Notes

Introduction 1. Oscar Wilde, “A Chinese Sage,” in Reviews, ed. by Robert Ross (London: Metheuen and Co., 1908), 533–534. 2. Wang Fuzhi , Chuanshan Quanshu , Volume 10 (Changsha: Yuelu Shushe, 1998), 613–614. 3. It should be noted that I am not taking what Michael Puett has called a “contrastive approach” to early Chinese thought where I understand texts to be representative of entire cultures or ways of life. Rather, my methodological aim is to complicate the categories of compari- son by illuminating the contexts and histories of interpretation in the background of much comparative work, revealing how certain “uni- versal yardsticks” like “morality” connote meanings which are more parochial. Thus, while the Zhuangzi may strike an unfamiliar chord in regard to received wisdom in the history of Western philosophy, the differences are not absolute and can be interpreted (not transcended) through thick description and historical sensitivity. See Michael Puett, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 4. Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 60. 5. Sima Qian , Shi ji gu shi xuan yi (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 1959), 2144. 6. See A. C. Graham, “How Much of Chuang-tzu Did Chuang-tzu Write?” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Litera- ture (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990), 283–321. See also Liu Xiaogan, Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1994); and Guan Feng , “Zhuangzi waizapian chutan” ,inZhuangzi neip- ian yijie he pipan (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960), 319–358. 7. See Fukunaga Mitsuji , S¯oshi (Tokyo: Asahi, 1978). 8. Holmes Welch, Taoism: The Parting of the Way (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 88. 9. Ibid. 10. In other words, although texts like the Zhuangzi and Huainanzi repeatedly make use of terms like dao and daoshu (“techniques 140 Notes

of the Way”), none employ Tan’s phrase daojia (“school of the Way”) nor speak of a self-identifying school of thought, even in the limited sense that Confucians and Mohists do during the fourth and third centuries. See Kidder Smith, “Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism, ‘Legalism’, et cetera,” The Journal of Asian Studies 62.1 (February 2003), 129–156. 11. Shiji, 3289. Sima Tan’s appellation of “Daoism” militates against the received view, initially promulgated during the Wei and Jin dynasties by Neo-Daoists and held by more recent scholars (e.g., Fung Yulan, Herlee Creel), that a foundational “Lao-Zhuang” lineage of Daoist philosophy, exclusively concerned with mystical and cosmological interests, existed prior to Sima Tan’s classification. 12. Jens Østergard Peterson, “Which Books Did the First Emperor of Ch’in Burn? On the Meaning of Pai Chia in Early Chinese Sources,” Monumenta Serica 43 (1995), 34. 13. Mark Edward Lewis, Writing and Authority in Early China (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999); and Michael Puett, To Become a God. See also Nathan Sivin, “On the Word ‘Taoist’ as a Source of Perplexity, With Special Reference to the Relations of Science and Religion in Traditional China,” History of Religions 17 (1978), 303–330. 14. Puett, To Become a God, 25. 15. Mark Csikszentmihalyi, “Traditional Taxonomies and Revealed Texts in the Han,” in Daoist Identity: History, Lineage, and Ritual, ed. by Livia Kohn and Harold D. Roth (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 83–84. 16. On the notion of “inventing traditions,” see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). One also calls to mind Foucault’s notion of a “discursive formation.” See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 1994). 17. See Harold Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 173–203. 18. Andrew Meyer, “The Altars of the Soil and Grain are Closer than Kin : The Qi Model of Intellectual Participa- tion and the Jixia Patronage Community,” Early China 33–34 (2010–2011), 38. 19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Third Edition, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), §66. 20. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Third Edi- tion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 222. 21. A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1989), 31. Notes 141

Chapter 1 1. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), xi. 2. Ibid. 3. See James Legge, Confucianism in Relation to Christianity (London: Trubner, 1877), 9. 4. Bryan Van Norden has suggested recently that we do not need exact lexical correspondences to make philosophical comparisons between traditions so long as we can “look at the particulars of the two lan- guages being compared in order to determine whether the presence or absence of a particular term is significant.” While I would agree with Van Norden that responsible comparisons can be made even when there are no lexical counterparts, the question that I am rais- ing concerns those instances where we seem to have surface lexical compatibility but the depth grammar of the terms reveals something thicker and more culturally loaded. See Bryan Van Norden, Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 22. 5. N. J. Girardot, “ ‘Finding the Way’: James Legge and the Victorian Invention of Taoism,” Religion 29.2 (April 1999), 118. 6. Anna Seidel, “Taoism: The Unofficial High Religion of China,” Taoist Resources 7.2 (1997), 40. 7. This should not be construed as a broadside against those working in the fields of Daoist studies, religious studies, or comparative religious ethics in regard to their interpretations of Daoism. My aim is merely to highlight why Daoism receives less attention than even other schools of early Chinese thought (e.g., Confucianism, Legalism) in regard to its moral philosophy and how we can bring Daoism into conversation as a specifically moral tradition, not only with other schools of thought in ancient China but also potentially with moral traditions in the West. 8. Herlee G. Creel, What Is Taoism? And Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 3, 4, 43. 9. Norman Girardot suggests that the contemporary Western under- standing of Daoism owes many of its guiding assumptions to the late Victorian invention of Daoism by sinologists such as James Legge (1815–1897) who tended to locate a “pure” form of Daoism in cer- tain “sacred texts” (e.g., the Laozi) in opposition to ritualistic or “magical” elements of the later tradition. The Leggian picture of Daoism survives in Creel’s work, on my reading, as two dichotomies which structure his entire discussion of Daoism—namely, the dis- tinction between “philosophical” and “religious” Daoism and the contrast between the “contemplative” and the “purposive” aspects of Daoism. It is my contention that both dualisms, along with 142 Notes

uncritical assumptions about the nature of morality, contribute to Creel’s blindness to the moral dimensions of Daoism. 10. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 174–175. 11. See Elizabeth Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33.124 (January 1958), 1. 12. I will from now on be using “morality” to refer to the special sys- tem of obligations and the “ethical” to denote the larger realm of the moral life. 13. For a helpful guide on the controverted nature of “morality” in comparative contexts, see David Wong, “Comparative Philosophy: Chinese and Western,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition); Edward N. Zalta, ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2011/entries/comparphil-chiwes/. As Wong notes, crit- ics of “morality” like Bernard Williams have tended, perhaps unfairly, to confine “morality” to Kant’s moral philosophy. Although Kant did exert a tremendous amount of influence on contemporary moral phi- losophy, I think there are other dimensions of our received notion of “morality” (listed above) that go beyond Kant. 14. Charles Taylor, “Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy,” in Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness, ed. by Maria Antonaccio and William Schweiker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 3. 15. Alan Gewirth, “Common Morality and the Community of Rights,” in Prospects for a Common Morality, ed. by Gene Outka and John P. Reeder, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 30. It should be noted that there are a small number of ethicists working within the tradition of “morality” who recognize that it does not cover the entire playing field of ethics. To take one recent example, T. M. Scanlon suggests that the narrow domain of morality having to do with our duties to other people (e.g., requirements to aid, prohi- bitions against harming and killing), “what we owe to each other,” comprises a “distinct subject matter, unified by a single manner of reasoning and by a common motivational basis. By contrast, it is not clear that morality in the broader sense is a single subject that has a similar unity.” See his What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 7. 16. Arthur Danto, Mysticism and Morality: Oriental Thought and Moral Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 114. 17. Danto explicitly states that he is referring to morality “as such, not this or that moral system.” See Ibid., 119. 18. Ibid., 115. 19. Ibid., 118. 20. Hans-Georg Moeller, The Moral Fool: A Case for Amorality (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). Notes 143

21. On amoralism, see Ronald D. Milo, “Amorality,” Mind 92.368 (1983), 482: “To say that a person is amoral is to say that moral considerations play no role in his practical deliberations and that moral beliefs form no part of his motivation for acting as he does. This may be so either because (1) he simply has no moral convic- tions, or because (2) although he has moral convictions these play no motivational role for him.” 22. Moeller, The Moral Fool, 4–5. 23. Ibid., 30. 24. Ibid., 35. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., 187. 27. Ibid., 43–44. 28. Ibid., 8–9. 29. Moeller’s myopic view of ethics is of a piece with his explicit endorse- ment of the fact/value distinction (i.e., that there is some value free realm of “facts”) that has long since been debunked by Quine, Sellars, and Putnam. Moreover, this kind of dualism contradicts the episte- mological views of Zhuangzi who believes that all views impose a “certain interpretation on reality,” that “knowledge of facts presup- poses knowledge of values.” On the fact/value dichotomy, see Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). See also W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). 30. All references to the Zhuangzi, unless otherwise noted, will be from D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching, eds., A Concordance to the Zhuangzi , ICS series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 2000). Citations will be in the form chapter/page/line. 31. P. J. Ivanhoe, “Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?” in Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangnzi, ed. by P. J. Ivanhoe and Paul Kjellberg (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 201. 32. Chad Hansen, “A Tao of Tao in the Chuang-tzu,” in Experimen- tal Essays on Chuang-tzu, ed. by Victor Mair (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 36; A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 210. 33. Chad Hansen, “Classical Chinese Ethics,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. by Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 76. 34. Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, 230. 35. Ibid., 78. 36. Hansen, “A Tao of Tao in the Chuang-tzu,” 35, 45, 47. 37. Ibid., 50. 38. Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, 229. 39. My references to the Laozi will be from the Mawangdui manuscript redactions in Robert Henricks, trans., Lao-tzu Te-tao Ching 144 Notes

