INSS Special Report Institute for National Strategic Studies October 2001 National Defense University Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership by Jeffrey Simon A nation’s effective integration into the Indeed, while allied governments will rely About this report North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is heavily on MAP performance to begin member- his report draws heavily on the pro- an arduous, time-consuming, and resource- ship negotiations, NATO should link the date of ceedings of the Second International intensive task. The nine countries now aspiring actual accession to the completion of specific T Conference on the Lessons Learned to Alliance membership should heed the prob- (to be determined) core requirements from and the Enhancement of the Membership lems that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech each of the five chapters. Action Plan organized by the Institute for Republic have encountered since accession and The MAP process has positively influenced National Strategic Studies at the National redouble their efforts on defense integration the growth of interministerial coordination Defense University, the George C. Marshall and civil-military reforms in the Membership within MAP countries and enhanced interna- European Center for Security Studies, and the Action Plan (MAP) program. tional cooperation among those countries. Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, with support During the past year, MAP has become a MAP has become an increasingly impor- provided by the Office of the Secretary of more versatile instrument for forging defense tant tool for member governments to build Defense. The conference was held in Sofia, and civil-military reform. With further public support for NATO as well as parliamen- Bulgaria, on May 28–29, 2001. strengthening, the process will help not only to tary support for necessary resources. NATO- Jeffrey Simon is a senior research fel- inform Alliance decisions on choosing new related educational programs are necessary to low in the Institute for National Strategic members at the 2002 Prague Summit but also help MAP partners implement public informa- Studies at the National Defense University. to ease post-accession challenges for invitees. tion strategies to build public opinion support He is the author of numerous works on Euro- Upon accession to the Alliance, Poland, for the Alliance. pean security affairs, including NATO En- Hungary, and the Czech Republic were disqual- NATO and the European Union need to largement and Central Europe: A Study in ified from important bilateral assistance pro- make further efforts to help MAP members Civil-Military Relations. Dr. Simon can be grams as NATO shifted attention to the nine delineate the relationship between the two reached at (202) 685–2367, by fax at (202) MAP partners. After the next round of invita- organizations because some partners are find- 685–3972, or via e-mail at [email protected]. tions, the United States and NATO need to keep ing it difficult to establish priorities for NATO the new allies eligible for and engaged in and the European Union. assistance programs after accession. The first MAP cycle (1999–2000) put Partnership for Peace NATO and its partners on a steep learning curve When NATO adopted the Partnership for as they sought to implement a new and Peace (PFP) program at the Brussels Summit untested Annual National Plan program. This in January 1994, few had any notion of how program, a core element in membership action important and essential PFP would become. planning, established standards but issued no Many aspiring members were disappointed assessments. In marked contrast, augmented with PFP, perceiving it as a “policy for post- NATO teams dealing with all aspects of MAP ponement” of NATO enlargement. In response rationalized the planning process and gener- to persistent pressures from partners to join, ated real assessments that partners considered NATO produced a Study on NATO Enlarge- fair and frank during the second MAP cycle ment in September 1995 that outlined Alliance (2000–2001). MAP partners view the third cycle (2001–2002) progress reports as playing a critical role in the next enlargement decision. SPECIAL REPORT 1 expectations of new members. The study noted Why MAP? The Newest Members that The NATO Washington Summit in April Since their accession on March 12, 1999, PFP would assist partners to undertake 1999 unveiled the Membership Action Plan Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have necessary defense management reforms (MAP) concept, in part to convince the remain- demonstrated how unprepared their armed [such as] transparent national defense ing nine aspirants that Article 10 and the Open forces were for functional integration into planning, resource allocation and budget- Door policy were not hollow and to assist the NATO, although cooperation with the Alliance ing, appropriate legislation and parliamen- aspirants in developing forces and capabilities within the Partnership for Peace was fruitful tary and public accountability. The PFP that could operate with NATO under its new in terms of training and education. Participa- Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC). MAP tion in the Bosnia-based NATO operations PFP exercises will introduce partners to went further than the 1995 Study on NATO helped, but the Kosovo conflict, occurring collective defense planning and pave the Enlargement in defining what the aspirants within days of accession, further challenged way for more detailed operational planning. the new members. After the December 1995 North Atlantic MAP provides an Since joining NATO, all three members Council (NAC) Ministerial launched enhanced authoritative, jointly have engaged in strategic reviews of their armed 16+1 dialogues with those partners interested forces; as a result Poland will reduce forces to in joining the Alliance, 12 partners expressed agreed set of targets for 150,000 by 2006, Hungary to 37,500, and the such an interest by early 1997. When the wide-ranging political and Czech Republic, still engaged in review, to Madrid Summit invited Poland, Hungary, and civil-military reforms 38,000–40,000. All share the objective of creat- the Czech Republic in July 1997, NATO reiter- ing more professional, mobile, and flexible ated its Open Door policy, strengthened the role armed forces but find that obstacles to political- of partners in PFP decisionmaking and plan- needed to accomplish on the path to member- military integration remain in civil-military ning, and adopted new terms of reference under ship. It was designed to incorporate lessons relations. Also, there remains a need to increase the enhanced Partnership for Peace to broaden learned in the accession discussions with the number of NATO-competent, English- cooperation beyond peace enforcement opera- Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. trained civilians and military officers to staff tions. The Political-Military Steering Committee MAP has four essential components: numerous posts in the Alliance, as well as the continued to manage PFP programs, including I a tailored Annual National Plan (ANP) national structures that cooperate with NATO the development of the Partner Work Program that identifies key targets spanning the political/ and provide appropriate protection of classified (PWP) and Individual Partner Programs (IPP). economic, defense/military, resources, security, and information. For example, Hungary still has The PFP Planning and Review Process became legal dimensions (dubbed “chapters” in MAP difficulty assigning officers and noncommis- more significant, and NATO expanded the parlance) of Alliance membership sioned officers (NCOs) to NATO commands and number of Standardized Agreements I a feedback mechanism by which NAC headquarters. Of the 59 positions allocated to (STANAGS) made available to partners (now members and the partner can jointly assess progress Hungary in Southern Regional Commands— I 1,169) through the Partnership Coordination a clearinghouse for coordinating security its strategic and highest priority—it has as- assistance from NATO members to the partner Center in Mons, Belgium. The Alliance did so to signed only 41 persons, or 69 percent. I enhanced defense planning at the country plan military exercises and develop PWP and level that establishes and reviews agreed planning Poland. Domestic political pressures in PARP interoperability objectives. targets. Poland following NATO accession have acceler- At the June 1998 NATO Defense Minister- ated force reductions rather disturbingly and Just as the Partnership for Peace has ial, allies and PARP partners agreed to a report undermined force goal implementation. But matured into a fundamental program not entitled “Expanding and Adapting the PFP NATO inattention also has been to blame. originally envisioned by its architects, the MAP Planning and Review Process,” which sug- Whereas it criticized Polish civil-military rela- process contains even greater potential. gested major enhancements to PARP to make it tions before accession, NATO ignored them Though tailored to specific situations, MAP more closely resemble the NATO Defense Plan- after accession, and relations eroded. Since provides an authoritative, jointly agreed set of ning Questionnaire (DPQ). Beginning in 1999, joining the Alliance, the Polish defense min- targets for wide-ranging political and civil- NATO approved PARP Ministerial Guidance istry and general staff have maintained two military reforms—targets that help aspiring (now like the