Rebel Organizations in Crackdown and Truce Kolby Hanson Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2019 c 2019 Kolby Hanson All rights reserved Abstract Rebel Organizations in Crackdown and Truce Kolby Hanson In the past three decades, more than two dozen civil conflicts have ended in a long-term truce between the government and rebels. In these agreements, neither side disarms or makes any sub- stantial concessions. Instead, rebel forces are permitted to recruit, fund themselves, and patrol territory without punishment so long as they leave government forces alone. Governments typi- cally offer these agreements when they have few domestic or political interests in the conflict (as in remote separatist regions) or when they face short-run international pressure to reduce violence (as in high-profile conflicts). What happens to rebel organizations when the government permits them to operate and recruit freely? Governments and scholars believe that forbearance benefits rebel organizations, allowing them to gather new funds and new members who will empower them on the battlefield and at the bargaining table. This book argues instead that these periods of truce undermine rebel organiza- tions by changing the types of recruits they attract. Truces do indeed make life safer and easier for rebel soldiers, attracting an influx of new rebel recruits. But they also undermine a key screen- ing process in rebel recruitment. Rebel leaders need rebel soldiers to sacrifice their own desires (safety, pleasure, and profit) for the movement’s goals (battlefield victory, territorial control, and bargaining credibility). The safety and material benefits of truce disproportionately attract selfish opportunists who are prone to desert, defect, and disobey in the long run. Constrained by recruit- ment competition and bureaucratic incapacity, rebel leaders struggle to screen or control these new soldiers. I lay out this argument in a formal model of rebel recruitment, competition, and screen- ing, validated with dozens of interviews of current and former rebels in Northeast India and Sri Lanka. I examine the effects of long-term truces on rebel organizations using three forms of evidence. First, I test how truces affect the behavior and motivations of rebel recruits with an innovative recruitment experiment in three separatist regions in Northeast India. By mimicking local rebel recruiting strategies in civic organizations and public gathering places, I gather nearly 400 likely rebel recruits. These recruits then evaluated randomly-generated hypothetical rebel groups, testing what factors make them more willing to join. The results shows that the safety and material benefits of truce disproportionately attract recruits who are less community-oriented, both in past behavior and self-assessments. Second, I explore the broader impacts of these recruit-side motivations on rebel organizations with 76 in-depth case interviews in Northeast India and Sri Lanka. These interviewees include rebel leaders, current and former rebel soldiers, and civilians interacting with rebel groups. By comparing over time (before and after truce agreements) and between movements, I track how truces shape rebel recruitment and control. Third, I construct an original worldwide dataset of civil conflict endings since 1946. This exercise shows just how common long-term truces are: since the end of the Cold War, more civil conflicts have ended in a truce than in a rebel victory or peace agreement. I also combine this data with existing conflict data, demonstrating that after a truce rebel groups are more likely to fragment, struggle in clashes with the government, and abuse civilians. This book challenges several key assumptions that scholars and policymakers hold about con- flict resolution, rebel organizations, and state development. By shining a light on the largely ig- nored phenomenon of long-term truces in civil conflicts, it demonstrates what happens when reduc- ing violence does not resolve a conflict. With innovative experimental evidence of rebel recruits’ motivations, it shows how changing resources can shift the quantity and quality of recruits rebels attract. By tracking rebel organizations before and after truce, it shows how a government can more effectively undermine a rebel movement in the long run with forbearance than with violent crackdown. Contents List of Tables iii List of Figures v Acknowledgments vii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The Argument . .3 1.2 Research Approaches . 10 1.3 Settings . 17 1.4 Outline of the Book . 21 2 Long-Term Truces in Civil Conflicts 23 2.1 Documenting Truces, 1946-2016 . 