DOCSLIB.ORG

Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts Duke Law Journal VOLUME 1989 DECEMBER NUMBER 6 "TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE": POLITICS, THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, AND THE INVENTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS WYTHE HOLT* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Why Do We Have the National Judiciary We Have? . 1422 A. Unnoticed National JudiciaryPuzzles .................. 1422 * University Research Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A., 1963, Amherst College; J.D., 1966, Ph.D., 1979, University of Virginia. This essay is copyrighted by the author, who reserves all rights thereto. The author is grateful to Dean Nathaniel Hansford and the University of Alabama School of Law for their generous support of several years of research that forms the basis of this essay, and for a sabbatical leave that also in part supported the research for this essay. The author is most grateful to Charlene Bickford, Kenneth Bowling, Helen Veit, and their colleagues at the Documentary His- tory of the First Congress project at George Washington University, who graciously made available their magnificent collection of materials and have been kind enough to advise, assist, and cheer the author on many occasions. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Jim Buchanan, Christine Jordan, Maeva Marcus, Jim Perry, Steven Tull, and their associates at the Documentary History of the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1800 project, for generously giving time, advice, and expertise, and allowing the author to supplement his research for this essay with their fine collection. William Casto, Eugene Genovese, L.H. La Rue, and Sandra Van Burkleo commented generously, helpfully, and often persuasively upon earlier drafts. Finally, the author gratefully ac- knowledges the expert aid, pleasantness, and unfailing good cheer extended to the author by the many librarians and research aides at the numerous repositories cited in this essay. None of these people or projects, of course, bears any responsibility for the opinions and conclusions of the author, or for any errors that may appear. This essay is dedicated to my female colleagues who have demonstrated time and again that in our macho culture, it is often more friendly and pleasant, efficient, and satisfying to work with and to rely upon women than men. One is rarely beset with the competitiveness, the status-jockeying, the impersonality, and the dishonesty that one often finds in so-called professional relationships with men. I would never have been able to finish this work had I been forced to rely solely upon the collegiality of males. Although I know the list is incomplete, I have particularly cherished the help, criticism, and support given me by Marie Ashe, Charlene Bickford, Sandra Van Burkleo, Vivien Clair, Claudia Johnson, Christine Jordan, Martha Morgan, Jennifer Nedelsky, Kathryn Preyer, and Mary K. Tachau. 1421 1422 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1989:1421 B. A Solution to PoliticalProblems ....................... 1424 II. The Socioeconomic Background of the Judiciary ........... 1427 A. Local Bias and Admiralty ............................ 1427 B. British Credit Produces "British Debts" ................ 1430 1. Debt Accrues Before the Revolution: Virginia ...... 1430 2. The Revolution Produces "Legal Impediments"..... 1435 3. The Peace Treaty Condemns "Legal Impediments". 1439 4. Peace Increases "Legal Impediments".............. 1440 5. The Depression of the 1780s ....................... 1445 6. Non-Slave States Repeal "Legal Impediments" ..... 1449 C. The Domestic Debt Crisis and Democracy .............. 1452 D. Federal Courts as the Response to State Bias ........... 1452 III. Federal Courts Are Invented: The Constitution ............ 1458 A. A Pro-CreditorConstitutional Convention .............. 1458 B. The Ratification Process Displays Pro-DebtorStrength .. 1466 IV. Federal Courts Are Invented: The Judiciary Act of 1789... 1477 A. The Stage and the Players ............................ 1477 B. The Great Compromise of 1789: Ellsworth's Plan ...... 1484 C. Alternatives: The Virginia Plan and Nisi Prius ........ 1489 D. Adjustment: More Restrictions, Some Expansiveness ... 1493 E. Expansiveness in Sections 13 and 14 ................... 1507 F. The Judiciary and the Bill of Rights ................... 1513 G. House Debate, Passage and Reactions to the Judiciary A ct .................................................. 1515 V. The Virtues of Historicism ................................ 1517 Appendix 1: A Partial Note on Sources ......................... 1522 A. Primary Sources ..................................... 1522 B. Secondary Treatments of the Judiciary Act of 1789 .... 1522 Appendix 2: An Introduction to Class .......................... 1525 Appendix 3: Two Important 1789 Letters ....................... 