International Journal of Political Science ISSN: 2228-6217 Vol 8, No 2 , Summer 2018, (pp.1-13)

China’s Maritime Interest and the Great Game at Seas

Peu Ghosh * Department of Political Science, Lady Brabourne College, Kolkata, West Bengal,

Received: 22 Dec 2017 ; Accepted: 20 May 2018

Abstract: Linking China‘s interest in the maritime waters arises from the geo-strategic importance of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) vital to the oil supply of the country. China is building strategic relationships and developing a naval capability to establish a for- ward presence along the SLOCs that connect China to the Middle East and to Africa. The entire stretch includes South China Sea, region and stretches as far as the Persian Gulf on the one hand and Port of Sudan on the other.The net result is a geo- graphical distribution of bases like the Chinese ‗pearls‘, USA ‗diamonds‘ and Indian ‗nuggets‘, principally reflecting concerns over energy security and secure access to SLOCs by each of the players. This paper would highlight the great game along the ma- ritime domain of China while highlighting the clash of interests with major players in this area as well as Chinese engagements with multitude of players to counter the chal- lenges arising from competitors. How energy requirement and quest for market imbibe China to design maritime strategies will be an important focus of this paper. It is also necessary to make an in-depth study of Chinese maritime strategy as it is going to have a grave impact on world politics. The paper will try to make future projections of the ‗Great Game‘ in the maritime stretch of importance to China.

Keywords: Sea Lines of Communications, Maritime strategy, Great Game, Strategic re- lationship, ‗Pearls‘, ‗Diamonds‘, ‗Nuggets‘.

Introduction world heading towards the existence of a sole The twentieth century witnessed a wave of hegemon, the United States of America globalization, spread of capitalist free-market (USA/US). The US became the strongest economy and a total change in the interna- power both in economic terms and military tional economic scenario. The political sce- dominance in the Post-Cold War era. How- nario also experienced dramatic transforma- ever, the 9/11 and the subsequent War on tions. From a bipolar world, it moved to a Terror did not reinforce American hegemony unipolar world. The reason is obviously the and the economic meltdown of 2008 further disintegration of the Soviet Union and the accelerated what academicians have started

* Corresponding Author‘s Email: [email protected] 2

China‘s Maritime Interest and the Great Game at Seas…

to ascribe it as an end of the American Cen- arena undoubtedly has an influence on con- tury. Against this backdrop, the rise of a mul- temporary World Politics even in the Twen- tipolar world with countries like China and ty-First Century, too. The most revered work India has to be followed closely. In the con- of Mahan which is being referred to in this text of this article, China‘s gradual rise is to article is his book – The Influence of Sea be examined as it tries to consolidate its vital Power upon History: 1660-1783, (1890). interests through OBOR initiative and ‗Mari- The strategic concepts which he discussed time Silk Road‘. in this book can no way be undermined. He This article is an attempt to study the talked about the sea as a ‗great highway‘ and perspective that is thought to be behind the ‗wide common‘ with ‗well-worn trade routes‘ ‗maritime silk road‘ as well as changes in over which men pass in all directions. He China‘s naval strategy in the recent times to also identified several narrow passages of show its naval prowess in the maritime strategic ‗choke points‘ and the control over stretch along the Sea Lines of Communica- them are what give a decisive power to a tions (SLOCs) which are transit for energy country. He had largely talked about the evo- and goods supply. Oil politics or to put it lution of Britain into a World Empire. Mahan another way, the disruption of choke points in his several writings like the one in the At- along the SLOCs have been dealt with this lantic Monthly entitled ‗The United States article to show the future flash points of Looking Outward‘ (1890) hinged upon the rivalry in the high seas.The catch point of point that U.S. security and interests were this article is that it tries to make future affected by the balance of power in Europe predictions of trends of maritime world and Asia. He understood that an Anglo- politics along the maritime zone of interest American sea-power was key to ensuring of China. geo-political pluralism in Eurasia. In his later writings, Mahan reviewed the successive A Prelude to China’s Maritime Interest moves towards the European continental he- and Strategy gemony by Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs, A name to reckon with any kind of discus- Louis XIV‘s France as well as Napoleonic sion of maritime strategy or maritime policy France where the great conditions supported connected with a country‘s maritime interest by sea-power thwarted the would-be hege- is that of Alfred Thayer Mahan. The works of mons. In his other work The Problems of this American naval strategist has relevance Asia and Its Effect Upon International Poli- till today and will continue to be so. Mahan cies, (1900) he showed how an expansionist was a legendary geo-political strategic think- Russia should be contained by an alliance of er who can be ascribed as a naval visionary. the US, Great Britain, France, Germany, and His understanding of the real politics in in- Japan. The Cold War period witnessed such ternational relations and the importance of containment policies as projected by Mahan. geography in the strategic thinking of a coun- In this work, Mahan also identified China try has to be recognized with respect. His with ‗immense latent force‘ and a potential understanding of the role of sea power in na- geopolitical rival of USA. Chinese military tional security as well as in the international thinkers might feel inspired by the dictums of

