3 Historical NSA/CSS Records
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Georgetown University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies
THE BATTLE FOR INTELLIGENCE: HOW A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF INTELLIGENCE ILLUMINATES VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR II A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies By Edward J. Piotrowicz III, B.A. Washington, DC April 15, 2011 Copyright 2011 by Edward J. Piotrowicz III All Rights Reserved ii THE BATTLE FOR INTELLIGENCE: HOW A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF INTELLIGENCE ILLUMINATES VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR II Edward J. Piotrowicz III, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Jennifer E. Sims, PhD. ABSTRACT Does intelligence make a difference in war? Two World War II battles provide testing grounds for answering this question. Allied intelligence predicted enemy attacks at both Midway and Crete with uncanny accuracy, but the first battle ended in an Allied victory, while the second finished with crushing defeat. A new theory of intelligence called “Decision Advantage,”a illuminates how the success of intelligence helped facilitate victory at Midway and how its dysfunction contributed to the defeat at Crete. This view stands in contrast to that of some military and intelligence scholars who argue that intelligence has little impact on battle. This paper uses the battles of Midway and Crete to test the power of Sims‟s theory of intelligence. By the theory‟s standards, intelligence in the case of victory outperformed intelligence in the case of defeat, suggesting these cases uphold the explanatory power of the theory. Further research, however, could enhance the theory‟s prescriptive power. -
The Army Counterintelligence Program
Army Regulation 381–20 Military Intelligence The Army Counterintelligence Program Distribution Restriction Statement. This regulation contains operational information for official Government use only. Distribution is limited to U.S. Government agencies. Requests from outside the U.S. Government for release of this regulation under the Freedom of Information Act or Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to HQDA (DAMI–CIC), Washington, DC 20310–1054. Destruction Notice. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 15 November 1993 UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY of CHANGE AR 381–20 The Army Counterintelligence Program This revision-- o Expands investigative responsibilities to all Army counterintelligence units (CI), and specifies investigative jurisdictions (chap 2). o Establishes the CI control office system (chap 3). o Clarifies collection authority (chap 6). o Requires CI analysis and production at all levels with staff capability (chap 7). o Permanently issues badges and credentials to CI personnel serving in designated assignments (para 9-4). o Provides authority for conducting intelligence polygraphs (para 10-2). Headquarters *Army Regulation 381–20 Department of the Army Washington, DC 15 November 1993 Effective 15 December 1993 Military Intelligence The Army Counterintelligence Program regulation also applies to all Army intelli- FN 381-20l, Counterintelligence surveys gence components, other military person- and inspections n e l a n d c i v i l i a n p e r s o n n e l o f t h e F N 3 8 1 - 2 0 m , L o c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e , c o u n - Department of the Army when they en- terintelligence, and security files gage in counterintelligence activities, and F N 3 8 1 - 4 5 c , D O D - a f f i l i a t e d p e r s o n n e l members of the U.S. -
Thailand's Progress Report 2019 January – March
Royal Thai Government’s Progress Report on Anti-Human Trafficking Efforts (1 January – 31 March 2019) Table of Contents Prosecution 1 1 Statistics on Human Trafficking Litigation, Suspects, and Victims 1 2 Human Trafficking Cases in the Judicial Process 2 2.1 Human Trafficking Cases Handled by Inquiry Officers 2 2.2 Human Trafficking Cases Pursued by Public Prosecutors 3 2.3 Human Trafficking Cases Pursued by the Courts of Justice 3 3 Combatting Official Complicity in Human Trafficking Cases 4 4 Asset Restraint and Seizure 5 5 Witness Assistance and Protection 5 6 Thailand Anti-Trafficking in Persons Task Force (TATIP) and 5 Thailand Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (TICAC) 7 Progress of the 2019 Plan 7 8 Capacity Building for Officers 8 9 Further Investigation on Prominent Cases of 2018 10 9.1 The Ugandan Transnational Sex Trafficking Case 10 9.2 The Facebook Case 10 9.3 The Victoria’s Secret Case 11 Protection 13 1 Respecting Victims’ Rights to Decide on Receiving Protection 13 2 Remedies through Compensations and Restitutions until 14 Reintegration into Society 3 Increased Capacity and Number of Interpreters 14 4 “Protect-U” Mobile Application For Victims to Improve Access 15 to Other Protection Services 5 Integrated Cooperation with Relevant Agencies to Better Provide 16 Effective Protection Prevention 18 1 Labour Management 18 2 Employer Change 19 3 Inspections of Migrant Labour Recruitment Agencies and Outbound 19 Employment Agencies 4 Labour Inspections 20 5 The Ratification of the C188 - Work in Fishing Convention, -
Center for Cryptologic History Publications Lili33-P.L
