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' ' * , ATTACIDIENT #1 .f
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: ! ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS j UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON 25, D, C. , 3g s- ; 'g October 20, 1% 4 Juk . f. ' Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg.
Chairican . U. S. Atomic Energy Commission - Washington, D. C.
" Subject: REPORT ON BODEGA BAY AT01EC PARK - UNIT NO.1
Dear Dr. Seaborg: 4 5 At its fifty-fifth meeting'on May 7-9,1%4 at Argonne, Illinois, and at its fifty-eighth meeting on October 7-10,1%4, the Advisory Com- , mittee on Reactor Safeguards again considered the proposal of Pacific Gas & Electric Company to construct and operate a 10081&(t) boiling water reactor on Bodega Head north of San Francisco, California. The 2l Co=nittee had the benefit of oral discussion with representatives of j the applicant and its consultants, with the AEC Regulat6ry Staff and 1 its consultants,' including staff members of the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS) and
- of the reports cited below. Subcommittee meetings were held July 31, 1%2 and March 20,1%3 and members of the Co=aittee agaib visited : the excavated site on June 3,1%4. Numerous information meetings ' vere held with the applicant, the AEC Regulat'ory Staff, and with ' consultants.
; This proposal had been considered at the Co'emitteeI a forty-seventh
, toerting and reported on in its letter of April 18,1%3 which stated: i * 'j " Tentative exploration indicates that the reactor and turbine buildings vill not be located on an active fault line. The Committee believes that if this point
; is established, the design criteria for the plant are adequate from the standpoint of hazards associated with baithquakes. Careful examination of the quartz-diorite iock below should be made during building excavation, to O confinn this point. Furthermore, the Committee suggests
, that, during design, careful attention should be given .I bd the ability of emergency shutdown systems to operate ' ''I - properly during and subsequent to violent earth shocks, j and to the stress effects that might be introduced because ! the reactor building and the turbine building are to be ! anchored in different geological formations. The need for earthquake-induced shutdown and isolation of the primary system can be considered at a later time." ,,
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* Att #1 - G-247 . * 1 i , i e
' i Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg 2- October 20,19% -
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' . O. The exploration suggested in the above comment has been completed, - and the geologic features discovered have led to further structural - considerations in the desigd. These geologic features include frac- tures in the underlying rock. One has been identified as the so- ca n ed "chaft fault". The character, extent, and age of the most , | recent activity of this fracture are controversial. Nevertheless,
, the applicant has considered its significance in the proposed struc- | ,tural protection. ,
; Proximity of the site to the San Andreas fault' system has been given j caretyl consideration. he Cocmittee has been advised by ceveral
! consultants that, during the life of the proposed reactor; there'is * a high probability that the reactor site vin experience at least one major earth shock. Bere is associated with such an earthquake & a remote possibility that the, plant will be subjected to the effect . of a shearing motion in the rock on which it would be built. The , ,q g , | 7p* USGS and USC&GS have proposed values for the intensity and accompany- " ing earth motions, including shear, which could be anticipated during
the vormt earthquake. Determination of these values has been hampered 3 i by lack of authoritati've historical records and reliable measurements. l | The applicant and his consultants believe that lover values are more , realistic. The Committee considers that the USciGS and USGS values | are conservative. j i ! The applicant has proposed methods for mechanical and structural i design to meet the predicted seismic occurrences. The applicant also
. has proposed to design the building to withstand up to three feet of j j shear displacec:ent along any plane at the site. S e Committee believes j that.the engineering principles and general design proposed to incorpo- i rate them are sound. These considerations afford that degree 'of assur- ! ance required for protection of the reactor in the unlikely event of the i
. predicted maximum earthquake.
a The USC&GS has recommended a design height for tsunami run-up at Bodega j Head. The applicant stated that the facility design and safeguard pro- cedures vin be such the plant would withstand such a tsunami safely. ' | | The Committee is of the opinion that the applicant's design objectives ' may be accomplished within the scope of present engineering knowledge. 1 -Many details of .the proposed design have not 'yet been completed. It 9 is understood that the applicant win continue to give careful attention
to the following items during design and construction: limitations on j the. maximum reactivity of individual control rods; provisions to accommo-' ~ .; date possible seismic earth movements and shear displacement; consideration.
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~ | Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg -3- October 20,19% 'i | i l I . , . of testing or other experimental verification of structursl desigo - ) features associated with earthquake protection; provisions to assure ; adequate cooling vater in case of damge to normal and emergency ' supply systems; core behavior during earthquakes; design and tests of critical plant components such as instrumentation,.1 solation valves, and control rod operating mechanisms to withstand earthquake damage; additional considerations which may be needed if zirconium clad fuel ! 1s to be used. | . | * . i The Committee recognizes that the applicant has accepted very conserva- ' tive values for earth shear movement, earthquake magnitudes, and - j tsimami heights as design criteria. These criteria.should not be con- 1 strued as precedents for use elsewhere. * . . { . r 1 | With due consideration being given to the items discussed above, the - Advisory Co=nittee on Reactor Safeguards is of the opinion that the ' | power reactor facility as proposed may be constructed at this site 'i with reasonable assurance that it may be operated without undue hazard ] to the health and safety of the public. . . j ' Sincerely yours, ,
' fQ - Herbert Kouts Chairman i
References Attached. i
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1 - 4- , s _. Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg' October 20, 1964 ) ;9 (BodegaBay) I ~;v ;; [ References: .- L . c./j 1. Amendment No. 2, Pacific. Gas' & Elec'tric Company, Bodega Bay Atomic ,: , Park - Unit No. 1, dated April 5, 1963 ,
, 2. U. S. Department of the Interior ietter to Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, ,, I dated May 20, 1963, with attachments. >
d . . 1] 3 Amendment No. 3, Pacific Gas & Electric Company, Bodega Bay i.tomic a ' Park, dated June 13,~1963 .
' 4. Amendment No. 4, Pacific Gas &' Electric Company, dated August 9,1963 'g - ,h 5 U. S. Department of the Interior letter dated September 25, 1963 to 55j Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg with attached report, TEi-837, " Geological and ps Seismic Investigations of e6 Proposed Nuclear Power Plant Site on g Bodega Head, Sonoma County, California", da.ted September 1963
. 6. U. S. Department of the Interior letter dated January 16, 1964 to . "[' 1 Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, with attached report, TEI-844, " Engineering i Geology of the Proposed Nuclear Power Plant Site on Bodega Head, ' , Sonoma County, California", dated December 1963 d | T. Amendment No. 5, Pacific Gao & Electric Company, Bodega Bay Atomic - Park,. dated January 22, 1964. - <- 8. Amendment No. 6, Pacific Gas & Electric Company, dated March 16, 1964 %
'''- | 9 Amendment No. 7, Pacific Gas & Electric Company, dated March 31, 1964. e: t 10. Amendment No. 8, Pacific Gas & Electric Company, dated July 20, 1964. 11. Amendment No. 9, Pacific Gas & Electric Company, dated September 16, 1964. n J ^ 12. U.S. Coast & Geodetic Survey report " Seismicity and Tsunami Report,
, Bodega Head, California" dated October 1964. . 4. 13 .h" U. S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey report "Engirieering GeoloEy of the Proposed Xuclear Power Plant on Bodega Head, Sonoma- ~y4 County,' California", dated October 1964.
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* * ' .., ,, . . ATTACHMENT #2 I .
