Canadian Armour in Normandy: Operation “Totalize” and the Quest for Operational Manoeuvre Roman Johann Jarymowycz
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Wilfrid Laurier University Canadian Military History Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 3 1-20-2012 Canadian Armour in Normandy: Operation “Totalize” and the Quest for Operational Manoeuvre Roman Johann Jarymowycz Recommended Citation Jarymowycz, Roman Johann (1998) "Canadian Armour in Normandy: Operation “Totalize” and the Quest for Operational Manoeuvre," Canadian Military History: Vol. 7: Iss. 2, Article 3. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Jarymowycz: Canadian Armour in Normandy Roman Johann Jarymowycz Introduction "Totalize" - The Plan he Allied record in Normandy is irritating Totalize" was to be the last great offensive Tsimply because we know we could have done in the Normandy Campaign. It was better. The extensive casualty rates to infantry General B.L. Montgomery's final opportunity and armour nearly exhausted American arms to wrest personal victory and publicity from and created a political crisis in Canada. The General Omar Bradley. The presence of the dazzling success of American armour during heavy bombers sealed the contract; it was all "Cobra's" pursuit eclipsed the Canadian or nothing. "Totalize" was First Canadian Army armoured battles of August, despite the fact that commander Harry Crerar's first "Army" battle the vast majority of Allied tank casualties from and he may have been nervous about it. The direct gunfire engagements occurred in II weight could not have been all that heavy since Canadian Corps. The exultation of operation he turned everything over to General G.G. manoeuvre, the closing of the Falaise Gap and Simonds, commander of II Canadian Corps. the liberation of Paris obfuscated the reality of tactical deficiency. It required three bloody "Totalize" was a grand corps battle, as II months and seven major operations to drive the Canadian Corps controlled almost every Germans out of Normandy. This occurred resource available to First Canadian Army. If despite total air supremacy and a strategical there was any pressure, the lion's share fell on numerical advantage. The reasons for tactical Simonds's shoulders. He decided that the frustration are technical, geographical, and Germans were not going to be surprised as to primarily, doctrinal. the location and direction of the offensive, but he was capable of perplexing them "in respect Second Canadian Corps has long been to time and method."1 It has been suggested2 deprived of critical operational analysis. This that ULTRA briefings from the Signals Liaison is perhaps because the technical complexities Unit attached to First Canadian Army HQ of armoured warfare at the tactical and convinced Simonds that 1st SS LAH operational level generally are not well (Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler) Panzer Division was understood. Canadian armour fought tank still south of Verrières and dug in astride the battles throughout Operations "Spring," main Falaise highway on the high ground near "Totalize," and "Tractable," but it did not Cintheaux. Certainly Simonds was unique as the only Allied Corps commander in Normandy maneuver. Canadian armour's greatest 3 opportunity for strategic victory occurred in cleared for ULTRA dissemination but Normandy. It is appropriate that an armoured intelligence interpretation would have been officer review these matters, pick up the thrown stretched to report the Leibstandarte's presence gauntlet and attempt to explain the armoured south of Caen. battlefield as it related to Operation "Totalize." © Canadian Military History, Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 1998, pp. 19-40. 19 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 3 Simonds's own Intelligence Staff concluded walked back to the end of the regimental that 89th Infantry Division had relieved 1st SS column, we were closed so tight that my feet LAH but "estimated that 1 SS Pz had left one never touched the ground, I just stepped from anti-tank battalion deployed on the front."4 An tank to tank."10 initial report admitted that the whereabouts of 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions was not The attack was to advance on compass so clear but subsequent intelligence made things bearing while flails and dozers cleared the clearer: "On 7 August news was received that ground of mines. To ensure direction was large amounts of 1 SS and at least a battlegroup maintained, Simonds had Bofors guns of 12 SS were fighting further West at VASSY deployed on either side of the columns firing and the FORET DE GRIMBOSQ respectively."5 tracers down the axis of advance. Batteries of This suggests that Simonds, rather than being giant anti-aircraft search lights were used for