RONALD REAGAN AND THE FOUNDATION

OF MASS INCARCERATION IN CALIFORNIA

A Thesis

Presented

to the Faculty of

California State University Dominguez Hills

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

Humanities

By

Jonathan Paul Michael Barber

Fall 2018 Copyright by

JONATHAN PAUL MICHAEL BARBER

2018

All Rights Reserved To my family.

Your unconditional love and continual support

has inspired me to reach for an unprecedented future.

Thank you for teaching me the values of hope, love, and compassion.

iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper is the product of countless individuals:

To my parents, Michael Barber and Sherri Evans, and family, thank you for your

unconditional love and unwavering confidence in my potential.

To Dr. Matthew Luckett, Dr. Myrna C. Donahoe, and Dr. Lyle Smith, thank you for your

mentorship. Your wisdom has been priceless. I am truly indebted for your guidance.

To the Correctional Training Facility (CTF) administration, thank you for your commitment to education. You have created a fertile environment for real rehabilitation.

To the CTF Education Department, specifically Principal Kevin Thompson, and Paula

Germain, thank you for the invaluable support that ensured the completion of this thesis.

A special thank to Sandra Wise and Roberta Schweers for empowering me, along with

many other inmates, with the tools and lessons for future success. Your belief in an

inmate’s redemption is indisputably inspiring.

To Eric Dungan, and Bilji Varghese, thank you for your meticulous proofreading, honest

feedback, and insightful suggestions. I am grateful for your friendship.

To the numerous individuals I failed to mentioned, I undeniably appreciate the continual

investment you place in me and the value you bring to my life. Thank you.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

COPYRIGHT PAGE ...... ii

DEDICATION ...... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... vi

ABSTRACT ...... vii

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Limitations of Thesis ...... 5 Definition of Terms...... 6

2. RONALD REAGAN’S GOVERNORSHIP ...... 11

Personal Staff ...... 12 Reagan’s Cabinet and Other Administrative Appointees ...... 15 Legislative and Judicial Branches ...... 25 Summary ...... 31

3. THE ROOTS OF THE MASS INCARCERATION PHENOMENON ...... 35

Four Analytical Frameworks ...... 36 Summary ...... 48

v CHAPTER PAGE

4. REAGAN ’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MASS INCARCERATION PHENOMENON ...... 51

The Central Figure ...... 51 Colorblindness, Dog Whistle Politics, and the Southern Strategy ...... 63 California’s Surpluses ...... 70 Summary ...... 78

5. CONCLUSION ...... 79

Thesis’s Findings ...... 79 Recommendation for Future Research ...... 85

WORKS CITED ...... 88

vi ABSTRACT

Conventional scholarship does not assign any responsibility for the creation of the prison-industry complex to Ronald Reagan. This thesis entails a critical examination of

Reagan’s governorship to identify his contributions to the mass incarceration phenomenon in California. It examines the structure of Reagan’s executive branch and its working relationships with other parts of California’s governmental bureaucracy. It also examines four different analytical frameworks on the development of the mass incarceration phenomenon; such an examination entails a review of the cultural dynamics of the 1960s and 1970s, the conservative movement’s usage of the southern strategy and dog whistle politics, the rise of the “law and order” and “tough on crime” movements, and the penal shift from rehabilitation to punishment. Finally, it furthers argues that

Reagan’s rhetoric and actions in office, regardless of the theoretical lens, set the stage for the mass incarceration phenomenon in California. 1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

America’s politicization of crime in the late-twentieth century has led to the creation of a massive prison-industry complex1 in the United States. Since its inception,

American politicians adopted a stringent stance against crime; consequently, a torrent of legislation funneled billions of dollars into law enforcement agencies’ coffers and increased criminal penalties. These actions vastly augmented the nation’s prison populations, thereby placing enormous fiscal strain on their families and other American taxpayers. Furthermore, the continual investment in pro-mass carceral policies has jeopardized the achievability of the American Dream.2 These “tough on crime” policies adversely and overwhelmingly affected minorities, especially African Americans and

Latinos. These intended or unintended consequences have plagued California since the

1960s.

The roots of the “tough on crime” movement lie in the wave of multiple cultural revolutions of the 1960s. The rising prominence of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics and the People’s Republic of China created a visceral fear of communism. The

Civil Rights Movement revealed a hypocritical fracture in America’s cherished ideals of equality and liberty; subsequently, the Latino, Native American, and Women movements joined the cacophonic calls for social justice. Towards the end of the 1960s, a

1 The term “prison-industry complex” will be used interchangeably with the term “mass incarceration phenomenon” throughout this thesis. 2 The American Dream is the achievement of socioeconomic success through the process of upward social mobility (Harty 17). 2 counterculture movement tested the country’s morals and social norms. The Vietnam

War pitted a substantial antiwar sentiment against revered American patriotism. In addition, underlying this monumental social upheaval was a major economic downturn.

All of these occurrences traumatized the American psyche and damaged the populace’s optimism of a better America.

As America’s dominant populace, White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASP)3 were fervently apprehensive and exceedingly resistant to the period’s cultural conflicts, which has come to be commonly known as “the white backlash” (Woodward 275). During the

1964 presidential election, Barry Goldwater exposed the allure of white resistance to the

Civil Rights Movement. In the American South, George Wallace rallied from electoral defeat by preaching against the “illegal usurpation of the Central Government.”4 Richard

Nixon captured the White House in 1968 by appealing to the “Silent Majority” with a modified version of Wallace’s implicitly biased rhetoric. Believing that “California was ripe for a change” (Cannon 9), Ronald Reagan, the charmingly polished personification of these three politicians, stormed into the Governor’s Mansion.

Across the nation politicians embraced the newly discovered political eureka, the southern strategy. By exploiting the fears of white America, politicians attained and secured power under the banner of “law and order” and “tough on crime.” Since white

America constituted over sixty-percent of the demography, politicians specifically

3 Generalizations about America are based on the culture of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASP). Throughout this thesis “WASP,” “white America,” and “America/American” will be used interchangeably. 4 In June 1963, Alabama Governor George Wallace protested the federal government’s order to desegregate the University of Alabama. Eventually, US Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach was sent down to Alabama to confront Wallace. In a staged protest, Wallace emphatically declared that desegregation was “an illegal usurpation of the Central Government” (qtd. in Lopez 15). 3 pandered to its needs while developing an indifference towards minorities’ plight. As a supporter of both Goldwater and Nixon, Reagan adopted a similar approach to politics prior to, during, and after his governorship in California.

In office, Governor Reagan affirmed his commitment to the conservative ideology and the southern strategy. Although Reagan acquiesced to multiple progressive measures, he consistently employed dog whistles throughout both of his gubernatorial terms to rouse support from his base Republican constituency and to activate the subconscious fears of struggling white middle-class Californians. With the employment of racially coded rhetoric such as “individual responsibility,” “the culture of welfare,” “weak self- discipline,” “fiscal responsibility,” and “tax reform,” Reagan was able to solicit support for his conservative ideology. Ironically, many of his policies proved to be detrimental to white middle-class workers (Lopez xi).

A major aspect to Reagan’s governmental reforms was the cost reduction of

California’s Criminal Justice System (CJS). During the first few years, Reagan enjoyed a reduced prison population, which was mainly prompted by Governor Edmund “Pat”

Brown Senior’s policy changes and Reagan’s one-time release of 10,000 prisoners

(Gartner 301-302; Marinissen 14). Obviously, this proposition makes sense considering that any structural adjustment requires sufficient time to produce noticeable changes

(Gartner 313). Similarly, some of the early penal policies during Governor Edmund

“Jerry” Brown Junior’s5 administration were grounded in the actions of his predecessor,

5 In this thesis, Edmund “Pat” Brown Senior will be referred to as Pat Brown while Edmund “Jerry” Brown Junior will be referred to as Jerry Brown. 4

Governor Reagan. A review of Reagan’s gubernatorial record reveals California’s new prison admissions initiated an upward trend after 1972 that has only recently been reversed (Gartner 306; California Department Corrections and Rehabilitation, Spring

2017 Population Projections, vi and 13).6

The exceedingly high US prison population dwarfs the prison populations of other leading industrial nations (Petersilia, “Overview,” 7) while California’s prison population remains the largest prison population in America (Petersilia, “Influencing Public Policy,”

340). Mass incarceration severely cripples the US’s ability to flourish in the twenty-first century. The most vulnerable populations—the poor and minorities—are most easily entrapped in an intricate web of incapacitation and collateral consequences (Alexander

185). The cost of ballooning prison populations is crippling national and state economies, especially California’s. Volumes of evidence prove that “tough on crime” policies do not work. Mass incarceration does not equate safer streets (Mauer, “Why are Tough on

Crime Policies so Popular?” 10-11); yet, politicians and the US populace continue to legislate through the perspective of fear.

Conventional scholarship posits that the mass phenomenon incarceration in

California began in the late 1970s, specifically with Governor Jerry Brown’s governorship, and then accelerated in the 1980s with the massive prison buildup under

6 California’s contemporary reversal in prison admission rates reveals a radical philosophical shift in corrections from “tough on crime” to “smart to crime” (Harris). This shift was launched by a series of court rulings and public initiatives. Two very important court rulings (Ralph Coleman, et al. v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV 5-90-0520 LKK JFMP and Marciano Plata, et al. v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH) ordered the state to reduce its prison population due to unconstitutional treatment of prisoners (for example, lack of medical and mental health services). In subsequent years, Californians passed four major public initiatives: Proposition 36: The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (November 2000), The Public Safety Realignment Initiative (October 2011), Proposition 47: Reduced Penalties for Some Crime Initiative (December 2014), and Proposition 57: The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act (November 2016).

5

Governor George Deukmejian’s administration. Although the Reagan Administration is generally regarded as “progressive,” this thesis argues that Reagan played a major role in the creation of the mass incarceration phenomenon by answering the following questions:

Did Ronald Reagan’s conservative political philosophy shape his penal policies?

What are the pillars of the mass incarceration phenomenon?

What policy changes did Reagan implement during his two gubernatorial terms that ultimately contributed to the mass incarceration phenomenon in California?

This thesis will review four subjects in order to answer these questions. Chapter 2 discusses the relationship between California’s three governmental branches, specifically their functionality during Reagan’s governorship, and the effects Reagan had on the interworking of the executive branch. Chapter 3 examines four different analytical frameworks of the mass incarceration phenomenon. Chapter 4 investigates Reagan’s contributions to the creation of the mass incarceration phenomenon.

Limitations of Thesis

Due to his incarceration, the author’s resource accessibility was extremely limited. The author relied on secondary and tertiary resources from numerous criminal justice experts, Reagan’s contemporaries, and scholarly journals. As primary sources, the author mainly relied on the oral testimonies of various Reagan gubernatorial administrative members and relevant political contemporaries collected by the University of California, Berkeley’s Bancroft Library, Ronald Reagan’s autobiographies and speeches, and administrative staff members’ memoirs. 6

Definition of Terms Special Terms

Bias: An inclination, preference, or prejudice, especially one that interferes with impartial judgment. All persons are vulnerable to bias, explicit and implicit. Explicit bias is a conscious prejudice whereas implicit bias is an unconscious bias (Alexander 107). Racial bias is most acute at the point of entry into the CJS (123).

Colorblindness: A term used to describe a race-neutral approach to social policy, which aspires to a state of being in which individuals are not capable of seeing racial difference

(Alexander 245). Regarding mass incarceration, it purports to see black and brown men not as black and brown, but simply as men—raceless men—who have fails miserably to play by the rules the rest of society follows quite naturally (241). Conservatives supports this approach because of its commitment to individualism whereas liberals support it because of its potential of racial equality (245).

Crime Complex: A term that refers to the politicization of crime. It is a set of criminal justice principles that embody a mentality that “stresses personal responsibility, rather than collective risk spreading, and minimal protection against economic harm, with a harshly enforced, highly moralistic criminal law promising almost total protection against crime, while emphasizing how dangerous the world is despite these much-needed measures” (Simon 23).

Crime Victim Paradigm: Linked to the notion of fear of crime, this paradigm promotes the “crime victim” as the ideal subject of the law and drives waves of crime legislation

(Simon 77). The identity of the “crime victim” is deeply racialized and aligns with the 7 experience of white victimization for it refers primarily to white, suburban, middle-class victims (Simon 76; Lopez 70, 102-103).

Dog Whistle Politics: A term used to describe racially coded appeals, which carefully manipulates hostility towards nonwhites (Lopez ix). It refers indirectly to racial themes while not directly challenging popular democratic or egalitarian ideals. Dog whistle politics “explains how politicians backed by concentrated wealth manipulate racial appeals to win elections and also to win support for regressive policies that help corporations and the super-rich, in the process wreck the middle class” (Lopez xii). Some examples of dog whistle politics are “quotas,” “reverse discrimination,” “forced busing,”

“states’ rights,” “welfare queens,” “tax cheats,” “welfare fraud,” “welfare reform,”

“freeloaders,” “individual responsibility,” “neighborhood schooling,” “school vouchers,”

“immigration reform,” “build a wall.”.

Fear of Crime Paradigm: A term that refers to a belief that a personal confrontation with armed violence—robbery, riot, police deadly force—is an inevitable possibility. Due to the social turbulence of the 1960s, many Americans adopted this perspective (Simon 3).

Governing through Crime Paradigm: A term the explains the emergence of a new style of governance that has invaded all social institutions and elevated “crime” as a significant and strategic issue for policy makers. It utilizes legitimate forms of interventions in various arenas outside crime control such as abortion (Simon 4-5). A main distinction between governing through crime and governing crime is that the latter seeks to protect and maintain governmental institutions whereas the former seeks to expand governmental legitimization and the exercise of power. The most visible features of governing through

8 crime is the practice of punishing, repressing, and confining people and the valorization of the pursuit of security and justice (Simon 20).

Mass Incarceration (also known as prison-industry complex): A term that refers to the contemporary penal approach composed of three distinct features of imprisonment: vast expansion, racially categorical application, and the selection of incapacitation as the preferred correctional modality (Simon 41-42). Furthermore, it is a direct result of the politicization of crime, which has affected not only the CJS but also the larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that control those labeled as “criminals” both in and out of prisons (Alexander 13-14).

Southern Strategy: A term coined by New York Senator Jacob Javits (D) in 1963 (Lopez

18). It describes a political strategy that shifted the strategic focus from class to race.

Moreover, it relies on the solicitation of working-class votes, at the expense of minority and the poor, through the usage of dog whistle politics (Alexander 44).

Welfare-Warfare State: A term that describes the centralization of war-making to a society’s socioeconomic security. In the twentieth century, the US’s massive defense spending spurred construction and development projects in the southern and western states and underwrote the nation’s welfare agencies (Gilmore 25).

Workfare-Warfare State: A term that describes the de-legitimization of wealth distribution and the deconstruction of the New Deal’s “creative government,” the nation’s welfare agencies. This prompted a shift of state surpluses—finance capital, land, population, and state capital—from redistributive programs to the containment of crime and the construction of a security state (Gilmore 79 and 85-86). 9

Acronyms

Adult Authority AA

Assembly Bill AB

American Civil Liberties Union ACLU

California Supreme Court CASC

California Council on Criminal Justice CCCJ

California Department of Corrections CDC

California Executive Assignees CEA

California Highway Patrol CHP

Criminal Justice System CJS

California Peace Officers’ Association CPOA

California Welfare Reform Act of 1971 CWRA

Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI

Friends Committee on Legislation of California FCL

Law Enforcement Assistance Agency LEAA

Offender Based Computer System OBCS

Office of Criminal Justice Planning OCJP

Occupational Safety and Health Administration OSHA

Public Safety Agency PSA

Senate Bill SB

University of California UC

United States Supreme Court USSC

10

White Anglo-Saxon Protestants WASP

Youth Authority YA 11

CHAPTER 2

RONALD REAGAN’S GOVERNORSHIP

Although California governors have relied on personal staff, administrative appointees, and California Executive Assignees (CEA) since the 1940s, their dependence on and assistance they received from these personnel is contingent on their philosophy and personality. In addition, the functionality of the executive branch largely depends on the efficacy of administrative staff and the effectiveness of their coordination between other departmental personnel and governmental branches, legislative and judicial. This process is principally determined by the governor’s philosophy, priorities, and instruction. A review of these relational dynamics is vital to accurately identifying a particular governor’s influence on penal policies.