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Mahan and might be embracing the strategic The US Energy Information Administration thinking of Mahan in the twenty-first Cen- (EIA) acknowledges the importance of eight tury. The book written by James R.Holmes vital choke points in the world which are cru- and Toshi Yoshi hare entitled Chinese Naval cial to oil supply. They are the Strait of Hor- Strategy in the 21st Century: the Turn to Ma- muz, the , the Cape of Good han (2007) is a pointer in this direction. Hope, and the Bab-el Mandab, the Danish Undoubtedly economic motivation is the Straits, the Suez Canal, the Bosporus and primary driver force in China‘s orientation Panama Canal. Out of these eight, China has towards its claimed maritime domain. China concerns over those choke points present in therefore, is interested in securing sea lanes the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean that are vital to China‘s energy supplies and stretching as far as the Persian Gulf and route other important economic activities. For this, to Europe. These routes are of China‘s con- China is bent on thwarting the regional rising cern because these are strategic trade routes hegemons and international global players and oil supply lines for China. A blockade of and trying to increase its influence in the sea. such choke points would hit hard the Chinese This can be related to China‘s ‗rise‘ and its economy. Therefore, to secure such vital ambition to become a global player in inter- choke points establishing ‗island outposts‘ national relations, too. This leads to many therefore, becomes a priority for China with probabilities of interaction between USA and which it has been working and staking claims China, China and India, China and South-east of several islands in this maritime stretch. Asian Countries and China and Japan and The Chinese claims of the islands of Paracel how they manage their internation- and Spratly are pointers in this direction. al/bilateral/multilateral relations pertaining to Chinese military buildup in these islands is high seas. noteworthy. The aim obviously is to create military bases as well as naval bases in order Identifying China’s Maritime Interest and to secure not only the oil routes but also Choke Point Politics southern approach to the country. At the outset, the maritime stretch of China The eight vital choke points in this Indian needs to be identified. from a Chinese point Ocean region are the Strait of Hormuz, the of view, its maritime stretch includes the Mozambique Channel, the Six Degree Chan- South China Sea, and even East China Sea, nel, the , the Bab-el Mandeb, the Indian Ocean region, and stretches as far as Nine Degree Channel, the Strait of Malacca the Persian Gulf on the one hand and Port of and the . Chinese security Sudan on the other. China seeks to ensure stretch extends from the Strait of Malacca to that there is unimpeded access to markets, the Strait of Hormuz and extends as far as to energy supplies, raw materials and technolo- the coast of Africa. For instance, China is gy and secured maritime and land transport cautious about its Malacca dilemma- a corridors as a part of its national interest choke point blockade threat. Therefore, Chi- along this entire stretch of water. nese involvement in port and pipeline devel- The presence of choke points is vital to opments in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the security of the SLOCs along this mari- and Burma are aimed at enhancing energy time stretch. The politics of choke points is security and reducing China‘s dependence on vital in the interplay of international politics. the Malacca Strait chokepoint to counter In-

