Unit: The Foundations of Pluralism in Judaism Introducing Tarbut HaMachloket

1. Unit Overview After the Chagim are over, the teacher should move into the “core curriculum” on Tarbut HaMachloket.

The teacher of this course in particular, and any teacher in a Jewish pluralistic setting, needs to formulate his or her own clear understanding of pluralism. What does pluralism mean to you as a Jew? How is it different from relativism and tolerance? What are the inherent problems and advantages to a pluralistic model of Judaism? How do you deal with those problems? What issues arise in a pluralistic Jewish educational setting? Thus, before even tackling how to teach pluralism, the teacher should grapple with his or her own understanding of pluralism in Judaism.

Perhaps the central question students will tackle in this opening unit is, “How is a community able to permit freedom of thought and action, but still remain a unified group?” Pluralism and democracy rests upon the individual’s freedom of choice and having many options to choose from. Judaism (at first glance) seems to rest upon a central authority with only one correct view (that of God’s). Does Judaism and pluralism contradict each other? Can modern Jews such as our students be both “authentically Jewish” and still be pluralistic? Is there a contradiction between the values of Judaism and those of democracy or pluralism?

The main idea is how to successfully live in diverse environments with people you may not agree with. So while students certainly spend ample time learning about how to create thriving pluralistic Jewish communities from a religious standpoint, this curriculum also spends a good deal of the year focusing on “non-religious topics”, like how to get along with friends you disagree with, how to get along with parents, and how to get along with non-Jews who don’t share your outlook on life.

The material in this unit looks at how to create this respectful dialogue, not only amongst the community leaders but amongst everyone in the community. Students will learn primary Jewish texts throughout Jewish history which pertain to this topic of Jewish pluralism. The assumption is that one can learn much from the successes—and failures—of the Jews over the millennia as they coped with the issues of living in diverse communities.

This unit will be focusing on the classic case of machloket in Jewish history, that of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. 1 The teacher should master introductory material on the historical circumstances surrounding the times when Hillel and Shammai lived, as well as their immediate disciples.

In general, Babylonian-born Hillel migrated to Israel in the first century BCE to study, and worked as a woodcutter, eventually becoming the most influential force in Jewish life. The Hillel dynasty ended with the death of Hillel II in 365 CE. Hillel’s adversary was Palestinian-born Shammai, about whom little is known except that he was a builder, known for the strictness of his views. He was reputed to be dour, quick-tempered and impatient. Both lived during the reign of King Herod (37- 4 BCE), an oppressive period in Jewish history because of the Roman occupation of Palestine. Shammai was concerned that if Jews had too much contact with the Romans, the Jewish community would be weakened, and this attitude was reflected in his strict interpretation of Jewish law. Hillel did not entirely share Shammai's fear and therefore was more liberal in his view of law. 2

Hillel was chosen by the Sanhedrin, the supreme Jewish court, to serve as its Nasi (president). While Hillel and Shammai themselves did not differ on a great many basic issues of Jewish law, their disciples were often in conflict, and it is how they approached their differences of opinion that will be the focus of this unit. The Talmud records over 300 differences of opinion between Beit Hillel (the House of Hillel) and Beit Shammai (the House of Shammai). The Rabbis of the Talmud generally sided with the rulings of the School of Hillel, although as we will learn, the Sages believed that both views were valid.

1 One might ask where “Tanur shel Achnai” is in this curriculum. It certainly has its place thematically. However, I don’t think it’s appropriate to teach it to most young, community day school audiences. My own experience learning that text at a young age, coming from a nonOrthodox background in which I hadn’t yet “bought into the system” of Rabbinic Judaism, actually turned me (and others) off to Rabbinic Judaism. I reacted negatively to what I felt was the sheer audacity of mortal rabbis arguing with God, beating God, and God supposedly being happy—it was unpersuasive, selfserving, and unbelievable. And that sugiya was taught by one of the best teachers I’ve ever had. Now that I’ve matured religiously, I see it as a powerful, influential text. I think the same message of that text can be better taught by presenting other less problematic rabbinic texts, which you’ll find in this curriculum. Tanur shel Achnai can and should wait until they mature religiously.

2 From jewishvirtuallibrary.org The purpose of this unit is not to simply learn Jewish history, or to simply study the history of the conflicts between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Rather, these studies ask the question of whether Judaism (as seen through Chazal/the Sages) views this classic machloket as positive or negative. What did they want the Jewish people for millennia afterwards to learn from it? How can Jews in pluralistic settings today conduct themselves based upon the values taught in these sources? In short, this curriculum presents history and texts as a guide to behavior and a source of Jewish identity. These texts teach that Tarbut HaMachloket is a positive value to be emulated in Jewish communities today.

This unit will focus on five central issues (many issues will overlap, obviously):

Part 1: The attitude and relationship towards the person with whom you disagree. Is it possible (or desirable) to disagree with someone yet still give them respect? What ways of arguing contribute to creating a respectful relationship between those who argue? Is the pursuit of your truth the most important value, or is the pursuit of peace more important, even if it means you must compromise your truth?

Part 2: Social coexistence in a culture of disagreement. Is it better to back down from your position for the sake of peaceful coexistence? Is it possible to peacefully coexist with those whom you disagree without backing down?

Part 3: The potential for communal confusion in a pluralistic model. Can the claim that “both sides are correct” withstand scrutiny? How can a community live with the notion that there is no clear final answer to an issue? How can an individual really be expected to repress his own opinion for the sake of the community?

Part 4: The impact of Tarbut HaMachloket on a community. Does machloket help or hurt a community? Should one who argues or disagrees with the majority be praised, or condemned?

Part 5: Authority and dissent. Is it preferred for an individual to act on the basis of personal reasoning or on the basis of the official rulings of society? Can one distinguish between expressing dissent on a theoretical level versus a level of action? How is one to act when one completely disagrees with the communal decision of “experts”? Is individual dissent ever permissible? To what extent? 2. Opening the Unit Start off with the following, instead of jumping into Text 1. These pre-thinking exercises will help the students start grappling with the issues we will be discussing.

Consider showing your class a British parliamentary debate (such as one videotaped from C-Span). If possible, you could show a Knesset debate. One might think that parliamentary debates are civil, especially in England, but oftentimes that couldn’t be further from the truth. In contrast to the rather civil debate one finds in American government, the British parliament is quite spirited and vigorous in their debating. Their debates, even (especially) when the Prime Minister is involved, can look like a dogfight. What do your students think of such a system of debate? It’s almost certain to be something foreign to them.

On the one hand, there’s much to dislike about such a system. People’s feelings could get hurt because of they way they are spoken to; one might feel as if their opinions are being dismissed or not listened to; the overall culture of argument might simply look unappealing and uncivil; someone might feel disrespected; the “loser” in the debate might feel as if his truth has been trampled on—why/when should he back down? On the other hand, there is much to respect about such a system. Perhaps the most striking thing is that such vigorous debate never leads to sectarianism. In other words, all of the sides are able to passionately offer their opinion, yet no group secedes from the parliament; there is strong unity amidst vigorous debate about “the truth”. Why do the students think this is so? What conditions need to be met in order for such a system to work? By analyzing the pros and cons of this system, the students will begin thinking about many of the issues involved in a pluralistic community.

You may also want to do the following exercise 3, as a follow up to the previous one or as an alternative to it. Split the class into two. Half of the students have to write reasons why arguing is bad. The other half have to write reasons why arguing can be good. Bring them together in pairs to compare and discuss giving concrete examples of disputes they have witnessed. As a pair they have to come up with a statement: Can arguing ever be good? If it can be good, what are the conditions that have to be present for an argument being a good one?

3 Suggested by Noam Zion and Steve Israel, Elu v’Elu curriculum Bring everyone together and discuss the issue. List on the board why arguments can be bad, why they can be good, and what the difference is between the two (i.e. what conditions have to be fulfilled in order for an argument to be considered a good one).

They can argue passionately but must stick to the principles of constructive argument that were mapped out before by the whole group. Maybe each group could have an observer whose task is to assess the “Culture of Argument” or “Dissent” in the group and to stop them if they cross any red lines. As a whole group, discuss the issue briefly but spend time discussing the way that the issue was discussed. If you have stationed observers, get reports from them.

Part 1: Truth versus Peace Ideally, the students will organically anticipate the idea that one’s motivation is crucial when considering whether an argument is a “good one” or a “bad one”. In other words, perhaps since the members of parliament are all arguing for the sake of the betterment of their state, their debates are positive in nature. Of course, the opposite may be true if they are arguing from more of a partisan, selfish point of view. Perhaps when a student raises this point (which may be after the teacher teases it out of the students), the teacher can note that the same point the student just made was also articulated in the Mishnah:

Text 1, Pirkei Avot 5:17

This is a part of the Mishna (Oral Law) which contains the moral and ethical and philosophical teachings of about sixty great Rabbis over a period of some five hundred years .

כל מחלוקת שהיא לש שמי סופה להתקיי ושאינה לש שמי אי סופה להתקיי איזו היא מחלוקת שהוא לש שמי זו מחלוקת הלל ושמאי ושאינה לש שמי זו מחלוקת קרח וכל עדתו : :

Any argument which is for the sake of Heaven, its end will endure, but one that is not for the sake of Heaven, its end will not endure. What is an argument for the sake of Heaven? The arguments of Hillel and Shammai. And one that is not for the sake of Heaven? The arguments of Korach and his company.

Even though the students will have already learned in years past what the Mishnah is, the teacher should make a point of reviewing it. Remember, a goal is trying to increase their “Jewish literacy”. An excellent resource is Joseph Telushkin’s book, Jewish Literacy , which can help easily explain terms and concepts.

Depending on the level and class makeup, the students might read the texts in this curriculum in Hebrew or English, in chevruta, alone, or as a class. It is preferable that the students try to translate the Hebrew/Aramaic sources by themselves first, with a lexicon. The teacher could then facilitate a discussion with the class based upon the analysis provided below.

After trying to translate Text 1, how did your students translate “l’shem shamayim” and “sofa l’hitkayem”? One way of translating “l’shem shamayim” is the literal translation, “For God’s sake” or “For Heaven’s sake”. What impact would that translation have? It would severely limit the scope of “legitimate disagreement” because there would be only one correct view—there would be only one truth, which actually hinders the succesful creation of a pluralistic community. In contrast, look at how Mibartenura and Rabeinu Yonah translate our mishnah:

Text 2, Rabeinu Ovadiah Mibartenura

Wrote one of the classic commentaries on the Mishnah. Italy, Jerusalem, 1445-1510.

" כל מחלוקת שהיא לש שמי סופה להתקיי"— ואני שמעתי פירוש " סופה " = תכליתה המבוקש מענינה. 1 ) והמחלוקת שהיא לש שמי : התכלית והסו המבוקש מאותה מחלוקת להסיג האמת . וזה מתקיי כמו שאומרי " מתו הוויכוח יתברר האמת " , כמו שנתבאר במחלוקת הלל ושמאי שהלכה כבית הלל. 2 ) והמחלוקת שאינה לש שמי : תכלית הנרצה בה בקשת השררה ואהבת הניצוח . וזה הסו אינו מתקיי כמו שמצינו במחלוקת קרח ועדתו שהתכלית וסו כוונת הייתה בקשת הכבוד והשררה והיו להיפ . .

“Any argument which is for the sake of Heaven, its end will endure”—I heard the meaning of “its end ” is “its purpose ” (eg its enduring essence).

1) An argument that is for the sake of Heaven: [This means] that the purpose (the “end” ) of such an argument is only to reach the truth. And this [truth] will endure, as the saying goes, “From argument will emerge truth”. This is just like how the truth emerged in the arguments between Hillel and Shammai that the law is according to Beit Hillel.

2) An argument that is not for the sake of Heaven: [This means] that the purpose of such an argument is only the desire of power and the love of victory. And this type of argument will not endure, as we found in the arguments of Korach and his company. Their purpose (their “ end ”) was the [selfish] desire for honor and power, but which actually led to the exact opposite outcome.

Text 3, Rabeinu Yonah

A great 13 th century rabbinic scholar from Gerona, Spain.

