DOCSLIB.ORG

Anderson, Robert B

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Anderson, Robert B YEMEN DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: Papers, 1950-61 General Correspondence and Memoranda Series Box 1 Memos of Conversation – General – A through D (3) [Yemen; Lebanon and Jordan; French-Tunisian situation; Algeria; Benjamin Cohen re Israel and Arabs; Baghdad Pact Syria; Saudi Arabia] Box 4 [Miscellaneous Correspondence June 20, 1956-Aug. 14, 1956] [Yemen] Personnel Series Box 20 Chron File – November 1958 (1)(2) [Yemen] Special Assistant Chronological Series Box 10 Macomber – Hanes Chronological June 1956 (1)-(4) [Israel; Mrs. Archibald Roosevelt re Yemen; Congressman Rooney re meeting on Israel] EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D.: Papers as President (Ann Whitman File), 1953-1961 International Series Box 54 Yemen NSC Series Box 9 352nd Meeting of NSC, January 22, 1958 [Middle East; Yemen] EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D.: Records as President (White House Central Files), 1953-61 General File Box 833 GF 122 Yemen Yemen Box 851 GF 122-A Yemen Heads of Foreign Countries & Foreign Diplomats- Yemen Official File Box 732 OF 216-A Yemen FITZGERALD, DENNIS A.: Papers, 1945-69 Box 26 TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS August-September 1957 (1)-(6) [Middle East; EximBank & Morocco; Iran; Libya; Yemen] TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS March-April 1958 (1)-(4) [Libya; Arab Development League; Morocco; Iran; Saudi Arabia; Jordan; Saudi Arabian food; Algerian refugees in Tunisia; Iraq; Egyptian teachers in Libya; Yemen] TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS July 1958 (1)-(3) [Egypt; Yemen; Iran and Iraq; Jordan; Middle East; Israel; Morocco] Box 27 TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS January 1959 (1)(2) [Jordan; Yemen; Libya; Baghdad Pact; Iran and police program] TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS May 1959 (1)-(3) [Egyptian wheat; Yemen; Morocco; Iran] TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS June 1959 (1)-(3) [Iran; EximBank loan to Morocco; Yemen; Iraq; Egyptian locomotives] Box 28 TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS October, November, December 1959 (1)-(6) [Desalination plant in Tunisia; Middle East; Israel; Syria; Morocco; Jordan; Yemen] TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS January, February, March 1960 (1)-(5) [Libya; Yemen; Morocco; Iran] Box 29 TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS June 1960 (1)-(3) [Yemen; Jordan; Egypt] Box 30 TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS March 1961 (1)-(3) [Yemen; Jordan] Box 35 READING FILE 7/2/55 – 12/30/55 (1)-(6) [Iran foundation; Aswan Dam; Iran and rice; Yemen; Israel] Box 36 READING FILE 7/1/57-12/30/57 (1)-(5) [Jordan; Yemen; Baghdad Pact activities] Box 37 READING FILE 7/1/58-12/30/58 (1)-(5) [Yemen; overseas internal security in Lebanon; Morocco] READING FILE 1/1/59-6/30/59 (1)-(5) [Yemen and Egypt; Lebanon] Box 39 ADMINISTRATION – STATE COORDINATION 1956-1959 (1)-(5) [Yemen and Jordan] ODLUM, FLOYD B.: Papers, 1896-1972 Box 160 Y Group, 1954-56 (1)-(4) [oil, natural gas & uranium in Yemen;] Yemen, 1954-56 (1)-(2) [potential for mineral and oil development] SMITH, JAMES H., JR.: Papers, 1932-80 Box 4 ICA Chron File, May 1958 [problem of access to Middle East Oil; Yemen] WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961 OCB Secretariat Series Box 8 OCB 319.1 Activity Report (File #1) (1)-(7) [1957 – weekly reports re issues; Libya; Internal Security programs; Palestine Refugee Program; Tunisia; civil aviation in the Middle East; Lebanon; Yemen; Morocco negotiations; Algerian refugees; Iran jet airfield; internal security for Libya; economic aid for Libya; Baghdad Pact meetings; disaster aid to Iran] Box 14 OCB 337. Minutes (File #7) (1)-(6) [March 1958-May 1958 –Libya; education in North Africa; Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP); Iran; Lebanon internal security; Middle East locust plague; Communist penetration of Yemen; doctors for Yemen; Jordan drought relief; American School at Tangier; education programs for Moslem students] Box 15 OCB 337. Minutes (File #10) (1)-(7) [April 1959-July 1959 –Yemen road; Iran; Jordan re Arab refugees; Libyan oil] Box 16 OCB 337. Minutes (File #13) (1)-(5) [April 1960-June 1960 –Yemen] WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray): Records, 1952-61 OCB Series, Administrative Subseries Box 1 Chronological - F.M. Dearborn, August-October 1957 (2) [Yemen; Near East] OCB Series, Subject Subseries Box 4 Near East (Middle East) (1) [Iraq; oil; Jordan; Yemen] Near East (Middle East) (2) [Israel; Syria; mergers of countries; Yemen Development Corporation; Near East aviation policy; oil; Iraq; review of long-range Near East policy; military implications of Joint Resolution on Near East] AUDIOVISUAL COLLECTION: Researchers should consult with the Audiovisual Archivist about the availability of photographs pertinent to Middle East topics. Researchers should also consult the “Middle East” search report for additional information on Yemen which may be found in folders such as “Middle East,” “Oil,” etc. .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • GCC Policies Toward the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Yemen: Ally-Adversary Dilemmas by Fred H
