A Common Setting for Naval Planning in Southeast Asia? Two Case Studies in Divergence

CHAPTER 3

YingHui Lee and Collin Koh Swee Lean

Abstract Two examples of naval development (Thailand and the Philippines) not treated elsewhere in the book are used to show that although there are common threats and challenges in Southeast Asia, especially growing competition between China and the United States and the jurisdictional dispute in the South China Sea, each country’s approach to them is distinctive. keywords Naval modernisation · Philippines · Thailand · Problems Strategic Consequences · South China Sea

Y. Lee (*) Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China e-mail: [email protected] C. Koh Swee Lean Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Blk S4 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798, Singapore e-mail: [email protected]

Introduction Many Southeast Asian navies are expanding their feets while at the same time also acquiring more advanced platforms, weapons and equipment. This is in part spurred by a general increase in military spending in the region. Data by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that military spending by Southeast Asian countries increased 50% over the last 10 years, from in US$ 25.8 billion in 2004 to US$38.7 billion in 2014.1 This has sparked off debates about whether a naval arms race is underway in this region.2 However, naval modernisation programmes in Southeast Asia are driven by a multitude of domestic concerns as well as strategic rationales. It would also be over-simplistic to assume a one-size-fts-all model for naval capability development in the region. A 2008 Australia Strategic Policy Institute study on military modernisation in Southeast Asia cor- rectly noted that “many different motivations exist concurrently, and the resources that various countries can bring to bear vary markedly, result- ing in a many-faceted picture”.3 Naval modernisation in this region is in part driven by structural factors such as the provisions outlined under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as the enduring importance of safeguarding the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) so critical for national socioeconomic development. There are also common maritime security concerns, for example piracy and armed rob- bery against ships in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the South China Sea,4 which require responses from robust naval resources. All these feature as important general considerations behind some Southeast Asian navies’ quest for a “green-water” capability.5 However, individual countries have different threat perceptions which determine the amount of budgetary resources their governments are willing to allocate to their navies. While the limelight has often focused on those Southeast Asian navies—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam— which has to date embarked on signifcant modernisation programmes by virtue of the sophisticated capabilities procured to date, the efforts undertaken by other, so-called “lesser players” should not be overlooked. The Philippines and Thailand present interesting case studies in this respect. Each of them confronts a different variation of traditional and nontraditional maritime challenges and this is refected in their naval capacity development priorities—despite both being military allies of Washington and equally facing severe resource constraints. Using these 3 A COMMON SETTING FOR NAVAL PLANNING … 35 two Southeast Asian navies, this chapter shows how countries in Southeast Asia approach and prioritise their naval capacity development differently as a result of differing threat perceptions in the face of fscal constraints. There is no one-size-fts-all model for naval capacity development in Southeast Asia despite sharing some common driving forces.

The Case of the Philippines

Myriad of Challenges The Philippine case is interesting because the country faces a myriad of both traditional and nontraditional challenges. Manila has traditionally been preoccupied with internal security concerns, especially in the restive southern provinces. As such, the Philippine Navy (PN) has not given as much attention to external defence vis-à-vis supporting the ground forces’ counter-insurgency operations. However, in the recent years, tensions have brewed up in the South China Sea (SCS), where the Philippines contests territorial and sovereignty claims, compelling Manila to pay more attention to external defence. This was especially following April 2012, when the PN engaged in a standoff with Chinese coastguards over the Scarborough Shoal and Beijing has since taken de facto control over the feature—the worst Sino—Philippine standoff in the SCS since the Mischief Reef incident in 1994–1995. About 3 months after, Beijing offcially established the Sansha city and a prefecture-level municipal government on Woody Island to administer Chinese-claimed SCS features and adjacent waters, including the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands, and the Scarborough Shoal.6 At the same time, Beijing also approved the formal establishment of a military garrison in Sansha city.7 According to Rory Medcalf, the “pro- nouncement of a garrison is symbolic” as it signifes that Beijing is “placing a frm military marker on China’s claim in the South China Sea”.8 These moves added onto the supposed mention of the SCS as one of China’s core interests—on a par with Tibet and Taiwan—by some Chinese offcials during closed-door meetings with the US in 2010,9 further raised fears of possible military confrontations over the disputed islands and sea. Meanwhile, although Manila managed to sign a peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), there appears no relief from its internal security concerns. Maritime terrorism has also become a thorny issue, especially when militant organisations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) continue to be active, using waters bordering 36 Y. LEE AND C. KOH SWEE LEAN