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.. <,.y1 SUMMARY' ANALYSIS I .. f .A'. i BY THE * ,
DIVISION OF RE ACTOR LICENSING -]
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i IN THE MATTER OF
1 1 'i PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY j i
' : BODEGA HEAD NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l .. J
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. . : ' 1 i i 4 1 * .) 1 | 6 ' i 1 . 6 - October 26, 1964 - ! n ..1 s. ) . si , 4 5 4 e f 1 4. 1 A - A . , , , . 7j . . %.. g.; -9p A m n c' r + . L.%_.epeawry,w:mc;wv__ . 5a.swgke..n~m. em- erenswn nun:+G. maw ; a#%w-wx e+ .y- - - -. ua .. . . . _ - ~ ~ ~ . a-..- -- .- x~- - - - - . . --- -- 1 ''-) - > i T. .gg-.4.biM_ .NsdNAN'MMO4,-@wdhsh.;jidhn$is.$W.G.s4.Eij/cgcN. ,d A-4 M+~JAS> . ' *py . ' . . ., .. Att #2 - G-247 . i . , , . . . 1 * .i- ., - r ! . ' . 1 * SUMMARY. ANALYSIS . | 1 ' , 1 4 < BODEGA HEAD NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 8 ; . I . , ,. m , .G . f',k Summary . In our review of the application from Pacific Gas.and Electric'Compahy, }$ - we have taken into account the reports of the Commission's. Advisory ~ Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and'information' supplied by our' consultants , . - . . . . in geology,* seismology and struct0ral engineering. .We also have had: numerous , ' discussions with representatives of.the Company and with PG&E's consultants. ' . , . 1 . . , ' We believe that in all respects except one' the proposed design of the j N , 1 r. 4!.~ a Bodega Nuclear Power Plant provides reasonable assuranc'e-that the plant cari . i -k- . * 'ba built and operat'dd without undue risk to the health and safety of the s i public. The one exception is the uncertainty associated with the proposed l, design concept to safeguard the reactor aga' inst the effects of'a major, earth- ..|, quake involving substantial shear movementi of 'the foundation rock. . .j - ] The proposed * reactor site is approximately 1000 feet west of the ' ' western edge of the. San Andreas fault zone.. The location has nece'ssitated i +.4 , " prolonged.and. intensive study of factors affecting the safety of the in- q ' .stallation in the event of the occurrence.of a severe earthquake-at or near . . " i * ; . the location of the plant. ~ ,t . .J. The fact that the proposed site is adja' cent to the San Andreas fault * ' - . zone makes it almost certain.. that it will be subjected to one or more severe ]. . . - ! , ..J i. . , ' I : , > . ;.r. , .*%i .,<. ak 2 _ __- - _- .__ - .s. - , - - . -_ , i , ' ;a el.Ln e,.w. &G'* Oa:n:bC k.4% J.uk.%. .G. w a :.E. %na L - - - -- . y m -mq =c umewesw - -. - - - -.:. 4._ ww ~.- , - .a. n.De- - - -- . .I , . - . . ,, . ! . . y . "Act #2 - G. -247 i i j s . J j seismic disturbances during the lifetime of the plant. While there is a . . 'l high probability that the plant under the proposed design could survive . the vibrational stresses of even a very large earthquake without damage, . it must be recognized that if such an earthquake should also involve several . . . ; feet of shear ground movement as ,well as ground accelerations as high as - J 2/3s to 1.0 8.there is presently no sound expe,rimental or experience basis l for predic. ting .the extent. of damage that.might;be incurred. by the reactor I containment-structure and emergency equipment designed to assure the safety i of the reaci:or. ! i A novel method .is proposed for safeguarding the Bodega Head reactor 1 . * 'd against differential ground movement of its foundation rock. This is not . . .i j in itself a cause for concern. What is'of concern is the lack of any experi- ! > mental or exper'ience proof-test of the proposed novel method that could form ! ' an acceptable basis for the required safety evaluation. 1 ' i Because of the magnitude of possible consequences of- a, major rupture in the reactor containment accompanied by a failure of emergency equipment, we do not believe that a large nuclear power reactor should be the subject of a pioneering construction effort based on unverified engineering principles, I however sound they may appear to be. . - For these reasons, it is our con'clusion .that Bodega Hesd is not a . . 1 ' ' suitable location for the proposed nuclear power plant at the present state l u . ,I "of our knowledge, 1 ~ | 2- | s . ' : .1 - ' ,0 ; . "' # & . m.--- c- m ,, w D TDY ' wf a $7 7 ' Q). . .2 f T ,'j?b*Yfsh'jk0''f'(,*,%QiL~ < * M.* yn~Rs s '< W s - [j ' AWM** XL'$*$ h'h?""?N"h""?"'* , -__ - <-1 . . ------. . . ~ m . w. ,, x , ,, . . . | ;w.;wndns:Am%yLheuwad,.Ah. . f. ..www n . - -_ ,_ a . ? . '. ; ' *j:x- ' s . o . ' Att #2 - C-247 ,. - ! . . r . , History ' The Pacific Gas and Electric Company of San Francisco on December 28, 1962, ' i submitted an application to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for a permit to i ; ;j construct and operate a nuclear power plant at Bodega Bay, California, pursuant 7 to the provisions of Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regt:lations, Part 50 < i . ; , (10 CFR 50). The application, which includes a " Preliminary Hazards Summary j Report," dated December 28, 1962, and Amendments 1 through 9, received during { , i ! the period March 4,1963, through September 16, 1964, has been reviewed by the ! AEC's Division of Reactor Licensing and other members of the Regulatory Staff. , | . . s Technical consultants assisted the staff in specialized areas. The application j i 1 was also considered by the AEC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), j - . " .: : ( The recommendations of the ACRS were expressed in letters to the Chairman o,f the . .) AEC dated April 18, 1963, and October 20, 1964 q . Site The nuclear power plant is proposed for construction on Bodega Head, a i { small peninsula in Sonoma County on the Coast of California about 50 miles ^ ; northwest of San Francisco! The property owned by Pacific Gas and E1ectric | . 1 Company at the site consists of'appro'ximately 225 acres and includes the entire I _4 southern end of the penissula. The proposed reactor site is approximately -i 1000 feet west of the Western edge of the San Andreas fault zone. * : | | . '} The nearest residence to the site.is approximately 1-1/2 miles away. ' Bodega Bay (population 350) is the nearest village and is located approxi- ' - - + . , , mately 2 miles north-northeast of the reactor site. The total population - - within 5 mile's is about 500 and within 25 miles is about 114,000. 3 , I e ,k = . . - ' . .\ n NMh h ND*d N'8MM'% Yd N'd 5b b - . .. . , L ..:.n. ~._1.w w _ _ - _. - , ,W: f,.&L*d?'r"M5> M &;~E-~u +.- = =O1.A :.: --w. , ., .. o . I ' . . , A,tt #2 - G-247 . 4 ' Plant Description , , . The nuclear power reactor proposed for construction on Bodega Head is a 1 [ direct. cycle, forced circulation, boiling water type. Reactors of the boiling ' water type have been operated successfully at.Dresden, Illinois, Big Rock, Michigan, and Humboldt Bay, California. Design power'at Bodega is 1008 thermal if, zJ . ' * messwatts (Mwt), compared with 700 Hwt for Dresden, 240 Mwt for Big Rock Point 0. t. ' and 165 Mwt for Humboldt Bay. . .. , , The reactor core will have an active fuel . length of 125 inches and a * 1 diameter of 137 inches. It will contain 592 fuel assemblies and 145 movable | , 1 ' 1 . .' control rods (cruciform blades). The control rod drives will'be similar to ' i the rod drives which have been'used at Dresden, Big Rock Point, and Humboldt | ,. Bay. . ! .c | For containment,at the Bodega Bay plant the company proposes to utilize .