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Master of Arts in Security Studies by Ryan Tepperman, B.A. Washington, DC March 15, 2010

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Master of Arts in Security Studies by Ryan Tepperman, B.A. Washington, DC March 15, 2010 ECHOES OF THE PAST : COMPARING SOVIET AND US COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE & STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts In Security Studies By Ryan Tepperman, B.A. Washington, DC March 15, 2010 Copyright 2010 by Ryan Tepperman All Rights Reserved ii ECHOES OF THE PAST : COMPARING SOVIET AND US COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE & STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN Ryan Tepperman, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Professor Natalie Goldring ABSTRACT For more than nine years the Soviet Union engaged a determined opponent in a counterinsurgency (COIN) conflict in Afghanistan. The United States is presently facing what appears to be an equally determined foe in that same country, and has now been waging a counterinsurgency campaign for nearly as long as the USSR’s. This paper seeks to compare current US counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine in Afghanistan with Soviet counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine, examining whether the US is repeating errors made by the Soviet Union made in prosecuting its war. This paper also attempts to discern lessons learned from the Soviet conflict that may be applicable to the current US counterinsurgency effort. In comparing Soviet and US doctrine and strategy, this paper employs primary source material from both countries. These materials are supplemented by several case studies comparing the leaders of the Afghan government under the DRA and the present US- backed Karzai Administration. This paper concludes that there are no major similarities between Soviet doctrine and US COIN doctrine. It does identify some similarities between US and Soviet strategy, particularly with regard to the protection of urban areas. These similarities, however, do not necessarily portend the failure of the US effort. The paper further suggests that the strongest similarity between the two conflicts is the lack of participation by the Afghan government in COIN efforts—both militarily and politically. The paper concludes by offering a series of lessons learned and associated policy recommendations. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Hypothesis & Methodology 1 Part 1: Comparing Soviet and US Situations Chapter 1: Country Background 4 Chapter 2: Comparing Operating Environments 12 Part 2: Comparing Soviet & US Formal Doctrine and Evidenced Strategies Chapter 3: Comparing Soviet and US COIN Doctrine 26 Chapter 4: Comparing Soviet and US COIN Strategy 36 Chapter 5: Lessons Learned & Recommendations 53 Appendix Appendix A: Case Studies of Influential Afghan Leaders 55 Bibliography 74 iv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1: Ethno-linguistic Groups of Afghanistan 6 Figure 2: Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan 10 Figure 3: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Territory Controlled 51 Figure 4: Ideal Result of ISAF Strategy 51 v INTRODUCTION Since the terrorist attacks of September 11 th and the subsequent US-led invasion which toppled the Taliban regime from power, the United States and the international community have struggled to stabilize Afghanistan. Successes, when they have occurred, have often come at a high cost. As of the publication date of this paper, the US death toll from the conflict in Afghanistan has reached 1,000. 1 This paper examines the last counterinsurgency effort which occurred prior to the US invasion — the Soviet-Afghan War. Specifically, this paper seeks to determine whether the US counterinsurgency (“COIN”) efforts (both military and political in nature) in Afghanistan have significant similarities to the Soviet COIN effort in that country. By doing so, it attempts to establish whether US-led efforts are repeating past Soviet-era errors, and also notes significant similarities between the two situations. This paper concludes with a summary of potential lessons to be learned by Coalition * forces operating in Afghanistan based on an evaluation of Soviet COIN operations. Hypothesis & Methodology This paper has two stated hypotheses, which are placed in the context of Afghanistan’s history, experience with insurgencies, and governance structures. Hypothesis #1 is that there are significant similarities between the current US COIN doctrine in Afghanistan 1 “U.S. Military Deaths in Afghanistan Near 1,000,” Washington Post (February 24, 2010), http ://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2010/02/24/GR2010022400364.html. * Note: Coalition, US, and ISAF are used interchangeably throughout this paper to refer to US and allied actions to combat the insurgency. US and ISAF forces typically follow similar concepts of operations and strategy, and are led by General Stanley McChrystal, who is both Commander of US Forces—Afghanistan and the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force. 1 and the Soviet COIN doctrine in Afghanistan. Hypothesis #2 is that there are significant similarities between the current US strategy in Afghanistan and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. Hypothesis #1 : There are significant similarities between the US COIN doctrine followed in Afghanistan, and the Soviet COIN doctrine followed in Afghanistan. The term “doctrine” is defined by the Department of Defense as, “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. 2” This hypothesis will be tested through a direct comparison of the basic concepts recommended by Soviet doctrine, and the practices US COIN doctrine has explicitly deemed “successful” and “unsuccessful.” Hypothesis #2 : There are significant similarities between the current US COIN strategy being implemented in Afghanistan and the Soviet COIN strategy in Afghanistan. The term “strategy” here is defined as the plan of action by which objectives will be met. Given a shared set of common objectives—gaining the support of the population; creating effective local control while integrating former insurgents into society; creating effective security forces; creating an effective government; and the overall focus of the COIN military effort. These objectives are common to most counterinsurgency efforts, and are more importantly common to both the Soviet-Afghan War and the current US-led war. 2 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms , Amended October 31, 2009, p. 168-169. 2 Judgments : The following terms will be applied to indicate the degree to which the hypothesis is supported by the evidence: Valid, Partially Supported, or Not Support. “Valid” indicates the hypothesis is supported by the evidence; “Partially Supported” means a significant portion of the hypothesis is supported by the evidence; “Not Supported” indicates the hypothesis not supported by the evidence. 3 PART I—COMPARING SOVIET AND US SITUATIONS Chapter 1: Country Background Situated at the crossroads of Central Asia, Afghanistan is, in the words of one longtime observer of the country, “Easy to pass through…impossible to conquer. Several of the world’s largest mountain ranges and deserts make life difficult for the resident population and invaders alike. 3”Afghanistan’s topography is dominated by mountains, rugged terrain, and deserts. However, these mountains have also created many valleys, where most of the arable soil in the country can be found and from which farmers can produce enough food to permit subsistence farming – or pastoralism in those regions where even subsistence farming cannot be sustained. A number of rivers also wind through the deserts of the west and the south, creating what are known as “green zones,” lush areas that are agriculturally productive. Both arable land and water are highly prized resources throughout the country, with much of the population unable to gain more than a subsistence living from either farming or pastoralism. These activities were and continue to be the major economic activities in Afghanistan. Even though only 12% of the land is arable, in 1978 (the date of the last census), the rural economy employed approximately 85% of the population. 4 Today, it is estimated to employ 80%. 5 The terrain works to segment society into small groups, known as qawms, which are scattered throughout the country. Each qawm has its own 3 Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos , (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2009), p.6. 4 Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan , 2 nd ed. (London: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 32. 5 CIA World Factbook, “Afghanistan,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/af.html . Accessed February 24, 2010. 4 separate identity and long history. The result has been a population with both a strong sense of local identity and a high resistance to governance by a centralized authority. At the same time, the existence of a weak state for most of the Afghan state’s 225 years of existence (maintained primarily by tribal chieftains respecting the legitimacy of the Monarch of the country) has prevented many from gaining an education. By the time of the Soviet invasion, only 20% of the population was literate by some estimates and most of the literate were concentrated in the cities. 6 Thirty years later, the literacy rate figure is now estimated at 28%. 7 Finally, ethnic and tribal divides have remained pronounced throughout the country, both during the 1980s and the present time. During the Soviet-Afghan war, all ethnic groups were fully engaged in the war against the Soviets. Today,
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