כל מחלוקת וכו ' לומר כי מה שאמר כל מחלוקת שהיא לש שמי סופה להתקיי הכונה שלעול יתקיימו במחלוקת היו יחלוקו בדבר א ' למחר בדבר אחר למחלוקת יהיה קיי ונמש ביניה כל ימי חייה ולא עוד אלא שאור ימי ושנות חיי יוסיפו לה ושאינה לשו שמי אי סופה להתקיי רק במחלוקת הראשו יספרו יתמו וש ימותו כמחלוקת של קרח : :

“Any argument…”—When we learn “Any argument that is for the sake of Heaven, its end will endure” this means that the process of argumentation itself will endure forever. Today, for example, they will argue about one matter, and tomorrow about another. The arguments will continue all the days of their lives! Moreover, the days of their lives will be lengthened [in reward]. In contrast, when we learn “Any argument that is not for the sake of Heaven, its end will not endure” this means that they will remain locked in the original argument and they will die in it [in punishment], just as in the arguments of Korach.

Mibartenura (as well as Rambam and Meiri 4) widens the meaning of “l’shem shamayim” by translating it as “an honest search for the truth”. Thus, in contrast to how “machloket l’shem shamayim” was originally translated above (which is how it is usually translated), a better translation could be “machloket l’shem hasagat ha’emet”, or “an argument conducted in an honest search for the truth”. Much of this unit will be spent trying to find examples of what such an honest search for truth looks like, with a focus on the machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, which the mishnah says is the classic example of a “machloket l’shem shamayim”. Now would be an ideal time to teach the background information on

4 Rambam and Meiri will be learned later in this unit. These other commentators are noted more for the teacher’s general knowledge than out of an expectation that the teacher will mention them to the students at this early juncture. Hillel and Shammai, and note to the students that they will be studying this machloket in depth during this unit.

How did your students translate “sofa l’hitkayem” (its end will endure)? Texts 2 and 3 offer two different interpretations. Mibartenura (Text 2) says that “sofa” (its end) is referring to the desired purpose of the argument. In other words, Hillel and Shammai’s desired purpose was only to learn the truth. In contrast, Korach’s desired purpose was a selfish desire for power. Thus, according to Mibartenura, the mishnah is commenting very positively on someone who argues for the purpose of attaining the truth. But the mishnah is severely criticizing one who argues only with selfish motivations in mind.

Rabeinu Yonah (Text 3) interprets “sofa l’hitkayem” to mean that the argument will last forever! He is clearly taking the stand that machloket is a very positive value, and arguments which have the proper motivations and purposes actually contribute positively to society and to individuals, even to such an extent that one who argues with the proper intentions will be rewarded with a longer life! An important question to ask your students is whether they think it is better for a machloket to be resolved, or to endure.

Which interpretation of “sofa l’hitkayem” do your students find more persuasive? Which interpretation of “l’shem shamayim” do they find more persuasive? Perhaps they will come up new interpretations which they like even better.

Text 4, BaMidbar, Chapter 16

Please consult your Chumash to read the story of Korach.

What is an example of a machloket that is not “l’shem shamayim”? Korach (Text 4). It is possible to spend weeks, literally, learning the story of Korach. Perhaps in a more advanced class you could 5. Instead, have your students read the entire story of Korach, and focus on answering one question: What are Korach’s motivations in arguing with Moshe and Aharon? Obviously, you’ll need to do a close textual analysis in order to answer that question 6. In your discussions on Korach, portray

5 Noam Zion’s curriculum on Mered Korach is a fantastic resource for the teacher who wishes to teach this story in greater depth. Nechama Leibowitz ( Studies in BaMidbar ) also has wonderful resources on Korach. Hirsch also has an excellent commentary. 6 The teacher should try to raise awareness of how to read the Tanach very closely and critically. For example, Korach took…”) without supplying a direct object. He notes“) " ויקח קרח“ Hirsch notes that in Bamidbar 16:1, it says him as the prototype of some politicians (and others) who act as though they represent a group and are working for the people, when actually their motives are suspect—their intentions are selfish desires for power and victory. Some students will question this conclusion. After all, how does one deal with Moshe’s repression of Korach? Is it possible to view Korach as an egalitarian revolutionary? Is it fair to criticize Moshe for squelching the values of democracy by putting down Korach’s rebellion? Perhaps you can come up with other examples throughout history, such as Lincoln’s decisions in the Civil War, or the American Revolution? Perhaps in trying to uncover Korach’s motives, you could read the following:

Text 5, The First Prime Minsiter of Israel, David Ben Gurion Speech from the First Kenesset, 1950 7

There were two events that determined the fate of our people and shaped their spirit forever: the Exodus from slavery to freedom and the giving of the Torah. Both are connected to the greatest personality in Jewish history—Moshe Rabeinu. Moshe was a leader, a liberator, a fighter, a great legistlator, and the first and greatest of the prophets. Moshe was a unique phenomenon---yet even against him they complained. Maasei avot siman l’banim —the past predicts the future...

Among the crises in the days of Moshe, let me recall two: 1) The Crisis of Meat (Numbers 11) 2) The Crisis of Trust (Korach—Numbers 16)

The crisis of credibility affects not only the commoners but also the leadership— members of the national assembly and men of renown. “There never arose another prophet like Moshe,” but the likes of Datan and Aviram arise in every generation. I can just imagine [as Ben Gurion looks out at the Knesset—probably in the direction of Menachem Begin, leader of the Cherut Party] how Datan touches up his moustache and puts on his glasses as he begins to give an oration. Then there is also the likes of Korach son of Yitzhar—the yeshiva bachur from such good lineage—who knows how to recite his family treee back to Kehat and to Levi. Korach knows how to associate with Datan and Aviram and demand to rule over the community by virtue of his yichus (lineage).

that Korach is being portrayed by the Tanach as a “taker”, someone who presumes that things belongs to him like a little child, someone who takes for the sole purpose of selfish desires, and not for the interests of the public (therefore his speeches were only camouflage for his true selfish intentions). 7 Cited in Noam Zion’s curriculum on Mered Korach So too the first governmental crisis in our day appears to me to be very serious. Not because the rations of meat are inadequate and not because government credibility is weakened but because of the deeper reason that gave birth to this loss of faith. The problem is an organic failing that clings to us from the beginning of nationhood that continued to fester and spread as we went into exile. That failing is our exaggerated, diseased tendency to break into factions and parties. 8

The important thing that the students should get from such discussions is the need to ask themselves if their motivations are pure when they argue. Motivations are not black and white—they are very complex and gray, so one has to really do a personal bedika and cheshbon nefesh (serious introspection). The mishnah (Text 1) is imploring us to only argue for the sake of honestly searching for the truth, and not for selfish reasons. What would the impact be on a community if everyone thought about their motivations before arguing with another community member? What would a community look like if individuals stopped themselves before arguing if they knew it was for selfish reasons? What would happen to a community if the only arguments that occurred were for the pure betterment of that community, for the pure search for truth? Is such a dream possible?

Can your students come up with contemporary arguments which might be understood as “l’shem shamayim”? Abortion? The debate within Israel about the future of the “territories”? The “who is a Jew” debate? What do they think is a modern argument that is not “l’shem shamayim”? We’re sure that your students will come up with many contemporary examples. Perhaps you could give the assignment to write a contemporary mishnah to “update” Pirkei Avot 5:17. How would they write it? What examples would they use? Additionally, two movies from Israel could be helpful in teaching this part of the unit, “Edumim” and “Noah bat 17”.

A machloket l’shem shamayim which leads to bloodshed Up until now we’ve seen a fairly positive spin on Tarbut HaMachloket, based upon Text 1 from Pirkei Avot. But Text 6 presents the opposite view of Text 1, that even a “machloket l’shem shamayim” can still lead to bloodshed:

Text 6, Yerushalmi Shabbat, Perek 1, Tur 3, Halacha 4

8 The teacher, should this source be used, will obviously need to spend time describing in detail the background to it.

The version of the Talmud written in Eretz Yisrael/Palestine in the 5th century CE, in contrast to the more authoritative one written in Bavel/Babylonia.

הלכה ד ' מתני אילו מהלכות שאמרו בעלית חנניה ב חזקיה ב גרו כשעלו לבקרו ונמנו , ורבו ב" ש על ב ה" . ושמנה עשר דברי גזרו בו ביו . 'גמ אותו היו היה קשה לישראל כיו שנעשה בו העגל ... תנא רבי יהושע אונייא : תלמידי ב" ש עמדו לה מלמטה והיו הורגי בתלמידי בית הלל . תני : ששה מה עלו והשאר עמדו עליה בחרבות ובר מחי . .

Mishnah: These are some of the laws that they stated in the upper chamber of Chananiah ben Chezikiah ben Guron when they went up to visit with him. They took a vote, and Beit Shammai outnumbered Beit Hillel. They decreed eighteen laws on that day. Gemara: And that day was as bad for the Jews as the day on which the golden calf was made…Rabbi Yehoshua Onaya taught, “The disciples of Beit Shammai took positions down below and killed disciples of Beit Hillel.” It was taught, “Six of them went upstairs, and the rest of them took positions with swords and spears.”

This event is likely to have actually happened, according to historians. The use of force and violence by Jews against other Jews for ideological reasons in this time period is a known occurrence (see Josephus). The eighteen decrees that Beit Shammai enacted had to do with forbidding relations between Jews and non-Jews, which in light of the time period (around the time of the Great Revolt of the Jews against the Romans in 66CE) seems likely. Thus, Beit Shammai in this account might be the equivalent of the Zealots who led the (failed) rebellion against the Romans. Perhaps, then, Beit Hillel could be seen as the “moderates” during this time period, and historical evidence exists that the zealots and the moderates did indeed act violently towards each other. This historical context should be set for the students—it’s crucial in understanding this source.

Up until this time, apparently, Beit Hillel had outnumbered Beit Shammai, and this was one of the reasons why Beit Hillel’s rulings had been accepted over Beit Shammai’s. Finally, Beit Shammai outnumbered Beit Hillel, but we find that this was only because Beit Shammai murdered students in Beit Hillel! But the crucial question is why? Is it a simple matter of Beit Shammai turning into a “Korach” (going back to Text 1)? It’s doubtful that it was a simple matter of them selfishly looking for power just for power’s sake without much ideological motivation, as was the case with Korach. Indeed, it is likely that Beit Shammai felt their extreme actions were justified based upon the purest ideological considerations in their violence against Beit Hillel—they were fighting for God’s sake (l’shem shamayim)! Thus arguments l’shem shamayim can actually lead to the exact opposite of a positive culture of argument (Tarbut HaMachloket)—such arguments can also lead to bloodshed. Text 6 clearly makes the connection between pure, ideological motives and impatient, coercive measures which lead to violence or worse.

In an advanced class, the teacher might decide to explore the episode of the golden calf 9, to which the Yerushalmi compares what happened between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. At the very least, the students should understand the extreme gravity of the situation if the Yerushalmi decides to compare it to the sin of the golden calf, which is perhaps the greatest sin in Jewish history. The students should explore why this episode between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai is described as being one of the worst moments in Jewish history. Perhaps the teacher could bring in the following two texts to help explain the Yerushalmi’s position:

Text 7, Talmud Bavli, Masechet Yoma 9b

Compilation of oral teachings and legal proceedings of 3rd -6th century scholars in Babylonia [Amoraim]; final redaction in the 6th -7th centuries.

מקדש ראשו מפני מה חרב ? מפני שלשה דברי שהיו בו : עבודה זרה , וגלוי עריות , ושפיכות דמי ... אבל מקדש שני , שהיו עוסקי בתורה ובמצות וגמילות חסדי מפני מה מה חרב ? מפני שהיתה בו שנאת חנ ל. למד ששקולה שנאת חנ כנגד שלש עבירות : עבודה זרה , גלוי עריות , ושפיכות דמי .

Why was the First Temple destroyed? Because three things happened in it: idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed…But the Second Temple, in which there was so much Torah study, observance of commandments, and acts of good deeds—why was it destroyed? Because there was senseless hatred inside of it. This teaches you that senseless hatred is equal to the three worst sins in Judaism: idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed.

Text 8, HaEmek Davar, Introduction to Sefer Breshite

Commentary on the Torah by Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Berlin (the Netziv), who was the Rosh Yeshiva of the famous yeshiva of Volozhin in Russia. 1817-1893.

9 I have lesson plans available if the teacher would like to teach Chet HaEgel in depth. The author has a photocopy of this source in Hebrew available for the teacher.