1529 I. WHY Do WE HAVE THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY WE HAVE? A. Unnoticed NationalJudiciary Puzzles If one pauses for a moment of thoughtful critique, the origins of our national court system and its jurisdiction seem to be a great puzzle with many unanswered questions, indeed an enigma. Why did the national government need its own separate system of courts, when in the 1780s The original spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and grammar of letters or documents have been reproduced in the quotes therefrom used in this essay to the extent possible. Sometimes it has proved impossible to reproduce precisely the various diacritical marks, punctuation, and abbrevia- tion practices then in common usage. Vol. 1989:1421] INVENTION OF FEDERAL COURTS 1423 there were thirteen completely unctioning state court systems? The Arti- cles of Confederation-the first Constitution of the United States-pro- vided for no national courts. What was so deficient about the state courts that the Framers felt a need to list the establishment of justice as the second item in the preamble to the new Constitution? The goal was not to augment justice or to perfect justice, but rather "to establish jus- tice"-as though justice could not be found in the state courts. Why are the provisions for that court system in article III of the new fundamental law embodied in the Constitution so maddeningly terse, vague, and open- ended? Why do they include the puzzling category of jurisdiction over suits involving citizens or subjects of foreign nations (hereinafter called "alienage jurisdiction")? Why did the opponents of the Constitution level their heavy guns at this vague new judiciary, claiming that it would be the very engine of the subversion of the states and of the kind of de- mocracy the Revolution had been fought to obtain? Why did the Judici- ary Act of 1789 establish such a highly-articulated, three-tiered, hierarchical judicial system, while perversely placing alienage jurisdic- tion and suits involving citizens of two or more states ("diversity jurisdic- tion") within federal trial jurisdiction but leaving cases arising under the Constitution, treaties or federal laws ("federal question jurisdiction") to those supposedly untrustworthy state courts? And why were the oppo- nents of the Constitution much more pleased with the Judiciary Act of 1789-hailed in later years as one of the more remarkable and enduring achievements of the First Congress-than were the supporters of the Constitution, who overwhelmingly populated that First Congress? Strangely enough, most historians have not noticed these questions.' Despite two centuries of almost constant and often harsh struggle over the power and place of our national courts-centuries during which other questions about such courts have been endlessly debated-it has seemed axiomatic to these historians that the nature and function of courts are timeless and thus courts are all alike, that all governments must have court systems, that our national court system was and is merely a clone of other court systems, and that the Judiciary Act of 1789 followed in a more or less logical and expected way from these premises. 1. There are exceptions. John Frank in 1948 posed some extremely good questions for further inquiry: If it had not been for the necessity of settling international admiralty disputes, would either the Convention or the Congress of 1789 have created a federal lower court system?... Why-a mystery truly dark-why did the Congress of 1789 provide that appellate jurisdic- tion should be sufficient in federal question cases while there should be trial court jurisdic- tion in diversity cases? Why diversity at all? ... [T]here is sufficient mystery left in the origins of the federal judiciary to keep a good many researchers busy for a long time. Frank, HistoricalBases of the Federal JudicialSystem, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 28 (1948). This essay seeks to answer all three questions. 1424 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1989:1421 Apparently unaware that they were looking with narrow and highly politicized hindsight, these whiggish historians2 have confidently div- orced law from politics in order to lavish praise upon "the growth of" a supposedly neutral, apolitical, legalistic federal judiciary, and a judicial system that supposedly has developed progressively into just the court structure that our nation needs. 3 As a result, there has never been a good critical history of the federal courts. Such a history would tell the chronology of the origin of the federal courts within a socioeconomic context. This essay is an attempt to begin that history. The results turn out to be surprising and instructive. B. A Solution to Political Problems A major puzzle at the very beginning is the astonishing lack of com- ment upon the need for a national court system
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Popular Sovereignty, Slavery in the Territories, and the South, 1785-1860
    Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2010 Popular sovereignty, slavery in the territories, and the South, 1785-1860 Robert Christopher Childers Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Childers, Robert Christopher, "Popular sovereignty, slavery in the territories, and the South, 1785-1860" (2010). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 1135. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/1135 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES, AND THE SOUTH, 1785-1860 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History by Robert Christopher Childers B.S., B.S.E., Emporia State University, 2002 M.A., Emporia State University, 2004 May 2010 For my wife ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Writing history might seem a solitary task, but in truth it is a collaborative effort. Throughout my experience working on this project, I have engaged with fellow scholars whose help has made my work possible. Numerous archivists aided me in the search for sources. Working in the Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill gave me access to the letters and writings of southern leaders and common people alike.
