The Italian War Economy's Contribution to the German War Effort (1943-1945)

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The Italian War Economy's Contribution to the German War Effort (1943-1945) Scholars Crossing Faculty Publications and Presentations Department of History 2004 Hidden Treasure: The Italian war economy's contribution to the German war effort (1943-1945) Timothy Saxon Liberty University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/hist_fac_pubs Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Saxon, Timothy, "Hidden Treasure: The Italian war economy's contribution to the German war effort (1943-1945)" (2004). Faculty Publications and Presentations. 2. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/hist_fac_pubs/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Hidden treasure: The Italian war economy's contribution to the German war effort, (1943-1945) Dr. Timothy D. Saxon (Etat-Unis) Introduction Gerhard Schreiber has described the German conquest, occupation. and exploitation of Italy in 1943 as th e Wehrmacht's "last victory" of the Second World War.' His description is correct in that th e German seizure of Fa scist Italy produced a substantial economic windfall that material ly assisted Ger­ many in continuing the Second World War until the economic collapse of Hitler's Reich. Italy, eve n after the bitter war years from 1940-1943, remai­ ned a prize 1V0rth winning. The German conque st and subseque nt economic exploitation of Italy raise a variety of important que stions, in spired in part by Peter Lieberman's book, Does Conquest Pay? Why did a society as natio­ nalistic and modern as Italy cooperate with the German occupation? What factors all owed th e Germans to extract a significa nt material advantage from th eir occupation? Did this exploitation of Italy inspire resistance or we re other factors more important in the thinking of Italians who chose to fight the German occupation? Does the Italian experience during World War II have any current relevance to potential con flicts around the globe? 2 Strategic Considerations of the Italian Campaign Italy occupied a central place in Allied strategy after the M ay 1943 de­ feat of Axis forces in Tunisia. Removing Fascist Italy from the war would eliminate th e only power direct ly supporting th e German war effort with a significalll number of troo ps in the Europea n the ate r. Italian troops, large numbers of whom had been killed and captured in North Africa and Russia. still defended parts of th e Balkans, Greece, and southern Fran ce against Al­ lied invas ion. M oreover, removing Italy from the war might undermine the continued participation of Hungary and Romania as Axis allies as well as head off potential Turkish moves favoring the Axis. ' Spanish and Swiss support for Germany might also be reduced in the event an Allied conqu es t of Italy. Removing Italy from the war also offered the cha nce to stri ke a stinging econom ic blow to the German war effort. When German officials su rveyed the It<lli<ln economy in M ay. J 943, a surprising picture of the Italian war eco­ nomy emcrgcd ." M<ljor General Hans Henrici. a member of th e German eco­ nomic SLaff in Italy, told Allicd illterrog:Jl ors arter the IVaI' that German au tho- ')41 ritie, learned that northern Ital y had "a suflicient number of highly modern (Jcrl11,ln plallncl's, who had hee n operating in Munich since ea rl y August factories " and " the best and Jllost Illodern Illachincs of Gcrman , A mcrican and undel' th e cover name of "'Economic Sta1l AschofL" pursued two part icular Swiss origin." M oreo ver, large numbers of highl y-sk illcd indust ri al work ers goals in th e early stages of th e takeover. Having surveyed th e po tential boos t li vc d in northern Italy, wh ere German adm inistrators could draw upon th em to German war production that ass imilating Italian industry offered, '3 planners iO su pport th e Gcrman war error!.' Italy's petroleulll production fac ilitics and wa nted to integrate Italian factori es and farms into the Cerman war economy na va l sh ipyards were located in northern Italy as we re .so me twcnty -sevc n quick ly an d effi ciently They also wa nted to keep th e A llies from seiling Ita­ aircraft rac tories and sixty-four arms and munitions works." Although total ly's in dustrial ca pacity, so mething that be tter lit w ith K esse lring's de ve loping Italian induslI'ial output aillounted to only 2.7 percent o f world production in strateg y th an ROlllmel's plans to abandon much or the Italian peninSUla. 