| # the pressure suppression concept similar to that already in use at its Humboldt Bay plant. The reactor vessel and the coolant recirculation system 'are to be enclosed in a dry well vessel, whose volume is about 115,000' cu. ft. The' dry well is connected through eight vent pipes, each eight feet in - . f diameter, to a suppression chamber with a volume of approximately 142,000 4 # ,, i cu. ft., of which about 62,000 cu. ft. is fille'd with water. In the unlikely - event of a complete severance of a reactor coolant recirculation line, the ' pressure build-up in the dry well would be reduced both in magnitude and . ! duration as a result of steam flow to the s'uppression pool where the steam f : ) would be condensed. (Any fission products released either concurrently or ~] subsequent.ly would be trapped either in the' dry well or suppression chamber.) 1 ! ' Tests have been conducted that demonstrate the effectiveness of this concept. i ' j , -4- . 1 , | . i .I . ..n . :g U i'd,9fi$ i@ M @ @ M. M y.maKinjJp ty ppd.?yg p ;u;p e... w., u.6,g,p p.,%,g , z , - .- -- . , . m , qg w ~: w. ap~a t: M,~r.w;, . em_+;;, _ 1_.t yv+.ww ., m~._w.;,,, 'n>. _ . . ' .- w, _ zg; . , ' . W: ; 1 ... .. - . | . .. . Att #2 - C-247 , , ' , # i * -i ! 'l The fuel-handling facilities at this plant provide for underwater transfer e of spent fuel from the reactor vessel to the fuel storage pool .thr'ough an [h,. interco.nnecting pool of water. These operations are to be conducted inside a ,w. fl| refueling building which will be maintained at a slight negative pressure by , , '{{ fans w'hich discharge air through, particulate and, halogen removal filters to ... . A .. .~.; , - a stack, thereby minimizing the possibility of direct out-leakage from the " - buil' ding. . ; > i , ' Radios,ctive liquid wastes from the Bodega plant are to be mixed with , i condenser effluent -(about 250,000 gpm) prior to discharge to the Pacific .> a .yI$ Ocean. .All solid wastes with radioactive contamination are to be transferred M nv ~ qg{ to licensed waste disposal agents for off-site disposal. Radioactive gases . 'b{c- are to be vented to a special stack the height o'f which is to be ppecified on the basis of results of a meteorological survey now in progress. The dis- pos.a1 of both liquid and gaseous radioactive . wastes resulting from plant - operations will be. monitored and controlled.so.that.at any off-site location, f ! the concentration of radioactive contaminants will not exceed the[ limits set ! t : . p;. forth in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20. ..m 2 i M?IN 1 ,- ' ,e ? Important Safety Considerations -3 0 In 'our evaluation of this application, 3m .have give.nu special consideration m fb :to a number of site and design features which..have.important safety impl$ca- '; * [. ' tions. The more important.of these eafety considerations .are discussed in - ' .QJ . ' TI .the. following paragrpphs. , . , ' ' 1. Suitability of the Proposed Site l Based on considerations of-potentialghazards. Aoppbblic healgh:pnd . J; ,-5- ' - - Njh _ . . .. , - , , ~ 4 ' .4 fe -' -* .seg eu , . 4 .Cd , ,Y dhe J Mi 1 ,,t_ ,[: M e 6. . i.x .1 .- ng g,Q gy * y {$ g : - - - . c_-- ,w. ______'.'.q w..ta, w ,suak&,m. a m .] .. .. . ' .< Att #2 - G-247 . , , . . * , . ! - st ' i ,- . ' I safety, this reactor sit'e is.an excellent one in all respects'except j i one - the possibility of a severe earthquake ' involving ~substantial shear . earth movement at the site. Earthquake problems posed by this location . - [}J are considered in a later section of this report, i ? By virtue of property ownership tiy PG&E, as enhanced by the water - ' .\ areas on three sides of the peninsula, the applicant can exert positive j conta l over an area having a minimum radius of about 450 feet from ] . . . '| , the reactor, and can exer.t substantial control over an area extending 9 out to a radius of about 1300 feet, the nearest point on Doran Beach . ', .' ] ' ; across the harbor entrance channel. '. I ! The population in the vicinity of the site is low and the iso- ' i lation distances are well within acceptable ranges. The meteorology | is as good.as or better than that in California generally. The site | .' ] , is not upstream from any drinking water intakes. ; I l . i 2. Suitability of the Nuclear Reactor Design | ! ' | The boiling water nuclear reactor proposed for the Bodega plant | | ] | ! , j i | is of a type that has been operated safely at a number of other | locations including Dresden, Big Rock Point and Humboldt Bay. It is : * j expected to exhibit negative temperature and void coefficients of . reactivity at operating conditions. Further, the reactor will be .. | - 1 ' ; - 6- 1 * | l < s | + | | ;f ' , -a pp :,'k b b E 58 M AM62Ef 5?%! 9 ?MS$4@ Ns M eMW W 07p M $ @ W % ~ P o GWM4Q" / B3 D. Th, l - > ~ , . .. , . ~ . ~, 7m :., .m ,y m-w, : .~+. w ,c.u.n a qu ,p~yy p:, . y -- - m , .wam,, we.,&g.~_.w . mw. .a;u ~; t ,4w.ma., - ______. , _ a!C ' * "" , . . .. - - . Att #2 - G-247 . . ) . . ' I , ; i '{ .< . ! brought to. full. power through a step-wise approach so that any. : unforeseen instability would be detected before a damaging nuclear ;, 3 excursion could result. | m," . . s, The' Bodega Bay reactor is t'o.be designed so that at any' time during core life.with s11 control rods inserted the k-effective of the core will not exceed 0.97. ' With the most reactive rod fully . withdrawn and tho'other rods fully inserted, the k-effective of the ' ' , , s , core will be 0.99 or less_. Thus, the reactor will remain sub-critical . .j ' - if one rod is inadvertently withdrawn, or it can be shut down even if ,, ' ' , one rod should become stuck in the fully withdrawn position. In , g . i .SU ' addition, a soluble poison control material can be injected into the i reactor vessel if needed to hold the reactor sub-critical. i * , i 1 j | i The control rod drives proposed for this' reactor are similar to,. | but include certain improvements over, the locking-piston type ro'd a ; drives that have been used at other p*lants_ The. applicant has stated ,1 / that prototype and production' drives will be subjected to functional :.% _g and endurance tests before reactor startup. _. ~1 Ij 3. Suitability of Fuel Handling Facilities - 1 1 The fuel-handling concept .for this facility has favorable safety ;j - characteristics. Ddringrefuelingoperationsth'efuelstoragepool i a , .m ' ' t . ]I , is connected by a' water channel to the reactor vessel, thus providing ,2 ' for visual observation and underwater cooling of all operations, and 't . i ' ' eliminating the potential hazards. associated with fuel handling casks. t . . * I e 7= * , N ,| ' A __-___ .. _ _ . - . + ' 1+ ,s ? - - w .- g ; U . A ... a a. _ -, ,.; m .a .,_ L .~. s m ~ L .:_. _ 21..;..--- + -- _ ... ------w w.w c w ... w._m. s - . ~ ._- , 7 m.m .. , . . ' . ~ . . . ; - * Att #2 - G-247 ,1 - i , . Adecuacy of the Radioactive Waste Disposal Plans and Designs | 4. ; ; Radioactive liquid wastes from this plant are to be mixed with condenser effluent prior to discharge to the Pacific Ocean. No problem , is anticipated in maintaining the concentration of. radionuclides in the inixture.below the maximum permissible concentrations specified in 10 CFR 20. In addition, the applicant has stated that a radiological ! monitoring survey of this site and its environs will be initiated two years before operation of the reactor and will continue after operatierr , cournences . Details of the sampling program have not been completed, . | but it is expected'that qu$rterly samples would be tak'en.of marine 1 ') ' waters, plankton, bottom sediments, invertebrates, shellfish, resident | 1 fishes and'of the intertidal algae and ' eel, grass. Thus, the applicant . i would be able to determine any reconcentration of radionuclides that 1 j might occur before it became a potential safety problem. All solid wastes from this plant are to be transferred to licensed waste disposal agents for off-site disposal. . The applicant has stated that gaseous wastes disposal will be i j monitored add controlled so that a maximum annual exposure at any- , . ! off-site location will not exceed permissible limits. There appears ! to be no reason to believe that this ob.jective'cannot be met. The , i ' I diffusion climatology is expected to be satisfactory and a ! meteorological facility is being installed at the site,to dev'elop.h - . better understanding of the local meteorology | so that an appropriate A radiological 1 radioactive gaseous waste stack height may be selected. s -8- , . t . .q ' * * '* I Y N I' ' ' ' ' SS' |1"Y % ' .m w _ h -__- -_ ._ -_. _ _ . . . -*' %'".."; y " ~~'- . z ~ ~ ,- ' &.G S G S 2 E M E22$$d Q R T"(H Q'f~*~': _(" p2 ' - .. .:@ , MM l . Att #2 - G-247 ,, . . . , , 'i ' ; . . . 