INSS Special Report Institute for National Strategic Studies October 2001 National Defense University Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership by Jeffrey Simon

A nation’s effective integration into the Indeed, while allied governments will rely About this report North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is heavily on MAP performance to begin member- his report draws heavily on the pro- an arduous, time-consuming, and resource- ship negotiations, NATO should link the date of ceedings of the Second International intensive task. The nine countries now aspiring actual accession to the completion of specific T Conference on the Lessons Learned to Alliance membership should heed the prob- (to be determined) core requirements from and the Enhancement of the Membership lems that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech each of the five chapters. Action Plan organized by the Institute for Republic have encountered since accession and The MAP process has positively influenced National Strategic Studies at the National redouble their efforts on defense integration the growth of interministerial coordination Defense University, the George C. Marshall and civil-military reforms in the Membership within MAP countries and enhanced interna- European Center for Security Studies, and the Action Plan (MAP) program. tional cooperation among those countries. Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, with support During the past year, MAP has become a MAP has become an increasingly impor- provided by the Office of the Secretary of more versatile instrument for forging defense tant tool for member governments to build Defense. The conference was held in Sofia, and civil-military reform. With further public support for NATO as well as parliamen- , on May 28–29, 2001. strengthening, the process will help not only to tary support for necessary resources. NATO- Jeffrey Simon is a senior research fel- inform Alliance decisions on choosing new related educational programs are necessary to low in the Institute for National Strategic members at the 2002 Prague Summit but also help MAP partners implement public informa- Studies at the National Defense University. to ease post-accession challenges for invitees. tion strategies to build public opinion support He is the author of numerous works on Euro- Upon accession to the Alliance, Poland, for the Alliance. pean security affairs, including NATO En- Hungary, and the Czech Republic were disqual- NATO and the European Union need to largement and Central Europe: A Study in ified from important bilateral assistance pro- make further efforts to help MAP members Civil-Military Relations. Dr. Simon can be grams as NATO shifted attention to the nine delineate the relationship between the two reached at (202) 685–2367, by fax at (202) MAP partners. After the next round of invita- organizations because some partners are find- 685–3972, or via e-mail at [email protected]. tions, the United States and NATO need to keep ing it difficult to establish priorities for NATO the new allies eligible for and engaged in and the European Union. assistance programs after accession. The first MAP cycle (1999–2000) put Partnership for Peace NATO and its partners on a steep learning curve When NATO adopted the Partnership for as they sought to implement a new and Peace (PFP) program at the Brussels Summit untested Annual National Plan program. This in January 1994, few had any notion of how program, a core element in membership action important and essential PFP would become. planning, established standards but issued no Many aspiring members were disappointed assessments. In marked contrast, augmented with PFP, perceiving it as a “policy for post- NATO teams dealing with all aspects of MAP ponement” of NATO enlargement. In response rationalized the planning process and gener- to persistent pressures from partners to join, ated real assessments that partners considered NATO produced a Study on NATO Enlarge- fair and frank during the second MAP cycle ment in September 1995 that outlined Alliance (2000–2001). MAP partners view the third cycle (2001–2002) progress reports as playing a critical role in the next enlargement decision.

SPECIAL REPORT 1 expectations of new members. The study noted Why MAP? The Newest Members that The NATO Washington Summit in April Since their accession on March 12, 1999, PFP would assist partners to undertake 1999 unveiled the Membership Action Plan Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have necessary defense management reforms (MAP) concept, in part to convince the remain- demonstrated how unprepared their armed [such as] transparent national defense ing nine aspirants that Article 10 and the Open forces were for functional integration into planning, resource allocation and budget- Door policy were not hollow and to assist the NATO, although cooperation with the Alliance ing, appropriate legislation and parliamen- aspirants in developing forces and capabilities within the Partnership for Peace was fruitful tary and public accountability. The PFP that could operate with NATO under its new in terms of training and education. Participa- Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC). MAP tion in the Bosnia-based NATO operations PFP exercises will introduce partners to went further than the 1995 Study on NATO helped, but the Kosovo conflict, occurring collective defense planning and pave the Enlargement in defining what the aspirants within days of accession, further challenged way for more detailed operational planning. the new members. After the December 1995 North Atlantic MAP provides an Since joining NATO, all three members Council (NAC) Ministerial launched enhanced authoritative, jointly have engaged in strategic reviews of their armed 16+1 dialogues with those partners interested forces; as a result Poland will reduce forces to in joining the Alliance, 12 partners expressed agreed set of targets for 150,000 by 2006, Hungary to 37,500, and the such an interest by early 1997. When the wide-ranging political and Czech Republic, still engaged in review, to Madrid Summit invited Poland, Hungary, and civil-military reforms 38,000–40,000. All share the objective of creat- the Czech Republic in July 1997, NATO reiter- ing more professional, mobile, and flexible ated its Open Door policy, strengthened the role armed forces but find that obstacles to political- of partners in PFP decisionmaking and plan- needed to accomplish on the path to member- military integration remain in civil-military ning, and