(New York: Ballantine, 1989) and the received recension in D. C. Lau, trans., Tao Te Ching (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982). 40. For example, chapters 10, 14, 16, 22, 28, 32. 41. Roger Ames, The Art of Rulership (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), 39. 42. Russell Kirkland, “The Roots of Altruism in the Taoist Tradition,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 54.1 (1986), 60. See also Taoism: The Enduring Tradition (New York: Routledge, 2008), 51–52. 43. Russell Kirkland, “Taoism,” in The Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. by Lawrence Becker and Charlotte Becker (New York: Macmillan, 1995), 2466. 44. Kirkland, “The Roots of Altruism in the Taoist Tradition,” 69. 45. Kristen Renwick Monroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 6–7. See also Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 46. Kirkland, “The Roots of Altruism in the Taoist Tradition,” 70. See also “Self-Fulfillment through Selflessness: The Moral Teachings of the Daode jing,” in Varieties of Ethical Reflection: New Directions for Ethics in a Global Context, ed. by Michael Barnhart (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 21–48. 47. Eske Mollgaard, An Introduction to Daoist Thought: Action, Lan- guage, and Ethics in Zhuangzi (New York: Routledge, 2007), 114–115. 48. Ibid., 114. 49. Ibid., 116. 50. Ibid., 117. 51. See Immanuel Kant, Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals and What Is Enlightenment? trans. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1959). 52. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 16. 53. Ibid. 54. Clifford Geertz, “Found in Translation: On the Social History of the Moral Imagination,” The Georgia Review 31.4 (1977), 795.

Chapter 2 1. Clifford Geertz, “The Uses of Diversity,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VII, ed. by Sterling M. McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 262. 2. Geertz, “Found in Translation: On the Social History of the Moral Imagination,” Georgia Review 31.4 (1977), 796. 3. Anita Jacobson-Widding, “ ‘I lied, I farted, I stole ...’: Dignity and Morality in African Discourses on Personhood,” in The Ethnography Notes 145

of Moralities, ed. by Signe Howell (New York: Routledge, 1997), 48. 4. Iris Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 30 (1956), 41. 5. Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 185. 6. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Third Edition, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958), §215. 7. David Wong, Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), xii. 8. Ibid., xii–xiii. 9. Ibid., 5. 10. Ibid., 6. 11. Ibid., 236. 12. Ibid., 39–40. 13. Ibid., 119. 14. See T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 7. 15. D. C. Lau, Ho Che Wah and Chen Fong Ching, eds., A Concordance to the Mengzi , ICS Series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1995), 13.26/70/4. 16. David Wong, “Relativism,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. by Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 445. See also Moral Relativity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 17. Ibid., 446. In his more recent work, Wong has focused more on the phenomenon of “moral ambivalence,” or the recognition of severe conflicts between important values and of the possibility that reason- able people could take different paths in the face of these conflicts. He acknowledges that he has been informed, in this respect, by the Zhuangzi and its endorsement of the value of accommodation. See his Natural Moralities, esp. chs. 1 and 9. 18. David Wong, “Taoism and the Problem of Equal Respect,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 11 (1984), 173. 19. Wong, “Relativism,” 173. 20. Wong also seems to overestimate the importance of filial piety and duty to ruler in the Zhuangzi when he states in Natural Moralities, “He [Zhuangzi] appears to accept love of parents and duty to ruler as necessary elements of human existence.” In the passage in ques- tion, Zhuangzi has Confucius voice the truism that there are “two grand commandments”—one to love one’s parents and the other to obey one’s ruler; however, this is suggested in the context of “roam- ing within the guidelines” of human society and not as a plea for Confucian virtue. 21. See 12/33/15, 29/88/4, 31/94/8, and 33/97/17. 146 Notes

22. Wong’s focus on compassion and deep love may also stem from how he defines morality as an idealized set of norms abstracted from the practices and institutions of a society that serves to regulate conflicts of interest. This is where I part ways with Wong since I do not see the emphasis on the regulation of conflict or social cooperation as a fundamental conception of the moral life for Zhuangzi. 23. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1. 24. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 216. 25. I employ “significant symbols” here as Geertz does in the following passage: “Thinking consists not of ‘happenings in the head’ ...but of a traffic in what have been called ...significant symbols—words for the most part but also gestures, drawings, musical sounds, mechanical devices like clocks, or natural objects like jewels—anything, in fact, that is disengaged from its mere actuality and used to impose meaning upon experience.” I have chosen “symbols” rather than just “stories” or “narratives” or “standards” to throw a wider theoretical net onto the data. See Clifford Geertz, “The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man,” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 45. 26. Since I do not want to bias this account toward those traditions (e.g., varieties of theism, Platonism), which have a monistic struc- ture in which a single, unifying Good forms the foundation of belief, worship, and conduct, I will use “(in)comparably higher,” or just gen- erally “the Good,” to designate those sources of normativity which are most important to an individual or group, relatively speaking. Again, the sources of normativity that I am referring to here do not nec- essarily refer to transhuman realities, though, of course, they will in many traditions. For accounts that refer solely to transhuman sources of normativity in the Western tradition, see Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2002); and John P. Reeder, Jr., Source, Sanction, and Salvation: Religion and Morality in Judaic and Christian Traditions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988). 27. By “force” I mean the thoroughness with which such symbols are internalized in the personalities of the individuals and social groups who adopt it, its centrality or marginality in their lives, and by “scope” I mean the range of social contexts within which these symbols are regarded as having more or less relevance. See Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 111–112. 28. Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 260. Notes 147

29. Guo Xiang , Zhuangzi jishi , ed. by Guo Qingfan (Taipei: Muduo Press, 1983), 113. 30. See, for example, Chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi: “There is a sense and reality to the Way, but no intentional action and form. It can be transmitted but not received. It can be obtained but not seen. Being its own source and root, the Way exists prior to heaven and earth” (6/17/1–2). 31. All passages from the Neiye will be from Harold Roth’s emended translation of the Sibu Congkan edition [Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1919] in his Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-yeh) and the Foun- dations of Taoist Mysticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 32. On this phrase, see Roth, Original Tao, 190–193, 202. 33. Harold Roth, “Redaction Criticism and the Early History of Taoism,” Early China 19 (1994), 7. 34. For example, the “Inner Chapters” of the Zhuangzi speak of “sitting and forgetting” (zuo wang ) and “fasting the mind” (xin zhai ) while the Daodejing refers to “embracing the One” (bao yi ). 35. H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978), 46. 36. Much of this discussion draws on Tyler Burge, “Self and Self- Understanding” (The Dewey Lectures 2007), The Journal of Philoso- phy 108.6/7 (June/July 2011), 287–383. 37. Burge, “Self and Self-Understanding,” 316. 38. Ibid., 320. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid., 321. 41. See Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. Part I. 42. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 113. 43. Many scholars have recently characterized Confucianism as a form of particularism. While I would agree that early Confucians certainly value the importance of wisdom or discretion in moral decision- making, they still seem committed to at least the prima facie value of rules and principles in most moral situations. To take a case in point, although Mencius in 4A:17 recommends that one should violate the rite of touching one’s sister-in-law if she were drown- ing, there is an implicit recognition that this constitutes a special or extraordinary case. Thus, I think we can describe Confucian ethics in general as a weak form of particularism, whereas it is my belief that Daoism, especially the Zhuangzi, tends to promote a stronger version of particularism where principles and rules do not possess even prima facie authority in the chain of moral reasoning. For an insightful dis- cussion of Confucian particularism, see Bryan Van Norden, Virtue 148 Notes

Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 44. Jonathan Dancy, “Moral Particularism”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta http:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/ moral-particularism/. See also Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). Cf. Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, Prin- cipled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 45. See also Laozi, Verses 10, 16, 20. 46. Angus Graham, “Chuang-tzu’s Essay on Seeing Things as Equal,” History of Religions 9 (1969/1970), 144. 47. Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, 120. 48. A. C. Graham, Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 144.