1 - ' ' ' survey pr.ogrxn at the site is planned for initiation two years in ~, . . . . J Idvance of reactor operation. Quarterly sampling of soil, vegetation, 'J . h /|,tJ local agricultural products, well water, stream water and stream mud, \ . . .|) andweeklysamplingo{airparticulatesandairbackgroundarealso , l . ! S , .y4 fsi planned. i \ ?;) : . ! .$$ , ' {:y 5. Adequacy of Emergency Systems * . 4.L ' . , Theapplicantproposestoe[quiptheplantwitha' subs'tantisi , number of facilities for the safe handling of emergen cies. An- J,- f, - ]1 emergency feedvater pump is provided to assure that the reactor, core , 1 j is always kept submerged in water so long as the reactor vessel and.. j , ' piping beneath it remain intact. Core spray systems are provided to j g' . ! . .,.. 31; cool the core if, for some reason, such as pipe failure, the core cannot | Mt . ' @ be kept submerged. Anemergencycondenserwithalarkewater, storage 1 \ J capacity and provisions for make-up from the fire system is provided | , .! A l to serve as a heat sink in case the main condenser is damaged. - . ! . - - bleed-and-feed system is available as a backup to che, emergency . , , ' | condenser. This system provides for bleeding steam_ from the main i ' - [ steam line to the suppression pool, and making up water thus lost .. @ ';;g through action of the auxiliary feed water pump or its backup. .A | AQ. liquid poison injection system is available to keep the reactor sub- m." , .D '?I / critical if such action becomes.neces'sary for-any reason. N). c . . . $;f . - Several sources,of emergency electric power.are available. A -: . .. .(p;y:11., . startup-standby transformer is provided.to supply station service | jfyi , ~ .j ' il power during plant startup, or in emergencies, from the 220 KV trans- .'-i., ' . ,! mission system. An auxiliary standby transformer can supply sufficient x .Js > |.n . 9 :d 4,,.),- a:..,* ' 'I 8 4*g - , * ,' a . , .. ., o. ,. 1 ., f . g y si.;. m . m - A ~ 4 M . J. .- y - Q w ~--4 A %La=." ^-~. ,~~---' W % 4v . . s * ! f$ i i .h * . * * i, .. Att #2' - G-247 1 . . | ' * | | ' | ' j , power for orderly shutdown from a 12 KV distribution Line from a. nearby substat. ion. If both these sources fail, an engine driven generator can supply power for' safe shutdown and decay heat r'emova'1. i ' In addition to these sources a substantial station battery will n- ( supply. power for control instruments and', through an inverter, .a - ' essentiel AC loads. . , : . J. , '' 6. .Adecuacy of the Containment Concept ' This plant is to' utilize the pressure suppression concept in its ,a containment design. Mockup tests have been conducted by the appli- 1 i .. i cant to determine the maximum pressure the containment would i , i ; i i . . . experience as a result of the complete severance of one of the ] | ' 28-inch recirculation loop lines under a variety of reactor coolant ! > > ~ pressures'and temperatures, and dry well temperatures. These tests ; have provided a suitable basis for designing the system and have also i shown that the steam exhausted to the suppression pool is completely | . 1 i condensed beneath the pool surface. 1 1 The applicant has proposed a number of special provisions to j assure reliable containment performance in the event of an accident. t Redundant isolation valves are to be placed in the main steam lines, a Containment leak rate tests are to be conducted after installation ! ' , of all penetrations by applying dry well design pressure to the .. ., completed dry well and suppression chamber design pressure to the l completed suppression chamber. The containment leaktightness will be ~ testedatperioficintervalsthrough,outthelifeoftheplant. d Specifications for containment design pressure jand leak rate will s . ' limit potential accident consequences to acceptable levels. . - 10~- .,. .E' q. s - Q , , * ' ' eT > _ .:,.., ,., 3j,,_...__._. y + c M .-?. y ,.g a. . % ,.g y, hur.*7 3..y .g,,m .,m.... y . .,, ., ,,. ,. , ,,r.:ee.v.ed+seva.k&menn6snel..g..,,a-m a au.g. + p %2a w.th a* m h a;.; g , 7 .. . s.,.3Mgg ; W1 7 . . .. 1 - . , ., , ' ' Att. #2 - G-247 , . .. ; i j , 7. Acceptability of Potential Exposure to the Maximum Credible . Accident ' The applicant has evaluated the consequences of a number of credible J accidents, based on the assumption that the containment and.other safe- I , ' - I c !.! Suards function as designed. In most cases they would create no . /W i M significant hazard to the health and saf.ety of the public. Of those I : 0~; l credible accidents which were considere'd by the applicant to have a I , ~0..$.. - t. ' i j ,. potential for significant releases of radioactivity to the environmen , , . , - the accident-categorized as the refueling accident resulted in the highest i 1 ~ 1 potential off-site doses. It was assumed in the refueling accident | ' il i .j .i analysis that a fuel bundle was dropped into a near-critical re' actor, I .s ,' , causing a nuclear excursion which releases fission products into the re- , ,Se M fueling butiding. Using standard calculation procedures and realistic , y.4 , .e numbers, the applicant calculated that the maximum off-si.te potential , I . ' ' , , ' | | whole body dose for the duration of this accident would be Iess than 1.0 rem. Noble gases are the major contributor to the potential whole body doses from.such an accident. Potential thyroid doses from this assumed- ; 1 ' accident would not result in potential whole body or thyroid exposures , , in excess.of Part 100 guidelines for reactor site criteria. | . Y,. ,; utilized in. final design of the plant.- They include the following: , - . ,1- %' 1. Radiological Survey . , v. . ' * . A preoperational mo6itoring survey o'f the site and its environs : .| - q to be initiated two years before -commencement of operation.of-the . reactor. Although the details of this program have not been completed, -!] ,' ' . 11 . $$$mmygwwrmwymqsamwpppggewihyggggy;gsammpmygpygggm - - _ _ - _ _ , , , . , . , .J wd.Jh.c@Liwj- AB:,kgd.,M& 5 %G:.:u:s.- _ _ _ _ f{ pigmL w.s4Qummw_.n i. a.ma,L&.,a&a; w :- . .r_. . ; - * '}Q'';. . .- . . < . : .t * ''' '- ' 4 . Att. #2 - G-247 9 . , . ..| ' 3 - } i it is' anticipated that-it will be similar to'that conducted for the i i i ) company's Humboldt' Bay nuclear unit. , , . .g ? . 7 '2.. Meteorology. ., Qh?q' . A meteorological facility is being installed at the ' site to pro- I , ' a:.e ' vide necessary data for. atmospheric diffusion studies'. ' Instruments ., i. will be mounted at three'. levels on a 250 ft. tower and.will measure a- 3 /f . temperature..and wind speed and direction. All readings will be q . .g -) .. o ~ ,j digitized'and recorded on paper tape. The results of this program - J .. will be used in calculating the potential dilution df radi6 active 'j , . j /k gases, and.in selecting a suitable stack height. i d 1 : v g 1 3. Oceanography - | Je . -l '1 The capacity, of the ocean to diffuse the condenser cooling , water and minimize the effects of temperature and radioactivity on ' ; the marine biota is being' investigated ~in a series of experiments ] d at the site. These tests include pse of drift poles and u enine dy'e ; l i j as well as measurements of temperature and salinity. . They will continue I ' .i . . j through at least one annual cycle of oceanographic and meteorological- 3 conditions. ' . t h . Marine Biology Survey .] 