DOCSLIB.ORG

Plans for the Fourth G20 Summit: Co-Chaired by Canada and Korea in Toronto, June 26-27, 2010 Jenilee Guebert Director of Research, G20 Research Group June 21, 2010

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Plans for the Fourth G20 Summit: Co-Chaired by Canada and Korea in Toronto, June 26-27, 2010 Jenilee Guebert Director of Research, G20 Research Group June 21, 2010 Plans for the Fourth G20 Summit: Co-chaired by Canada and Korea in Toronto, June 26-27, 2010 Jenilee Guebert Director of Research, G20 Research Group June 21, 2010 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 2 7. Appendices 96 Preface 3 List of Meetings 96 1. Background 3 Leaders 96 2. Agenda and Priorities 4 Ministerials 96 Global Imbalances 13 Sherpas 97 Economic Growth 14 Deputies 97 Stimulus and Exit Strategies 17 Workshops 97 Regulation and Supervision 22 Other 98 Debts 32 G20 Leaders’ Experience 98 Accounting 36 List of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Offshore Jurisdictions and Tax Havens 38 Governors, 1999-2009 98 Executive Compensation 43 G20 Sherpas 103 Levies on Banks 47 Members of G20, Gleneagles Dialogue and Major Currencies and Exchange Rates 53 Economies Forum 104 Hedge Funds 61 G20 Leaders’ Biographies 104 Reform of the International Financial Institutions 63 Outreach Participant Countries 109 Trade 65 International Organization Participants 110 Climate Change 68 Statistical Profiles 112 Energy 70 Argentina 112 Employment 71 Australia 113 Development 71 Brazil 115 3. Participants 72 Canada 116 4. Implementation and Preparations 74 China 117 Implementation 74 France 119 Preparatory Meetings 78 Germany 120 Preparations 78 India 121 Other Meetings 85 Indonesia 123 5. Site 87 Italy 124 Next Summit 88 Japan 126 6. Civil Society and Other G20 Related Activities 94 Mexico 127 Republic of Korea 129 Russia 130 Saudi Arabia 131 South Africa 133 Turkey 134 United Kingdom 136 United States 137 European Union 139 Key sources 140 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations AIMA Alternative Investment Management Association APEC Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision BIS Bank for International Settlements BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China CDS credit default swap DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DTA double taxation agreement ECB European Central Bank FSB Financial Stability Board FSF Financial Stability Forum GDP gross domestic product IADB Inter-American Development Bank IASB International Accounting Standards Board IDA International Development Association IEA International Energy Agency IFIs international financial institutions IFRS International Financial Reporting Standard IMFC International Monetary and Finance Committee IMF International Monetary Fund MEF Major Economies Forum MEM Major Economies Meeting NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries UNCTAD United Nations Convention on Trade and Development UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change WTO World Trade Organization Fourth G20 Summit Plans as of June 21/10 2 Preface This report on the “Plans for the Fourth G20 Summit” is compiled by the G20 Research Group largely from public sources as an aid to researchers and other stakeholders interested in the meetings of G20 leaders and their invited guests. It is updated periodically. Note that this document refers to the G20 leaders’ meeting (or summit), which had its first gathering on November 14-15, 2008, in Washington DC (as opposed to the G20 finance ministers forum, which was founded in 1999, and other groupings such as the G20 developing countries formed in response to the agricultural negotiations at the World Trade Organization). Bolded sections indicate new information. 1. Background The Group of Twenty (G20) leaders met for the first time in 2008, initially on November 14 for a working dinner and then on November 15 for a working meeting in Washington’s National Building Museum. The official name of the meeting was the “Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy.” Participants from the G20 systematically significant developing and emerging countries gathered to discuss the global economic and financial crisis affecting the world. The G20’s members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. Spain and the Netherlands also participated in the first meeting as part of the French delegation, under the auspices of the EU. The second summit took place on April 1-2, 2009. The United Kingdom hosted the meeting in London. Spain and the Netherlands again participated and representatives from ASEAN, the Financial Stability Forum, the International Monetary Fund, NEPAD, the United Nations, the World Bank and the WTO were also included. The third G20 meeting took place in Pittsburgh on September 24-25, 2009, with the United States as host. The fourth G20 summit (and the first institutionalized one) will take place in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, on June 26-27, 2010. It will be co-hosted by Canada and the Republic of Korea. The fifth summit is scheduled to take place in Korea in November 2010. In 2011, France will take over as chair. The G20 finance ministers’ and central bank governors’ group first met in 1999. They met for their tenth annual meeting on November 8-9, 2008, in Sao Paulo, Brazil. They have started meeting more frequently since the G20 leaders first met in Washington, including during the leaders’ meetings. They met on April 24, 2009, in Washington on the margins of the annual spring meeting of the IMF and World Bank, on September 4-5 to prepare for the Pittsburgh Summit and again for their annual meeting on November 6- 7, 2009, in St. Andrews, Scotland, which was be hosted by the UK (which held the chair of the G20 for 2009). Under the Gleneagles Dialogue, since 2005 a group of 20 ministers in the fields of Fourth G20 Summit Plans as of June 21/10 3 environment and energy have met, including in Japan in 2008, to discuss issues associated with climate change. On the margins of the G8 Hokkaido Summit in Japan in July 2008, the 16 Major Economies Meeting (MEM-16) was held at the summit level, following official-level meetings of this forum started by the United States in 2007. President Barack Obama co-chaired the second summit-level meeting of the renamed Major Economies Forum (MEF) as part of the G8 L’Aquila Summit in Italy on July 9, 2009. In both cases, membership largely overlaps that of the G20. 