Chapter 3 1. All references to the Zhuangzi will be from D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching, eds., A Concordance to the Zhuangzi ,ICS series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 2000). Citations will be in the form of chapter/page/line. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. 2. All passages from the Nicomachean Ethics are taken from J. A. K. Thomson’s translation in The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. by Jonathan Barnes (New York: Penguin, 1976). 3. See Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 203. 4. Nancy Sherman, “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47.4 (1987), 595. 5. Philia, for the ancient Greeks, was not limited to voluntary relation- ships of the kind that we imagine today but could be applied to relations among family members as well as among fellow citizens. On the etymology of philia, see David Konstan, “Greek Friendship,” American Journal of Philology 117 (1996), 71–94. See also John Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics,ed. by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 301–340. 6. John Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” 318. 7. All passages from the Magna Moralia are taken from St. George Stock’s translation in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2, ed. by Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 8. Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” 328–329. 9. Sherman, “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life,” 598. 10. Ibid., 597. Notes 149

11. Ibid., 595. 12. Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” 332. 13. On the subject of citizenship in Aristotle’s political works, see Dorothea Frede, “Citizenship in Aristotle’s Politics,” in Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays, ed. by Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 167–184. See also Donald Morrison, “Aristotle’s Definition of Citizenship: A Prob- lem and Some Solutions,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 16 (1999), 143–165. 14. All passages from the Politics are taken from Benjamin Jowett’s translation in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2. 15. One could further argue that the tension between self-sufficiency and friendship, so pronounced in Aristotle, likewise never arises in the ancient Chinese context precisely because of the competing understandings of self and community. 16. See Cecilia Lindqvist, China: Empire of Living Symbols, trans. by Joan Tate (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1991), 37. Besides you, other common characters for friend were peng , originally meaning two strings of cowries and then later as a measure term for a string or group of friends, and jiu and gu (both separately and as a compound), both meaning old, most often in reference to a relationship with a history. 17. See Maria Khayutina, “ ‘Friendship’ in Early China,” 13th Conference of the Warring States Working Group (Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA: October 13–14, 1999), 2. On the formal structure of Western Zhou bronze inscriptions, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, Sources of Western Zhou History: Inscribed Bronze Vessels (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 18. See Zhongguo kexue yanjiuyuan kaogu yanjiusuo , Yin Zhou jinwen jicheng (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984–1994). 19. On Western Zhou kin terminology, see Paul Vogt, Between Kin and King: Social Aspects of Western Zhou Ritual, PhD disserta- tion, Columbia University, 2012. See also Lothar von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000–250 BC): The Archeologi- cal Evidence (Los Angeles: Cotsen Institute of Archeology, University of California, Los Angeles, 2006). 20. David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1. 21. All passages from the Shujing are taken from James Legge’s transla- tion in The Chinese Classics, Volume 3, The Shoo King (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960). 22. See his “You yu liang Zhou junchen guanxi de yanbian ,” Lishi yanjiu 5 (1998), 94–109. 23. Aat Vervoorn, “Friendship in Ancient China,” East Asian History 27 (2004), 2. 150 Notes

24. All passages from the Shijing are taken from Arthur Waley’s transla- tion in The Book of Songs (New York: Grove Press, 1996). 25. Yiqun Zhou, Festivals, Feasts, and Gender Relations in Ancient China and Greece (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 141. 26. Vervoorn, “Friendship in Ancient China,” 12. 27. Ambrose King, “The Individual and Group in Confucianism: A Relational Perspective,” in Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values, ed. by Donald Munro (Ann Arbor: Uni- versity of Michigan Press, 1985), 58. Cf. Xiufen Lu, “Rethinking Confucian Friendship,” Asian Philosophy 20.3 (2010), 225–245. 28. Roger T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011), 114. See also David Hall and Roger T. Ames, “Confucian Friendship: The Road to Religiousness,” in The Changing Face of Friendship, ed. by Leroy Rouner (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 77–94; and David Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998), esp. 254–268. 29. Zhou, Festivals, Feasts, and Gender Relations in Ancient China and Greece, 152–153. 30. On notions of “flourishing” in early Chinese thought, see Bryan Van Norden, Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 31. Book/page/line references from the Analects are from D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching, eds., A Concordance to the Lunyu , ICS Series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1995). 32. On the dangers of attributing Western notions of systematicity to Confucius’s corpus, see Bryan Van Norden, “Unweaving the ‘One Thread’ of Analects 4:15,” in Confucius and the Analects: New Essays, ed. by Bryan Van Norden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 216–236. 33. Beyond formal rites like proper mourning rituals and appropriate ways of receiving gifts (see examples from Book 10), more informal rit- ual behavior seems to be constitutive of Confucian friendship. For example, we are told in 4.26 that one should not be too critical in one’s appraisals of friends and in other sections how friends should be sincere in their speech. 34. Aat Vervoorn argues that Confucius can be interpreted as present- ing a “friendship theory of society” in which the sociopolitical system is ordered by relations of affinity. I think this overstates the impor- tance of friendship in Confucius’s moral thought and attributes to him a social-contract model of society that is anachronistic. How- ever, I would agree with Vervoorn that friendship served as a “bridge between family and society” for Confucius. See Vervoorn, “Friendship in Ancient China,” 13–14. Notes 151

35. P. J. Ivanhoe, “Reweaving the ‘One Thread’ of the Analects,” Philosophy East & West 40.1 (1990), 24. 36. Book/page/line references from the Mencius are from D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching, eds., A Concordance to the Mengzi ,ICS Series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1995). 37. Book/page/line references from the Xunzi are from D.C. Lau, Ho Che Wah, and Chen Fong Ching, A Concordance to the Xunzi , ICS Series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1996). 38. All references to the Mozi are taken from Mozi Yinde (A Con- cordance to Mo Tzu), Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement no. 21 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956). 39. See Elizabeth Telfer, “Friendship,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1970–1971), 223–241. 40. John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel, trans., The Annals of Lü Buwei (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 308. 41. See Eric Henry, “The Motif of Recognition in Early China,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 47.1 (1987), 5–30. 42. On death in the Analects, see P. J. Ivanhoe, “Death and Dying in the Analects,” in Mortality in Traditional Chinese Thought, ed. by Amy Olberding and P. J. Ivanhoe (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2011), 137–152. 43. Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” 328–329. 44. See Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 23: “Death presents soci- ety with a formidable problem not only because of its obvious threat to the continuity of human relationships, but because it threatens the basic assumptions of order on which society rests. In other words, the marginal situations of human existence reveal the innate precar- iousness of all social worlds. Every socially defined reality remains threatened by lurking ‘irrealities’. Every socially constructed nomos must face the constant possibility of its collapse into anomy.” 45. Brian Lundberg notes that friendship for Zhuangzi also possesses the potential to take one away from egoistic and narcissistic concerns: “Developing a friendship is, in essence, a training in looking out- ward beyond and away from self-interest—only one step away from letting go of personal preconceptions, a prerequisite for the expansion of insight.” See Brian Lundberg, “A Meditation on Friendship,” in Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed. by Roger T. Ames (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998), 213–214. While I agree generally with Lundberg’s observation about the ways in which friendship can take us out of forms of egoism, I would argue that friendship can also reinforce it by expanding the sense of self to include others as a part of one’s own projects and ends. In other words, since the good of my friend becomes my good, I am in essence pursuing my own good 152 Notes

as I pursue hers. This tension between egoism and friendship will be addressed more fully below. 46. Seidel, “Taoism: The Unofficial High Religion of China,” 44. De in the Daoist context means something like the physical manifes- tation of the Dao or the embodiment of its virtues in action and being. In other philosophical contexts, the term takes on different connotations. For example, when Confucians talk about the de of the noble person, they are referring to the moral power or charisma of the individual. 47. See, for example, the following description of a “spirit man” from Chapter 1: “Far away in the mountains of Gu Ye, there lives a spirit man whose flesh and skin is like ice and snow and gentle like a virgin. He does not eat the five grains, but inhales the wind and drinks the dew. He rides the vapor of the clouds, driving a flying dragon, and roams beyond the four seas. When his spirit concentrates, he protects creatures from illness and plague and makes the grains ripen every year” (1/2/14–16). 48. On Hui Shi’s relationship with Zhuangzi, see A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989), 76–82, 174–175. See also Lisa Raphals, “On Hui Shi,” in Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, 143–162. 49. David Brink, “Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community,” Social Philosophy & Policy 16 (1999), 270. 50. Jennifer Whiting, “Impersonal Friends,” The Monist 74 (1991), 7. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid., 8. 53. Ibid., 10. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., 23.

Chapter 4 1. See Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, eds., Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Joseph Chan, “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,” in The East Asian Challenges to Human Rights, ed. by Joanne R. Nauer and Daniel A. Bell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 212–240; and the contributions by Henry Rosemont, Jr., Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Roger T. Ames in Human Rights and the World’s Religions, ed. by Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). As Stephen C. Angle points out, with the notable exception of Wm. Theodore de Bary, much of the work being done with Confucianism and human rights seems to equate “classical Confucianism with the whole of Chinese tradition and seems to assume that Chinese moral discourse is static.” See Stephen Notes 153

C. Angle, Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21. 2. R. P. Peerenboom, “What’s Wrong with Chinese Rights?: Toward a Theory of Rights with Chinese Characteristics,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 6 (1993), 32. Peerenboom concedes that Confucianism is not the “only intellectual influence,” but the only other “tradition” which he mentions is “socialism.” 3. On this point, see Sumner B. Twiss, “Confucianism and Human Rights,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Human Rights, ed. by David Forsythe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 394–403. 4. Anna Seidel, “Taoism: The Unofficial High Religion of China,” Taoist Resources 7.2 (1997), 40. 5. See Q. C. Ian Brownlie, ed. Basic Documents on Human Rights,3rd Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 6. See Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 2009), 355–387. See also Amartya Sen, “The Global Reach of Human Rights,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 29.2 (2012), 91–100. 7. Karel Vasak at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg initially forwarded the conceptual division of human rights language into three discrete “generations” in 1979. The first genera- tion deals primarily with civil and political liberties or negative rights that protect the individual from the excesses of the state (e.g., freedom from political torture, freedom of religion). The second generation encompasses positive rights to welfare, employment, peace, and equal- ity. The third generation centers on what might be called collective rights of solidarity (e.g., right to sovereignty, self-determination). 8. This framework is adapted from Sumner B. Twiss, “A Construc- tive Framework for Discussing Confucianism and Human Rights,” in Confucianism and Human Rights, 45. 9. I view the Chinese intellectual tradition as both dynamic and plu- ral, even within “traditions” or schools (jia ). Again, I am only attempting to contribute to the dialogue on human rights in the Chinese context with a previously ignored intellectual tradition that in my mind could be conceptually illuminating and pragmatically useful. On the tensions between universal human rights language and “Asian values,” see Fred Dallmayr, “ ‘Asian Values’ and Global Human Rights,” Philosophy East & West 52.2 (April 2002), 173–189. See also Wm. Theodore de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). 10. See Liu Xiaogan, Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1994); Luo Genze , “Zhuangzi waizapian tanyuan” ,in Zhuzi kaosuo (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1958), 282–312; 154 Notes