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dia‘s strategies of blocking the choke points. projection is that ‗whoever controls the oil There is also another urge for China to worry can also control the lifeblood of other coun- about in the Indian Ocean Regional that is tries‘ economic development‘ (Erickson and exploration and exploitation of sea-bed re- Goldstein, 2009) then China has a vision sim- sources. China Ocean Mineral Resources Re- ilar to this in the South China Sea as well as search and Development Association (CO- along its entire maritime stretch. MRA), the nodal agency for seabed explora- tion and exploitation of resources was estab- Chinese Maritime Strategy: Developing lished. In 2001, China obtained mining rights the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) for poly-metallic nodule and in 2002, Chinese maritime strategy has been using the poly‐metallic sulfide deposits in the South- economic power as well as the military pow- western Indian Ocean. In 2011, COMRA er to secure its maritime stretch. China tar- signed a 15‐year exploration contract with geted the countries all along the SLOCs and the International Seabed Authority (ISA) that has tried to penetrate economically. With entrusted it with rights to develop ore deposit government encouragement, Chinese busi- in future. China plans to deploy the manned nessmen invested heavily in Southeast Asia, deep‐sea submersible Jiaolong in the Indian Latin America, Central Asia, and Africa, Ocean. Jiaolong can potentially monitor winning access to massive agricultural, tim- submarine cables which carry nearly 99 per- ber, food, and mineral resources around the cent of digital data and crisscross the Indian world. China is now the biggest trade partner Ocean. China has therefore, broad plans for of many Asian countries. These include the garnering its position and prowess in the In- ASEAN countries and also South Korea, dian Ocean. (Sakuja, 2014) China‘s Hormuz Taiwan, and Japan among others. (Roberts, dilemma is discussed later in this article in 2011: 10-12) the context of CPEC and OBOR initiative. Chinese economic investments in Asia China‘s current claims on its ocean fron- and Africa have come to attract international tier comprise three main elements like claim attention. It is observed that behind strategic to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan, claim planning, there are heavy economic invest- to territorial sovereignty over a large number ments which are new tools of entrapping of other small islands in the South China Sea countries facing low economic growth. A (Paracel and Spratly islands) or the East Chi- debt trap creates a dependency syndrome na Sea (Senkaku Islands), and claim to mari- which can be utilized by China for fulfilling time resource jurisdictions that might pass on its strategic purpose as OBOR/BRI, Maritime to China if its claims to the land territories Silk Road or its ‗string of pearls‘ strategy. If were recognized by adjacent states. we follow World Systems Theory or the De- Given a complicated regional picture, pendency Theory, satellites or neo-colonies China is expected to continue to invest heavi- are created this way in contemporary interna- ly on the navy and inspired by a vision al- tional relations to the benefit of neo- most similar to Mahan, where in the future it colonialists. A few examples will make can ultimately seek maritime domination it things clear. will embark upon an aggressive policy. If the

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Sri Lanka is one such case. The Hamban- exchange for oil. In Democratic Republic of tota Port (part of the ‗string of pearls‘ strate- Congo, the biggest high grade copper deposit gy), was built by the Chinese. The Mattala in Kamoa is being developed by China. International Airport and other infrastructural These though look economic investments but facilities have seen Chinese investments. It is are actually strategic investments to protect this economic penetration which has entan- the Chinese vital interests in the far seas. gled Sri Lanka in a debt trap. To come out of (Krishnan, 2017:34) this debt trap, Sri Lanka, in 2017 had been China has extended its maritime stretch as thinking of handing over the Mattala Interna- far as the Horn of Africa. It is investing heav- tional Airport to India. This might help Sri ily in constructing a new military base in Ob- Lanka to repay the dues to China‘s Exim ock in Djibouti. Djibouti is located at the Bank. Though through this initiative, India, southern entrance to the Red Sea and the can balance the Chinese influence in her Gulf of Aden. More precisely, it is located neighborhood, but China has succeeded in between Somalia, Eritrea, and Yemen. It oc- getting 99 years lease of Hambantota Port cupies a strategic location adjacent to the Bab (short of using it for defense purpose). el Mandab Strait, which is a critical corridor (Krishnan, 2017:36) for international shipping. Crude oil imports Now turning to the African continent and natural gas imports transit make this blessed with huge resources and a lucrative junction a sensitive area. Therefore, the secu- destination for extra-regional players, China rity dilemma involving the choke points in here too invests to materialize its maritime this region has been the part of compulsions vital interests. Along with the US, Russia, of Chinese maritime designs in the Indian Turkey, Brazil, and India, China has become Ocean Region. The presence of other powers a topmost investor and trading partner in like the US, France, and Japan with the sole Africa. Among many other African countries, foreign military base in Djibouti, matters will Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, Morocco, become complicated in the future undoubted- Kenya, Egypt are some of the attractive des- ly with the growing Chinese presence. tinations for Chinese investments. The Mom- As scholars of International Relations, we basa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway is be- can find an echo of dependency theory in ing funded by the Chinese. The same is being international relations in Djibouti and other constructed by China Road and Bridge Con- countries of Africa too. Poor economic health struction (CRBC). Development of Port La- creates grounds for neo-colonial powers to mu in the east coast of Africa is also within exploit and extend their influences in these the Chinese strategic design. Port Sudan has neo-colonies like Djibouti. This will result in been incorporated into the ‗string of pearls‘ a scramble for control of neo-colonies in the strategy by the Chinese for its geo-strategic future in the African continent by foreign location. So it is also being developed by the powers working towards achievement of their Chinese. strategic and economic interests. Other investments in Africa that can be Therefore, what is clear from the above cited are like Husab in Nigeria which has one discussion is that China has used its econom- of the world‘s biggest uranium deposits and ic prowess to boost its strategic designs to this has been acquired by China. In Angola, manage its maritime stretch as well as eco- the Chinese has built roads and railways in nomic belt initiatives. Here, it will be impor-