Reagan ushered in a new type of governance in California. His approach centered on individualism, free enterprise, patriotism, and limited government (Dallek 7); above all, he revered good management (Hamilton 185).7 He fervently believed that governmental bureaucrats produced large, unhealthy, and ineffective organizations (184) and that citizens became dependent on the array of social welfare programs that those organizations perpetuated (Cannon 349). His philosophical foundation demanded a restoration of private initiative and a return of societal functions to local citizens,

7 Regan established two groups to research methods to make California’s bureaucracy more efficient. The first group, the Businessman’s Task Force, ultimately recommended over 1,700 procedural reforms, with half of those reforms implemented. The second group, the Weinberger Commission (named after its chairman, Casper Weinberger), researched alternative forms of executive organization (Hamilton 191). It concluded that Governor Pat Brown’s Agency Plan did not sufficiently define the roles of the agency secretaries and that role specification was needed (Hamilton 191). 12

businesses, and communities (Hamilton 184). In order to achieve his vision, Reagan created a flexible administration with well-established formal lines of authority and communication.8

This chapter investigates Reagan’s philosophy of governance and his overall effect on administrative personnel, specifically California’s correctional departments, and the legislative and judicial branches.

Personal Staff

Ronald Reagan placed huge amounts of trust in his personal staff as he heavily relied on them for candid advice (Hamilton 22-23). In general, California governors surrounded themselves with individuals from preexisting relationships to ensure such trust. Being a political novice, Reagan configured his administrative staff with dedicated campaign staff members (186) after which he followed the advice of Holmes P. Tuttle9;

Lyn Nofziger, his first communication director; Thomas C. Reed, his first Appointments

Secretary; and Phillip Battaglia, his first executive secretary, to fill the remaining staff positions (Cannon 176; Hamilton 24).10

Reagan mastered the ability to command the Governor’s Office. He captured his staff’s respect and admiration by embodying the pomp of the office and acting like a leader (Hamilton 195). He became the emotional center of his staff’s lives through his

8 Reagan’s second and third chiefs of staff, William P. Clark and Edwin Messe III, were instrumental in the creation of Reagan’s administrative hierarchy roles (Hamilton 187-88). 9 Holmes P. Tuttle and Henry Salvatori organized the “Friends of Ronald Reagan” group, which led the efforts to elect Reagan in 1966. These friends became very influential in the Reagan Administration and became known as the “Kitchen Cabinet” (Cannon 175). 10 Throughout his governorship, the majority of Reagan’s staff members were in their late thirties and forties (Procuiner 62). They were also mostly married and encouraged to spend time with their families (Hamilton 235n41).

13

ongoing demands of loyalty and commitment (46). While his ability to bond with people proved to be one of his invaluable assets (Cannon 82), Reagan kept the dynamics in the office professional and formal (Hamilton 195), thereby not blurring his established lines of hierarchy (Breed 45).

Reagan displayed a pattern of delegating authority and tasks (Hamilton 48). Two reasons that explain his approach of governance are: 1) Reagan disliked management functions, especially tasks he considered “dirty works” such as firing staff members and officiating office fights (195), 2) the process of delegation created a highly centralized form of governing, which Reagan considered vital to a functional organization (Cannon

114). To ensure his hierarchy, Reagan empowered his chiefs of staff to act as his gatekeepers.

Two Chiefs of Staff that were instrumental in Reagan’s success were William P.

Clark and Edwin Meese III.11 Unlike Phillip Battaglia, Reagan’s first chief of staff, who was guided by philosophical interests, Clark focused on the revamping of Reagan’s administrative staff. Under Clark’s leadership, the role of the Chief of Staff became vital to Reagan as he implemented a corporate style of governance (Cannon 254; Hamilton

187). To eliminate role confusion, he formalized staff assignments and implemented a

11 As chairman of Reagan’s Southern California 1966 campaign organization, Philip Battaglia held much influence and power; consequently, he quickly positioned himself as the prime candidate for Chief of Staff (Hamilton 186). While in office Battaglia amassed immense power by isolating Reagan, withholding information, and improperly making decisions (Hamilton 187). Reagan eventually became aware of Battaglia’s tactics in 1967 when two reporters, Lyn Nofziger and Drew Pearson, broke the story of an alleged homosexual sex ring, “Scandal of the Summer of 1967,” within the Governor’s Office (Holden 236-37). Although Reagan generally did not care about his staffers’ private lives as long as they did not interfere with daily operations, Battaglia’s alleged misconduct, compounded with his mounting cabinet meeting absences and complaints of arrogance, staff manipulation, and abuse of authority, forced Reagan’s hand (Holden 236). Reagan fired Battaglia and then appointed Clark, his first cabinet secretary, as his new chief of staff. 14

formal chain of command. Clark made it clear that junior staffers were to report to senior staffers and that senior staffers were to report to him (Hamilton 188). Clark also encouraged Reagan to associate with various California policy makers; these interactions exposed Reagan to diverse viewpoints and initiated much needed relationships (Cannon

254).

Meese, Reagan’s first Extradition and Clemency Secretary, succeeded Clark after two years.12 As the perfect replacement, Meese shared Clark’s interest in administrative organization and employed a military-style approach to problem solving (Procunier 10).

Meese continued many of Clark’s policies, such as minimizing the calls of politics while keeping the Governor’s Office focused on goal attainment (Hamilton 187). In addition,

Meese developed the staff member training and rewrote staff training manuals

(Ellingwood 10). Meese eventually became Reagan’s “right-hand man” (Houghton 28), because he embodied and articulated Reagan’s philosophy, values, and goals (Procunier

61-62; Cannon 327-328).13

Another powerful staffer was Herbert Ellingwood. In 1969, Ellingwood moved into the position of Legal Affairs Secretary, previously known as the Extradition and

Clemency Secretary (Ellingwood 9). Granted he reported directly to Meese (11), but he was known as Reagan’s “action man” (Palumbo 31). One key function given to

Ellingwood was the identification of favorable judicial appointees.14 This function held

12 Clark and Meese decided that Meese would become the next Chief of Staff prior to Clark’s resignation (Cannon 326). 13 Ray Procunier, California Department of Corrections (CDC) Director between 1967 and 1975, believed that Reagan did not fully understand the value Meese brought to his governorship (Procunier 62). 14 In conjunction with Ned Hutchison, Reagan’s Appointments Secretary, Ellingwood compiled lists of potential judicial appointees (Ellingwood 11). 15

extreme importance to Reagan and his criminal justice priorities (Ellingwood 22). Reagan viewed judges as an obstacle in obtaining tougher penal policies (Houghton 42).

Ellingwood was also instrumental in facilitating Reagan’s vision of criminal justice with correctional officials (Ellingwood 26).

Michael Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff, rounded out Reagan’s personal staff circle (Cannon 372). An associate of Reagan since 1967, Deaver, originally the coordinator of the state administrative activities, soon became Reagan’s “Friday Man”

(Dallek 76). He ran the governor’s residence, oversaw staff, protected Reagan from excessive demands, and liaised with other directors (76). In addition, he took care of the partisan political functions of the Governor’s Office (Hamilton 188). The relationship between Reagan and Deaver transcended the governorship and lasted through the

Reagan’s presidency.

Reagan’s Cabinet and Other Administrative Appointees15

Beside personal staff governors rely on gubernatorial appointees to direct the state’s bureaucracy by implementing his or her vision and instruction. Each administrative department is led by a gubernatorial appointee, who also services a dual function as a Cabinet member. This section examines Reagan’s relationship with his

Cabinet, other gubernatorial appointees, and administrative departments, specifically the correctional departments.

15 Reagan’s Cabinet was composed of four agency heads: Agriculture and Services, Business and Transportation, Resources, and Human Relations, in addition to the director of Finances and the Executive Secretary (Chief of Staff) (Hamilton 192). 16

Cabinet

Reagan constructed a cabinet that resembled a corporate board of directors

(193).16 This approach aligned with his political perspective of efficient governance.

Reagan’s friendly, but formal demeanor supported a level of devotion between his cabinet members (Breed 46). Each cabinet member sought to impress Reagan with his or her level of preparedness and knowledge (46). In general, Reagan accepted the recommendations of his executive directors (Cannon 303; Hamilton 81).17 Reagan’s cabinet structure produced three desired effects: 1) the mitigation of Reagan’s governing inexperience, 2) the promotion of consensus management, and 3) the empowerment of department heads (Hamilton 196).

Cabinet meetings conveyed twice a week (190).18 The typical attendees included

Meese, the eight directors, and three other staff members (Breed 44). Reagan attended these meetings, called “Management Forum,” when in town (Hamilton 82, 193). The cabinet meetings proved to be highly valuable to the departmental directors. They offered an opportunity to present unfiltered information to the governor and his trusted staff members (Breed 44). Over the course of the Reagan Administration, the cabinet members developed a genuine sense of group cohesion, which engendered unified movement (47).

The cabinet’s rigid decision-making structure was based on a “memo system” devised by Clark. The “memo system” relied on “[s]ingle-paged briefs that summarized the issues under discussion, described the alterative possible actions and their probable

16 Many of Reagan’s cabinet members came from the corporate world (Breed 46). 17 Reagan once told William Penn Mott Junior, director of State Parks and Recreations Department, “‘You run the department and I’ll handle the politics’” (qtd. in Cannon 316). 18 Allen F. Breed, once director of the Youth Authority (YA), contradicted this claim. He stated that the directors met once a month and on occasions met more often (Breed 44).

17

consequences, and made a recommendation” (Hamilton 193).19 While Joseph

Gunterman,20 a legislative lobbyist, believed Reagan mainly worked off these memos

(Gunterman 27), Lou Cannon, a Reagan biographer, claimed Reagan often utilized supplemental material (Cannon 187).21 Although Reagan was known for delegating many tasks and responsibilities, Reagan was the one person to make the final decision on any given issue (Breed 45; Cannon 186; Meese 38).22

Correctional Departments. The Reagan Administration followed its typical hands- off approach with the correctional departments; however, the correctional departments reflected the governor’s philosophy (Palumbo 42) and did what he wanted (Gunterman

28).23 Reagan empowered Edwin Meese, his Chief of Staff, and Herbert Ellingwood, his

Legal Affairs Secretary, to work with California’s correctional officials (10, 13). Three key areas that shaped California’s correctional system under Reagan’s governorship were fiscal conservatism, public safety, and institutional security. Subsidiary concerns included sentencing laws, parole polices, prison overcrowding, and prisoners’ rights.

Multiple officials described their experience of Reagan’s leadership as laissez- faire. Ellingwood confirmed that he possessed a good amount of discretion to act on criminal justice issues (Ellingwood 12). Youth Authority (YA) Director Allen Breed stated that Reagan did not interfere with his leadership during his tenure (Breed 15). Ray

19 Each memo contained four paragraphs: 1) a statement of the issue; 2) a list of the issue’s crucial facts; 3) a discussion of the issue; and 4) a conclusion and list of recommendations (Cannon 187). 20 Joseph Gunterman was a lobbyist for the Friends Committee on Legislation of California (FCL). FCL was the oldest public interest lobby in California during the Reagan’s governorship (Gunterman 61-75). 21 Clark and Meese ensured that Reagan had access to all vital information, documentation and individuals, before he issued a decision and instructions on important matters (Meese 38; Breed 44). 22 Once Reagan made a decision neither Clark nor Meese would attempt to reopen debate (Meese 38). 23 Procunier stated that, “‘[p]arole board members want to reflect what the governor wants’” (qtd. in Procunier 32). 18

Procunier, chairman of the Adult Authority (AA), agreed that Reagan deferred to his expertise and judgment (Procunier 32).24 Earl Brain, director of the State Health and

Welfare Agency, also enjoyed huge amount of liberty from Reagan (Breed 17). In essence, Reagan allowed the correctional departments to operate on their own throughout his administration as long as they adhered to his vision for California. One aspect of that vision included the “law and order” fervor, which infected both Reagan and the correctional department (Breed 67-68; Campbell 383).

Reagan’s fiscal conservatism influenced the direction of many correctional policies. Reagan entered the Governor’s Mansion with a deficit of eighty million dollars

(Way 18).25 In order to reduce the deficit, he sought to make California’s government more efficient and effective. Reagan imbued the Department of Finances with considerable power to maintain fiscal discipline (Breed 22; Hamilton 104). Nevertheless,

Reagan supported the entire CJS more than any other part of the state government.

Amidst statewide budget cuts, the CJS, including the correctional departments, saw its budget either increased or remained the same during Reagan’s tenure (Ellingwood 28).26

Breed became aware of Reagan’s frugality when he attempted to launch a new delinquency program. After discovering a million dollars of unused funds in his budget,

24 Procunier claimed Reagan gave full discretion and authority to Procunier to appoint his department’s staff (Procunier 24-25; Marinissen 16), and that, “Reagan and [he] were thicker than thieves the whole eight years” (qtd. in Procunier 7). 25 Meese claimed that the state deficit amounted to at least $167 million at the start of the Reagan Administration (Meese 33). 26 CDC Director Walter Dunbar ordered Procunier, as a prison warden, to “cut, trim and squeeze” his budget by ten-percent. Procunier’s resolute refusal convinced Dunbar to relent. Moreover, this gesture made a strong impression on Spencer Williams, who later recommended him as CDC Director to Reagan (Procunier 18).

19

Breed solicited Spencer Williams’s, director of the Health and Welfare Agency,27 approval for his proposed project. Williams replied, “Thank you very much for helping us reduce our overall deficit by a million dollars” (qtd. in Breed 21).

Another cost-cutting example stems from the 1967 Governor’s Survey on

Efficiency and Cost Control Task Force’s recommendations. The overall assessment called for the elimination of many of California’s several hundred commissions and boards, but it also recommended several administrative adjustments. In particular, the

Division of Law Enforcement was deemed as inadequate (Houghton 57). It suggested dividing the division into two branches: the Investigative and Law Enforcement Branch and the Criminal Identification and Information Branch (57-58).

Reagan heralded public safety as a paramount concern (Ellingwood 28). His 1967 election campaign castigated Governor Pat Brown’s ineffectiveness in curbing civil disturbances—the Watts riots and UC campus protests—and rising crime rates.28 As he ushered in his first term, Reagan continued to call for “law and order” policies. The fact that many of his appointees came from the CJS, such as Meese and Ellingwood,29 strengthened his commitment to an anticrime agenda (36).

27 Under the Reagan Administration, the Secretary of Human Relations held authority over the Departments of Corrections and the Youth Authority (Hamilton 64). 28 Crime rates increased prior to and after the Reagan Administration (Gartner 302). 29 Prior to working within the Reagan Administration, Meese was a deputy district attorney and a lobbyist for the California Peace Officers’ Association (CPOA). As deputy district attorney, Meese advised law enforcement officials during the UC campus disturbance at Sproul Hall and later persecuted the 773 arrested protesters (Meese 29). Ellingwood was a legislative advocate for the State Bar Board and a CPOA lobbyist before working in the Reagan Administration (Ellingwood 3). 20

Because he deemed drugs as a principal social problem, Reagan created drug abuse programs and increased penalties for drug sales (Ellingwood 28, 37).30 To combat the rising trend of civil protests, he successfully lobbied for the use of non-lethal gun legislation (Palumbo 16). He advocated for the passage of the 1967 Panther Gun Bill to remove guns off the streets as well (Gilmore 39). Even as a fiscal conservative, Reagan felt it necessary to increase the budget of criminal prosecutors (Ellingwood 28). He also was the first governor to promote victims’ right legislation (Ellingwood 37-41, 48).