2. Agenda and Priorities U.S. president Barack Obama appealed to G20 members not to waver in their efforts to support the economic recovery. “We must act together to strengthen the recovery,” Obama said in a letter to other leaders of the G20. “Our highest priority in Toronto must be to safeguard and strengthen the recovery,” he said. “We worked exceptionally hard to restore growth; we cannot let it falter or lose strength now.” Obama called on the other nations to “reaffirm our unity of purpose to provide the policy support necessary to keep economic growth strong.” The president noted that “significant weaknesses” linger among the major and developing economic powers. He told his summit partners “it is essential that we have a self-sustaining recovery that creates the good jobs that our people need.” Obama said that the June 26-27 summit should also focus on efforts to stabilize public deficits in the “medium term.” Several European nations including Germany, France and Britain are already moving to attack high deficits in an effort to calm global financial markets. Obama said “I am committed to the restoration of fiscal sustainability in the United States and believe that all G-20 countries should put in place credible and growth- friendly plans to restore sustainable public finances … But it is critical that the timing and pace of consolidation in each economy suit the needs of the global economy, the momentum of private sector demand and national circumstances.” The recovery from recession in the United States has been erratic and uneven. Obama also called on his G20 partners to promote “balanced global demand” and said he remained concerned about the “continued heavy reliance on exports by some countries with already large external surpluses.” While not mentioning China by name, that comment was an obvious reference China’s trade surpluses and continued resistance to U.S. demands that allow the renminbi to rise in value against the dollar.1 (June 18, 2010, Associated Press Newswires) At the G20 meeting in Korea on June 4-5, the finance ministers agreed that the economic recovery has been faster than anticipated, “although at an uneven pace across countries and regions.” They agreed that the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth is a key mechanism and they will submit a basket of alternative policy options that have been recommended to their leaders to consider at the June summit. The ministers “committed to reach agreement expeditiously on stronger capital and liquidity standards as the core of [their] reform agenda.” The leaders will receive reports and recommendations from the FSB and IMF to deliberate on when they meet in Toronto in 1 Associated Press Newswires (June 18, 2010), “Obama tells G-20 nations to seal economic recovery.” Fourth G20 Summit Plans as of June 21/10 4 June. The finance ministers “welcomed the agreements for substantial capital increases and institutional reforms at the World Bank, Inter American Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and African Development Bank.” They called for an “acceleration of the substantial work still needed for the IMF to complete the quote reform by the Seoul Summit” and they committed to ensuring that
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Bundesbank Ellen Kennedy
    Key Institutions of German Democracy Number 4 THE BUNDESBANK ELLEN KENNEDY GERMAN ISSUES 19 American Institute for Contemporary German Studies The Johns Hopkins University THE BUNDESBANK ELLEN KENNEDY GERMAN ISSUES 19 The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) is a center for advanced research, study, and discussion on the politics, culture, and society of the Federal Republic of Germany. Established in 1983 and affiliated with The Johns Hopkins University but governed by its own Board of Trustees, AICGS is a privately incorporated institute dedicated to independent, critical, and comprehensive analysis and assessment of current German issues. Its goals are to help develop a new generation of American scholars with a thorough understanding of contemporary Germany, deepen American knowledge and understanding of current German developments, contribute to American policy analysis of problems relating to Germany, and promote interdisciplinary and comparative research on Germany. Executive Director: Jackson Janes Research Director: Carl Lankowski Director of Development: William S. Stokes IV Board of Trustees, Cochair: Steven Muller Board of Trustees, Cochair: Harry J. Gray The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. ©1998 by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies ISBN 0-941441-17-2 ISSN 1041-9810 Additional copies of this AICGS German Issue are available from the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Suite 420, 1400 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-2217. Telephone 202/332-9312, Fax 202/265-9531, E-mail: [email protected], Web: http://www.aicgs.org ii FOREWORD Professor Ellen Kennedy’s short study is the fourth in the Institute’s series on key institutions of German democracy.
