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2004

Hidden Treasure: The Italian war economy's contribution to the German war effort (1943-1945)

Timothy Saxon Liberty University

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Hidden treasure: The Italian war economy's contribution to the German war effort, (1943-1945)

Dr. Timothy D. Saxon (Etat-Unis)

Introduction

Gerhard Schreiber has described the German conquest, occupation. and exploitation of Italy in 1943 as th e Wehrmacht's "last victory" of the Second World War.' His description is correct in that th e German seizure of Fa scist Italy produced a substantial economic windfall that material ly assisted Ger­ many in continuing the Second World War until the economic collapse of Hitler's Reich. Italy, eve n after the bitter war years from 1940-1943, remai­ ned a prize 1V0rth winning. The German conque st and subseque nt economic exploitation of Italy raise a variety of important que stions, in spired in part by Peter Lieberman's book, Does Conquest Pay? Why did a society as natio­ nalistic and modern as Italy cooperate with the German occupation? What factors all owed th e Germans to extract a significa nt material advantage from th eir occupation? Did this exploitation of Italy inspire resistance or we re other factors more important in the thinking of Italians who chose to fight the German occupation? Does the Italian experience during World War II have any current relevance to potential con flicts around the globe? 2 Strategic Considerations of the Italian Campaign Italy occupied a central place in Allied strategy after the M ay 1943 de­ feat of Axis forces in Tunisia. Removing Fascist Italy from the war would eliminate th e only power direct ly supporting th e German war effort with a significalll number of troo ps in the Europea n the ate r. Italian troops, large numbers of whom had been killed and captured in North Africa and Russia. still defended parts of th e Balkans, Greece, and southern Fran ce against Al­ lied invas ion. M oreover, removing Italy from the war might undermine the continued participation of Hungary and Romania as Axis allies as well as head off potential Turkish moves favoring the Axis. ' Spanish and Swiss support for Germany might also be reduced in the event an Allied conqu es t of Italy. Removing Italy from the war also offered the cha nce to stri ke a stinging econom ic blow to the German war effort. When German officials su rveyed the It

')41 ritie, learned that northern Ital y had "a suflicient number of highly modern (Jcrl11,ln plallncl's, who had hee n operating in Munich since ea rl y August factories " and " the best and Jllost Illodern Illachincs of Gcrman , A mcrican and undel' th e cover name of "'Economic Sta1l AschofL" pursued two part icular Swiss origin." M oreo ver, large numbers of highl y-sk illcd indust ri al work ers goals in th e early stages of th e takeover. Having surveyed th e po tential boos t li vc d in northern Italy, wh ere German adm inistrators could draw upon th em to German war production that ass imilating Italian industry offered, '3 planners iO su pport th e Gcrman war error!.' Italy's petroleulll production fac ilitics and wa nted to integrate Italian factori es and farms into the Cerman war economy na va l sh ipyards were located in northern Italy as we re .so me twcnty -sevc n quick ly an d effi ciently They also wa nted to keep th e A llies from seiling Ita­ aircraft rac tories and sixty-four arms and munitions works." Although total ly's in dustrial ca pacity, so mething that be tter lit w ith K esse lring's de ve loping Italian induslI'ial output aillounted to only 2.7 percent o f world production in strateg y th an ROlllmel's plans to abandon much or the Italian peninSUla. 1939, [{aly's industrial base was a considerable prize if added to Germany's Economic Staff Aschoff's plans and ac tions after Operation Achse played a 10.7 perce nt of workl production? critical role in res toring Italian wa r prod uction."