4. ; . . 1 j. An ecological survey is being. conducted to prepare lists of | ' 1 I . the marine fauna and flora of Bodega Head and Harbor. ' , || ' ' $ 5. Pressure Suppression -Tests ; - . Extensive tests of the pressure suppression concept have been: 1 ' 1 conducted at the Company's test facility'at its Moss 1,anding Power ^7 | ' t - 12 - w . , "[ t 19 4 - w/ [email protected];;f , s kEi [YS_YE M _h N N f $ND$ *%477Q$5M'.h"JGNgiDfy.';d) $bf' bNbbbE@f5ENNh 3 _ .m. . . g m .:. m n -. m+v - ;n. ,-~2 + - :- - . a w ~ : %,ms&ywn:ww.w.~& habt.srin%i s.;b%%Et%hi.hk skiana& ~2ka.1&.msa w.mcu.x&.w_a.a..: .>. ak A> , :.{f ' Jy(. . . .. - t 1 , . 1 . - ' - Att. #2 - G-247 . . e i e ' : f Plant. ; Additional tests will be conducted at the company's plaUt to .j determin'e whether or not baffles between vent pipes are required 'in the' ! . . .'. . , Bodega suppression pool. , ' ; . | 1 % , 6. Fuel Development- n.4, ' . ,.' t.' n .. -Results from fuel element development tests and ex,perienc'e with l < . . . , fuel designs.now employell in existing; reactors will. form the basis for . . the selection of the Bodega fuel cladding and its thickness. ]| - :t 1 ~i 7. Instrumentation Development I In-corestareupran[eneutrondetectorsarebeingdevelopedas' - ,- . - . | 3 a possible substitute for the p'esentlyr planned out-of-core detectors I N * . ! *h. 8. Control System Development | T '?j. A prototype Bodega control rod drive will be subjected to extensive | - , ! t developmental testing before et}e final drive design is released for i )| ' manuf a cture .- Several devices which would reduce the liklihood or magnitude of a control rod dropout accident are being developed.for ! - ! possible use in the Bodega control system. | { e I 1 l - - f , , J, Se'ismic Considerations - .:3 -;' < The propose.d locatidn of the Bodega Nuclear Power Reactor is approxi- a. j mately 1000 feet west of the Western edge of the San Andreas fault zone, a ..ct .s , ]y prominent '?nd of seismic activity running generally north and south' along .m. .. a frig most of the State of California. The choice of this location by the . . 9:3 * */ ;'./ applicant has necessitated prolonged and intensi.ve study of factors affecting .D; - the safety of the installation in the event of the occurrence of.a severe- : - earthquake at or near the location of the plant.~ .s - ' - 13 - i . r .. . . a. 6 m a * * '...i ' y __ , ~ , p.e..~ u.',b L,:..-; L:. =: Q ' M.~.a:.1|ti. sun " w w a A d.c r,.n. m . .-. 4 . iA - @ ... M ;~ --- h- .. - - - . . . . .: tem::.nes.+.,n:-, .+ww.Meu ". : ) < . :,y .. . . 1 ; . f( - * I . A tt. #2 '- G-247 . . , * Since the fields of geology, seismology and earthquake structural design | , | are highly spec,lalized, it has been necessary to call upon the services of . i . expert consultants for help in analyzing the various problems involved'.in arriving at a decision on the technical feasibility of building the Bodega 3 ' . plant at the proposed location with reasonable assurance that it will safely N ( , . | I' withstand the maximum earthquake that might credibly occur during the life of. . ' ,, the plant. / The consultants employed by the applicant iPG&E) include Dr. George W. . Housner, Professor of Civil Engineering and Applied Mechanics at the - California Institute of Technology, Dr. Hugo Benioff, prominen't West Coast ; , Engineering Seismologist,.and Mr. E. C. Mar 11 ave, Consulting Geologist. i '; f$ , The AEC Regulatory Staff has retained the services of Dr. N. M. Novmark, ' Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Illinois and Mr. Robert j ' b ; | A. Williamson of Holmes & Narver. The staff has been assisted by the U.'S. ) I Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS) and the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) ' ; i on seismicity and geology. i + There is a substantial difference between the viewpoint of the applicant - sud that of the USC&GS and USGS with respect to the maximum credible earth- ~ quake that should be taken as the design basis for the Bodega Head plant, f ! The PG&E earthquake consultants feel strongly that tha maximum ground I i | ' j acceleration to be expected during any credible earthquake at or near the f j - - . j | plant site is 0.33g, and they consider it incredible that there should ever 1 ,be more than a few inches of differential ground motion under the site. The USC&GS, on the other hand, has recommended that the reactor and its . , - 14 - | c J : ' | . 4. | . .e:. - NEN$kO'EOf N'*Mif/sl'VU N%; AL'Yp,jp,v%b "' p:g/.r:a[ . [ Lb f' ' ''.'' * ''! N - > 1 ,s,, ng. .,, 4 , _ ,. ' T?T":Q ';p, O '.;~ ( h asp Q z. g yygr.7 y fp /. * fwTA+,$-h m e g;p;.; ,, ;. u . > m , ' - * ** , , ,, .| ' ' , ,Att. 42 - G-247 ,i ,.- ., ~ -i. 4, . ( / / . < .) . s , < , , , , containment structutt,<. be designed to withstand a ground responsefspectr6m of ' y , ; , * I , 2/1g..with peak. accelerations up to 1.0g, together with possible differential > 1 ' ] [ shear ground motion of up to 2-l/2 feet. 'IneUSGS,pointingoutthatthe ; . :r .-i geologic' setting of Bodege Head is similar to that of Point Reyes Petiinsula ' a r , *q.y . , Q?.1 where bedrock ruptures did occur in the 1906 California earthquake, f: eels , . m.s :u0 < . (' j that t1[ere is a possibility of a comparable rupture of up to 3 feet at' the ' < - . ..? proposed reactor site in the. event of a severe earthquake in that area. .W..o . ' < . | , | - There is also a wide difference of opinton respecting the size of the - - , < j r . , ) .j tsunamis (seismic induced Locean waves) that nuay be expected to result.from - ], - j - ) off-shore earthquakes. Consulta.nts to the app;licant.are firm in their ; j ' 'I opinion, based on all available records along the West Coast, that no , , .c , < f 1 ?P tsunami vill ever push water more than 15 feet aBove mean water level at the ' I N , plant site. However, the USC645 has recommended. that protection against d.h - | a . 50-foot tsunamis be provide,d in the design,of the plant. . | . I | The applicant was made aware of the recommendations of the USC&CS and || / J . USGS, and was asked a number of. questions designed to determine whether'the | * ' I 5 | company considered it fqasible to design the Bodega plant so as to provide ' - | , , ;} reasonableassurancethattheintegrityofthereactorcontainmentwould%t FJ \ preserved and that.the roactor would be shut down and maintained in a safe' l[].s condition in the avant of the occurrence of an earthquake of the severity - ',1 ., . . Wq postulated by the USC&GS and USGS. The technical basis for their conclusica - y , . :m was also requested. ' , . ' , <.. 'wl _f ...;. . , While continuing to disagree strongly with the credibility of such anJ | 3,gg . 1 eu {, 'j ; extreme earthquake, the applicant has nevertheless proposed e design which . , , y .9' f - i i . 15 - . *;, ', )l a a|h . . . ]. 't. .y A D L_ :__ - __ _:_ a. _ _ _ _ . - - . - , -- ,, , | , Ib - - ,.p.< w9m w.,:,wn % ,w anx.t- e . .sM 1 C.m .nh .. t..%*i~~~' m - O.GG .'i iu _.-._ LadLc:0.%-.....,_-,: & h- @~.-% L.*-W~2-s =- i'* . . ., | 3 | ,) . . .. . , n- , v - - | 4 f ' s , 7 ;, ' - ., . , . Act. #2 0-247 ; < ; & ., . ! 