adopted new terms of reference under ship. It was designed to incorporate lessons relations. Also, there remains a need to increase the enhanced Partnership for Peace to broaden learned in the accession discussions with the number of NATO-competent, English- cooperation beyond peace enforcement opera- Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. trained civilians and military officers to staff tions. The Political-Military Steering Committee MAP has four essential components: numerous posts in the Alliance, as well as the continued to manage PFP programs, including a tailored Annual National Plan (ANP) national structures that cooperate with NATO the development of the Partner Work Program that identifies key targets spanning the political/ and provide appropriate protection of classified (PWP) and Individual Partner Programs (IPP). economic, defense/military, resources, security, and information. For example, Hungary still has The PFP Planning and Review Process became legal dimensions (dubbed “chapters” in MAP difficulty assigning officers and noncommis- more significant, and NATO expanded the parlance) of Alliance membership sioned officers (NCOs) to NATO commands and number of Standardized Agreements a feedback mechanism by which NAC headquarters. Of the 59 positions allocated to (STANAGS) made available to partners (now members and the partner can jointly assess progress Hungary in Southern Regional Commands— 1,169) through the Partnership Coordination a clearinghouse for coordinating security its strategic and highest priority—it has as- assistance from NATO members to the partner Center in Mons, Belgium. The Alliance did so to signed only 41 persons, or 69 percent. enhanced defense planning at the country plan military exercises and develop PWP and level that establishes and reviews agreed planning Poland. Domestic political pressures in PARP interoperability objectives. targets. Poland following NATO accession have acceler- At the June 1998 NATO Defense Minister- ated force reductions rather disturbingly and Just as the Partnership for Peace has ial, allies and PARP partners agreed to a report undermined force goal implementation. But matured into a fundamental program not entitled “Expanding and Adapting the PFP NATO inattention also has been to blame. originally envisioned by its architects, the MAP Planning and Review Process,” which sug- Whereas it criticized Polish civil-military rela- process contains even greater potential. gested major enhancements to PARP to make it tions before accession, NATO ignored them Though tailored to specific situations, MAP more closely resemble the NATO Defense Plan- after accession, and relations eroded. Since provides an authoritative, jointly agreed set of ning Questionnaire (DPQ). Beginning in 1999, joining the Alliance, the Polish defense min- targets for wide-ranging political and civil- NATO approved PARP Ministerial Guidance istry and general staff have maintained two military reforms—targets that help aspiring (now like the DPQ) that replaced the old inter- separate lines of command; consequently, the members to mobilize domestic support for the operability objectives with Partnership Goals general staff link to the political process weak- painful and expensive defense reforms that are (PGs) for Interoperability and for Forces and ened. Also, once in the Alliance, Poland found necessary for accession. Accordingly, it is appro- Capabilities, which aimed to develop specific that NATO was hesitant to provide advice to priate to assess the defense planning experi- armed forces and capabilities that partners allies. In the absence of such advice, the Polish ences of new members and of the nine MAP could offer in support of NATO operations. In armed forces 2006 plan (recently completed) partners over the past 2 years to improve the addition, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was driven more by economic and political MAP program and to better inform the NATO provided the forum for greater partner partici- exigencies than by defense planning require- enlargement decision at the Prague Summit pation in deliberations involving operations to ments. Despite allocating 2.1 percent of gross planned for 2002. which they contribute forces. domestic product (GDP) on defense, Poland’s rapid deployment units continue to absorb the

2 SPECIAL REPORT majority of its defense resources and starve its who immediately replaced defense ministry planning period, adopted the NATO national forces. deputies and tasked them with developing a planning cycle in ANP 2001. Third, since the Hungary. Meeting force goals and concept in 90 days for developing a totally ANP 2000 objectives exceeded available re- deploying and maintaining armed forces professional force in 4 to 6 years. sources, they had to be scaled back. Fourth, abroad presented challenges for Hungary. In sum, the defense planning capabilities Romanian efforts to correct these problems Initially, it had difficulty with the Implementa- of new members have not improved perceptibly included establishing an Interdepartmental tion Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force since accession, and in some cases have eroded. Committee for NATO Integration at the state (SFOR), and then with a Kosovo Force (KFOR) secretary level chaired by the foreign ministry guard and security battalion of 350 personnel MAP Progress Report and a defense planning council and led by the that it sent to Pristina in July 1999. As a conse- defense minister. During the first MAP cycle, aspirants quence, Hungary began a strategic review after Romania’s main achievements during attempted openness, but they were overly ambi- joining the Alliance. In the first phase, the ANP 2000 include improving domestic coordi- tious. In the second cycle, while ANPs were strategic review calls for reductions in the nation mechanisms, training 158 officers and more sober and realistic, they remained more Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) to 45,000 civilians in NATO and member schools, further (including 7,500 civilians) by 2003. To achieve downsizing of 2,020 military personnel (1,256 its deployment requirements, Hungary is to defense planning officers, 764 NCOs and warrant officers) and increase (from 35 to 70 percent) the manning capabilities of new 1,200 civilians, counseling and training for level of its combat formations with volunteer members have not released personnel, and continued support to reserves rather than conscripts (in part because SFOR and KFOR. 9-month conscription introduced in 