Indonesia and the Philippines as gateways to travel within Southeast Asia.10 The explosion of Superferry 14 which claimed almost a hundred lives, on 27 February 2004 highlighted the ASG’s ability to carry out acts of maritime terrorism.11 Most recently between late March and early April, Indonesian and Malaysian seamen were abducted when their tug- boats were boarded by ASG gunmen in two separate incidents.12

Too Few Resources Notwithstanding the maritime nature of many of its traditional and nontraditional security concerns, the PN lags behind many of its ASEAN counterparts in terms of naval capabilities.13 Once hailed as the model navy of the region during the 1950s and 60s,14 the PN quickly deterio- rated in the 1970s mainly as a result of mounting internal security issues. The American withdrawal from Subic Bay and subsequent termination of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991 exacerbated this deterioration, given that Manila has traditionally depended on the US security umbrella, along with generous American military aid, for external defence. The Philippines thus has to take up greater responsibility; despite an alliance treaty still in force that obliges Washington to come to its assistance should it ever come under external attack, including its territorial seas and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).15 Manila recognised the need for a modern navy capable of defending its sea in 1995 when the PN was left defenceless against Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef. This led to the frst Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) modernisation attempt through the passing of the AFP Modernization Act in Congress in 1995.16 Specifcally in response to the need for naval modernisation, the Naval Modernization Offce was established that same year. At present, the bulk of the PN mainly comprises obsolete, ageing, vin- tage equipment—including ships dating back to the Second World War. Furthermore, the PN is essentially weak in all dimensions of naval warfare: no offensive anti-surface strike, anti-submarine and counter-mine warfare capabilities, anti-air defences comprising just guns, an atrophying amphibious sealift force, as well as just a tiny pool of obsolete, short-range maritime patrol aircraft barely suffcient to cover the entire archipelago. It does not help that counter-insurgency requirements in the 1990s and early 2000s forced the government to prioritise the Philippine Army (PA), which consumes a large proportion of the AFP annual budget. Current modernisation plans are based on the Strategic Sail Plan 2020, formulated by the PN in 2006, which provides a roadmap for the 3 A COMMON SETTING FOR NAVAL PLANNING … 37 modernisation of the navy into “a credible navy that [the Philippines] can be proud of” by 2020.17 This corresponds with President Benigno Aquino III’s plan for the AFP to achieve a “minimum credible deter- rent”, for which a total of US$ 1.8 billion has been earmarked over 5 years. The funding has to some extent enabled the PN to make some improvements to its feet using a mix of new-build and second-hand equipment procured overseas. Additionally, Washington announced in April 2016 a military aid package in excess of US$ 120 million.18 Under the Aquino Administration the navy has seen hardware improvements with the limited funds available. So far, Manila has acquired two ex-US Coast Guard Hamilton-class coast guard cutters under a grant programme in 2011 and a third one to soon follow.19 A pair of Strategic Sealift Vessels (SSVs), based on the Indonesian Navy’s Makassar-class landing platform dock, are under construction in Indonesia; the frst ship is expected to enter service in May 2016.20 Talks are held with Japan to lease Maritime Self Defense Force TC-90 planes, retroftted for maritime surveillance, to reinvigorate the Naval Air Group.21 The PN is also poised to acquire two missile-armed frigates, with an Indian shipbuilder having entered the post-qualifcation process.22 A pair of AW159 Wildcat anti- submarine helicopters—the next signifcant naval helicopter deal following the purchase of AW-109E light helicopters in 2012—was also ordered. When based on board the new frigates,23 the Wildcat will confer upon the PN a three-dimensional capability for the very frst time. Manila has also made signifcant steps to ease the procurement process for high-tech military equipment. In May 2014, The Senate fnance committee approved a bill amending the 2003 Government Procurement Reform Act to allow for major arms procurement without the need for public tenders.24 Yet despite these measures, PN acquisitions thus far remain modest at best, given the size of the Philippine maritime zone. Funding for further enhancements remains limited for the time being. To date, the PN’s budgetary allocations continue to pale in compari- son to the PA’s, despite the worsening SCS situation following China’s island-building and fortifcation activities. According to the 2015 national budget, the PA was allocated P41.2 billion, whereas the PN a measly P13.4 billion.25 To compound the situation, there are outstand- ing capability gaps the PN has yet to fll. For instance, Manila’s desire for submarines26 will remain a pipe-dream for now. Given the slow, at best uncertain, pace of PN modernisation (and for that matter, the AFP as a whole), other alternative, austerity measures are needed. 38 Y. LEE AND C. KOH SWEE LEAN

