Criminal and Moral Responsibility Issues in the Chinese Massacres Trial Singapore, 1947

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Criminal and Moral Responsibility Issues in the Chinese Massacres Trial Singapore, 1947 Justice Done? Criminal and Moral Responsibility Issues In the Chinese Massacres Trial Singapore, 1947 Genocide Studies Program Working Paper No. 18, 2001 By Wai Keng Kwok Branford College Advisor: Professor Benedict Kiernan Yale University April 11, 2001 Introduction simultaneously in order to understand the The Japanese Occupation of chain of events leading to the decision for Singapore from February 1942 to August sook ching and subsequently, to determine 1945 was a particularly momentous period of responsibility for the affair. loss and sacrifice for the Chinese population The investigation into the affair as compared to other ethnicities, because they revealed a massacre of mostly Chinese were the targets of brutal Japanese military civilians numbering in the thousands. policies. During a month of screening Through a supposedly systematic screening procedures and indiscriminate massacres in process whose official goal was to weed out 1942 known as sook ching, or cleansing anti-Japanese elements, the Japanese army operations, an undetermined number of killed at least five thousand people between civilians were separated from their families February and March 1942. In reality, the and friends and suffered uncertain fates. In selection process was unselective and random many cases, the last time relatives saw loved which led to deaths of innocent Chinese ones was at a screening center before the civilians. Procedures differed at each center. unlucky victims were driven away in trucks to At certain locations, the men waited for unknown destinations. After the war, when it several days before the screenings started. became clear that the Japanese Army had Screenings could consist of interviews by a committed atrocities in Singapore, a British Japanese officer and a local interpreter or they crown colony at the time, the British legal could include as little as walking in single file system conducted an investigation and a trial past the officers. Many families reported in order to administer justice in 1947. male members taken away by trucks to Although the court considered the case undisclosed locations. Contemporary closed, the matter was never fully settled in eyewitness accounts later confirmed the the eyes of the public and a question remained rumors that soldiers had massacred groups of as to whether justice had been adequately men but little physical evidence was rendered. discovered until the 1960s. The Singapore massacres are not as The killing of civilians in wartime familiar to Western scholars as the Nanking equaled a war crime. After the Japanese and Manila Massacres although all three surrender, the British established procedures involved civilian populations. The thousands for war crimes trials both in the European as killed in Singapore are by no means well as in the Pacific theatre. The British insignificant and should rightfully claim their arrested seven Japanese officers and charged space among the Japanese war atrocities them with: “Committing a war crime in that at committed during WWII. The investigation Singapore Island between the 18th February into this event also adds to the body of and 3rd March 1942, the accused … being all knowledge on Japanese military responsible for the lives and safety of civilian administration in Southeast Asia. This thesis inhabitants were, in violation of the laws and draws upon archival material at the Singapore usages of war, together concerned in the National Archives and the Public Records massacre of Chinese residents of Singapore Office (PRO) in Kew, London for eyewitness Island…,” thereby following the precedent set testimonies of the atrocities and the transcript at Nuremberg and Tokyo.1 of the Chinese Massacres trial respectively. Although a few other historians and scholars 1 Public Record Office, Kew, London [PRO]: War have referred to both collections, this paper is Office [WO] 235/1004, Judge Advocate General's the first attempt to draw on both Office, War Crimes Case Files, Second World War. 10 1 Although the trial put seven Japanese claimed that the screenings were used to military personnel to the task of defending maintain domestic security during the their actions during the massacres, the court Occupation by eradicating only anti-Japanese identified and dismissed two other guilty influence. Another essential point was that parties. They were the Emperor Hirohito and the officers allowed the soldiers in their General Yamashita of the Twenty-Fifth command to commit these atrocities with full Army, from whom the orders for the knowledge that the screenings were beyond screenings originated. This paper explores the specific scope of the original orders. both the emperor’s and the general’s guilt in The prosecution’s argument was a order to create a more complex picture of compelling one and the court sentenced two accountability for the massacres. officers to death and the remaining five to life Hirohito’s general war guilt in WWII imprisonment. Nonetheless, public opinion was and remains a topic of interest for both split on this affair. Portions of the surviving scholars and public opinion internationally. Chinese population remained unsatisfied and However, this thesis will focus on the called for further retribution by demanding arguments for his innocence as presented in further investigations and trials of more the Chinese Massacres trial. In brief, neither officers. A more moderate stance, on the other the prosecution nor the defense wanted to hand, called for leniency by attributing indict him for reasons because to do so would responsibility to the entire Japanese military involve issues such as legal and historical ideology, thus removing accountability from precedent and divine sanctity. individuals. General Yamashita was a different This paper presents the arguments for story. He had already been executed for and against the culpability of each of the three crimes committed in the Philippines. The parties, namely Emperor Hirohito, General defense was therefore eager to place all Yamashita and the seven defendants on trial responsibility on him by using the plea of in 1947 for the Chinese massacres. It is not superior orders, in essence arguing that the meant as a definitive judgment on who court should sentence only the superior who ultimately was responsible, for the very nature had issued the original orders. Subordinate of the crime creates an immense number of officers, the defense argued, had no choice potential culprits. Rather, it is an attempt to but to follow orders and therefore should not go beyond the purely descriptive function of be held responsible. The prosecution the archival material to analyze the legal countered with tenets of international law arguments within the trial that survivor relating to command responsibility, stating accounts corroborate. The thesis will argue that all officers were responsible for their that the trial, though successfully prosecuting actions and for those of their subordinates. and convicting the defendants, was In this way, the prosecution placed the unsuccessful in convincing the public that blame squarely on the defendants. It argued justice had been done, which leads to a larger that the orders the defendants implemented question; can legal proceedings for cases of ran counter to both international and Japanese mass atrocity ever create that sense of justice law. In addition, the screenings were and closure. premeditated and thus nullified the defense’s An interesting aspect of the trial is that plea of immediate military necessity that it did not provide a solid sense of punishment and therefore justice to the Chinese March 1947 to 8 May 1952, Transcript of ‘Chinese population in Singapore. Scholars have Massacres Trial’ and related documents, 12. argued that war crimes trials begin a long 2 process of peace and reconciliation with the enemy was a severe blow to the Allies. past. If nothing is done to condemn war Yamashita made a statement in the Syonan crimes, not only will a culture of impunity Times newspaper that declared Singapore, arise that may encourage future crimes, but now renamed Syonan-to, part of the East Asia cycles of deep resentment in the victimized Co-Prosperity Sphere as well. There was also population may lead to further conflict.2 an alarming premonition of things to come: Trials reject the notion of collective guilt by Nippon armies hereby wish Malayan publicizing individual guilty defendants and people to understand the real intention attempt to convey a notion of justice served.3 of Nippon and to cooperate with The Chinese Massacres trial, however, while Nippon army toward the prompt demonstrating guilt of individual officers, did establishment of the New Order and not satisfy the Chinese population who the Co-prosperity Sphere. Nippon continued to demand retribution well into the army will drastically expel and 1960s and in decreasing recurrence until the punish [emphasis added] those who 1990s. However, the demands shifted from still pursue bended delusions as those of criminal indictment to ones of heretofore, those who indulge monetary compensation and official themselves in private interests and apology—from individual to collective wants, those who act against humanity responsibility. In effect, justice may have or disturb the public order and peace been served within the courtroom, but it was and those who are against the orders seen not to have been done, thus rendering the and disturb the military action of case still open in the minds of the public.
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