The Jews who lived in the time of the Second Temple were righteous and God- fearing and observant of the Torah, but weren’t observant of the common norms of humanity. Due to the senseless hatred in their hearts, they suspected everyone who they thought weren’t exactly like them in their reverence towards God as being heretics. And it was because of this that there was so much bloodshed and evil, and this ultimately led to the destruction of the Temple. God does not have patience for “righteous people” such as these unless they also observe the common norms of humanity, even though they might claim they are acting “l’shem shamayim”, for the sake of God. Because it is exactly this misguided claim that caused so much destruction of life.

Both Texts 7 and 8 reinforce Text 6, that even though there are people who feel very passionately that they are acting “l’shem shamayim”, those pure ideological motives can lead to fanaticism, hatred, and even bloodshed.

Spend some time applying the previous three texts to our contemporary world. Perhaps you could give the students a number of situations from modern history which ended in bloodshed or violence—are there any which the students feel are justified for ideological reasons? For example, the Jews in pre-state Israel faced a dilemma…what means should they use to fight for the state of Israel? Should they be patient and cooperate with the British (the Haganah’s position), or should they resort to violence in order to wrest Israel from the control of the British (the Lechi’s, Irgun’s, and Stern Gang’s position)? Blacks in the 1960’s had the same decision to make: should they fight for civil rights peacefully (Martin Luther King’s position) or should they fight with violence (Malcolm X’s position)? Suppose you have students who think that, under certain circumstance such as these, it is permissible to use violence to attain your ideological goals (eg a homeland, civil rights)…can they apply their position to what militant Muslims are doing today? What is the difference? What about the murder of Prime Minister Rabin—is that a good example of the type of misguided “l’shem shamayim” attitude that Texts 6- 8 are describing? How is that different than when the State of Israel assassinates a Hamas leader? The students could also be taught the story of the Altalena—what would they have done in that situation? When is it justified to use violence to fight for your ideology, and when is it not justified? Try to always relate the students’ opinions back to the texts.

Truth tempered by peace Up until now, one value has been emphasized: the truth. In general, the honest pursuit of the truth has been what characterizes the “good” type of machloket, the type which is “l’shem shamayim”, and which according to at least one source is typified by how Hillel and Shammai originally argued with each other. However, two perversions of that search for truth arose. One was Korach, who actually used arguments which were “l’shem shamayim” only as a ruse to achieve personal power, and the other were the disciples of Shammai, who took their ideological positions too fanatically which led to bloodshed. Thus, while “machloket l’shem shamayim” is a hallmark of positive Tarbut HaMachloket, it can also lead to very negative consequences. How does one create a positive culture of “machloket l’shem shamayim” which does not end up like Korach or the disciples of Shammai? The answer could lie in adding another key value to the search for truth, the value of peace. Thus, a community’s search for truth needs to be tempered by the necessity for peace, as will be taught in the next text.

Text 9, Talmud Bavli, Masechet Yevamot 14b

"אע פ שנחלקו ב" ש וב" ה בצרות , ובאחיות , בגט יש , ובספק אשת איש , ובמגרש את אשתו ולנה עמו בפונדק , בכס ובשוה כס , בפרוטה ובשוה פרוטה , לא נמנעו ב" ש מלישא נשי מבית הלל , ולא ב" ה מבית שמאי , ללמד , שחיבה וריעות נוהגי זה בזה , לקיי מה שנאמר : + זכריה ח' + האמת והשלו אהבו . .

Even though Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel argued about the issue of sisters, rivals, an old bill of divorce, a doubtfully married woman, a woman whom her husband had divorced and who stayed with him overnight in an inn, money, valuables, a prutah and the value of a prutah, Beit Shammai nevertheless did not abstain from marrying women from the families of Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from the families of Beit Shammai. This teaches you that they showed love and friendship towards each other, thus putting into practice the Biblical text, “Love truth and peace.” (Zechariah 8:19)

Skip over the actual halachic debates in this source—they simply aren’t important for this unit. All that needs to be noted is that they debated serious halachic questions which could have split the groups apart into two religions. For example, if Beit Hillel ruled one way about women, and Beit Shammai ruled another way, the result could have been that each group of Jews told the other, “We don’t agree with your rulings and forbid our women to marry with your men”. This could have ended disastrously for the Jewish people—there could have been two separate religions. But they nonetheless managed to interact halachically.

Why? That’s the major question. After all, doesn’t truth imply exclusivity, and peace imply inclusivity? How can the verse from Zechariah be fulfilled (“Love truth and peace”), if the two values contradict each other? Apparently, the answer is that there was a higher value than truth involved—the value of Clal Yisrael, the unity of the Jewish people. In other words, each group was able to compromise their truth because they felt that the value of peace (represented by Clal Yisrael) was too important.

It’s more complicated than that, though. It’s not that one side said, “We’ll compromise what we think is right because we love you too much”. The reason why they were able to compromise is much deeper, as seen in the next source.

First, though, which account of the machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai is accurate, the one from Text 1 (that they are the prototype of a positive machloket l’shem shamayim), or Text 6 (that they killed each other)? One possibility is that one is more historically accurate, and one is more “nostalgic”. It could be a case of two distinct “memories” (the violent and the peaceful) being recorded by a redactor. It’s possible that both accounts are true, and one account historically followed the other. In other words, Hillel and Shammai’s machloket originally was peaceful in nature, but their disciples became fanatical which led to bloodshed. What’s most important, though, is not which portrayal is more historically accurate. In a sense, it really doesn’t matter if any of these accounts are true. The most important thing is the values that we cull from these texts about how diverse communities live together peacefully and respectfully.

Elu v’Elu—You’re both right! The following source is one of the central texts of this unit. As the Jews were adapting to life after the destruction of the Temple, the reality became that there was a multiplicity of opinions about how to practice Judaism. These controversies could have easily led to Jews living drastically different kinds of Jewish life, and anarchy could have been the rule in the Jewish world, and social solidarity would have been threatened (as indeed is described in the Talmud—as will be studied later). This highly volatile and unstable political, social, and religious climate in which the Rabbis were examining the limits of permissible disagreement is the background to Text 10:

Text 10, Talmud Bavli, Masechet Eiruvin 13b

אמר רבי אבא אמר שמואל : שלש שני נחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל , הללו אומרי הלכה כמותנו והללו אומרי הלכה כמותנו . יצאה בת קול ואמרה : אלו ואלו דברי אלהי חיי ה , והלכה כבית הלל . וכי מאחר שאל ו ואלו דברי אלהי חיי מפני מה זכו בית הלל לקבוע הלכה כמות מפני שנוחי ועלובי היו , ושוני דבריה ודברי בית שמאי . ולא עוד אלא שמקדימי דברי בית שמאי לדבריה . .

Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel argued. One asserted, “The law agrees with our views”, and the other asserted, “The law agrees with our views”. The voice of God came down and announced, “They are both the words of the living God, but the law agrees with Beit Hillel.” Since both were the words of the living God, what entitled Beit Hillel to have the law agree with them? Because they were kind and modest, they studied their own rulings and those of Beit Shammai, and not only that, but they mentioned the rulings of Beit Shammai before their own.

Perhaps as an introduction to this source, you could tell the students a joke: A husband and wife are having marital troubles, and go to a psychologist. The psychologist asks what the problem is. The couple says that they argue all the time. The husband says, “But I’m always right!” The psychologist says, “You’re right!” The wife says, “No, I’m always right!” The psychologist says “You’re right!” The husband and wife say together, “But how can we both be right?!” The psychologist ponders for a minute and says, “You’re right!” It’s a (not-so) funny joke, but the moral is very serious. How can two contradictory opinions both be right? Is it possible? The students should think about what the point of the joke is, and whether it’s a good philosophy.

The students should struggle with this text on their own first. What is the actual point of argument between the two schools? Why would such an argument be so problematic to the Jewish religion at this point in history? How do they understand the “elu v’elu” (“They are both the words of the living God”) part—is it really possible for two conflicting truths to both be right? Isn’t there only one “right way” according to God? How do they understand “but the law agrees with Beit Hillel” in light of “elu v’elu”? Is this contradictory? What were the Rabbis trying to do by telling this story—what is the Rabbinical justification for the story? In their own words, what are the Rabbis trying to say, and why?

The rabbis are conveying a much deeper idea than simply saying that God’s word can be legitimately interpreted in different ways. They are saying that God stands behind different—and conflicting—opinions which both authentically represent and transmit the word of God. There is not a single opinion which can be ascribed to God—here is explicit acceptance of the idea that there can be conflicting ideas which are both “right” in God’s eyes. The interpretive process is justified and contrary opinions are given equal validity. 10

The Rabbis weren’t trying to create a superficial society of compromisers, as one might have understood from Text 9. In other words, it’s not that the Rabbis wanted us to simply compromise our truths for the sake of peace. They actually held that our opponent’s truth, even though it contradicts our truth, is an equally valid expression of God’s will. This is a much deeper way of relating to an opponent—it lends infinitely more integrity to one’s opponent than simply saying, “I’ll put up with you for the sake of the unity of this community”. Clearly, the Rabbi’s agenda is to create a pluralistic community in which Jews who hold opposing opinions deeply respect their opponent’s positions—the diverse and pluralistic nature of the Jewish people was elevated to an expression of God’s will! The interpretative process and “kosher argument” became a reflection of God’s very nature. They were trying to make the potentially splintered Jewish community a cohesive one by making pluralism of interpretation a divine value. They are saying that just because one side “wins” an argument doesn’t mean the other side is “wrong”.

But what to do with the fact that even though both views represented God’s will, only one of them (Beit Hillel) was accepted as the law? What exactly does “elu v’elu” mean? If both views are right, why couldn’t both views be accepted as law? This source apparently makes a distinction between theoretical study of Torah (in which differing opinions are considered valid) and halachic decision making (in which only one view can be put into practice). Different laws for different citizens would produce anarchy and would not be a good way to run a system. There have to be principles for deciding between interpretations if a coherent system is to be run.

10 There are other sources later on in the curriculum which are not as complementary of pluralism in Judaism. For example, a Rambam says that it isn’t that God wants pluralism of interpretation (as is suggested in Text 10), but the pluralistic nature of Judaism can in fact be attributed to natural mistakes in human understanding. This text is also saying that there is a social and political need for decision and authoritative action, but that this need does not undermine the legitimacy of each side’s claim to truth. The authorities may prefer one solution over another, but at the same time are not making a truth claim. The rabbis are saying that there is a need for unified authority and social order, but that authoritative decisions do not exhaust the truth.

Two questions immediately arise. The first, which is examined later in this curriculum, is what happens if the “loser” in a halachic debate decides to keep teaching and/or practicing his interpretation? What are the limits of dissent, what are the boundaries of pluralistic communities? Are all views valid? The second question is one students will be turning to now: if both views are valid, how exactly was one way chosen over another?

Text 10 answers that question by saying that Beit Hillel was more kind and humble, they taught both their own rulings and their opponents’, and they taught their opponents’ opinions before they taught their own. While these are all great characteristics, are they truly so important as to be the foundations of a legal system? Are they really good reasons to choose Beit Hillel over Beit Shammai? Your students will have much to say about this tension between “elu v’elu” and the fact that Hillel’s view is the law.

One exercise 11 you could do in preparation for this discussion is to divide the group into two (or more) and ask them to come up with the ideal characteristics of a judge or congressman. Is it important that they be kind? Smart? Wealthy? Each group should present its ideal judge/lawmaker to the whole class, and note any characteristics that the groups disagree on. How does their list compare to that from Text 10? Discuss similarities and differences, and further analyze the text.

Noam Zion and Steve Israel offer eight possible reasons for why Hillel’s personal qualities qualified him to have his views accepted as halacha:

1) His humility is associated with skeptical self-criticism. People who are modest and humble are aware of their own deficiencies, and such humility better inclines them to sincerely listen to other people’s points of view, and therefore make a much better decision as to what the right thing to do is.

11 This exercise and the following analysis of Hillel’s characteristics are from Noam Zion and Steve Israel’s Elu v’Elu curriculum. 2) Even if Shammai is considered the wiser scholar, Hillel’s view is based on accumulation of their own insights and those of Shammai. Thus, they’ve actually gone well beyond Shammai to a greater wisdom than just Shammai alone. 3) Ethics are more important for social peace. Deciding like Hillel is less likely to lead to power politics since we know Hillel is a pursuer of peace. 4) The humility of Beit Hillel leads the people to accept their leadership more readily since they are not seen as acting out of self-interest. 5) The Rabbis wanted their leadership to be personal examples of the people they aspired to lead, and Hillel exemplified the model Jew according to the Rabbis. 6) The teaching of the opponent’s view means that in the future, the decision can be reconsidered. We learn in another source that dissenting views are preserved (as Hillel surely believed) in order to keep them for reconsideration in the future, in case an old law is held to be mistaken. Hillel’s views, therefore, are less risky because he is open to a self- corrective process unlike Shammai. 7) Hillel is more considerate of human needs and not just of the ideal that it demands—humility and modesty tend to make one more open to the reality of situations rather than just a set of social and legal ideals which one might try to impose on a society. 8) Humility towards God means that the decisions will be less influenced by one’s desire to be right. Humility is a religious value which in many ways is more important than blindly obeying the law or obeying the rules.