A. C. Graham, “How Much of Chuang-tzu Did Chuang-tzu Write?” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990), 283–321; Guan Feng , “Zhuangzi waizapian chutan” ,inZhuangzi neipian yijie he pipan (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960), 319–358. Luo calls this group “leftist Daoists” (zuopai daojia ) while Liu, in addition to this group of chapters, also adds chapters 28, 29, and 31 (what Graham labels the “Yangist Chapters”) to a classificatory heading that he calls the “Anarchist School.” Although there are clear similarities between the Primitivist and Yangist Chapters (e.g., critique of moralists, focus on xing, utopian aspirations), I believe that the two sets of chapters are distinct enough ideologically and philosophically that the two designations, pace Liu, are warranted. I would also add Chapter 16 (Shanshing ), based on philosoph- ical affinity and parallel terminology, to the category of “Primitivist Chapters.” 11. See Qian Mu , Xian Qin zhuzi xinian (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), 524–574. 12. See Harold Roth, “An Appraisal of Angus Graham’s Textual Schol- arship on the Chuang Tzu,” in A Companion to Angus C. Graham’s Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters, ed. by Harold Roth (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003), 199. 13. See Liu, Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters, 165–166. 14. Where possible (and applicable), I will draw connections and similar- ities with the Laozi. Since the “Primitivist Chapters” reflect many of the ideas of the Laozi, sometimes quoting directly from the text, we should see the two texts in terms of family resemblances. 15. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Second, Revised Edition, trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1995), 300. 16. Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Topics in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 85. 17. Hayden White, Metahistory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 11. I am assuming with White that one invokes, at least tacitly, such putative laws in the course of explaining such his- torical phenomena as, let’s say, the Great Depression or the Fall of the Roman Empire. 18. This is based on Ruan Zhisheng’s analysis of Sima Qian’s his- torical method in the Shiji. See Stephen Durrant, The Cloudy Mirror: Tension and Conflict in the Writings of Sima Qian (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995), 128. The relative convergence between Sima Qian’s historiographical presuppositions and those of the Primitivists may derive from a shared set of cultural beliefs (e.g., cosmology, meta- physics) more than anything else. As Michael Loewe, Frederick Mote, and Benjamin Schwartz have suggested, the “organismic” model of Notes 155

cosmology may be a pan-Sinitic phenomenon, applicable to ancient Chinese thought as a whole. 19. Chapter 10 specifies the time period as beginning with the House of Rong Cheng and ending with the reign of Shennong (the “Daemonic Farmer”), the legendary inventor of agriculture, whereas Chapter 16 locates the utopia prior to the rule of Suiren and Fu Xi . 20. Cf. Laozi 80. Although Arthur Waley infers from the relative con- sonance between Chapter 80 of the Laozi and the passage from Chapter 10 of the Zhuangzi that the former must have borrowed from the latter, one could argue, perhaps more reasonably as Graham does, that both passages could be derivative of a common source, possi- bly the lost writings of Shennong. See Arthur Waley, The Way and Its Power: Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching and Its Place in Chinese Thought (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 242; Graham, “Reflections and Replies,” in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham, ed. by Henry Rosemont, Jr. (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1991), 271. See also Cho-yün Hsü, “Comparisons of Ide- alized Societies in Chinese History: Confucian and Taoist Models,” in Sages and Filial Sons: Mythology and Archeology in Ancient China, ed. by Julia Ching and R. W. L. Guisso (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1991), 43–63. 21. David Miller, Anarchism (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1984), 5. See also Patrick Dunleavy, “The State,” in A Companion to Contem- porary Political Philosophy, ed. by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), 611–621. 22. This picture generally resembles many pre-historic and early-historic societies prior to the “birth of civilization”: “Even before the agri- cultural revolution, groups of people, presumably extended families, were able to settle for relatively long periods of time if the sup- ply of natural food was abundant and reliable. Typical economic bases for such villages might be lake fishing or wild-grain harvest- ing ...the domestication of plants and animals made it possible for vastly greater numbers of people to settle down in villages and to systematically explore and learn to exploit the resources of their land- scape.” See Edward L. Farmer, Gavin R. G. Hambly, David Kopf, Byron K. Marshall, and Romeyn Taylor, Comparative History of Civi- lizations in Asia, Volume I: 10,000 B. C. to 1850 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 7. 23. Ames, The Art of Rulership, 7. See also Michael LaFargue, ATaoof the Tao Te Ching: A Translation and Commentary (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992), 167. 24. Needham, Science and Civilization in China, 104. 25. A. C. Graham, “The Nung-chia ‘School of the Tillers’ and the Origins of Peasant Utopianism in China,” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature, 97. 156 Notes

26. A. C. Graham characterizes the Primitivist utopia as a “political myth” (e.g., Sorel’s myth of the general strike), but this characterization seems to cast the Primitivists as romantic idealists who were per- haps more nostalgic about the past than committed to changing the present. Given what we know about the historical context of the Primitivist authors, I prefer to view it as a normative aspiration in the same sense as Martin Luther King’s notion of a “beloved commu- nity,” a moral vision that recognizes the political realities of the day but yet articulates what the realization of the Good would be. See Ibid., 96. 27. Dan Robins, “The Warring States Concept of Xing,” Dao: A Jour- nal of Comparative Philosophy 10 (2011), 32. Cf. A. C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature, 7–66. See also Franklin Perkins, “Recontextualizing Xing: Self-Cultivation and Human Nature in the Guodian Texts,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37 (2010), 16–32. 28. David Little, “Natural Rights and Human Rights: The International Imperative,” in Natural Law and Natural Rights: The Legacy of George Mason, ed. by Robert P. Davidow (Fairfax, VA: The George Mason University Press, 1986), 69. 29. See Roth, “An Appraisal of Angus Graham’s Textual Scholarship on the Chuang Tzu,” 201. 30. The Laozi metaphorically describes xing as “uncarved wood” and the “state of the infant” and likens it to emptiness. See, for example, chapters 16 and 28. 31. Ames, The Art of Rulership, 35. 32. See Qian Mu , Guoshi da gang (Beijing: Shang wu yinshu guan, 1996), 88–89. 33. Mark Edward Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989), 96. 34. See George Woodcock, Anarchism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), 111. 35. William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, ed. by Isaac Kramnick (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976). 36. For example, David Wieck, Paul Goodman, and David Miller. 37. On this point see Roger T. Ames, “Is Political Taoism Anarchism?” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10.1 (1983), 27. 38. John P. Clark, “What Is Anarchism,” in Anarchism, ed. by J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York Univer- sity Press, 1978), 13. See also Richard Sylvan, “Anarchism,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, 215–243. 39. See Julia Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xv. Notes 157

40. Sumner B. Twiss, “Global Ethics and Human Rights: A Reflection,” Journal of Religious Ethics 39.2 (2011), 212. 41. Sen, The Idea of Justice, 357–358. 42. Sen, “The Global Reach of Human Rights,” 93. Sen argues hypotheti- cally that the freedom of a disabled person to be treated by others with respect rather than disdain or prejudice may be important enough to be considered a human right, but that the most optimal means of real- izing this commitment may not be through legal redress but through some other means (e.g., education, social discussion). 43. Harold Roth, “The Yellow Emperor’s Guru: A Narrative Analysis from Chuang Tzu 11,” Taoist Resources 7 (1997), 44. 44. Cf. Laozi 3, 72, 75. 45. Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1997), 27.

Chapter 5 1. David N. Keightley, “Early Civilization in China: Reflections on How It Became Chinese,” in Heritage of China: Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization, ed. by Paul S. Ropp (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 33. 2. I should note at the beginning of this chapter that I am not suggest- ing that there was one monolithic model of death or the afterlife in ancient China but merely trying to locate the ideas of the Zhuangzi within the intellectual context of pre-Han China, discerning where the authors may have diverged from contemporary understandings of death and the afterlife. On this point, see Mark Csikszentmihalyi, ed. and trans., Readings in Han Chinese Thought (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 140–145. 3. Michael Loewe, Faith, Myth and Reason in Han China (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2005), 25. 4. See David N. Keightley, Sources of Shang History: The Oracle-Bone Inscriptions of Bronze Age China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). See also Guo Moruo and Hu Houxuan , eds., Jiaguwen heji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1978–1982). 5. According to Wang Guowei , the term jipo originally denoted the time between the 8th or 9th to the 14th or 15th of the lunar month. Conversely, the term jisipo corresponded to the time between the 23rd or 24th to the end of the lunar month. See his “Shengba siba kao” ,inGuantang ji lin , vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), 19–26. See also Yu Ying-shih, “ ‘O Soul, Come Back!’ A Study in the Changing Conceptions of the Soul and Afterlife in Pre-Buddhist China,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 47.2 (1987), 363–395. 158 Notes