1939, [{aly's industrial base was a considerable prize if added to Germany's Economic Staff Aschoff's plans and ac tions after Operation Achse played a 10.7 perce nt of workl production? critical role in res toring Italian wa r prod uction." Why didn't Allied strateg ic pl an nCJ"s cons ider th e economic potential of A n urgent meet ing held on 17 Scptember 1943 discllssed th e necess ity northern haly when drafting th eir plans to eliminate that nation from th e war') of pUlling the Italian economy back to work. Participants cl ea rly un de rstood A llied force s needed to approach Italy from North Africa via Si cily and th en th at reac hing this goal required several steps. First, German ad ministra tors to the heel of the boo t- shaped Italian peninsula. Short-ranged Allied fighter needed to put an Italian administrative structure in place that could assume aircraft imposed an absolute lim it on pos sibl e invasion sites, given th at the res pon sibil ity for supervis ion orthe Italian economy. Sec ond , the meeting's German Luftwaffe, which Ulli'a intelligence tracked closel y, still packed a po­ partic ipants, who made no attempt to cover th e purpose of rest ori ng th e func­ tent punch in the M ed iterranea n th eater. Moreover, th e Germans had retained tioning of the Italian eco nomy, lea rned that Italy wou ld suffer the sa me fate as most of their armor an d Jll otorized forces in northern Italy , which mea nt th e oth er occu pied states. Minutes recorded th at. desp ite th e presence of Italian fa rther north the Allies land ed , the more powerfu l the initial German counte­ representatives from the Bank of Italy, Al fa Romeo, and ot her Italian con­ ratt ac k aga in st th e Allied beachhead was likely to be'" A plan calling for th e cerns, "[elxperi ence ha s shown clearly th at th e exploitat ion of foreign coun­ landing of the American 82nd Airborn e Division near Rome was th e boldest tries is poss ible only when the loca l administrati ve and economic in stitutions Allied proposa l of an otherwise unimag inative and un inspired campaign. are made use ful in th e quickest wa y poss ible for the area's own requirements." When German force le ve ls increased in the Rome area, General Dwight D . Finally, partiCipants noted that military sec urity and mobility requ ired the res­ Eisenhower cancelled th e lan ding at the las t minute on 8 September 1943, toration of italian infrastructure to working status as quick ly as possible. ls effectively eliminating any All ied attempt to co ntes t Germany for control of Shortly thereafter Army Group B 's commander establi shed a committee northern and central Italy at an early stage in th e ca mpaign." (ltalien ische Wirtschaftskomitee beim Deutschen Oberbefehlshaber) to direct Conquest: Operation Achse the Italian economy wi th seve n members named by hi s Repl'ese ntative for Direc ti on of the Economy (Beauftragter fur die Wirtschaftsfuhrung). The The coded message, "Bring in the Harvest. " initiated Operation Aehse, Committee worked <lt the PI'ovincial Economic Council's offi ce in M i lan and the German scenario for an Italian su rrend er and Al lied invasion of Ital y in had re sponsibility for estab li sh in g food, price, and wage policies for Italian ci­ Septem ber 1943 .'" The message was an altoge ther appropriate one gi ve n what vilians, direction of the eco nomy in the Army Group's are a, and repo l1ing the followed. German forces quickly seized control of Italy's transportati on hubs economy's req uircments. The German ad ministration would enforce cu rrent including ports, roads , and railn)ads, often aga in st stiff Italian res istance . II ec onomic laws, although changes co uld be ordered by th e Army Group co m­ Erwin Rommel's plan, predicated on an Allied in vasion of Italy as far north mander. O n 12 September 1943, Hitler had as signed Albert Speer sole res ­ as Rome, call ed for German forces to abandon sou th ern Italy and fall b,lCk at 1 1 pons ibility fo r arms produ ction in Il<d y. The Committee there fore noted th at leas t as far as th e Italian cap ital. A lbert Kesselring's decision to disrega rd this questions con ce rning armaments were to be direc tly cont rolled by the Specia l plan by res isting at Sa lern o and conducting a fi ghti ng withdra wal to the Liri Representative of the Reich's Minister fo r Armamcnts and War Producti on V al Icy line south or Rome wa, onc of the war's most important strategic de­ 1 ) (Sonderbe<lu l'tragter des Rcichsministcrs fur Bcwallnung und Kriegsproduk­ cisions.
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