26 2.2 Explaining Truces . 33 2.3 Why Truces Matter . 46 3 Theory 50 3.1 Truces and Rebel Recruitment . 51 3.2 Truces and Rebel Organizations . 56 3.3 Formal Model . 59 3.4 Hypotheses . 69 3.5 Alternative Strategies for Rebel Organizations . 71 4 Recruitment Experiment 74 4.1 Design . 75 4.2 Results . 87 4.3 Alternative Strategies for Rebel Organizations . 93 5 Rebel Organizations in Northeast India 97 5.1 Changing Membership . 99 5.2 Recruitment Competition . 102 5.3 Misbehavior in the Community and in Battle . 105 5.4 Alternative Strategies for Rebel Organizations . 109 i 5.5 Comparisons within Manipur . 113 6 Rebel Organizations in Sri Lanka 116 6.1 Alternative Strategies for Rebel Organizations . 117 6.2 Changing Membership . 120 6.3 Recruitment Competition . 122 6.4 Misbehavior in the Community and in Battle . 126 6.5 Forced Recruitment . 130 7 Cross-National Evidence 132 7.1 Organizational Fragmentation . 134 7.2 Violence Against Civilians . 138 7.3 Battlefield Performance . 141 8 Implications for Scholars and Policymakers 147 8.1 Peacebuilding and Civilian Protection . 149 8.2 Conflict and Statebuilding . 152 Bibliography 157 Appendices 165 A Cross-National Analysis 166 A.1 All Conflict Endings . 166 A.2 Analysis: Cause of Truce . 174 B Formal Model Proofs 176 B.1 Proposition 1: Organizational Control . 176 B.2 Proposition 2: Fragmentation . 178 B.3 Proposition 3: Government Crackdown . 180 C Recruitment Experiment 181 C.1 Questionnaire . 181 C.2 Descriptive Statistics and Main Analysis . 183 C.3 Robustness Checks . 186 D Case Interviews 189 D.1 Interview Subjects . 189 D.2 Standard Interview Questions . 193 ii List of Tables 1.1 Featured Rebel Movements . 18 2.1 Conflict Downturns by Outcome . 30 2.2 Cases of Long-Term Truce . 31 2.3 How Other Datasets Categorize Long-Term Truces . 32 2.4 Characteristics of Conflicts by Ending Type . 35 3.1 Game Play . 60 3.2 Player Utilities . 61 3.3 Exogenous Parameters . 62 3.4 A’s Recruitment Strategy (Monopsonist Case) . 63 4.1 Demographics and Traits by Sampling Group . 82 4.2 Armed Group Features in Conjoint Experiment . 84 5.1 Change over Time in Types of Recruits . 101 5.2 Change over Time in Intra-Rebel Defection . 103 5.3 Splits and Mergers in Nagaland . 104 5.4 Change over Time in Soldier Misbehavior . 108 5.5 Causes of Misbehavior . 109 5.6 Comparing KCP Factions from Other Meitei Groups . 114 6.1 Splits and Mergers in Tamil Eelam . 124 6.2 Change over Time in Soldier Misbehavior . 128 7.1 Yearly Averages of Active Rebel Factions and Fatalities . 135 7.2 Effect of Truce on Rebel Fragmentation . 137 7.3 Effect of Truce on Rebel Violence Against Civilians . 140 7.4 Effect of Truce on Rebel Battlefield Performance . 144 C.1 Stages of Survey . 181 C.2 Effect of Armed Group Features on Joining, by Respondent Type . 185 C.3 High/Low Commitment Difference in Treatment Effects, Controlling for Demo- graphics . 186 C.4 Interactions Between Treatments (T-Statistics) . 187 iii D.1 Interviewees by Location . 189 D.2 Interviews: Current/Former Rebels in Northeast India . 190 D.3 Interviews: Civilians in Northeast India . 191 D.4 Interviews: Sri Lanka . 192 iv List of Figures 1.1 Major Separatist Movements of Northeast India . 18 2.1 Coding Process for Conflict Downturns . 28 3.1 A’s Recruitment Strategies . 66 4.1 Respondents’ Altruism: Community Orgs vs. Gathering Places . 81 4.2 Example of Hypothetical Armed Group in Conjoint Experiment . 83 4.3 Effects of Armed Group Features on Joining (Baseline) . 87 4.4 Effects of Material Benefits and Safety on Joining (by Recruit Type) . 89 4.5 Wage Screening Effects . 91 4.6 Effects of Strict Discipline and Hardline Ideology on Joining (by Recruit Type) . 94 C.1 Histogram of Dependent Variable . 183 C.2 Northeast India Survey Locations . 184 C.3 Interaction Effects by Region . 188 v List of Organizations Civil Society Organizations AASU All Assam Students Union ABSU All Bodo Students Union NSF Naga Students Federation Rebel Groups in Nagaland NNC Naga National Council NNC-A NNC - Accordist faction NNC-Kudao NNC - Kudao faction NNC-N NNC - Non-Accordist faction NSCN National Socialist Council of Nagalim NSCN-IM NSCN - Isak Muivah faction NSCN-K NSCN - Khaplang faction NSCN-R NSCN - Reformation faction NSCN-U NSCN - Unification faction Rebel Groups in Manipur KCP Kangleipak Communist Party KNF Kuki National Front KNO Kuki National Organization KRA Kuki Revolutionary Army KYKL Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup PLA People’s Liberation Army (of Manipur) PREPAK People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak UNLF United National Liberation Front Rebel Groups.