6. See D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching, eds., A Concordance to the Fa yan and Tai xuan jing , ICS Series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1995). 7. James Legge, trans., The Chinese Classics, Volume V: The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1961), 329. All of the translations from the Zuozhuan are mine, though I will list the corresponding page numbers in the Legge translation. 8. Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, 551. The way in which Heaven is characterized in the two anecdotes recall descriptions in the Shang divinatory record of the many ways that the dead (e.g., divinities like Di , senior ancestors) could affect the living. 9. In fact, in the two cited passages on Zhao Tong and Bo You, Legge translates po as “wits” and as “reason.” 10. This is unlike the conception of psuchê in classical Greece, particularly in pre-Socratic philosophical works and Homeric poems, where the presence of a soul does not depend in any way on the favor of the gods. It would be odd indeed to have someone comment that the gods are harming Achilles’ soul or that Zeus is taking it away. Although by the end of fifth century the soul comes to be identified more and more with the moral and intellectual qualities of a person, there is still no connection between the character of a person, her soul, and the wishes of the gods in ancient Greece. See Jan Bremmer, The Early Greek Concept of the Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 11. Hu Shih and Yu Ying-shih have speculated that the notion of the hun may have originated in the southern regions and then gained more currency in the north during the Warring States Period. In the “Tan Gong” chapter of the Liji, Prince Jizha of the southern state of Wu is reported to have said the following at the funeral of his son: “Destiny requires that the bones and flesh should return to the earth; but his soul energies can go everywhere, everywhere” ( ). In this passage, the Prince does not refer to the po at all and seemingly only has the hun in mind when he mentions the soul. The duality here is not between the hun and po but between the hun and the physical body. See Hu Shih, “The Concept of Immortality in Chinese Thought,” Harvard Divinity School Bul- letin (1945–1946), 26–43; Yu Ying-shih, “ ‘O Soul, Come Back!’ ” esp. 373–378. 12. Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, 708. 13. Ibid., 618. 14. Wing Tsit-chan glosses Zichan’s description of hun and po in the fol- lowing way: “hun is the spirit of man’s vital force which is expressed in man’s intelligence and power of breathing, whereas po is the spirit of man’s physical nature which is expressed in bodily movements.” See his A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 12. Notes 159

15. Mu-chou Poo, In Search of Personal Welfare: A View of Ancient Chinese Religion (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998), 64. 16. Angus Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989), 328. 17. John S. Major, Sarah A. Queen, Andrew Seth Meyer, and Harold Roth, trans. and eds., The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Prac- tice of Government in Early China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 296. 18. The Shuowen glosses hun as and po as . 19. Since most of our information comes from codified ritual texts of the northern plains, songs and elegies from southern states, and the burial goods and tombs of aristocrats, it is difficult to present a comprehen- sive portrait of what the “common people” might have believed about death and the afterlife. 20. In passing and in detail, texts as varied as the Liji, Mozi, Hanfeizi, Yili, Huainanzi all refer to the hun and po as embodying heavenly and earthly qualities respectively and speak of death in terms of the separation of the two souls. Kenneth Brashier argues that modern scholarship may have overestimated the prominence of the hun-po schema, suggesting that the dualistic framework may have been at best a “scholastic model.” See his “Han Thanatology and the Division of Souls,” Early China 21 (1996), 125–158. 21. Yu Ying-shih argues that we can interpret the T-shaped painted banner from Tomb 1 at Mawangdui containing the body of Lady Dai as a visual chronicle of the fu ritual. See his “ ‘O, Soul, Come Back!’ ” 365–369. Cf. Michael Loewe, Ways to Paradise: The Chinese Quest for Immortality (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), 17–59. 22. Mourners would some times place floss on the mouth and nostrils to confirm that the breath had stopped. 23. There are certain variations to the rite depending on one’s status and rank and the circumstance. For example, “The Greater Record of Mourning Rites” (Sang Da Ji ) chapter of the Liji advises that if the deceased is a visitor staying at a public lodging, his soul should be summoned whereas if a visitor is staying at a private lodging, his soul should not be called back. 24. See Stephen R. Bokenkamp, Ancestors and Anxiety: Daoism and the Birth of Rebirth in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 8; “Ancient Chinese mortuary cults, with their lavish and painstaking care of the dead, apparently left no detailed records explaining why the Chinese did such things.” 25. D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching eds., A Concordance to the Shuoyuan ICS Series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1992), 18.31/ 160/12–14. 26. Mu-chou Poo, “Ideas concerning Death and Burial in Pre-Han and Han China,” Asia Major 3.2 (1990), 33. 160 Notes

27. Gu Yanwu, Rizhilu jishi (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1994), 1079. 28. See Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Volume 5: Chemistry and Chemical Technology, Part 2: Spagyrical Discov- ery and Invention: Magisteries of Gold and Immortality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 98. Hu Shih, though not as definitive as Needham, also suggested that the ancient Chinese did not have a proper conception of the afterworld until the arrival of Buddhism. See his “The Indianization of China: A Case Study in Cultural Borrowing,” in Independence, Convergence, and Borrowing in Institutions, Thought, and Art, Harvard Tercentenary Publications (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), 224–225. 29. Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, 6. A similar reference can be found in the Zhan Guo Ce where in the “Book of Chu” we have Lord Anling vowing to protect his king by sending his body first to the Yellow Springs. Later texts like the Mengzi and Zhuangzi also refer to the Yellow Springs as a kind of geological floor. The Mengzi, for example, states, “The earthworm eats from the dry earth above and drinks from the yellow springs below” ( ). See D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching, eds., A Concordance to the Mengzi , ICS Series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1995), 6.10/35/16. 30. Although the descriptions between the “Yellow Springs” and the “Dark City” differ dramatically, one conspicuous feature that they share is the quality of darkness. As Mu-chou Poo notes, “In ancient China, the darkness of the netherworld, or the Dark City, is a concept retained well into the Eastern Han period ...Here it seems the soul has nothing much to do in the netherworld except to exist in endless darkness.” See his “Preparation for the Afterlife in Ancient China,” in Mortality in Traditional Chinese Thought, ed. by Amy Olberding and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2011), 19. 31. David Hawkes, trans., The Songs of the South: An Ancient Chinese Anthology of Poems by Qu Yuan and Other Poets (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 224. 32. It is interesting to note how here the distinction between heaven and hell does not divide between a celestial paradise and an underworld hell but essentially between the terrors of the unknown world in all quarters and the domestic comforts of the soul’s old abode. 33. In rhetorical structure, “The Great Summons” (Da zhao ), the second of the summons poems from the Chuci, replicates the same warnings-enticements pattern as “The Summons of the Soul,” with the primary difference being the self-conscious way in which the sum- mons is addressed to a ruler and the particular pleasures and dignities that would attend such an office. Notes 161

34. For a philosophical analysis of the deprivation account of death, see Thomas Nagel, “Death,” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–10. 35. John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegal, trans., The Annals of Lü Buwei: A Complete Translation and Study (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 227. 36. Book/page/line references from the Analects are from D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching, eds., A Concordance to the Lunyu , ICS Series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1995). 37. Of course, the ultimate domestication of death would be to live on forever. And we see such aspirations in the cults of immortality (xian ) and the interest in macrobiotic hygiene that are prefig- ured in early Daoist texts like the Zhuangzi and developed in more systematic ways during the Han. See Needham, Science and Civiliza- tion in China, Volume 5: Chemistry and Chemical Technology, Part 2: Spagyrical Discovery and Invention: Magisteries of Gold and Immortal- ity, 93–113. See also Yu Ying-shih, “Life and Immortality in the Mind of Han China,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 25 (1964–1965), 80–122; and Donald Harper, Early Chinese Medical Literature: The Mawangdui Medical Manuscripts (London: Kegan Paul, 1998). For an account of the phenomenon of “release from the corpse” (shi jie ), see Donald Harper, “Resurrection in Warring States Popular Religion,” Taoist Resources 5.2 (1994), 13–28. 38. Poo, “Preparation for the Afterlife,” 32. 39. Guolong Lai suggests that by the beginning of the Han, death was imagined as a “journey during which travelers required protection” largely as a result of the expansion of geographical knowledge of the outside world. I would argue that even in this travel model, the purpose of outfitting the corpse for postmortem travel would be to domesticate the journey so that a “safe trip” could ensue. See Guolong Lai, “Death and the Otherworldly Journey in Early China as Seen through Tomb Texts, Travel Paraphenalia, and Road Rituals,” Asia Major 18.1 (2005), 1–44. 40. Traditionally, the Huainanzi has been categorized as an “eclectic” or “miscellaneous” (za ) work, following Liu Xiang’s classifi- cation in the Han Shu. This is a view which has been championed recently by scholars such as Griet Vankeerbergen, Michael Puett, and Michael Loewe. While I would acknowledge that the work as a whole is difficult to characterize in terms of intellectual affiliation, I think it is undeniable, based on parallel and borrowed passages, that certain chapters (e.g., “Jing Shen” ) betray a distinctive Daoist orienta- tion. See Griet Vankeerbergen, The Huainanzi and Liu An’s Claim to Moral Authority (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001); Michael Loewe, “Huang Lao Thought and the Huainanzi,” Journal of the Royal 162 Notes