    [Show full text]
  • Justice William Cushing and the Treaty-Making Power
    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 10 Issue 2 Issue 2 - February 1957 Article 9 2-1957 Justice William Cushing and the Treaty-Making Power F. William O'Brien S.J. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation F. William O'Brien S.J., Justice William Cushing and the Treaty-Making Power, 10 Vanderbilt Law Review 351 (1957) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol10/iss2/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. JUSTICE WILLIAM CUSHING AND THE TREATY-MAKING POWER F. WILLIAM O'BRIEN, S.J.* Washington's First Appointees Although the work of the Supreme Court during the first few years was not great if measured in the number of cases handled, it would be a mistake to conclude that the six men who sat on the Bench during this formative period made no significant contribution to the develop- ment of American constitutional law. The Justices had few if any precedents to use as guides, and therefore their judicial work, limited though it was in volume, must be considered as stamped with the significance which attaches to all pioneer activity. Moreover, most of this work was done while on circuit duty in the different districts, and therefore from Vermont to Georgia the Supreme Court Justices were emissaries of good will for the new Constitution and the recently established general government.
    [Show full text]
  • 1835. EXECUTIVE. *L POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT
    1835. EXECUTIVE. *l POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT. Persons employed in the General Post Office, with the annual compensation of each. Where Compen­ Names. Offices. Born. sation. Dol. cts. Amos Kendall..., Postmaster General.... Mass. 6000 00 Charles K. Gardner Ass't P. M. Gen. 1st Div. N. Jersey250 0 00 SelahR. Hobbie.. Ass't P. M. Gen. 2d Div. N. York. 2500 00 P. S. Loughborough Chief Clerk Kentucky 1700 00 Robert Johnson. ., Accountant, 3d Division Penn 1400 00 CLERKS. Thomas B. Dyer... Principal Book Keeper Maryland 1400 00 Joseph W. Hand... Solicitor Conn 1400 00 John Suter Principal Pay Clerk. Maryland 1400 00 John McLeod Register's Office Scotland. 1200 00 William G. Eliot.. .Chie f Examiner Mass 1200 00 Michael T. Simpson Sup't Dead Letter OfficePen n 1200 00 David Saunders Chief Register Virginia.. 1200 00 Arthur Nelson Principal Clerk, N. Div.Marylan d 1200 00 Richard Dement Second Book Keeper.. do.. 1200 00 Josiah F.Caldwell.. Register's Office N. Jersey 1200 00 George L. Douglass Principal Clerk, S. Div.Kentucky -1200 00 Nicholas Tastet Bank Accountant Spain. 1200 00 Thomas Arbuckle.. Register's Office Ireland 1100 00 Samuel Fitzhugh.., do Maryland 1000 00 Wm. C,Lipscomb. do : for) Virginia. 1000 00 Thos. B. Addison. f Record Clerk con-> Maryland 1000 00 < routes and v....) Matthias Ross f. tracts, N. Div, N. Jersey1000 00 David Koones Dead Letter Office Maryland 1000 00 Presley Simpson... Examiner's Office Virginia- 1000 00 Grafton D. Hanson. Solicitor's Office.. Maryland 1000 00 Walter D. Addison. Recorder, Div. of Acc'ts do..