Why didn't Allied strateg ic pl an nCJ"s cons ider th e economic potential of A n urgent meet ing held on 17 Scptember 1943 discllssed th e necess ity northern haly when drafting th eir plans to eliminate that nation from th e war') of pUlling the Italian economy back to work. Participants cl ea rly un de rstood A llied force s needed to approach Italy from North Africa via Si cily and th en th at reac hing this goal required several steps. First, German ad ministra tors to the heel of the boo t- shaped Italian peninsula. Short-ranged Allied fighter needed to put an Italian administrative structure in place that could assume aircraft imposed an absolute lim it on pos sibl e invasion sites, given th at the res pon sibil ity for supervis ion orthe Italian economy. Sec ond , the meeting's German Luftwaffe, which Ulli'a intelligence tracked closel y, still packed a po­ partic ipants, who made no attempt to cover th e purpose of rest ori ng th e func­ tent punch in the M ed iterranea n th eater. Moreover, th e Germans had retained tioning of the Italian eco nomy, lea rned that Italy wou ld suffer the sa me fate as most of their armor an d Jll otorized forces in northern Italy , which mea nt th e oth er occu pied states. Minutes recorded th at. desp ite th e presence of Italian fa rther north the Allies land ed , the more powerfu l the initial German counte­ representatives from the Bank of Italy, Al fa Romeo, and ot her Italian con­ ratt ac k aga in st th e Allied beachhead was likely to be'" A plan calling for th e cerns, "[elxperi ence ha s shown clearly th at th e exploitat ion of foreign coun­ landing of the American 82nd Airborn e Division near Rome was th e boldest tries is poss ible only when the loca l administrati ve and economic in stitutions Allied proposa l of an otherwise unimag inative and un inspired campaign. are made use ful in th e quickest wa y poss ible for the area's own requirements." When German force le ve ls increased in the Rome area, General Dwight D . Finally, partiCipants noted that military sec urity and mobility requ ired the res­ Eisenhower cancelled th e lan ding at the las t minute on 8 September 1943, toration of italian infrastructure to working status as quick ly as possible. ls effectively eliminating any All ied attempt to co ntes t Germany for control of Shortly thereafter Army Group B 's commander establi shed a committee northern and central Italy at an early stage in th e ca mpaign." (ltalien ische Wirtschaftskomitee beim Deutschen Oberbefehlshaber) to direct Conquest: Operation Achse the Italian economy wi th seve n members named by hi s Repl'ese ntative for Direc ti on of the Economy (Beauftragter fur die Wirtschaftsfuhrung). The The coded message, "Bring in the Harvest. " initiated Operation Aehse, Committee worked Erwin Rommel's plan, predicated on an Allied in vasion of Italy as far north mander. O n 12 September 1943, Hitler had as signed Albert Speer sole res ­ as Rome, call ed for German forces to abandon sou th ern Italy and fall b,lCk at 1 1 pons ibility fo r arms produ ction in IlFoggia air­ licld complex decp in southern Italy.,e Laggin g coa l deliveries co nstilLlt ed an illlmcdiate problem hilllkring Thc di scove ry of hoal-d ed ra IV IllOctober 1943 as co,lI deli ve ri es increa sed to I A OO,()OO a shortage of r,l IV materials. Lucio Ceva and Giorgio Roc hat note th at " in tons. nincty-three pc rc ent of th e targe t. German authorities dramatica lly red u­ Se pt embe r 1943 the Germans se ize d three times as much ste el as was availa­ ced the targe t in N ovember 1943 to 400 ,000 tons , of wh ich 385 ,000 were deli ­ ble in 1940. " The return of su ch raw ma terial s to Germany materially ass isted ve red. Coa l delivers slowly r o~ e in early 1944 on ly to collapse in th e late 1044 th e rapid ex pansion of German war producti on in late 194:1 and ea rl y 1 9 44 .