Nevertheless, Reagan ordered the release of 10,000 prisoners in 1971 when budgetary concerns arose (Gartner 301-302; Marinissen 14).31

Reagan’s list of penal policies also included institutional security. The Civil

Rights Movement inspired prisoners across the state to unite under a call for basic rights

(Marinissen 8). Correctional officials wrongly interpreted this galvanization as a revolutionary movement against the government, specifically the CJS (11).32 Reagan made it clear that the correctional departments were to maintain four priorities—security, custody, safety, and legality; hence, Breed and other correctional officials were able to obtain waivers amidst multiple budget cuts (Breed 23). Reagan believed that the push for prisoners’ rights threatened these priorities; so, he spoke out against it (Houghton 47).33

30 The CPOA concurred with Reagan that crime was the primary social problem (Ellingwood 37). 31 Marinissen claimed that Reagan’s prison reduction was based more on financial considerations rather than compassion and justice (Marinissen 14). 32 The protests within California’s prisons fed this fear. In 1968, two general strikes shutdown the prison industries (Berk 67). In 1970, Folsom State Prison witnessed the longest prison hunger strike of nineteen days (Berk 83-84). Inmate-social activist George Jackson’s murder in 1971 triggered multiple revolts not only in California, but also across the nation. Between 1970 and 1973, eighty inmates and eleven guards were killed in California’s prisons (Procunier 84). 33 In 1971, Reagan also vetoed legislation that would have liberalized voting rights for former prisoners. The voters approved Proposition 10, which restored voting rights to ex-felons in 1974 (Gartner 316).

21

In an attempt to strengthen institutional securities, Reagan redirected additional funding to the Department of Corrections in order to conduct a study on California’s penal system (Marinissen 21). The 1971 California Correction System Study (also known as the Kelgord Study) concluded that there was a lack of leadership and competence in the central office. It further determined that the cause of prison violence stemmed from the administration’s inability to adjust to contemporary issues and the demand of prisoners,34 and that the adherence of law drastically differed from prison to prison (22).

In his second term, Reagan toughened his stance against crime (Houghton 44;

Gunterman 31).35 Reagan commissioned the Select Committee in Law Enforcement

Problems as a part of his plan to strengthen law enforcement. The “Controlling Crime in

California” committee released its findings in what is commonly known as the “Blue

Book.” This committee’s report was Reagan’s last major action on the CJS and crime

(Palumbo 45-46).36 The committee’s recommendations encapsulated Reagan’s philosophy and strategy for the CJS reform (40).37 The report called for mandatory sentencing, the repeal of probation subsidies, jury selection reform, juvenile petitions,38 and the establishment of a Universal Emergency Telephone Number (911) (Ellingwood

34 A study at San Quentin Prison identified prisoners’ uncertainty of release increased their propensity of violence (Marinissen 25). 35 Ironically, Reagan took Stuart Spencer’s suggestion to soften his “law and order” rhetoric and to stress the importance of environmental and tax relief during his second gubernatorial campaign (Cannon 347). 36 Regan felt improvements to the CJS were a critical part of his administration’s record (Palumbo 42). Ellingwood differed, “Criminal justice . . . was important only really as it related to the other things that were happening in society. I don’t think you could place it over welfare or . . . the [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] OSHA problems or . . . the California Rural Legal Assistance problems or . . . a list of other problems’” (qtd. in Ellingwood 22). 37 The report also concluded that not enough criminals were being caught, that district attorneys were not securing enough convictions, and that less than one out of ten convicted felons went to prison (Houghton 24; Meese 37). 38 Reagan sought to grant district attorneys the authority to petition the courts to try juveniles as adults (Ellingwood 47).

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45-48; Meese 37). The Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP) stated that the process of implementation was initiated in 1974, but could not be completed due to an administration change (Palumbo 41).

Reagan’s overall impact on the correctional department can be summed up by four policies: the proposed repeal of the probation subsidy program, the endorsement of the “law and order” movement’s call for tougher criminal penalties, the shift to mandatory and uniform sentences, and the increase in law enforcement investment.

California’s legislature created the probation subsidy program in 1965. It encouraged counties to reduce prison commitments through probation in exchange for subventions (Gartner 301; Breed 53; Berk 69-70).39 Earlier on this program, in addition to the work furlough program, proved very successful at reducing prison populations, but during the Reagan Administration, its efficacy was reduced. Calls for “get-tough-on- crime” measures apparently affected judicial discretion since prison admission rates steadily increased after 1973 (Gartner 306; Way 34).40 Reagan’s support for the “Blue

Book’s” probation subsidy program repeal recommendation also affected correctional policies.41

The penal shift towards incapacitation and determinative sentences exacerbated

California’s prison population crisis. Although Reagan ordered a 10,000 inmate release in

1971, the parole board continued to tighten its parole consideration. Procunier admitted

39 CDC Director Procunier and AA chairman Henry Kerr expressed support for the probation subsidy program and a desire to expand it to a US House of Representatives subcommittee (Gartner 301). 40 Way surmised that the “law and order” fervor compelled judges to send more people to prison (Way 34). Meese supported this belief when he admitted that he and Reagan felt that not enough criminals were being sent to prisons in his memoir (Meese 37). 41 Criticism of the probation subsidy program stemmed from its ineffective rehabilitative treatment (Ellingwood 48). 23

that parole board members acquiesced to the governor’s wishes and priorities (Procunier

32); hence, Reagan’s desire of a firmer stance on incapacitation prompted a decrease in parole rates. In 1971, 9,000 inmates were granted parole, but two years later that number was reduced to 5,000 (82). Overall, parole rates declined by twenty-percent between

1967 and 1974 (Gartner 307).42 As a result, California’s prison population rose from

19,773 to 22,486 between 1972 and 1973, a thirteen-percent increase (Procunier 83).

Moreover, the CPOA’s influence on Reagan and the correctional bureaucracy produced strings of anticrime legislation (63). By 1974, Reagan had signed tens of bills strengthening law enforcement’s capabilities and codifying tougher criminal penalties

(Cannon 308; Procunier 81).43

California’s CJS received an influx of investment capital from the state and federal governments. As mentioned above, Reagan maintained or increased the CJS’s budget. Much of this allocation came at the expense of California’s social welfare programs. The federal government invested into California’s and other states’ law enforcement agencies with the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe School

Act of 1968. Its passage indicated a shift from the “War on Poverty” to the “War on

Crime.” The new law created the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA), an enormous federal effort designed to provide funding to state and local enforcement agencies for fighting crime. In its early years, much of its emphasis was on providing support to local law enforcement agencies to acquire new technology and to upgrade

42 Parole violation rates decreased for both males and female between 1967 and 1974 (Gartner 310). 43 CPOA’s ability to oppose legislation proved highly effective. For instance, the CPOA defeated or had vetoed all major “opposition measures” in 1970 (Berk 79).

24

crime reporting methodologies (Mauer, “Why are Tough on Crime Policies so Popular?”

6). The US Congress initially allocated $300 million, but by 1974 that amount rose to

$1.25 billion (6).

California sought LEAA funding in hopes of improving its CJS. Millions of dollars were eventually directed towards California to be used on various programs from correctional facilities to crime control projects (Palumbo 49; Breed 27). In the preliminary stages, CDC and YA received the majority of the funding (Breed 27). CDC and YA utilized the funding for the hiring of additional staff and equipment upgrades

(Palumbo 46; Breed 27). This decision was largely based on the mounting civil rights protests within the institutions. Later in the Reagan Administration, the funds went towards technological improvement, the computerization of record keeping, and informational system improvements (Breed 27).

The California Council on Criminal Justice (CCCJ)44 handled the LEAA funding

(Palumbo 50). One program that received LEAA funding for a technological upgrade was

California’s Offender Based Computer System, which tracked arrestees throughout the

Criminal Justice System (Houghton 49, 35). Portions of the LEAA funding also went towards drug prevention programs (Breed 36). In addition, the relationship between the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and California’s law enforcement agencies improved through their participation in LEAA programs (Gunterman 46).

In general, the process of unifying and improving California’s CJS never fully materialized (Breed 29). Law enforcement agencies, district attorneys, courts, and

44 The California Council on Criminal Justice was renamed the OCJP in 1974 and put under the authority of the Public Safety Agency (PSA) (Palumbo 45). 25

correctional officials refused to surrender autonomy (30). The program was plagued by abuse and scarred by politics as well. Political power blocs consistently lobbied for pet projects funding (Breed 28; Houghton 45).45 Nevertheless, the influx of cash vastly improved California’s technological capabilities, law enforcement training, and equipment quality.

Legislative and Judicial Branches

As the head of the executive branch, governors must collaborate with the legislative and judicial branches to increase the likelihood of a success administration.

Reagan was a larger than life figure with an ambitious vision for California, but without direct control, he had to learn how to work with California’s other two governmental braches. Moreover, the mass incarceration phenomenon required a radical shift in penal policy; therefore, his relationship with these two governmental branches fundamentally affected his anticrime agenda. This section explores how Reagan approached these governmental relationships and the means utilized to implement his penal vision.

Legislative Branch

As a fervent “law and order” advocate who castigated Governor Pat Brown for his inaction amidst the Watts riots and UC campus disturbances, Reagan entered the

Governor’s Mansion with an ambitious anticrime agenda. Reagan was only able to get three bills, Senate Bills (SB) 85-87, through the Democratic legislature in his first year in

45 Breed claimed Anthony L. Palumbo, CCCJ Director, utilized the LEAA funding to reward people (Breed 30).

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office (Berk 60).46 Even the Democratic legislators failed to implement their own penal reforms in 1967 when confronted by the “law and order” opposition; however, a major crime legislation, Assembly Bill (AB) 581 “Prisoner Rights,” was enacted that year (Berk

70).47 The other two major legislative issues passed that year were “parole revocation” and “due-process violation” (Berk 67). Reagan took a hard stance against civil protest and endorsed the 1968 AB 545, which authorized the use of tear gas on protesters

(Gunterman 53).48

The legislative tide turned in favor of the Republican Party in 1970. The timing of this political shift aligned perfectly with the California Peace Officers’ Association’s

(CPOA) rising influence in Sacramento.49 The CPOA’s push towards a police state was spearheaded by legislators and the governor, who eagerly consented to a series of “law and order” legislation (Campbell 403). With over eighty “law and order” bills passed,

1969 was dubbed the CPOA’s “most successful” year to date (Berk 75).50 1970 turned out just as successful with a plus fifty-percent passage rate for affirmative legislation and a hundred-percent success rate on oppositional legislation (79).

46 The Reagan-Deukmejian Penalty Package (SBs 85-87) called for increasing penalties for crimes of violence (Berk 60). Deukmejian also authored a bill that created the CCCJ in 1967. 47 Reagan only signed the bill because law enforcement officials did not explicitly request a gubernatorial veto (Breed 70). 48 Assemblyman Craig Biddle’s (R) AB 545 extended authority to use gas to California Highway Patrol (CHP) and state prison officials. 49 By the 1950s, the CPOA gained legislative influence. The law enforcement lobby groups, specifically CPOA, exerted a lot of pressure during the Reagan Administration. Reagan acquiesced to many of their demands, because their agenda aligned with his “law and order” sentiment (Campbell 383). By the end his governorship, Reagan granted the law enforcement forces much control over the criminal bureaucracy (Berk 86; Campbell 384). 50 Many of the “law and order” legislation were buried in the Assembly Criminal Procedure Committee (Cannon 214), which was renamed to the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice in 1971 (Berk 81). 27

1970 produced mixed legislative results even with a Republican majority.

Reagan’s Task Force on Riots and Disorders issued a report that became the cornerstone of California’s “War on Crime” (78). Part of its recommendations included the implementation of invasive tactics such as blanket surveillance, computer data banks, preventive detention, and “emergency power” acts (78).51 During this year, the State Bar began to lose interest in the “law and order” movement due its adoption of liberal positions such as the “abolition of the death penalty, decriminalization of marijuana (70), and the legal toleration of private sex acts between consenting adults” (79). Irrespective of this relational break, the law enforcement lobby obtained another major victory when

Senator Donald Grunsky (R) purged the “far too liberal” Penal Code Revision Project

(76).

In 1971, the Republican Party took a massive electoral hit and lost control of the legislature (Breed 81). The Democratic legislature successfully passed AB 1811—The

Penal Ombudsmen Bill. Since it threatened California’s correctional bureaucracy and gubernatorial authority, Reagan vetoed the bill (Gunterman 59).52 Nevertheless, AB 1811 further indicated a legislative shift away from the “law and order” movement. In response, the CPOA instigated a new campaign directed at the public towards the end of

1971 (Campbell 384, 403).

51The System Development Corporation was a “law and order” think tank developed in 1963. As the brainchild of William Hermann, it specialized in the “domestic application of counterinsurgency research.” The sentiment of “‘destroying the system from the mass of dissenters, then, . . . win[ning] their hearts and minds,’” was adopted by the Reagan Administration when Hermann became the head of the Task Force on Riots and Disorders in 1970 (qtd. in Berk 77-78). 52 A new Ombudsman bill was introduced in 1972, but vetoed again by Reagan (Gunterman 59).

28

Determinate sentencing came to the forefront in the early 1970s. Senator Howard

Way (R) led the campaign after he discovered controversy over sentencing and parole practices and prison overcrowding (Way iv). In 1972, Way joined forces with John

Nejedly (R) on the Senate’s Select Committee on Penal Institutions to investigate new solutions to the rising turmoil.53 Although their efforts finally culminated in the passage of the Determinate Sentencing Act in 1977 (SB 42),54 their quest for fundamental sentencing reform was highly visible during Reagan’s second gubernatorial term and strongly supported by him (Way 22-23; Campbell 388).55

During the last two years of Reagan’s governorship, state legislators considered the recommendations of the Select Committee on Law Enforcement Problems

(Ellingwood 37a). Reagan’s task force instructed its seventeen committees to investigate various aspects of the CJS (44-45). It eventually recommended comprehensive changes to the judicial system, law enforcement, and the correctional departments. Some of the endorsed judicial reforms included the empowerment of district attorneys to file juvenile court petitions (47), the removal of general rule of secrecy in juvenile court proceedings

(46-47), the implementation of strict standards for plea negotiations (Houghton 43), a change to a 5/6 jury verdict (Ellingwood 47), and the reduction of jury size (12 to 6) for misdemeanor cases and nonlife felony cases (47). Some of the other key penal reforms called for mandatory sentences for narcotic and gun crimes (Ellingwood 46), the repeal of

53 Craig Biddle, Ned Nejedly, and Howard Way acted as Reagan’s legislative gatekeeper to the CJS (Way 23). 54 Senators Nejedly and Way framed this legislation in 1972 (Way 22). 55 Ray Procuiner disputed this claim by asserting the penal change came after Reagan’s governorship (Procunier 35); however, Ellingwood asserted that Reagan promoted mandatory penalties for use of force, gun, and drug crimes (Ellingwood 37-38). 29

the probation subsidy program (48), the expansion of correctional industries (48), and the installment of prisoners’ mandatory work assignments (48). To strengthen public protections, the committee suggested several improvements to law enforcement

(Procunier 85). Such proposals included the creation of the PSA,56 which would possess authority over all of California’s law enforcement agencies (Houghton 24), the creation of a mutual aid plan with the Office of Emergency Services for local law enforcement

(Ellingwood 47), the expansion and standardization of law enforcement training and communication systems (48), and the authorization of non-lethal forces for riot control

(Houghton 42).

The legislators created the OCJP to implement the committee’s recommendations and placed it under the control of the governor (Palumbo 50). The OCJP also recommend the reorganization of the CCCJ.57 Antony Palumbo, the OCJP Executive Director, welcomed the change, because he felt that the problems were related to past badly written legislation (Palumbo 44). Many of the committees’ recommendations were not fully implemented due to the change of gubernatorial administration (Procunier 40). The reorganization was eventually completed in January 1997.

56 Governor Jerry Brown disbanded the PSA in his second term (Palumbo 47). 57 The committee failed to consider the recommendations of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: “Prison sentences be limited to five years except for murderers, professional criminals, and other dangerous offenders; imprisonment to be used only as last resort after all other alternatives have been explored; [and] a ten-year moratorium placed on all new jail and prison construction” (Procunier 85).

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Judicial Branch58

Reagan took issue with the judicial branch of government for several reasons. He believed that the “jungle was closing” because judges and jurors failed to put “their house[s] in order” (qtd. in Berk 79). He generally felt that the majority of judicial rulings limited individual freedom and stripped criminal justice officials of vital enforcement tools while strengthening criminals’ defenses against prosecutions (Houghton 43; Cannon

215, 223).59 Moreover, Reagan postulated that constitutional protections could be secure without “arrogant and arbitrary action by governmental authorities” (Meese 306). He surmised that the fix to the judicial system laid in the implementation of a merit system60 and the reduction of the necessary unanimous vote for criminal convictions. Furthermore,

Reagan sought to reconfigure California’s judicial make-up with the appointments of conservative judges.