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Politics in Districting the Federal Circuit System
    PUSHING BOUNDARIES: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN DISTRICTING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SYSTEM Philip S. Bonforte† I. Introduction ........................................................................... 30 II. Background ............................................................................ 31 A. Judiciary Act of 1789 ......................................................... 31 B. The Midnight Judges Act ................................................... 33 C. Judiciary Act of 1802 ......................................................... 34 D. Judiciary Act of 1807 ....................................................... 344 E. Judiciary Act of 1837 ....................................................... 355 F. Tenth Circuit Act ................................................................ 37 G. Judicial Circuits Act ........................................................... 39 H. Tenth Circuit Act of 1929 .................................................. 40 I. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980 ...................................................... 42 J. The Ninth Circuit Dilemma ................................................ 44 III. The Role of Politics in Circuit Districting ............................. 47 A. The Presence of Politics ..................................................... 48 B. Political Correctness .......................................................... 50 IV. Conclusion ............................................................................. 52 † The author is a judicial clerk
    [Show full text]
  • John Adams, Political Moderation, and the 1820 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention: a Reappraisal.”
    The Historical Journal of Massachusetts “John Adams, Political Moderation, and the 1820 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention: A Reappraisal.” Author: Arthur Scherr Source: Historical Journal of Massachusetts, Volume 46, No. 1, Winter 2018, pp. 114-159. Published by: Institute for Massachusetts Studies and Westfield State University You may use content in this archive for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the Historical Journal of Massachusetts regarding any further use of this work: [email protected] Funding for digitization of issues was provided through a generous grant from MassHumanities. Some digitized versions of the articles have been reformatted from their original, published appearance. When citing, please give the original print source (volume/number/date) but add "retrieved from HJM's online archive at http://www.westfield.ma.edu/historical-journal/. 114 Historical Journal of Massachusetts • Winter 2018 John Adams Portrait by Gilbert Stuart, c. 1815 115 John Adams, Political Moderation, and the 1820 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention: A Reappraisal ARTHUR SCHERR Editor's Introduction: The history of religious freedom in Massachusetts is long and contentious. In 1833, Massachusetts was the last state in the nation to “disestablish” taxation and state support for churches.1 What, if any, impact did John Adams have on this process of liberalization? What were Adams’ views on religious freedom and how did they change over time? In this intriguing article Dr. Arthur Scherr traces the evolution, or lack thereof, in Adams’ views on religious freedom from the writing of the original 1780 Massachusetts Constitution to its revision in 1820. He carefully examines contradictory primary and secondary sources and seeks to set the record straight, arguing that there are many unsupported myths and misconceptions about Adams’ role at the 1820 convention.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 2 the Marshall Court and the Early Republic
    Chapter 2 The Marshall Court and the Early Republic I. The Supreme Court in Its Initial Years: 1 78918O11 The Supreme Court of the United States was a relatively insignificant institution during the first decade of the new Republic. Presidents Washington and Adams had some difficulty attracting people to serve, and the rate of turnover was high. Three men were appointed chiefjustice during the first 12 years.JohnJay resigned after six years to serve as New York’s governor, which he presumably deemed the more important office (and during his tenure he sailed to England to serve as the princi pal negotiator of what became known as the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, which, together with his co-authorship of the Federalist Papers, remains his primary claim to fame for most historians) . His successor, John Rutledge, had been appointed as an Associate in 1 789 but had resigned in 1 791 , without ever sitting, to go to the more prestigious South Carolina Supreme Court. He was nominated to become Chief Justice ofthe U.S. Supreme Court in 1795 but failed to receive Senate confirmation. Thereafter, Oliver Ellsworth was nominated and confirmed in 1796; he served until 1800, when he resigned while overseas on a diplomatic mission to France. One source of discontent was the onerous duty of “riding circuit,” which required eachJustice to travel twice a year to sit in the federal circuit court districts. (There were no “circuit courts” in the modern sense; instead, they consisted of districtjudges sitting together with a Supreme Courtjustice as a “circuit court.”) The trips were strenuous and time-consuming.