    II. Analysis Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi, and King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Saudi Arabia, preside over the ‘Sheikh Zayed Heritage Festival 2016’ in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on 4 December 2016. GCC Policies Toward the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Yemen: Ally-Adversary Dilemmas by Fred H. Lawson tudies of the foreign policies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries usually ignore import- S ant initiatives that have been undertaken with regard to the Bab al-Mandab region, an area encom- passing the southern end of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Yemen. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have become actively involved in this pivotal geopolitical space over the past decade, and their relations with one another exhibit a marked shift from mutual complementarity to recip- rocal friction. Escalating rivalry and mistrust among these three governments can usefully be explained by what Glenn Snyder calls “the alliance security dilemma.”1 Shift to sustained intervention Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have been drawn into Bab al-Mandab by three overlapping develop- ments. First, the rise in world food prices that began in the 2000s incentivized GCC states to ramp up investment in agricultural land—Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi all turned to Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda as prospective breadbaskets.2 Doha pushed matters furthest by proposing to construct a massive canal in central Sudan that would have siphoned off more than one percent of the Nile River’s total annual downstream flow to create additional farmland.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Developing Countries
    Overseas Development lostitute Briefing Paper March 1991 THE IMPACT OF THE GULF CRISIS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES The economic repercussions of the Gulf crisis have been widespread. Apart from the impact on the Gulf states Box 1: Impact of Gulf Crisis themselves, the resulting economic disruptions over the past (where impact > 1% of GNP) seven months have affected many countries. In response to requests for a consistent set of estimates of the impact on less Impact of the Gulf crisis developed countries, ODI undertook a study both to assess the Oil CostI Non-oil effects and to consider the response by the international Country (B eneftt) Cost Total Cost community. US$7n US$m. US$m %GNP This Briefing Paper, finalised on the day the war ended, Low income draws on the findings of this study. Two conclusions stand Middle p:ast out. First, the large number and wide range of developing Yemen (570) 1400 830 10.4% countries that have been severely affected by the crisis-. Second, South Asia while there has been a considerable response to the crisis, the Bangladesh 130 115 245 1.4% distribution of assistance has been highly selective. Some Pakistan coimtries have been almost over-compensated while others 560 295 855 2.4% have received little help. Sri Lanka 140 125 265 4.0% Sub-Saharan Africa Effect on developing countries Beiiin 40 40 2.2% The Gulf crisis has had both global and specific effects on Chad 25 25 2.5%. developing countries. The crisis, in particular the period of Ethiopia 115 115 2.0% higher oil prices, has adversely affected world growth and Ghana 50 50 1,0% hence growth in developing countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Automatic Exchange of Information: Status of Commitments
    As of 27 September 2021 AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (AEOI): STATUS OF COMMITMENTS1 JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES IN 2017 (49) Anguilla, Argentina, Belgium, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus2, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Seychelles, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turks and Caicos Islands, United Kingdom JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2018 (51) Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan3, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominica4, Greenland, Grenada, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Macau (China), Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue4, Pakistan3, Panama, Qatar, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sint Maarten4, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago4, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2019 (2) Ghana3, Kuwait5 JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2020 (3) Nigeria3, Oman5, Peru3 JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2021 (3) Albania3, 7, Ecuador3, Kazakhstan6
    [Show full text]
  • 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background the Yemen Civil War Is
    CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background The Yemen civil war is currently in its fifth year, but tensions within the country have existed for many years. The conflict in Yemen has been labelled as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world by the United Nations (UN) and is categorized as a man-made phenomenon. According to the UN, 80% of the population of Yemen need humanitarian assistance, with 2/3 of its population considered to be food insecure while 1/3 of its population is suffering from extreme levels of hunger and most districts in Yemen at risk of famine. As the conditions in Yemen continue to deteriorate, the world’s largest cholera outbreak occurred in Yemen in 2017 with a reported one million infected.1 Prior to the conflict itself, Yemen has been among the poorest countries in the Arab Peninsula. However, that is contradictory considering the natural resources that Yemen possess, such as minerals and oil, and its strategical location of being adjacent to the Red Sea.2 Yemen has a large natural reserve of natural gasses and minerals, with over 490 billion cubic meters as of 2010. These minerals include the likes of silver, gold, zinc, cobalt and nickel. The conflict in Yemen is a result of a civil war between the Houthi, with the help of Former President Saleh, and the Yemen government that is represented by 1 UNOCHA. “Yemen.” Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_Yemen_HNO_FINAL.pdf. 2 Sophy Owuor, “What Are The Major Natural Resources Of Yemen?” WorldAtlas, February 19, 2019.
    [Show full text]
  • Institutional Change and the Egyptian Presence in Yemen 1962-19671
    1 Importing the Revolution: Institutional change and the Egyptian presence in Yemen 1962-19671 Joshua Rogers Accepted version. Published 2018 in Marc Owen Jones, Ross Porter and Marc Valeri (eds.): Gulfization of the Arab World. Berlin, London: Gerlach, pp. 113-133. Abstract Between 1962 and 1967, Egypt launched a large-scale military intervention to support the government of the newly formed Yemen Arab Republic. Some 70,000 Egyptian military personnel and hundreds of civilian advisors were deployed with the stated aim to ‘modernize Yemeni institutions’ and ‘bring Yemen out of the Middle Ages.’ This article tells the story of this significant top-down and externally-driven transformation, focusing on changes in the military and formal government administration in the Yemen Arab Republic and drawing on hitherto unavailable Egyptian archival material. Highlighting both the significant ambiguity in the Egyptian state-building project itself, as well as the unintended consequences that ensued as Egyptian plans collided with existing power structures; it traces the impact of Egyptian intervention on new state institutions, their modes of functioning, and the articulation of these ‘modern’ institutions, particularly the military and new central ministries, with established tribal and village-based power structures. 1. Introduction On the night of 26 September 1962, a column of T-34 tanks trundled through the streets of Sana‗a and surrounded the palace of the new Imam of Yemen, Mu ammad al-Badr,2 who had succeeded his father Imam ‘ mad (r.1948-62) only one week earlier. Opening fire shortly before midnight, the Yemeni Free Officers announced the ‗26 September Revolution‘ on Radio Sana‗a and declared the formation of a new state: the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR).
    [Show full text]
  • YEMEN Unrelenting Conflict and Risk of Famine
    IRC WATCHLIST 2021 14 IRC WATCHLIST 2021 15 1. YEMEN Unrelenting conflict and risk of famine KEY FACTS PROBABILITY IMPACT CONSTRAINTS ON HUMAN THREAT Population: 29.8 million 10 8 COUNTRY RESPONSE EXISTING PRESSURES NATURAL THREAT 24.3 million people in need of humanitarian aid 5 8 ON POPULATION (80% of population) 16.1 million people facing crisis or worse levels of Yemen tops the IRC’s annual Emergency Watchlist for the food insecurity (IPC 3+) in 2021 (54% of population) third year in a row: a consequence of over five years of major armed conflict and severe underfunding that has pushed the 53.2% child stunting due to malnutrition (second world’s largest humanitarian crisis to new lows in 2020 and highest in world) left the humanitarian response on the brink of collapse. 20.5 million people lack access to clean water and The conflict remains intense even after five years since the escalation sanitation of the war in 2015 following the Saudi and Emirati-led Coalition’s intervention to support the Internationally Recognized Government 3.6 million people internally displaced (IRG) against the Ansar Allah movement. Conflict between forces loyal to the IRG and Ansar Allah escalated in Jawf and Marib governorates 50% of health facilities are not fully functional throughout 2020. There is no sign of a political resolution to the crisis despite localized agreements over the past two years. Meanwhile, the 190th (of 195 countries) for capability to prevent and COVID-19 pandemic and a steep drop in humanitarian funding puts the mitigate epidemics country at risk of massive further deterioration.