With assistance of Ned Hutchison, Appointments Secretary, and Ellingwood,

Reagan appointed more than six hundred politically amenable judges to local and state benches (Cannon 221-222; Ellingwood 11).61 Aligned with his governmental philosophy,

58 The California Supreme Court (CASC) led the nation in civil justice innovation between the years of 1950 and 1980 (Simon 122). 59 Four cases that strengthened criminals’ rights were Mapp v. Ohio (1961), which orders law enforcement agents to obtain a search warrant, in most cases, prior to conducting a search, Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), which guarantees the accused the right to counsel, Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), which deems coerced confessions as inadmissible, and Miranda v. Arizona (1966), which orders law enforcement agents to inform suspects of their legal rights. 60 Reagan advocated the Judicial Selection Act and the Judicial Merit Plan for consecutive years to no avail (Hamilton 79; Cannon 221). 61 Potential judicial appointees were first pre-rated by Hutchison, and then presented to Reagan. After which, Reagan and Ellingwood selected the most appropriate candidates (Ellingwood 11). They also utilized this approach to reconfigure the State Bar Board. Meese claimed, upon Reagan’s request, that he developed the system to evaluating judicial candidates (Meese 30). Cannon asserted that Paul Haerle, 31

these selected individuals held a strict constructionist view of a judge’s role opposed to the propensity of contemporary judicial activism (Ellingwood 18; Meese 317).62 Reagan was also willing to trade judgeships for legislative votes (Cannon 221).

Three other issues that Reagan wished to come to fruition were the repeal of the

“exclusionary rule,”63 the implementation of tougher mandatory sentences on gun-related and drug sales crimes, and the creation of more flexibility for search and seizure policies

(Houghton 42-43; Meese 305-306). In the end, Reagan hoped that these moves would bring about a stricter approach to crime control, including the return of the death penalty

(Simon 44).64

Summary

This chapter examines Reagan’s impact on California’s three governmental braches and its bureaucratic functionality in order to accurately identify his effect on

California’s CJS. To accomplish this examination, this chapter analyzes Reagan’s personnel sections, governance style, legislative agenda, judicial vision, and penal policies and goals.

Reagan’s second Appointments Secretary, set up the five-person judicial selection boards, with the assistance of William French Smith, Reagan’s longtime attorney and Meese (Cannon 220). 62 His most significant judicial appointment was Donald R. Wright as California’s Supreme Court Chief Justice (Cannon 222). Wright epitomized Reagan’s desire for judicial restraint and conservatism (Cannon 223). 63 The “exclusionary rule” states if law enforcement officials do not follow correct evidential procedure, the evidence is to be excluded (Meese 305). 64 In 1970, Reagan signed AB 1003, authored by Assemblyman Craig Biddle (R), which extended death penalty eligibility for other crimes (Way 28). In People v. Anderson (1972), Chief Justice Wright announced the court’s decision against the constitutionality of death penalty (Way 28). The US Supreme Court (USSC) later ruled in Furman v. Georgia (1972), that the death penalty was cruel and unusual, yet, statutes that specified aggravating circumstances were permitted to sentence individuals to death penalty (Mauer, Race to Incarceration 41-42). George Deukmejian (R) proposed Constitutional Amendment 13, which would have reinstated death penalty in California (Way 28), but it failed on the senate floor (Gunterman 58). Ultimately, the death penalty was reinstated in 1974.

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Each governor manages the executive branch according to his or her political philosophy and vision for the state. Reagan entered into the Governor’s Mansion with numerous boards, commissions, and departments to oversee; consequently, he introduced

California to a new style of governance, one which rested on the pillars of individualism and limited government. He implemented a corporate-style management to improve its effectiveness and efficacy. Throughout his governorship he sought to restore private initiative and responsibility. Although he empowered his personal staff and administrators with huge amounts of power and liberty to execute his instructions,

Reagan left no ambiguity on who was in charge. His administration clearly understood that he set the administration’s priorities and goals. At the end of the day, Reagan was the one person to make the final decision.

In the beginning of his governorship, Reagan did not possess many friendships with legislators; yet, he had gained much respect and admiration by the end of his second term. Due to the political composition of the legislature, Reagan’s anticrime legislative agenda was inhibited; consequently, his desire for comprehensive penal reform did not fully materialized during his governorship. Nevertheless, Reagan did initiate a paradigmatic shift in penal policy with his decision to align with the new political power bloc, the law enforcement lobby, and his vociferous remonstrations about the threat of crime and lawbreakers, which redirected public attention.

Throughout his campaign for “law and order” Reagan sought to integrate his revered principles of individual and corporate responsibility into California’s CJS. To implement his vision, he heavily relied on his advisors, Edwin Meese III and Herbert 33

Ellingwood. Some of his new ideas included uniform and mandatory penalties, increased sentences for gun-related crimes, and victims’ rights. In addition, Reagan successfully initiated a massive lobbying effort to solicit millions of dollars from the federal government program, LEAA. The CCCJ then coordinated the state’s efforts to improve its CJS with this influx of LEAA capital. The main benefits from this venture consisted of the coordination of local police force training, computer system modernization, and equipment upgrades. Although the OCJP was unable to fully complete all of the recommendations of the Select Committee on Law Enforcement Problems, those recommendations epitomized Reagan’s penal philosophy and forecasted many of the policies of the mass incarceration phenomenon (Palumbo 40).

Reagan was extremely disappointed over several judicial rulings, which he believed severely handicapped law enforcement from doing its job effectively. In order to correct this problem, he proposed the implementation of judicial merit selection and several trial procedural reforms. In his view, a proper judgeship exercised judicial restraint based on a literal interpretation of the US Constitution; thus, he selected judges whose records indicated strict adherence to this criterion. Moreover, many of the cases that eventually limited judicial relief for criminal defendants aligned with Reagan’s philosophy of strengthening law enforcement’s capabilities without diminishing constitutional protections.

Reagan’s promotion of conservatism left an indelible mark on all three of

California’s governmental branches. With an ardent belief that crime was the primary issue confronting society and that the root of crime was the lack of individual 34

responsibility, Reagan strongly advocated for societal security reform. Even though the public did not possess much of an interest in crime in 1960, his series of vociferous complaints shifted public opinion on crime and other subjects, such as welfare and taxes.65 Reagan’s influence on penal policy—his advocacy of juvenile petition filings, increased criminal penalties, victims’ rights, and the repeal of probation subsidies— stretches across decades as many of his policies underwrote the infancy of the mass incarceration phenomenon. When he exited the Governor’s Mansion, prison admission rates were up, parole rates were down, and California’s prison population had escalated for two consecutive years.

65 As the 1966 gubernatorial campaign unraveled, the public concern over crime, drugs, and juvenile delinquency (57%), racial problems (49%), state taxes and finances (44%), and welfare reform (44%) took center stage (Anderson 550). Fifty-five of the respondents believed that Reagan would do a better job than Governor Pat Brown handling these issues (Anderson 550). 35

CHAPTER 3

THE ROOTS OF THE MASS INCARCERATION PHENOMENON

The mass incarceration phenomenon rests on the “law and order” and “tough and crime” movements. Fundamental to both movements was the concepts of race, fear of crime, and colorblindness (Lopez 51; Mauer, Race to Incarceration 49). America witnessed a rise in crime, political and ordinary, beginning in the 1960s (Friedman 450).

Politicians began to take advantage of the tumultuous environment by exploiting the public’s concern for security and stability. “Law and order” proponents framed social activists as “law breakers,” “hoodlums,” and “street mobs.” Under this pretense of

“order,” these proponents demanded a response to the social upheavals; moreover, it captured white America’s concerns of increased “black criminal behavior” (Mauer, Race to Incarceration 45). The utilization of such racial euphemisms allowed the public to entertain an illusion of innocence. As the 1970s unrolled, states adopted stringent criminal legislation, which adversely affected minorities. The colorblind naivety effectively insulated the public’s conscience from the reality of an emerging unjust and racist penal paradigm, a prison-industrial complex. Incapacitation and punishment replaced rehabilitation as the preferred correctional modality, especially in California.

These trends elevated to unprecedented levels by the 1980s and 1990s. 36

This chapter describes the conventional theory66 and three other analytical frameworks of the mass incarceration phenomenon. Through a thorough examination of the conventional theory, Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow, Jonathan Simon’s

Governing through Crime, and Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s The Golden Gulag analytical frameworks, a clearer picture of Reagan’s contributions to the mass incarceration phenomenon’s creation and perpetuation can be attained.

Four Analytical Frameworks

The Conventional Theory of the Mass Incarceration Phenomenon

When searching for the origins of the mass incarceration phenomenon, penologist

Marc Mauer suggested reviewing four issues: 1) the politicization of crime; 2) changes in sentencing philosophy; 3) the media climate and sensationalism of crime; and 4) the racial dynamics of crime policy (Mauer, “Why are Tough on Crime Policies so Popular?”

6). In this section, these issues will be discussed in attempt to provide an analytical foundation.

The concepts of fear of crime and colorblindness found tractions in the “law and order” movement. Anti-New Deal proponents argued that the contemporary expansive government created a needy environment that was conducive to high rates of crime

(Beckett 47).67 Some politicians discovered that coded race-neutral terms, dog whistle politics, stimulated the instinctual fears of white America.

66 The author categorizes Marc Mauer’s, Katherine Beckett and Theodore Sasson’s, and Michael Tonry’s explanations of the mass incarceration phenomenon as the conventional theory. 67 Conservatives’ success of redefining poverty as the consequences of an individual’s failure cemented the image of undeserving and lazy criminals siphoning taxpayers’ hard-earned money (Beckett 46). The assault

37

After the United States Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown decision, civil rights activists intensified their calls for social justice and equality. In turn, conservative politicians negatively labeled the protesters as “agitators” and “street mobs.”68 Moreover, conservative politicians proclaimed that these “law breakers” created unsafe living conditions and that a “crackdown” was necessary for the return of societal stability and security. White Americans rewarded “law and order” candidates with their votes as their anxiety rose with the mounting social crises of 1960s. During his 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon captured the essence of the public sentiment: “Let us recognize that the first right of every American is to be free from domestic violence” (qtd. in Lopez

24).

Republican Senator Barry Goldwater made the “law and order” movement the centerpiece of his 1964’s presidential campaign: “Security from domestic violence . . . is the most elementary form and fundamental purpose of any government. . . . History shows us that nothing prepares the way for tyranny more than the failure of public officials to keep the streets safe from bullies and marauders” (qtd. in Beckett 45). He further described the fear of crime, “‘No wonder law and order has broken down, mob violence has engulfed great American cities, and our wives feel unsafe in the streets”

(qtd. in Beckett 47). Although he failed to capture the White House, Goldwater initiated a

Republican reconfiguration of political strategy on taxes argued that governments amassed too much power while the assault on crime claimed that policy makers failed to punish said lawbreakers (Simon 154). 68 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover abhorred the nonviolent protests. In 1965, he declared, “‘Civil disobedience, a seditious slogan of gross irresponsibility, has captured the imagination of citizens. . . . I am greatly concerned that certain racial leaders are doing the civil rights movement a great disservice by suggesting that citizens need only to obey the laws with which they agree. Such an attitude breeds disrespect for the law and even civil disorder and rioting’” (emphasis added) (qtd. in Lopez 24). 38

The southern strategy focused on the acquisition of Southern electoral success by appealing to white America’s racial sentiments (Lopez 18). Through the usage of dog whistle politics, terms such as “states’ rights” and “freedom to exclude,” Goldwater and other “law and order” proponents argued that governmental activism infringed on

Americans’ freedoms (Lopez 20; Woodward 276). By extolling virtues of personal responsibility and rugged individualism, Goldwater and others rallied against civil rights legislation and expansive government. Ironically, their solution of crime control entailed a massive expansion of governmental powers (Friedman 275).

The evolution of “law and order” movement into the “tough on crime” movement was seamless. The American public continued to grow more antagonistic towards the various social justice protesters as the 1970s unfolded. In addition, continual media coverage ingrained prejudicial stereotypes and the threat of increased crime rates into the

American psyche (Mauer, Race to Incarceration 49-50; Simon 24).69 For different reasons, both conservative and liberal policy makers sought systemic changes to the CJS, which led to a paradigmatic shift in American penology. Policy makers identified punishment and incapacitation as the ideal correctional modality rather than rehabilitative treatment; consequently, calls for tougher criminal punishment intensified (e.g., determinative sentencing laws).70 One major consequence of tougher mandatory sentencing laws was the unjust and unfair prosecution of the poor and minorities,

69 Political demagoguery and continual media coverage intensified the threat of crime rate increases in the 1980s and 1990s as well (Mauer, Race to Incarceration 49-50). 70 New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller pushed through the first major mandatory sentencing law in 1973 (Freidman 411) while Governor Jerry Brown signed California’s first mandatory sentencing law four years later. 39

especially African Americans. The “War on Drugs”71 and its calls for other stricter penal policies further exacerbated the racial disparity in the CJS. By advocating for each of these factors Reagan, played a prominent role in the development of the mass incarceration phenomenon.

The New Jim Crow

Michelle Alexander described the mass incarceration phenomenon as a “new racial caste system” and policy makers’ solution to the “War on Drugs.” Since its inception, the mass incarceration phenomenon has become a “stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow” (Alexander 4). Furthermore, this system is mainly buttressed by the “ethics of colorblindness” (emphasis added) (100), an ideal state of being in which racial differences are not seen or even considered (243). However, she identified that minorities, specifically African Americans, have been disproportionally ensnared in the CJS. Once branded with a “prison label,”72 individuals are thereafter subjected to legal forms of discrimination; hence, banished to an underclass status (12-

13). Alexander further argued that the mass incarceration phenomenon threatens the fabric of American democracy with the disenfranchisement of a large portion of the US populace (1).

Alexander traced the roots of the mass incarceration phenomenon to the “law and order” movement of the late 1950s (40). She posited that the “law and order” movement

71 President Richard Nixon officially declared the “War on Drugs” in 1971 (Harty 59). 72 The phrase “prison label” will be used interchangeably with either “criminal label,” “criminal,” “ex- convict,” or “felon” throughout this thesis.

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rose from Southern policy makers’ opposition to the Civil Rights Movement (40). These officials claimed that “civil disobedience was the leading cause of crime” (41). Under this pretense, countless politicians exploited white America’s fear of the social unrest.

Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater’s divisive rhetoric during his 1964 presidential campaign prepared the way for the “get-tough-on-crime” movement (42). This led to

Richard Nixon’s successfully presidential bid in 1968. Relying on the southern strategy,

Nixon loaded his speeches with “subliminal appeals to the anti-black voter” claimed John

Ehrlichman, former special counsel to the president (qtd. in Alexander 44).73 Ultimately,

Nixon’s electoral success reconfigured the Republican strategy (44).

In a colorblind society, racial animus is not needed to perpetuate discretionary practices. Alexander posited that a colorblind CJS works in two stages: 1) the expansion of law enforcement’s discretion and 2) the limitation of legal remedies for racial discrimination (103).74 She asserted that implicit bias guides law enforcement’s discretion (107) and is fueled by prejudicial stereotypes, such as Kathryn Russell’s criminalblackman archetype (162).75 The first stage describes the process that law enforcement officials obtain the ability to determine who, when, where to make an arrest,

73 Nixon dedicated seventeen speeches to “law and order” during his 1968 presidential campaign (Alexander 46). 74 Alexander also described the “War on Drugs” as a racially discriminatory process of entrapment. The process unrolls, first, with the roundup, second, the formal control (e.g., incarceration and/or probation/parole), and, third, invisible punishment (i.e., collateral consequences) (Alexander 185-186). 75 Russell coined this social construct to describe the archetypal criminal, a black or brown man, as the stereotypical target of the “War on Drugs” (Alexander 162). It was reinforced through stereotypical propaganda by the media and political elites (107). 41

and how subsequent discretionary prosecution creates huge racial disparities in incarceration rates, which in turn affirms their implicit bias (103).76

The second stage has been achieved through a series of court rulings that has closed the door for judicial relief against racial bias. Two major cases to acknowledge are

McCleskey v. Kemps (1989) and Whren v. United States (1996).77 In McCleskey v. Kemps

(1989), the United States Supreme Court (USSC) ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution does not protect against racial bias in sentencing without clear evidence of conscious and discriminatory intent (Alexander 109; Mauer, Race to

Incarceration 142-145). Then in Whren v. United States (1996), the USSC ruled that police officers are free to initiate drug investigations on the pretense of a minor violation

(Alexander 108). Both of these cases have proven to be huge barriers to judicial relief

(109, 114). Again, implicit bias (e.g., Russell’s criminalblackman archetype) fuels criminal justice officials’ discretionary actions, thereby making it very difficult to procure evidence of racial animus (107).

