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Global Cyber Bi-Weekly Report by INSS November 1, 2016 ISRAEL

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Global Cyber Bi-Weekly Report by INSS November 1, 2016 ISRAEL Global Cyber Bi-Weekly Report by INSS November 1, 2016 Editor-in-chief: Gabi Siboni, Editor: Hadas Klein; Contributors: Jeremy Makowski, Simon Tsipis, Gal Perl Finkel, Ido Sivan, Paola Aurucci ISRAEL US Department of Homeland Security officials are coming to Israel to discuss including Israeli cybersecurity companies in federal tenders For years, claims have been made in the United States that Israeli high-tech companies had incorporated backdoors in their products in order to gather information from US government departments and agencies. These claims, which, as far as is known, have never been verified, are the reason why Israeli companies are restricted from participating in US federal tenders. Now the Americans, with the aid of Israeli organizations, are trying to deal with the problem. A senior official in the US Department of Homeland Security is set to come to Israel to discuss with her Israeli counterparts ways of removing the restrictions. http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-us-govt-mulls-removing-bar-to-israeli-tech-cos- 1001156645 UNITED STATES Non-state actor likely behind US cyberattack The giant cyberattack that paralyzed many US sites last week was likely not the work of a foreign country, the top US intelligence chief James Clapper said. Clapper, who oversees US intelligence branches including the CIA, the FBI, sand Homeland Security, pointed to degrees of cybersecurity threats. “We’ve had this disparity or contrast between the capability of the most sophisticated cyber actors, nation-state cyber actors, which are clearly Russia and China, but have to this point perhaps more benign intent,” he said. “And then you have other countries who have a more nefarious intent. And then even more nefarious are non-nation-state actors,” he added. http://phys.org/news/2016-10-non-state-actor-cyber-clapper.html#jCp The Institute for National Security Studies 40, Haim Levanon St, POB 39950, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 61398 Tel: +972-3-6400400 Fax: +972-3-7447588 United States vs. Russia: Cyber war will have to wait until after the election After US intelligence agencies and the Homeland Security Department accused and blamed Russia for cyber espionage designed to interfere with the presidential election, the Obama administration promised a response “to protect [the country’s] interests at a time and place of our choosing.” That response, however, seems unlikely to come before Election Day. According to four officials, Obama is giving the next president a chance to gradually hit back at Russia for hacking the DNC. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/10/27/the-u-s-cyber-war-with-russia- will-wait-for-president-hillary-clinton.html EUROPE United Kingdom: British Army launches cyberattacks on ISIS Talking at an international conference on waging war, UK Defense Secretary, Sir Michael Fallon suggested that Britain is unleashing its cyber capability on ISIS. Indeed, in response to the question whether the United Kingdom is launching cyber- attacks on ISIS in order to reclaim the northern Iraqi city Mosul, the Defense Secretary answered: “I'm not going into operational specifics, but yes, you know we are conducting military operations against Daesh as part of the international coalition, and I can confirm that we are using offensive cyber for the first time in this campaign.” The UK army is now starting to launch cyber operations. In April 2015, they created a cyber unit named the 77th Brigade which includes reservists as well as regular soldiers, from all three services of the armed forces. Like the United States, the United Kingdom is now launching offensive cyber operations in order to counter terrorism and cyber terrorism activities. Indeed, terrorist groups such as ISIS are developing their cyber capabilities and using encrypted applications to communicate. Thus, armed forces have to adapt themselves and be more reactive. Cyber terrorism will continue, and if its impact is limited to attacking critical infrastructures, it most likely will directly cause human loss in the future. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37721147 The Institute for National Security Studies 40, Haim Levanon St, POB 39950, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 61398 Tel: +972-3-6400400 Fax: +972-3-7447588 RUSSIA Alarming Russian cybernetic strengthening The US administration has noted the strengthening of the Russian armed forces, including their cyber capabilities, GPS jamming, and the use of drones, according to US Secretary of the Army Eric Fanning. According to Fanning, in 2014, in the context of the disagreements with Russia over Ukraine, the Pentagon discovered that the Russian armed forces have improved many cybernetic aspects. https://ria.ru/world/20161024/1479893224.html Russian Foreign Ministry internet site hacked On October 23, the American hacker “the Jester” cracked the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, CNN reported. The official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, explained that it was an old site, which is no longer in operation. http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/22/technology/russian-foreign-ministry-hacked/ Russia to develop its own internet browser The Russian Federal Security Service approved on October 27 the ongoing local Russian internet browser development project, following the President’s decree from May 22, 2015. The aim is to create separate internet for each state under the name RSNet, based on the Federal Security Services’ resources and integrating all Russian government agencies and their subordinate organizations. http://www.securitylab.ru/news/484271.php Russia to tighten its cyber defense towards its elections Russia intends to strengthen the security of its presidential elections, to be held in 2018. According to the publication Izvestia, the Central Election Commission is considering the possibility of minimizing the influence of the human factor when entering the final protocols of the State Automated System (SAS) Elections. http://www.securitylab.ru/news/484267.php The Institute for National Security Studies 40, Haim Levanon St, POB 39950, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 61398 Tel: +972-3-6400400 Fax: +972-3-7447588 MIDDLE EAST A hacking group operating from the Middle East, arguably linked to Hamas, has been exposed Several Cybersecurity firms have tracked the group’s activity. Its main tactics are social engineering, spear-phishing emails, and social media. http://news.softpedia.com/news/moonlight-apt-uses-h-worm-backdoor-to-spy-on- middle-eastern-targets-509667.shtml Cisco reports rise in cyber threats in the Middle East According to Cisco, the main cyber threats are to oil production and intellectual property. At the same time, the Middle East suffers from a shortage in cybersecurity professionals. http://www.4-traders.com/CISCO-SYSTEMS-INC-4862/news/Cisco-Cyber-threats-in- Mideast-rising-23260009/ CHINA and ASIA PACIFIC $43 million for new lab to bolster Singapore’s cyber security A new laboratory has been launched by the National Research Foundation (NRF). The new laboratory will bolster Singapore’s capabilities in the battle against cybersecurity threats. The NRF, National University of Singapore (NUS), and telecommunications company Singtel will invest $43 million in the lab over the next five years to develop new ways to fight such threats. The NUS-Singtel Cyber Security Research and Development Laboratory will dive deep into areas such as quantum cryptography, which uses light to secure communications over fiber-optic networks, as well as data analytics and machine learning, which helps in the auto-detection of threats. The National University of Singapore has developed some prototypes in quantum cryptography that will be tested over Singtel’s network, he added. The lab has also been tasked to develop a pool of cybersecurity professionals. It is slated to host 100 researchers and train 120 new cybersecurity professionals from undergraduate to postgraduate levels over the next five years. In 2013 the university The Institute for National Security Studies 40, Haim Levanon St, POB 39950, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 61398 Tel: +972-3-6400400 Fax: +972-3-7447588 launched a five-year $130 million National Cyber Security Research and Development Program to bolster the nation’s security. http://bit.ly/2f5pVCj DDoS attack on StarHub, first of its kind on Singapore’s telco infrastructure: CSA, IMDA In a joint statement, the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) and Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) stated that the DDoS attacks on StarHub’s broadband network were the first of that nature on Singapore’s telecommunications infrastructure. This comes after the telco revealed in a media briefing that compromised devices such as webcams and routers owned by its customers led to the DDoS attacks. Communications and Information Minister, Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, said at an Asian Pacific cyber security summit that businesses must take action and address their specific cyber security needs, even as the government steps up efforts to help them stay safe. Dr Yaacob said the government has been consistent in pursuing cybersecurity development and working with multiple stakeholders, including businesses and international partners. This includes launching the national cyber security strategy earlier in October, and developing a multi-tiered cyber security response plan. A new Cybersecurity Act is also in the pipeline. Dr. Yaacob emphasized that the Government cannot do it alone, and urged companies to make cybersecurity a priority. http://bit.ly/2f79NFn China’s Xiongmai recalls webcams after cyberattack on Twitter and the New
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