Foreign Countries: Central Europe (1969)
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Central Europe West Germany FOREIGN POLICY I-,F THERE WAS little progress in foreign affairs to be reported in the first year of the Kiesinger-Brandt administration (AJYB 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 477), there was even less in 1968. This was not mainly attributable to Bonn's attitude or an unwillingness to act. Rather the Federal Republic, like many Western countries, was victim of a stalemate in international politics that was sharpened by the Soviet bloc's intervention in Czechoslovakia on August 21 (p. 401). The feeling of frustration was openly expressed in a letter of Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger to Foreign Minister Willy Brandt on the occasion of the latter's 55th birthday, December 18, 1968: This year, political and military tensions in Europe and all over the globe again have risen. Therefore, it is particularly difficult for you to pursue a foreign policy based on a constant striving for lessening the existing political and ideological conflicts. He added the hope that Brandt's policy directed toward world peace would be successful. A major dispute in the coalition government over the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was not resolved by year's end. Brandt and his Social Democratic party, who were for signing the document, were strongly opposed by Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauss and the majority of the Christian Social Union. Public opinion seemed in favor of signing the treaty, but CSU feared that such a step would hinder Germany's nonmilitary use of atomic energy. While the persistent efforts of the Federal Republic for better relations with East European countries were frustrated by international developments, Bonn's situation was made even more difficult, both by the Soviet bloc's aggressive line toward it, and the reluctant or skeptical support it received from the Western allies. Relations with the United States were certainly most cordial during Konrad Adenauer's chancellorship, when Dwight David 361 362 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1969 Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles determined U.S. policy. The cooling-off during John F. Kennedy's presidency carried over to Lyndon B. Johnson's administration. Relations with Great Britain as well as with France were never too close, though President Charles de Gaulle was probably more strongly impressed by Adenauer than by the succeeding chancellors. Soviet agitation against the allegedly nationalist and revanchist Federal Republic was never as strong as in 1968. And regardless of whether it expressed real conviction or was politically motivated, this campaign was fed by the ultra-nationalist National Democratic party's (NPD) undeniable success in local and diet elections since 1966 (AJYB 1967 [Vol. 68], p. 352; 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 481-2; p. 365). Even if one failed, or hesitated, to con- sider NPD as fascist and neo-Nazi, as the Soviets and the German Demo- cratic Republic (DDR) called it, it caused much concern and discomfort also in the countries of the free world. Therefore, like the question of the extension of that statute of limitations beyond 1969 (AJYB 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 350-51), the problem of this rightist group could no longer be considered merely a domestic one. At various times de Gaulle and Kiesinger exchanged visits whose un- productiveness could hardly be concealed by the official communiques. There was no change in de Gaulle's adamant refusal to revise his opposition to Great Britain's affiliation with the European Economic Community (EEC; Common Market). President Heinrich Liibke, Kiesinger, and Brandt paid visits to various countries. Kiesinger was criticized for his October trip to Portugal and Spain which, except for Greece, were the least democratic states in Europe. He also went to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. In February Brandt traveled to South America, Morocco, and several European countries, to the latter mainly in connection with NATO or Common Market matters. Germany's hope that other Arab states would follow the example of Jordan (AJYB 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 477) and reestablish diplomatic relations with it was not fulfilled in 1968. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS Efforts to improve West Germany's economy, after a short recession late in 1966 and early in 1967 (AJYB 1967 [Vol. 68], p. 354; 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 477-8), were apparently successful, even in isolated West Berlin. West Berlin Mayor Klaus Schiitz told the press on December 20 that the city's economic situation was better than at any time since 1945. In October the unemployed in the Federal Republic and West Berlin numbered 180,200, less than 50 per cent of the comparable 1967 figure. There were 580,000 job vacancies, or 88 per cent more than the year before. The number of foreign workers in West Germany exceeded one million, an increase of at WEST GERMANY / 363 least 10 per cent over 1967. (The number of workers who came to West Berlin from West Germany increased by 20 per cent since 1967.) Imports and exports also showed a marked upswing in the first five months of 1968, rising to DM 32.4 billion ($8.1 billion) from DM 27.8 billion in the comparable period of 1967; exports increased to DM 39.1 billion (almost $10 billion) from DM 35.1 (less than $9 billion) in 1967. Total 1968 exports were estimated at DM 100 billion (DM 87 billion in 1967). When, late in November, a currency crisis shook France, above all, but also Great Britain and, to a lesser degree, the United States, foreign cur- rency valued at a total of $4.5 billion was exchanged for German marks within a period of four weeks. This was convincing proof of the world's confidence in West Germany's economy. When the "Club of Ten" (Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, France, Canada, the United States, and the Federal Republic) assembled in Bonn, November 21, under the chairmanship of Federal Minister of Economics Karl Schiller to save France's currency and economy, and granted it a loan of $2 billion (DM 8 billion), West Germany contributed a larger share (DM 2.4 billion—DM 400 million more than the United States) than any of the other nations represented. The almost miraculous increase of German exports endangered the economies of other Western countries; France, in particular, sought the upward valuation of the mark to relieve pressure on the franc. However, Germany was unwilling to revalue the mark, as it had done in March 1961. It preferred to impose an export tax of four per cent, a measure that tended to help foreign producers and hamper domestic ones. Presidential Nominations The Federal Republic was troubled by a number of political events relating in part to Germany's Nazi past, in part to its delicate relations with its neighbors (East Germany possibly being the most annoying), and in part to its uncertain future. It was announced on October 14 that Federal President Heinrich Liibke would resign on June 30, 1969, slightly before the expiration of his term in September. In recent years, demands for the resignation of the 74-year-old head of state were frequently voiced, since he had become a source of ever increasing discomfort and criticism for political (AJYB 1967 [Vol. 68], p. 351) and other reasons. The way to the nomination of a successor having been cleared, the Social Democrats were first to announce their candidate for the presidency. On November 1 they unanimously nominated Minister of Justice Dr. Gustav Heinemann, 69, an eminent churchman and jurist, who had left his post as minister of the interior in the Adenauer cabinet in protest against the re- armament of West Germany. 364 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1969 CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale Union),* on November 15, nominated for the presidency West German Minister of Defense Gerhard Schroder, who also had held the posts of minister of the interior and of foreign affairs. Kiesinger, apparently distrustful of the allegedly ambitious and conservative Schroder who never was a friend of the present Grand Coalition but favored one between the two major "bourgeois" CDU/CSU and FDP (Free Democratic party), failed in his attempt to secure the nomination for the fairly unknown head of the Ger- man Protestant church, Professor Richard von Weizsacker. Ex-chancellor Ludwig Erhard, the choice of Franz Josef Strauss's CSU, also was defeated. As Bundestag (federal parliament) President Eugen Gerstenmaier an- nounced, December 18, the new president was to be elected by the Bundes- versammlung (federal assembly) in Berlin on March 5, 1969. For a long time, date and place were matters of dispute. There were unverified rumors that one Western power had voiced misgivings about the choice of West Berlin as the location for the ceremony. The decision was promptly char- acterized by Soviet news agency Tass, December 19, as "an escalation of the unrealistic and dangerous actions of the ruling circles of the Federal Republic toward West Berlin." Tass reaffirmed the Soviet view that West Berlin was "an independent political entity," while Bonn and the Western allies regarded it as closely linked to the Federal Republic. The Federal Assembly, a body created for the sole purpose of electing the president, consisted of 1,036 delegates, half of them members of the Bunde- stag and the rest representatives of the Landtage (state diets), who were chosen on the basis of party affiliation. Neither CDU/CSU nor SPD (Social Democratic party), the major opposition party, had an absolute majority in the assembly and therefore both needed the support of the two small parties (FDP with 84 votes and the National Democratic party, NPD, with 22) to elect their candidate. NPD officially stated in December that its delegates would not vote for the SPD candidate.