~' to 100,000 tons. le ss than a fon y percent of the promised 250,000 ton s." Mussolini's lac k of control over Italy's war industries lay at the root The German occupati on of Italy un covere.d large stockpiles of raw ma­ of the Italian eco nomic failure in W orld War II. One sc holar describes th e tel-ials that Italian industri ali sts had ca refully hoard ed in hopes of being th e Ital ian effu rt at mobil izi ng nati onal resou rc es d lIri ng the Second World W ar first to initiate co nsumer produ ct ion at the war 's end_ Field Marshal Albert as 'triAing ' when compared with th at of the First W orld W ar. An ex aminati on Kesse lring reported th at he believed th e Italia ns had pursued "a deliberate o f ec onomic fi gul-cs bea rs out this as sertion. Stephen Harvey notes that policy of hoarding quite beyond my co mpre-hension. The di scovery. afte r th e ce rtain non- strateg ic industries we re virtually un affec ted by the war: defection of th e Italians in 1943, of va st stores of unuse d wa r material is alone pri vat e ex pend iture on fu rn iture fo r ex ample was 5.837,000,000 I ire ( 1939 va­ suffi cient pro of of thi s cheese -pari ng " '" M aj or Gen eral Hermann Burkhart lues) in 1939 and had dropped only slightl y to 5,2 82 .000,000 lire in 1942. It is Mueller-Hillebrand eo nli rmed after the IV ar tha t Italian industrialists had en­ illuminating to compare nati onal ec onomic in ves tment in the First W orl d W ar gaged in hoard ing. w ith that in th e Sccond World W ar. St at istics for th e ratio bet ween consump­ Italy_ for instan ce. would make coulllerreques ts for large quan tities of ti o n and in vestment show that mobilizati on of national resources 19 39 -45 was r,1\V materi als alld coal. In thi s co nnec tion, moreover, as w as discovered aft er tri Aingcompared to 19 15-1 8: th e defect ion o f Iwly in Sep tember, 1943 when the Italian armament indu stry 19 15 -7.8 1940 +5.7 wa s more strictly controlled by German agencies , the Italian govern me nt had neve r becn in Cull control of its indu stries. Raw materi als se nt fro m Germany 19 16 -2 1. 9 1941 +6.8 for armament purposes were found hoarded for pos t- war pu r p os e s. "~" 191 7 -:10_2 1942 +2.9 German officials used so me of th ese raw materials in I w lian factories 191 8 - :1 0.9 1943 - /.2"'; and assigned nlaterial reshipment to G ermany , w hi ch bega n th e day of th e Ge rman takeover. hi gh pri ori ty in th e adm inistra ti on of th e Italian industrial M oreove r, as recent rese arch affi rms. no shortage of ra w materi als pre­ b as e . ~ ' In Se[ltcm ber and October 194 :1 alone, so me 6 ~.200 tons of raw mate­ c ipita ted Italy'S poor produ ction record and eventual defe at. What explains ria ls we re transport ed bac k to G erlll ' ln y.~ ~ Fasci st Italy'S pOO!' perfo rm

545 I I industry. Purchases or consumer goods and textiles. w hi ch alone WCI"e valued Thc conljucq of Itilly yielded Gerl11any substantial gains includillg stock­ t at some RM 30(U)OO ,()()(). ilided the German wa r elTort by relieving pressurc I piles of raw materials. modern industrial plant. large pools of skilled labor. on German factories that increasingly focused on arms production." Although I and agricultural production, all locatcd close to thc li ghling front, which subs­ iron orc product ion sank l'I'o m Wj S,77 3 tons in 1943 to tons in 1044, I 390 .4~3 I tantially boosled the output of the German war economy. Although optimal Italy still provided signilicant amounts of aiuminulll, mercury, linc, copper, I performance was never achieved, th e occupation and exploitation of Iialy and manganese ores for production'"'! Iron production sa nk from (i4~,()OO I more than paid th e conque rors' costs. lOns (I (43) to 232,038 tons (1944). as did stee l production, which fell from RESISTANCE 1,727.20 I tons ( 1(43) to I ,()26, I 93 tons ( 1944 l, wh ich was not as i mponant I I as it may lirst see lll, given that large stockpile of iron and stee l existed in Ita­ I According to Peter Lieberman 's "logic of re sistance ... ruthless con­ lian warehouses in 1943 .11) Italian factories also