1997 is to improved perceptibly Outlook. As of early 2001, the new Ro- be reduced to 6 months in 2002 again). In the since accession manian government revised priorities include: second phase (2004–2007), HDF plans to Creating a fair and transparent career improve training, and during the third phase ambitious than resources permitted. The sec- development and promotion system. Since many (after 2007) to begin acquisition. Because it ond MAP cycle witnessed a growing community foreign-trained officers, who need to be retained, allocates only 1.6 percent of GDP for defense, have lost patience, the government wants to have a effort by aspirants to find more creative, tai- the test of Hungary’s strategic review imple- promotions board operational by June 2001. Future lored solutions to meet their individual “na- mentation will concentrate on how to reduce general officers need to achieve STANAG–English tional” situations. Not only is this diversity seen and restructure its “reverse pyramid” officer language level-3 so that they can operate in inter- as a positive development, compared to the corps, attract and retain contract soldiers, find national units, since Romania must keep 180 troops “cloning” that was evident in the first cycle, resources to finance the reserve volunteers, and trained to rotate and fill requirements. but more generally the MAP process is ushering Developing more realistic defense planning. utilize costly 6-month conscripts effectively. in a security environment that is much more As of March 2001, of the 84 PGs Romania initially Czech Republic. While spending 2.2 transparent and cooperative than ever before. assumed, only 9 have been fully implemented and percent of GDP on defense, the Czech Republic 61 partially implemented, and 14 have been post- shares many of Hungary’s problems. Human Former Warsaw Pact poned until after 2004. and resource constraints remain evident in that Restructuring armed forces as a result of the Czechs have assigned only one of the five Despite strong support for NATO and disbanding a number of units. The 1999 Kievenaar officer and two or three of the NCO slots allo- relatively high defense expenditures (2.2 and defense reform assessment provided 3 troop vari- cated to them at Supreme Allied Command, 2.8 percent of GDP respectively), Romania and ants—140,000, 112,000, and 85,000—for Atlantic. (The Poles maintain four officers and Bulgaria have many of the same problems as Romania’s Plan 2004. Though Romania planned one NCO, while the Hungarians have two new NATO members in dealing with the ves- a target of 112,000, its forces are now at 97,800 officers at Norfolk.) Because a National Secu- tiges of the Warsaw Pact culture, reducing and because its resources could not sustain the plan. Romanian wartime strength will be scaled back rity Strategy (NSS) was not in place, two major restructuring large and heavy armed forces, from 370,000 to 230,000. Its current 446 flag factors continue to undermine the Czech Re- and dealing with the challenges of NATO de- officer positions must be reduced to a total of 140 public capacity to meet its NATO obligations. fense planning. During 1999, the United States by 2004, at which time only 82 currently serving The decision made years ago to acquire an performed defense reform assessments for flag officers will remain. excessive number (72) of L–159 subsonic Romania and Bulgaria (the so-called Kieve- Implementing Air Space Operations Control aircraft coupled with the downsizing expenses naar assessments), and their 1999 Annual and acquiring a military digital communications to resettle officers have dried up defense funds, National Plans benefited from this experience. system that is consistent with STANAG specifications. so that its NATO training requirements remain Romania. A number of lessons were Bulgaria. June 2001 elections resulted unfulfilled. To address the crisis within the learned by Romania from the initial MAP in the first Bulgarian government to serve its defense ministry and general staff establish- cycle. First, because the Romanian late budget full 4-year mandate since the democratic ment, which has ballooned to 3,500 personnel approval cycle was not synchronized with the transition. Bulgaria has achieved sustained with the addition of background institutions, NATO planning cycle, it did not have sufficient economic growth over the past 3 years and Prime Minister Milos Zeman in May 2001 money for the first 5 months of 2000. Second, maintains good bilateral relations with neigh- relieved Defense Minister Vladimir Vetchy. He because there were numerous overlaps in the bors. Also, Bulgaria participates in several appointed Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik,

SPECIAL REPORT 3 forms of regional cooperation: South-East provide greater parliamentary control of the Bulgaria, the three Baltic states have had to European Defense Ministerial; Black Sea Naval armed forces. This is particularly important build state institutions and defense establish- Force Cooperation; hosting the brigade head- because the Bulgarian armed forces comprised ments from scratch. Also, since the populations quarters of Multinational Peace Forces South- 81,500 troops in 1999, then downsized to of , , and are so Eastern Europe in Plovdiv; establishing a 71,778 in 2000, and will be further reduced to small—1.5, 2.65, and 3.6 million multinational Engineer Task Force; and partic- 45,000 by 2004, with an ultimate goal of creat- respectively—they are building combined ipating in a regional information network for ing a fully professional force by 2015. Stated military institutions such as the joint Baltic crisis management. simply, Bulgaria’s present officer corps (13,899) Battalion, Baltic Defense College, and BALTNET Similar to Romania’s experience with is too large, while its NCO corps is too small. To radar system. During 1998, the United States MAP, Bulgaria found that its budget cycle was fix this reverse-pyramid problem, which was performed defense reform (Kievenaar) assess- not synchronized with the Alliance. It also highlighted in Partnership Goal G 0028 (Re- ments for all three Baltic countries, and their discovered during the second cycle that plans view of Force Structures), the current ratio of 1999 ANPs reflected this experience. needed to be more realistic and consistent with senior/junior officers of 54/46 percent needs to Estonia. During the second cycle of resource availability. As a result, Bulgaria is change to 45/55 percent by 2004. Bulgaria also MAP (2000–2001), Estonia’s Parliament (Ri- emphasizing