    [Show full text]
  • Germany and the Euro: Redefining EMU, Handling Paradox, and Managing Uncertainty and Contingency*
    Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation No. 6/2000 Germany and the Euro: Redefining EMU, Handling Paradox, and Managing Uncertainty and Contingency* Kenneth Dyson Department of European Studies University of Bradford Bradford BD7 1DP, UK [email protected] This paper has two interrelated elements. It provides an examination of the complex discursive structure underpinning and shaping German responses to EMU. It then goes on to investigate the strategic behaviour of German policy makers. This strategic behaviour is informed by the deeper discursive structure. At the same time it is a response to the new paradoxes, uncertainties and contingencies with which EMU faces them. The changes in discursive structure outlined at the beginning are in turn shaped by these contextual changes. What emerges is a picture of complex, interactive changes in which discursive structure, uncertainty and contingency emerge as powerful factors in conditioning German responses to EMU. EMU raises interesting questions about the forces changing German policies and politics and about the role of discourse in mediating those changes. These forces have in substantial part been common to other European states, notably globalization and fundamental technological changes. One force – German unification – has been specific to Germany, and has been associated with a redefinition of Germany as a ‘burdened’ state. The domestic debate about Standort Deutschland predated German unification in 1990 (Dyson 1999). However, by 1993 sharp, harsh ‘de- industrialization’ in the five new federal states, high unemployment consequent on low productivity and rising costs there, and huge fiscal transfers had given a new focus and impetus, and a specific German dimension, to problems of domestic policy reform.
    [Show full text]
  • In the LINE of Fre the Threats to Central Bank Independence Invested in the Future
    Winter 2021 Vol.12 Ed.1 in the LINE of fre The threats to central bank independencE Invested in the future. You don’t thrive for 230 years by standing still. As one of the oldest, continuously operating financial institutions in the world, BNY Mellon has endured and prospered through every economic turn and market move since our founding over 230 years ago. Today, BNY Mellon remains strong and innovative, providing investment management and investment services that help our clients to invest, conduct business and transact in markets all over the world. To learn more, visit bnymellon.com ©2019 The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. AS_0319_3793_print.inddUntitled-2 1 1 29/03/20193/28/19 2:34 09:20 PM Contents Winter 2021 Vol.12 Ed.1 10 4 ABOUT OMFIF 26 WHY RISING PUBLIC DEBT WON’T DRIVE 5 LEADER COUNTRIES INTO DIFFICULTIES Christian Kopf 6 REVIEW WORLDVIEW COVER STORY 28 10 REASONS WHY RENMINBI WILL KEEP 10 IN THE LINE OF FIRE ON RISING David Marsh David Marsh 15 ECB MAIN TASK IS TO FOLLOW 30 DON’T OVERPLAY THE RIGHT POLICIES DOLLAR’S DECLINE IN 2021 Danae Kyriakopoulou Mark Sobel 16 SCEPTICISM OPENS DOOR FOR 31 ERA OF LOW INFLATION CRYPTOCURRENCIES COULD LAST FOR Steve Hanke 50 YEARS Meghnad Desai OUTLOOK 2021 17 32 WHY BROWN SHOULD 18 WHAT NEXT FOR RESERVE MANAGERS? BE THE NEW GREEN Massimiliano Castelli Danae Kyriakopoulou 30 19 DIGITAL DYNAMISM WILL FUEL 33 THE CASE FOR A ASIA’S OUTPERFORMANCE EUROPEAN BANKING CHARTER Taimur Baig Ignazio Angeloni 20 BIDEN MUST ADOPT MULTILATERAL 34 A SURGE IN INFLATION IS ON THE TACTICS FOR CHINA
    [Show full text]
  • Presseinformationen 60 Jahre Deutsche Bundesbank
