreciation of the bravado of

British soldiers. Standing before the House of Commons, Hughes professed that as an avid reader of the history of the British Army, and having witnessed British soldiers and officers in South Africa, he had never seen or heard of British manhood shining as brightly as it had during the South African War. Whatever actions they were guilty of having committed, Hughes asserted, was not their fault, rather it was the fault of the corrupt British system.324 That could be fixed, he believed, by granting colonial troops more influence and equality alongside the British. In 1906, Hughes even helped oversee a principle that any retired British soldier or Empire Boer War veteran would be given preference to any land grants in the West.325

Whatever the faults of the Empire, Hughes declared his imperial loyalties saying,

“While a Canadian, I am also a British subject, and should Canada try to cut adrift from

Britain, I as either soldier or citizen, would not be disloyal in recognizing the home

[British] authorities rather than the General Officer Commanding in Canada”.326 He was one of those who epitomized Principal Grants maxim, as already discussed, that in order to be Canadian, he must also be British. As already mentioned, after the South

African War, Hughes still believed that Canada and Britain needed closer co-operation, and he remained a champion of imperial federation, seen by his demands in 1909 that

Canada should support Britain with millions of dollars to build Dreadnought battleships.

324 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901, 8. 325 Haycock, 108. 326 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901, 16. Crosby 73

Hughes still believed long after the South African War that support for the Empire corresponded with a growing stature as a nation for Canada.327

Hughes also returned home to Canada embracing the imperialist rhetoric of the war being a civilizing mission. It was after all, in his opinion, the Boers who were the greedy ones trying to establish the supremacy of the Boer Republic throughout South

Africa.328 Hughes declared that Canadians desired supporting the war in South Africa in order to punish the Boers for violating the principle of unfair taxation established after the American War of Independence.329 Hughes believed that the Boers were unfairly taxing British citizens in the area without giving them proper representation, and this was a violation of “proper government”, reflective of a “civilized world”.330 British citizens in the Transvaal, Hughes believed, paid at least 80 percent of the taxes that went into the Transvaal treasury, but did not have a voice or vote in the management of the affairs of the community. Thus, the Boers had to be dealt with, and he believed

Canadians were eager to assist in disciplining the Boers.331 Hughes also argued that the Boers deserved discipline because he believed that Boer policies were not intended for personal liberties, but were meant to heighten the Kruger oligarchy.332 He claimed that while in South Africa, he talked to a Boer who claimed that the last thing Kruger desired was an independent republic because it would ensure a vote for all citizens.

Since there were a large number of British citizens in the area, Hughes believed that

Kruger would be voted out, and wished to suppress British citizens by any means. 333

327 Cook, 34. 328 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901, 5. 329 Ibid. 330 Ibid. 331 Ibid. 332 Ibid., 6. 333 Ibid. Crosby 74

In his speech delivered to the House of Commons in 1901, Hughes clearly sounded like a British imperialist, describing the British as belonging to a civilized world, while portraying the Boers as uncivilized and backwards. He painted the war as black and white, as good (British) vs. evil (Boers) and justified the British intrusion as bringing civility to the country. Hughes’ imperialism was defined by Haycock, as focusing on responsible government and personal liberties for all.334 This coincides with his belief that Britain and its colonies, including Canada, enjoyed responsible government as well as civil liberties while the Boers did not. Therefore the war was about bringing these values to South Africa.

Thus, while Canadian military historian Desmond Morton argues that many

Canadian troops departed as “soldiers of the Queen” and returned as “self-conscious

Canadians”,335 Sam Hughes’ bond with the British Empire did not falter. While he returned home to Canada with the belief that the Canadian citizen-soldiers had put

Canada on the map and built up the nation, he remained loyal to the British Empire. He believed in still having a British General Officer Commanding in Canada, looked past the atrocities committed by British soldiers in South Africa, and even adopted the imperialist rhetoric of the British as good and the Boers as evil. Also, since he advocated Canada attaining an elevated status within the British Empire, for the promotion of the Empire and its values, it can be argued that Hughes was trying to make Canada’s bond with Britain and the Empire stronger.

334 LAC, Sir Sam Hughes Papers MG 27 II D 23, vol.2, file 4, Speech of Lt.‐Col. Sam Hughes, February 25, 1901, 6. 335 Morton, A Military History of Canada, 117. Crosby 75

Carman Miller states that the South African War greatly benefitted Canada’s militia, above all else.336 As Desmond Morton argues, active service in South Africa gave Canadians “fresh confidence” in their competence. Sam Hughes’ prophecy that the Boers would “ride rings” around the British proved true, and Canada was quick to come to Britain’s rescue.337 Colonial troops proved effective in battle, even more effective than the British soldiers, one could argue. As the Ottawa Citizen declared in

1903, “the new status of the militia force of Canada may be said to date from the Boer

War”.338 The war also served to uphold the “militia myth” which argued that a trained citizenry would be more effective than a professional, standing army.339 Hughes’ personal vision of imperial nationalism demanded that Canada have a greater influence and role within the British Empire, all with the goal of maintaining the wealth and superiority of the Empire. He was a Canadian nationalist who advocated greater

Canadian identity and influence through the British Empire.

Hughes was also a militarist who believed that the militia, above all else, defined a nation. In October 1899, he predicted to Prime Minister Laurier that the South African

War would be an “advertisement” for Canada and would allow the young country to gain global recognition. Hughes’ militarism was also apparent through his bitter feud with the British General Officer Commanding Edward Hutton. Hutton believed that colonial soldiers would be a menace in battle, and would only hold the British back.

Hughes, on the other hand, believed that the Boers would wipe the British professional soldiers out, and that colonial militaries composed of civilians would be the backbone of

336 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 438. 337 Morton, A Military History of Canada, 117. 338 Stephen Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860‐1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 219 339 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 439. Crosby 76 the fighting against the Boers. Hughes took Hutton’s insults of the Canadian military as a swipe against the Canada and Canadians, a gesture that he viciously refuted. In

South Africa, once Hutton had been fired from duty, Hughes was free to gain influence, and quickly found himself immersed in battles. In contests such as the one at Faber’s

Put or at the city of Upington, Hughes’ combination of bravery and toughness proved too much for the Boer enemies, and he oversaw minor victories. Hughes frantically wrote letters to Canada, some of which were published in newspapers, discussing his victories and those of other Canadians, while taking time to remind everyone that the

British were as incompetent as he always had known.

Arriving back in Canada under controversial circumstances, Hughes professed in the House of Commons in 1901 that the military had effectively created a better nation. He believed that Canada had become more internationally known and admired, as well as viewed as an attractive place to immigrate to. He also demanded that

Canada take steps towards controlling its own imperial affairs and towards becoming equal partners with Britain through the British Empire. Unlike those Canadians who returned home from the war disenchanted with the actions of the British, Hughes remained loyal to the Empire. He preached the same racial imperialist views as Britain, honoured the British soldiers’ bravery and offered them concessions for their services, and claimed his British identity proudly for all to hear. Hughes was an imperial nationalist, trying to maintain the dominance and prestige of the British Empire, while simultaneously promoting Canadian interests as a form of distinct nationalism, and for him, militarism was the way to build a better Canadian nation.

Crosby 77

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Pictures

Map of the Battle of Faber’s Put, 30 May 1900, Courtesy of the Canadian War Museum