Thus, Hillel winning isn’t a prize for good behavior—it is recognition by the Rabbis (and God?) that listening to and respecting your ideological opponent is a positive value in Judaism. Thus, not only is there the value of the divine pluralistic nature of truth, but also the value of listening to, respecting, and developing your opponent’s position in your search for the truth.

Part 2: Social Coexistence In this part, students examine in practical terms how ideological opponents actually live together in a way which is not mere toleration, but true co-existence. Perhaps as a pre-thinking exercise, you could bring in various situations in history in which ideological opponents successfully and not-so-successfully co-existed. For example, the Palestinians and Israelis. Is it at all possible for them to truly live in harmony together in the same land? Is even mere toleration possible? How? Or, what about a school Shabbaton in which there are people who don’t observe any mitzvot, and those who completely observe mitzvot? Or what about a kipah policy in a pluralistic day school which states all students must wear kipot all day long?

The fact is that Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai did co-marry and eat together, even though they interpreted Jewish law very differently, even to the point of being entirely contradictory. Remember, proper observance of the Torah was extremely valued in their society, so it was no small thing that they were (possibly) compromising their observance of halacha for the sake of the unity of the Jewish people. This section will focus on how ideological opponents exist peacefully together in the same community.

There are five different models of how Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai co-existed:

1) Rav: Beit Shammai voluntarily followed Beit Hillel’s halacha for the sake of unity even though they disagreed with it. 2) Shmuel: Each group followed their own halacha, and relied on God that no laws would be broken when the groups interacted halachically (like in marriage and kashrut). 3) Mibartenura: Each group followed their own halacha, and informed the other side of problematic cases in their own communities to prevent problems from arising in the first place when they interacted halachically. 4) Mishna Yevamot: Each side ate even from the things made by the other side that they personally considered not kosher simply because it had the hechsher (“kashrut symbol”) of the other side, for the sake of unity. 5) Rabbi Shimon: Each side didn’t eat things made by the other side that they were sure were not kosher according to their view, but they did eat things made by the other side that were safek (doubtful) whether or not it was kosher.

Models 1 & 2 Text 11, Talmud Yerushalmi Yevamot Perek 1, Halacha 6

לא נמנעו ב" ש מלישא מבית הלל ולא מבית הלל מב" ש אלא נוהגי באמת ובשלו שנאמר " האמת והשלו אהבו ." ממזרות בנתיי ואת אמרי הכי ? הי עבידא ? קידש הא ' בשוה פרוטה , והב ' בדינר על דעתיה דבית שמאי מקודשת לשני והולד ממזר מ הא ' . על דעתיה דבית הלל מקודשת לא ' והולד ממזר מ השני ... ר ' יוסי בר בו אמר : רב ושמואל , חד אמר אלו ואלו כהלכה היו עושי , וחד אמר אלו כהלכת ואלו כהלכת . ממזרות בנתי ואת אמר הכי ? המקו משמר ולא אירע מעשה מעול . .

[Despite their halachic arguments], Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, and Beit Hillel from Beit Shammai. Rather, they acted according to the verse from Zecharia, “Love truth and peace”.

How can you say such a thing when there could be mamzerut 12 involved?!

What is an example of a case illustrating this? If one man betrothed a girl with what is worth a prutah , and a second betrothed her with what is worth dinar , in the opinion of Beit Shammai she is betrothed to the second man, and any children she has by the first are mamzers. In the opinion of Beit Hillel, she is betrothed to the first man, and any children she has by the second are mamzers…

Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Bun said, “Rav and Shmuel had a dispute [regarding how Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai acted in practice with each other]. One of them [Rav] said, “Both of them acted according to one law,” and the other one [Shmuel] said, “These acted according to their view of the law, and those acted according to their view of the law.”

[Regarding Shmuel’s view], how can you say such a thing when there could be mamzerut involved?! God watched out for them, and a case of mamzerut never occurred…

The first model explaining how exactly Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai co-existed is that of Rav. He says that Beit Shammai voluntarily followed Beit Hillel’s halacha for the sake of unity even though they disagreed with it. Do your students find this model persuasive? Well, if they don’t, accuse them of not being very American! Because Rav’s model is very similar to the democratic model that we employ in the United States of America. The Democrats and Republicans (among others) argue all the time, sometimes viciously, and only one side can win. The loser in an election voluntarily agrees to follow the winners, even though they disagree with them, all for the sake of the unity of the United States of America. The losers can nonetheless voice their disapproval with the winners.

12 The teacher will need to explain the concept of mamzerut to the students. A mamzer is the product of incestuous relations or adultery. (A child born out of wedlock is not a mamzer). Besides the fact that a mamzer may only marry another mamzer, a mamzer is a fullfledged Jew in all respects. See Devarim 23:3; Hilchot Issurei Biah chapter 15; and Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer, chapter 4.

A question that must be asked about Rav is what are the boundaries of his democratic model? In other words, what parties are legitimately allowed into the American democratic political system? Would a political party which is anti- democratic be allowed in, for example? Is it possible for a Community party to win power and turn American into a Communist state? In the case of Judaism, are we talking about Secular Humanistic Judaism and Orthodox Judaism? Is he suggesting that one adopt the other’s extreme halacha (or lack of halacha) for the sake of unity? It’s likely that the boundaries of his religiously democratic model are much smaller. For example, he might be talking about the differences in Halacha between the boundaries of Modern Orthodoxy and Centrist Orthodoxy at an institution like Yeshiva University, as opposed to such extremes as Orthodox and secular Judaism.

This is also probably the case for the second model, Shmuel’s. He said that each group followed their own halacha, and relied on God that no laws would be broken when the groups interacted halachically (like in marriage and kashrut). He’s likely not talking here about the halacha of Reform and Orthodox Judaism, for example. This isn’t explicit, but it’s probably safe to assume Shmuel wasn’t saying something as far reaching as “whatever a Jew does, just look the other way because God will make sure you don’t violate halacha”. More likely, a better example of Shmuel’s view is “I won’t check this person’s tzitzit—I’ll just assume they’re kosher”, or “I’ll eat at this restaurant because it has a kashrut certificate, even though I’ve never eaten in this city before and don’t know who the Orthodox rabbi is on the certificate.”

One might criticize Shmuel for being religiously naïve, in the sense that he is relying on God to miraculously save him from violating halacha without him having to do anything really proactive. But this is probably how many people actually operate. For example, if one is invited into a person’s home from their Modern Orthodox synagogue for Shabbat, it’s probably common to assume they keep kosher, and wouldn’t serve unkosher food. On the other hand, someone who is Shomer Mitzvot wouldn’t set himself up to eat in a home he or she knew to not be kosher. One might be able to read this type of realistic scenario into Shmuel’s otherwise religiously naïve model of co-existence.

Pedagogical Suggestions Consider presenting the students with a case study of the “Denver Beit Din”. It came to symbolize the possibilities as well as lost opportunities for greater religious unity. Beginning in 1978, Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox/Traditional rabbis formed a joint Beit Din (rabbinic court) to oversee conversions. The purpose of this program was to avoid a situation in which rabbis in Denver did not recognize each other's converts to Judaism. If Orthodoxy did not recognize the legitimacy of non-Orthodox converts, then they would not be able to marry, and in effect there would be two distinct religions. Under the Denver program, each rabbi still retained autonomy to perform his own conversions, but a significant number (approximately 750 individuals) underwent conversion in Denver through the communal rabbinic court.

In order to function in concert, all participating rabbis compromised some of their views. The Orthodox rabbis were prepared to accept the fact that the converts would not observe all the mitzvot, but were beginning an effort to learn about Judaism and start the path to commitment. The Reform rabbis, in turn, compromised by agreeing to teach about traditional observances, such as Jewish dietary laws and special Passover regulations, and also agreed that converts should go to the mikvah and undergo a symbolic circumcision (hatafat dam brit). Not coincidentally, the lone Conservative rabbi in Denver, whose conception of conversion represented a centrist position, served as the chairman of the board for most of its history. But the actual conversion ceremony was supervised by three Orthodox rabbis. The Reform rabbis agreed not to sign the conversion certificate.

In 1983, after six years of relatively smooth functioning, the Denver Beit Din was dissolved. The move was precipitated by the resolution on patrilineality adopted that year by the Central Conference of American Rabbis (the governing body of Reform Judaism). This decision to redefine Jewish identity, as well as the designation of Denver as a pilot community for a new Reform outreach effort to recruit converts, convinced the Orthodox and Conservative rabbis that they could no longer participate in the joint Beit Din. The Orthodox and Conservative rabbis could not cooperate in a conversion program with rabbis who held so different a conception of Jewish identity. And furthermore, they could not supervise conversions that would occur with increasing frequency due to a Reform outreach effort that was inconsistent with their own understanding of how to relate to potential converts. The possibility of future cross-denominational cooperation in other Jewish communities was further undermined by the response of Orthodox groups to the Denver program. When the existence of that program became public knowledge (ironically, through the announcement of its demise), Orthodox groups denounced the Orthodox rabbis for even participating in a joint conversion effort.

There are many ways you could present this to the students. You could give them the assignment to interview their congregational rabbis about the viability of such a joint Beit Din today. You could actually create a joint Beit Din of students who represent each of the denominations, and stage a mock conversion (which may or may not work out, depending on whether the students think such a Beit Din is viable). You could give the students the bare facts of the Denver Beit Din and not yet teach them how it ended up, and let them think through the possible outcomes of such a setup.

Model 3 Text 12, Rabeinu Ovadiah Mibartenura 13 to Mishna Yevamot 1:4

לא נמנעו : ואע" פ שבני הצרות שנתיבמו כדברי ב"ש , ממזרי ה לב ה" , ... אעפ" כ לא נמנעו ב" ה מלישא מב" ש לפי שהיו מודיעי לה אות הבאות מו הצרות, ופורשי מה.

“Did not refrain…”—Even though the children of the co-wives who performed the rites of levirate marriage according to the law of Beit Shammai were mamzerim according to the law of Beit Hillel, …Beit Hillel nonetheless did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai since they would notify them of those young women born from co-wives, and they would separate from them.

In this third model, Mibartenura says that each group followed their own halacha, but informed the other side of problematic cases in their own communities to prevent problems from arising in the first place when they interacted halachically.

It’s unimportant to explain to your students the halachic debate here—it would needlessly sidetrack the discussion. All that needs to be said is that the dispute was so serious that the sides thought about not marrying each other due to the fact that the children of these “mixed marriages” might be considered mamzerim.

13 This model can also be learned from Bavli Yevamot 14b, but this Mibartenura explains the same model in an easier way. The focus should be on how they managed to marry regardless of this very serious religious issue.

It’s interesting to note that according to Mibartenura, their solution focused on the “self” rather than the “other”. In other words, rather than checking out the other side and labeling what they are doing forbidden or permissible, this model warns the other side about potential problems within —it is not focused really on “the other”. In order for that to happen, it’s also interesting to note that each side has to be thoroughly aware of the other side’s understanding of Judaism in order to know what they need to be warned about. This model emphasizes that you help your opponent, instead of hurt him. In essence, this model centers around helping out your ideological opponent, and in doing so you create a pluralistic community.

What do your students think are modern examples of this model? Maybe if a secular Jew who does not keep kosher invites his observant family over to visit, and is sure to serve drinks with kashrut symbols on them, and only cold fruits and vegetables and serves them on paper plates with plastic utensils. He knew to do this because he called his observant family member beforehand and notified him of how he keeps his kitchen, and they were able to discuss ways in which the observant Jew could eat in the secular Jew’s home.