practical implementation and needs to reform the active forces by restructur- igikogu) approved an Emergency Preparedness maintaining a better dialogue with NATO. It ing personnel in the rapid reaction formations Act (September 2000), a National Security wants to establish specific objectives with con- and in the reserve forces, whose strengths are Strategy (NSS) on March 6, 2001, and a Na- crete timeframes and to avoid duplication with not sustainable in terms of training, equip- tional Military Strategy on February 28, 2001. the European Union. Bulgaria learned that it ment, or budget. Defense planners are attempt- Reforms in Estonia’s defense structure included needs to develop a new model of economic ing to identify 1,000 key positions and establish the creation of the Army Staff and further accountability, as well as new laws on the a database on personnel and career develop- implementation of PG G 0028 to optimize the exchange of information and on protecting ment. Their intention is to train people for Estonian Defense Force (EDF) structure. The classified information and security. those posts, but planners find it difficult to Prime Minister chairs the governmental Com- Even though it has a defense budget of identify potential leaders 5 years in advance. mission on NATO Integration. Estonia’s PGs 2.8 percent of GDP for 2001, which is to be In 2000, Bulgaria accepted 82 PGs (of were also incorporated in its Annual National sustained through 2003, Bulgaria realized that which 47 are MAP related) and allocated $21 Plan, and all ANP goals were coordinated with a mismatch exists between the risks that it million for their implementation in 2001. the defense ministry. Defense ministry ANP faces in the Balkans and the resources that the NATO, however, at the March–April 2001 19+1 goals are reviewed quarterly by the ministry’s country can allocate to defense. It has also progress report session, suggested that Bulgaria Secretary General, and those under other min- learned that it lacks capabilities not only for further adjust some of its plans to bring objec- istries every 6 months, with the objective of making assessments but also for prioritizing tives and priorities in line with financial re- linking goals with available resources. MAP activities. In May 2000, Bulgaria intro- sources. The Bulgarians find the OCC useful in In its second ANP, Estonian efforts on the duced a planning, programming and budget- preparing forces for NATO non-article V (that political/economic front (chapter 1) included ing system (PPBS) that prepared the 2001 is, out-of-area) activities and are completing final approval of its NSS and continued partici- defense budget comprising 21 programs. These PARP questionnaires for the Pool of Forces pation in NATO and UN peace operations, as programs are to be optimized and reduced to Database. They lack, however, essential NATO well as the border monitoring efforts in Georgia 12 in 2002. Bulgaria has established reform documents and criteria for assessment. The of the Organization for Security and Coopera- priorities. The first priority is to restructure and Bulgarians consider the NATO Defense Capabil- tion in Europe. Meanwhile, its efforts to build downsize its armed forces while achieving ities Initiative useful to bring armed forces domestic support for the Alliance saw an in- interoperability in the key areas of air defense reform closer to membership requirements, but crease from 53 to 66 percent in favorable and air traffic management; command, con- they desire more information to avoid wasting public opinion from 2000 to 2001. Regarding trol, communications, and computers; logistics resources. Finally, since the second MAP cycle defense and military issues (chapter 2), the (including host nation support); and educa- progress reports for Bulgaria’s defense/military government approved the National Military tion and training (including language). A reforms (so-called chapter 2) were drawn from Strategy, forming the basis for optimizing the second priority is to modernize and rearm, the PARP assessment, and no PARP assessment EDF structure, reorganized the General Staff which led to the creation in April 2001 of a is planned for next year, Bulgaria would like a into a Joint Staff, and formed an Army Staff. In new Armaments Policy Directorate in the MAP progress review on all criteria in 2002 as a January 2001, the government established a defense ministry. basis for the enlargement decision at the Logistics Center and EDF Medical Center; on Outlook. During the second ANP cycle, Prague summit. March 20, 2001, it decided to create the Eston- Bulgaria learned that its personnel manage- ian Rapid Reaction Battalion, which should be ment and career development program for The Baltic States operational by 2005. officers and NCOs needed special attention, Outlook. Estonia’s priorities now include Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were mem- including using foreign-trained officers more completing (by September 2001) a Review of bers of the Warsaw Pact as Soviet republics, but effectively. Defense planners have proposed not independent states. Unlike Romania and legislative authorization of personnel ceilings by category and eventually by rank that will

4 SPECIAL REPORT Force Structures (PG G 0028) for initial gov- (chapter 2), the Partnership Goals and Individ- made progress in developing its command, ernment approval in November and (by the ual Partner Program activities were integrated control, and communications system, new end of the year) completing a long-term equip- within ANP 2000. Latvia introduced a PPBS, force structure, professional military education, ment procurement plan. The defense budget significantly improved the quality of life for the training and doctrine, logistics, infrastructure, has steadily increased from 1.4 percent of GDP military, improved the personnel management airspace management, and quality of life for in 1999, to 1.6 percent in 2000, to 1.8 percent and education systems, and began to develop the military. in 2001, and will rise to 2 percent in 2002, with logistics and procurement systems that should During the third cycle, Lithuania will overall economic growth at 5 percent since become operational by 2002. focus on the personnel and career manage- 2000. These funds will permit Estonia to gener- Outlook. Latvia will achieve a new thresh- ment system, personnel and physical security, ate a small immediate reaction force in 24 old of capability in 2003, when its defense constitutional and legislation requirements for hours; a