    [Show full text]
  • A General History of the Burr Family, 1902
    historyAoftheBurrfamily general Todd BurrCharles A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE BURR FAMILY WITH A GENEALOGICAL RECORD FROM 1193 TO 1902 BY CHARLES BURR TODD AUTHOB OF "LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOBL BARLOW," " STORY OF THB CITY OF NEW YORK," "STORY OF WASHINGTON,'' ETC. "tyc mis deserves to be remembered by posterity, vebo treasures up and preserves tbe bistort of bis ancestors."— Edmund Burkb. FOURTH EDITION PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR BY <f(jt Jtnuhtrboclur $«88 NEW YORK 1902 COPYRIGHT, 1878 BY CHARLES BURR TODD COPYRIGHT, 190a »Y CHARLES BURR TODD JUN 19 1941 89. / - CONTENTS Preface . ...... Preface to the Fourth Edition The Name . ...... Introduction ...... The Burres of England ..... The Author's Researches in England . PART I HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL Jehue Burr ....... Jehue Burr, Jr. ...... Major John Burr ...... Judge Peter Burr ...... Col. John Burr ...... Col. Andrew Burr ...... Rev. Aaron Burr ...... Thaddeus Burr ...... Col. Aaron Burr ...... Theodosia Burr Alston ..... PART II GENEALOGY Fairfield Branch . ..... The Gould Family ...... Hartford Branch ...... Dorchester Branch ..... New Jersey Branch ..... Appendices ....... Index ........ iii PART I. HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL PREFACE. HERE are people in our time who treat the inquiries of the genealogist with indifference, and even with contempt. His researches seem to them a waste of time and energy. Interest in ancestors, love of family and kindred, those subtle questions of race, origin, even of life itself, which they involve, are quite beyond their com prehension. They live only in the present, care nothing for the past and little for the future; for " he who cares not whence he cometh, cares not whither he goeth." When such persons are approached with questions of ancestry, they retire to their stronghold of apathy; and the querist learns, without diffi culty, that whether their ancestors were vile or illustrious, virtuous or vicious, or whether, indeed, they ever had any, is to them a matter of supreme indifference.
    [Show full text]
  • Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" in Our Constitutional Jurisprudence: an Exercise in Legal History
    William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 20 (2011-2012) Issue 2 Article 4 December 2011 Restoring "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" in Our Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History Patrick J. Charles Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj Part of the Legal History Commons Repository Citation Patrick J. Charles, Restoring "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" in Our Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 457 (2011), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol20/iss2/4 Copyright c 2011 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj RESTORING “LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS” IN OUR CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: AN EXERCISE IN LEGAL HISTORY Patrick J. Charles* INTRODUCTION .................................................458 I. PLACING THE DECLARATION IN LEGAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT .....461 II. A BRIEF HISTORIOGRAPHY OF “LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS” AS A MATTER OF LEGAL THOUGHT, WITH A FOCUS ON “HAPPINESS” ...............................................470 III. PLACING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF “LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS” IN THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ...477 A. Restoring the True Meaning of the Preservation of “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in Constitutional Thought .............481 B. “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” and the Embodiment of the Representative Government ..............................490 C. Eighteenth-Century Legal Thought and the Constitutional Theory Behind Preservation of “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” ......502 IV. APPLYING THE PRESERVATION OF “LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS” TO MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM .....................517 CONCLUSION—OUR HAPPY CONSTITUTION ...........................523 * Patrick J.
    [Show full text]
  • Congress's Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today's Congress and Courts
    Pepperdine Law Review Volume 37 Issue 3 Article 2 3-15-2010 Congress's Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today's Congress and Courts Paul Taylor Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Legal History Commons Recommended Citation Paul Taylor Congress's Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today's Congress and Courts , 37 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 3 (2010) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol37/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. Congress's Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today's Congress and Courts Paul Taylor* I. INTRODUCTION II. JAMES MADISON AND THE CONVENTION DEBATES III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT IV. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (ALEXANDER HAMILTON) VI. OLIVER ELLSWORTH AND THE FIRST CONGRESS A. The JudiciaryAct of 1789 B. The Pro-FederalGovernment Policy ofSection 25 of the JudiciaryAct of 1789 C. Supportfor the JudiciaryAct of 1789 in the First Congress D. Cases Dismissed Under Section 25 of the JudiciaryAct of 1789 VII. THE POLICY BEHIND THE 1914 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 25 OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 VIII.