I) 1 > 1 -F.L. gt-?P D@@Z& 3021101 REF ID:. Center for Cryptologic History Brochures Use this form to order a copy of any of these publications. [All brochures are unclassified] Solving the Enigma: History of the Cryptanalytic Bombe Traces the history of the development of the cryptanalytic Bombe during WWII. It discusses the history of the Bombe from the time the Poles solved the Enigma, through the British involvement in developing the machine, the Navy contract with National Cash Register Corp. to build an American version, and, finally, the Allied successes against German U-boats in the North Atlantic. The Start of the Digital Revolution: SIGSALY - Secure Digital Voice Communications in World War I1 A brief overview of the revolutionary effort to provide secure voice communications for high-level government officials. Army Security Agency Aerial Reconnaissance: Mission and Sacrifice. Describes the use of Army aircraft for DIF and ELlNT collection, primarily during the Vietnam War. Sharing the Burden: Women in Cryptology during World War 11. A brief look at the contributions and sacrifices made by women as civilian and military cryptologists during WWII. American Cryptology: Two Centuries of Tradition A synopsis of the role of cryptology in the American Revolution, Civil War, interwar period, and World Wars, and concluding with the establishment of the National Security Agency. The Cipher Disk ppproved for Release by NSA on 08-1 7-2006, FOlA Case # - - d.2848 -- -- - - -- - - -- - - -- - - Invented in Italy sometime before 1470, the cipher disk represented a breakthrough in ease of encipherment and decipherment. This basic invention survived to be used until several years after the First World War. -
Swire. “The Declining Half-Life of Secrets”
CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE New America Cybersecurity Fellows Paper Series - Number 1 THE DECLINING HALF -LIFE OF SECRETS And the Future of Signals Intelligence By Peter Swire July 2015 © 2015 NEW AMERICA This report carries a Creative Commons license, which permits non-commercial re-use of New America content when proper attribution is provided. This means you are free to copy, display and distribute New America’s work, or in- clude our content in derivative works, under the following conditions: ATTRIBUTION. NONCOMMERCIAL. SHARE ALIKE. You must clearly attribute the work You may not use this work for If you alter, transform, or build to New America, and provide a link commercial purposes without upon this work, you may distribute back to www.newamerica.org. explicit prior permission from the resulting work only under a New America. license identical to this one. For the full legal code of this Creative Commons license, please visit creativecommons.org. If you have any questions about citing or reusing New America content, please contact us. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Peter Swire, Nancy J. and Lawrence P. Huang Professor of Law and Ethics, Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology; Senior Counsel, Alston & Bird LLP; and New America Cybersecurity Fellow ABOUT THE CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Internet has connected us. Yet the policies and debates that sur- Many thanks to Ross Anderson, Ashkan round the security of our networks are too often disconnected, disjoint- Soltani and Lee Tien for assistance with ed, and stuck in an unsuccessful status quo. This is what New Ameri- this draft, and to the fellow members ca’s Cybersecurity Initiative is designed to address. -
Offensive Capabilities
GCHQ and UK Mass Surveillance Chapter 5 5 Beyond signals intelligence: Offensive capabilities 5.1 Introduction Documents released by German magazine Der Spiegel provide a much richer picture of the offensive activities of the NSA and its allies, including the UK’s GCHQ.i The global surveillance infrastructure and hacking tools described in the previous chapters are not only used for obtaining information to be fed into intelligence reports and tracking terrorists. The agencies are also developing cyber-warfare capabilities, with the NSA taking the lead within the US armed forces. This militarisation of the internet saw U.S. intelligence services carried out 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011ii. The UK's National Strategic Defence and Security Review from 2010 made hostile attacks upon UK cyberspace a major priorityiii. It is fair to assume that many countries are following suit and building cyber-warfare capabilities. Der Spiegel terms the development of these aggressive hacking tools as Digital Weapons. In their view D weapons which should join the ABC (Atomic, Biological and Chemical) weapons of the 20th century because of their indiscriminate nature. Here lies a fundamental problem. The modern world with connected global communications networks means that non-state actors such as civilians and businesses are now affected by the agencies’ activities much more frequently than before. The internet is used by everyone – cyberspace is mainly a civilian space – and the opportunity for collateral damage is huge. The papers leaked to Der Spiegel appear to show that signal agencies have little regard for the security and wellbeing of anyone who gets caught in the path of their operations. -
9 Purple 18/2
THE CONCORD REVIEW 223 A VERY PURPLE-XING CODE Michael Cohen Groups cannot work together without communication between them. In wartime, it is critical that correspondence between the groups, or nations in the case of World War II, be concealed from the eyes of the enemy. This necessity leads nations to develop codes to hide their messages’ meanings from unwanted recipients. Among the many codes used in World War II, none has achieved a higher level of fame than Japan’s Purple code, or rather the code that Japan’s Purple machine produced. The breaking of this code helped the Allied forces to defeat their enemies in World War II in the Pacific by providing them with critical information. The code was more intricate than any other coding system invented before modern computers. Using codebreaking strategy from previous war codes, the U.S. was able to crack the Purple code. Unfortunately, the U.S. could not use its newfound knowl- edge to prevent the attack at Pearl Harbor. It took a Herculean feat of American intellect to break Purple. It was dramatically intro- duced to Congress in the Congressional hearing into the Pearl Harbor disaster.1 In the ensuing years, it was discovered that the deciphering of the Purple Code affected the course of the Pacific war in more ways than one. For instance, it turned out that before the Americans had dropped nuclear bombs on Japan, Purple Michael Cohen is a Senior at the Commonwealth School in Boston, Massachusetts, where he wrote this paper for Tom Harsanyi’s United States History course in the 2006/2007 academic year. -