Illanufactured fu ses_ cartridge querors should bc able to co mpel the political and economic collaboration of and shell casings, long-barre led antitank and antiaircraft guns, and vehicles, I defeated societies at low cos!."'" The German experience in Italy confirms this all of which we re in short supply." Italian raw material stockpiles helped pre­ I theoretical assertion in man y ways. The occupation of Italy required the use i vent bottlenecks that had hindered output in both Germany and other occupied I of large numbers of German troops, w hich fou nd dual employment in both co untries until late in 1944.'2 1 internal sec urity and defense roles. Lieberman's argument tha t "expectations I of liberation - for example - if the occupier is embroiled in a closely fought The German war effort also ben efi ted from control of northern Ital y's I I international wa r - can heighten res ista nce and reduc e co llaboration" also ri ch ag ri culrural regions, especially th e fertile Po Valley)' A German survey I is confirmed by events in Italy"" Although Italian resistance increased as it of Italian agricultural surpluses reponed on 2 September 1943 tha t northern i becamc apparent that Germany was losing the wa r. th e Germans made gre at Italy could supply 249,180 tons of ric e, 76,900 ton s of corn (Maisl, and I gains in return for a sec urity investment th at they would hav e had to make 165.700 ton s of potatoes.'J This massi ve surplus meant that Germany could I anyway. supply a good portion of its agricultural needs from nonhern Italy, feed its ! troops fighting there, and release German farmers either to fight or produce I Resistance to th e war and th e costs that it imposed on Italian society be­ I arms. A steady stream of agricultural produce Rowed from the provi nces of I gan long before the 5 March 1943 worker< strike at Ihe enormous Fiat Mira­ uppel' Italy to Germany and to Wehrmac ht forces fighting in occupied Italy. ! fori factory complex in Turin. which Mussolini bl amed on Italian communists. By December 1943, Italian farillers had provided 41,500 tons of rice to Ger­ I The strike spread throu ghout the indust ria l regions of northern Ital y, inspired many. In 1944. Italian fields. orchards, and vi neyard s supplied wheat, ri ce. I in part by th e loss of large numbers of troops from th e Italian Eighth Army in corn, oats. rye. potatoes , suga r, fruit, vegetables, meat, fat. fi sh. and wine for I Ru ss ia, which lUrned passive resistancc into open opposition to Mussolini's I German eo n s urnption .' ~ In just th e las t three months of 1944. food shipments regime.'" The si tu ation was severe enough to become a topic of disc ussion at I JI from northern Italy to th e Reich totaled approximately 82.500 tons. '~ I one of Hitler' s FLihrcr confel'ences that month. I The German war economy similarly benefited from the large pool of ! After th e German takeover. strikes continued. By the fall of 194J. the ,killed Italian labor. Italians worked in th e factories of nonhern Italy or as I economic situation for Italian workers had worsened. and strikes were repor­ forced labor in Germany. While Nazi labor authorities shipped some skilled ted in Turin. The iss ue behind a 17 November 1943 strike by 15,000 workers Italian laborers from the gre at industrial belt of northern Italy to Germany, in two Fiat factories was rationing. Italian workers complained th at German the majority of sk illed workel's remained in Italian faClories producing goods aUlhorities had provided too little food and that the y encountered problems vital to the Gerl11an warellon until Gerl11any ' s war economy co llapsed during procuring thc rations th at they were owed. Moreover, food prices were rising th e wintcr of 1944-1945. Moreover, German authorities employed Italian much faster than wages. Price for staples in th e Italian diet such as olive oil, Illilit,i\'y intern ees captured in 1943 as slave labor. Estimates of their IlUm­ beans . and [last,1 climbed