    [Show full text]
  • History of the U.S. Attorneys
    Bicentennial Celebration of the United States Attorneys 1789 - 1989 "The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor– indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." QUOTED FROM STATEMENT OF MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, BERGER V. UNITED STATES, 295 U. S. 88 (1935) Note: The information in this document was compiled from historical records maintained by the Offices of the United States Attorneys and by the Department of Justice. Every effort has been made to prepare accurate information. In some instances, this document mentions officials without the “United States Attorney” title, who nevertheless served under federal appointment to enforce the laws of the United States in federal territories prior to statehood and the creation of a federal judicial district. INTRODUCTION In this, the Bicentennial Year of the United States Constitution, the people of America find cause to celebrate the principles formulated at the inception of the nation Alexis de Tocqueville called, “The Great Experiment.” The experiment has worked, and the survival of the Constitution is proof of that.
    [Show full text]
  • CREATING the FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
    If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. CREATING the FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM ()c::) FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ~ t--- ~ ~.... 1789-BICENTENNIAL OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY-1989 THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER Board The Chief Justice of the United States, Chairman Judge J. Clifford Wallace Chief Judge William C O'Kelley United States Court oj Appeals Jor the Ninth Circuit United States District Court, Northern District oj GeOTfJia Judge Monroe G. McKay Judge David D. Dowd, Jr. Uflfted States Court oj Appeals Jor the Tenth Circuit United States District Court, Northern District oj Ohio Judge Jose A. Cabranes Judge Robert E. Ginsberg United States District Court, District oj Connecticut United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District oj Illinois L. Ralph Mecham Director oj the Administrative OJJice oj the U.s. Courts Director .Judge John C Godbold Deputy Director Charles W. Nihan Division Directors William B. Eldridge, Research Daniel L. Skoler, Continuing Education & Training Richard D. Fennell, Innovations & Systems Development Russell R. Wheeler, Spedal Educational Services Alice L. O'Donnell, Inter-Judicial Affairs & InJormation Services 1520 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C 20005 Telephone (202) 633-6011 ~ 102728 u.s. Department of Justice National Institute of Justice This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice. Permission to reproduce this 0 : 5 Igl:tcd material has been granted by Public Domain Federal- JuCiicial Center to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).
    [Show full text]
  • H. Doc. 108-222
    34 Biographical Directory DELEGATES IN THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS CONNECTICUT Dates of Attendance Andrew Adams............................ 1778 Benjamin Huntington................ 1780, Joseph Spencer ........................... 1779 Joseph P. Cooke ............... 1784–1785, 1782–1783, 1788 Jonathan Sturges........................ 1786 1787–1788 Samuel Huntington ................... 1776, James Wadsworth....................... 1784 Silas Deane ....................... 1774–1776 1778–1781, 1783 Jeremiah Wadsworth.................. 1788 Eliphalet Dyer.................. 1774–1779, William S. Johnson........... 1785–1787 William Williams .............. 1776–1777 1782–1783 Richard Law............ 1777, 1781–1782 Oliver Wolcott .................. 1776–1778, Pierpont Edwards ....................... 1788 Stephen M. Mitchell ......... 1785–1788 1780–1783 Oliver Ellsworth................ 1778–1783 Jesse Root.......................... 1778–1782 Titus Hosmer .............................. 1778 Roger Sherman ....... 1774–1781, 1784 Delegates Who Did Not Attend and Dates of Election John Canfield .............................. 1786 William Hillhouse............. 1783, 1785 Joseph Trumbull......................... 1774 Charles C. Chandler................... 1784 William Pitkin............................. 1784 Erastus Wolcott ...... 1774, 1787, 1788 John Chester..................... 1787, 1788 Jedediah Strong...... 1782, 1783, 1784 James Hillhouse ............... 1786, 1788 John Treadwell ....... 1784, 1785, 1787 DELAWARE Dates of Attendance Gunning Bedford,
    [Show full text]