battalion-size rapid reaction force in budget is expected to reach 2 percent of GDP. At NATO membership, and public support for 30 days; and 2 brigades of main defense that time all of its forces should be able to defense. Of the 66 activities in ANP 2001, 5 forces—one mobilized at 90 days, the other at operate with NATO on Latvian soil; its rapid have already been implemented, and progress 180 days. Regarding resources (chapter 3), reaction force will be able to participate in has been registered in 43 others. So far, Lithua- Estonia plans to develop further mechanisms operations outside Latvia; and it will build nia has implemented nine PGs, completed the for defense planning and budgeting and to specialized capabilities in peace support opera- local area network for the defense staff, estab- focus on infrastructure development with an tions (PSOs), including military police, divers, lished the National Crisis Center, and made eye to procurement in 2003. Concerning secu- and medical units. In the security sphere progress in building the defense communica- rity (chapter 4), the Riigikogu adopted (on tion network. December 20, 2000) the Security Institution Latvia faces major Outlook. Lithuania’s highest priority MAP Act, which reorganized Estonian intelligence challenges in further goals emphasize the need to provide realistic and security services; it came into effect March and resource-based ANP tasks. The 2001 de- 1, 2001. During the third cycle, special atten- streamlining its Partner- fense budget was pegged at 1.95 percent of GDP tion will be paid to information security. Lastly, ship Goals, Individual to accomplish the tasks that include the further on legal issues (chapter 5), the government Partner Plans, and Annual development of the armed forces and imple- drafted domestic legislation in the form of a mentation of a 3-year planning, programming, new Peacetime National Defense Act, which is National Plans and budgeting system. The NAC progress report proceeding through Parliament. It has also of March 29, 2001, has been immensely helpful implemented “Legal Arrangements for Partici- (chapter 4), Latvia has introduced NATO stan- in reviewing programs and modifying priori- pation in Collective Defense” (PG G 0050 1). dards within Latvia’s legal framework on physi- ties. This report criticized Lithuania’s: Latvia. Lessons learned in the second cal and personnel security and recognizes the legal system, which prohibits long-term cycle ANP 2000 include how to coordinate need to develop further communications secu- contracts for procurements. As a consequence, the national plans better with NATO interoperabil- rity. In the legal area, the government has Seimas Security and Defense Committee approved ity requirements as well as how to use MAP to approved the Law on National Security, drafted an updated law that would permit 3-year contracts. develop self-defense capabilities and prepare for laws on mobilization and military personnel, defense plans for four combat brigades, membership. The Prime Minister heads an drafted regulations on armed forces procure- which were too ambitious. For that reason, interagency NATO Integration Council. Latvia ment and logistics, and analyzed the legal Lithuania now plans to have one high-readiness has become more realistic about its priorities; aspects of NATO membership. Even so, Latvia brigade by 2006. By 2002, it will maintain one its ANP 2000 had 22 activity areas, including faces major challenges in further streamlining battalion (without rotation capacity) for PSO deployment and further develop logistics capabili- 277 activities, while its third cycle, ANP 2001, its Partnership Goals, Individual Partner Plans, ties for sustainability. contains only 18 activity areas and 85 activi- and Annual National Plans. It needs to acquire training of its territorial defense forces and ties. During the second cycle, Latvia developed and translate more NATO documents, improve reserves. Lithuania is seeking advice to address this resource-based plans for each activity, moni- internal institutional and external Baltic states problem. tored monthly by an ANP Implementation coordination, and allot more time to evaluate Lithuania has learned that the ANP Control System that proved to be effective in NATO proposals for PGs (since they had to progress report has been a useful device to help that 245 activities (88 percent) were completed, postpone seven of them). shape national plans. 19 (7 percent) were cancelled, and 13 (5 per- Lithuania. Strong support for NATO In summary, all three Baltic states have cent) postponed. and EU enlargement is reflected by the agree- found PARP helpful in their force planning, During the second cycle (ANP 2000), work ment between the 11 parliamentary (Seimas) and they found the PGs especially useful in on political and economic issues (chapter 1) parties and the government regarding the aligning scarce resources among competing focused on naturalizing Latvia’s Russian mi- future contours of Lithuanian defense strategy. priorities. In addition, they have found the nority (nearly 40 percent of the population), One of the major lessons learned from the MAP trilateral Baltic cooperation both necessary and cooperating with Russia cross-border, and process is the need to establish a prioritization valuable because of the small size of their forces building public support for NATO (now at 57 of Lithuanian national plans. This has been and the fact that all three essentially share the percent). In the defense and military area aided by the candid feedback from the second same goals. Finally, mentoring partnerships cycle MAP. During the ANP 2000, Lithuania