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tant to remember that the current policy of road‘ is a more non-military approach which the Chinese government is to develop the will involve its strategy of investing in mari- ‗Maritime Silk Route‘. The design of the time infrastructure in ASEAN and further route and the urge to create the route are im- west and not to leave out Africa. portant points of discussion in current inter- The Indian Ocean Region is gradually be- national relations. coming an ‗arena of competing for influ- The ‗maritime silk road‘ initially targeted ence‘, more so with the significant presence to China‘s neighbors in the South China Sea, of the United States and India. The net result especially the ASEAN countries. It was pro- is a geographical distribution of bases like the posed as an attempt to enhance connectivity Chinese ‗pearls‘, USA ‗diamonds‘ and Indian and cultural links in China‘s backyard in the ‗nuggets‘, principally reflecting concerns South China Sea. Later it was expanded to over energy security and secure access to include the littoral states of Indian Ocean and SLOCs. The Chinese ‗pearls‘ comprise Ban- extended as far as Africa. It is clearly dis- gladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. cernible that China has a vision of construct- The US ‗diamonds‘ consists of Australia, ing ports, logistical stations, storage facilities, Bahrain, Diego Garcia, Djibouti, Egypt, In- and free-trade zones in the South China Sea donesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Sin- extending till the Indian Ocean. gapore, and UAE. The Indian ‗nuggets‘ A question which can be raised is that though lesser in number, yet are important whether the ‗maritime silk road‘ is a larger footholds for India. They include Andaman version of the ‗string of pearls‘? This though Islands, Mauritius, and Maldives. never has been officially announced by Chi- India is the rising hegemon in the Indian na, never-the-less has been doing rounds in Ocean Region. Therefore, containing India is the academic circle as well as the military a prime motivating factor behind the adop- strategic thinking of the concerned countries. tion of the ‗string of pearls‘ strategy by Chi- The referral region in this context is the In- na. This involves massive Chinese invest- dian Ocean Region, and the country specifi- ments in developing or managing strategic cally targeted is India, as well as the US. stations and ports all along the Indian Ocean (Krishnan, 2017:35) Region to counter India and compete with the The ‗string of pearls‘ concept is often US. In Sri Lanka China has built the port of viewed as a military initiative and is viewed Hambantota. Another container port is un- as a Chinese strategy of giving Chinese navy derway in Chittagong, Bangladesh. In 2014 accesses to a series of ports stretching from China floated the idea of developing Iha- the South China Sea to the ex- vandhippolhu in Maldives as Maldives has tending to the Persian Gulf on one hand and been identified as a ‗pearl‘ too by President the Gulf of Aden moving towards Europe on Xi Jinping. Other activities include involve- the other. This has caused some worry par- ment in Myanmar‘s offshore islands, includ- ticularly in India, which feels that it is being ing St. Matthews, near the mouth of the Ma- encircled as pointed out in the above discus- lacca Strait, and the Coco Islands (Indian un- sion by the Chinese ‗string of pearls‘. There- til their transfer to Burma in the 1950s), in fore, a new terminology of ‗maritime silk the . There are reports of the