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Programme Gulf States the Yemen
    Regional Programme Gulf States Policy Report – October 2019 The Yemen War Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations Introduction Fabian Blumberg Recently, there have been important developments in the war in Yemen; a war which has, according to the UN reports, created the worst humanitarian disaster of the 21st century. On the one hand, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) withdrew significant part of its military forces from Yemen declaring the time has arrived for a peace settlement to the conflict. On the other hand, militants of the South took control over Aden from the internationally-backed government amid a fierce armed confrontation between the forces of the two sides leading to a crack in the Arab Coalition that is fighting the Houthis since March 2015. News also has erupted as the Houthis claimed that they managed to attack Saudi Arabia’s largest oil facilities at the 19th of September. Back in March 2019, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) had organized a workshop in Cadenabbia, Italy, to discuss the prospects of peace in Yemen after the Stockholm agreement between the international recognised government and the Houthis. Entitled “Yemen’s War: Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations”, the workshop was attended by experts on Yemen from Europe, Germany, US, and Yemen who provided informed opinions about the conflict in Yemen and on the best way to advance peace among the warring parties. Building on that, KAS has asked experts to write down their analyses on the situation and their recommendations on how to bring about peace in Yemen. They also provide ideas for the contribution German foreign policy could provide.
    [Show full text]
  • Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options
    <. -.. , ,. .. CMC ,, OCCASIONALPAPERS ., ...-. Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options Colonel Mazen Qojas Jordan Army G CENTER .- -..., .,%.. ,. ,.,..< +-”-- ,. %---- “---- ~~ ,,. /“““ ‘-%. ---- “’\ >“’”””’“’ Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation. NOTICE: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors. Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from Office of Scientific and Technical Information PO BOX62 Oak Ridge, TN 37831 Prices available from (61 5) 576-8401, FTS 626-8401 Available to the public from National Technical Information Service US Department of Commerce 5285 Port Royal Rd. Springfield, VA 22161 NTIS price codes Printed Copy: A03 Microfiche Copy: AO1 SAND 98-0505/8 Unlimited Release March 1999 Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options Col.
    [Show full text]
  • From Yemen War to Joint Army? WP Egyptian-Saudi Differences Over Arab Military Cooperation
    Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments From Yemen War to Joint Army? WP Egyptian-Saudi Differences over Arab Military Cooperation Jessica Noll and Stephan Roll S On 25 March 2015 a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states launched air strikes on Yemen to halt the advance of the Houthi movement. A few days later the summit of the Arab League decided to set up a joint Arab army. Nevertheless, the two most important Arab countries support opposing concepts for military cooperation: Egypt proposes institu- tionalised long-term military cooperation to increase its political weight in the region, while Saudi Arabia prefers ad hoc coalitions precisely in order to avoid long-term dependency on other countries, not least Egypt. However, the two events suggest that states in the region are stepping up military cooperation. Germany and the European Union should treat this development with scepticism. Experience shows that such col- laborations tend to exacerbate rather than resolve regional conflicts. At their summit meeting at the Egyptian of the Saudi military operation against the resort of Sharm al-Sheikh on 28 and 29 Houthi movement in Yemen, there is no March 2015, the members of the Arab direct connection between the two events. League agreed to set up joint armed forces. Consequently the Arab League resolution According to the final declaration of the makes no mention of the Yemen conflict. summit, the force should be capable of In fact, the joint army project is an Egyptian rapid intervention to guarantee the national initiative that President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi sovereignty of member states and protect first floated in February 2015 in connection them against territorial threats.