Model 4 Text 13, Mishna Yevamot 1:4

… בית שמאי מכשירי ובית הלל פוסלי אע" פ שאלו אוסרי וא לו מתירי אלו פוסלי ואלו מכשירי לא נמנעו בית שמאי מלישא נשי מבית הלל ולא בית הלל מבית שמאי כל הטהרות והטומאות שהיו אלו מטהרי ואלו מטמאי לא נמנעו עושי טהרות אלו על גבי :אלו :אלו

Even though Beit Shammai declares one thing kosher while Beit Hillel declares the same thing not kosher, even though these forbid while the other permits, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying the women of Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying the women of Beit Shammai. Even though one side declares things to be pure while the other side declares the same thing to be impure, nonetheless they did not refrain from preparing things requiring a state of purity by using things from the other side.

The fourth model states that each side ate even from the things made by the other side that they personally considered not kosher simply because it had the hechsher of the other side, for the sake of unity. This is the extreme pshat (most literal understanding) of “Lo nimneu”. Perhaps an analogy is an Orthodox Jew eating in a Reform Jew’s home, or an Orthodox Jew marrying a Reform convert. This model seems unlikely in practice, and while very idealistic and pleasant to think about, is hard to understand how it would ever work.

Nonetheless, there are those who are extremely pluralistic who seem to agree with this model. I heard a lecture by an observant rabbi in Jerusalem in which he challenged the audience to think what they would do for the sake of the Jewish people. He said that if he was in a Jew’s home and that Jew served him something that he normally would not eat because it’s not up to his kashrut standards, in that case he would eat it simply because the value of Clal Yisrael overruled the value of observing one particular ritual. Most observant Jews would probably not do this.

David Dishon, in his book Tarbut HaMachloket , writes something similar (paraphrased from page 59): “An individual must never create an ideological wall around himself in which he can never break the law for the sake of the better good of his community. Otherwise, such an individual lives in a ghetto.” Perhaps you could ask your students to respond to this statement. Couldn’t one react to this statement and say that it in fact goes against the very value of community it purports to defend? Where do all of the Ultra-Orthodox fit into such a statement? They very often do live in ghettos and probably would never break a law (like kashrut) for the better good of Reform Judaism (ie “Clal Yisrael”). Are such Jews excluded from Dishon’s community by the very fact that they exclude the non-Orthodox? Perhaps. Or perhaps his statement is too restrictive, and in fact limits the scope of a pluralistic community. Then again, can you include people into your community (the Ultra-Orthodox) who don’t want to be included (for example, by including their philosophies, if not their people)?

Pedagogical Suggestions Maybe you could first get the students to write down the top three values or things that are most important to them. You could ask then your students, “What would you give up for the sake of your community?” Is the betterment of the public more important than the individual? You could give specific scenarios in which the students would have to decide what they would do for their community.

You could also contact schools or community members in places such as Tekoa, Moshav Shorashim, Kefar Edumim, or Kefar Ketoret. All are communities in Israel which are well known for their successful (some more, some less) attempts at creating religiously pluralistic communities in which secular and observant Jews co- exist peacefully. Perhaps you could create a video conference in which students research these communities and prepare questions, and those communities do the same for our students. This could be a fruitful dialogue.

Model 5 Text 14, Tosefta Yevamot 1:12

The Tosefta can be seen as a sort of parallel body of Jewish literature to the Mishna, a supplement to the Mishna, or even a commentary of sorts on the Mishna.

ר ' שמעו אומר: מ הספק לא היו נמנעי אבל נמנעי ה מ הודיי . .

Rabbi Shimon says: “They did not refrain from interacting halachically regarding doubtful things, but they did refrain from interacting halachically regarding things which were not subject to doubt.”

The fifth model takes the fourth one and perhaps makes it more palatable to put into practice for observant Jews. Rabbi Shimon states that each side didn’t eat things made by the other side that they were sure were not kosher according to their view, but they did eat things made by the other side that were safek (doubtful) whether or not it was kosher. This appears to be a much more workable model than the previous one because it allows for someone to not have to compromise what he knows to be wrong. On the other hand, if he has a doubt about something, he gives his opponent the benefit of the doubt as opposed to assuming the worst.

Pedagogical Suggestions To learn all five models one after the other might be tedious, although it certainly could be done. Instead, perhaps think about dividing your students into chevrutot. Each chevruta should take one model, master it and present it to the class. Obviously the teacher will need to make detailed chevruta guides to help the students understand each text. This will also enable the teacher to have more individual time with students.

The students shouldn’t merely present the texts. They should come up with their own original example of their particular model to act out in front of the class. The class has to guess what the model is and anticipate what the sugiya that the chevruta is acting out actually says. Then the students will compare their anticipated sugiyot with the actual sugiyot, which will facilitate a discussion on the actual sugiyot, led by both the chevruta which mastered it and the teacher.

Shabbaton Exercise As your major study of Shabbat this year, you could do the following two exercises with your students. First, when we hold our transdenominational Shabbatonim in which there are those who observe Shabbat and those who don’t (and a lot in between), how would each of the five models suggest that we communally observe the laws of Shabbat? Write “A Statement of Principles and Practice: Transdenominational Shabbat Observance at Upper School Shabbatonim”. Try to be as inclusive as possible while not making anyone compromise more than they have to, or are able to. Bring your document to the student government and the Judaic Studies administrator to be “ratified”. Included below is an example of a previous statement.

Second, is it possible to all be able to pray together on the Shabbatonim. Create a transdenominational Shabbaton siddur that will be acceptable to all denominations and stripes of Jews. The grander the better—consider having students illustrate the siddur, and spend time researching and writing original commentary on the Shabbat prayers as well.

A Statement of Principles and Practice: Transdenominational Shabbat Observance at Upper School Shabbatonim Our 10 th grade Judaic Studies classes have been studying about how to create Tarbut HaMachloket , which is a community with lots of different individual practices and beliefs that finds a way to come together, despite their differences.

We learned that Hillel and Shammai, two of the greatest Talmudic rabbis, disagreed about how to get married. If they didn’t recognize each other’s marriages, this would mean that each side viewed the other’s children as mamzerim, “bastard children”. This dispute (among many others) could have split the Jewish people into two. Despite this, they decided to marry each other because they thought that the unity of the Jewish people was too important.

We talked about how this is similar to a Shabbaton at the Upper School. We’re a school that welcomes all kinds of Jews—those that observe Shabbat traditionally, and those that don’t observe Shabbat traditionally, and everybody in between. How can all these types of Jews possibly observe Shabbat together? For example, if someone’s practice is to use electricity on Shabbat, can they watch a movie at our Shabbaton? Wouldn’t that offend or alienate those Jews who think this is a violation of Shabbat? Can individuals use a phone if that’s their practice?

So we looked in the Talmud and its commentaries, and learned some possibilities of how Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai (the Schools of Hillel and Shammai) overcame their differences, and we applied them to our Shabbaton.

One view (Rav in Talmud Yerushalmi Yevamot Perek 1, Halacha 6) said that Beit Shammai voluntarily followed Beit Hillel’s halacha for the sake of unity even though they disagreed with it. We thought that this was nice in theory, but in practice couldn’t work. Nobody would volunteer to be on the “losing side”.

Another view (Shmuel in the same source) said that each group followed their own halacha, and relied on God that no laws would be broken when the groups interacted halachically. We thought this was naïve to rely upon God to prevent problems from happening, and this was probably not a very practical solution to our problem.

Another view (Mishna Yevamot) said that each side ate even from the things made by the other side that they personally considered not kosher simply because it had the hechsher (“kashrut symbol”) of the other side, for the sake of unity. Relating this to our situation, we didn’t think it was fair to ask those people who observe Shabbat traditionally to break Shabbat for those who don’t observe Shabbat traditionally. And those who didn’t observe Shabbat traditionally weren’t all willing to observe it traditionally.

The last view we looked at was Rabbi Shimon in Tosefta Yevamot 1:12. Each side didn’t eat things made by the other side that they were sure were not kosher according to their view, but they did eat things made by the other side that were safek (doubtful) whether or not it was kosher. We liked this spirit of compromise, and thought of ways everyone could compromise and still be happy at our Shabbaton. The main issue, by the way, was that most of the students wanted to be able to watch movies over the Shabbaton, but at the same time didn’t want to be disrespectful of those students who couldn’t watch movies on Shabbat.

After brainstorming different ideas, we came up with the following solution. We decided to make a difference between communal and individual observance of Shabbat. As a community, we wouldn’t do anything which broke Shabbat. This means that we won’t plan any activities as a group which traditionally violates Shabbat. The reason is because if we planned to watch a movie, that would alienate some students and we don’t want to split the community apart like that. So we agreed to not watch movies over the Shabbaton. Another example of things we won’t do is to have an activity or game where everyone needs to write.

But, we decided to respect everyone’s individual, private way of observing Shabbat. This means that if someone wants to step away from the group during their free time to use their cell phone, they can. And if someone wants to write in a journal on their own time, they can. The important thing is that there won’t be any group activities involving these types of things.

This way, we’re respecting each other’s individual ways of practicing Shabbat without making anyone feel that they have to violate Shabbat to be part of the group. This way those who do and don’t observe Shabbat traditionally can feel comfortable and welcome, even though they’re both compromising a little. Those who observe Shabbat traditionally may see individuals “violating” Shabbat, but know that they will not have to violate Shabbat to be part of any group activity. And those who don’t observe Shabbat traditionally won’t be able to watch movies (for example), but know that they can do things like use the telephone on their own free, private time.

We feel that this is in the spirit of how Rabbi Shimon in Tosefta Yevamot 1:12 wrote that Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai compromised their individual beliefs and practices in order for the Jewish people to stay together.

Part 3: Communal Confusion A common reaction to everything we’ve learned so far is…”Well, how am I supposed to make any decisions in my life in this very complicated and confusing pluralistic system? How do I know what the right thing to do is? Is anything wrong if everything’s right? Help!” In particular, the average observer to these ideological and pluralistic debates can get quite confused. Even the debaters themselves can feel unsure of how to actually live their lives in such a pluralistic world. Part 3 addresses this concern.

What solutions to this issue can your students come up with? One possible solution is to always act “l’chumra”, to always act according to the most stringent position. People who do this feel that they’re living a consistent life, and that they aren’t making any mistakes because they are living according to the strictest interpretation possible. What do your students think are the pros and cons of such an approach?

Another possibility is to “Aseh l’cha rav” (see Pirkei Avot 1:6), to find an authority figure and just do whatever he says. Especially until people are old enough and wise enough to make difficult decisions on their own, this is a commonly recommended solution to the problem raised previously. What are the pros and cons of this approach? There are certainly many pros, but who gets to be the “Rav”? At what point does one think that he can make his own decisions, especially if they contradict his Rav?

The previous two solutions are potential options. A third possibility, one which is explored in depth now, is to simply live with the contradictions inherent in a pluralistic system. This is an extremely difficult way of living ones life, and represents a psychologically subtle and savvy personality. Your students are unlikely to be able to do this just yet, but it’s important to teach them how.

This third possibility (described in Text 15 below) parallels a scheme developed by psychologist William Perry. Perry theorizes that students journey through nine positions (described below) with respect to intellectual and moral development. The essence of his scheme is that we should teach our students both commitment plus recognition that pluralism is both real and legitimate. You should not teach this scheme to your students; rather it’s important for the teacher to be aware of this information, and his scheme is an important context within which to frame your lessons on this subject. Perry's scheme of cognitive and ethical development follows. 14

Category A: Dualism (There are right and wrong answers known to authorities)

14 Perry, William G. Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years: A Scheme . 1970. Position 1, Basic duality: Authorities know what is right, and if we work hard, read every word, and learn the right answers, all will be well.

Transition But what about those other authorities? And different opinions? And uncertainties? Some of our own authorities disagree with each other or don't seem to know, and some give us problems instead of answers.

Position 2, Full duality: True authorities must be right, and the others are frauds. We remain right. Others must be different and wrong. Good authorities give us problems so we can learn to find the right answer by our own independent thought.

Category B: Multiplicity (Conflicting answers exist. Beginning to make own decisions.)

Transition But even good authorities admit they don't know all the answers yet!

Position 3, Early multiplicity: Then some uncertainties and different opinions are real and legitimate temporarily, even for the authorities. They're working on them to get to the truth.

Transition But there are so many things they don't know the answers to! And they won't for a long time.

Position 4a, Late multiplicity : Where authorities don't know the right answers, everyone has a right to his own opinion; no one is wrong.

Transition But some of my friends and teachers ask me to support my opinions with facts and reason. (And/or) Transition Then what right do they have to grade us? Based upon what?

Position 4b In certain classes authorities are not asking for the right answer; they want us to think about things in a certain way, supporting opinion with data. That's what they grade us on.