Alexander borrowed Jeremy Travis’s term “invisible punishment” to identify the most underappreciated component of the mass incarceration phenomenon (186). Invisible punishment is more commonly referred to as collateral consequences. They are the civil sanctions that are implemented post incarceration. These sanctions typically have a greater impact on the offender and are often permanent, albeit they are imposed by law and not by the sentencing judge (186). Voter disenfranchisement is the best-known

76 This phenomenon, the “circular illogic of racial profiling,” posits that the targeting of minorities is justified by the disparity in racial composition in prisons and jails (Alexander 134). 77 Alexander cited several other examples such as United States v. Brignomi-Ponce (1975), Armstrong v. US, Purkett v. Elm (1995), and Alexander v. Sandoval (2001). 42

example of collateral consequences. (Lafollette 241).78 Collateral consequences greatly reduce the ability of a person to assimilate back into society and therefore increase the likelihood of recidivism.79 Loïc Racquet coined this phenomenon as the “closed-circuit of perpetual marginality” (Alexander 95).

Alexander asserted that once a person is trapped in the throes of the CJS, they are subjected to legal discrimination (e.g., criminal record, social stigma, and collateral consequences); thus, they become enmeshed in an underclass stratum. Today thousands of minorities, especially African Americans, face this grim reality of second-class citizenship. It is this pool of people that preserve the unjust colorblind system of the mass incarceration phenomenon. As a main proponent of the “law and order” movement, who utilized dog whistle politics, fervently supported law enforcement, and judicial restraint,

Reagan laid the foundation of the mass incarceration phenomenon in California.

Governing through Crime

In Governing through Crime, Jonathan Simon proposed that a paradigmatic shift of authority radically transformed American governments (local, state, and federal)

(Simon 6). Simon coined this shift as governing through crime and postulated that since the 1960s governmental foci realigned around crime (Simon 13-14). Unlike Michelle

Alexander, Simon rejected the propositions that the CJS is intentionally prejudicial

78 Hugh Lafollette discussed the nature and effects of collateral consequences in “Collateral Consequences of Punishment?: Civil Penalties Accompanying Formal Punishment.” He raised the question, “Should significant elements of formal sentences extend beyond incarceration and parole?”(Lafollette 242). Several examples of current collateral consequences are as follows: termination of parental rights, grounds for a divorce, prohibition of holding public office or employment, ineligibility of federal contracts bidding, prohibition of jury duty, and prohibition of firearm ownership (241, 242). 79 Lafollette offered five reasons why collateral consequences are unjust for five reasons: 1) they violate the requirement of publicity; 2) they are neither justified nor likely be supported by the public; 3) they are not proportional to the crime; 4) they are confusing and conflicting; and 5) they perpetuate the US’s racist legacy (Lafollette 254).

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against poor and minorities, that crime control is a form of repression, and that a central force generates all crime polices (Simon 18). Instead he argued that conservative and liberal policy makers identified crime as a solution to the breakdown of the New Deal political order (25).80 Simon further argued that the governing through crime paradigm has eroded American democracy and racially polarized society while perpetuating a culture of fear and control; consequently, the New Deal dream of a “welfare state” has transmogrified into the “penal state” nightmare known as the mass incarceration phenomenon (6).

Simon posited that two factors fueled the paradigmatic shift of authority—the utilization of the southern strategy and the development of a crime complex. Simon agreed with Katherine Beckett’s allegation of political exploitation, the southern strategy.

Beckett argued that white Southern politicians exploited race and crime as a means to secure white votes, to resist the Civil Rights Movement, and to continue segregation (23).

Simon also agreed with David Garland’s claim of political order realignment. Garland posited that, “[t]he emergence of mass incarceration and the polarization of crime both reflect a fundamental transformation in . . . the political experience of life in modern societies” (23). He labeled this phenomenon as a crime complex and identified its dependency on two emerging social patterns, “urban formation/hyper-suburbanization

80 Underlying the New Deal political order was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s belief that “‘the function of government must be to favor no small group at the expense of its duty to protect the rights of personal freedom and of private property of all its citizens’” (qtd. in Olmstead 28). The New Deal political order produced great economic growth in the 1950s; however, several major social issues—inflation, civil disorders, political and trade union strife, and high crime rates (Simon 23)—threatened that prosperity as the 1960s unfolded. In response, policy makers constructed a new political order based upon crime control in order to main “the status quo of wealth and power” (26). They then exploited cultural preferences through the use of dog whistle politics, terms such as “law and order,” “individual responsibility.” With the assistance of the media, policy makers nurtured a culture of fear by exaggerating the threat of crime. 44

and the fragmentation of the family” (24).81 This dependency created a vicious cycle in which fear heightens public attention, rising crime rates justify those concerns, and crime controls increase (24). Reagan used both factors, the utilization of the southern strategy and the development of a crime complex, before and during his gubernatorial terms.

The Golden Gulag

Many penal scholars identify the period between 1980 and 2000 as the era of the mass incarceration phenomenon (Gilmore 7). During this period, California saw a five hundred-percent increase in its prison population (7). In The Golden Gulag, Ruth Wilson

Gilmore characterized California’s phenomenal prison growth as a “geographical solution” to the state’s monetary, political, economic, and structural crises (26). A major component underlying those crises was the era’s social instability. Furthermore, the tumultuous political economy and the penal policies changes of 1970s formed the basis for the system’s expansion in the 1980s (88). The state’s power holders identified incapacitation as an effective social control mechanism to manage multiple crises (12).

This translated in the imposition of unjust and debilitative conditions for minorities and the poor.

Gilmore identified the “worker-consumer” as the central figure in the mass incarceration phenomenon (56).82 She posited that the “worker-consumer’s” relationship

81 Rapid urbanization was the result of a mass migration of Southern rural blacks and white Appalachians into the growing industrial economies of the Midwestern and Northern cities. Urbanization is also normally equated to an increase of crime rates (Mauer, Race to Incarceration 50-51). Due to the lack of an adult male, women were forced into the work market and made to assume both parental roles; hence, children lacked a positive male role model (Simon 24). 82 The “worker-consumer” concept describes the relationship between working and purchasing; one “has to work to buy and buy to work” (Gilmore 56). 45

with four surpluses (finance capital, land, population,83 and state capacity) created the driving “force” behind California’s prison buildup (57). Surpluses are necessary to secure profits under capitalistic theory; however, the over-accumulation of surpluses produces a societal crisis. 84 The “worker-consumer” is most susceptible to negative consequences due to the inability to save like affluent businesses and persons (257).

After thirty years of economic progress, the New Deal political order hit its zenith in 1967 and 1968. The welfare-warfare state lost its credibility as profits declined across the nation. California fitted this mold perfectly (37). As the New Deal’s safety net programs came under attack, voters became disenchanted with the promises of wealth redistribution (79). Policy makers revamped the New Deal’s social welfare agencies to deal with the current social problems, the four surpluses. The result was the construction of the workfare-warfare state, a massive expansion of state power (85-86).

The financial capital surplus developed as elected officials became unwilling to ask the public for an increase in public debt while voters refused to acquiesce to such measures (62). In addition, federal defense funding inundated California with large influx of capital in the late 1970s and 1980s (60). California-based municipal financiers and private firms eventually sought to identify public/private projects to utilize this influx of capital (63).

The expansion of urban areas and the decline of rural economies created two processes, equalization and differentiation, which ultimately created the surplus of land

83 Gilmore interchangeably used the terms “population surplus” and “labor surplus.” 84 “Equalization, a function of the necessary expansion of capital, is the process through which the ‘earth is transformed into a universal means of production’ (Smith 1996: Harvey [1982] 1989). . . . Differentiation results from the ‘spatial centralization of capital in some places at the expense of others’ (Smith 1996:79). The phenomenon of surplus land lies in the nexus of these contradictory tendencies” (Gilmore 65). 46

(65). The amount of irrigated land peaked in 1978 and has since drastically declined as acreage was taken out of production (65). Droughts further exacerbated the trend of irrigated land reduction (67). To absorb the excess land surplus, larger farmers eventually brought insolvent farmers; subsequently, developers brought out those large farms. The result was a contentious competition between developers (69).

As the economic crises of the 1960s delegitimized the New Deal political order’s welfare-warfare state, California began to develop a population surplus in the early

1970s. A large immigration influx produced the majority of the population surplus (70).

Another factor in the development of the population surplus was the change in the labor market structures, which greatly affected minorities (75).85 Lastly, welfare reform and the defunding of community-based employment training programs also contributed to the population surplus (76-77).

“Capacities” are “the fiscal, institutional and ideological means” used to maintain the “balance of power relations” (78). State capacity is the balance between state’s profitability and maintenance of public support amidst formal inequality (78). Beginning with the cultural revolutions of the 1960s, a power struggle ensued over fundamental

American values (e.g., justice, equality, liberty, order, etc.) (78). The major division occurred between the preference of a welfare-warfare state and a workfare-warfare state

(New Deal liberalism versus anti-New Deal conservatism) (79). Instead of reducing these surpluses, the state reacted by reducing programs that, ironically, increased the surpluses and maintained a massive governmental bureaucracy (83).

85 Corporate managers, desiring to increase manufacturing automation and the breakup of labor unions, shifted power to corporations desiring to increase profits (Gilmore 71). 47

California’s power holders deemed a prison buildup as the solution to all four crises. The philosophical shift of corrections and several court rulings encouraged state officials to retrofit existing prison institutions (92). The introduction of a new prison design further inspired enthusiasm for prison construction (91). Once the 1980s emerged, the state’s official plan included a massive prison expansion project (Gilmore 93). Prison expansion constituted “an excellent long-term opportunity for capital investment”

(Gilmore 99; Simon 157). Small-town delegations eagerly sought out new prison contracts in hopes of revitalizing their struggling rural economies; consequently, landholding capitalists identified prison expansion as a way to unload their excess property (Gilmore 106). By increasing the amount criminal statutes and sentences and sternly enforcing them, the state was able to decrease the population surplus, which was mainly composed of minorities and the poor.86

The elevation of fear of crime paradigm drove the expansion of state governance

(114). The push to utilize state capacity surplus in the name of “tough on crime” produced “contradictory political economic conditions—conditions that are at once enabling and constraining” (114). The prison boom greatly reduced the labor surpluses with the hiring of prison staff and the countless contracts issued to the companies rendering supplemental services (119). These last two factors eventually created an unbreakable alliance between the state government and correctional officials (121).

Reagan’s advocacy of the deconstruction of the New Deal political order and the

86 State officials claimed minorities and the poor were not targeted albeit they filled the majority of the prison beds (Gilmore 113).

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strengthening of law enforcement supports some elements of Gilmore’s origin theory of the mass incarceration phenomenon.

Summary

The mass incarceration phenomenon continues to gravely impact American society and democracy. The United States incarcerates more people than Russia and

China combined. Countless theoreticians have studied this phenomenon in hopes of bringing clarity to its foundation and discovering socially just solutions. The above analytical frameworks are four examinations of the mass incarceration phenomenon.

Although they shared many similar characteristics, there are some noteworthy nuances to acknowledge.

As Mauer suggested when examining the mass incarceration phenomenon, the following four issues must be reviewed: 1) the politicization of crime; 2) changes in sentencing philosophy; 3) the media climate and sensationalism of crime; and 4) the racial dynamics of crime policy. The conventional theory of the mass incarceration phenomenon fulfilled these four issues. It identified the breakdown of the New Deal political order and the rise of the Civil Rights Movement as key catalysts. With the assistance of media, these two occurrences allowed politicians to promote a white backlash as a conservative “law and order” movement. A part of this movement was the development of a fear of crime paradigm that called for tougher criminal penalties. Race- neutral language, dog whistle politics, fueled the targeted populace’s concerns and provided eager politicians with political cover. The mass incarceration phenomenon 49

provided society a solution to restoring “order” and a way to return America to its “good o’ days.”

Alexander’s Jim Crow described the mass incarceration phenomenon as a

“disguised system of racial social control.” Central to her theory is the “prison label” and the American public’s acceptance of legalized discrimination. She posited that the continuation of the mass incarceration phenomenon threatens American democracy. Key to unwinding this phenomenon is the acknowledgment of the erroneous notion of colorblindness and its denial of contemporary racism. She claimed that the mass incarceration phenomenon does not require racial animus and that implicit bias is the real threat to consider. Implicit bias is fully functioning as law enforcement officials utilize their discretion during public encounters; hence, minorities are more likely targeted.

Furthermore, the convicted criminal over the years has lost the ability to remedy racially biased prosecutions through judicial relief. Overall, Alexander opined that once ensnared in the CJS the likelihood of re-assimilation is dramatically reduced.

Simon focused on the selection of crime as the ideal governmental frame. In

Governing through Crime, he concentrated the dissolution of the New Deal political order and the white backlash from the Civil Rights Movement. His concluded that the development of a crime complex (or fear of crime paradigm) created a vicious cycle: an increase of public attention towards crime, an increase in crime rates, and increased calls for tougher criminal penalties. Two vital components of this vicious cycle were the processes of urban formation/hyper-suburbanization and familial fragmentation. Simon 50

rejected Alexander’s assertion that the mass incarceration phenomenon is an intentional design of prejudice; yet, he did agree that it poses a threat to American democracy.

Gilmore’s Golden Gulag isolated the 1980s and 1990s as the key developmental periods of the mass incarceration phenomenon. She posited the policy makers identified an expansion of the state’s prison system as a “geographical solution” to the state’s monetary, political, economic and structural crises. She claimed that the crises originated from the state’s four surpluses: finance, land, population, and state capacity. As the New

Deal political order dissolved, the welfare-warfare state was replaced by a workfare- warfare state. The new system promoted a domestic militarism, which was largely funded by the federal government’s “War on Drugs.” California’s rural areas became key players during this expansion as acres of irrigated farmland came out of production due to economic recessions and nature disasters. California’s urban areas exploded with an excessive labor pool during the 1970s and 1980s. Combined with the public’s preference for a correctional modality based on incapacitation and its increased use of the fear of crime paradigm, policy makers determined prison expansion was the perfect societal solution.

The examination of these four analytical frameworks provides a firm foundation to determine Reagan’s contributions to the mass incarceration phenomenon. The next chapter continues to explore Reagan’s relationships with each framework’s key components and then identifies how those relationships helped constructed the mass incarceration phenomenon. 51

CHAPTER 4

REAGAN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MASS INCARCERATION PHENOMENON

The four analytical frameworks are composed of key features, which were discussed previously. Some of these features are mutually exclusive while others are not.

Therefore, instead of analyzing each framework individually for Reagan’s contributions, the key features will be discussed in general. In this chapter, the following features will be examined: each framework’s central figure; the contemporary penal shift; the fear of crime paradigm, the notion of colorblindness, dog whistle politics, the southern strategy, biased discretion, judicial relief limitations; and California’s four surpluses (finances, land, population, and state capacity).

The Central Figure

Each of these frameworks is based on a central figure. This figure provides the framework’s foundation; hence, it is necessary to understand its role to fully comprehend a framework’s theoretical composition.

The central figure of the conventional theory of the mass incarceration phenomenon is the “swing voter,” also identified as the white middle-class worker

(Beckett 49). Alexander’s “prison label” identified the “criminal” as the figure to focus on when examining the mass incarceration phenomenon (Alexander 14, 142). Simon posited that the “crime victim (or the potential crime victim)” is the central figure (Simon

77, 109) whereas Gilmore suggested that the “worker-consumer” is the central figure in 52

the mass incarceration phenomenon (Gilmore 75). Reagan promoted all of these central figures throughout his political years.