SPECIAL REPORT 5 with NATO members and partners have been This process began with the integration of soil, all political parties agree that it does not extremely helpful: Sweden and Finland (which the general staff with the defense ministry need to be amended. They do, however, recog- are not in MAP) for Estonia; and Poland, during January–May 2000 and accelerated in nize the need to modify both the Defense Act Denmark, and America for Lithuania. earnest when Josef Stank replaced Defense and the Military Service Act. has Minister Pavol Kanis in January 2001 and learned that legal issues regarding NATO mem- New States initiated significant changes within the min- bership are more taxing and challenging than istry. Stank appointed an apolitical state secre- originally anticipated. and Slovenia, with respective tary, Rastislav Kacer, to oversee NATO integra- The NAC and Slovenia’s progress assess- populations of 5.6 and 2 million, face the tion, and he intends to reduce the defense ment of April 2001 was sober and useful and challenges of constructing new defense institu- ministry’s seven directorates to two or three, provides the basis for the third cycle of MAP. tions (a ministry, general staff, and armed thereby improving Slovakian defense planning The report was silent on the second and third forces), with only 1.89 and 1.45 percent of GDP capability and prospects for NATO membership. chapters of MAP (defense/military and re- allocated for defense respectively. These new The Defense Strategy (adopted by the sources) simply because Slovenia had not done states also face the challenge of building popu- government in May 2001) is to be presented to much in these areas. The Slovenian Armed lar understanding of and support for NATO, parliament in Bratislava in the fall, and the Forces 2010, which had been adopted by par- which presently stands at about 50 percent. The draft Military Strategy is to be submitted soon liament in February 2000, called for defense United States first performed defense reform to the government. The 2010 Concept for budgets of 1.86 percent of GDP ($400 million) assessments for Slovakia and Slovenia during Slovakia’s Armed Forces, initiated in March in 2001 and was to rise to 2 percent ($440 2000; thus, their 1999 ANPs did not benefit 2001 and based on the above strategic docu- million) in 2002. The new government was from this influence and experience. ments, will lead to a new structure of small aware before the election that the plan was Slovakia. To the new state of Slovakia, mobile forces that should be presented to the unrealistic and unachievable and revised the MAP is more than a mere technical tool in that Alliance in autumn 2001. Slovakia’s armed defense budget to a realistic 1.45 percent of it has enhanced political contacts with NATO, GDP in 2001 ($300 million), which should enabled Slovakia to assess the state of its pre- provide enough resources to fulfill 56 PGs. The paredness, and generated a healthy tension for the Slovenian government new Slovenian government also plans to adopt Slovak parliamentarians to understand the now regards MAP as a the Swedish system of multiyear budgeting and need to provide necessary human and material strategic priority planning and rewrite the Slovenian National resources. The April 20, 2001, NAC progress Security Strategy and Defense Strategy. review session positively assessed that, during forces will be reduced from 45,000 to 32,000 by Outlook. Though Slovenia lost a year, it the second MAP cycle, Slovakia accomplished 2002. Parliament is committed to maintain a has learned a great deal from 2 years of MAP. the following: defense budget at 1.89 percent of GDP for 2002, The next Annual National Plan will be realistic amended its constitution to remove remain- which provides sufficient resources to complete and resource-based, reflecting a shift from the ing accession impediments 64 Partnership Goals. goal of working for an invitation to building adopted a Security Strategy in May 2001 Slovenia. In its first and second ANP capacity that can command respect within the maintained good relations with neighbors cycles, Slovenia found MAP useful. Indeed, the Alliance. Slovenia accepted NATO comments, acceded to the Council of Europe’s Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Slovenian government now regards MAP as a criticisms, and recommendations in a con- removed antipersonnel mines and SS–23s strategic priority in preparing the country for structive spirit, and the ANP third cycle will from its arsenal membership. During the first cycle, Slovenia likely register substantial improvement in stabilized its macroeconomy and increased learned what to do and how to do it but went overall Alliance assessment of Slovenian armed foreign investments off track by producing an unachievable ANP forces programs. To do so, Slovenia has estab- established a National Security Office 2000–2001. Slovenia also did not reassess lished an Interdepartmental Working Group for and drafted a new law on protecting classified threats and risks after significant changes had cooperation with NATO, which is chaired by information. occurred in the region and failed to determine the state secretaries of the foreign and defense Outlook. The NAC review session has what it could afford for defense. ministry and includes the General Staff, underscored what Slovakia needs to do during The elections in autumn 2000 confirmed supported by five other ministries and foreign the third MAP cycle. Slovakia intends to: Slovenian democratic traditions and commit- advisors to develop a restructuring concept. strengthen public support for NATO integra- ment to Euro-Atlantic integration. Slovenia is Slovenia’s mobilization capacity will be re- tion (now at 52 percent) pursuing a communications strategy to duced from the planned 47,000 troops in 2010 adopt a formal Defense and Military Strategy strengthen public support for NATO, which to 35,000 by 2004, and defense budget cuts prepare a Long Term Concept for Building remains at only 53 percent. In addition, the have been halted. In 2001, Slovenia also in- Armed Forces—2010 government intends to approve a NATO classi- tends to establish three other intergovernmen- restructure the defense ministry for more fied data bill in July 2001, after which it will tal working groups for information, interoper- effective defense planning, crisis, and human revise legislation to establish a National Secu- ability, and crisis management. resources management. rity Authority. Although the Slovenian constitu- Based upon MAP experience and outside tion makes no provision for sending troops advice (the so-called Garrett U.S. Defense abroad or receiving foreign troops on Slovenian Assessment, plus input from British advisors),