Asiatic Society 4.3 (1994), 377–395; Michael Puett, The Ambivalence of Creation: Debates Concerning Innovation and Artifice in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). 41. See Yu, “ ‘O Soul, Come Back!’,” 374. See also Hu, “The Concept of Immortality in Chinese Thought,” 31–32. 42. The references to the soul using only the hun character occur a total of 59 times throughout the text, mostly in the two soul-summoning chapters. 43. See Yu, “O Soul, Come Back!” 373. 44. The passage in question concerns a dialogue between Duke Huan and Wheelwright Bian where Bian chides the Duke for “read- ing the dregs of old men” ( ). In this passage, the author employs zaopo ( ) as a fixed compound meaning “dregs.” 45. See Huainanzi, 7/57/10–7/58/3. In a private communication, Harold D. Roth suggests that the notion of the soul articulated in texts like the Huainanzi may be related to the unconscious, espe- cially in regard to dreaming. In other words, there is an equivalence between the activity of dreaming and the stirrings of the soul. This is why, according to Roth, both the Huainanzi and Zhuangzi speak of sages or “true men” ( ) as being able to sleep without dreaming ( ). 46. Yu Ying-shih and Hu Shih argue persuasively that we can characterize ancient Chinese conceptions of the soul generally as “materialistic.” As Yu suggests, “the idea that the individual soul can survive death indefinitely seems to have been alien to the Chinese mind. In this regard ...we may take the Chou sacrificial system as an illustration. Perhaps partly as a result of the shift from the predominantly lateral succession of the Shang period to the lineal succession, the Chou system set a limit to the number of generations in ancestor-worship according to social status. The royal house, for example, would offer sacrifices to no more than seven generations of ancestors while com- mon people to only two generations ...The system was apparently predicated on the assumption that after a certain period of time the spirits of the dead gradually dissolve into the primal ch’i and lose their individual identities.” See Yu, “ ‘O Soul, Come Back!’,” 379–380. See also Hu, “The Concept of Immortality in Chinese Thought,” 33. 47. Csikszentmihalyi, Readings in Han Chinese Thought, 148–149. 48. For more on the concept of death as annihilation, see Fred Feldman, “The Termination Thesis,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (2000), 98–115. 49. This is a reading that follows Guo Xiang (252–312) in his Com- mentary that suggests that the workings of the Dao can best be understood in terms of the concept of spontaneity (ziran ). 50. Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” in The Stoic and Epicurean Philoso- phers: The Complete Extant Writings of Epicurus, Epictetus, Lucretius, Notes 163

Marcus Aurelius, ed. by Whitney J. Oates (New York: The Modern Library, 1949), 30–31. 51. On the existence requirement, see Jeff McMahan, “Death and the Value of Life,” Ethics 99.1 (1988), 32–61. 52. This attitude toward death informs the critique of practitioners of “guiding and pulling” (daoyin ) found in Chapter 15 ( ). 53. D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching, eds., A Concordance to the Xunzi , ICS series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1996). 54. Poo, “Ideas concerning Death and Burial in Pre-Han and Han China,” 31. 55. Csikszentmihalyi, Readings in Han Chinese Thought, 148–149.

Chapter 6 1. Harold Bloom, Poetry and Repression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 2–3. 2. Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 43. 3. Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 108. 4. Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence, 30, 42. 5. Ibid., 10. 6. The varieties of misprision, all of which disclose a dimension of the strong poet’s life-cycle, can be typologized into “six revision- ary ratios”: Clinamen, Tessera, Kenosis, Daemonization, Askesis, and Apophrades. 7. On the changing meaning of “bai jia” during the Warring States Period, see Jens Østergard Peterson, “Which Books Did the First Emperor of Ch’in Burn? On the Meaning of Pai Chia in Early Chinese Sources,” Monumenta Serica 43 (1995), 1–52. 8. On the classification and dating of the Syncretist phase of early Daoism, see Liu Xiaogan, Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 129–171; A. C. Graham, “How Much of Chuang Tzu Did Chuang Tzu Write,” in his Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991), 283–321; and Harold D. Roth, “Who Compiled the Chuang Tzu,” in Chinese Texts and Philosophi- cal Contexts, ed. by Henry Rosemont, Jr. (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2000), 79–128. Graham and Liu classify chapters 12–14, the end of 11, 15 and 33 as Syncretist (or Huang-Lao in Liu’s terminology). 9. Although the “Syncretist Chapters” will be the focus of this chapter, other relevant Syncretist materials like the Huang-Lao Manuscripts from Mawangdui, the Huainanzi, several essays from the Guanzi, and Sima Tan’s “Discussion of the Essentials of the Six Schools” will be integrated into the discussion. 164 Notes

10. Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence, 14. 11. Bloom’s characterization of the intra-poetic relationship as a “fam- ily romance” between father and son seems particularly apt, sans the Freudian connotations, in the ancient Chinese intellectual con- text where jia (literally “family”) referred to traditions organized around master-disciple lineages, with the master serving as the parent figure. On the different models of intellectual participation in public life during the Warring States Period, see Andrew Meyer, “The Altars of the Soil and Grain are Closer than Kin : The Qi Model of Intellectual Participation and the Jixia Patronage Commu- nity,” Early China 33–34 (2010–2011), 37–100. On the formation of “Masters” literature, see Weibke Denecke, The Dynamics of Mas- ters Literature: Early Chinese Thought from Confucius to Han Feizi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011). 12. See for example, Herlee G. Creel, “On Two Aspects of Early Taoism,” in What Is Taoism? and Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), esp. 44–45. 13. I recognize that the “Syncretist Chapters” may be part of an extended “family romance,” the progeny of more than one “father” (e.g., Neiye, Laozi, etc.). Indeed, the author of Chapter 33 seems to be more polite to Laozi and Guan-yin—the standard text (retranslated by Graham according to the principle of lectio difficilior) stating that the two “can be said to have attained the ultimate.” However, for this chapter I restrict the intra-poetic relationship to the “Inner Chapters” since, on first blush, the “Syncretist Chapters” may appear to be a bastard child of the “Inner Chapters.” To this extent, the following study makes the implicit claim that there is a direct lin- eal descent or a “family resemblance” between the “Inner Chapters” and the “Syncretist Chapters,” and more generally, between the “Individualist” and “Syncretist” phases of early Daoism. 14. Isabelle Robinet, Taoism: The Growth of a Religion, trans. by Phyllis Brooks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 47. Although Robinet is here referring to the sage of the Huainanzi, I think the characterization can be extended to the sage of the “Syncretist Chapters.” On the background of the sage figure in ancient Chinese thought, see Julia Ching, “Who Were the Ancient Sages,” in Sages and Filial Sons: Mythology and Archeology in Ancient China, ed. by Julia Ching and Richard Guisso (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991), 1–22. 15. My reasons for extending the analysis beyond the intra-poetic rela- tionship are the following: first, Bloom’s theory seems at times to indulge in psychoanalytic excesses, which, in essence, rewrites literary history in terms of the psychic drama between castrating precursor and oppressed son. This Freudian dynamic seems misplaced here since the identity of the authors remains in obscurity and, more importantly, Notes 165

we do not possess autobiographical accounts that could shed light on the strong poet in her battle for self-origination. Moreover, as Roger Ames has suggested in regard to the Chinese intellectual tradition, the “authority one’s ideas might gain by operating within the bounds of an existing tradition would far outweigh concerns for pride in authorship.” In other words, the kind of hyper-individualism (i.e., the Protestant Romantic tradition that extends from Spencer to Milton and Blake, Shelly, and Yeats) that Bloom’s theory seems to imply may be inappropriate in the ancient Chinese philosophical context where the prominence of a historical figure is a function not of discontinu- ity and identity but of continuity and tradition. Nevertheless, I would contend that Bloom’s theory, stripped of its Freudian and Nietzschean predilections, can illuminate the dynamics of poetic influence, partic- ularly as it applies to how the later poet imaginatively re-visions the precursor poet and poem in order to create her own poetic space. As such, we need not be concerned with the psychoanalytic com- plexes that may have plagued early Daoists (in any case unfathomable) in their attempt to find their poetic voice, but rather with the literary and ideological evolutions that we can decipher from the texts them- selves. See Ames, The Art of Rulership: A Study of Ancient Chinese Political Thought (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), xxi. 16. Robinet, Taoism: The Growth of a Religion, 2–3. 17. Stephen W. Durrant, The Cloudy Mirror: Tension and Conflict in the Writings of Sima Qian (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), xv. 18. Ban Gu (32–92 CE), in his “Bibliographic Essay” (Yiwenzhi ) of the Han Shu relates how the Various Masters “all arose when the doctrine of the kings had already disappeared,” how the “theories of the nine schools arose like wasps.” 19. Liu Xiaogan interprets this passage as a description of the Warring States Period, further validating his theory that the entirety of the Zhuangzi was written before the Qin unification. As Liu points out, the Tian xia chapter was written at a time when the Mohist school was not yet extinct. This assertion seems to be supported by the treatment of Mohism as an extant school by the authors of the chapter. How- ever, this does not by itself necessarily place the text prior to the Qin unification since we know that there was a brief revival of Mohism after the fall of Qin in 209 BCE. As such, although Mohism as an organized movement seems moribund by the middle of the second century BCE, we need not date the Tian xia chapter as “certainly the Warring States Period,” as Liu does, and can even speculate, as Graham does, that the chapter could have been written after the Han reunification. As Graham states, “We know from the five Yangist essays in the Lushi Chunqiu and the account of the Mohist sects as still active in Hanfeizi chapter 50, that the schools of ‘Yang and Mo’ survived until the beginning of the Qin; after a suppression of only four years 166 Notes