between 300-400 percent during 1944-1945. A si ­ bers have ranged frolll ()OO ,OOO to 1.000,000. Many Italian workers labored milar silUation likew ise made it all but impossible to obtain clothing or shoes. under horrible conditions, wh ilc interned mel11bers of the IlJanuary 1944, 150.000 rai l cars had of strength w ith the Germans, Italian partisans halted bu s and rail lines in th e been available for shipping goods, By January 1945, th at number had fallen area, preventing the movement or workers and goods. The Ge rm ans respon ­ to 41 ,OOO ,~ 1 By early 1945, fu el and ammunition, already in short supply by ded ill kind, Field Marshal Kcsse lring dispatched troops to northern Italy to th e sUlllmer of 1944, were no longer shipped f rom the Reich to Italy. German support SS units and Italian Fa sc ist militia in arresting and sp iriting away labor forces in Italy th ereafter relied so lely upon Italian production for small arms leaders to que ll th e demonstra tions. Hitler initially demanded th e de portation and ammunition, Although neither rations nor clothing supplies ever en tirely of twenty percent of I talian laborers in northern Italy to Germany, so mething disappeared. fuel shortages res tricted vehicle traffic to just eigh ty kilometers that Dr. Rudolph Rahn, Gel'man Ambassador to Mussolini's Italian Soc ial movement during th e final Allied offensive_ When A llies broke finally broke Re pub lic, vehementl y opposed on the grounds that the resulting dec line in war through the German line at Bologna in Apri l 1945, the German Fourteenth producti on was exactly w hat Ita lian resistance movemen ts wa nted , Rahn also Army aba ndoned all of its eq uipment. Its siste r force, the Tenth Army, lost feared that Hitler 's repressi ve policy wou ld cause work ers to go over to the half its eq uipment in th e helter-skelter rush from Italy,\1 part isans in large numbers, something that had not he l-eto fore occu n-ed_'" It is wel l worth noting tha t production in Italy tinally halted because of Beyond th e hindrance of strikes, two other factors slowed down indus­ the economic col lapse in Germany and resul ted from neither the de struction trial recovery, A llied air raids, which Italian industrialists blamed \'vhenever" of th e Italian industrial ba se nor re sistance to the German occupation. Ger­ l)I'oducti on sho rtfall took place, and a growing coa l shortage th at gripped Italy man gains in Italy far exceeded th e investmenr of Illen and coerc i ve force that as it did Germany in the fa ll and winter of 1944-1945 contributed to th e gra ­ maintaining Italian production for th e duration of the war. dual dec line of Italian outpu t. Italian workers turncd air raids wa rnings into Conclusions lengthy pauses in the ir work, the on ly effecti ve GCI"ll1a n response to wh ich was paymem of bonuses for work ers w ho n~mained at theil' machines during The economic value or northern Italy to th e German wa r effort was the raid sl'? Nonetheless, despite the problems of stl-iking worke rs, shortages eno rmous_ Whether in th e fOI-m captured weapons used to reti t divisions for of critical raw materials, and Allied air raids. th e Germans did not lose conrrol co mbat or roodstuffs that fe d Germans in th e worst days of the war, occupied of Italian indust ry until the collapse of the German war eeo nom)'_ northern Italy made a vital contribution to th e German war effort from 1943 to 1945 still not fu lly grasped_" As Germany retreated from the Ukraine, Poland, Collapse France, Belgium, and cri ti ca l bOl"der regions such as Si lesia and the Sa,1I", the Allied air force leaders finally hit upon thc COITec t manner or attacking Italian contri bution to th e Ge rman war economy rose proportionally, A t th e the German W,lr economy in Septembcr 1944, Air Ch ici' Marshal Sir Arthur lea st, it is worth not ing that w ithout It alian produc tion , th e Gerl11an armies Tedder, with th e assi stance or opcrational re sea rch spec ialist. Sol ly Z ucker­ fighting in i ta ly could not have sus tained their campaigns th ere_ By late 1944 l11an. had argued before Operati on Overlord that th e kcy to the German war and ea rl y 1945, rhe Ita li an th eChina, suggest that th e question 'Does conquest Fijih Ulliled S,u,es Al'lm' Halllql/oriers .. 