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
ATP 2-22.9 Open-Source Intelligence July 2012 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Unlimited Distribution Headquarters, Department of the Army *ATP 2-22.9 Army Techniques Publication Headquarters No. 2-22.9 (FMI 2-22.9) Department of the Army Washington, DC, 10 July 2012 Open-Source Intelligence Contents Page PREFACE.............................................................................................................. iv INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... v Chapter 1 OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT) FUNDAMENTALS ........................ 1-1 Definition and Terms .......................................................................................... 1-1 Characteristics .................................................................................................... 1-1 The Intelligence Warfighting Function ................................................................ 1-2 The Intelligence Process .................................................................................... 1-3 The Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection Process ........................ 1-4 The Military Decisionmaking Process ................................................................ 1-4 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ........................................................... 1-5 Chapter 2 PLANNING AND PREPARATION OF THE OSINT MISSION ............................. 2-1 Section I – Planning OSINT Activities ........................................................... -
Breaking Japanese Diplomatic Codes David Sissons and D Special Section During the Second World War
Breaking Japanese Diplomatic Codes David Sissons and D Special Section during the Second World War Breaking Japanese Diplomatic Codes David Sissons and D Special Section during the Second World War Edited by Desmond Ball and Keiko Tamura ASIAN STUDIES SERIES MONOGRAPH 4 Published by ANU E Press The Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at http://epress.anu.edu.au National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Title: Breaking Japanese diplomatic codes : David Sissons and D Special Section during the Second World War / edited by Desmond Ball and Keiko Tamura. ISBN: 9781925021073 (paperback) 9781925021080 (ebook) Subjects: Sissons, D. C. S. (David Carlisle Stanley), 1925-2006. Allied Forces. Southwest Pacific Area. Allied Intelligence Bureau World War, 1939-1945--Cryptography. World War, 1939-1945--Secret service--Australia. World War, 1939-1945--Electronic intelligence--Australia. World War, 1939-1945--Military intelligence--Australia. World War, 1939-1945--Japan. Cryptography--Australia--History. Military intelligence--Australia--History--20th century. Other Authors/Contributors: Ball, Desmond, 1947- editor. Tamura, Keiko, editor. Dewey Number: 940.548694 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design and layout by ANU E Press Cover image: David Sissons about 18 years old before joining the Army in 1944. Photo courtesy of Mrs Bronwen Sissons. Printed by Griffin Press This edition © 2013 ANU E Press Contents Preface . ix Acknowledgements . xi Acronyms and Abbreviations . -
Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States
HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM and the INTELLIGENCE POLICY CENTER THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Homeland Security Program RAND Intelligence Policy Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. -
Polish Mathematicians Finding Patterns in Enigma Messages
Fall 2006 Chris Christensen MAT/CSC 483 Machine Ciphers Polyalphabetic ciphers are good ways to destroy the usefulness of frequency analysis. Implementation can be a problem, however. The key to a polyalphabetic cipher specifies the order of the ciphers that will be used during encryption. Ideally there would be as many ciphers as there are letters in the plaintext message and the ordering of the ciphers would be random – an one-time pad. More commonly, some rotation among a small number of ciphers is prescribed. But, rotating among a small number of ciphers leads to a period, which a cryptanalyst can exploit. Rotating among a “large” number of ciphers might work, but that is hard to do by hand – there is a high probability of encryption errors. Maybe, a machine. During World War II, all the Allied and Axis countries used machine ciphers. The United States had SIGABA, Britain had TypeX, Japan had “Purple,” and Germany (and Italy) had Enigma. SIGABA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIGABA 1 A TypeX machine at Bletchley Park. 2 From the 1920s until the 1970s, cryptology was dominated by machine ciphers. What the machine ciphers typically did was provide a mechanical way to rotate among a large number of ciphers. The rotation was not random, but the large number of ciphers that were available could prevent depth from occurring within messages and (if the machines were used properly) among messages. We will examine Enigma, which was broken by Polish mathematicians in the 1930s and by the British during World War II. The Japanese Purple machine, which was used to transmit diplomatic messages, was broken by William Friedman’s cryptanalysts. -
A Reference Guide to Selected Historical Documents Relating to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) 1931-1985
Description of document: A Reference Guide to Selected Historical Documents Relating to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) 1931-1985 Requested date: 15-June-2009 Released date: 03-February-2010 Posted date: 15-February-2010 Source of document: National Security Agency Attn: FOIA/PA Office (DJP4) 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6248 Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248 Fax: 443-479-3612 Online form: Here The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. A REFERENCE GUIDE TO SELECTED HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE 1931-1985 (U) SOURCE DOCUMENTS IN Compiled by: CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY Gerald K.