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Well Oiled RIGHTS Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea WATCH Equatorial Guinea HUMAN Well Oiled RIGHTS Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea WATCH Well Oiled Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea Copyright © 2009 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-516-4 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org July 2009 1-56432-516-4 Well Oiled Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea Map of Equatorial Guinea’s Major Offshore Oil and Gas Fields .................................................... 1 I. Summary .................................................................................................................................. 2 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 5 II. Background ............................................................................................................................. 7 The Macías Dictatorship, 1968-79 ......................................................................................... 7 Obiang—Democracy Pledged but Authoritarianism Preserved ................................................ 8 Political arrangements and regional balance of power ..................................................... 9 Political parties and the political opposition ................................................................. 10 Elections ........................................................................................................................11 Human Rights Record of Recent Governments ..................................................................... 15 The Onset of Oil .................................................................................................................. 17 III. The Equatoguinean Economy: Corrupt, Mismanaged, and Non-Transparent ......................... 19 Corruption Defining the Oil Boom ........................................................................................ 19 Nepotism ...................................................................................................................... 20 Equatorial Guinea Indications of Corruption ........................................................................ 21 The Riggs Bank scandal ................................................................................................ 21 Companies owned by government officials and the role of multinational oil companies 26 The US Securities and Exchange Commission inquiry .................................................... 32 Indications of corruption by President Obiang’s eldest son ........................................... 34 Government of Equatorial Guinea’s Response to Corruption Allegations .............................. 36 Financial Mismanagement and Lack of Transparency .......................................................... 38 Financial mismanagement in the oil sector ................................................................... 38 Efforts to improve transparency in the oil sector ............................................................ 42 IV. Impact of Corruption and Oil Revenue Mismanagement on Economic and Social Rights in Equatorial Guinea ..................................................................................................................... 45 Inadequate Funding of Health, Education, and Social Services ............................................ 46 UNESCO ........................................................................................................................ 49 The Rights to Health and Education Under International Law ............................................... 49 Equatorial Guinea’s Efforts to Fight Poverty ......................................................................... 50 V. The Government’s Record on Civil and Political Rights .......................................................... 53 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 53 Limited progress on human rights, including criminalization of torture .......................... 56 Media and Information Freedom Heavily Curtailed ............................................................... 57 Restrictions on Freedom of Assembly .................................................................................. 59 Imprisonment of Opposition Politicians and Perceived Government Opponents ................. 60 Detentions and abuse arising from coup plot allegations .............................................. 61 Other prisoner cases .................................................................................................... 66 Abduction of opposition politicians from neighbouring countries .................................. 70 Extrajudicial Killings Abroad ................................................................................................ 72 VI. The “Wonga Coup” Attempt of 2004 ..................................................................................... 73 Trials for the Coup Attempt Seriously Flawed ....................................................................... 76 Crackdown on Foreigners .................................................................................................... 81 VII. The Role of the International Community ........................................................................... 82 The United States ................................................................................................................ 82 China ................................................................................................................................. 86 Other International Actors ................................................................................................... 87 VIII. Recommendations ............................................................................................................ 88 To the government of Equatorial Guinea ............................................................................. 88 To EITI ................................................................................................................................ 88 To the US government ........................................................................................................ 88 Appendix: Letters from Oil Companies to Human Rights Watch ................................................. 90 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. 102 Map of Equatorial Guinea’s Major Offshore Oil and Gas Fields ©2009 John Emerson 1 Human Rights Watch | July 2009 I. Summary Since 1968, the year Equatorial Guinea gained independence from Spanish colonial rule, the country has been run by a succession of repressive dictatorships. Until the mid-1990s it was one of the more closed countries in the world; generally what little international comment it attracted was for its dismal human rights record. But that all changed when significant oil reserves were discovered off the country’s coast in 1995. As one of the world’s newest oil hotspots, Equatorial Guinea garners global attention as a valuable source of natural resources. Its government, however, is setting new low standards of political and economic malfeasance: billions of dollars in oil revenue have not translated into widespread economic benefits for the population or dramatic improvements in human rights, making Equatorial Guinea a classic example of an autocratic and opaque oil-rich state. After a bloody coup on August 3, 1979, Equatorial Guinea has been for some 30 years under the control of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who, together with his family and close associates, maintains almost absolute control over the country’s economic and political life. The country has become the fourth-largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa (behind only Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan) and a magnet for foreign investment in the hydrocarbons sector. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is on a par with Italy and Spain. But the broader population—just above half a million people—enjoys little of the benefit and has not been lifted from poverty, while the elite directs the country’s newfound wealth into its own pockets: the president’s son spent more than US$42 million between 2004 and 2006 on luxury houses and cars in South Africa and California, nearly a third of the total amount the government spent on social programs—including health, education, and housing—in 2005. Dating back to before the oil boom, the current regime’s efforts to control the country’s political space and economic resources have fuelled a culture of fear marked by
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