influenced by ULTRA and his own Intelligence both artificial moonlight as well as long resources, chose to ignore most recent distance beams that were fixed over the distant information and stuck to his original objective and served as a surreal guide. The appreciation, written on 1 August wherein he Corps Signals Regiment set up radio homing concluded, mostly based on "Spring" analysis beacons to guide the tank commanders.11 that: "The position [May-sur-Orne to Tilly and south to Hautmesnil] is at present manned by 1 This grand march was supported by attacks SS Right and 9 SS Left."6 Faced with the latest by heavy bombers designed to obliterate the ULTRA updates as well as his own Intelligence towns that eluded capture during "Atlantic" Summaries, Simonds was clearly not prepared and "Spring." "Totalize" was an extraordinary to revise his estimate at this late date. He may offensive, of such Cecil B. DeMille epic have been overtaken by events. proportions that it overwhelmed senior officers in briefings: Neo-Classical Testudos - I well recall his "O" Group before "Totalize" when the several dlv comds sat in a circle under Evolution of the Simonds Doctrine the pine trees (all being much older than GGS and some with desert sand in their ears) to eneral Simonds decided to launch another whom he opened, "Gentlemen we will do this frontal attack.7 As there was little option attack at night with armour." Their jaws G 12 for maneuver before breakout, Simonds settled dropped noticeably. on technique. "Totalize" is often used to show Its sheer scope was so much larger than life Simonds's creative mind at its best. It is that it ensured every participant was a share sometimes used to demonstrate his genius for holder in its success. It was Simonds' planning and his gunner's precision. Simonds masterpiece and it had everything, from flame- crafted a plan of attack unlike any other. Again breathing Crocodiles to electronic warfare. It he decided to go at night. Again he used artificial was clearly bound to fail. moonlight. Now came the changes, and they were doctrinally astounding. Armour was to lead. The There were no doctrinal precedents, unless spearhead of this night attack was not going to one decided that the classic was El Alamein, be infantry but a meat grinder of armoured and the best way to win in Normandy was to columns. He drew up two armoured Testudos launch a Montgomery-style desert attack.13 It before the startline which consisted of an was "Bluecoat's" terrible experience with mines intricate parade of navigation tanks, mine- that appears to have inspired Simonds to plan clearing flail tanks, armoured bulldozers, flame- 8 "Totalize's" armoured crawl. It is not recorded throwing Churchills, and main battle tanks in if any II Corps staff officer suggested to Simonds very cavalry columns of fours. These were that mines readily sown by German infantry, followed by "Simonds' APCs," Priest self- such as in the closed country south of Villers- propelled guns converted to armoured Bocage,14 was a near impossible task in the open personnel carriers (Kangaroos) at the Corps 9 country south of Caen. "Totalize" was too Commander's request. Each armoured group complex, and like "Spring" before it, based on was packed closer than Piccadilly Circus at rush untrained, unrehearsed troops. No one dared hour. One officer recalls, "I left my tank and tell the emperor about his clothes. It is perhaps 20 http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss2/3 2 Jarymowycz: Canadian Armour in Normandy unfair to criticize Simonds. At least he tried. objective, consolidate it during darkness and At least he attempted innovation. But the wait for pick up in the morning.16 simple truth was that he was out of doctrinal ideas. He really did not know what to do with The solution to his problem was found on his infantry or armour. He was trying new the Russian front which used overwhelming combinations, gambling with lives to save lives. artillery on a front wide enough to tear holes that could not be plugged or covered by fire. Whereas tanks were used in small-sized The Russian offensive tore out divisional-sized portions during "Spring" and "Atlantic," this time sections of front, poured in armoured there would be a surfeit of armour - two tank battlegroups and immediately did battle with brigades in Phase 1 and two entire armoured panzer reserves which they overwhelmed. divisions in Phase 2. The forthcoming traffic jam Simonds did not learn from the Russians, should have been predicted by the movement although ironically, a delegation from Stalin 17 planning officers. It probably was. The road visited him on 27-29 July, just as "Totalize" march to the form-up place for Phase 1 was "a was ordered. dusty hell-you couldn't see much."15 Simonds planned to use the cab rank in the air for support .