Transition But this "way" seems to work in most classes, and even outside them.

Category C: Relativism (There are reasoning methods for making your own decisions.)

Position 5, Contextual relativism: Then all thinking must be like this, even for the authorities. Everything is relative but not equally valid. You have to understand how each context works. Theories are not truth but metaphors to interpret data with. You have to think about your own thinking.

Transition But if everything is relative, am I relative too? How can I know I am making the right choice?

Position 6, Pre-commitment: I see I am going to have to make my own decisions in an uncertain world with no one to tell me if I am absolutely right.

Category D: Commitment through Pluralism (Interpretation of knowledge from others coupled with experience and reflection; choosing commitments in the face of differing points of view.)

Transition I am lost if I don't. When I decide on my career (or values) everything will straighten out.

Position 7, Commitment: Well, I have made my first commitment!

Transition Why didn't that settle anything?

Position 8, Challenge to commitment: I have made several commitments. I have got to balance them--how many, how deep? How certain, how tentative?

Transition Things are getting contradictory. I can't make logical sense out of life's dilemmas.

Position 9 This is how life will be. I must be wholehearted while tentative, fight for my values yet respect others, believe my deepest values right yet be ready to learn from others. I see that I will be retracing this whole journey over and over-- but, I hope, more wisely.

The following text organically raises the problems of pluralism which were raised in the introduction to Part 3. If the students haven’t already raised the issues from the introduction to Part 3, you could raise them from the following text.

Text 15, BaMidbar Raba 14:4

From the genre of Midrash Agadah, those commentaries dealing mainly with the stories in Tanach and having some sort of moral teaching.

…" דברי חכמי כדרבונות וכמסמרות נטועי בעלי אסופות נתנו מרועה אחד ". ( קהלת :יב יא ) תני : מעשה בר ' יוחנ ב ברוקא ור ' אלעזר חסמא , שהלכו להקביל את פני ר ' יהושע בפקיעי . אמר לה : מה חידוש היה בבית המדרש היו ? אמרו לו : תלמידי אנו ומימי אנו שותי . אמר לה : אעפ" כ אי אפשר לבית המדרש בלא חידוש . שבת של מי היתה ? שבת של ר ' אלעזר ב עזריה . היתה ובמה היתה הגדה היו ? אמרו לו:…" בעלי אסופות " , אלו תלמידי חכמי שיושבי אסופות אסופות ועוסקי בתורה , הללו מטמאי והללו מטהרי , הללו אוסרי והללו מתירי , הללו פוסלי והללו מכשירי ש, מא יאמר אד : הואיל והללו מטמאי והללו מטהרי , הללו אוסרי והללו מתירי , הללו פוסלי והללו מכשירי , היא אני לומד תורה מעתה ? תלמוד לומר : " נתנו מרועה אחד" אל אחד נתנ , פרנס אחד אמר מפי אדו כל המעשי ברו הוא , שנאמר ( שמות כ ) " וידבר אלהי את כל הדברי האלה " , א אתה עשה אזנ כאפרכסת וקנה ל לב שומע את דברי המטמאי ואת דברי המטהרי , את דברי האוסרי ואת דברי המתירי , את דברי הפוסלי ואת דברי המכשירי…

…“The words of the wise are like prods, and the nails well driven are like the sayings of the masters of collections, coming from One Shepherd.” (Kohelet 12:11) It was taught: Once Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka and Rabbi Elazar Chisma went to welcome Rabbi Yehoshua at Pekiim, and he asked them, “What new thing did you learn today in the Beit Midrash?” They replied, “We are your students, and it is your water that we drink.” He said to them, “Nevertheless, one can’t imagine a Beit Midrash where nothing new was said. Whose Shabbat was it?” They replied, “The Shabbat of Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah.” “And on what topic was the lecture today?” [They describe different topics which were taught, and focus on how he interpreted the above verse from Kohelet.] “…masters of collections…” ( Baalei Asufot) is referring to the scholars who sit in groups and study the Torah, some of them declaring a thing impure while others declare it pure; some declaring a thing to be forbidden while others declare it to be permitted; some declaring a thing to be kosher while others declare it to be not kosher. Just in case someone sees all of these arguments and says, “How can I study Torah under these conditions?!”, the Torah states that they are all given from One Shepherd. One God has given them, one leader has uttered them at the command of the Lord of all creation…So make your ear like a grain-receiver and make your heart understand the words of those scholars who declare a thing impure as well as those who declare it pure; the words of those who declare a thing forbidden as well as those who declare it permitted; the words of those who disqualify an object as well as those who declare it kosher.

Two answers are given to the question of “I’m so confused…How should I make decisions if I believe in pluralism?!” One answer is that God gave all opinions and interpretations, therefore they are all legitimate. Thus, one should not fear making decisions because all interpretations are Godly. This might alleviate some of the concern and confusion over making life decisions.

The second answer is to listen well to all sides of an argument (“make your ear like a grain-receiver”), think critically about it, actively internalize all sides, and then let your heart decide 15 . This is, more or less, the equivalent of the ninth and final stage of Perry’s scheme described above. One gets the impression from this source that the model described in this text appears to be one preferred by the Rabbis. 16

Obviously this answer presents new challenges. Who gets to make such decisions? Your students? Or are students supposed to listen to their teachers until a certain age? Who is qualified to make decisions, teach them, make judgments for a community, make judgments for him or herself? Are there any limits as to what decisions are permissible? What are the boundaries of this pluralistic system? We aren’t given any answers to these critical questions.

One might come to the conclusion that we weren’t given answers to these questions on purpose. David Dishon, in his book Tarbut HaMachloket, writes in his analysis of

from Pirkei Avot…see " עשה ל רב וקנה ל חבר" from this source and " קנה ל לב" Note the similarities between 15 Introduction to Part 3 for the connection—it probably isn’t coincidental.

16 See also Tosefta Sotah 7:12—“A person might think, ‘Since the House of Shammai declare unclean, and the House of Hillel clean, this one prohibits and that one permits, how then, can I learn Torah?!’ …All the words [of Torah] have been given by a single shepherd, one God created them, one Provider gave them, the Lord of all deeds, blessed be He, has spoken them. So make yourself a heart of many rooms and bring into it the words of the House of Shammai and the words of the House of Hillel, the words of those who declare unclean and the words of those who declare clean…”

this source that “The Torah was not given so that we should lead simple, uncomplicated lives. Life mediated through Torah is intentionally complex and open to pluralistic interpretations.” (paraphrased) Dishon writes that there are two ways of viewing Torah. One is that it is in its final form, and not open to pluralistic interpretation. He says that this is what makes one afraid of it, and confused. The other way of viewing Torah is that it is open and may be pluralistically interpreted with an “understanding heart”, which is clearly Dishon’s perspective.

The following text underscores the argument that this model is the one that is preferred by the Rabbis:

Text 16, Tosefta Yevamot 1:13

לעול הלכה כדברי בית הלל הרוצה להחמיר על עצמו לנהוג כדברי בית שמיי וכדברי בית הלל על זה נאמ ' הכסיל בחש יל התופס קולי בית שמיי וקולי בית הלל רשע אלא א כדברי בית שמיי כקוליה וכחומריהו א כדברי בית הלל כקוליהו וכחומריהו . .

Under all circumstances the law follows the opinion of Beit Hillel. If someone wants to follow the law more strictly by following both Hillel and Shammai, the Torah calls such a person “a fool who walks in darkness.” (Kohelet 2:14) One who follows only the lenient rulings of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai is evil. But if one follows Beit Shammai, one should follow both their strict and lenient positions consistently, and if one follows Beit Hillel, one should follows both their strict and lenient positions consistently.

As noted in the introduction to Part 3, one might solve any confusion by observing the chumras (stringencies) of both opinions in an effort to assure that one is “right”, even without really understanding the reasons for observing either opinion. The only consideration is to follow the strictest opinions of both sides to make sure you’re doing the “right thing”.

The tosefta calls such a person who does this a fool. Why? He lives his life in fear, without thinking, with no real coherent order to his life—he will blindly do anything, even contradictory things, just as long as it’s a chumra.

Others might do the exact opposite—observe all the kulas (leniencies) from both sides. Such a person is to be considered equally foolish. All this person wants is an easy way out, is taking advantage of the situation, and is not thinking or struggling with what is the right thing to do.

The tosefta prefers a third model: that one chooses a side and sticks to it. It must be noted that almost all commentaries (see the Meiri on this source, for example) say that this sugyia is not talking about strictly choosing to follow Hillel or Shammai in all cases, but only on a case by case basis. After all, even though “the halacha follows Beit Hillel” (see Text 10), in a minority of cases the halacha actually follows Beit Shammai.

Relativism vs. Pluralism It’s important to have a discussion with the students on the difference between relativism and pluralism. This isn’t to say that relativism doesn’t sound reasonable at first. If one sees the two sides as completely relativistic, then it might sound like the right thing to do. One might reason, “If both sides are equal, then what does it matter which one I choose? I might as well choose the easier route if they’re both equal.” What do your students think about this approach? Is this pluralism, or is it relativism? What’s the difference, after all?

Philosopher Isaiah Berlin (in The First and the Last , p. 50) writes that relativism states ‘”I like my coffee with milk and you like it without; I am in favor of kindness and you prefer concentration camps”—it is a philosophy which lacks convictions and integrity. It is the polar opposite of exclusivism (also called monism), which holds that there is one single genuine truth. In terms of Judaism, exclusivists would hold that non-halachic Jews are heretics and may have forfeited their status as Jews. Both of these philosophies we feel actually hinders the creation of a Tarbut HaMachloket.

Many students will likely find relativism meaningful. Perhaps one can make the point that relativism is a poor philosophy by sharing with the students the following article from The American Thinker (americanthinker.com):

Text 17, How does the Left know that Hitler is bad? Jack Kemp, February 16 th , 2005

Recently, a Upper Schoolstudent, seventeen-year-old Jeffrey Eden of Charlestown, Rhode Island won a prominent award, the “Silver Key,” by constructing a diorama comparing President Bush and Adolf Hitler: ‘’Bush/Hitler and How History Repeats Itself.’’

This raises a question for the left: on what basis do you judge that Hitler was bad?

After all, the left does not believe in Judeo-Christian morality, but rather embraces moral relativism. Moral relativism is a philosophy that holds there are no fixed values, that all value judgments on behavior have to be considered within the context of the culture of the times and the society in which they occur. No absolutes for them, as they ridicule George Bush and Ronald Reagan for using the simplistic and embarrassing term “evil” to describe foes.

“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter ” is a typical leftist mantra reflecting this mindset. So, what moral or philosophical basis does the left have to prove that Hitler’s storm troopers and Stuka bomber pilots who overran Europe were not “freedom fighters”? Wasn’t Germany the victim of the Versailles Accords that ended WWI, with humiliating and punitive penalties placed on them just for losing the war? Shouldn’t we be looking at the “root causes” of WWII, to use a favorite leftist term?

Last spring, at the Academy Awards in Los Angeles, the liberal left honored the memory of Hitler’s favorite filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl, as the camera scrolled down a list of departed film artists In Memoriam . After all, if Hollywood thinks The Triumph of the Will , a film celebrating a 1930s Nazi rally, is great, how bad can Hitler be to the left? To a typical 17 year old, Leni Riefenstahl could be the name of an NHL player from Eastern Europe, but the issue matters.

If the left is reluctant to say that cannibalism in New Guinea is morally wrong, then on what intellectual or moral basis do they condemn Hitler? He was wasting food by not eating people? Hitler was a vegetarian and a devoted animal lover, so meat was out of the question.

Invoking Hitler gets an (understandable) emotional reaction, yet if the left has no real moral basis to oppose him, then their opposition becomes merely an emotional statement of his unpopularity – Academy Awards celebration of Riefestahl aside. But popularity ebbs and flows, especially as history undergoes reconsideration by subsequent generations. After all, Stalin, whom the left and the 1930s New York Times loved, killed 11 million Ukrainian peasants for political reasons, but was not compared to President Bush by the Rhode Island Upper Schoolstudent. Communist Cambodian dictator Pol Pot killed millions of his own countrymen as well, but the left (and the Rhode Island student) don’t compare President Bush to Pol Pot. Chairman Mao of China killed even more millions of his countrymen in politically-caused famines, not to mention firing squads. The left (and the Rhode Island Upper School) aren’t as outraged about Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot – from a comfortable distance. To present-day leftists, these mass murders are consigned to George Orwell’s memory hole.