1945 e I), 8,9: Siegfried Knapjl(' pay')' is an important one in international relati ons. W ould a Chinese con­ and Ted BruSIl H', SoldOi' Ref/eelions oj a Cerl1l lln Soldier, 1936, 1949 (New York. Dell, 1992), 270 quest of Taiwan assist thi s nation in rea lizing its ambition to asse n power as a regional hegemon and/or a global power') While Chinese GDP is currently 12, Ralph MlJvrogordUio. "Hiller's Decisioll on Ih e D ejl'llse oI/ia/I', " in C oll!l11and Decisions, I'd. Kel1l Roberls Greenfield (Wu.lhinglOlI, D.C: C. P.O., 1960). estimated as th e second largest in the world at $5 ,989,000,000.000, trailing 3 10; Kurl, /-{eillrich Graj von Klinkowslro('m. "llUly's Breok,Awuy alld Ih e on ly th e United States at $10,450,000.000.000, Taiwan ranks twenty-third Figllling Around ROlliI' (Seplel71h er 1943)," NARA Microfiche PuiJli('(liion at $406,000,000.000 or seven percent of Chinese GDP." Given that man y M 1035, Fiche 0197, Foreigll Milil(Jry Siudies. D, .~'eries (RG 338). /J,301, Taiwanese already have made maj or inves tments in the mainland China WushinglOll. D.C .. 1947.4, 14: Oberkol11l11ondo d. Heeresgruppe B Heeresg econo my and share a common nationality with the potential conqueror. the ruppelllvirlsch({fi.\jiilzrer. BUll de.lurchivlMililiirarchiv (Fr('iliurg) , RW 321 7.' suggestion that th e conquest of Taiwan might be eco nomica lly prontable to 16,17. I Selilember, 1943, Lag I" ulld TaeligkeilsiJeriellls Nr. I th e People's Republic of China is not hard to belie ve . • 13 , Oberkol11l1lOndo der Weilrl11oc/1I W Sih (AlI.Il). "Wehrl1'irlsc/wfi luiliell.I ." Notes 14 , Muximiliolle Rieder. "Z wischen Biilldis lin d Ausliellllll1g." Quellen und Fonelwllgen A,lS Iwlienischen Archivell ulld Bililif/lhe/.:ell, 110 . 7 1 (1991): /, Gerhllrd Scilreihei. Delllsci1e Krieg.IT('rlirechen in Iwliell: Tiil er. Op(er 652,53. 654. Siru/i'elj(llgullg (Miinchell' C H. Beck, 1996).40. 15, Obl'l'/.:oll7l1wndo d. Heeresgruppe B Hel'lesgruppell wirlschufisjiihrer, 17 2, Peler Lieliermall. Does COllqll esl p(I\'? (Prill celo". NJ : PrilicelOll Universin' Sep,el11iJer, 1943. Orgllni.IUlioll del' IIU/ienischeli Wirl.l chafi 1111 Bereich Press. JlJ96). 14,15.' . der Heeresgmppe B, BUllde.l(lrehil-/Mi/il(irorc/7iv (Freibllrg). RW 3217.'126, 3, Peler CII/l'Ocoressi, Guy Willi. ulld John Prilc/wrd, Toiol Will': The Callses 0/1(1 128, Rieder, "Zwischen Biindis Lin d Au.lh('uiLlng." 625,20, 655. CO llrses o(Ihe Secollti \Vorlti Wur. 2ti I'd. (Nell' York : POllllwoll. 1989).398. 16, OI)erkollll1lundo d. Heerl'sgruppe B Heer es.~l'IIppenl1 · irlsc!l(lfl.\flihr er, 4, Oher/.:ollllllundo del' Wehl'llloc/ll W Sih (AlIsl). J)oClIlJl elli AL 2890 (OKW W Pr(!/(I/.:oll Vliel' d ie Beuh.l·iellligie Orgonislilion da IlUlieniscilen Wirlschaft SIi) (Aw'/) 2.11 0 A~ 3 i 10 N r. 390 1143 ,~.Kd(JS . ), Die Wehnl 'il'llc!wji /iuliell s. 1111 Bereich del' Heeresf!,l'IIppe B. 1943, BUl1desarcilivIM i/iidrarchi" IlIlperiol Wor MuseulIl. LO lldoll (Freilmrg). R W ,1217: 129; MIl.1' Wehrig. "D",il'.l (/1/(1 Opermion 0(1171' IlUlian

5 , HilliS H enrici, "The Use oI Iw/iun Ilidusirv ill Ihe Sen'ice o( Gel'lllUII Sen ion o(Ihe Chiejo/Wehmwcl/l Mowr TrUlisporiUlion." NA RA Microfiche MUllil/olls Protilloion, " NARA Micro/iche Plll!iicm ioll M 1035 Fiche (JO()'), PuhliullioJl M f()35, Fiehe (J086. Forl'ign M ili/{JrI' SllIdin, D ,Series (RG Foreign Mililor\' SIlidies. f) ,Series (RG 338) f)·O()1 5. 1947, 1,2. 338) 1)·120. Wo.lhingltln, D. C .. 1947. 5,6. /0·12 : Dielrich EichlJ(J" ~ . Ceschidll e l/c'r Delll.leh!'11 Krieg sll'irlsc/1I.J(I (/J!'I'IiIl: Ak{l(lel11ie ' Verlog. 6 , Dellischlulltis Riislllllg 1111 7.1I·cil(,1I Wc /ikrieg: I-lillr'n KOllli'r e ll ~e ll lIIil 1985).157,58. Alhen SI'