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International Journal of Political Science, Vol 8, No 2 , Summer 2018 presence of Chinese communications moni- neo-imperialist strategy as discussed in the toring facility for collecting information previous section. The object is to get these about Indian naval operations and missile countries entangled in a debt-trap so that their testing. The most important of all is the dependency on China would turn them into Gwadar port in Pakistan which is very close neo-colonies of China. China will strategical- to the Strait of Hormuz. China has con- ly be able to maintain military presence in structed the Gwadar Port to create a huge these countries and station PLA along the naval base here. (Haider, 2005) China suffers periphery of BRI. OBOR or BRI is an ambi- from the Hormuz dilemma too which is al- tious project of linking mainland China with most identical with its Malacca dilemma. The Central Asia and Europe. Central Asia and choke points closure or disruption will hit the the Caspian Sea region are blessed with rich Chinese energy supply hard. The potential energy resources which can be reached threat of course is from India and her cooper- through the economic belt much easily and at ation with the Iranian government to develop a low cost. (Kanwal, 2017) The ‗maritime the port of Chabahar. Also, India is being a silk road‘ must be seen as a counter part of part of the project of construction of the In- the OBOR, one stretching over the maritime ternational North-South Transport Corridor interest areas of China and the other on the (INSTC) which will join Mumbai port and land. Bandar Abbas (on the narrow Strait of Hor- Here, one point must be highlighted and muz). that is the change in the strategic planning of China, sensing its Hormuz dilemma there- the Chinese military establishments. There fore, alongside the development of the port of was a decision from the top leadership in Gwadar, has embarked on ambitious plans around 2013 that the size of the PLA would with Pakistan like the China-Pakistan Eco- be reduced. The White Paper released in nomic Corridor (CPEC) as well as the ‗One 2013 declared Chinese naval forces would Belt, One Road‘ (OBOR) trade initiative. enhance comprehensive offshore operations. These preparations are all geared up to pro- Followed by this would be developing task tect China‘s vital interest in the Strait of force formation in the blue water. This meant Hormuz extending as far as to Central Asia. gearing up overseas operational capabilities. The naval preparedness close to the Strait of (Kondapalli, 2018: 114) Hormuz, a geographic choke point, as well as The new alignment of the maritime strate- sending feelers to the Iranian government for gy was announced in 2013 by President Xi joint naval exercise show full proof plans to Jinping. There was also the announcement of secure its maritime interests and maritime centralization of the bureaucratic control over strategies in this region. the maritime law enforcement agencies and China‘s ‗One Belt, One Road‘ (OBOR) assimilation of the previously separate mari- initiative now known as ‗Belt and Road Initi- time law enforcement bodies into the one ative‘ (BRI), is designed to use Chinese ‗soft integrated structure under the State Oceanic power‘ strategies to win over countries along Administration (SOA) which is a part of the this belt. This includes giving soft loans to Ministry of Land and Natural Resources. the participating countries to help them build Another highlight of this new policy has been infrastructure for the BRI. The whole strategy an increasing importance of the China Coast is quite a design of what can be dubbed as a Guard. This is not a part of the Navy but this

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agency play an important role in the maritime upon with a serious note. Whether it is the waters like in the South China Sea and the Pacific or the Indian Ocean, there is an ob- East China Sea. It would be pertinent now to servable presence of the US Navy and exis- draw attention to the Scarborough Shoals tence of the US naval bases. The US, in its incident with Philippines in 2012 when a Phi- bid to maintain its position as a hegemonic lippine Navy surveillance plane intercepted maritime power dominance not only in the several Chinese fishing vessels in a lagoon at Atlantic or the Pacific, but also in the Indian Scarborough. The news prompted the Philip- Ocean has taken many measures to achieve pines to deploy its largest warship, the BRP, this goal, including strengthening its pre- Gregorio Del Pilar. Two Chinese maritime sences in Diego Garcia and Bahrain, updating surveillance ships later reportedly positioned its military cooperation with established themselves between the Gregorio Del Pilar allies, and setting up forward military net- and the Chinese fishing vessels, preventing works to control key choke points. As we the arrests of the fishermen. Therefore, be- have mentioned in the previous section the hind civilian vessels, or Chinese Coast America maintains the ‗diamonds‘ or bases Guards, there is a huge naval presence lurk- in the entire maritime stretch that coincides ing in the rear and waiting for signal to act. with China. The 2015 White Paper mentions the mili- The US has propped many allies in the tary preparedness to effectively secure Chi- ASEAN countries and also roped in India. In na‘s overseas interests. It calls for a combina- September and October 2005, for instance, tion of strategies of offshore water defense to the US and India conducted their first naval open seas protection. maneuvers—MALABAR 05—employing Thus, China‘s Blue Water Navy with po- U.S. and Indian aircraft carriers, and this oc- werful amphibious warfare and aircraft carri- curred in the Arabian Sea. Recent naval exer- er components are ‗rocking the boat‘ in the cises, the nineteenth edition of MALABAR IOR and the South China Sea. This might (2015), a joint naval exercise of the US and help China to secure its ever lengthening India in the Bay of Bengal saw innovation as maritime stretch of communications along there was the presence of Japanese Navy the SLOCs or its implementation of the Mari- which took part in the iteration of MALA- time Silk Road of the Twenty-First Century. BAR for the first time. Hence, there has been However, China‘s neighbors are suspicious a transition from a bilateral engagement to a about its intentions and China‘s naval power trilateral one (INDIA, USA and JAPAN). projections. A feeling of ‗threat‘ among the Another development has been the Indian neighbors may be behind China‘s attempt to Navy‘s engagement with the Royal Australi- dilute military strategy by a non-military an Navy (RAN) in 2015. Therefore, China concept of Maritime Silk Road Initiative. has to face competition from the US, Japan, and India. If it follows Mahan, then to control Future Projections: A Competition for the sea it has to remove its opponents. The Global and Regional Leadership rising regional hegemon, India has to be en- What can be the consequences of such expedi- circled and contained within the limits of the tious policy of China has to be pondered South Asia.