they would, surely, like the Confucians, emerge from hiding to com- pete for the favors of the various contenders for the Empire. No doubt they soon withered in the very different climate of the Han; but down to 202 BC it would seem to a philosopher that he was still living in the age of the Warring Kingdoms, interrupted by only a decade of polit- ical unity.” See Liu, Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters, 69–72; and Graham, “How Much of Chuang Tzu Did Chuang Tzu Write?” 282. 20. K. C. Hsiao, A History of Chinese Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 28. 21. John Knoblock, in consonance with Durrant’s thesis, suggests that “one might understand the title to be harsher than ‘contra’, if one takes the book to be in the Mohist polemical tradition. As such it would be successor to Mo Di’s ‘Condemnation of the Ru’ and should be considered Xunzi’s ‘Condemnation of Twelve Philoso- phers’.” Although Angus Graham tends to group Xunzi’s “Contra Twelve Philosophers” along with the Tian xia chapter and Sima Tan’s “Discussion of the Essentials of the Six Schools” as exempli- fying a “syncretic attitude” (i.e., treating rivals as not wholly wrong but as one-sided), this seems extremely charitable considering the fact that the most Xunzi is willing to cede to other schools of thought is that they are sufficiently “reasonable” so as to “deceive and mis- lead the ignorant multitude.” See A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989), 236, 378. See also See John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, Vol. I: Books 1–6 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 212–232. 22. Durrant, The Cloudy Mirror, xv–xvi. 23. We can speculate that Sima Tan’s appellation of “Daoism” (Daojia ) may be informed by the self-definition of the Syncretist authors as those who possessed the “tradition of the Way.” As such, the impe- tus behind the nomenclature of “Daoism” may, in fact, derive from the syncretic perspective shared by both Sima Tan and the Syncretist authors, in effect, defining the very essence of Daoism as syncretic from its inception—embracing not only methods of inner cultiva- tion and a cosmology of the Way but also extending those practices and beliefs, along with relevant ideas from other philosophical lin- eages, to the sociopolitical realm. As Durrant suggests, “Entire works written in the late Zhou and early Han dynasties strove for precisely the kind of eclecticism reflected in the Zhuangzi treatise [i.e., Tian xia]. These works gathered teachings and principles from a variety of schools and brought them together into a broad synthesis that has often been labelled ‘Daoist’ ...Sima Tan, like his contemporary Liu An (179–122 BCE), gathered his eclecticism under the philosophical rubric of Daoism.” See Durrant, The Cloudy Mirror,4,5. 24. Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence, 66. Notes 167

25. Ames, The Art of Rulership, xx–xxi. 26. Graham, “How Much of Chuang Tzu Did Chuang Tzu Write?” 321. 27. A. C. Graham, trans., Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 45. 28. Harold Roth, “Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ Chapter of the Zhuangzi,” Journal of Chinese Religions 28 (2000), 31–32. See also Harold Roth, “Redaction Criticism and the Early History of Taoism,” Early China 19 (1994), 1–46. 29. Although Graham contends that the Way has assumed a “secondary position” within the Syncretists’ worldview, the terminological shift seems to be one of emphasis. In fact, the hierarchical list of governing measures in Tian Dao, which Graham cites as evidence, is introduced as the “great Way” of the men of old, intimating that a founda- tional, cosmological substructure grounds the individual guidelines. As Harold Roth suggests, “the significance of the Way of Heaven or the Way of Heaven and Earth is in its emphasis on the practical mani- festation of the vast and profound Tao within the universe.” See Roth, “Who Compiled the Chuang Tzu?” 100. 30. John S. Major, Sarah A. Queen, Andrew Seth Meyer, and Harold D. Roth, trans. and eds., The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Prac- tice of Government in Early China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 304. 31. Graham, “Textual Notes,” in Chuang-tzu, 257. 32. David N. Keightley, “The Religious Commitment: Shang The- ology and the Genesis of Chinese Political Culture,” History of Religions 17.3/4 (February–May 1978), 212–213. See also K. C. Chang, Shang Civilization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), esp. 31–35; and “Shang Shamans,” in The Power of Culture: Studies in Chinese Cultural History, ed. by Willard J. Peterson, Andrew H. Plaks, and Ying-shih Yu (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1994), 10–36. 33. Keightley, “The Religious Commitment,” 213. 34. Anna Seidel, “Taoism: The Unofficial High Religion of China,” Taoist Resources 7.2 (1997), 49. 35. Henri Maspero, China in Antiquity, trans. by Frank A. Kierman, Jr. (Amherst: UMASS Press, 1978), 86–87. 36. Toshihiko Izutsu, A Comparative Study of the Key Philosophical Con- cepts in Sufism and Taoism (Tokyo: Kokusai, 1967), 16. 37. Cf. Robinet, Taoism: The Growth of a Religion, 35–36: “Some of the features characteristic of Zhuangzi can be seen in another movement with which he shares certain affinities, to the point that it is possible and even probable that Zhuangzi is only the visible member of a once widespread movement that has left few traces: this other movement is that of the Chuci, the ‘Songs of the Chu’ .... The poems seem to be the written remnant of the tradition of the wu, a term translated 168 Notes

roughly as ‘shaman’ or ‘sorcerer’ .... Many Taoist practices descend in a direct line from this tradition, even though Taoists insist that they have no part of it.” 38. Seidel, “Taoism: The Unofficial High Religion of China,” 44. 39. Graham, “Textual Notes,” in Chuang-tzu, 257. See also Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 100: “The meditation practiced privately and rec- ommended to rulers as an arcanum of government descends directly from the trance of the professional shaman.” 40. Robinet, Taoism: The Growth of a Religion, 48. Bibliography

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Note: The locators followed by ‘n’ refer to note numbers

Adams, Robert M., 146n26 burial practices, 104–6 Ames, Roger, 68 see also death anarchism, anarchy, 94–8 see also “Primitivist Chapters” Ching, Julia, 95 Angle, Stephen C., 152–3n1 Chuci , 107–11, 160n33, Analects, 20, 69–79, 109 167–8n37 see also Confucianism, Confucian; Clark, John P. 94–5 Confucius common power, see tong de Anscombe, Elizabeth, 15–16 Confucianism, Confucian, 17–18, Aristotle, 57–63 20, 37, 42, 46–9, 51, 68–71, on eudaimonia, 57, 62 74–5, 85, 92, 116 on external goods, 57 attitudes towards death, 105–6, on friendship (philia), 58–61, 109, 116–17 71, 75 and human rights, 81 Magna Moralia,60 and ideals of empire, 88 Nicomachean Ethics, 57–62 and moral particularism, Politics,62 147–8n43 “Asian Values,” 11, 83, 98 Confucius, 21, 30, 49, 51, 52, 69, 71, 72, 74–5, 76, 109, 118, Ban Gu (32–92 CE), 118, 131–3 165n18 Cooper, John, 61 Berger, Peter, 75, 151n44 Billeter, Jean Francois, 28 Creel, Herlee G., 14–15 Bloom, Harold, 121–3, 127, Csikszentmihalyi, Mark, 7, 118 164n11 see also poetic influence Dancy, Jonathan, 48 Bokenkamp, Stephen R., Danto, Arthur, 17–18, 142n17 159n24 Dao (the Way), 2, 28, 34, 40, Book of Documents, see Shujing 43–4, 47, 69, 100, 118, 130, Book of Poetry, see Shijing 139–40n10 Book of Rites, see Liji attunement to, 2–3, 5–6, 8, 10, Brashier, Kenneth, 159n20 43, 45, 48, 54, 74 Brink, David, 76 as normative guide, 29–30, 41–51 Burge, Tyler, 46 as “prescriptive discourse,” 22–5 182 Index

Daodejing /Laozi , 22–4, fact/value distinction, 143n29 27, 39–40, 95, 155n20 Fan Ning (ca. 280–340), 1 Daoism, Daoist, 2, 82, 124 fasting of the mind, see xinzhai as an “adequate morality,” 37–9 Foucault, Michel, 140n16 and altruism, 26–8 friendship, 55–80 and amoralism, 18–21 and achieved relationships, 64 ethics, 4, 45 in ancient China, 62–8, 149n16 imperative, 43, 51–2, 54 brute friendship model, 77 and Kant, 28–31 character friendship, 58–61 and morality, 2–3, 14–17, 20, Confucian, 68–71 25–8, 141n7 Daoist, 72–80 and Orientalism, 14, 18 and egoism, 151–2n45 phases of, 8–9 ethocentric” view, 78 and the philosophy of language, as an external good, 57, 62 21–5 impersonal view of, 73–7 as a “school” (jia ), 6–9, and kin relations, 63–8 139–40n10, 140n11, Mohist, 70–1 166n23 as other selves, 59–61, 77–8 and “semantic core,” 8 and philia, 58–61, 148n5 as a tradition, 8–9 and self–knowledge, 60–1 the Victorian invention of, 14–15, and self–sufficiency, 149n15 141–2n9; and passim. and shared activities, 61–2, Daoist sage, 19, 27–8, 40, 43, 112, 75–6 124, 133 during the Warring States Period, Daoshu (techniques of the Way), 68–72 45, 119, 139–40n10 in the Zhuangzi, 10–11, 72–80 “Dark City” (you du ), 107–8, Fukunaga Mitsuji ,5 160n30 Davidson, Donald, 34 Gadamer, Hans–Georg, 86 de (inner power), 74, 75–6, 97, Geertz, Clifford, 31, 33, 146n25, 152n46 146n27 death, 99–119 Gewirth, Alan, 17 in ancient China, 101–10 Giles, Herbert, 1 in ancient Mesopotamia and Girardot, Norman, 141–2n9 Greece, 99 Godwin, William, 94 and anomy, 151n44 Graham, A. C., 53, 84–5, 104, 130, and Chu culture, 110–11 134, 137, 156n26, 167n29, and existence requirement, 116 168n39 and psychological continuity, 104 Gray, John, 19 and symmetry argument, 116 “great returning” (da gui ), see also burial practices 112–13, 119 dreams, 42–3 Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), 106 guci (“Dedications”), 63–4 Epicurus, 116 Guo Xiang (d. 312 CE), 5, epistemic faculties, 52 162n49 Index 183