6 SPECIAL REPORT Slovenia has written “Guidelines for the Opera- them during 2005–2009. Albania’s old armed illicit trafficking, and creating a National tion of the Ministry of Defense Up to 2004.” force structure comprised 5 divisions/32 Military Strategy. This document focuses on providing adequate brigades, with no engineers, logistic, or civil Macedonia. While it sought to develop financial resources to the Slovenian armed protection structures; the new structure will democratic institutions and equitable intereth- forces for the purpose of implementing a per- comprise 7 combat brigades and 3 combat nic relations since independence in 1991, these sonnel policy for officers, NCOs, and conscripts support brigades. Albania’s total armed forces goals have proved elusive for Macedonia, and with proper legislation. This implementation are to decline from 43,000 to 31,000 troops the de facto result has been Albanian (roughly should permit contracted reservists to partici- (15,000 army; 3,500 air force; 2,500 navy; 30 percent) minority separation. As a result, pate in peace support operations and should 9,000 command; and 1,000 students and re- Macedonia has sought significant assistance help to restructure the reverse pyramidal struc- from Western institutions. On May 18, 2001, ture of the Slovenian officer corps. Albania is now developing when the NAC met with Macedonia to review MAP performance, it found that the constitu- Challenged States new legal frameworks tion and laws do not present obstacles to NATO membership. In supporting NATO operations Albania and Macedonia, with populations for structuring the state and accepting more than 360,000 refugees of 3.6 and 2 million respectively, have experi- police, addressing organ- during the Kosovo campaign, Macedonia acted enced significant political and social chal- ized crime and illicit as if it were a de facto NATO member. Macedo- lenges to their state institutions. During 2001, nia demonstrated this quasi-membership by its the United States performed defense reform trafficking, and creating a PFP status-of-forces agreements, which permit- (Garrett) assessments for both countries; thus, National Military Strategy ted the stationing and transit of NATO armed the ANPs of both countries for 1999 and 2000 forces during the campaign and the Agreement did not benefit from the experience. servists) with a wartime strength reduction on the Status of KFOR. Unfortunately, popular Albania. In contrast to most other MAP from 232,000 to 120,000. By 2004, the officer support for NATO, which had been 80 percent partners, Albania has expressed high popular corps will decline from 6,000 to 4,000; the NCO before the Kosovo campaign, eroded to 58 support for NATO as a result of the 1999 Kosovo corps will increase to 4,500 from 4,000; percent in November 2000 and may have operation. Albanian national objectives are to and the 30,000 conscripts will decline to deteriorated further in the wake of renewed build a constitutional state with democratic 19,000, of which 9,500 will be volunteers. troubles in spring 2001. institutions and civilian oversight of the armed Finally, though English-language training has Outlook. As a result of the first MAP cycle, forces. Albania’s political and economic recov- improved, only 13 percent of the officer corps Macedonia accepted the fundamental require- ery (MAP chapter 1) has not been easy since now speaks English. ment to integrate its national security strategy the 1997 total collapse of the state. Some im- As for resources, Albania’s defense budgets with its force planning and defense budgeting. provement has been registered with internal in 2001 and 2002 amount to only 1.1 percent During the second cycle, it made important security and public order, but corruption, illicit of GDP. During the first cycle, Albania targeted progress: In August 2000, the country approved trafficking, and organized crime remain ram- 80 PGs; during the second cycle, the number of a reorganization of its defense ministry and pant. The October 2000 local elections exem- PGs was more realistically reduced to 53, which general staff; it also implemented initial opera- plified some political progress, as did the June still stretched the financial capacities of a weak tional capability for the Border Brigade and 24, 2001, parliamentary elections. Some eco- country. Thus, Albania will place priority on 1st Infantry Brigade in June and October respec- nomic growth (roughly 7 percent) was regis- those PGs linked with NATO Minimal Military tively, prepared the Defense Law, which awaits tered in 2000 and 2001. Albania has signed Requirements. Albania realizes that it needs Parliamentary approval, and is drafting the good neighbor treaties with all neighbors, NATO assistance because it lacks expertise, Military Service Law. including Macedonia, and has reestablished especially in communications and personnel Escalating internal strife is clouding diplomatic relations with Serbia. management. Regarding security issues (chap- Macedonia’s third cycle ANP work. Nonetheless, Albanian authorities initially believed that ter 4), Albania plans to establish under the the country’s plans for 2001–2002 remain MAP ANP applied only to the defense ministry, Council of Ministers a classified information ambitious: full operational capability of the but after the first cycle realized that it had office responsible for information standards, Border Brigade and 1st Infantry Brigade during nationwide application. Hence, to deal with procedures, and controls. On legal issues the next few months; the reorganization of the MAP, Albania created new structures, including (chapter 5), Albania possesses no constitutional defense ministry and general staff by January a senior interministerial commission headed obstacles to NATO membership. Parliament and February 2002 respectively; and establish- by the Prime Minister and an interministerial approved a National Security Strategy and a ment of new commands for training, logistics, commission comprising the integration depart- Defense Policy on January 23, 2000, and and air defense and aviation by February, ments of the defense and foreign ministries and later passed new laws on war powers and com- March, and April 2002, respectively. Macedonia three General Staff structures. mand authority, military hierarchy and ranks, has reduced the 45 PGs originally accepted in Outlook. On military and defense issues and payment and allowances for military PARP to 24 priority PGs for ANP 2001. In build- (chapter 2), Albania plans first to transform and civilian personnel. Albania is now develop- ing light and mobile armed forces to be inter- from heavier to smaller, more efficient armed ing new legal frameworks for structuring the operable with NATO, Macedonia plans total forces during 2000–2004, then to modernize state police, addressing organized crime and