2 I-Rieder, "Zwischen Biill(lis lind Ali shelJlIlI1M, " {)59. 39· l.ieh(' rJll(I II , Does COII!jl/eSI Po."? 24.

22- DeUTsch/and" Rii.I' II./1/M 1111 Z I1'l'il('11 Weilkrieg, 308. 40- Call'()coressi, Winl, (lild Prilc/WJ'(I, Towl Wor, 398: Frederick W. Deakill, 23- Bunde,lurchil' Ko Nen:, T?71755. 133 -134 . Til e BUllol Frielldl'hill: Mlissolilli, Hiller 011(1 Ih e Fall O/Ilolion /-'oscisl11 24- Lucio Ce\'({ and Ciorgio Rochm, ""oly," lrunslmed hr John Gooch, ill (Nn,' York: H(JJ'per & R()\\', 1962), 261-63: !-Ion'ey, "llolioll Ww ['OJ/tlr!," The Oxford COIllP(llIioll 10 World War J/, ed. r.C.B. Oeor (lil d M.R.I) FoOl 44: Tim M(l.\'oJ/, "The 7'lIrill Slrik es 0/ March 1943," ill No:isil1, Foscism (Oxford: Oxford Unil'ei'.lilV Press, 11)95 ), 585, 586. alld IIIe Working Closs, I' d. .Iolle Coplall (CoJl1liridge: CamhridMe Universily Press. 1995), 287: I. S, O. PlrnIoir, el al., The Medilerrunean and Middle 25- Slephen Hon'e,\' , "The Ilolio/1 Wor Ef(or! ond Ihe Sm.llegic BOl11h illg o/lwlv," £USI , I' d. Sir Jallles BUliN. vol. IV, The DeSlrJICiioll of Axis ForcC!.\ in AJrica, HislOry 70 (Fehruon' 1985): 34·35. HislOrv of Ihe Second World War. Uniled Kingdolll Mililar\' Series (London: 26- Ceva alld Rochm. "f/(lIy" , 585, 586. HMSO, 1966),409. 27- Deul.l·chlalldl Riislung 1m Zweilen W eilkrieg, 308: Cl Or/::." Ranki, The 4 I - 0Ifice of Ih e A C of S He(J(/c/lwr! ers 10/.1'/ Airhome Dil'ision, 0-2, U.S. Econom ics of Ihe Second World Wor, ediled br Helmlll Konrad, Bijh!ous Arm,' Mililan' Historv Inslilllle, Adol/liiller Paflers, Slenogruphic Account Zeilg eschichlliche Si/Jliorhek, vol. 2 I (Vienna: Siihlau Verla/::, 1993), 34 I . of Sia/f Conferences 0/ Adol( Hiller ond Germall High ComJlland. 53 Parts, 28- D eilisch/onds Rii.Hul1 /:: 1m Zweilen Wellkrieg, 39 7, HI. A. S odde, Die Frogmenl No .7, FriI /:: lI1 e JlI oIan Evening, S ilLiulion Prol){J/)/V of £arly March Deuisehe Vvinschajr 1930- 1945 : III/emu D es R f!ichswirrsehajrsl1linisleriulIl 1943 (il Ih e Wol/Ischawe., Curlisle, Po., 3-5; Hillns Logehesllrechllngen: s (DusseldolI Drosle, 1983 ), 3 19. Die Prolokollji-ogll1enle Seiner Mililiirischen Kon(eren:en 1')42-I ')45, 29- Anlluli Dell'Econol11ia Ilaliw1(J , ed. Gelano Rasi (Milano: Ins,i,u/O Ipsoa, ediled hv HeloJ/.lI Heiher, Quellen Lllld Darslellungen Zur Zeilgeschichle, 1983),912.112. 1'01.10 (Sllll/gan: Deuische V('J'lags· AnSlall, 1962). 184-86. 30- Al1noli Dell'£(,OJlOlI1ia Iialiana 912: I 16. 42· Feldwirrschajrsoj(i:ier Piemonl (Solhrillker), 28 De:em!Jer, 1943, Logeherichl Fiir die Zeil VOIII 16. Novemher Sis 24.De:elllher 1943, 31- Henriei, "Use of l/(IliOI1 InduslI'.", " 3: R. L. DiNardo, Meehani:ed J ugMe maur BrB.Nr.179J183143 , SlIlIi/esarchivIMilil(irarchiv (h eiburg ), RW 32119/FI: or Miliran' Anachronism: Horses and Ihe Genll.am' Army oj World War II, 16. A/)£1911.·246. C onlrihurions ill MiJirary S llIdie.\, vol. 113 (New York: Grr:e/1l1'ood, 1991 ), 75. 