Fortuitously, Manila could still count on its mutual defence treaty with the US despite uncertainties regarding Washington’s commitment to regional security,27 and its involvement in the event of war in the Spratlys. In a way, this alleviates the pressure on Manila to fully bear the external defence burden. The 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement fnally moved forward after almost of 2 years of delay in implementation. This will see the US military stationing troops and materiel in fve AFP bases.28 The recent election of President Duerte, however, seems likely to result in quite a substantial reset of US–Philippine security relationships, and there is even talk of his con- ducting a “pivot” towards China which could well result in the acquisition of Chinese platforms, weaponry and sensors on economically advantageous terms which would at once reduce the burden of both commitments and of the resources needed to meet them.29 But Manila is certainly aware of the limitations of both its naval modernisation efforts and especially after President Duerte’s election of the prospects of a military alliance with the US. To optimise its scarce resources, it has attempted to rationalise and promote inter-agency approaches to its maritime problems. Earlier, in late March 2016, Manila had already formed a high-level task force comprising of several government departments and security agencies to synchronize a “unifed” government action towards the SCS.30

The Case of Thailand

A More Peaceful Context Compared to the Philippines, Thailand faces a relatively calm strategic maritime environment given the lack of territorial conficts in the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, where Thailand has managed to delimit overlapping EEZs with its neighbours through diplomatic negotiations. Notably in October 1979, Thailand signed a treaty with Malaysia to delimit their territorial seas,31 and in August 1997 Thailand again suc- cessfully concluded a pact with Vietnam settling the maritime boundary dispute in the Gulf of Thailand.32 Although Thailand still has existing sea borders which remain undefned—notably with Cambodia—despite occasional skirmishes in the 1990s, both countries managed to reach a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a Joint Development Area (JDA).33 3 A COMMON SETTING FOR NAVAL PLANNING … 39

Meanwhile, Thailand being a non-claimant has little to be concerned about in the SCS. Furthermore, despite being a traditional US ally, Thailand has constantly maintained friendly relations with rising pow- ers in the region, for example China. Therefore, unlike the Philippines, Thailand does not feel as much pressure in external defence, at least in the maritime realm even though it still confronts land-based border dis- putes with, notably, Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple. However, for Thailand nontraditional challenges have been of more pressing security concern though many of these are terrestrial in nature. For example, although the land border with Myanmar has mostly been settled, Bangkok continues to face occasional refugee infux across the border due to the ethnic confict in north-eastern Myanmar. In the South, Muslim-inspired insurgency has persisted since 2004. On 13 February 2013, a military base in Narathiwat province was assaulted by some 60 insurgents.34 This prompted the deployment of a large number of army personnel in those provinces, thereby demonstrating the pri- oritisation of landward defence in Thai strategic thinking. Where nontraditional maritime challenges are concerned, an especially thorny challenge stems from seaborne irregular migration/human traffcking. Many Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand, had to deal with a large infux of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh and Myanmar at sea in recent times.35 The boat refugee crisis began in 2015, with 25,000 people undertaking the perilous voyage across the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea in the frst 3 months alone, twice as many in the same period in 2014.36 Many of them also fall victim to human traffcking and slavery.37 In addition, the use of naval forces by some countries to turn back those boats led to accusations of mistreatment. This includes Bangkok’s new “push-out” policy where refugees arriving on Thai shores are towed back into international waters with little food and water, and alleged use of force.38 Also, Thailand has long struggled to deal with the issue of fsh slavery—concerning forced labour and exploitation aboard illegal fshing vessels. Bangkok has since cracked down on human traffcking in the fshing industry, leading to the arrest of more than 100 people in 2015 but slavery in the Thai fshing industry remains a serious problem.39