Hansen, Chad, 21–5 Loewe, Michael, 100 Han Shu , 113, 118 Lü Buwei ,85 heaven (tian ), 52, 101, 158n8 Luhmann, Niklas, 19 Hobsbawm, Eric, 140n16 Lundberg, Brian, 151–2n45 Hsiao, K. C., 125–6 Lüshi chunqiu , 72, 85, 108–9 Hu, Shih, 158n11, 160n28, 162n46 hua (transformation), 99–100, MacIntyre, Alasdair, 9, 41 113–15 Maspero, Henri, 135 Huainanzi , 104, 110, 134, Mencius (372–289 BCE), 37, 161–2n40 70, 73, 89, 147–8n43 Hui Shi (ca. 370–310 BCE), Meyer, Andrew, 140n18 76–7 Milo, Ronald D., 143n21 human rights, 81–98 ming (illumination), 49, 130 from a “Chinese Perspective,” 83, Moeller, Hans–Georg, 18–21, 152–3n1 143n29 functional analogues, 82, 98 Mohism, Mohist, 42, 46, 48, 70–1, and functionings, 93 73, 85, 92, 117 generations of, 153n7 Mollgaard, Eske, 28–31 and priority interests, 11, 96–8 moral fool, moral foolishness, 18–19 and quanli ,81 morality, 1, 10, 13–15, 19–20, and social ethics, 96 33–5, 139n3, 142n13 and Daoism, 1–4, 14–17, 25–8, illumination, see ming 141n7 inner cultivation, 44–5, 52–3, 130–3 and disagreement, 35–7 and rulership, 129–34 and disengaged reason, 16–17 inner power, see de and ethics, 15–17, 142n15 intertextuality, 121 and the history of Western see also poetic influence philosophy, 14–17 “inward training.”, see Neiye as a system of obligations, 3–4, Ivanhoe, P. J., 70 15–17 Kant, Immanuel, 16, 28–9 and the Zhuangzi, 1–4 Keightley, David, 99 King, Ambrose, 68 nature, see xing Kirkland, Russell, 25–8 Needham, Joseph, 88, 106 Knoblock, John, 166n21 nei sheng wai wang (inwardly Konstan, David, 148n5 a sage, outwardly a king), Korsgaard, Christine M., 40–1 130, 138 Neiye (“Inward Training”), 8, Legge, James, 13–14 44, 48, 131–2 Lewis, Mark Edward, 7, 92–3 Niebuhr, H. Richard, 45 Lai, Guolong, 161n39 non–action, see wu–wei li (rites), 47, 70, 104–6, 116–17, Nongjia (School of the Tillers), 150n33 88, 97 Liji (Book of Rites), 70, 103–5 normativity, 34, 40–5 Liu Xiaogan, 85, 165–6n19 norms, 45–7 184 Index

Parfit, Derek, 47 Shuowen jiezi ,69 particularism, 47–51, 147–8n43 Shuo Yuan , 106 Peerenboom, R. P., 153n2 Sima Qian (145–86 BCE), Peterson, Jens Østergard, 7 4–5, 110, 154–5n18 poetic influence, 121–3, 127, Sima Tan (d. 110 BCE), 6, 9, 164n11, 164n13, 164–5n15 123, 139–40n10, 140n11, Poo Mu–chou, 106, 109, 117, 166n23 160n30 sitting and forgetting, see zuowang “Primitivist Chapters,” 84–98 Sivin, Nathan, 140n13 and anarchism, 94–8 Smith, Kidder, 140n10 authorship and dating, 84–6, Songs of the South, see Chuci 153–4n10 soul, 12, 101–4, 162n46 and historiography, 86–7 hun , 12, 102–5, 110, 111, utopian vision, 87–8, 155n22, 159n20, 162n42 156n26 po , 12, 101–5, 110, 111, on xing (nature), 89–94 159n20 Puett, Michael, 7, 139n3 and psuchê, 158n10 Putnam, Hilary, 143n29 and yin and yang , 103 Spring and Autumn Period qi (vital energy), 52, 104 (722–479 BCE), 65 state, 87–8 Records of the Grand Historian, Western conceptions, 87 see Shiji Stout, Jeffrey, 3–4 Reeder, John P., 146n26 su pu (unadorned and relativism, 23, 33–4, 37–8 simple), 90 extensive pluralistic, 34–6 “summoning the soul” (fu ), rites, see li 105–8, 159n23 Robinet, Isabelle, 166–7n37 see also soul Robins, Dan, 89 “Syncretist Chapters,” 2, 73, Roth, Harold, 7, 84–5, 130, 122–38, 165–6n19 162n45, 167n29 and commitment to Scanlon, T. M., 142n15 continuity, 127 Seidel, Anna, 76, 82, 152n46 and the “Inner Chapters,” 123–5, Sen, Amartya, 11, 82, 96, 98, 127–8, 164n13 157n42 notions of rulership, 124, Shang (ca. 1600–1045 BCE), 129–34 63, 101 and shamanism, 135–7 Sherman, Nancy, 61 Way of Heaven and Earth, 126–7, Shiji (Records of the Grand 167n29 Historian), 4, 6–7 Shijing (Book of Poetry), 66–8 Taylor, Charles, 16 “Cherry Tree” ( ), 66–7 Tian Jian (r. 264–221 BCE), 85 “Woodman’s Axe” ( ), 67–8 to preserve and accept, see zai you Shujing (Book of Documents), tong de (common power), 88, 97 64–5 transformation, see hua Index 185 true men, see zhen ren you (friend, friendship), 55, 63–8, Twiss, Sumner, 96 149n16 Yu Ying–shih, 158n11, 159n21, Universal Declaration of Human 162n46 Rights, 82 see also human rights zai you (to preserve and accept), Upright Gong, 20 82, 84, 96 utmost oneness, see zhiyi Zha Changguo ,65 zhen ren (true men), 30, 74, Van Norden, Bryan, 141n4, 115, 162n45 147–8n43 zhiyi (utmost oneness), 87, 98 Vasak, Karel, 153n7 Zhou (1045–256 BCE), 63, Vervoorn, Aat, 65–6, 150n34 65, 101 vital energy, see qi Zhouli , 105 Vlastos, Gregory, 57 Zhou Yiqun, 68–9 Zhuang Zhou . See Zhuangzi Waley, Arthur, 155n20 Zhuangzi (ca. 369–286 BCE), Walzer, Michael, 13 1–6, 37, 42, 47, 50–1, 53–4, Wang Danzhi (330–375), 1 76–7, 126–7 Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692), 1 biography, 4–6, 110 Wang Guowei , 157n5 on death, 11–12, 74, 78–9, way. See Dao 99–119 Welch, Holmes, 6 on friendship, 10–11, 72–80 White, Hayden, 154n17 on human rights, 11, 81–98 Whiting, Jennifer, 77–8 on morality, 2 Wilde, Oscar, 1 Williams, Bernard, 15 on the rites, 117–18 Wing Tsit–chan, 158n14 on the soul, 111–13 Wong, David, 34–40, 142n13, Zhuangzi’s wife, 78–9, and 145n17, 145n20, 146n22 passim. wu–wei (non–action), 96–7, Zhuangzi, 1–6, 19, 21–3, 29, 30, 123, 129 35, 41, 48–54, 63, 111–19, 121 xing (nature), 11, 47, 82, 84, butterfly dream, 42–43 89–94, 156n30 Cook Ding, 27, 29 xinzhai (fasting of the mind), and ethics of attunement, 2–3, 30, 52, 131, 147n34 5–6, 10, 35, 43, 74 Xunzi (ca. 310–219 BCE), 1, Huizi, 50, 53 36–7, 63, 70, 117, 126 “Inner Chapters,” 4–5, 30, 53, 79, 86, 123, 127–8 Yang Wangsun , 113, 118 Laozi, 55 Yangism, Yangist, 5, 37, 90 the monkey–keeper, 50 Yangzi Fayan , 101 and moral relativism, 23 “Yellow Springs” (huang quan ), normative unity of, 5–6, 86 107, 160n30 Qin Shi, 55–6 Yili , 105 “spirit man,” 152n47 186 Index

Zhuangzi—continued Yan Hui, 27, 30, 49, 52 Toeless Shushan, 76 Zigong, 51, and passim zuowang (sitting and forgetting), Wang Tai, 76 49, 147n34 Xu You, 48–9 Zuozhuan , 101–3, 106, 107