Conventional Theory

The conventional theory targets the “swing voter”87 as the central figure (Beckett

49). Starting with Goldwater, Republican politicians sought to drive a wedge between the typical Democratic voter, white middle-class worker and recently migrated Northern black voter (48). The strategy adopted to achieve this division became known as the southern strategy. Fueled by frustration and anger over the Civil Rights Movement’s use of direct action tactics and civil disobedience to force integration, white Southerners heeded Republican politicians’ racially charged rhetoric and voted accordingly (44).

Electoral success encouraged other politicians to utilize similar coded language to attract these swing votes.

Reagan was at the forefront of this movement to allure swing voters’ support. In his “A Time for Choosing” speech, he stressed the necessity of the maintenance of “law and order” (Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” 43).88 He also tapped into white

Californians’ concerns over welfare expenditures and UC campus disturbances during his

1966 gubernatorial campaign (Holden 18). He declared in his gubernatorial message that

“lawlessness by the mob, as with the individual, will not be tolerated. We will act firmly and quickly to put down riot or insurrection wherever and whenever the situation requires” (Reagan, The Creative Society 34). In front of the National Sheriffs Association

87 “Swing voters” has also been referred to as the “forgotten workers,” “Regan Democrats,” “waitress moms,” “lunch-pail dads,” “soccer moms,” and “office park dads” (Beckett 50). 88 While on the General Electric circuit, Reagan delivered this stock speech at a hundred and thirty factories in twenty-five states and met over 200,000 workers (Holden 98).

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in 1968, Reagan expressed a similar sentiment: “[W]e cannot afford to overlook the fact that mass criminal violations and mob violence are endangering our communities” (28).

Moreover, he presented California as a cesspool of crime: “Our city streets are jungle paths after dark, with more crime violence than New York, Massachusetts, and

Pennsylvania combined” (qtd. in Cannon 144).

Another hot issue Reagan used to tap into white Californians’ paranoid psyche was housing. Hiding under the pretense of property rights, Reagan boldly claimed, “If an individual wants to discriminate against Negroes or others in selling or renting his house, it’s his right to do so” (qtd. in Holden 174).89 His advocacy of the “freedom to exclude” won support from the majority of Californians. In addition, by establishing a correlation between property ownership and the fear of crime paradigm, Reagan created a wave of apprehension amongst swing voters. Homes and neighborhoods are attached to one’s identity and a sense of belonging (Simon 154-155). When either one is attacked, the other is attacked as well. Swing voters embraced the “law and order” movement in hopes of protecting their homes and neighborhoods, but, most importantly, their sense of identity.

Reagan’s demagogic slanders of welfare recipients are well known in the 1980s; however, he began this assault back in the 1960s. In his “A Time for Choosing” speech, he offered a hyperbolic anecdote of a woman who requested a divorce based on the conclusion she would earn more money from the state than remaining married to her

89 The Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1936 prohibited landlords from discriminating against potential tenants based on ethnicity, religion, sex, marital status, physical handicap, or familial status; in addition, it forbade racially restrictive covenants. Californians quickly placed Proposition 14, a proposed state constitutional amendment to repeal the Rumford Act, on the state ballot. It was approved by sixty-five- percent of the voters in 1964, but was ruled unconstitutional by both the California and the United States Supreme Courts. Reagan supported Proposition 14, and had brought a piece of property with a “Caucasian only” restrictive covenant in 1941 (Holden 174; Anderson 546). 54

husband (Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” 47). 90 Later in his infamous story of a

“Chicago welfare queen,” he claimed a woman collected “‘eighty names, thirty addresses, [and] twelve social security cards [while] collecting veteran’s benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands. She’s got Medicaid [and] food stamps, and she [was] collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income [was] over

$150,000’” (qtd. in Lopez 58). 91

“Reagan was at heart an ideologue” (Reeves 300). He capitalized on the public’s fears during his 1966 gubernatorial campaign as his inflammatory rhetoric intensified an already tensed atmosphere (299). By utilizing the southern strategy, Reagan was able to gain the ear and support of the “swing voter.” Throughout his governorship, he kept the attention of white middle-class workers who were economically struggling and disillusioned over the failures of New Deal programs.

Jim Crow

The central figure of Alexander’s Jim Crow is the “criminal” (Alexander 94).

After the passage of the US Constitution’s 14th Amendment, liberty cannot be denied to an American citizen unless due process of law has transpired. Due process is satisfied once a person goes through the CJS’s proper channels. Upon a guilty felony conviction, the individual is subjected to a range of punishment: incarceration, fines, community service. Since 1868, policy makers have enacted a myriad of laws and regulations that have produced dire residual effects for convicted persons, which prevents an individual

90 Reagan possessed a tendency to embellish his anecdotes. Over time his anecdotes acquired the power of truth for him (Cannon 11). His welfare anecdotes have been debunked on numerous occasions (Aaronson). 91 Reagan combined and then exaggerated several real stories of welfare fraud to create his infamous “welfare queen” anecdote. Over the years his “welfare queen” hyperbole perpetuated the false belief that poor black mothers are the archetypal result of years of welfare dependence (Gustafson 657). 55

from assimilating back into society;, consequently, subjecting him/her to a second-class citizenship. The tragic result has been the marginalization of a large portion of the

American populace, who remain highly susceptible to the mass incarceration phenomenon.

As a response to the Civil Rights Movement, Reagan and other conservatives offered an attractive new concept of liberty, the “freedom to exclude” (Woodward 276).

This racially coded message conveyed to white voters that they possess the right to exclude non-whites from their social environments (for example, neighborhoods, restaurants, schools, etc.) (Lopez 67). Reagan advocated this “sacred property right” sentiment on numerous occasions, “I cannot believe or bring myself to believe that we should open the door to government interference with regard to the individual’s right to disposition of his own personal property” (Reagan, Creative Society 38; Putnam 27). This concept of “freedom to exclude” is antithetical to American democracy; unfortunately,

Reagan and his conservative progeny legitimized the practice of legal discrimination.

Reagan has been instrumental in shaping the narrative of the “criminal.” His response to the Civil Rights Movement and UC campus disturbances demonstrated his willingness to caricature protesters as savage revolutionaries: “[Some minority leaders] are standing between us and those revolutionaries who believe the only answer is the last hopeless gesture of the torch and the clubs” (emphasis added) (Reagan, The Creative

Society 36). In a speech to the National Sheriffs Association, Reagan framed California citizenry’s only two choices as swift enforcement or violence and anarchy (28). Such a limited perspective spurs fear, hatred, hostility, and bigotry. A populace holding this sort

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of perspective is seeming too willing to limit the freedom of its perceived adversaries, such as witnessed during World War II with the American government’s implementation of the Japanese internment camps or the passage of the Uniting and Strengthening

America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism

(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Reagan’s anticrime agenda also set up the exploitation of the “criminal” label. In

1967, Reagan offered his first legislative agenda, which focused on six points: tightening pornography laws, creating state regulations of sexual activity, stiffening criminal record sealing procedures, instituting judicial merit selection, increasing criminal punishment for violent offenses, and creating the CCCJ (Berk 60). Although only the last two points were codified with SBs 85-87, this agenda set a new “tough on crime” tone. SBs 85-87 increased the sentences for robbery, rape, and burglary with a dangerous weapon to fifteen years to life. The CCCJ was created to direct funds towards technological improvement for the CJS.

Reagan’s decision to increase prison sentences indicated a governmental shift in the state’s penal approach. Instead of rehabilitation, policy makers advocated punishment through the preferred method of incapacitation. The setup of the CCCJ vastly improved

California’s record keeping system. The law enforcement upgrade allowed state officials to collect, categorize, and store huge amounts of criminal records. This record collection was instrumental during the 1980s and 1990s when newly enacted crime laws enhanced 57

criminal sentences to astronomical heights.92 Furthermore, his advocacy for juvenile petition filing foreshadowed the over-abused practice of charging juveniles as adults.

By spotlighting the “criminal,” Reagan absolved society of its responsibility to address pressing societal issues (Alexander 248). His inflammatory rhetoric ameliorated the scapegoating of civil rights protesters and promoted discrimination based on the concept of “freedom to exclude.” He assisted with the penal shift from rehabilitation to punishment within California’s CJS. His desire to strengthen law enforcement capabilities through the creation of the CCCJ, to authorize juvenile petition filings, and to coordinate CJS’s technological upgrades provided the resources for future district attorneys to exploit during the 1980s and 1990s. All of these factors contributed to the mass incarceration phenomenon.

Governing through Crime

The central figure of Simon’s Governing through Crime is the “crime victim.”

The focus of this figure began in the 1960s during the Civil Rights Movement and various social protests. Simon posited that the crime victim paradigm elevates the experience of victimization and the imagined possibility of victimization in policy makers’ agendas (Simon 77). The idealization of the crime victim as a white, suburban, middle-class American injects a highly racial polarization into the equation of justice

(76). The mass incarceration phenomenon has thrived off the perpetuation of this central figure.

92 A crime that typical carries a five year sentence easily could turn into a thirty-five-year sentence if a judge adds penalty enhancements (e.g., the person was a felon, had previously been incarcerated in prison, committed the crime with a gun, or is a validated gang member).

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Reagan agreed with and promoted the crime victim paradigm. During his first

Inaugural Message (January 5, 1967), Reagan made the case for additional public security: “The law abiding are entitled to at least as much protection as the lawbreakers”

(Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” 64). In 1968, Reagan painted a foreboding picture of the state of California’s neighborhood streets: “Already in our country few women are brave enough or foolhardy enough to venture out alone at night. Many neighborhoods are not even safe in the daytime” (Reagan, The Creative Society 22). During the UC disturbances, he also successfully connected student protesters to society’s increased of drug use (Harty 59; Reeves 277). Reagan introduced the concept of fear of crime to white

Californians and then exploited its allure throughout his administration (Simon 76-77).

Reagan also perpetuated the racial elements of the “crime victim.” His language classified “crime victims” as white, taxpaying workers who followed the law while struggling with typical life problems (Lopez 59). In contrast, Reagan consistently described minorities in despairing terms such as “slum dwellers,” “welfare queens/cheats,” and “strapping young bucks” (Reagan, The Creative Society 92; Lopez

58-59). When Reagan sat in the White House similar semantic tactics were utilized during his “War on Drugs” to describe its “perpetrators.” His media campaign publicized

“horror stories” of crack users and dealers in ghetto communities (Alexander 105). As

Reagan employed similar tactics as governor and president, he failed to acknowledge that criminal activity, and its victims, transcends socioeconomic barriers.

The crime victim paradigm injects prejudice into the political arena. The mass incarceration phenomenon has grown exponentially through the promotion of said 59

prejudicial stereotypes. Mainly fueled by fear, policy makers been able to orchestrate the populace’s acquiescence on pro-carceral polices, even to its own detriment, to gain political status and power. Reagan was at the forefront exploiting this revelation by promoting the crime victim and fear of crime paradigms, thereby constructing an “Us versus Them” mentality:93 “I think it is time the establishment—the hard-working, over- taxed men and women of labor and management, the hard-hats and the soft-hats, blue collar and white, housewife and secretary—takes inventory. We have been picked at, sworn at, rioted against, and down-graded until we have a built-in guilt complex”

(Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” 88). 94

Golden Gulag

The central figure of Gilmore’s Golden Gulag is the “worker-consumer.” The

“worker-consumer” is the result of the American economic evolutionary process.

Gilmore defined the “worker-consumer” as one “who has to work to buy and buy to work” (Gilmore 56). This figure’s prominence emerged at the dawn of the 1970s as multiple recessions hit the US and the concept of wealth redistribution was delegitimized.

Gilmore posited that California identified a massive prison buildup as the solution to its economic woes. Reagan contributed to the development of the “worker-consumer” figure through his assaults on the New Deal and other redistributive programs and his calls for tax reductions.

93 Policy makers have successfully constructed a racial division with the pretense of a societal zero-sum game in which the socioeconomic elevation of minorities threatens the status of white Americans (Lopez 71; Isenberg 264). 94 On September 4, 1970, Reagan made this statement during his Ours is not a Sick Society speech at a Sacramento Host Breakfast (Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” 88).

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Reagan was a byproduct of small town America and big city Hollywood. Being from Illinois, he adopted a Protestant work ethic and revered values like autonomy, individualism, religion, patriotism, morality and free enterprise (Dallek 7). Reagan adopted the modern consumer culture as his career in entertainment took off.95 This mixture of conservative and liberal values assisted Reagan’s promotion of the “worker- consumer.” White Californian migrants, from the South and Midwest, opposed government spending, high taxes, unbalanced budgets, and the UC campus disturbances.

They believed that they had earned their social mobility through hard work and that others were just as capable without government assistance. Reagan spoke to these

“average”96 people: “We are going to squeeze and cut and trim until we reduce the cost of government” (Reagan, The Creative Society 8). He further proclaimed: “Here in our

Capitol, we seek solutions to the problems of unrealistic taxes that threaten economic ruin to our biggest industry . . . Californians are already burdened with combined state and local taxes $113 per capita higher than the national average. . . . The cost of California government is too high; it adversely affects our business climate” (Reagan, “A Time for

Choosing” 69-70).

Reagan spoke out about the underlying theory of the New Deal for years. The

New Deal embodied his concerns of growing governmental power: “Federal aid is the foot in the door to federal control” (29). At the heart of his opposition was his fervent belief in the private sector’s ability to confront societal problems: “[G]overnment does

95 The twentieth century is marked by the advent of expressive individualism (Freidman 13). The consequence of this ascension is the deconstruction of collectivism and social responsibility, all of which assisted in the creation of the anti-New Deal fervor. 96 “Average” refers to white middle-class Americans. 61

nothing as well or as economically as the private sector of the economy” (43). He also felt that the continual governmental encroachment threatened individual liberty and economic prosperity: “We approach a point of no return when government becomes so huge and entrenched that we fear the consequence of upheaval and just go along with it”

(54).

To counter the expansion of governmental growth, Reagan focused on two things: the tax system and governmental spending: “The fodder upon which our government has fed and grown beyond the consent of the governed is the fruit of the tax system whose only consistency is that a levy once imposed is seldom removed” (32). Many Californians heeded his calls for governmental expenditure reductions and tax cuts. The “worker- consumer” was suffering from two recessions, 1969-70 and 1973-75, as the American unemployment rate doubled, wages declined, and interest rates rose (Gilmore 40-41).

Reagan connected these consequences as an overreach of government power: “We all know that inflation is the direct result of governmental spending” (Reagan, “A Time for

Choosing” 141). Framing California’s economic woes in apocryphal terms, he called for

“all-out war on the tax-taker. If we failed, no one ever again will be able to try. We must succeed” (qtd. in Dallek 49).

The “worker-consumer” attached significant meaning to homeownership as a member of the middle-class. Homeownership makes up a key aspect of the “worker- consumer’s” identity. Reagan’s calls for property tax relief resonated with the “worker- consumer” after Californian real estate’s value plummeted in the late 1960s and the

1970s. Reagan finally achieved his long desired property tax relief after multiple failed 62

attempts with the assistance of Senator Robert Moretti. The passage of SB 90 gave both a significant legislative achievement (Cannon 366).97 Four years following Reagan’s governorship, California voters led a major tax revolt with the passage of Proposition 13:

Jarvis-Gann Constitutional Amendment, which Reagan took credit for during his presidential bid (Putnam 45).