In Austerity Mode The tough balancing act between controlling refugee infux and providing humanitarian assistance on the one hand, and curbing illegal fshing 40 Y. LEE AND C. KOH SWEE LEAN on the other, constitute a major challenge for the Royal Thai Navy (RTN). Moreover, in addition to protecting Thai territorial integrity and enforcement against nontraditional maritime challenges, the White Paper “Defense of Thailand 2008” tasked the RTN with the responsibility of assisting in international affairs.40 The navy has become a perma- nent contributor to the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 counter-piracy operations off Somalia, where Thai vessels were involved in some hijack- ing incidents. This is in addition to RTN’s offcial involvement with the Malacca Straits Patrol in September 2008.41 Since the 1990s, the RTN has endeavoured to shift from purely coastal defence to limited blue-water capabilities. This was refected in the focus on bolstering the surface feet including new Chinese-built frigates and a Spanish-built light aircraft carrier HTMS Chakri Naruebet. Commissioned in 1997, the carrier was equipped with Sea Harrier ver- tical short take-off and landing fghters and Seahawk helicopters, and intended to serve various roles including as an offshore base for disaster relief missions. However, the Sea Harriers were already decommissioned, leaving only helicopters on board.42 The 1990s was the RTN’s “golden era”, especially since it was the only ASEAN navy with a carrier. However, funding constraints—a problem that has afficted the RTN since the economic crisis of 1997— continue to persist. This limits acquisitions for the enhancement of its blue-water capabilities. In August 2013, it commissioned the frst BAE Systems-designed offshore patrol vessel, HTMS Krabi. In February 2016, the navy announced the acquisition of a second vessel equipped with Harpoon surface-to-surface guided missile system43—constituting an almost 3-year gap. The purchase of a second frigate with Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering—some 2 years after the frst ship was contracted in 2013—took place.44 But whether the deal will be struck remains a huge question mark. Although funding for the RTN has increased over the years, the Royal Thai Army—given its dominance in Thai politics and domestic political instability in recent years—has received a large proportion of the military budget.45 For now, with the submarine project stalled and besides the small, incremental additions to its surface feet—mainly comprising home-built patrol and combat vessels tailored for coastal duties46— the RTN has to content itself with upgrading the Chakri Naruebet and Chinese-built Naresuan-class frigates. 3 A COMMON SETTING FOR NAVAL PLANNING … 41

Conclusions This brief discussion demonstrates that notwithstanding certain common structural factors—for example the provisions of international maritime law and general desire to safeguard access to SLOCs—there are different approaches to naval capacity development in Southeast Asia. The Philippine and Thai case studies exemplify that, there is no “one-size-fts-all” model, given each of them faces a different set of threat perceptions, even as both countries share commonalities—facing signifcant resource constraints on the one hand and until recently at any rate being allies of the US.

Notes 1. Data obtained from the SIPRI Military Expenditures Database. Figures quoted are in constant 2014 USD. Southeast Asia here refers to the countries within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Timor Leste. Data from 1988 to 2015 is available for download online at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/ milex_database. 2. Read for instance, Carl Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, ASPI Strategy Series (Australia: Australia Strategic Policy Institute Limited, 2010), 1–68; and Richard Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 32, No. 1 (April 2010), 50–69. 3. Andrew Davis, Asian Military Trends and Their Implications for Australia (Australia: Australia Strategic Policy Institute Limited, 2008), 2. 4. There was an increase in the number of reported incidents (actual and attempted) in recent years, with reported incidents increasing from 133 in 2012 to 200 in 2015, and a 7% year-on-year increase from 2014 to 2015. However, there was also a general downward trend since August 2015, except for a slight increase between December 2015 and January 2016. ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, Annual Report 2015 (Singapore: ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, 2016); ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, Monthly Report: Report for February 2016 (Singapore: ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, 2016). 5. Generally, navies can be classifed into brown-, green-, blue-water and global categories. A global navy can exert worldwide presence and oper- ate independently on a continuous basis in more than one regional ocean basin. A bluewater navy possesses open-ocean capability beyond the EEZ with external support for short durations, and it is capable of extra-regional 42 Y. LEE AND C. KOH SWEE LEAN