    Presseinformationen 60 Jahre Deutsche Bundesbank © Deutsche Bundesbank © Image Source/Corbis © Wolfilser – Fotolia © Deutsche Bundesbank Presseinformationen 60 Jahre Deutsche Bundesbank Seite 2 Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Die Aufgaben der Deutschen Bundesbank 2. Daten zum rechtlichen Rahmen der Deutschen Bundesbank von 1948 bis 2016 3. Die Präsidenten der Deutschen Bundesbank 4. Stimmen aus Wissenschaft und Politik 5. Die Deutsche Bundesbank in Zahlen 6. Wussten Sie,… 7. Terminplan der Veranstaltungen im Jubiläumsjahr Presseinformationen 60 Jahre Deutsche Bundesbank Seite 3 Die Aufgaben der Deutschen Bundesbank Presseinformationen 60 Jahre Deutsche Bundesbank Seite 4 Die Deutsche Bundesbank nimmt als unabhängige geld- und währungspolitische Institution sowie als nationale und europäische Aufsichtsinstanz viele Aufgaben rund um das Thema Geld wahr. Gemeinsam mit der Europäischen Zentralbank und den anderen Zentralbanken des Eurosystems trägt sie Verantwortung für die Geldpolitik im Euro-Raum. Der Präsident der Bundesbank wirkt als Mitglied des EZB-Rats an den geldpolitischen Entscheidungen mit. Als Grundlage für die Entschei- dungsfindung erstellt die Bundesbank umfassende Analysen. Die Umsetzung der Geldpolitik ist in Deutschland Aufgabe der Bundesbank. Außerdem erläutert sie der deutschen Öffentlichkeit die Geldpolitik des Eurosystems und bezieht Position dazu. Neben der Beteiligung an der Geldpolitik erfüllt die Bundesbank weitere wichtige Aufgaben auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene. Eine dieser Kernaufgaben ist die Bankenaufsicht. Um
    [Show full text]
  • The Sadness of Karl Otto Pöhl's Legacy
    The Sadness of Karl Otto Pöhl’s Legacy “We now have the ECB française.” ith the largest ever bond-buying pro- gram by the European Central Bank looming, Bundesbankers were in an By Klaus C. Engelen apprehensive mood when they gath- ered on January 13 for a commemora- tive ceremony to mark the passing of the Bundesbank’s former President Karl Otto Pöhl. Pöhl, who for decades served as a member of TIE’s editorial advi- Wsory board, passed away December 9, 2014, at the age of eighty-five. For those present who are or were important to the institution, the huge quantitative easing program, pushed by the ECB’s President Mario Draghi on shaky legal and economic grounds, is feared to be the Bundesbank’s most damaging setback since the start of monetary union. In the long battle to block massive bond purchases from debt- laden eurozone member states, the Bundesbank under its President Jens Weidmann is being forced to take part in the largest money print- ing experiment post-war Europe has experienced. No wonder one of Weidmann’s predecessors, Helmut Schlesinger, confessed in a recent interview that quantitative easing reminds him of “war financing.” Jens Weidmann has often drawn attention to the fact that the ECB’s THE MAGAZINE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY unconventional monetary measures have huge effects in shifting risks 220 I Street, N.E., Suite 200 and burdens towards member countries and their taxpayers, including Washington, D.C. 20002 Germany. For the Bundesbankers, European monetary union means that Phone: 202-861-0791 Fax: 202-861-0790 the fortunes of German savers and taxpayers have been taken hostage www.international-economy.com [email protected] Klaus C.
    [Show full text]
  • Monetary to Fiscal Point of Inflection
    October 2016 The Bulletin Vol. 7 Ed. 9 Monetary to fiscal Point of inflection FOCUS on Frankfurt’s new path Charles Goodhart, Geoffrey Wood on QE risks Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu on African democracy Vicky Pryce on Germany and the G20 Ignazio Visco on the euro policy mix William White on zombie banks and companies Global Public Investor 2016 is the third annual report by OMFIF on public sector asset management and ownership. The increased detail and coverage builds on analysis in the 2015 and 2014 editions. GPI 2016 is focused on two fundamental developments on the world investment scene: the use of a rising number of currencies in world asset management; and the growth of low-carbon investment, part of a general upgrading of the importance of sustainable investment. Selected media coverage GPI 2014 GPI 2015 GPI 2016 The march of the Global state investors shift China’s central bank remains sovereigns into property world’s top public investor The Economist Financial Times China Daily 17 June 20 May 29 June Heimliche Strippenzieher Sovereign funds risk inflating Central banks lead fall in der Finanzwelt global property bubble GPI’s assets in 2015 Die Welt South China Morning Post The Business Times 27 June 21 May 29 June To order your copy visit www.omfif.org/shop #OMFIFGPI2016 Contents - Vol. 7 Ed. 9 October 2016 COVER STORY: Monetary to fiscal October 2016 Frankfurt forges Monthly Review European path 6-7 Briefings – OMFIF meetings, Advisory Board International monetary policy 8 Limits of ‘low-for-long’ interest rates FRANKFURT Stijn Claessens,
