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Scientific Realism, Physicalism, and the Status of Psychology Realism in Mind _____________________ A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Ricardo Restrepo Echavarría _____________________ University of Canterbury 2010 2 For two surrealists, Inés and Marce 3 Acknowledgments Thanks to my supervisors Graham Macdonald and Cynthia Macdonald for the discussion, the blend of wide support, encouragement, and skepticism. The mix of independence and discipline that they encouraged (or is it ―tolerated‖?) was essential. In midst of it all, because of them I got to be in Belfast in time for the event where Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley put the guns downs and sat at the same table. Thanks to my other supervisor Jack Copeland for discussion. Thanks to the Marsden Fund that the Macdonalds were awarded and with which this research was funded. Thanks to Julia Capon for co-juggling the adventure that was our film, which in turn made possible completing this thesis. Thanks to Marce for introducing me to the Land of the Long White Cloud and the University of Canterbury. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introducing What’s to Come ............................................................. 6 1. Scientific Realism in Psychology: Necessary Adaptations ......... 9 1.1 The Metaphysical Thesis: The Mind-Independent Study of What? ............................ 11 1.2 Semantic Realism: Theories, Instruments and Visions .......................................... 34 1.3 The Epistemic Thesis: Computational Cognitive Science .......................................... 60 1.3.1 Is Computational Cognitive Science a Field Born Dead? ................................. 60 1.3.2 The Kind of Argument Searle Employs ............................................................. 61 1.3.3 The Reconstruction .......................................................................................... 64 1.3.4 Reasons Why Intentional Properties of Computers are Good Enough............... 75 1.3.5 Computational Properties are Not Purely Formal ............................................ 84 1.3.6 Multiple Realizations of the Same Objective Property .................................... 106 1.4 Scientific Realism about the Mental ........................................................................ 113 2. Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation .................. 114 2.1 The Usurpation of Mentality as a Cause by the Physical ......................................... 116 2.1.1 Functionalism is Vulnerable to the Causal Exclusion Argument ..................... 119 2.1.2 Anomalous Monism is Vulnerable to the Causal Exclusion Problem .............. 126 2.2 The Argumentative Genesis and the ―Physical Winner‖ .......................................... 132 2.2.1 Unpacking Physicalism .................................................................................. 141 2.2.2 Chomsky’s Challenge to Physicalism and the Inadequacy of Physical Spiritualism ............................................................................................................ 143 2.2.3 A Problem for Micro-Fundamentalism ........................................................... 146 2.2.4 Problems for Papineau’s Proposal ................................................................. 147 2.2.5 Dowell’s Alternative Proposal is Not Quite Right ........................................... 148 2.2.6 A Modest Proposal that Get Us What We Want .............................................. 151 2.2.7 The Mental Comes Back to Power .................................................................. 155 2.3 Kim on Non-Basic Causation .................................................................................. 162 2.3.1 Supervenience and Dependence ..................................................................... 162 2.3.2 A Fundamental Tension.................................................................................. 166 2.3.3 Epiphenomenal Causation as Real and as Hoax: Through the History ........... 169 2.3.4 Kim‘s Views on Real, Epiphenomenal, and Reduction: Through the History .. 173 2.3.3 The Tension Between Real, Epiphenomenal, and Reduction ........................... 187 2.4 Non-Reductivist Solutions to the Problem of Causal Exclusion ............................... 189 2.4.1 Generating the Problem of Causal Exclusion Again ....................................... 190 2.4.2 Non-Reductive Monism .................................................................................. 199 2.4.3 Does Trope Theory Compete? ........................................................................ 207 2.4.4 The Constitution View .................................................................................... 217 2.5 Obstacles for the Proposed Solutions ...................................................................... 234 2.5.1 Properties of Events Make Causal Contributions- But Surely Not All of Them 235 2.5.2 Too Many Causally Relevant Properties......................................................... 238 5 2.5.3 The Identity Solution Does Not Allow for the Existence of the Relation of Non- Identical Constitution.............................................................................................. 244 2.5.4 The Constitution Solution Does Not Allow for the Existence of Contingent Identities ................................................................................................................. 245 2.5.5 Primary Properties in the Metaphysics of Constitution Are Uninformative ..... 252 2.5.6 The Debate between Contingent Identity and Constitution .............................. 253 2.6 A Dissolution of the Problem of Mental Causation ................................................. 259 2.6.1 Supervenient Causation for the Dependency Version ...................................... 260 2.6.2 Supervenient Causation for the Autonomy Version ......................................... 264 2.6.3 Some Corollaries and Edwards’ Dictum......................................................... 265 2.6.4 A Dissolution of the Dependency Version ....................................................... 267 2.6.5 A Dissolution of the Autonomy Version .......................................................... 270 2.6.6 The End of the Problem? ................................................................................ 272 The Road Taken ............................................................................ 273 References ..................................................................................... 278 6 Introducing What’s to Come This book is divided into two main sections. Each section exposes a prominent threat to Mental Realism and provides arguments to defeat it. Mental Realism is the doctrine that ―mental properties are real properties of objects and events; they are not merely useful aids in making predictions or fictitious manners of speech‖ (Kim 1993a, 344). To be a Mental Realist ―your mental properties must be causal properties- properties in virtue of which an event enters into causal relations it would not have otherwise have entered into‖ (Kim 1989b, 279). More broadly, let us say that Mental Realism is the doctrine that mental properties, objects, and events are a part of the causal structure of the world, and that they enter into causal relations as mental. The addition of ―as mental‖ seems to be trivial. Could mental properties contribute to causal processes other than as mental properties? Could mental events or mental objects enter into causal transactions as other than what they are- mental? However, because some argue that mental properties are reductively identical to physical properties actually doing all the causal work, the view that mental properties have an active place in the production of behaviour is deflated to be the view that mental properties have an active place in the production of behaviour, not insofar as they are mental, but only insofar as they are non-mental. However, when we explain behavior we seem to be talking about certain mental events going on in the world, where agents have certain mental properties, in virtue of which their behavior comes about. The recognition that this is so, even in the last analysis, is the view that mental properties are irreducibly mental and causal. 7 A presupposition of Mental Realism is that the core assumption of mentalistic explanation, that mental properties are exemplified by agents in events (at times; or by events at times), is not undermined by our further assumptions as Scientific Realists and physicalists. Stathis Psillos has defended and stated Scientific Realism in terms that (perhaps inadvertently) negate the reality of mind. Thus, Scientific Realism becomes a threat to Mental Realism. As formulated by Psillos, Scientific Realism undermines the essential role for minds in the construction of theories, the bearers of scientific truth-value itself, for example. It also undermines the idea that psychology is a scientific field whose subject matter is the mental. The first section will take note of the implausibly big cost of holding on to such a statement of Scientific Realism and propose corresponding adaptations to the theory. This section will conclude with an extended defense of computational cognitive science from an argument that has received little attention but is immanent in John Searle‘s work and directly relates the realist philosophy of science with the philosophy of mind. Jaegwon Kim has generated a problem for mental realists who believe that all mental properties are
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