    [Show full text]
  • Egypt & Jordan
    G E O T O U R S EGYPT & JORDAN JANUARY 24 – FEBRUARY 10, 2021 PALAWAN EGYPT & JORDAN = $2890 (16 days/15 nights in Egypt & Jordan) Included – Hotels, breakfasts, 3 lunches, 4 dinners, entries, flight from Cairo to Amman, transportation, guides, Matt and/or Suzan Ebiner as group leader Not Included – Airfare from USA (about $800); meals not listed above, tips to guides and drivers Highlights: Pyramids & Sphinx of Giza, Cairo (Citadel, Khan el Khalili bazaar, Egyptian Museum with King Tut’s treasures), Camel Ride to an old desert monastery, Nubian village and dinner, Luxor (Valley of the Kings and Hatshepsut Temple), Felucca (traditional sailboat) ride on the Nile River from Aswan to Kom Ombo (1 night sleeping on deck on the Nile riverbank); Jordan: Wadi Rum (desert safari and camp, Bedouin culture); Petra (ancient city carved into stone cliffs; one of the greatest archeological sites in the world); Madaba (Byzantine mosaics), Dead Sea (float in the saltiest, lowest body of water on earth), Amman (Jordan’s capital); Jerash (great ancient Roman city) Sun 1/24/21 Depart USA to Egypt Depart the USA for Cairo, Egypt Mon 1/25/21 Arrive Cairo, Egypt Welcome to Egypt! Two nights in Cairo at Pyramisa Suites Hotel (5*) or equivalent. Tue 1/26/21 Cairo Spend a full day in Cairo to enjoy some of Egypt’s highlights. Start at the Pyramids and Sphinx, and marvel at the most famous ancient site on the planet. For extra cost you can ride a camel or go inside the interior of one of the pyramids.
    [Show full text]
  • The Disi Aquifer: a Silenced Conflict Between Jordan and Saudi Arabia
    TheThe securitizationsecuritization ofof thethe DisiDisi Aquifer:Aquifer: aa silentsilent conflictconflict betweenbetween JordanJordan andand SaudiSaudi ArabiaArabia DisiDisi isis ¾ AA sharedshared groundwatergroundwater basinbasin ¾ AA nonnon renewablerenewable aquiferaquifer ¾ AA projectproject withwith aa heavyheavy environmentalenvironmental impactimpact ¾ FarFar fromfrom AmmanAmman andand consequentlyconsequently costlycostly OurOur theoreticaltheoretical toolstools ¾¾ TheThe securitizationsecuritization continuumcontinuum Non- Politicised Securitized Violised politicised ¾¾TheThe SanctionedSanctioned discoursediscourse ¾¾TheThe hydraulichydraulic missionmission conceptconcept ¾¾TheThe conceptconcept ofof “non“non violentviolent conflict”conflict” ¾¾SilenceSilence asas aa methodmethod ofof controlcontrol && powerpower ¾¾PriorPrior useuse conceptconcept WhyWhy DisiDisi?? ¾¾JordanJordan isis oneone ofof thethe countriescountries locatedlocated withinwithin Israel’sIsrael’s hegemonichegemonic areaarea ¾¾AsAs aa consequenceconsequence ofof thisthis ,Jordan,Jordan chosechose thethe optionoption toto embarkembark onon aa conflictconflict withwith SaudiSaudi ArabiaArabia thanthan openingopening aa newnew bargainingbargaining processprocess withwith IsraelIsrael ¾¾DisiDisi isis thereforetherefore anan effecteffect ofof dominancedominance dependingdepending onon thethe IsraeliIsraeli “hydro“hydro--HegemonHegemon status”status” TheThe politicizationpoliticization phasephase ¾ Disi was discovered in 1984 and until the 1990s geological and hydro-chemical
    [Show full text]
  • ASSESSING the IMPACT of WAR on Development in Yemen
    ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF WAR on Development in Yemen Jonathan D. Moyer | David Bohl | Taylor Hanna | Brendan R. Mapes | Mickey Rafa DISCLAIMER This report presents the findings of a commissioned study on the impact of war on development in Yemen, through scenarios using the Sustainable Development Goals lens. The views expressed in this study are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations, including UNDP, or the Member States of the United Nations. Furthermore, the designations employed herein, their completeness and presentation of information are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the United Nations Development Programme. Copyright 2019 By United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 60th Meter Road P.O. Box: 551 Sana’a, Republic of Yemen Website: http://ye.undp.org All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronical, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of UNDP ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The core team for this report comprised Dr. Jonathan D. Moyer, Assistant Professor and Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver; Mr. David Bohl, Senior Research Associate; Ms. Taylor Hanna, Research Fellow; Mr. Brendan Mapes, Research Fellow; and Mr. Mickey Rafa, Assistant Director of Research Operations. From UNDP Yemen Country Office, all discussions were led by Mr. Auke Lootsma, Resident Representative; Ms. Asmaa Shalabi, Strategic Advisor; MS. Leanne Rios, Communication and Advocacy Team Leader; and Mr.
    [Show full text]