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Several repercussions can follow from pressurize the US over Taiwan. this. A series of future predictions can be Both can come to an understand- summarized as given below: ing and balance off each other in 1) There can be clashes and competi- the maritime domain too. As Pres- tions between the Chinese Navy ident Xi Jinping made it clear that and the US Naval Forces in the certain ‗negative factors‘ are hurt- Pacific as well as in the South ing China-US relations. The 2018 China Sea and the Indian Ocean. tariff war is a test of nerves be- Latest in July 2017, the US Navy tween the US and China. destroyer USS Statham sailed 12 4) Strong US presence in the Pacific, nautical miles (22km) of the small South China Sea and the Indian Triton Island in the South China Ocean can be a factor in China- Sea which is claimed by China, North Korea relations. Amid the Taiwan and Vietnam. China Singapore Summit between Kim quickly readied its naval ships and and Trump in 2018, China and military jets to ‗warn off‘ the de- North Korea, both are guarding stroyer. China denounced the US their relations cautiously. For move as a ‗serious political and China, North Korea can be an im- military provocation‘. In June portant card as it faces a potential 2017, China launched its biggest trade war with the US in 2018. new generation domestically-built 5) ‗Containment policy‘ of China to- destroyer.It is equipped with air wards India may continue as India defense, anti-missile, anti-ship stretches her ties to the South-East and anti-submarine weapons. This Asia through her Act East Policy. is a 10,000-tonne warship and its Containing a competing regional inauguration can be seen as a part hegemon is a necessity for China of China‘s plan of becoming a na- to get rid of its ‗choke point‘ di- val power. lemma along the SLOCs. 2) Rife over Taiwan will continue 6) Border tensions between two big and on economic and political neighbors, India and China as front there can be ups and downs witnessed during the 2017 at Dok- in the Sino-US relations. President lam, can be on the rise. Side by Xi Jinping, in the background of side there can be competitions at the US warship moving into Chi- High Seas also. Following the na‘s alleged territorial waters, said Doklam standoff there was a sur- that the US should manage its re- prising presence of the Chinese lations on the basis of ‗one-China‘ warships (almost 13) in the Indian policy. Ocean Region. There can be such 3) There can be another twist to the shadow boxing between India and Sino-US relations. The US in or- China in the high seas whenever der to reduce its trade deficit can there is a crisis on the land continue to pressurize China to front.As China tries to secure its revalue their currency. China can mainland, there can be clashes be-