1 ' ~ , the company.and its consultants . feel confident will safely ride through a q , a ' ,, j 2/3g earthquake, with peak ground deceleration.up to 1.0g .which is , ] ' . accompanied by differential shear g'round ' displacement under the rtseto'r - - , v , . j , - y , , l 1 containment of up' to 3 feet either horizontal or vertical. If each 'an ea rth- - .o ,y s f. | . ' .j ! . , ? G quake sh,#4 occur, the containment might be ,tip' ped or.20tated.s11ghclyk but . 4 ( ' there would be no breach in its. leak-Eightness and no release of fission | * j products, in the opinion of 'the applicant. * o - a : . I ' ' 1 ; The pospulate'd earthquake involves a pattern of ground motion generally | ' * l I . ' similer to,that recorded.by the Coast and Geodetic Survey f# the El Centro , + e > Earthquake, of M*y 18, 1940, but*with approximately twice the intensity,- , . , .: . corresponding to a maximus acceleration of two-thirds p;ravity, a maximum velocity of. :J f t/sec, and a maximum ground displacement of 3 feet, and , +: i ; with occasional' intermittent pulses of acceleration up to 1.0ge .Thp, , structures are considered to 1,e subjected'to simultaneous shear displace f : , 4 c ) mente ranging up to' 3 feet, along lines extending under the containmcat < . . \ structure or other parts of the plant, with motiens in either horizontal or ., vertical directions along the fault. It is also assumed that aftershocks | . . i of licensity equal to the El Centro quaka might be suffered before remedial , n! # * ^ .;! action could be taken., , . . % ',' There are two major problems posed by the postulated earthquake. The , most unusual one is that of providing for shear ground displacement of as much-as three feet underneath the reactor buildinf;. The other is that of . I .2 , vibrational stresses. , . - 16 - . 6 ,i 'h''y j' . ..r, s .. i) . hk f Wkh hhkW?Wt ** Ib$ f* 2Y5 5k?&'E4M.h 5{.5[ - _ _ _ , s:. g ., y ...y, . a w ym .. b.. . a .,p.e.. G .+. e b. ;g.t.| .: p a ,.. J a .p. : w .. x.p'. .e mwww u_m_% 4 _ , n,:< ,m . ,~,.;,y_ ,. , wyang2mpw.m e,' ag;gu;m . _ . ' ' < c.- y) ., . Att. # 2 - G-247 - ' , . . s e ' ~ Although there is a substantial design effort involved in computing ' . ,, , the vibrational stresses, and judgment has to be exercised as to the proper .j vibrational spectrum and structural damping factors to use in assuring $ . ?j. that the reactor containment structure and all the vital equipment [" inside it will safely withstand the vibrational aspects of the earthquake, i :.N n . f. s the technology is well understood. The critical area.here is the ability ( of vital structural components to withstand the stresses put on them by , . the simultaneous occurrence of the. maximum postulated accident (rupture ; of reactor coolant system) and maximum postulated earthquake. Under ; i | | these extreme conditions the, question focuses on the gaximum allowable 1 '| stresses that should be used in the design computation relative to ' i I I the yield stress of the various materials under consideration. 'While many ; * . ! t of these details have not yet been resolved for the Bodega reactor, par- . | ticularly with regard to the vibrational stress criteria, there appears to , i be no reason to believe that anything of a fundamental nature with respect ! : i to vibrational problems will arise that cannot be successfully handled. Building the reactor structure and its foundation.in such a way'that I it will safely survive a shear ground movement underneath it of as much as ! I I 1 q)' 3 feet poses a more troublesome problem. The applicant proposes to | t I i '1 accomplish this by a design which provides for a 3 foot unobstructed | l ! d radial clearance between the outside of the reinforced concrete contain* d .a ment structure and the inside of a containment pit, completely around the - , .3 , fj., circumference, from elevation -73 feet to yard elevation at +25 feet. The i gh walls of the reactor containment pit will be lined with reinforced concrete g . to prevent possible spalling of material into the pit. The annular' space ' h;i1 | will be permitted to fill with water. The reactor containment structure will . | 3; be founded on a layer of carefully selected sand of characteristics which the .1 . a:q - 17 - i th ______-_ - _-___ -_ - .. * A$.|&w. %. S., i;,w;._e.. |.:;. L2. ad h v - - - {h..w.4.]Ig.um*ue_&.y\'$wi,-+.4y ,+ ;e. .u - mn.. - x , . ' * . .* , . ,, " - '.Att. #2 - G-247 ( ! - . I 4- . 3 . s e j. applicant believes will permit horizontal movements up to 3' feet without , , impairing the function of the containment structure, although the structure I might be shifted or rotated. Differential vertical motions up to 3, feet may . 1 ' cause the containment structure to tilt or shift, but, in the opinion of the y,r . , applicant, in no case will the containment function be impaired. I f , , It is proposed that the plant be designed with no rigid structural , , interconnection between any major components.. The reactor containment I structure will b'e struett$ rally independent ,of the turbine generator founda- tion, the plant control building, the radweste facility, the, stack, and the. , 1 . I i j plant service buildings. Piping and wiring interconnections important to . safety between the reactor, containment structure, the control building and .; - . . .1 the turbine generator will have sufficient flexibility to accommodate 3 feet .l , of relative movemen.t. In order to prevent overstress at point of penetration for piping connecting the dry well with the turbine, the company proposes to , provide adequate anchors and bracing adjacent to the containment shell and - . , ' , beyond the double isolation valves. These anchors will be adequate to : - withstand all piping loads due to differential motion in.any direction up , j to'3 feet between the, reactor containment structure and the turbine generator .. foundation. i o i . The foregoing proposal for safeguarding the Bodega Reactor and its i 1 i containment structure against the postulated shear differential ground .r 1 ' motion embodies concepts which are in many respects novel and for which " little or no precedent exists. The Regulatory Staff Consultants, Dr. N. M. Newmarkn a'd Mr. Robert Williamson have come tc the conclusion after carefully - 18 - ; . 5( ' , 'i a-q, *} I , Eh j' .' * '9 ' d dr =' ; 7 * k k ,* ' jh,e.. , . '[ \' \'_ ) ( 'i 5 i. ~e . '* ['d! + ' 'n*= ' ey - x:r , . .. .p;4&g.wn..ri=* M : r,. y&.mes.3 a ;-p+a C iA ucum.tg ..yyy;pQsj. ,;m.Kjgg ti=:@.wsi. :;.,o .u+i L. r ,jj.64,6.'s~~ &g|cig.jg.g.L A&MMW4.--hQu.d. _ .g4 . if - ' g.,,,g $$ . . .:4{ . . . .. '~ , , , :Att. #2 - G-247 _ , . . , . t . ' :. ). * , ; , '.; ' ' + studying tha basis...of, the proposal, that the structural integrity. and . . . p~ .1 leak-tightness..of.the containment. building 'can be maintained under the ui c <, g,;;.; earthquake conditions postulated. ki) , 49 .They. point out, however, that certa ni precaut onsi must be considered ME especially in the design.of umbilicals and of penetrations to the 4 containment. building. All attachments and primary system piping must be arranged to prevent failure.by shearing or crushing due to contact with walls, rock, earth, ste., in'the event of major eart,hquake, motions. The , piping would have.to be made sufficiently flexible to accommodate a . :.I relative movement of 3 feet without failu're, and at the same time.be .dsmpe[i ' . .cf . ,n.y LC, to reduce its. dynamic response to earthquake oscillations.. G9c . '' . - .- The sand layer under the containment building is intended to act in | q I two ways: (1) to isolate in part the containment structure from the high j . - ' - ] peaks of acceleratiori that might be transmitted to it from the ground i J beneath it.; .and. (2) to permit either horizontal or vertical faulting' to ! take place.in:the rock beneath the containment structure without damaging the structure. Dr. Newmark~ feels that the effectiveness of the sand layer . '' o in reducing the peak accelerations may be questionable, but that its . effectiveness in reducing the consequences of faulting will be substantial. . . ~Q Protection of the plant against the possible occurrence of large -4 , tsunamis has not yet been completely resolved but does not appear to offer J. ~.b.'