The “worker-consumer” accepted Reagan and other like-minded politicians’ arguments and solutions as disillusion set in over the New Deal’s broken promises. A shift from collectivism to individualism further heightened their disappointment and anxiety. South and Midwest migrants believed the scapegoating of welfare recipients as

Reagan successfully painted a picture of undeserving people benefiting while hardworking white Californians desperately sought decent jobs and wages. His continual verbal assault led to the passage of the California Welfare Reform Act (CWRA) of

1971.98 Reagan’s demagogic campaign for welfare reform and subsequent tax reform created an environment conducive for the mass incarceration phenomenon through the

97 Meese alleged that Reagan’s media campaign for CWRA forced Assembly Speaker Moretti to agree to its passage. Reagan stated that Moretti came to his office one day and submitted “‘Okay, I give in’” (qtd. in Meese 35). SB 90 raised homeowners’ property tax emption from $750 to $1,750, provided a then-record $332 million increase in scholastic funding, and laid the groundwork for a useful state response to school needs after a second Serrano court decision (Cannon 366). In Serrano v. Priest (1971), the California Supreme Court (CASC) ruled that California’s system of financing education with local property taxes as unconstitutional (Cannon 362). 98 The CWRA of 1971 reduced the amount of hours welfare recipients could work and qualify for assistance, reclassified household furnishings as personal assets, required a one-year residency for assistance qualification, required children-less recipients to work at public serve jobs, and created several antifraud measures (e.g., cross reference between county records and employer earning records and financial incentives for counties to recoup child support payments) (Cannon 359-360).

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demonization of the poor and minorities, thereby dispelling society’s responsibility of uplifting disadvantaged populations. 99

The dire economic times of the 1970s caused the “worker-consumer” tremendous suffering. The New Deal successes failed to reach all Californians. The tumultuous atmosphere, generated by the various cultural movements, injected frustration and anxiety over the security and future of the state. Some citizens began to question the validity of collectivism. All of these occurrences led to a revolt against the perceived encroachment of government. Reagan spoke to the “worker-consumer” and offered solutions such as the strengthening of law enforcement, tax reduction, and welfare reform. These solutions and others created a fertile setting for the prison-industrial complex of the 1980s.

Colorblindness, Dog Whistle Politics, and the Southern Strategy

The actual mechanics of the mass incarceration phenomenon is largely misunderstood. Unlike chattel slavery and the Jim Crow era, the mass incarceration phenomenon depends on the façade of colorblindness. A colorblind system relies on racial indifference and engenders a myth that racial animus is necessary for systemic injustice. This myth has promoted a deep denial throughout the American populace about the true nature of the CJS (Alexander 183). In addition, colorblindness legitimizes the substance of dog whistle complaints (e.g., criminals, welfare recipients, illegal aliens,

99 Many Californians felt that the “welfare state” turned “liberty” into a “license” to disobey laws. One citizen wrote to Reagan, “It is far more important NOW to give our attention to these problems than it is to beat the Russians to the moon . . . [and] less emphasis [should be put] on Civil Rights and more Civil Disobedience” (qtd. in Janssen 722). 64

threat of sharia law, terrorism, etc.). It hides the social connection between racial and social difference:

“It simplistically insists that race is only a matter of superficial difference, an

idiosyncratic tic like blood type that has no bearing on the dimension of

individual lives or group situation. . . . Colorblindness shifts the harm of racism

from degradation, exclusion, and exploitation, to being treated differently on the

basis of a socially irrelevant characteristics—no matter how benign the motive”

(emphasis added) (Lopez 90-91).

Furthermore, it propagates the modern false notion of white racialized victimization (102-

103). Reagan introduced the notion of colorblindness to California politics with his dog whistle complaints, minimization of minorities’ oppression, and his promotion of the white victim notion. Furthermore, his 1966 gubernatorial election campaign laid the groundwork for Nixon and the “law and order” movement’s new political approach, the southern strategy (Reeves 299).

As mentioned in previous sections, Reagan was notorious for his use of racially coded language, dog whistle politics. Reagan’s mastery of dog whistle demagoguery included his rationalization of “states’ rights,” his defense of his opposition to the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, his calls for “individual responsibility” to justify tougher criminal penalties, and his use of denigrating hyperbolic stereotypes to gain support for welfare reform. In weekly press conferences, Reagan offered unscripted opinions on these various topics (Meese 37). This immediate access to the public granted Reagan considerable power to shape the narrative with his use of dog whistle politics. His 1966

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and 1970 California gubernatorial electoral victories, legislative achievements, and influential imprint on political successors are additional clear indicators of Reagan’s success of dog whistle politics.100

Dog whistles politics objectifies selected individuals; it requires the minimization of said individuals’ personal experiences. Reagan’s contribution to the mass incarceration phenomenon entailed his rejection of minorities and poor’s existential conditions. Reagan completely failed to appreciate the significance of social injustice and the duty of the oppressed to demand one’s “inalienable rights” when he framed civil disturbances as

“terror . . . in our streets and parks, and school yards,” (qtd. in Garner 299) and advocated for “law and order.” Reagan’s misunderstanding is further revealed in this statement:

“Granted, we have not erased prejudice from every heart—or will it–be erased by militant behavior or parading pickets—but we opened doors that had been locked and barred for a hundred years” (emphasis added) (Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” 90).

The limited freedoms blacks and other minorities enjoyed were fought for by tooth and nail. The door was not willingly opened by white Americans. They were blasted opened by the courageous men and women who fought throughout the numerous generations of Civil Rights activists. As Fredrick Douglass perfectly described this reality of the struggle against power inequality: “[P]ower concedes nothing without demand; it never has and it never will” (Foner).

Reagan advocated racially ignorant sentiments from the 1960s on with millions of white Americans adopting his beliefs. As his rhetoric was encoded into mainstream

100 Reagan utilized dog whistle politics during his presidency with his calls to end affirmative action and forced busing (Meese 314). 66

vernacular, policy makers discovered that it was easier to implement policies that adversely affected minorities. All the while, white Californians found comfort in their justified dog whistle complaints: “But we are not going to perpetuate poverty by substituting a permanent dole for a paycheck. There is no humanity or charity in destroying self-reliance, dignity, and self-respect . . . the very substance of moral fiber”

(Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” 64).

Dog whistle complaints and the minimization of the oppression of minorities are easily reinforced when one personally feels victimized. Reagan’s language blamed minorities for their plight (e.g., “individual responsibility”) and introduced the concept of white victimization. Comments such as “Californians should be able to walk on our street safely day or night. The law abiding are entitled to at least as much protection as the law breaker,” (64) inspired fear and hostility. An American Institute of Public Opinion poll asked the question, “Do you feel at risk walking a mile from home?” (Harty 33). In 1965, seventeen-percent of male responders and forty-three-percent of female respondents answered, “Yes” (33). In 1972, those percentages rose to twenty and fifty-eight-percent

(33). Furthermore, Mauer cited a 1969 poll that reported that eighty-one-percent of respondents blamed “Negroes who started riots” and “communists” for the breakdown of

“law and order” (Mauer, Race to Incarceration 52). This jump can be attributed to a range of factors, including the use of dog whistle politics.

Another subject that inspired feelings of white victimization is welfare. Reagan successfully characterized welfare in terms of the workforce, thereby exploiting “the dominant American ideology of old Anglo-Saxon ideas about the poor and poverty”

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(Aaronson). He espoused the belief that the “average” taxpayer was being defrauded.

Through the use of phrases like “waste, fraud and abuse,” “welfare cheats,” and

“freeloaders,” he emphasized that larger portion of taxes were being siphoned by undeserving and lazy people “who’ll accept a lower standard of living in order to get by without working” (Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” 174). Reagan invited white

Californians into the feelings of victimization by entertaining the pretense of welfare abuse.

Reagan’s rhetoric transformed into measurable actions. He praised the CWRA of

1971 as a momentous achievement, which reduced welfare caseloads and increased the benefits for the “truly needy” (Canon 359-360).101 However, Reagan’s underlying approach was geared towards policing the poor by investing more in enforcement

(Gustafson 677). His colorblind rhetoric and legislation targeted the poor and minority as the source of fraud rather than the welfare bureaucracy (655). As Reagan scapegoated these populations, he initiated the criminalization process of welfare. 102 The “get-tough- on-welfare” reforms service as a paragon of how a colorblind policy greatly affects incarceration rates.103 Instead of potential or existing welfare recipients being able to gain proper assistance, their problems festered until they required law enforcement intervention (673). Reagan’s influence on welfare reform is strongly correlated to the

101 Aaronson claimed that by the early 1970s, the rate of welfare nonparticipation for eligible families “had largely come to end—that is, most California families entitled to benefits were applying for and receiving them.” 102 The criminalization process of poverty includes three factors: 1) the stigmatization, surveillance, and regulation of the poor, 2) the assumption of the poor’s latent criminality, and 3) the intersection of the welfare system and Criminal Justice System (Gustafson 647). 103 Operation Talon targeted welfare recipients who possessed outstanding warrants. Law enforcement officials targeted food stamp offices and arrested these individuals when they picked their benefits (Gustafson 669-670). Between 1997 and 2006, over 10,000 individuals were arrested (671). 68

mass incarceration phenomenon because of his promotion of the criminalization process of poverty.

Biased Discretion and Judicial Relief Limitations

In general, bias refers to an inclination or preference, especially one that interferes with impartial judgment. There are two types of bias: explicit bias, a conscious prejudice, and implicit bias, an unconscious prejudice (Alexander 107). When examining the CJS it is important to focus on implicit bias, because it fuels the illusion of colorblindness. It functions under a person’s awareness, which has been shaped by their interpretations of past experiences. With unquestioned racial generalizations, a person tends to make decisions, which on the surface seem fair but in reality are prejudicial and unjust.

Philosopher Fredrick Nietzsche attested to this mental phenomenon when he wrote “there is no immaculate perception” (qtd. in Alexander 106). “The entire criminal justice process is predicated on the use of discretion” (Mauer, Race to Incarceration 152); hence, the dangerousness of implicit bias is most prevalent at CJS’s point of entry as CJS officials’ discretion is highly active. It becomes the most important factor in the development of legal situations (Alexander 123).

Dog whistle politics is racially prejudicial at its core. Reagan is guilty of perpetuating such negative stereotypes by using inflammatory rhetoric based on prejudicial generalizations. His comments like “welfare queens,” “slum dweller,”

“strapping young buck,” “lawbreakers,” and “street mobs” cast black Americans as subhuman, social outcasts, outlaws, and threats to American society. His sentiments were received and accepted by the “average” citizen. Combine this with the fact that the

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majority of the CJS positions are occupied by white Americans, it is easy to conclude that implicit bias is pervasive throughout the CJS.

Minorities are at a disadvantage, because implicit bias shapes CJS officials’ judgment at all levels. Minorities are detained, charged, arrested, and convicted at higher rates than white Americans (Mauer, Race to Incarceration 144-146). Once a person enters the claws of the CJS it is virtually impossible to escape. This difficulty is one of the reasons the mass incarceration phenomenon ensues. Reagan reinforced the negative image of minorities, especially black Americans, as he carried the banner of the “law and order” movement.

The US Constitution is supposed to protect against unjust prosecutions; unfortunately, a series of court rulings limited judicial relief. The consequences of these rulings mean a person cannot correct prejudicial prosecution or conviction. This strengthened CJS officials’ discretionary power, especially for the police and district attorneys (Simon 33-44).104 The police officers decide who to detain and arrest while the district attorney selects who to prosecute and the criminal charges to file (Alexander

123). The inability to check the discretionary power of theses officials significantly affects minorities, who are the likely targets of racial bias (139).

Reagan severely disagreed with the liberal court rulings of the 1960s, which he perceived as “criminal friendly” (e.g., Mapp v. Ohio [1961], Gideon v. Wainwright

[1963], Escobedo v. Illinois [1964], and Miranda v. Arizona [1966]) (Houghton 43;

Cannon 223). He felt that they stripped law enforcement of vital enforcement tools.

104 The discretionary power of district attorney “can effectively eliminate a person from the community for a generation” (Simon 40). 70

During his governorship he appointed over six hundred judges, all of whom who he felt held a judicial restraint perspective (Ellingwood 18; Meese 317).105 These judges influenced thousands of criminal cases over the next several decades.106 Reagan’s effect on the judicial system greatly assisted the movement of judicial relief limitation (Simon

116).

California’s Surpluses

Gilmore posited that policy makers identified an expansion of the state’s prison system as a “geographical solution” to the state’s monetary, political, economic, and structural crises. She further claimed that the crises originated from the state’s four surpluses: finance, land, population, and state capacity. This section examines how

Reagan contributed either to the formation or exploitation of these four surpluses.

Finance Capital Surplus

Essential to financial public policy is the establishment and maintenance of

“legitimate areas for the accumulation of public debit” (Gilmore 60). Beginning in the

1960s, Reagan and other conservative policy makers reshaped the public’s view of governmental responsibilities and roles. Reagan convinced Californians that the expansion of government was detrimental, that taxes were too high, and that private entities can provide cheaper and more efficient services (Reagan, “A Time for Choosing”

105 Eighty-percent of Regan’s judicial appointees were Republicans (Cannon 222). 106 Reagan appointed hundreds of federal judges utilizing a similar selection process during the massive 1980s’ prison buildup (Meese 317).

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43, 141): “Government does not really solve problems; it subsidizes them” (Reagan, “A

Time for Choosing” 113).107

As a tide of public reluctance developed, California’s typical investment of infrastructure—highways, streets, and government buildings—shifted to other capital investments (Gilmore 62). To Reagan that meant redirecting state capital from social welfare programs towards law enforcement improvements and tax rebates.108 By 1974, he had created an atmosphere of public suspicion towards government. For instance,

Reagan’s persistent push for the tax reduction inspired a “taxpayer revolt,” which ultimately resulted in the passage of Proposition 13: Jarvis-Gann Constitutional

Amendment in 1978 (62). Furthermore, subsequent governors hesitated to solicit public debt and failed to formulate state development general plans due to voters’ overwhelming reluctance and suspicion (62).

An initial unintended consequence was the reduction of private investment opportunities; however, just as the federal government propelled California’s economic growth during World War II, the Omnibus Crime Bill and Law Enforcement Assistance

Agency (LEAA) funneled loads of money into state and local governments during the late 1960s and early 1970s.109 This influx of capital created a golden opportunity for

107 In his “Why the Conservative Movement is Growing” speech, Reagan lambasted Democrats and government expansion: “[T]he inflation we are struggling with today was a deliberate, planned policy under the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society. . . . We all know that inflation is the direct result of government spending; we all know it’s cruel tax falling on those least able to pay” (Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” 141). 108 Speaking at a Southern GOP convention in 1973, Reagan touted his achievement of a $1 billion homeowners’ tax rebate (Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” 145). “By the end of his governorship he had returned $5.7 billion to taxpayers” (Dallek 51). 109 President Reagan took a similar approach while in the White House and invested heavily in law enforcement and national defense. 72

private investors (63). With the tone set against crime, policy makers and the private sector selected the prison expansion as the best investment.

Land Surplus

“As capital migrates spatially or sectorally in order to enhance its capacity to expand, whatever capital abandons . . . is devalued and its price consequently goes down”

(64). This sort of capital movement accurately indicates the development of sociopolitical symptoms conducive for California’s prison expansion. Beginning in the 1970s, sociopolitical symptoms began to appear as capital moved out of urban and rural areas.

Urban areas experienced an increase of population, crime, and unemployment, and a decline in well-waged wages whereas rural areas suffered losses of agricultural resources and jobs due to multiple droughts (1973, 1976, and 1977), torrential flooding, (1978-79,

1979-80, and 1982-83), and mechanical innovations (64, 141).

The deterioration of urban and rural areas was instrumental to California’s increase of land surplus. California’s farmland was taken out of production as droughts decimated water reserves and farm technology increased productivity. This led some farmers to seek loans for water and other agricultural technological upgrades while others simply left the agricultural markets all together (67).110 Over time, financial institutions acquired cheap property as many farmers defaulted on their loans and suffered foreclosure. Suburbanization eventually transformed many rural areas by the 1980s.111

110 Since large-scale farms possessed the ability to purchase irrigations systems and labor-saving machinery, they were able to control the market’s pricing; consequently, these famers became major players in the political arenas (Gilmore 132-133). 111 “The removal of irrigated lands from production far exceeds the rate of land use for suburbanization” (Gilmore 68).