43 ADD 911.247 32· Wehrig, "llaJian Seclion, " 6. 44· Del' 13evo//oll.iciJligler Generul del' [)e JlIs chen Wehmrachl in lrolien. Abl. 33 - Oberkol17l11alldo der Wehrmochl W Sib (A U.I/], "Wr:hr 1l' irr.lc/iojt l!aliens, " 7. 10, Anlagen :.UI1l KTB 1./.1944-20.4.1945 - F4.146-148, Ahl./aILg.Nr.14181 34 - o berkol11l11a II do d. HeeresxrupJl f! S Heerr:sgruppf! 1I11'irrschojt.lfimre r, 44 g.Kdos., 28 January 1944, Logeherichl Uber del' Zeil VOJJ1 15.12. Sis 2 Seplember, 1943. File: Br.B.Nr. 87143 GK(/os, UII/asLlchung Uher die 15. I. 1944, Sundesorchi1'IMililiirarchi,' (Freihurg), RW 3 I IVI16.· I 46: Erich EnldiJml1gSI1'i risclui/ili('he Leislllil I( slah iXkei I NordilUl i ens, Bundesa rchi vi Kub,', V('J'J'(JIOJI/D eursch: Wie dos Drille Reich I/(Ilien Rlli"ierre (Hamburg : Milildrarclul' ( Freihurg ), RW 32?7:22-35. Hol/illunn & CO l1l pe, 1982),448·4 9, .:150. 35- Erndhrungs-l1'irrscha(lliche Bilall:f!I1 Iw/ien.l. J. Jallllor 1944 Sis 31. Juli 4 5- Kurl Millernwier, MII.Isolinis Ende Die Refluhlik 1'011 Soli; 1943- 1945 1944, WoshillglOn , D .C.. NARA, RG T-S4 (Micro/ilm), Roll 103, File.' (Miiwlwn' Lallgen Miiller, /995;. 1()1 ·()2 : Cul1'(}core.lsi, Willi, and FraJ11 f!.11397414·461. Prilchoul, Towl War. 409· 10. 30· AiJl. Erniihl/JlIg /111(1 I.Olldwirlscha/i (E.II.L) Rr:/;'r(// 10 -han.lpon e, I() 4{)· /..UI: Klillklwllllller. Z wischen 13ii"i/lli.l· Jlnd Be.lol:.lIl1g .- Dos Jalll((Jr 1945, 1945, Au. 10 //1 1'1'. 3500, Johrr:shaicll/ Bllllilesarchil'l Nariolla /.w:iolisliche U e Jll S('il/oJl( I III /(I die Rel'Jlhiik 1'011 Sol,) 1943-1945, Mililiirorchil' (Freilmrg;, J?H 3 I filii I 8:3. Rihliollli'k J)n I)('ulschell Hislorischell IIISliluls ill ROJII. nil. 75 (Tfiliillgen: 37- Tria l oflhe MojoI' War Criminals Bf!(ore Ih e InleJ'l/ illiolwl Mililwy TrihlllJal, Mo.\' NiellJel'N. 1993), 287, 295, 2<)7.- Kllhv , VerJol all/ Dellisch, 452: (NllrellJhag. G erJllall.". 1948), XVl0451 -52. 522: Heurici. "Use o( IlalioJ) Mil/allwier, MIJ,I·.wlinis £"de. 103. lui/llslr\'." I : Ulrich !--/('I'l>e rr, "1 .ohOl/r Will £nNl1JiuiJIioll.' £coJ)o Jllic 47· Wehrig , "IIOlioll SeCiioll, " I I - 12: Dr /-filllS Ll'v('I's. "1/(Ilio" Wor Prodauion Inleresl olld II Ie I'rimocr 0/ Wl'iIOIlSc!WUIIII X in Noliollol Socialism," POSI S"hse!fuellilo /3 SI'lil(' lIlhN 1943, " N Ai?A M icro/iche Puliliwli(l/I MI035 (Jlld I' resell/ 138 (Fd]J'JJ(JlT 1(93): 180-81: ./ells /'elerscn, "j)e/(lsciJI(lud Fiche O(J03 Foreigll Mililan' SllIdie.l, I). Serie.1 (i?G 338) D-OOm, IIlId Ilulieu 1939 [h, 1945," in O('J' Lweile Wellkneg, ('(I. Wo /jgulIg Micholko Wu .I/linglOll, J)C 1947, 23-26. (Mlloi"h: /,iI'N, 1989), I 16- 18: CalwJ'(j ScllreiiJ('/', Die Iwliellisch('JI

553 48- Alfred C. Mier:ejew.I'ki. The ColllIl'se o/Ihe Cel"l//(/II Wllr r:coIIOlI/v: Alliecl Air POlVer olld lire Germull Nlliiollul R"itwo." (Chapel !-lill' Ne IY8!:l). 81-82 .

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554