.1. h ~ any unsurmountable design barriers. m|y: . ., - It is difficult to evaluate the public safety risks. involved in a new ' ~(.) a . type of construction for which there is little or no experience background. 1.':] - , - 19 - j %.y. . . . - . . 'q g 4 ? . | , [' |,.m. ,.. .;. .nn;% -.w. : ., ,veun L.-m.n&, %~d.mnm,.w.;-Mww- - .s. -=.AkMk.a d.a|.ku~, a & L'.m nY.a_ - - , g .. , *% .. .. ' ,. - ' Att. #2 - G-247 , . i . - ' .. y| , ! Other reactor installations have presented acismic design problems, .but not . 1 I in the extreme form presented by Bodega Head under the earthquake. postulated 1 ' 1 ' ' by the Coast and Geodetic Survey anli the Geological Survey,. One problem . | . ' which the. Bodega plant,has in common with all other nuclear powe'r plants. / - v /. W.w 'y, subject co..special seismic design considerations is the inability to conduct | f - T, any sort of performance test. on the finished . structure that will demonstrate / that the design objectives have been achieved. The uncertainty presented by. this situation has been accepted'as a reasonable risk in the seismic desiIgn - at other locations where the only problem involved is the ability to withstand . . ~ i | vibrational stresses, since this aspect of earthqualle design is well under- | . i , , , stood and has a considerable amount of experience background. There is *. , difficulty.in. applying ttie.same philosophy at Bodega liend, however., because | of the necessity of considering the additional; problem of designing the i - ; 1 j ' reactor' structure'to safely withstand differential ground motion as well as J high vibrational stresses, and because there is no realistic way of ' [ evaluating the proposed solution to the problem. . . ' The f act that the proposed site is adjacent to tihe San Andreas f ault | zone makes it almost certain that it will be subjected to one or more severe ' seismic disturbances during the lifetime of the plant. 'While there is a high |' j probability that the plant under the proposed design could survive the ! vibrations from even a very large earthquake without damsge, it must be 1 i .I ' recognized that :if such an earthquake should also involve several' feet of * t] 1 shear ground movement as well as ground accelerations as high as 2/3g to 4 '' 'i - 1.0g th~ere is presently no sound experimental or experience basis for- { / predicting the extent of damage that might be incurred by the reactor con- I tainment structure and emergency equipment designed to assure the safety of .. ' ; - 2 0_ - i | ~ | l .. , W?!?$$$$??$W;bb9*jgyyy,q:6 % ; '.p9:pp.7.,;g 3y4g4.g _, , _ _ . . _ __ q # W :p;?|%2 & j % % nTM- k N 4 5"T.ai& $?9 S Y,NM: ,,, - ~.w ~ n ., . _ . . _ yn .g.g S?'hafNt'% * & ". Y Y ' . ,, , ;. k . , sh:- ' -* . Att. #2 - G-247 - . .' , * . , ; - - \ , .. j the reactor. ., i ; l . a . ., The fact that a novel method is proposed for safeguarding the' Bodega- a . . ,N' Head reactor.against. differential ground movement o'f its. foundation rock is ,3 * - a I .A not'in itself a cause for concern. The nuclear power industry is replete. , ; c: ' 7" with new methods of coping with a large variety of problems never previously. u. . - ' .. encountered until. the arrival ,of the atomic age.- What is of concern is the v. ' , lack of any' experimental or experience proof-test of the proposed novel method , I that could form en accept'able basis for the required ~ safety eva'luation. , . - i The' pressure-suppression~ concept of reactor containment was completely- \ l novel when it was first proposed for use at the Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power q 4 - . . . <| - Plant. In many respects it was much simpler than the pe'destal concept.for w safeguarding against' sheer movement of foundation rock proposed for the. .p, 4 . Bodega Head reactor *. But it was not approved9 for use as reactor containment < until after the successful conclusion of a long series of engineering tests . at the PG&E's Moss Landing power generation plant which proved beyond , ! r : ; reasonable doubt that the concept could be utilized safe'1y for boiling water 'j | reactors. Similar proof-test standards have consistently been applied to other new and previously untried features incorporated from time to time in ! i nuclear power plants. ' ; i ' The fact that meaningful proof tests are difficult,to achieve in the ., ' ''' case of seismic safeguards does not, in our opinion, constitute a valid . ;; * I ' 'd reason for accepting these safeguards in critical areas on'the, basis of . ; 7 theoretical' reasons alone. Nor'does~it justify. relying on opinions.as to 1 , . ,-t't :'! the feasibility of the proposed seismic' safeguards unless these are supported , , . . . - . 21 - | 4 - ! 1 - i q,4. ' ., * . * ; ^I' ., .. ', 'b i , _ - - , , , . * ",2:y yr"ir-d b =-Q |.k " W G ~5 _ _ . - .. , ~As"~_u % 8_0."~&*NUYJK ' b 'U i , s p . . . " ' Att, #2 - G-247 i , . - | 1 by.somewhere.near the same kind of experimental evidence.. required of all other | , safeguards. We do not see such evidence in support of the pedestal concept ' , ' for safeguarding the Bodega Reactor ageinst differential. ground motion. j | 3 I ^ Whether the public benefits to be gained from operation of the Bodega i r3 | |i * , Nuclear Power Plant are.high enough to justify acceptance of the added i - . + uncertainties involved in the seismic design of the plant to withstand several feet of shear ground movement._is, of course, a matter of judgment. The regulatory requirement that there be " reasonable assurance" that , 1 | | any licensed nuclear reactor c'an be built and operated without' undue risk , 1 i' ,0 tothehealthandsafetyofthepublicrecognizesthatthereisnowayof,,, 1 + 1 g j/, eliminating all of the uncertainties; experience'd judgment is therefore { * required. The standara Bf l'reas'ohab.le assurin'es# tiarmoih alffitutt! :to-meet j when it becomes neces'sary to take into consideration external forces having , the potential of invalidating some of the safeguards built into the reactor installation. The difficulty is enfarged when there are uncertainties in , | f the cesign measures intended to counteract the external forces. Somewhere along.the line enough uncertainties will create a situation in which the , I 'M " assurance" can no longer be said to be " reasonable." We believe that this ; situation would exist if the proposed pedestal concept of seismic design | i j were to be approved without more convincing evidence of its validity than .| is afforded by presently available information. l Conclusions . The containment and all of the emergency equipment for shutting down , the Bodega reactor and maintaining it indefinitely in a safe condition in - 22 - J . a ,f' | 's jh I b N"''N'K'"Y d N ['hk@2bhM NSY'M MI ' <> b d N M N E N U ht4E^ ______- _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - -_ 1 . . p .;,, ... -., . . ,. +.. ,. p . ,,, . .., , ; 7, , .u .;..,, . ; ., ., m.s.g p p . p . 2.n .-.- -,,.u--:.~.:l- ' 44.nnu.,w a:.auxnn As.ne.~%a%: s-1.hw.&a a = - e4 . - f.' .. .. 1 . - - Att. #2 - G-247 . - j < - . . , = 1 e ' the absence. of seismic disturbances are designed .on the basis of well- ~ ' i established engineering principles. They can also be tested to ascertain I .. ; .! 