I wonder if they taught the Rhode Island Upper Schoolboy about the 1939 peace pact that Stalin signed with Hitler before invading Russia in 1941? Stalin stood by while Hitler gobbled up countries in Europe, making him an “enabler,” to use the current pop psychology term, a passive ally of Hitler. I wonder if they taught this kid that there were Western arms inspectors in Germany in the 1930s who looked the other way while Hitler built up his army, navy and air force – a situation reminiscent of Saddam Hussein and his foiling Western arms inspectors as he built his military back up after 1991. I doubt that he was taught any of this at his Upper School.

Before reading this article, the teacher might start by asking the students, “How do you know that what Hitler did was wrong? According to him, he was right! And if everything is right, who’s to say that Hitler was wrong?” The teacher should be prepared for students who will insist that Hitler, indeed, was right. Perhaps after facilitating a discussion on the subject (see analysis below), the students could write a letter to this student agreeing or (hopefully) disagreeing with the project he created.

What, then, is the difference between relativism and pluralism? Pluralism is difficult to define; different people will offer different definitions. What follows is mine, with full knowledge that it may contradict other definitions. Pluralism argues that there is no one single authoritative truth, that one objective reality may be interpreted in different but equally valid ways. This differs from relativism in that one can hold that ones beliefs reflect the truest interpretation of Judaism and at the same time respectfully recognize that all Jews do not hold this position. In terms of Judaism, a pluralist would argue that Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox Judaism are equally valid ways of understanding and practicing Judaism. One Jew might disagree or argue with the practice of another, but that Jew would not argue that the other’s practice is false or invalid.

It must be noted to the students that pluralism, as defined above, may exclude Orthodoxy. Thus, by definition, pluralism is not really pluralistic. The prominent Reform theologian Eugene Borowitz has admitted that “Orthodoxy cannot recognize the teaching of Progressive Judaism as valid...We cannot ask Orthodoxy to violate its own faith and accept Progressive Judaism, de jure, as a fully equivalent, if alternative, interpretation of Judaism”. Chief Rabbi of Great Britain Jonathan Sacks: “[Orthodoxy] does not recognize the legitimacy of interpretations of Judaism that abandon fundamental beliefs or halachic authority. It does not validate, in the modern sense, a plurality of denominations...It cannot...accept the validity of Reform and Conservative Judaism as alternative readings of Torah...Orthodoxy is not a denomination”.

Rabbi Norman Lamm, past president of Yeshiva University, has claimed that pluralism is not a sacred principle within Judaism: “...a pluralism which accepts everything as co-legitimate is not pluralism, but the kind of relativism that leads...to spiritual nihilism. If everything is kosher, nothing is kosher.” Rabbi Walter Wurzburger, past editor of the modern Orthodox journal Tradition, wrote: “Religious pluralism borders on religious relativism, if not outright nihilism. It rests on the assumption that no religion can be true and that it does not really matter what kind of myth we invoke in order to provide us with a sense of meaning and purpose.”

A fourth model (besides relativism, exclusivism, and pluralism, as they’ve been described above) is inclusivism. Inclusivism holds that there is only one truth, but that the ‘other view’ is to be somehow included. In terms of Judaism, an Orthodox Jew might hold that he holds the single truth, but that Reform Jews are making excusable errors, and therefore may be ‘included’ in the faith community. This is in contrast to exclusivists who hold that Reform Jews are making inexcusable errors and are to be fully rejected out of hand. A self-described inclusivist, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, admits that “The inclusivist understands in advance that Jews outside Orthodoxy will find his position ‘patronizing’ or ‘imperialistic’.” This is the main problem with inclusivism: a Reform Jew might not want to be in dialogue with someone who views him or her as making “excusable errors”. That might be inexcusably condescending. Put simply, pluralism might be as unacceptable to Orthodox Jews as inclusivism is to Reform Jews.

These discussions will likely be lively, especially bringing in a relativistic approach to Hitler (which hopefully you will be able to demonstrate carries no integrity). The intention is to get the students thinking about the complexities of a pluralistic society, and to illustrate how to exist in such a community without relying on the crutch of relativism or exclusivism, or the other undesirable models learned thus far in the sources. Hopefully your students will find the third model of the tosefta (Text 18) to be persuasive.

Part 4: The impact of Tarbut HaMachloket on a community What can a culture of machloket do to a community? Can it actually rip it apart? Or does it have a positive impact on a community? There are three perspectives from the sources:

1) Machloket represents something negative about a community: It is a sign of a community’s deterioration and will lead to “two Torahs” (irreparable splintering of the community). 2) Machloket represents something fairly neutral about a community: It is a natural evolution of ideas due to the imperfect nature of human understanding. 3) Machloket represents something positive about a community: It adds greatly to a community.

Model 1: Machloket is negative Text 18, Tosefta Chagiga 2:9

אמ ר' ' יוסי כתחלה לא היתה מחלוקת בישראל אלא בית די של שבעי ואחד היה בלשכת הגזית ... מש הלכה יוצא ורווחת בישראל משרבו תלמידי שמיי והלל שלא שימשו כל צרכ הרבו מחלוקות בישראל ונעשו שתי תורות

Rabbi Yossi said, “From the beginning, there was never machloket in Israel. Rather, there was the court of seventy one that was located in the chamber of hewn stones…From there the law went out and was disseminated in Israel. Once the students of Shammai and Hillel who did not adequately serve their masters increased, machloket multiplied in Israel, and there emerged two Torahs.

The students of Hillel and Shammai did not adequately serve their masters…they weren’t diligent, and didn’t listen close enough to their teachers. If they had, they would have been able to pass on the Tradition just fine, without any machloket, which is described in Pirkei Avot 1:1—

Text 19, Pirkei Avot 1:1

משה קבל תורה מסיני ומסרה ליהושע ויהושע לזקני וזקני לנביאי ונביאי מסרוה לאנשי כנסת הגדולה ...

Moshe received the Torah from Mt. Sinai and transmitted it to Yehoshua, and Yehoshua to the Elders, and the Elders to the Prophets, and the Prophets transmitted it to the Men of the Great Assembly…

As a result of their students’ carelessness, “two Torahs” emerged, which is a decidedly negative result. It is just about the worst thing that can happen to people who want only to do God’s will: “How can I do God’s will if we lost the tradition of what God’s will is?” A case in point is the Karaite controversy which did indeed end in “two Torahs”, two religions, two claims on the truth. The teacher should spend time teaching this controversy.

So according to this source, pluralism is negative; it means that the community is “damaged goods”, and is never able to go back to the original, unified, pristine state of understanding God’s will 17 .

Model 2: Machloket is neutral Text 20, Rambam, Introduction to his commentary on the Mishnah

(Rambam: acronym for Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, aka Maimonides, 1135-1204. One of the leading Torah scholars of the Middle Ages, and of all time. His three major works are his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Mishneh Torah—a comprehensive code of Jewish law, and the Moreh Nevuchim/Guide for the Perplexed, a major work of Jewish philosophy.)

The author has a photocopy of this source in Hebrew available for the teacher.

…At least agree with me when it comes to arguments such as that between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai …Do not imagine that one of their traditions was transmitted uninterruptedly from Moses to us, and that the other was not. All

17 To be fair, “never” is too strong a word. The end of Mishna Eduyot does suggest that the Mashiach can fix all machlokot… similar disputes are to be understood in the same manner: They are in reality the branchlets of the branches of branches extending from the basic principles received by both debaters.

…Any two men equal in intellect…will have no disagreements in their theorems; and if some conflict of opinions should arise, it will happen very rarely, as is the case with Shammai and Hillel who differed in just a few laws…However, when their students’ diligence for attaining wisdom slackened, and their abilities of logical analysis grew weak compared to the abilities of Hillel and Shammai, their masters, then conflicts resulted between them concerning the analysis of many matters…

Nonetheless, we should not take them to task for this, since we cannot demand of two sages that they conduct their debates at the level of a Yehoshua and Pinchas…

In this way did machloket arise, and not because one authority was…wrong and the other right…

This Rambam says the Torah given to Moses, and initially transmitted by Moses, was perfect. But at a certain point when Jews began to interpret the Torah, they began to err because they weren’t perfect beings. So by necessity machloket arose, as a result of inevitable human error in interpretation. It’s not a negative phenomenon which leads to disaster, as Text 18 thought. Machloket is an expected, fairly neutral natural phenomenon. Rambam says it’s not anyone’s fault It’s natural and unpreventable. God only expects the best .(" ואי להאשימ בכל זאת") you can give Him, using the best of your limited powers as a human, and that you listen to “the judges that are in those days”. This last statement means that one can and should only rely upon the flawed abilities of humans, and should not worry about trying to live like during the times when Moses was alive.

One might infer from this Rambam that because laws are human and by necessity full of errors, then humans cannot fully understand such a thing as “truth” or “lies”. Thus, one cannot use “ the truth” as a real value in ones life; one can only think in terms of “logical” or “convincing”. The Rambam’s Moreh Nevuchim/Guide of the Perplexed (Part 1, Chapter 2) reinforces this understanding. One might also infer that the proper understanding of how we got to where we are today (ie a pluralistic world) will prevent the feeling of their being “two Torahs”—thus he doesn’t even refer to Text 18 in his commentary.

Model 3: Machloket is positive Text 21, Meiri, Commentary to Avot 5:17

Menahem ben Solomon He-Meiri (1249–1316), born in Provence, a scholar and commentator of the Talmud.

The author has a photocopy of this source in Hebrew available for the teacher.

“Any argument which is for the sake of Heaven, its end will endure…”—…It seems to me that the term “argument” refers only to one group challenging the first group…When a second group responds to the first and says, “What you just said is not the right thing to do”…then this is an argument. And therefore an argument is referring to only one of the sides, the one who challenges the first side.

So [in Pirkei Avot 5:17] it means that if this second group disagrees not as one who is being merely provocative or stubborn, but as one who wishes to teach the truth—in the end his words will endure, for the truth makes its own way. But if it is not for the sake of Heaven but rather only to provoke or be stubborn, then in the end his words will not endure, and the words of the first person will endure…The intent here is to encourage a person to try to support the truth…Do not be afraid of anyone…

differently than " כל מחלוקת שהיא לש שמי סופה להתקיי" The Meiri interprets what we’ve seen thus far. He wonders how it is possible for both sides to endure for thousands of years. So he says that the challenger to the original position, as long as the challenge is to search for the truth and not just to win power, is the side which will endure. Thus he sees machloket as a positive value which helps search for the truth in the best possible way, and he thinks that people should be encouraged to see it as a positive communal value.

His perspective requires much from both sides. The initial group needs to acknowledge the challenger’s right to argue and the challenger’s ultimate victory for the sake of the truth. The challenger must have the courage to challenge! It demands a high level of intellect and understanding, and ability to give and take constructive criticism 18 . It requires a person to be able to stand up to all kinds of pressure.

18 Students will be spending considerable time on this ability in a later unit on Tochecha, the art of rebuke. It is a special type of community who can live according to the Meiri’s take on pluralism. It is very unique in character. A pluralistic community such as this needs to be strong, and not cave in or give in to the weaknesses of individual humans. Do your students think such a community is possible?

Part 5: Authority and Dissent Part 4 looked at the impact of pluralism on a community from a more theoretical level. But what actually happens if a community has two authority figures teaching conflicting actions ? For example, what would have happened if Al Gore had decided to set up his own presidency and not accept George Bush’s win? Or, what happens if individual citizens disagree with the authorities and actually teach and do something different than what the law is? Can individuals disagree not only in thought but in action, and the community still remain a unified community? Did Rosa Parks do the right thing? Maybe show how the movie “Barber Shop” made fun of Rosa Parks, and get student reaction to that movie clip. Or, what about a soldier disobeying a direct command from his officer because he disagrees with it? What about a community leader who teaches something to the community, or gives a ruling to the community, that he personally disagrees with but is necessary for the greater good of the community? 19

There are three perspectives to these issues, all based on interpreting the “Lo titgodedu” verse from Text 22 below. Those three perspectives are:

1) Rabbi Yochanan: It’s completely forbidden to give contradictory laws to the community, and everyone must conform to one way of action, although everyone can express dissent while conforming in deed. 2) Abaye: Within one community, this view is identical to the previous one. But within two different communities, one can differ not only in thought but in deed. 3) Raba: Different courts within one community can give different legal rulings and the individual is left to decide which to follow.