deployments. A brownwater navy is a coastal defense force largely limited to territorial and inland waters. A greenwater navy falls in between brown- and bluewater; primarily oriented towards EEZ operations while possessing a limited, secondary ability to conduct “out-of-the-area” missions. Thomas J. Hirschfeld, Multinational Naval Cooperation Options (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1993), p. 12; James L. Lacy, Between Worlds: Europe and the Seas in Arms Control (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, August 1990), p. 22. 6. “China establishes Sansha City,” Xinhua, 24 July 2012. 7. “Sansha military garrison established,” China Daily, 27 July 2012. 8. “China’s Newest City Raises Threat of Confict in South China Sea,” Time, 24 July 2012. 9. Susan V. Lawrence and Thomas Lum, “U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, 12 January 2011. 10. Senia Febrica, “Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Maritime Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 8 No. 3, June 2014, 64. 11. Frederick Chew, “Piracy, maritime terrorism and regional interest,” Geddes Papers, 2005, p. 75. Available online at: http://www.defence.gov. au/ADC/Publications/Geddes/2005/PublcnsGeddes2005_310310_ PiracyMaritime.pdf. 12. “Philippines’ Abu Sayyaf abducts 10 Indonesian sailors,” Reuters News, 28 March 2016; “Suspected Filipino militants kidnap 4 Malaysian boat crew- men,” Associated Press Newswires, 2 April 2016. 13. Sam Bateman, “Naval Balance in Southeast Asia: Search for Stability,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 11 May 2005. 14. For a discussion on the state of the PN in the 1950s and 60s, see Regino Giagonia, The Philippine Navy (1898–1996) (Manila: Headquarter of the Philippine Navy, 1997). 15. Because Washington takes no sides on the merit of competing SCS claims, whether it will come to the Philippines’ rescue, should the latter be embroiled in fghting over the dispute, remains uncertain. In December 1996, US military offcials reportedly rejected Manila’s call to include the Spratly Islands in a bilateral Mutual Defense Board meeting. “US refuses to include Spratlys in defense treaty with Manila,” Agence France-Presse, 10 December 1996. Yet in 1997, Pacifc Command Chief Admiral Joseph Prueher said that Manila could rely on Washington’s help if war breaks out in the disputed waters. Luz Baguioro, “US ‘will help Manila in case of war’,” Straits Times, 19 June 1997. Then, in June 2011, doubt was cast on whether Washington will indeed help Manila as per the 1951 treaty. “Philippine vice-president wants US to clarify help in case of Spratlys war,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacifc, 20 June 20 2011. 3 A COMMON SETTING FOR NAVAL PLANNING … 43

16. The Corpus Juris, “An Act Providing for the Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and for Other Purposes,” Republic Act No. 7898, Congress of the Philippines, 23 February 1995. Available online at: http:// www.thecorpusjuris.com/legislative/republic-acts/ra-no-7898.php. 17. Quoted from Rommel C. Banlaoi, Philippine Naval Modernization: Current State and Continuing Challenges (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012), 21. 18. Manila received USD50 million in military aid from Washington in 2015, but will be receiving USD79 million in 2016, and an additional USD42 million from the newly-created Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative that the US Government utilizes to assist in regional maritime security capacity-building efforts. “Philippines gets U.S. military aid boost amid South China Sea dispute,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. 19. “3rd US warship due this year to boost PH’s maritime security,” Manila Bulletin, 15 March 15 2016. 20. “‘BRP Tarlac’ joins PH naval force in May,” Manila Bulletin, 23 January 2016. 21. Aurea Calica, “Government to lease 5 Japanese aircraft for maritime patrol,” The Philippine Star, 10 March 2016. 22. Priam F. Nepomuceno, “Indian shipbuilder undergoing post-qualifcation process for DND’s frigate program,” Philippines News Agency, 31 March 2016. 23. “PH eyes 2 anti-sub choppers, 2 frigates,” Manila Standard, 31 March 2016. 24. Senate, An Act Amending Sect. 53 of Republic Act No. 9184, Otherwise Known as the ‘Government Procurement Reform Act,’ and for Other Purposes, 16th Philippines Congress, Senate Committee Report No. 355, 28 May 2014. 25. Department of Budget and Management, “Appropriations and Obligations: Department of National Defence,” in National Expenditure Program 2015 (Manila: Department of Budget and Management 2015). Available online at: http://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/ NEP2015/Volume%20III/DND/DND.pdf 26. Jaime Laude, “Noy mulls submarine force for Philippine defense,” The Philippine Star, 31 March 2016. 27. For a discussion on US commitment to Southeast Asia, refer to: Parameswaran Ponnudurai, “Obama’s Asia Trip Uncertainty Raises U.S. Commitment Questions,” Radio Free Asia, 3 October 2013. 28. EDCA’s legality was upheld by the Supreme Court in January 2016, thereby allowing the pact to be implemented. Jose Katigbak, “US, Phl agree on 5 base locations under EDCA,” The Philippine Star, 20 March 2016. 44 Y. LEE AND C. KOH SWEE LEAN