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Reagan’s contribution to California’s land surplus cannot be clearly established; yet, a few loose correlations may be drawn. The use of dog whistle politics, specifically

Reagan’s advocacy of the “freedom to exclude” and the fear of crime paradigm marked urban areas as unattractive; consequently, white residents refused to move into these areas (Simon 150).112 Moreover, rather than being denied their “right to exclude” and ability to discriminately sell or rent, white property owners migrated to suburban or rural areas. This migratory process removed capital, jobs, and specialized skills from urban neighborhoods with the consequence of initiating a surge in unemployment and crime rates and a decline in well-paying jobs and property values. Reagan’s welfare reform also exacerbated urban areas’ prospects. By tightening the criteria and shortening the length of welfare eligibility, Reagan dampened the chances of upward social mobility of those individuals on the threshold of poverty.113

Reagan’s record on California’s water condition varies. He stopped multiple projects that would have devastated the ecology of California; yet, some of those projects may have lessened the blow of future natural disasters, like droughts and flooding.

Reagan prevented dams from being built on the Feather River in 1967, the Eel River in

1969, and the Klamath River in 1972 (Cannon 307-15). The dam proponents attempted to sell the projects as drought insurance (i.e., extra drinking and irrigation water storage) and prospective hydroelectric production (Cannon 308). However, they did not forecast the negative consequences of torrential flooding, like those caused by multiple El Niño

112 This phenomenon is also known as “White Flight” (Janssen 706). 113 The Reagan Administration witnessed a twenty-five-percent increase in children’s poverty levels (Gilmore 52). 74

winters (Gilmores 142). Reagan’s decision to purchase two underwater Pacific Ocean preserves may have softened the effects of future water shortages. These two preserves provided California with much needed additional groundwater supply.

Reagan oversaw a deterioration of urban and rural areas in California. Multiple economic recessions caused an abandonment of capital investment, which resulted in the loss of industrial well-waged jobs. He destroyed the safety net of the New Deal political order by reshuffling of state funds from social welfare programs to law enforcement.

Although Reagan managed to protect California’s northern rivers and surrounding ecology, he may have denied California drought protection. The lack of water towards the end of the 1970s severely affected small-scale famers. They could not keep up with large-scale firms who possessed the capital to upgrade their systems and machinery

(132). The agricultural sector lost much of its irrigable land as El Niño ravaged California in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Both of these developments created the conditions conducive for a substantial prison buildup.

Population Surplus

The United States has always been an attractive solution to the optimistic migrant.

California’s booming economy, largely due to the federal government’s heavy defense spending, became an ideal location for Southern and Midwestern settlers in the early

1900s. Foreign migrants, mainly Mexicans, migrated under the bracero programs as

“guest workers” between 1942 and 1965 (136). As a result, California’s population doubled between 1950 and 1970 (37-38). However, Gilmore’s population surplus refers to an excessive level of workers, the “relative surplus population” (71).

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The decline of the New Deal political order removed huge amounts of capital from California. Eventually urban areas experienced severe resource shortages (e.g., well-wage jobs, housing, etc.), which disproportionally affected minorities (70 and 75).

Gilmore posited that, “capital must be able to get rid of workers whose labor power is no longer desirable” and that California’s prison buildup solved the problem by eradicating such “undesirables” through incapacitation (70-71) 114

Reagan’s view of government roles played a major part in California’s economic restructuring. As an ardent supporter of laissez-faire capitalism, Reagan attempted to reduce governmental expenditures and regulations. In addition, he shifted resources from social welfare programs to law enforcement, thereby replacing society’s safety net with a

“criminal dragnet” (Gilmore 77). His administration’s demonization of civil rights protestors sanitized prejudicial scapegoating while his penal shift from rehabilitation to punishment intensified demands for tougher criminal penalties. His objection to “criminal friendly” court rulings and subsequent conservative reshaping of California’s judicial system further fertilized the political landscape for a prison buildup, which Governor

Jerry Brown initiated during his second term as governor (92).

The high employment of the 1970s highlighted the excessive labor force, domestic and foreign. Along with the promotion of the fear of crime paradigm, these economic difficulties propelled California voters to approve a series of deportation laws and harsher criminal sentencing laws (77). A prison buildup offered policy makers a wonderful opportunity to reduce the labor force and to bring “order” to California’s

114 Sixty-percent of California’s state prisoners are from the five counties of the Los Angeles region (Gilmore 75). 76

neighborhoods while cashing in the political dividends from white Californians. With the implementation of such measures, Reagan instigated a political landscape reconfiguration during his governorship.

State Capacity

Gilmore posited that state capacity must be augmented through ideological, institutional, and financial means in order to promote capital’s profitability and minimize the negative consequences of inequality (78). Due to the 1960s and 1970s cultural revolutions, the nation, in particular California, experienced tremendous pressure to respond. Conservative proponents chose to emphasize the deficiencies of the New Deal political order. In the following years, a major transformation from a welfare-warfare state to a workfare-warfare state ensured. The workforce-warfare state paradigm nurtured conditions for the mass incarceration phenomenon. The Reagan Administration initiated and promoted many of its policies.

The conservative ideological shift rode Reagan’s inflammatory rhetoric. Reagan denounced communism on the General Electric circuit in the 1960s. As the Cold War ended, Reagan and other political opportunist switched their attacks from communists

(“commies”) to civil rights protesters (“lawbreakers”), which resulted in demands for

“the containment of crime” (85). His anti-New Deal stance also called for the de- legitimization of wealth redistribution (79).

Reagan institutionally rearranged state capacity by elevating the fear of crime paradigm to the most pressuring issue facing society through his advocacy for “law and order.” As he stirred public support away from social welfare programs towards law 77

enforcement, the California Peace Officers’ Association (CPOA) emerged as a new political power bloc in California. These factors legitimized the state ability to redefine crime and punish lawbreakers without limits and with impunity.

One of the basic fiscal means of state capacity is a government’s tax structure.

The composition of a tax code reveals the state’s configuration of power (Gilmore 80).

Prior to his inauguration, Reagan rallied against the government’s excessive demands for taxpayers’ money. He continued to lead protests over high taxes once in office.115 His effective pursuits led to several tax rebates, but, most importantly, he inspired a wave of voters’ protest, which lasted well into the 1980s (81). Furthermore, his calls for

“individual responsibility” and “states’ rights” opened the door for his future devolution of federal funding while serving as the president of the United States (83).

Gilmore’s theory of the mass incarceration phenomenon largely concentrated on the 1980s and 1990s. She failed to fully realize that Reagan shaped the political atmosphere while in the Governor’s Mansion. His core message embodied the rationale for the expansion of state capacity. He advocated fiscal restructuring with calls for tax and welfare reform. Institutionally, he assisted the nascent ascension of a new political power bloc, CPOA, and funneled loads of state funding into the coffers of law enforcement. Most of all, he directed a new wave of conservatism that infected the nation and his gubernatorial successors who were compelled to be “tougher” on crime than him.

115 In 1968, Reagan framed his Tax Reform Task Force’s advice of shifting the tax burden to lower class individuals as “an opportunity to pay their fair share” (qtd. in Putnam 34-35). This policy never emerged from Unruh’s Revenue and Taxation Committee. 78

Summary

Four different analytical frameworks of the mass incarceration phenomenon—the conventional theory, Alexander’s New Jim Crow, Simon’s Governing through Crime, and Gilmore’s Golden Gulag—were introduced in this thesis. This chapter examines

Reagan’s contributions to the development and perpetuation of these analytical frameworks. Sufficient correlations can be established between Reagan and the mass incarceration phenomenon regardless of which analytical framework is utilized.

As Reagan navigated the political arena, he employed racially coded rhetoric, dog whistle politics, to communicate his message of “rugged individualism,” “states’ rights,” and “tax/welfare reform.” He stood at the forefront of the “law and order” movement and advocated for a penal shift of punishment and incapacitation. He spoke to “average” citizens who felt socially, politically, and economically alienated and abandoned by pursuing these themes. Fearful of the cultural revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s, they rewarded Reagan and other conservative politicians with their votes. California accumulated surpluses in four fields—finances, land, population, and state capacity— during the economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s. Policy makers began to identify an expansion of California’s prison system as a solution to these surplus crises. This policy shift would not have been possible without the inflammatory words and conservative policies of Reagan’s gubernatorial administration. 79

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Thesis’s Findings

Reagan’s stance on and approach to crime and penology is encapsulated in the following quote as he asserted the importance of “common sense and realism in the war on crime”:

Let us have an end to the idea that society is responsible for each and every

wrongdoer. We must return to a belief in every individual being responsible for

his conduct and his misdeeds with punishment immediate and certain. With all

our science and sophistication, our culture and our pride in intellectual

accomplishment, the jungle still is waiting to take over. The man with the badge

holds it back. (qtd. in Cannon 216)

The author posits that Ronald Reagan significantly contributed to the development of the mass incarceration phenomenon. In order to prove this hypothesis, the author posed the following questions:

Did Ronald Reagan’s conservative political philosophy shape his penal policies?

What are the pillars of the mass incarceration phenomenon?

What policy changes did Reagan implement during his two gubernatorial terms that ultimately contributed to the mass incarceration phenomenon in California?

The answers to these questions were uncovered through an examination of

Reagan’s personal style of governance, personnel selections, and relationship with 80

legislative and judicial branches; four different analytical frameworks of the mass incarceration phenomenon; and Reagan’s contributions to the development of the mass incarceration phenomenon.

The author first described Reagan’s personal influence on California’s three branches in Chapter 2. In the early 1900s, California’s state government underwent an enormous transformation. It had turned into a huge bureaucracy by the time Reagan entered the Governor’s Mansion. As a key part of the resurging conservative movement,

Reagan campaigned on the premise of a limited government; consequently, he initiated an overhaul of the perceived bloated and dysfunctional state government. He encouraged a corporate-styled government where his subordinates were empowered to act with liberty and authority. His regularly scheduled cabinet meetings granted his personal staff and administrators the opportunity to clarify his instructions and to present opposing views on important issues. He also held unscripted weekly press conferences to discuss current events and controversial issues with the media and public. He rarely admonished or dismissed personnel as long as his vision for California was being implemented. Most importantly, Reagan remained the chief in control throughout his governorship.

Reagan’s relationship with the legislative and judicial branches developed over the course of his administration. Being a political novice, Reagan possessed very few legislative friends upon his inauguration. He also met resistance from his own party because of his far-wing conservatism. Reagan eventually won admiration from the legislature due to his charisma and fairness. Although his legislative agenda did not fully materialize during his administration, Reagan did reshape public perception of the threat 81

of crime, consummated a new powerful relationship with the law enforcement lobby, and spearheaded a massive security buildup with LEAA funding. Furthermore, his opposition to the progressive trends of the 1960s pitted him against the state and federal judiciaries.

Yet, empowered with the ability to appoint judges, Reagan reconfigured California’s judicial branches, thereby heavily impacting penal policy for decades to come.

Upon identifying Reagan’s individual style of governance and governmental relationship, the author further answered the three key questions by examining four different analytical frameworks, in Chapters 3 and 4, that described the development of the mass incarceration phenomenon: the conventional theory, Alexander’s Jim Crow,

Simon’s Governing through Crime, and Gilmore’s Golden Gulag. These frameworks share many similarities such as the dissolution of the New Deal political order, a conservative resurgence under the guise of “law and order,” a penal shift from rehabilitation to punishment and incapacitation as the preferred correctional modality, the selection of the southern strategy and dog whistle politics as political tactics, and the strengthening of law enforcement to the detriment of social welfare programs.

The four analytical frameworks’ differences are few, but present importantly unique nuances. By claiming that the mass incarceration phenomenon is a “disguised system of racial social control,” Alexander emphasized the importance of reviewing the notion of colorblindness and its progeny’s, implicit bias, impact on American democracy.

Simon’s focus on the paradigmatic shift of governmental foci is useful in considering the

American populace’s reaction to the perceived threat of crime and its willingness to impose harsher punishment. Gilmore’s assertion that policy makers choose to expand

82

California’s prison system to remedy deficiencies in the urban and rural areas presents an alarming concern. Policy makers deliberately selected the incapacitation of a particular population over more socially just and responsible solutions.

When exploring the question—Did Ronald Reagan’s conservative political philosophy shape his penal policies?—the author found that Reagan’s conservative perspective played a large role in his vision for California and its CJS, and that he contributed to the development of key elements of the mass incarceration phenomenon.

Two core values that played a huge role in Reagan’s governorship were limited government and “individual responsibility.” His belief in limited government compelled

Reagan to pursue policies that reduced taxes, welfare expenditures, and business regulations, but when it came law enforcement his value of limited government did not apply. Thus, he redirected millions of dollars from social welfare programs to law enforcement’s coffers.

His belief in “individual responsibility” led Reagan to a couple of conclusions. He first concluded that an individual possesses sufficient means to achieve the American

Dream without governmental assistance. This proposition convinced him that private initiative, not government, is the solution to societal problems. His second conclusion posited that crime is a direct result of an individual’s irresponsibility; thus, the best approach to crime is deterrence and incapacitation (i.e., mandatory and harsher punishments). Because he disagreed with civil disobedience and deemed protesters as

“lawbreakers,” he sought tougher measures against direct action tactics. Reagan’s enthusiasm for “law and order” was a manifestation of these two core values. 83

As Reagan grew up in the political limelight, he came to appreciate his ability to talk to the “average” citizen. Reagan captured the attention of the white middle-class workers with his Hollywood charisma and smooth speech delivery. Eventually known as the southern strategy, much of Reagan’s rhetoric, dog whistle politics, spoke to the instinctual fears of white Californians. He demonized civil right protesters and portended the “jungle’s” release. He advocated for discriminatory rights such as the “right to exclude.” He created an “Us versus Them” mentality between white and minority

Californians by connecting the decline of homeowners’ property values, civil rights protests, and welfare to the increase of crime. His solution to these problems was a return of “order”: the tightening of criminal penalties and the adoption of welfare and tax reform.

California experienced a six hundred-percent increase in its prison population since the 1970s (Harty 1). Reagan’s governorship was the catalyst of that trend as his administration signified a new era in Californian penology. Although he released approximately 10,000 inmates in 1971, Reagan implemented several policy changes that greatly affected California’s prison population. His multiple task forces called for the uniform and mandatory sentencing, stiffer punishments for violent, drug sale, and gun- related crimes, victims’ right bills, technological improvements and record keeping upgrades, and juvenile petition filings. In addition, Reagan’s support for the removal of the probation subsidy program reversed the successful management of the prison population in the 1960s. Parole rates declined from approximately forty-percent to twenty-percent between 1967 and 1974 (Gartner 304). His calls for tougher criminal

84

penalties affected judicial discretion as prison admissions increased steadily after 1973.

Furthermore, his numerous judicial appointments produced a conservative umbrella over

California court system that limited judicial relief for prejudicial bias and constitutional violations while empowering law enforcement with a series of favorable court rulings.

Many scholars posits that Reagan’s gubernatorial administration was “generally progressive” (Cannon 222) and that the era of mass incarceration began after the passage of the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1977. This author found sufficient evidence that Reagan laid the foundation of the mass incarceration phenomenon in

California.

Mass incarceration is largely predicated on the evolution of “dog whistle politics and the use of crime as a proxy language for race” (emphasis added) (Lopez 51). It is initiated and perpetuated through the politicization of crime, changes in sentencing philosophy, the media’s sensationalism of crime, and racially targeted crime policy

(Mauer, “Why are Tough on Crime Policies so Popular?” 6). This author posits that

Reagan’s utilized these four elements to advance his political career and agenda at the expense of justice, liberty, and life.

Although Reagan oversaw a thirty-percent reduction in imprisonment between

1968 and 1972, Reagan’s other policies prompted a steady increase from 1972 on. By the end of Reagan’s second gubernatorial term, the “law and order” and “tough on crime” movements were firmly established in California politics. To the detriment of society, many of these pro-carceral polities are still in place. 85

Recommendations for Future Research

Conventional scholarship posits that the mass phenomenon incarceration in

California began in the late 1970s, specifically with Edmond “Jerry” Brown Junior’s governorship, and then accelerated in the 1980s with the massive prison buildup under

Governor George Deukmejian’s administration. However, it became apparent to this author that many elements of the mass incarceration phenomenon were initiated during

Reagan’s gubernatorial administration.

Many sources were not available for review due to the limitation of this author’s access to research resources; nevertheless, a correlation can be established between

Reagan and the development of the mass incarceration phenomenon. Therefore, this author highly suggests that further research be conducted to fully clarify Reagan’s contributions to the mass incarceration phenomenon. Recommended sources for future research are as follows:

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86

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