Text 22, Devarim 14:1

בני את לידוד אלהיכ לא תתגדדו ולא תשימו קרחה בי עיניכ למת : :

19 It might be beneficial to teach about Zaken Mamreh here. I chose not to because the main ideas of the Zaken Mamreh are taught in this curriculum anyway. A good analysis of the relevant texts, should the teacher want to teach it, can be found in Volume One of The Jewish Political Tradition , pp. 323333. Nonetheless, the term “Zaken Mamreh” should be alluded to, at the very least for the sake of Jewish literacy.

You are children of the Lord your God. You shall not cut yourselves or shave the front of your heads because of the dead.

Without looking at the following commentaries, what do your students think is the pshat (most basic understanding) of “Lo titgodedu” (You shall not cut yourselves”)? Pshat would seem to be a literal interpretation—do not gash your skin, most likely because that was a pagan practice which Judaism wanted to disassociate itself from. But see if you can tease out any other meaning of “Lo Titgodedu”—point the students in the direction of the first half of this verse. This is what the Sifri (Text 23, below) bases its interpretation on:

Text 23, Sifri Devarim 96 and 346

From the genre of Midrash Halacha, those midrashim dealing mainly with laws, organized according to their appearance in the Chumash.

96 לא תתגודדו , לא תעשו אגודות אלא היו כולכ אגודה אחת…

“Lo Titgodedu” (“You shall not cut yourselves…”)—Do not split yourselves into factions. Rather, be one united group… 346 ויהי בישורו מל , כשישראל שוי בעצה אחת מלמטה שמו הגדול משתבח מלמעלה שנאמר ויהי בישורו מל , אימתי בהתאס ראשי ע ואי אסיפה אלא ראשי ע ...

… יחד שבטי ישראל כשה עשוי אגודה אחת ולא כשה עשוי אגודות אגודות

“And there was a king in Yeshurun (33:5)”—When all of Israel is united in their counsel below, His great name is praised above, as it is said, “And there was a king in Yeshurun”. When does this occur? “When the heads of the people gathered the tribes of Israel in unity (33:5)”.

“…the tribes of Israel in unity.”—(He is King) when they form one unified group; (He is) not (King) when they form several factions.

The Sifri’s interpretation of “Lo Titgodedu” isn’t so far fetched, considering the first part of that verse is talking about being the children of God. It is saying that unity isn’t just an important political/national value; in Judaism, unity is an important religious value. It would seem that, according to this verse, God’s kingdom depends on Israel being unified. It would be useful to actually go to the verse in Devarim (33:5) and see how this Midrash is using it (ie “There was a king [God] in Yeshurun [Israel] when the Jewish people were united; but when they are not united, God cannot be King.”)

The question still remains, though, what individual actions are “forbidden” (ie which ones violate “Lo Titgodedu” and cause factions), and which actions are permissible. This will be addressed in the sources which follow.

Pedagogical Suggestions David Dishon, in Tarbut HaMachloket, recommends that after presenting Text 1, but before presenting the remaining texts, share the following analogy with the students (but leave out what is in the parentheses).

Some teachers at the school don’t want to give grades because they think it’s educationally unsound. They don’t push other teachers to agree with them, though (which is Raba’s position). The principal opposes these teachers because he thinks it will cause confusion and anarchy—he wants a school which is unified in practice. But he does not oppose these teachers breaking off and forming their own school (which is Abaye’s position). The superintendent of the school district opposes even a breakoff, though, and insists that all schools in the district, and even the country if he was able, have a uniform grading policy (which is Rabbi Yochanan’s position).

Ask the students who they would side with and why. Understanding these three positions will help them later on in understanding the upcoming texts. Obviously the topic of “grades” is not the focus here—it should be downplayed in fact. As the teacher teaches the following texts, this analogy should be utilized to help the students understand the different positions.

Text 24, Talmud Yerushalmi Pesachim, Perek 4, Daf 30, Turim 3-4

א"מ/ / מקו שנהגו לעשות מלאכה בערבי פסחי עד חצות עושי מקו שנהגו שלא לעשות אי עושי ההול ממקו שעושי למקו שאינ עושי או ממקו שאינ עושי למקו שעושי נותני עליו חומרי המקו ' שיצא מש וחומרי המקו שהל לש ואל ישנה אד מפני המחלוקת ...

רבי שמעו ב לקיש שאל לר ' יוחנ ואינו אסור משו בל תתגודדו אמר ליה בשעה שאילו עושי כבית שמאי ואילו עושי כבית הלל בית שמאי ובית הלל אי הלכה כבית הלל ? ... אמר לו : הרי ראש השנה ויו הכיפורי ביהודה נהגו כר ' עקיבה ובגליל נהגו כרבי יוחנ ב נורי אמר ליה שנייה היא שא עבר ועשה ביהודה כגליל ובגליל כיהודה יצא ...

Mishna: Where they are accustomed to do work on the eve of Passover up to noon, they do so. Where they are accustomed not to do so, they do not do so. He who goes from a place where they do work to a place where they do not do work, or vice versa, they expect him to follow the stricter rules from where he came from, and the stricter rules in the place where he currently resides. But a person should not vary from the local custom so as to avoid controversies and arguments.

Gemara: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan, “Isn’t this [practicing different customs in different cities as described in the Mishna] forbidden because of the prohibition “You shall not cut yourselves…” (Lo Titgodedu)? He replied, “[No,] this prohibition [only] applies in a situation in which some follow [the laws of] Beit Shammai and some follow [the laws of] Beit Hillel and [we know that] when Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel argue, the law follows Beit Hillel.”…He (Rabbi Shimon) said back, “Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur—in Judah they follow the ruling of Rabbi Akiva, and in the Galil they follow Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri!” He replied, “That is a different case since if one went and followed the Judean custom in the Galil, or the Galilean custom in Judah, one has fulfilled one’s obligation.”

The point of Text 24 is to clarify which situations actually threaten Jewish unity. There are three possibilities to understand “Lo Titgodedu” according to Rabbi Yochanan:

1) Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish assumes that uniformity of minhag/custom is necessary to prevent the violation of “Lo Titgodedu.” Rabbi Yochanan says that uniformity of minhag is not the case here. Rabbi Yochanan says that one violates “Lo Titgodedu” when you follow a law (not a minhag) which is different than normative law. He cites the example of someone following Beit Shammai when we know that Beit Hillel is normative law. This person violates “Lo Titgodedu”. But someone who follows a different custom (as described in the Mishnah) does not violate “Lo Titgodedu”. Thus, according to Rabbi Yochanan, “Lo Titgodedu” applies only to uniformity of law (mitzvot), not uniformity of custom (minhag).

To him, machloket over minhag may cause “problems” but is not enough to destroy the unity of a nation, like machloket over law can do. Mitzvot, then, are the essence of the Jewish community according to him. All Jewish communities must have one uniform law. What do your students think is their “mitzvah” and what is their “minhag”? In other words, what are the essential values which cannot be broken and must be uniformly obeyed, and which are lesser values which, while they shouldn’t be lightly regarded, nonetheless do not rip a community apart if there is disagreement on them? Why do they think the essence of a community is mitzvot according to Rabbi Yochanan?

2) Rabbi Yochanan’s statement about Hillel and Shammai imply that had Beit Shammai actually acted at they taught, they would have violated the prohibition of “Lo Titgodedu”. But, since they succumbed to the majority view in practice, they did not violate the prohibition. Do your students agree that it is okay to voice dissent but not act upon that dissent for the greater good of the community?

3) The final part of this text seems to be saying that if both sides are aware of the other’s laws, and a traveler follows the other’s laws in the other’s land, then this is acceptable “bidieved” (post-facto). However, one might deduce that for Rabbi Yochanan, if they don’t know of each other’s laws it would create an issue of “Lo Titgodedu” no matter how far in distance the two places are. For Rabbi Yochanan, it is enough that a Jew knows of a place out there in the world that is doing some mitzvah differently. Such a thing is creating “two Torahs”, two religions.

Interestingly, maybe one can say that Rabbi Yochanan’s position allows for accepting the other’s position in a bidieved way. For example, Rabbi Yochanan might say, “I’ll compromise if I can get by with a bidieved way of fulfilling the mitzvah—it’s not ideal, but it might be permitted for the sake of the unity of the Jewish people.”

Text 25, Talmud Bavli, Masechet Yevamot 14a

אמר אביי : כי אמרינ לא תתגודדו כגו שתי בתי דיני בעיר אחת , הללו מורי כדברי "ב ש והללו מורי כדברי ב ה" , אבל שתי בתי דיני בשתי עיירות לית ל בה . אמר ליה רבא : והא ב" ש וב" ה כשתי בתי דיני בעיר אחת דמי ! אלא אמר רבא : כי אמרינ לא תתגודדו כגו ב" ד בעיר אחת , פלג מורי כדברי ב" ש ופלג מורי כדברי ב ה" , אבל שתי בתי דיני בעיר אחת לית ל בה . .

Abaye said: The warning against “Lo Titgodedu” is only applicable to such a case as that of two courts of law in the same town, one of whom rules in accordance with the views of Beit Shammai while the other rules in accordance with the views of Beit Hillel. In the case, however, of two courts of law in two different towns, the difference in practice does not matter. Raba said to him: Surely the case of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is like that of two courts of law in the same town! The fact, however, is that the warning against “Lo Titgodedu” is only applicable to such a case as that of one court of law in the same town, half of which rule in accordance with the view of Beit Shammai and half of which rule in accordance with the view of Beit Hillel. In the case, however, of two courts of law in the same town, the difference in practice does not matter.

According to Abaye, within one town it is important to have one authority. This prevents the violation of “Lo Titgodedu”. For Raba, within one town there can be differing opinions and actions, as long as the two sides treat each other well. The perfect example for him is Hillel and Shammai. His perspective is only destructive if within one court there is disagreement on a ruling. Why do your students think he makes this qualification? Why does he allow two courts of law in one town to give differing rulings but not within the same court?

It would be useful pedagogically to return to the school grading analogy to end this section.

3. Final Project One final project your class could do, or those students who are interested in doing it, could be to start a Tarbut HaMachloket Club (hopefully they’ll come up with a better name!) This student-led group could be the school leaders in creating a strong and healthy pluralistic community in which everyone feels welcome and a sense of belonging, a community where people can stand up for what they believe in while at the same time affirming the dignity of those who they disagree with.

This group could write a charter, and could recruit a cross-section of students from all grades, faculty, and administrators to meet on a regular basis. They could assess the current atmosphere in the school, come up with a vision of what they’d like the school to look like, and think of ways to improve things. They could be in charge of bringing in guest speakers, and teaching the other students about Tarbut HaMachloket.

Their task is a huge one, because it’s much more than creating an atmosphere of religious pluralism. As seen in later units, this special type of community means that students respect each other in all ways and in every interaction, not just religiously; that students work on creating respectful environments at home ; that students work on improving the unification of the Jewish community in general; and that students work on relationships with all kinds of non-Jews. So the students in this club will have an endless supply of possibilities as to how they can work with the rest of the students. Throughout this curriculum, you will find other concrete proposals for what this club can do; for example this club can incorporate the “Diversity Committee” idea described later on. They can also help create parent- child workshops, and can take the lead in interfaith dialogues.

The first major project they could undertake could be to create a “Pluralism Report”. A great model of such a report can be viewed at http://www.akibaweb.org/why/PluralismReport.htm . The report from Akiba Academy in Philadelphia includes a general introduction to pluralism and the need for the report; pluralism goals at the school; pluralism at the school currently; and recommendations for improvement. The students could present this to the administration and even the board, and make sure the recommendations are followed through on.

“The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement. But the opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth.” - Physicist Niels Bohr (1885 – 1962)

This curricular unit could not have been written without the help of David Dishon. His book, Tarbut HaMachloket (Shocken Press, 1984—Hebrew), was instrumental for me in organizing the topic of pluralism in Judaism, and provided me with many of the texts on this subject along with excellent analyses. I am indebted to his hard work on this subject, and this curriculum is very much influenced by him. His book’s influence can be found on almost every page of this unit. Noam Zion’s and Steve Israel’s curriculum, Elu v’Elu (Tichon, Hartman Institute, 2004), was also influential. Noam in particular has always been a valuable mentor and colleague. Both David and Noam have been very kind in lending their support and guidance to my curriculum efforts.

All mistakes are the author’s. If I failed to credit someone or cite a source in this curriculum, please contact me and I will rectify all mistakes and omissions immediately.