The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait

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The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait This Page Intentionally Left Blank The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait US-Taiwan Business Council May 2010 This report was published in May 2010 by the US-Taiwan Business Council. The Council is a non-profit, member-based organization dedicated to developing the trade and business relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Members consist of public and private companies with business interests in Taiwan. This report serves as one way for the Council to offer analysis and information in support of our members’ business activities in the Taiwan market. The publication of this report is part of the overall activities and programs of the Council, as endorsed by its Board of Directors. However, the views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of individual members of the Board of Directors or Executive Committee. 2010 US-Taiwan Business Council The US-Taiwan Business Council has the sole and exclusive rights to the copyrighted material contained in this report. Use of any material contained in this report for any purpose that is not expressly authorized by the US-Taiwan Business Council, or duplicating any or part of the material for any purpose whatsoever, without the prior written consent of the US-Taiwan Business Council, is strictly prohibited and unlawful. 1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1703 Arlington, Virginia 22209 Phone: (703) 465-2930 Fax: (703) 465-2937 [email protected] www.us-taiwan.org Edited by Lotta Danielsson-Murphy Printed in the United States The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword......................................................................................................................................i Executive Summary....................................................................................................................iii Introduction................................................................................................................................ 1 State of Taiwan’s Air Defense Forces........................................................................................... 3 Combat Aircraft.............................................................................................................................................. 3 Ground-Based Air Defense............................................................................................................................ 6 C4ISR.............................................................................................................................................................. 7 Comprehensive Threat Environment & Vulnerabilities ..............................................................9 China’s Offensive Missile Capability............................................................................................................. 9 Taiwan’s Air Defense Challenge.................................................................................................................. 10 Operational Issues for the Taiwan Air Force ............................................................................. 13 Block Obsolescence.......................................................................................................................................13 Material Availability .....................................................................................................................................13 Cross-Strait Air Power Balance ..................................................................................................17 Dynamic Balance Scenarios ...................................................................................................... 19 Combat Air Patrol ........................................................................................................................................ 19 Defensive Counter-Air ................................................................................................................................. 19 Maritime Strike/Anti-Invasion ...................................................................................................................20 TBM & LACM Defense.................................................................................................................................20 The Chinese SAM Threat..............................................................................................................................21 Balance Evaluation .......................................................................................................................................21 Possible Measures to Strengthen Taiwan’s Air Defense ............................................................ 23 Bridging the Fighter Gap ............................................................................................................................. 23 Mid-Life Upgrade......................................................................................................................................... 23 Ground-Based Air Defense.......................................................................................................................... 25 ISR ................................................................................................................................................................ 25 EW & IW....................................................................................................................................................... 26 Innovative and/or Asymmetrical Options ................................................................................. 29 STOVL........................................................................................................................................................... 29 Passive Defense............................................................................................................................................ 29 Counter-Strike Capability............................................................................................................................30 The Political Dimension ............................................................................................................ 33 2010 US-Taiwan Business Council www.us-taiwan.org The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait Taiwan’s Role in Supporting the U.S. Regional Strategic Presence........................................... 35 Conclusions................................................................................................................................37 Appendix................................................................................................................................... 39 Acronyms......................................................................................................................................................39 Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................43 TABLES & FIGURES Table 1: Taiwan’s Current Combat Aircraft ................................................................................. 3 Table 2: Taiwan’s Current Aircraft Deployment.......................................................................... 4 Table 3: Taiwan’s Current Ground-Based Air Defenses .............................................................. 6 Table 4: Taiwan’s Current Short-Range Air Defenses ................................................................. 6 Table 5: Estimate of Chinese Land-Attack Missiles Deployed Against Taiwan ............................ 9 Table 6: Comparison of Approximate Principal Combat Aircraft Strength................................17 Figure 1: Aircraft Deployment and Command & Control Infrastructure..................................... 5 Figure 2: Timeline Showing Projected Available Air Frames - 2009-2025 .................................15 2010 US-Taiwan Business Council www.us-taiwan.org The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait FOREWORD The US-Taiwan Business Council is committed to providing our members and the broader policy-making community with strategic insight into the bilateral relationship between the United States and Taiwan. This report is part of our continuing efforts to offer value-added benefits to all our member companies, as well as to help inform all those individuals who are actively engaged and interested in the Asia Pacific region. In 2006, Taiwan attempted to submit a Letter of Request (LOR) to the United States for Price and Availability (P&A) data for 66 F-16s to replace its aging fleet of F-5s and Mirage 2000-5s. Over the past four years, two U.S. administrations have taken the unprecedented step of denying a security partner the ability to even submit an LOR, thereby prohibiting a thorough evaluation of the legitimacy of Taiwan’s request. In the absence of any movement towards such an evaluation, Congress took it upon itself - in the spirit of cooperation embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) - to instruct the Obama Administration to undertake such a review. On October 28, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Upon enactment of the legislation, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) received instruction from Congress directing it to submit a “Report on Taiwan’s Air Defense Forces” within 90 days. The directive report language stated: Report on Taiwan’s Air Defense Forces.
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