    [Show full text]
  • The Bundesbank's Fight to Be Heard
    GERMANY GOLD KEEPER: Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, here outside a safe at the money museum in Frankfurt, says the bank should be a ‘stability anchor’ REUTERS/KAI PFAFFENBACH The once-mighty German central bank is now just one voice among many. Can Jens Weidmann get it to roar again? The Bundesbank’s fight to be heard BY ANDREAS FRAMKE AND PAUL CARREL FRANKFURT, JULY 1, 2013 eeting in Bratislava’s neo-classical Reduta Seated two places to the right of ECB President concert hall on May 2 this year, the 23 men Mario Draghi in the grand, gilded room was Jens M who form the European Central Bank’s poli- Weidmann, chief of Germany’s Bundesbank and, in cymaking Governing Council were divided. his country’s post-war tradition, an inflation-fighting With inflation undershooting their target of close to hardliner. Weidmann resisted the impulse to cut, 2 percent and most of the euro zone in the clutches of worried it would have little impact and use up some recession, the vast majority wanted to cut borrowing costs. of the ECB’s remaining room for manoeuvre. SPECIAL REPORT 1 GERMANYFIGHTING FOR INFLUENCE: Jens Weidmann’S BUNDESBANK A large screen on the wall showed fluc- tuating market prices. Ruthless inflation fighter The quiet German assessed the mood The Bundesbank developed a reputation as an inflation buster. Now the European Central Bank is doing its work around the oval table. A significant group in the room wanted to cut the main interest 1957 1999 rate by half a percentage point. Bundesbank was established Euro was introduced Seeing that a cut was inevitable, he chose 10 % German discount/short-term repo rate to accept it and instead focused on trying to limit its size.
    [Show full text]
  • Absturz Vom Olymp Machtlos, Orientierungslos Und Womöglich Überflüssig: Seit Der Einführung Des Euro Hat Die Bundesbank Nicht Mehr Viel Zu Melden
    FOTOS: ACTION PRESS (li.); ACTION FOTOS: (re.) H. DARCHINGER J. Ernst Welteke (mit Ehefrau), EZB-Präsident Duisenberg (l., 1999) Karl Klasen, Kanzler Brandt (1970) Bundesbankpräsidenten: Der Verlust der Kommandogewalt hat tiefe Spuren in der einst so robusten Psyche der Bundesbanker hinterlassen BUNDESBANK Absturz vom Olymp Machtlos, orientierungslos und womöglich überflüssig: Seit der Einführung des Euro hat die Bundesbank nicht mehr viel zu melden. Die einstmals ebenso gefürchtete wie bewunderte Behörde mit ihren 16000 Mitarbeitern sucht verzweifelt nach neuen Tätigkeitsfeldern. enn es so etwas gibt wie den Mo- Weltekes atemlos hervorgestoßene Ver- derung. Niemals zuvor in der Geschichte ment der Wahrheit, dann kam er wünschung, nie wieder an einem G7-Tref- hätten die Deutschen über ein größeres Wfür Ernst Welteke am Mittag des fen teilzunehmen, rief bei den Umstehen- Reich geherrscht. 22. Januar. Erwartungsfroh und auch ein den nur ein mitleidiges Lächeln hervor. Aber auch innenpolitisch scheuten die bisschen aufgeregt hatte der neue Präsi- Was für eine Demütigung, welch ein Ab- machtbewussten Bundesbanker keine Aus- dent der Deutschen Bundesbank im Sit- sturz. Noch gar nicht so lange ist es her, da einandersetzung, früher oder später leg- zungssaal des Tokioter Mita-House Platz durften sich die Herren aus dem Bundes- ten sie sich mit jeder Bundesregierung an. genommen, an diesem riesigen Verhand- bankhochhaus im Frankfurter Stadtteil „Manche Leute in der Bundesbank maßen lungstisch im Kreis der Finanzminister und Ginnheim als die eigentlichen Regenten sich Rechte an, die nur dem Verfassungs- Notenbankgouverneure der sieben größ- Europas fühlen, als ein Götterrat, dessen gericht in Karlsruhe zukommen“, schimpf- ten Industriestaaten der Welt. Geldpolitik nicht nur die Inflationsraten in te noch Jahre nach seinem Ausscheiden Zum ersten Mal nahm Welteke an einem Deutschland bestimmte, sondern auch Ex-Kanzler Helmut Schmidt.
    [Show full text]