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tween India and China more often New Delhi, both India and Japan along the border. proposed to synergies their ‗Act 7) More tensions are in the offing re- East Policy‘ and ‗Free and Open garding the implementation of Indo-Pacific Strategy‘. This can mega connectivity projects like be seen as an act of balancing off the BRI or even the Maritime Silk China at open seas of interests of Road. As of June 2018, even in all three countries. the 18th SCO summit though there 9) ASEAN neighbors of China have was agreement on other SCO in- to witness clashes along the mari- itiatives but India expressed her time stretch and confront Chinese dissent over BRI. So matters may Coast Guards and Naval Ships as brew up in the future. maritime disputes continue. 8) How well can India play the Ja- 10) Russia is another big question. pan Card is also an important How Russia will maneuvered and leverage that India can think handle such changing scenario has about. This came out to be true to be watched closely. In the when Japan gave its support to wildest of the imagination can India on the Doklam stand-off there be a China-Russia strategic between China and India. Japan partnership with Pakistan as an al- had pinned on thwarting the ex- ly? If this ever happens, the re- pansion of China in the East gional as well as global politics China Sea. Therefore, similarity will see a dramatic change in the of Chinese expansionist policy power equations. prompted Japan to enter the 11) China has started to take an ac- scene. The disputed island of tive interest Afghanistan and is Senkaku in the East China Sea, trying to broker peace between already has witnessed quite a Pakistan and Afghanistan. A trila- military preparedness on both teral, China—Afghanistan— sides. If China is successful in Pakistan has been formed which is Doklam, it might try out Senka- a foreign minister level dialogue ku unilaterally. Japanese trade forum. This will act to enhance which passes through the Strait of the peace process in Afghanistan. Malacca might be subjected to Chi- Definitely, this has a long-range na‘s maneuvering. If India contin- object in the Chinese thinking. ues to be the dominant naval power Not only achieving regional sta- in the region, Japan will be assured bility and adopting a posture of of its energy and trade roads. There- arbiter of regional and interna- fore, Japan-India strategic partner- tional disputes but also ensuring ship can see an upsurge in the fu- the CPEC and routes to Central ture. In the June 2018, India-Japan Asia as well as the security of the Vice-Ministerial 2+2 dialogue in ‗maritime silk road‘ cannot be de-

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nied. This will have an impact on maritime regions instead of a full-fledged navy. regional politics too when has Simultaneously, ambitious plans like OBOR or seen in the context of India. BRI and ‗maritime silk road‘ initiatives are 12) Another point that should not be creating waves in the strategic thinking of Chi- forgotten is that the African conti- na‘s neighbors. nent would face more competi- Therefore, the maritime stretch of China tion, more dependency, and there is most likely to witness a ‗Great Game‘ will be a scramble for neo- among regional and extra-regional players. colonies among existing powers Clashes in the seas will be more frequent as and aspiring powers like China as the Chinese vessels patrol the disputed mari- has been shown in the above dis- time waters. The East China Sea, the South cussion. China Sea and the Indian Ocean will be wit- ness to the clash of vital interest, if not, choke The expansionist strategies and military point disruptions. designs backed by economic policies point The silence in this maritime stretch after out that China are planning to assume global the game-changing verdict of the internation- leadership. It seems that China will first se- al arbitral tribunal in The Hague on the Phil- cure its mainland and then it will secure its ippines‘ South China Sea case against China maritime domain. The latter will bring insta- in 2016 is illusory. The Tribunal found that bility and clash into the high seas. The 2020 China had violated the Philippines‘ sovereign has to be watched carefully whether major rights in those waters by interfering with its players like the US and India balance of, or fishing and petroleum exploration and by con- clash with China at the seas. structing artificial islands. However, Beijing refused to accept the ruling. There is no doubt Conclusion this region is going to witness many a nerve- One thing comes out to be clear is that China wracking politics among regional and extra- has restructured its maritime strategy. The fo- regional powers in the not so distant future. cus is more on naval forces rather than land forces. Again, when it comes to using its naval References forces, it does not mean the navy only. China is Anandabazar, Patrika, (Bengali Newspaper, revamping its Coast Guard Units and as pointed daily), (2017),‘Djiboutite Ghati, out above, China has deployed the world‘s Noushakti Barate Nazar Beijing r‘, largest Coast Guard Vessel in the South China Kolkata, July Sea. Is this ringing an alarm bell for its neigh- Economic Times, (2017), ‗China commis- bor? This is a valuable question. It has disputes sions biggest new generation de- with almost all neighbors- India, Philippines, stroyer ship for its navy‘, 28 June, Vietnam, and Malaysia to mention a few. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com Therefore, to tackle the maritime disputes, con- /news/defence/china-navy-launches- flicts in the high seas, or patrolling in the con- latest-generation- tested waters or the development of strategic destroyer/articleshow/59351769.cms bases in the disputed islands, China has devised (accessed on 21 August, 2017), June this strategy of deploying paramilitary or civi- EIA (2013), ‗The South China Sea is an im- lian vessels to stake its claim in the disputed portant world energy trade route‘,

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