4 ' that the design objectives.have been achieved. Consequently, there is a / .L]~ I . high.degrea of assurance,that the reactor can be built and operated without - .9^* undue risk to the health and safety of the public in the absence of seismic i l t , j disturbances. . The seismi.c design of the reactor structure to withstand purely ; . . , i vibrational effects is also based on well-established engineering principles | | which in some cases at least.have been verified in the presence of earthquakes. ) , 1 ;.Thus, while it is not-possible' to carry out any measurements on the finished I structure to assure that the seismic design * objectives have been accomplished, A s | there is sufficient- experience background to justify a conclusion that the ; , specified seismic.. vibrational criteria can be achieved and that the plant can , - therefore he safeguarded against any cred'ible earthquake that does not rupture ; ' the foundation rock, : ! We believe there is room for reasonable doubt, however, that a comparable~ situation exists with respect to that particular aspect of the proposed seismic )f , design of the Bodega reactor structure intended to assure that the containment ~, d and reactor shutdown functions will remain. intact in the, event of a shear { ' displacement of its foundation bedrocik* as. great as three feet in any direction. .While the proposed engineering principles appear reasonable, experimental . v- . verification and experience background on the proposed novel construction i I | .i method are lacking. If approved, this would', to the best of our. knowledge, ' be the first attempt on record to design a building structure and its ' l . 23 - .I , "I j - ~j +f i . .. _ __ * % , . ~ . a .. , a.;,. +. . . . = n w. La w N n & u d ia:d hnzih M & iw % w w , 2 n ' e. mmmy.w;' mm U1 ~ -n um .a_ < - - w.-aa e . <,.a wam w- ., a 1 1 .o .. .. .. ' * Att #2 ,G-247 , . t . I associated vital equipment to withstand the effects of substantial movement , 1 in its foundation simultaneously with the vibration accompanying a severe - earthquake. Because of the magnitude of the possible consequences of a ' major rupture in the reactor containment accompanied by 'a failure of | - 1 . ;, emergency. equipment, we do not believe that a large nuclear power reactor ! | , should be t.ha. subject of a pioneering construction effort based on unverified ! engineering princ.iples,,however sound they may appear to be. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has reached the conclusion i ^ l that the reac' tor can be constructed and operated at the proposed location . without undue risk to the. health and safety of the,public. We have carefully considered the views of the ACRS. We have the highest respect for those ., , views and we do not lightly reach an opp'osit.e conclusion. This is a kind' | . f ' e i <- of case, however, on which reasonable men may differ. In our' view, the ' I . | proposal to rely;on unproven and perhaps unprovable design measures to cope ' ! ' with forces.as great as would be produced.by severmi feet of shear ground i i i movement under a large reactor building in a severe earthquake raise; a ! i I substantial safety questions. : ! In all respects except one the proposed design of the Bodega Nuclear ; j ' Power Plant provides reasonable assurance that the plant can be built and J M operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. However, | the. single exception is quite important if one accepts the credibility of an , earthquake of sufficient magnitude to cause a major displacement of ; * ~ .j foundation rock undernea th~ the plant. Although there is a wide difference of expert opinion on the credibility of such an earthquaka, prudent judgment , I ~j favors , accepting the conservative recommendations of the USC&GS and the USGS.- On this basis and for reasons given above, it'is our conclusion that. Bodega Head is not a suitable location for the proposed nucles'r power plant at the 1 - 4 present stage of our knowledge. i - 24.- * e A, f/hJ ' N^#* d' ' * . :2NbFCi_m dWNN hkN ~N * Y I .r .- - .n . . , , < bihis.ENa& gNY% 55$YbR 4d. &.h h;b h ..'.!b5Ebj. fvSih Nk5Gkbkl&U .. ~ . , ._ N | s R | . v 1 . ~ . ~ ~ . - . :Yf m S.c4 rw x _ w %n. . ,; ; , $ * h5 *5 O h, ' | fMN& - h & $;, hM"%; , + Ots mj/q :GdWMrf O ,cp ggk hf'.;;373.xg \ jf',g, ,ig. g:.y *. g. &.._fb ,.):f g|fE, ' 'n,yG-},}fWf , w - _oa Q..% ~.m mA - (m$Qpbh.&_. - m_ by &.m:&c_,gm , &.,.f._:u Q_ ga. No. G 247 FOR IfEEDIATE RELF.ASE ! ' Tel. 973-3335 or (Tuesday, October 27, 9 ) | ' 973 3446 WNf2 1 : . . _ _ _ i ' e. ggMLU? r.mb_ .Q ,) _ () f AEC RELEASES TWO REPORTS ON PROPOSED, REACTOR AT ' BODEGA HEAD, CALIFORNIA / _,,2 W//o MQ , : . / M s' z # . The Atomic Energy Commission today is ' making public j .,l two reports concerning the safety aspects of a nuclear power plant proposed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company at Bodega ' Head, approximately 50 miles north of San Francisco. . , 1 One report is from the Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, a group establishe(by law to advise ! 'j the AEC on safety matters involved in reactor construction 1 and operation. The ACRS has concluded that there is reasonable 1 assurance that the proposed reactor can be constructed and | operated at the Bodega Head site without undue hazard to the )|' health and safety of the public. ' I The other report, by the Division of Reactor Licensing, 4 has been issued by the AEC Director of Regulation, whose . staff makes safety reviews of reactor licensing applications. The Regulatory Staff has concluded that " Bodega Head is not a suitable location for the proposed nuclear power plant at the i present state of our knowledge." ) 1 4 1 Under AEC regulatory procedures, a decision by the | Commission on PG&E's application will not be made until after the holding of a public hearing and issuance of an initial decision by a three-member atomic safety and licensing board. Pacific Gas and Electric Company has applied to the . . Commission for a permit to construct a 325,000 electrical ' kilowatt boiling water reactor at the south end of Bodega a Head, a peninsula separating Bodega harbor from the Pacific ~ . Ocean. The proposed reactor site is approximately 1000' feet j . west of~the western edge of the San Andreas fault zone. ! The application for a provisional construction permit was made on December 28, 1962. Nine amendments.to the appli- cation have been received. In addition to information provided . i , (more) ) ' .N'i- - dj . t r m m u m % e_ m___ y g . w ,. . w . w . m . m . , a - - _ _ - - . ___ _.______. * > .rgid M E M h C h i k ., 4:; G W~:1 2 ? h.] L ug w 'g? '. ~,.. ^2Q ;| 1 " . . . c ,- . 's , , , " * ; , A . .- ~l ' . .. g . i +-, , 9 ' , G 247 -2- , i , - , 'T by the' company and its consultants, the ACRS and the Staff. - }/ have r&ceived data fr'om a, number of AEC consultants, includ- C ing 'the U. S. Geolog'ical Survey, ' the' U. 'S.. Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Dr..Nathan M.'Newmark, Professor of Civil Engineer- * ing at the University of Illinois. . . . . . Copies of the report of the ACRS and the analysis by ' the AEC Regulatory Staff are attach'ed. Copies of PG&E's application and amendments to the application, and copies * of the reports of th'e' Geological Survey, the Coast and Geo- deti'c Survey, and Dr. Newmark 'are a'vailable for inspection ' in the Commission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W. , . . Washington, D. C., and 'at the Commission's o*ffice at 2111 , ' ;se g Bancroft Way, Berkeley, California. . '' % .n, |_ # l (NOTE TO EDITORS AND CORRESPONDENTS: This informatiori also f is being issued ,by the Commission's San' Francisco Operations | Office in Berkeley, California.) . | ' ' . :, e t 6 -| l .: \ 1 'i a . .. t , < * 1 ; ** r q : 3 '; 'I e i 4 'l * ' ' ' '" I - + - * * * - . , , .;,- [[ d __ _:__ f.