29. Mark J Valencia ‘Ties with South-east Asia: Can US put the genie back in the bottle?’ and Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘China needs ‘lose-win’ diplo- macy in Asean,’ The Straits Times, 3 Nov 2016. 30. The task force, as specifed under Memorandum Circular No. 94 issued by Aquino, is chaired by the National Security Advisor and comprises various departments, in particular National Defense and Foreign Affairs, as well as the AFP, Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine National Police- Maritime Group. “PNoy creates task force for unifed action on West Philippine Sea issue,” Manila Bulletin, 25 March 2016. 31. “Treaty between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia relating to the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the two Countries 24 October 1979,” United Nations, 24 October 1979. 32. “Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Thailand, 9 August 1997,” United Nations, 9 August 1997. For further information on the background to the dispute and negotiation process, see: Nguyen Hong Trao, “Vietnam’s First Maritime Boundary Agreement,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Autumn 1997, 74–78. Notably, Thailand has also signed various other accords with Myanmar and Indonesia on the delimitation of maritime boundaries. 33. David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith, International Maritime Boundaries Volume V, The American Society of International Law (The Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005), 3742–3744. 34. Amy Sawitta Lefevre, “Thai insurgents attack southern army base, troops kill 16,” Reuters, 13 February 2013. 35. Al-Zaquan Amer Hamzah and Aubrey Belford, “Pressure mounts on Myanmar over Asia ‘boat people’ crisis,” Reuters, 17 May 2015; “The Rohingya boat crisis: why refugees are feeing Burma,” The Week, 21 May 2015. 36. Tom Miles, “Bay of Bengal people-smuggling doubles in 2015: UNHCR,” Reuters, 8 May 2015. 37. Beh Lih Yi, “Malaysia tells thousands of Rohingya refugees to ‘go back to your country’,” The Guardian, 13 May 2015. 38. See for example, “Govt denies navy threatened migrant boat with gun- fre,” Bangkok Post, May 21, 2015; Paul Chambers, “Thailand Must End Its Own Rohingya Atrocity”, The Diplomat, 23 October 2015. 39. Thai authorities began a large-scale crackdown following the threat of an EU-wide boycott on seafood imports from Thailand last year. Kate Hodal, “Slavery and traffcking continue in Thai fshing industry, claim activist,” The Guardian, 25 February 2016. 3 A COMMON SETTING FOR NAVAL PLANNING … 45

40. Ministry of Defence, Defense of Thailand 2008 (Thailand: Ministry of Defence, 200), 33ff. 41. “Thailand embarks on maritime security cooperation,” The Nation, 6 October 2008. 42. Wassana Nanuam, “MILITARY - ‘Chakri Naruebet’ gets new lease of life,” Bangkok Post, 24 December 2015. 43. Ridzwan Rahmat, “Thailand to arm second OPV with Harpoon missiles,” Jane’s Navy International, 29 February 2016. 44. Jon Grevatt, “DSME discusses second frigate and submarine procurement with Royal Thai Navy,” Jane’s Navy International, 3 November 2015. 45. Traditionally, the Army receives around 50% of the defence budget while the Navy and Air Force receives around 22% each. Jon Grevatt, “Thailand increase defence budget by 7%,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 April 2015. 46. Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, “Marsun signs M58 contract with Thai navy, set for more orders in 2014,” Jane’s Navy International, 24 January 2014.

Authors’ Biography YingHui Lee is a Ph.D. candidate at Shanghai Jiaotong University. She took her frst degree at the University of Reading in the UK and her Masters at Peking University, before working as a research analyst for the Maritime Security Programme at the RSIS.

Collin Koh Swee Lean is a Research Fellow at the Maritime Security Programme, part of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies which is a con- stituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). He is especially interested in researching on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacifc, focusing on Southeast Asia in particular, and generally issues related to naval technologies, naval modernization, naval arms control, and the offence-defence theory. Collin also taught at the Military Studies Programme and taught various professional military education and training courses with the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute. Prior to joining the Maritime Security Programme, Collin worked at the Military Studies Programme (2010–14) and the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (2008–10), also at RSIS. 本文献由“学霸图书馆-文献云下载”收集自网络，仅供学习交流使用。

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