SPECIAL REPORT 7 armed forces of 15,000, with a wartime and constructive criticism. In broad terms, it One area that requires across-the-board strength of 60,000. Macedonia also plans to has found criminality to be a problem among improvement is deployment of forces. While increase the number of professionals in the many MAP partners, with the corresponding most partners have identified required re- forces and to reinforce the 1st Infantry Brigade. need for better border control. While treatment sources, their ability to sustain deployments The goal of the Military Service Law is to of minorities generally has improved, prob- remains limited. Most have experienced rota- provide support for recruitment and retention lems remain in Macedonia with Albanians, in tion problems that severely tax their human of the military by creating a personnel man- Latvia and Estonia with Russians, and in and material resources. Resource constraints agement system based on a rational rank Romania generally. Public opinion support for continued to exceed the more sober and realis- structure and developing an NCO corps and a integration remains uneven, and the Alliance tic second cycle objectives of MAP members progressive and systematic military education. needs to assist partners in developing more and will further influence their third cycle The new Defense Law provides for participa- objectives. Not only has ANP chapter 4, on tion of Macedonian armed forces outside all MAP members are security activities, contributed to building MAP Macedonia, imparts host nation support within cooperative security processes, but so have Macedonia, and prohibits political activity hampered by limited experiences in the Balkans. NATO engaged for within the armed forces. ANP has helped resources and are the first time militarily in IFOR/SFOR in Macedonia not only to identify and prioritize struggling with force Bosnia, then for the second time in KFOR in key tasks but also to recognize the difficult task Kosovo. With respect to legal and constitu- of balancing capabilities and resources. restructuring tional issues, some MAP members are still encumbered by domestic constraints on de- Assessing MAP Impact effective ways to inform and educate public ploying troops for sustained operations abroad. opinion. NATO also finds it difficult to make The enlargement process continues to In retrospect, the first cycle of MAP was a uniform comparisons of economic indicators play a vital role in shaping the progressive learning process, as one would expect with among MAP ANPs. While some economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe any new program. First, the Alliance had to improvement was registered, relative stagna- military institutions. Both MAP and ANP have determine what should be incorporated into tion with unemployment and inflation re- helped create a structure for defense reform the Annual National Plans and then had to mains. For example, Slovenia showed eco- and civil-military coordination that otherwise establish a process with the Political-Military nomic growth but experienced a decline in might not have arisen. This is exemplified by Steering Committee, Senior Political Commit- investments. In some cases where privatization the performance of the new members who did tee (Reinforced), NAC, and MAP partners. has been significant, partners have funded not benefit from MAP experience. MAP also has The first cycle provided no universal standard their PGs from accrued funds, so their ability helped aspiring Alliance members to contribute and did not result in an assessment. PARP to sustain these resources is questionable. more effectively to NATO operations as well as appeared to be disconnected from the Individ- In the defense and military spheres, all to look hard at security challenges within their ual Partner Programs (IPP), and PGs focused MAP members are hampered by limited re- own areas. At the same time, the Alliance needs on interoperability rather than NATO mem- sources and are struggling with force restruc- to make further adaptations to institutionalize bership objectives. turing. Most MAP members made genuine the new dimensions of this partnership— During the second cycle, NATO stream- efforts to commit human resources and im- particularly in the areas of flexibility and lined the process and provided a set of real prove interdepartmental coordination, but sustainability of armed forces, establishing new assessments. As a consequence, there is now their defense efforts varied, and significant training and equipment standards, standing up only one review meeting for IPP, PARP, and progress is still required. Though MAP partners Combined Joint Task Forces and deployable ANP. The Senior Political Committee (Rein- demonstrated their crisis-management capa- headquarters, developing a faster force genera- forced) no longer convenes, but only the NAC bility by participation in IFOR, SFOR, and tion process, and improving the capability of (19+1). With PGs and plans now in place, KFOR, they still need to focus more on their Alliance partnership institutions to engage in realistic measurements can be made for uti- involvement in the OCC, Political-Military effective crisis prevention. lization of resources. NATO made an effort to Framework for NATO-led PFP Operations, and link the overall PFP (PWP) with ANP and Defense Capabilities Initiative. provided a closer linkage with the PARP survey, modeled on the Defense Planning Question- naire. NATO teams were enlarged to cover all The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes The Strategic Forum series presents original research by five MAP chapters, and these teams, in turn, books, monographs, and reports on national security members of the National Defense University as well as improved progress reports to assist partners strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy. other scholars and specialists in national security affairs For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at: from this country and abroad. The opinions expressed or better. Partners then viewed NATO feedback as http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also implied in this publication are solely those of the authors fair and frank. Transparency was enhanced in produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the and do not necessarily represent the views of the that some partners invited others to hear their Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at: National Defense University, the Department of Defense, progress review. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm. or any other governmental agency. INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NDU PRESS In its ANP assessments, NATO has sought Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear Robert A. Silano William R. Bode a judicious balance between encouragement Director Director of Research Director of Publications General Editor

8 SPECIAL REPORT